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ABSTRACT 
 
Kurt Birrenbach and the Evolution of German Atlanticism 
 




This dissertation explores the multifaceted life of Kurt Birrenbach as a window into the 
historical evolution of a Liberal German Atlanticism during the post-World War II era.  
While tracing the development of this Atlanticism into a “mature,” establishment 
phenomenon, themes addressed include the founding and financing of an elaborate 
infrastructure, the creation of extensive political networks also stretching abroad, the 
execution of ambitious public relations actions, and distinct tendencies towards 
geographic and thematic expansion.  Those challenges confronting Atlanticism in the 
Federal Republic, among them the persistence of Conservative Abendland perspectives 
and, later, the rise on the Left of interrelated pacifist, anti-nuclear and environmental 
movements, are touched upon as well.  The broader historiographical issues examined 
encompass postwar continuity and discontinuity in the Federal Republic, processes of 
Americanization, the functioning of transnational networks, the impact of generational 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
A. Kurt Birrenbach as a Window into the German Atlanticist Milieu 
German Atlanticism, with its core postulate of an essentially unitary north 
Atlantic civilization, underwent a significant and multi-faceted evolution in the postwar 
Federal Republic.  Existing initially as a fledgling presence confronting a persistent 
Occidentalism that saw especially the United States s at best a mere appendage to the 
West European Abendland, German Atlanticism had developed by the late 1960s and 
beyond into a mature, establishment phenomenon, itself the subject of emerging 
challenges, primarily from the left of the political spectrum, to its constant efforts to 
strengthen trans-Atlantic relations.  In the course of this broad, overarching process, 
German Atlanticism also evolved with respect to a multitude of its more specific features, 
among them its infrastructure, personnel composition, financing methods, thematic 
content, modes of activity and reproduction; the structure and scope of its internal, 
German, and external, transnational, networks; and,fi ally, the obstacles and challenges 
it faced both within the Federal Republic and abroad.  This dissertation seeks to explore 
the evolutionary development, to identify its component elements, to determine its most 
powerful driving forces and to assess its wider impact.   
The life and career of Kurt Birrenbach as they are utilized in this, not strictly 
biographical, study serve well as a crystal clear window into this unfolding world of 
Atlanticism in the Federal Republic in the critical decades following the Second World 
War.  In addition to being among the most crucial and prominent of German Atlanticists 
during this period, Birrenbach also represented a relatively novel and still quite rare, 
though increasingly common, figure in German society: the politician-businessman.  
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Indeed, from the mid-1950s until well into the 1980s, in large part due to his roles as 
CDU parliamentarian, Thyssen steel executive and philant ropic foundation president, 
Birrenbach’s career simultaneously spanned the domains of Politik and Wirtschaft as well 
as that of the Wissenschaft.  Concentrating on Birrenbach, therefore, provides a valuable 
opportunity to observe German Atlanticism operating in a plethora of seemingly 
disparate spheres and levels and to bring these diverse but intimately connected realms of 
activity together into a coherent narrative over an extended period of time. 
B. Historiographical Trends and Debates Revolving around German Atlanticism 
This dissertation touches on a number of major historiographical trends and 
debates, some of considerable practical import, in the voluminous scholarship related to 
postwar German Atlanticism.  One such tendency involves a gradual expansion of focus 
in the study of trans-Atlantic networks.  The first historical accounts of West German 
foreign policy and the relationship to the US appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
as attention shifted away from tracing the roots of the National Socialist regime; as 
German foreign relations transitioned into a new era, as exemplified by the Ostpolitik; 
and as relevant sources, such as Adenauer’s memoirs, became increasingly available.1   
During the 1970s, political, economic and business hi torians began to enlarge the study 
of German-American relations both thematically, to include subjects like American 
occupation policy, and methodologically, as attested to by a number of quantitative 
                                                
1 Gerhard Wettig, Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943-1955: Internationale 
Auseinandersetzungen um die Rolle der Deutschen in Europa (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1967); Wolfram 
Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1967); Arnulf Baring, Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie 
(Munich, Oldenbourg, 1969); Waldemar Besson, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Erfahrungen und 
Maßstäbe (Munich: R. Piper, 1970); Bruno Bandulet, Adenauer zwischen West und Ost: Alternativen der 
deutschen Außenpolitik (Munich: Weltforum, 1970).  However, long after the appearance of these initial 
studies, the “thirty-year rule” continued to restrict access to many archival sources. 
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analyses.2  Yet up to the early 1980s, the literature, largely works of an historically 
minded political science shaped by the centrality of the Cold War, was characterized by 
narrow accounts of traditional diplomatic history.3  Such research has, admittedly, 
inspired fruitful controversies, for example regarding the relationship between and 
relative importance attached by German and foreign l aders to Western integration and 
German reunification, thus stoking a debate originating among contemporaries in the 
1950s,4 as well as the impact of the Marshall Plan on West German economic recovery, 
this latter dispute swirling especially around the work of Werner Abelshauser.5  
Unfortunately, despite these developments, historians had explored the postwar elite 
trans-Atlantic networks existing in their respective fields still to an only limited extent, 
the main exception being the connections evaluated by diplomatic historians among the 
small group of top governmental personalities wrestling with issues of “high politics.”  
However, there are indications today that the literature of postwar German 
Atlanticism and trans-Atlantic networks is beginning to embrace perspectives that also 
consider levels of international interaction below the uppermost political tier.  In so 
                                                
2 A path-breaking work on the American occupation was Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern 
(Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1973).   
3 Ernst Nolte, Deutschland und der kalte Krieg (Munich: Piper, 1974); Roger Morgan, The United States 
and West Germany, 1945-1973: A Study in Alliance Politics (London: Oxford University, 1974); Andreas 
Hillgruber, Deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1982: Die “deutsche Frage”  in der Weltpolitik (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1983). 
4 Episodes, most notably that of the “Stalin note” of March 1952, have been dissected to determine whether 
Adenauer (and, to a lesser extent, other Union leaders) and the Western Allies were sincere in their 
commitment to German national unity or actually placed a dearer value on ties to the West.  While Hans-
Peter Schwarz and Klaus Gotto have seen a symbiotic c nnection between Westbindung and reunification, 
others, among them Josef Foschepoth and Rainer Zitelmann, have argued that the emphasis on 
Westbindung obstructed possible, ultimately missed, chances for reunification.  On this, see the analysis in 
Ronald Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 50 ff.  See also Rolf Steininger, The German Question: The Stalin 
Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification (New York: Columbia University, 1990).   
5 For Abelshauser’s downplaying of the significance of the Marshall Plan and other outside aid, see Werner 
Abelshauser, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1975).  Along similar lines but on 
a broader scale, see Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (Berkeley: University 
of California, 1984).  Opposing judgments can be found in Hans-Jürgen Schröder, ed., Marshallplan und 
westdeutscher Wiederaufstieg: Positionen-Kontroversen (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1990).   
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doing, this parallels larger trends in the historiog aphy of the Federal Republic with its 
greater interest since the 1980s in social history.  In part, such innovative perspectives 
have been facilitated by the altered overall framework as a tight focus on the Cold War 
and the issues and academic debates entangled with it, such as Westbindung or the 
German Question, have been deprived of their contemporary relevence and 
underpinnings.6  Political scientists also deserve some credit for his expansion.  Robert 
Keohane, Joseph Nye, Werner Link and Thomas Risse-Kappen have all demonstrated 
particular interest in transnational relations, with the first two having co-authored and 
edited seminal works addressing the universal theme and the latter two having produced 
worthy studies specifically on trans-Atlantic networks.7  These scholars have investigated 
and debated the theoretical and concrete influence of transnational relations, including in 
the postwar Atlantic context, on individuals, societies and international relations and 
vice-versa.  Meanwhile, though not explicitly concerned with international affairs, 
sociologists have, especially since the late-1970s, created and contested a variety of 
intricate models, methodologies and concepts to analyze the formation, reproduction, 
transformation and effect of networks in general on processes of social change and have 
given birth to a considerable literature, including historically based empirical studies and 
                                                
6 For instance, views and controversies about Adenaur’s policies were often based, even in the 1970s and 
beyond, on current political perspectives.   
7 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University, 1972); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Glenview, IL: 
Scott, Foresman, 1989); Werner Link, Deutsche und amerikanische Gewerkschaften und Geschäft leute, 
1945-1975: Eine Studie über transnationale Beziehungen (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1978); Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and 
International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995); Thomas Rise-Kappen, Cooperation 
among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University, 
1996).  Link especially was among the first to sketch the networks that developed both within the American 
zone of occupation and across the Atlantic.   
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specialized network journals.8  Such undertakings in the social sciences have provided 
historians with a multitude of helpful insights and approaches for exploring transnational 
networks.   
At the same time, historians themselves are now delving more intensely into the 
German transnational connections across the Atlantic.  Over the past three decades, and 
especially in recent years, they have produced a number of works tracing the 
development of the distinct components of the German link in these political trans-
Atlantic networks.  Usually solid, if unspectacular, these include Ralph Uhlig’s earlier 
study of Die Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft nd, more recently, Daniel Eisermann’s 
account of the Research Institute of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtiges Politik, 
Ludger Kühnhardt’s somewhat simplistic and patently celebratory work dealing with the 
Atlantik-Brücke, and Albrecht Zunker’s study on the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.  
In contrast to some more polemical approaches, including the essays contained in the 
volume edited by Holly Sklar, Stephen Gill has applied Gramscian theoretical concepts 
of hegemony, historic blocs and organic intellectuals to analyze the meaning of the 
Trilateral Commission for the prolongation of United States supremacy in the world.  
While not ostensibly concerned with the German trans-Atlantic relationship, Rainer 
Nicolaysen has examined the birth and development of one of the Atlanticist network’s 
                                                
8 See on this theme and its related sociological literature especially the article and bibliography of Mustafa 
Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency,” in American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 6, May 1994.  The specialized journals I allude to are Social Networks 
and Connections, both founded in the late 1970s.  Trailblazing works of sociological network analysis 
include John A. Barnes, “Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish,” in Human Relations, Vol. 
7, No. 1 (February 1954), pp. 39-58; and Elizabeth Bott, Family and Social Network (London: Tavistock, 
1957).   
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most generous financial sources located in the Federal R public in Der lange Weg zur 
Volkswagenstiftung.9   
In addition to these institutional studies, certain individual German Atlanticists 
have also enjoyed some attention from historians.  With respect to Birrenbach himself, 
Hans-Peter Hinrichsen has published a lengthy biography on Der Ratgeber (The 
Counselor) that concentrates primarily, as its subtitle suggests, on determining 
Birrenbach’s, ultimately rather minimal, direct personal influence on West German 
foreign policy.  Meanwhile, Matthias Schulz has examined in essay form “Die politische 
Freundschaft Jean Monnet-Kurt Birrenbach.”  Like a number of other German 
Atlanticists, Birrenbach also produced useful memoirs, covering what he called Meine 
Sondermissionen (My Special Missions).  Thanks to this recent uptick in scholarly 
interest, we have a noticeably better but still fragmentary understanding of the manifold 
transnational relationships formed by Atlanticist-minded Germans that were so vital in 
fostering trans-Atlantic relations after 1945.10  Informed by this general trend, the present 
dissertation distinguishes itself from the hitherto dominant strain of historiography 
                                                
9 Ralph Uhlig, Die Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, 1949-1983: Der B itrag ihrer “Königswinter-
Konferenzen” zur britisch-deutschen Verständigung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986); Daniel 
Eisermann, Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion: Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1955 
bis 1972 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999); Ludger Kühnhardt, A lantik-Brücke: Fünfzig Jahre deutsch-
amerikanische Partnerschaft,1952-2002 (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002); Albrecht Zunker, Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik (SWP): Entwicklungsgeschichte einer Institution politikbezogener Forschung (Berlin: Berliner 
Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2007); Holly Sklar, ed., Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite 
Planning for World Management (Boston: South End, 1980); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the 
Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991); Rainer Nicolaysen, Der lange Weg zur 
Volkswagenstiftung: Eine Gründungsgeschichte im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002). 
10 Hans-Peter Hinrichsen, Der Ratgeber: Kurt Birrenbach und die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung, 200 ); Matthias Schulz, “Die politische 
Freundschaft Jean Monnet-Kurt Birrenbach, die Einheit des Westens und die ‘Präambel’ zum Elysee-
Vertrag von 1963,” in Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Andreas Wilkens, ed. (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999); Kurt Birrenbach, Meine 
Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 
1984).  Another example from the relevent memoir literature is Karl Carstens, Erinnerungen und 
Erfahrungen (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1993). 
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through its examination of a still relatively unexplored but essential elite level of the 
complex transnational linkages spanning the Atlantic, existing below, but still intertwined 
with and impacting on, the more visible plane of top-level policymakers.  This work also 
aims to transcend that focus on discrete organizations and individuals typical of the 
previous research and to explore more coherently the phenomenon of postwar political 
German Atlanticism, its extensive transnational, trns-Atlantic network and the 
considerable international and domestic significance of its activities. 
Another notable trend in the historical scholarship pertaining to German 
Atlanticism on which this dissertation dwells is the increased interest, beginning in the 
1980s, in the process of Americanization in the Federal Republic, a subset of the 
literature on the American role in the remarkable and rapid changes in Western Europe 
since 1945.  At times employing the techniques of cultural history and the history of 
perception from below, scholars such as Volker Berghahn, Victoria De Grazia and Ralph 
Willett have stressed the indispensable role of American hegemony and pinpointed the 
processes, formal and informal, conscious and impersonal, and the impact, political, 
economic, social and cultural, of postwar Americaniz tion.11  To highlight just one fertile 
avenue of investigation, a considerable amount of original research has been produced 
over the past two decades on the efforts of the United States government and its assorted 
                                                
11 Volker Berghahn, The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1986); Ralph Willett, The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949 (London: Routledge, 1989); 
Hermann-Josef Rupieper, Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie: Der amerikanische 
Beitrag 1945-1952 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993); Reiner Pommerin, ed., The American Impact 
on Postwar Germany (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995); Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, eds., 
Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945-1970 (Frankfurt, Campus, 1997); Victoria De 
Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twenti th-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap, 2005); and Alexander Stephan, ed., Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German 
Encounter with American Culture after 1945 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005).  On the inter-war 
Americanization of German industry, see Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the 
Modernization of Germany (New York: Oxford University, 1994). 
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agencies, most notably and covertly the CIA, as well as those of large, private American 
foundations to promote Americanization through the waging of a “cultural and 
intellectual Cold War” in the Federal Republic and the rest of western Europe.12  The 
literature on the theme of Americanization after 1945 has generated a number of 
historiographical debates.  One such controversy, echoing arguments voiced polemically 
in political, business, cultural and intellectual contexts by both Left and Right throughout 
the 20th century in Germany, including in the Wilhelmine and Weimar periods, addresses 
the sheer desirability or undesirability of the purported Americanization, with some 
treatments welcoming the effects, citing for instance the emergence of a liberal-
democratic state and a capitalist market economy, and others deploring the quasi-
imperialist destruction of German, indeed European, traditions, values, ways and 
ideologies, not least an anti-capitalist socialism.13 
Meanwhile, another controversy regarding the concept of Americanization has 
erupted around the accuracy with which this designat o  captures postwar change in the 
Federal Republic.  Prompted in part by larger historiographical shifts, including the 
employment of different categories of historical agents and institutions and the embracing 
of more reciprocal notions of causation and influence, some scholars have recently 
                                                
12 Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Letters (New York: New 
Press, 1999); Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the 
CIA, and Post-War American Hegemony (London: Routledge, 2002); Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-
Smith, eds., The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960 (London, Frank Cass, 2003); Hugh 
Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 
2008).  On the private foundations, especially the Ford Foundation, see Volker Berghahn, America and the 
Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shephard Stone betwe n Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy 
(Princeton: Princeton University, 2001), which explores the cultural aspects of the Cold War trans-Atlantic 
relationship, including its socio-cultural networks.   
13 For unabashedly positive and negative accounts of Americanization, see respectively Peter Duignan and 
L.H. Gann, The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945-1958 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992); and Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The 
Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina, 1994).   
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challenged the Americanization perspective.  While not dismissing American influence 
entirely, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Hartmut Kaelble, Michael Ermarth and others have 
downgraded that factor’s centrality and instead underscored a complex array of German 
and West European (including British) circumstances, onceptions, models and agency 
and also pointed to broader, more impersonal, parallel processes of Europeanization, 
Westernization and globalization affecting all advanced industrial societies.14  Uta Poiger 
has been among those reminding us of the need to consider how Germans themselves 
appropriated and transformed American ideas and proucts, from technology to popular 
music, to suit their own ends.15  Finally, spurred by a trans-Atlantic malaise in the wake 
of the Cold War, several works, some regrettably flaunting a childish neo-conservatism, 
have addressed explicit German resistance to Americanization.16  Though not presuming 
to settle definitively the questions raised in this controversy, this dissertation will assess 
the relative roles of Americanization and other contributing factors in the German 
                                                
14 For an accent on non-American influences, see Michael Ermarth, “Introduction”; Arnold Sywottek, “The 
Americanization of Everyday Life?  Early Trends in Consumer and Leisure-Time Behavior”; and Hans 
Woller, “Germany in Transition from Stalingrad (1943) to Currency Reform (1948),” all among the essays 
in Michael Ermarth, ed., America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945-195 (Providence RI: Berg, 
1993); and Hans Mommsen, “Der lange Schatten der unt rgehenden Republik,” in Der Nationalsozialismus 
und die deutsche Gesellschaft (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1991), pp. 362-404.  For an example of the 
Europeanization thesis, see Hartmut Kaelble, Auf dem Wege zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft (Munich: 
Beck, 1987).  On Westernization, see Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? 
Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 1999); 
and Holger Nehring, “’Westernization’: A New Paradigm for Interpreting West European History in a Cold 
War Context,” Cold War History 4, no. 2 (2004): 175-91.   
15 Uta Poiger and Heidi Fehrenbach, eds., Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American 
Culture in Western Europe and Japan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000).  Also in this vein, see Richard 
Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World 
War II (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herrigel, eds., Americanization and its 
Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan (Oxford: Oxford 
University, 2000); and Akira Kudo, Matthias Kipping and Harm Schröter, eds., German and Japanese 
Business in the Boom Years: Transforming American Management and Technology Models (London: 
Routledge, 2004).   
16 The more recommendable include Michael Ermarth, “Te German Talks Back,” in Michael Ermarth, ed., 
America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945-195 (Providence RI: Berg, 1993); Alf Lüdtke, Inge 
Marssolek and Adelheid von Saldern, eds., Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 
20. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996); and Axel Schildt, Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien 
zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999). 
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Atlanticist phenomenon, whether vis-à-vis the nature of its infrastructure, its methods or 
its perspectives, ranging from those on particular issues like security to broader visions of 
Atlantic Community and the world-at-large.  Where appropriate, it will also gauge the 
degree to which such elements of Americanization as did exist were the upshot of 
deliberate efforts by identifiable trans-Atlantic elites, both German and foreign.    
The notion of Americanization, as well as the possibility of alternative processes 
of change, have also occupied a salient place in the on-going historiographical debates 
surrounding the matter of continuity and discontinui y in the Federal Republic.  Like 
some of the other previously discussed controversies, th  scholarly disputes about the 
significance of May 1945 emerged from contemporary debates, which in this case had 
raged since virtually war’s end.  The initially dominant interpretation of “a new 
beginning,” a Stunde Null, posited a variety of modernizing factors, including the 
National Socialist revolution, a process of Americaniz tion, and the consequences of 
World War II, with the latter comprising not only the division of Germany but also 
massive population dislocations, the dissolution of Prussia and the collapse of the 
conservative, aristocratic military and agrarian ruling strata.  All this led to a radical 
break with the authoritarian Sonderweg and a dramatically recast, “normal” Western 
nation and society, basking in peace, prosperity and stability.17  However, amidst the 
                                                
17 Works espousing the “new beginning” thesis include Alfred Grosser, Germany in our Time (New York: 
Praeger, 1971); Jürgen Kocka, “1945: Neubeginn oderRestauration?”, in Carola Stern and Heinrich August 
Winkler, eds., Wendepunkte deutscher Geschichte, 1848-1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1979), pp. 
141-68; Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, eds., Von Stalingrad zur 
Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988);   and 
Dennis Bark and David Gress, A History of West Germany, 2 vols. (London: Basil Blackwell, 1989).  The 
collection edited by Broszat, Henke and Woller periodizes the transition, characterized by a radical social 
transformation, as beginning during the war, especially from 1943, a year of mounting military casualties, 
the stunning defeat at Stalingrad and intensified Allied bombing, accelerating with defeat in 1945, and 
ending, in western Germany, with the stabilizing currency reform of June 1948.  For pre-war social 
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social unrest of the late 1960s and 70s, some revisionist-minded historians on the Left 
began to espouse a “restoration” thesis that stressed long-term continuities, including of 
National Socialist and conservative elites and of various political, economic and 
demographic structures, rather than the discontinuities, in postwar society.18  In contrast 
to the Stunde Null account’s glowing assessment of Americanization and more in line 
with that of the Wisconsin School, the restorationist approach often considered American 
influence during the Cold War a key conservative factor in an imposed reaction that 
foiled radical German plans to implement genuine democracy and socialism.  Hereafter, 
the “new beginning” and “restoration” theses came to function as historical means to 
attack or defend the legitimacy of the Federal Republic and its society.19 
While the “restoration” thesis never succeeded completely in replacing its “new 
beginning” counterpart, the historiography of the continuity-discontinuity controversy 
has been characterized since the early 1980s less by dichotomy than by a more 
sophisticated synthesis.  Though diverging on specifics, historians have increasingly 
acknowledged that the postwar Federal Republic experienced both continuity and 
                                                                                                                                      
transformation, see David Schoenbaum, Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 
1933-1939 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966). 
18 Examples of the restoration thesis include Eberhard Schmidt, Die verhinderte Neuordnung 1945-52 
(Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1970); Ute Schmidt and Tilman Fichter, Der erzwungene 
Kapitalismus: Klassenkämpfe in den Westzonen, 1945-48 (Berlin: Klaus Wagenbach, 1971); Ernst-Ulrich 
Huster, et al., Determinanten der westdeutschen Restauration 1945-19 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1972); Theo Pirker, Die verordnete Demokratie: Grundlagen und Erscheinungen der Restauration (Berlin: 
Olle und Wolter, 1977); Richard Detje, et al., Von der Westzone zum Kalten Krieg: Restauration und 
Gewerkschaftspolitik im Nachkriegsdeutschland (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1982); and Lothar Gall, “Die 
Bundesrepublik in der Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte,” in Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 239 (1984): 
603-13.   
19 Alongside and even before the emergence of this historiography, the critical notion of a restoration 
existed, already at the latest by the 1950s, among small circles of intellectuals and in certain press and 
literary forums.  For instance, surveying bastions f power like the foreign office and its diplomatic corps, 
the journalist Eugen Kogen bemoaned the return of the “Hindenburg Germans.”  On such themes, see the 
essays from the previous two decades contained in Eugen Kogen, Die unvollendete Erneuerung: 
Deutschland im Kräftefeld 1945-1963 (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1964).  Frustration regarding 
an alleged restoration was not exclusive to the left-wing at this early stage, as conservative Catholics and 
Protestants came to regret the lack of a thoroughgoing re-Christianization, including a Grundgesetz they 
considered too secular. 
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discontinuity in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres and devoted greater 
attention to analyzing precisely the elements, balance and agents of change and stasis, 
their subjects now also encompassing hitherto ignored mentalités, habits and traditions.20  
While this evolution can be attributed to a variety of factors, including the unearthing and 
utilization of new kinds of evidence, the improved historical perspective offered by the 
passage of time, and the flow of generational change among historians, it was also due in 
large part to the thawing of the Cold War, and eventually to German reunification, which 
undermined the East-West opposition so crucial to perpetuating the historiographical 
dichotomy.  Thus, our knowledge of continuity and discontinuity on previously 
unplumbed levels has been enriched by Lutz Niethammer and others with the appearance, 
beginning in the 1980s, of the first social histories of the Federal Republic,21 and, more 
recently, by the findings of James Diehl, Robert Moeller and Heide Fehrenbach 
illuminating points of intersection between top-down, political history and bottom-up, 
social history.22  By exploring the struggle between a budding Atlanticism and an older 
Occidentalism and, then, the challenges later confronted by that triumphant Atlanticism, 
                                                
20 A range of evidence and assessments regarding the significance of 1945 as a radical break, supporting 
propositions of both continuity and discontinuity can be found in Klaus-Jörg Ruhl, ed., Neubeginn und 
Restauration (Munich: dtv, 1982) as well as Hans-Erich Volkmann, ed., Ende des Dritten Reiches-Ende 
des Zweiten Weltkriegs: Eine perspektivistische Rückschau (Munich: Piper, 1995).  Berghahn’s work on the 
Americanization of German industry adduces evidence of just such an amalgamation of continuity and 
discontinuity in the rebuilding process, in this cae in areas like the composition of industrial elites, 
stamped largely by the former, and the concepts of industrial organization.  
21 Often relying on oral and life histories, pioneering works of social history from the first half of the 1980s 
that examined the issue of continuity and discontinuity, paying ample heed to the former, include Lutz 
Niethammer, ed., Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet 1930-1960, 3 vols. (Bonn: Dietz, 1983-
85), a project on the Ruhr working class; and Werner Conze and M. Rainer Lepsius, eds., Sozialgeschichte 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Beiträge zum Kontinuitätsproblem (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1983).   
22 James Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after th  Second World War (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina, 1993); Robert Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in 
the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley: University of California, 1993); Heide F hrenbach, 
Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina, 1995); Robert Moeller, ed., West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and 
Culture in the Adenauer Era (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1997).   
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my dissertation will further this line of inquiry by contributing to our understanding of 
the core factors relevant to the existence of both c ntinuity and discontinuity in the 
unique context of the postwar Federal Republic. 
Finally, this dissertation reflects a broader historiographical trend characterized by 
an enhanced awareness of autonomous European perspectives, behavior and decisions in 
explaining Cold War history, rather than primarily focusing on those of the United States, 
particularly of the American government.  One prominent work in this more recent vein 
that has aroused considerable debate is that of Geir Lundestad, which views American 
hegemony over western Europe as an “Empire by Invitation” that, far from being 
imposed, was actually encouraged by those Europeans eager to reap its benefits.23  Other 
experts, such as Anne Deighton specifically in regad to Britain, have stirred controversy 
by calling attention to the essential part played by the actions of European states in 
bringing about the Cold War.24  While clearly different from these works of a more 
conventional diplomatic history, the social histories that started to appear in the 1980s, 
along with some of the studies pertaining to the Americanization debates, likewise had 
the effect of highlighting the active roles performed by West Germans themselves, rather 
than by Americans and other foreign occupiers and governments, during the Cold War 
and in shaping the development of the Federal Republic.  Without exaggerating the 
weight of the German Atlanticists in determining events and policies within the larger 
Western framework, my dissertation will strive to offer an account of their efforts, via the 
                                                
23 Geir Lundestad, The American “Empire” (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget AS, 1990).  John Lewis Gaddis has 
also invoked the concept of “Empire by Invitation” at times.   
24 From this school, see Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the 
Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) and the essays in David Reynolds, ed., The Origins of 
the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven: Yale University, 1994).    
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construction and maintenance of a far-reaching transn tional network, to exercise such 
influence in the Cold War environment and of the challenges they confronted in doing so. 
C. Primary Sources and Dissertation Outline 
While the germination of this study relied greatly on the heretofore cited 
secondary literature, the dissertation itself is grounded in extensive research in the 
primary sources.  Chief among these has been the Birr nbach Nachlaß, housed at the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Augustin, near Bonn.  This large collection of some 
twenty-six shelf meters boasts a wide variety of reco d types, including correspondence, 
reports, memos, meeting protocols, government documents, newspaper clippings, 
speeches and publications.  These papers are divide into several sections, including 
materials dealing specifically with Birrenbach’s private life and business dealings; 
general correspondence and documents; papers pertaining to particular countries, the 
largest part being devoted to the United States; correspondence with particular 
individuals, again the majority of such contacts being Americans; papers relevant to 
Birrenbach’s involvement with key organizations, particularly the Atlanticist institutions 
to be discussed in this dissertation; and finally important speeches and publications, 
including many drafts.  Birrenbach was a strikingly prolific writer of letters, a fact 
reflected in the copious correspondence contained i the Nachlaß describing his activities 
and depicting his views on the events and people of the day as well as his musings on 
broader topics of interest.  Among the most stimulating and enlightening records are 
those pertaining to the Atlanticist organizations which include memos and proposals, 
financial documents, and accounts of various meetings, all of which offer terrific insight 
into the functioning and outlooks of these institutions. 
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Yet while superbly covering most relevant aspects of Birrenbach’s existence, the 
Nachlaß leaves a few significantly underdocumented, unavoidably rendering this study in 
some senses incomplete.  The period prior to his return to the Federal Republic from exile 
in South America in the early 1950s garners very little attention, a gap precluding us from 
knowing with much certainty about some, potentially explosive, themes, notably his 
attitudes towards National Socialism.  However, even some more recent aspects of 
Birrenbach’s life, occasionally of interest for this study, are given short shrift.  In general, 
private life and even business dealings receive only sketchy coverage.  More importantly, 
his activities in connection with certain institutions, including the Atlantic Institute, are 
dealt with in just a few files covering scattered years, thus leaving wide swaths of his 
time there unrecorded in any systematic way.  The same goes for his activity by the 
DGAP prior to becoming president in 1973, thus obscuring to some extent his precise, 
though obviously vital, role in the study groups there.  Other episodes of Birrenbach’s life 
remain shrouded in a secrecy stemming from the strict treatment of certain subjects by 
the German authorities, particularly the foreign office.  For instance, the files addressing 
Birrenbach’s 1965 mission to Israel and its aftermath are, more than forty years later, still 
not open to researchers.  Finally, the “Sperrfrist” as a rule denies researchers access to 
files not yet thirty years old.  This potential obstacle, which at the time would have 
prevented me from inspecting files from the mid-1970s onward, was surmounted by the 
Adenauer Stiftung’s special permission to examine these documents.  Yet even with this 
privilege in hand, certain later files, particularly those repository to the DGAP’s financial 
information, remained blocked.  Despite these limitations, the Birrenbach Nachlaß 
ultimately proved a magnificent resource for the exploration of German Atlanticism. 
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Were this dissertation to be published in book form, some of these holes would 
inevitably remain, but possibilities would also exist to tap further primary sources in 
Germany and perhaps elsewhere, including here in the United States.  An examination of 
the papers of some German and foreign personalities associated with Birrenbach in his 
diverse fields of endeavor, for example the Atlantic Institute, would probably yield some 
benefit.  With time, documents in the Birrenbach Nachlaß previously blocked by the 
Sperrfrist are gradually becoming available, particularly those files referring to the 
DGAP during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Although I did not actually visit the DGAP 
in Berlin or the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung in Cologne, I did receive permission from them to 
examine their relevant documents, in the former case particularly those pertaining to the 
study groups organized there during the 1960s.  Finally, it might be of some use to 
conduct interviews with personalities who worked with Birrenbach.  However, while 
these sources would no doubt contribute a few intriguing details, it is extremely doubtful 
they would significantly alter the substantive account and conclusions I present here. 
This study employs a hybrid chronological-thematic pproach to best illuminate 
fundamental aspects of the evolution of postwar German Atlanticism.  This introductory 
chapter has primarily served to position the work in its proper historiographical context.  
Chapter 2 examines Birrenbach’s “early” life up to the late 1950s, when he finally 
entered the Bundestag, relating it to his future experiences and to the Atlanticist 
phenomenon as a whole, while Chapter 3 delineates the nature, ideas and structures of 
German Occidentalism, the most serious obstacle facing the upstart Atlanticism well into 
the 1960s.  Chapters 4, 5 and 7 portray the efforts of the German Atlanticists during the 
1950s and 60s to create an effective infrastructure, o finance that infrastructure (with 
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special attention to the construction of a private German Stiftung system) and to stage 
public relations actions at home and abroad, and evaluates the internationally integrated 
Atlanticist sub-networks existing in each of these fields.  Meanwhile, Chapter 6 analyzes 
the personal trans-Atlantic political network Birrenbach assembled with the indispensable 
assistance of the Atlanticist infrastructure and demonstrates some major consequences of 
these undertakings.  Chapter 8 pushes the account into the late 1960s and 70s, stressing 
the expansion of the geographical scope of Atlanticism and the emerging internal and 
external challenges confronting the now firmly established German Atlanticist 
phenomenon.  Finally, Chapter 9 surveys Birrenbach’s twilight years and broaches some 
fresh themes, such as the retrospective aspects of Atlanticism in the late 1970s and 80s.  
With its exploration of Atlanticism as well as a surfeit of connected themes, among them 
German identity, philanthropy in international affairs, and state-society relations, what 
follows should prove eminently rewarding for those fascinated with the international but 




















Chapter 2: A Tortuous Path to Influence - Birrenbach’s Turbulent  “Early” Life  
 
A. Introduction 
Providing an account of Kurt Birrenbach’s life prior t  around 1954 is a rather 
tricky proposition given the relative dearth of primary sources.  Furthermore, we are 
reliant in such an undertaking almost exclusively on Birrenbach’s own Nachlaß.  The 
extent to which the vicissitudes of German history that Birrenbach and others 
experienced, stretching from Kaiserreich through Weimar and Third Reich all the way to 
the Federal Republic, encouraged frequent modifications in the relating of one’s personal 
autobiography provided, even at the time, rich fodder for jokes.  This naturally presents 
problems of reliability with regard to particular themes, most notably Birrenbach’s 
relationship to National Socialism.  Though any account of Birrenbach’s life will, in the 
end, leave many questions unanswered, we can console ourselves in some other 
important respects.  Using the Nachlaß as the main primary source, it is indeed possible 
to construct at least an overall sketch of the first orty-five to fifty years of Birrenbach’s 
existence, all the while keeping in mind the potential weaknesses in certain regards in an 
approach utilizing such narrow source material.  Most significantly, Birrenbach’s 
activities prior to the 1950s are principally of relevence for us only in so far as they shed 
light on that which came afterwards, especially on his own later, explicit Atlanticism, and 
thus have bearing on the overall theme of this study, the evolution of the wider postwar 
German Atlanticism.  The Nachlaß appears to be generally reliable and well suited to this 
somewhat more focused task. 
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B. Youth and Education 
Kurt Birrenbach was born on 2 July 1907 in the town of Arnsberg in the 
Westphalian Sauerland to Dr. Hermann Birrenbach, an internal and heart specialist and 
ultimately Chefarzt at the St. Franziskus-Hospital in Münster, and his wife, Antonia.  
Birrenbach grew up in Münster, the rapidly growing provincial capital, in what he would 
later characterize as a “liberal-Catholic” household.  Throughout his youth, he attended 
the tradition-rich Stadtkirche St. Lamberti on the Prinzipalmarkt, where he would come 
to know and like his eventual priest, the later bishop and cardinal Clemens August von 
Galen.1  The young Birrenbach was enthusiastic about sport and achieved considerable 
success in district championships in track and field and in hockey, though a hockey 
accident also rendered him blind in one eye.  Birrenbach attended, from 1913, the 
Ludgeri-Volksschule and, beginning in 1917, the esteemed humanistic Gymnasium 
Paulinum, one of the oldest schools in Europe.  Educated at a time when the Gymnasium 
of Humboldt mold was still important, Birrenbach many years later still valued the broad, 
subtle benefits this style, with its emphasis on not only math, German or geography but 
especially on Greek and Latin along with the study of history (including cultural history), 
had bestowed on him.  Later, though training to become a jurist, he would also attend 
lectures at university on classical philology.  This fascination with the ancient world and 
its languages is ironic in light of his later oppositi n to an Abendland concept that often 
                                                
1 For autobiographical narratives of Birrenbach’s “early” life, see the interviews “Zeugen der Zeit”: Kurt 
Birrenbach im Gespräch mit Werner Hill, 27 December 1979, recorded on 20 October 1979, ACDP 
K213/1; and “Zeitgenossen”: Dr. Kurt Birrenbach im Gespräch mit Dr. Wolfgang Bergsdorf und Henning 
Röhl, aired on 7 September 1980, Südwestfunk, 2. Programm, ACDP K213/1.  Birrenbach preserved some 
ties to Münster throughout his life, returning at times for special occasions, such as birthdays, or to give 
talks and maintained contact with certain friends from his youth, like Max Horst and Carl Spannagel.  Even 
many years later, Birrenbach described Münster as “a very beautiful city, in which the inhabitants also still 
have substance.” [KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 20 July 1981, ACDP K210/2].  On Birrenbach’s repeated 
admiration for “the familiar Schloß” whenever he was in Münster, see KB to Prof. Dr. Heinrich Brüning, 
18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4.   
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sought legitimacy and roots with reference to that world.2  Though he later professed to 
have had much understanding and “high appreciation” at the time for the “very 
remarkable” young people of the “Generation der Jugendbewegung” who belonged to 
the Wandervogel and Quickborn organizations, including many friends, Birrenbach never 
joined them, an early reflection of his life-long temperament as a self-conscious loner.3 
Aside from the attention devoted to sports and the classical world, some of 
Birrenbach’s other serious pursuits foreshadowed, at a quite precocious age, his eventual 
career path.  From the first years of his time at the Gymnasium, he found himself 
particularly drawn to history and politics, stirred during this period by his experiences of 
and lively interest in the inception and early stages of the Weimar Republic.  Already 
during the Weimar years, Birrenbach personally knew and thought highly of Heinrich 
Brüning, a fellow native of Münster and Paulinum alumnus whose sister happened to be 
friends with Birrenbach’s mother.4  Even more specifically, he focused his attention on 
international affairs and foreign policy.  During his Gymnasium period, he built up a 
library of books and materials on international relations, indeed a rather large one for 
somebody his age, and engaged in numerous conversations with friends about the foreign 
policies of the Weimar Republic and the other European powers.  For his Abitur, which 
                                                
2 Birrenbach would continue to pepper his later correspondence with Latin phrases and repeatedly utilized 
classical imagery, for instance the need to find a way between “Szylla und Charybdis” in KB, Buenos 
Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 15 November 1951, ACDP K207/4.    
3 KB to Prof. Dr. Helmut Schelsky, Münster, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2. 
4 The Birrenbach-Brüning relationship continued after th  Second World War.  Birrenbach took up contact 
with the ex-chancellor, in exile in the United States (Vermont), in the mid-1940s, initially via an occasional 
correspondence.  Beginning in the 1950s, the first half of which Brüning temporarily spent in the Federal 
Republic, they also saw one another face-to-face quit  frequently, especially in West Germany, for instance 
Cologne and Münster, but also in the US.  For Birrenbach’s “joy and satisfaction” when he was able to talk
with Brüning about questions of general interest; for Birrenbach’s valuing of Brüning’s advice and 
wisdom; on the admiration and friendship of Birrenbach and his family for Brüning and his now deceased 
sister; and for Birrenbach’s efforts to convince Brüning to remain for good in the Federal Republic, rather 
than in the United States, a situation that was “very painful” for Birrenbach, see KB to Heinrich Brüning, 
Hartland, Vermont, 18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4.  
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he received in Spring 1926 at the age of eighteen, Birrenbach voluntarily wrote an 
ambitious and sophisticated essay of over seventy typed pages, entitled “Der englische 
Imperialismus,” dealing with the dramatic changes in British foreign policy during the 
first decade of the 20th century, especially addressing the “Einkreisungspolitik” while 
highlighting the central role of King Edward VII.  n the process, this work also depicted 
the larger context and background conditions of the “großen Politik” in Europe and the 
world since the final decades of the 19th century, including the industrial and naval 
competition between Britain and a rising Germany.5  This effort was indicative not only 
of Birrenbach’s foremost youthful “passion,” that for oreign policy, but also of at least 
an incipient interest in the Anglo-Saxon powers andof a perspective that looked beyond 
the horizon of continental western Europe.6 
Birrenbach’s post-Gymnasium schooling took him far afield as he studied 
Rechtswissenschaft and Staatswissenschaft, irst at the universities of Geneva and Paris in 
1926 and later Munich, Berlin and, much closer to home, Münster.  This intentionally 
peripatetic approach, particularly the periods spent abroad, would yield future benefits, 
                                                
5 In his essay, Birrenbach praised British policy for bringing the country out of its dangerous isolatin by 
settling festering disputes with and obtaining the support of nations like France, Russia, Italy, America and 
Japan (“almost the entire world”) and for its effectiveness in fashioning a unique diplomatic and political 
system of counterweights against the German Reich.  All of this had increased the power and respect of 
England in the world and even secured a certain, qualified supremacy, not least as the strongest European 
power. Birrenbach also demonstrated the linkages between foreign policy, party struggle and public 
opinion and between arms policy, resulting deficits and a tax policy needed to produce positive balances, 
while simultaneously pointing to the dominance of the liberal Weltanschauung in England throughout the 
19th century.  Though acknowledging the respect Edward VII’s great political and diplomatic talents had 
evoked among the European nations and noting his popularity among the English people, Birrenbach 
ultimately argued that the policy carried out during his reign did not, in the long-term, achieve its goal of 
preserving for England the peace, “the first task of a ruler,” rather contributed to endangering it. [Der 
englische Imperialismus, 14 December 1925, ACDP K206/1].  Nevertheless, almost fifty-five years later, 
Birrenbach remained impressed by the shrewdness [Klugheit] of the British government at the start of the 
20th century, especially in contrast to the current American government [KB to Ministerialdirektor Berndt 
von Staden, BKA, 18 June 1980, ACDP K034/1]. 
6 Birrenbach’s essay displayed a basic knowledge of American history, including themes like the Civil War 
and industrialization.  While pointing to the crucial entrance in modern times of the United States and,
later, Japan as extra-European great powers into world p litics, he cited control [Herrschaft] over the 
Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico as the goal of contemporary American imperialism.   
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with Birrenbach crediting his semester in France, for example, with bringing him closer 
to and encouraging him to endorse warm relations with that country, while teaching him 
to communicate with Frenchmen in a manner that later enabled him to win their 
friendship.7  Birrenbach combined academics with work as a foreign affairs 
correspondent for several Westphalian newspapers, covering the League of Nations while 
in Geneva and French policy while in Paris, where he was also invited to the house of 
Wladimir d’Ormesson, editor at Le Figaro.8  In June 1930, Birrenbach took his first legal 
Staatsprüfung, the Referendarexamen, at the Oberlandesgericht Hamm, shining with 
grades of “good” overall and “very good” in Staatsrecht and Völkerrecht.  His requisite 
practical preparation in the Prussian Justizdienst ook him from Hamm and Münster to 
Berlin.  In January 1933, while still in the midst of this Referendariat, he earned a 
doctorate in law from the University of Tübingen with a dissertation on “Der 
Realisierungszwang im Tarifrecht” that received a rating of “very good.”  This work dealt 
with the controversial issues and relationships of tate authority, Wirtschaft, trade unions, 
arbitration law and Arbeitsrecht, especially in connection with the Arbeitskampf in the 
German steel and iron industry in 1928.9  He concluded what he believed to be his career 
training at the Kammergericht in Berlin, where he spent time as Referendar for the 
                                                
7 For Birrenbach’s belief, even late in his life, tha  his experiences attested to the merits of such a foreign 
stay, see KB to Holzamer, 10 July 1978, ACDP K160/1.  On his view that the Paris he had experienced in 
the 1920s was “more amusing [amüsanter] than it is today,” see KB to Hesselbach, 6 July 1979, ACDP 
K160/1.  As of 1978, Birrenbach still claimed to love France and was at least willing to entertain the notion 
of the French as the first Kulturvolk on earth (KB to Hans [Speidel], 28 March 1978, ACDP K145/1). 
8 KB to Sohl(?), 19 December 1977, ACDP K173/1.  Always intrigued by international affairs, 
d’Ormesson would eventually become a French diplomat and ambassador.  These Westphalian newspapers 
included ones in Dortmund and Münster, among them the Westfälischen Merkur.  
9  Birrenbach’s dissertation was an early manifestation of his talent in and tendency towards abstract 
problem-solving, investigation and legal reasoning.  In this project, Birrenbach dealt with and apparently 
accepted the validity of but does not seem to have been overly enthralled by the social- nd economic-
political ideas of the controversial authoritarian Catholic political and legal theorist Carl Schmitt, as 
expressed in recent works like Der Hüter der Verfassung (1931) and Der Begriff des Politischen (1932) 
and including the notion of the struggle between state and Wirtschaft for the realization of the “total state.”  
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prominent Jewish defense counsel Prof. Max Alsberg and in 1934, at the Reich Justice 
Ministry, passed his final tests, the Assessorexamen, each with “Prädikat.”10 
So far as they can be ascertained, Birrenbach’s views during this period with 
regard to international relations already intimated, in part, some of their later, more 
fleshed-out, versions.  For instance, and most obviously, Birrenbach seems, already 
during the 1920s and 30s, to have embraced the enthusiasm for the anti-nationalist idea of 
“Europe,” which found prominence, at least rhetorically, in the international relations and 
foreign policies of that time.  Birrenbach dated his own unwavering commitment and 
engagement for this concept, and for unification as the only path “to save Europe,” to the 
era of Briand and Stresemann (specifically 1926) and the time of their meeting in Stresa, 
explicitly lauding the latter’s foreign policy as “a constructive one.”11  According to 
Birrenbach’s testimony of later years, he had recognized already during the 1920s that the 
interests of the nation-state could no longer enjoy exclusive priority.  He had no contact 
with the organizations of the interwar “political” youth like the Jungstahlhelm, the 
Jungwolf, the Kyffhäuserverband and the NS-Jugendorganisation, claiming that “[t]he 
one-sidedness [Einseitigkeit] of the nationalist variant was too strong to me.  I… thought 
in other categories than these youth.”12  In line with these pro-European convictions, he 
familiarized himself with some of the related ideas floating around during this period, for 
                                                
10 Alsberg committed suicide in Swiss exile in Septemb r 1933.   
11 On Birrenbach’s early recognition of unification as “the unique opportunity to save Europe,” see KB to 
Jean Monnet, 20 July 1972, ACDP K140/2.  For Birrenbach’s reference to himself as “a European of the 
first hour,” see KB to Shirley Williams, MP, Secretary of State for Education and Science, London, 25 July 
1977, ACDP K074/1.  For Birrenbach on the Franco-German understanding that had been arduously 
reestablished in Locarno and Stresa, and Herriot’s speech related to American policy before the Palais 
Bourbon that provided the final impetus for the shaking of that understanding, see KB to Dr. Hans 
Schäffer, Sweden, 21 August 1959, ACDP K004/2.  Birrenbach claimed that he had first “erlebt” Briand in 
1926 in Geneva, when he was studying there.  For Birrenbach’s belief at the time, in a situation that w s 
admittedly different than that of today, that Stresemann’s policy was “a constructive one,” and that his 
death would be a turning point in the politics of the Weimar Republic, see the Birrenbach interview 
“Zeitgenossen,” 7 September 1980, ACDP K213/1.   
12 KB to Prof. Dr. Helmut Schelsky, Münster, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2. 
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instance the elitist, Catholic conservatism of the Austrian Prince Karl Anton von Rohan, 
the founder in 1924 of the “European Kulturbund,” reading the articles in his respected 
journal, European Revue, and attending one of his talks in Berlin during the early 1930s.  
On the other hand, though he later professed that he had been “extraordinarily interested” 
already since the times of Stresa in the “V rbindung” with the Anglo-Saxon states, the 
United States does not yet seem to have loomed very large in his international interests at 
this relatively early stage of his life.13 
C. Relationship to National Socialism 
Although clearly interested in political affairs, Birrenbach never belonged to a 
political party during the Weimar Republic.  This was largely due to a personal 
disposition that, as we have previously noted, inclined him already in his youth towards a 
pensive solitude.  However, he did vote prior to 1933 and, given the Catholic milieu in 
which he grew up in Münster, it should come as no surprise that he cast his ballot 
exclusively for the Zentrum.  By the early 1930s, with the republic incapable of forming a 
tenable parliamentary basis and suffering the effects of the dire economic situation, 
Birrenbach had recognized many symptoms of and evenfor seen the decline and demise 
of Weimar.  Looking back, he would point to “defects” that existed in Weimar 
democracy from the start, including the abrupt break with the imperial state tradition and 
the population’s lack of identification with the new state form; to external factors, like the 
                                                
13 On this “extraordinarily interested” Birrenbach see KB to Schelsky, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2.  
On the US foreign political and finance-political filure during the interwar period, including the Senate’s 
rejection in 1920 of Wilson’s proposals, among them an American entrance into the League of Nations that 
would have strengthened the European security system and, thus, probably rendered impossible the military 
conflict of the 1930s, and the Republican government’s lacking the courage and strength[Kraft] in 1932 to 
write off the war debts, which would have immediately solved the German reparations problem, thus 
helping to undermine Franco-German understanding and possibly failing to impart to the world economic 
crisis an alternative course, see KB to Schäffer, 21 August 1959, ACDP K004/2.  In contrast, Birrenbach 
argued that with the 1931 Hoover Moratorium the US had met all German expectations at that time with 
respect to war debts and reparations.     
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French occupation policy; and, finally, to the hopelessness engendered by mass 
unemployment, the ruin of the middle-class Bürgertum and the failure to mold a stable, 
functioning government.  While he later denied ever having advocated a form of 
“conservative dictatorship” before 1933, he did believe at that time that the only possible 
way to overcome the debilitating crisis and to stabilize the republic against the onslaught 
from Right and Left was the rule of “a government with authority,” which would 
essentially implement “conservative-liberal” policies.  Observing the unfolding of actual 
events, he considered figures such as Franz von Papen or Kurt von Schleicher unsuitable 
to wield this authority.  As the Weimar state entered its final stages, Birrenbach therefore 
continued to favor the Zentrum because of its efforts to form a broad parliamentary 
majority that he hoped would be able to master the crisis without instituting an outright 
authoritarian resolution, for instance via the now notorious Article 48.14 
As already indicated, Birrenbach’s relationship to Hitler and the National 
Socialist movement remains somewhat ambiguous.  Many years later, he claimed that he 
had never been, even for a second, enthused by Hitler, on the contrary that he had 
maintained an extremely cold attitude towards him from the start.  As a student during his 
one semester in Munich in 1927, he had gone to see Hitler at an assembly in the 
Bürgerbräukeller at the advice of his friends.  He pronounced himself so “disgusted” by 
Hitler and found his speech so “mediocre,” that he walked out of the beer hall “appalled” 
after only about twenty minutes, therefore right in he middle of the talk, in protest.  
                                                
14 However, for Birrenbach’s defense of Chancellor Brüning and his cabinet, particularly with regard to the
paucity of currency- and finance-political options genuinely available in the early 1930s given the for ign 
policy imperative of eliminating reparations and the fact that the revolutionary ideas contained in Keynes’ 
General Theory (1936) had not yet emerged, see KB to Schäffer, 21 August 1959, ACDP K004/2.  
Birrenbach was already familiar during the early 1930s with Keynes’ prior ideas, having acquired his 
fundamental work Vom Gelde immediately after its appearance in Germany in 1932.   
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Nevertheless, four weeks later, once more at the encouragement of his friends, who 
wanted him to engage with this phenomenon again, he went along with them to listen to 
Hitler, this time in the Zirkus Krone on a Sunday morning, and was “astonished” that the 
great masses there were like “clay” in his hands.  Birrenbach also recounted similar 
occasions taking place many years later, but also including the period up to 1933, in 
places like Münster and Berlin in which the audience (“the devil knows whom”), stood 
on the chairs in enthusiasm, though here it is not clear if Birrenbach himself was in 
attendance.  Groping for some sort of elucidation of these perplexing spectacles, an 
admittedly baffled Birrenbach was ultimately resigned to fall back on the notion that the 
enthusiasm exhibited for Hitler at such events by what he considered “mad” people was a 
type of inexplicable “Volkshysterie.”15  Years later, Birrenbach claimed that from this 
point on he had fully recognized the “Fatalität of this personality” and that it was already 
clear to him how the regime would develop.16  Nevertheless, in assessing the rise of the 
NSDAP to within a hairsbreadth of power, Birrenbach lso still found room for broader 
factors, not only world economic crisis but also the post-WWI policies of certain Allies.17  
Despite his evidently low regard for Hitler and themasses he moved so 
effectively and his later claim of having never voted for National Socialism, Birrenbach 
                                                
15 On these experiences, during which Birrenbach claimed to have remained “eiskalt,” see the interviews 
“Zeugen der Zeit” (27 December 1979) and “Zeitgenossen” (7 September 1980), both in ACDP K213/1. 
16 For instance, KB to Federal President Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin, 30 May 1984, ACDP K031/2. 
17 Though his 1925 essay on “the English imperialism” was praised for also attempting to do justice to the 
standpoints of Germany’s rivals, Birrenbach consistently rejected throughout his life the idea that a war-
mongering Germany was chiefly responsible for the outbreak of World War I.  Instead, he noted the roleof 
other powers, particularly France, obsessed with its imperial past and the idea of revanche, and Russia, 
with its Pan-Slavist pressure on the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.  These were the main drivers of European 
Politik that hindered a definitive peace settlement, generated the crises of the first decade of the 20th
century (e.g. Morocco, Balkans) and made a conflict unavoidable sooner or later.  To a lesser extent, 
Birrenbach also criticized Weltmacht Britain for its passive support of France and Russia, in its efforts to 
maintain the European balance.  Meanwhile Birrenbach acknowledged the strengths, but also pointed to the 
weaknesses, of the Central European continental powers (and Triple Alliance).  For an example of 
Birrenbach continuing to hold to such views much later in life, see his 1981 Discussion Contribution in 
ACDP K075/1. 
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entered the NSDAP “with a very heavy heart,” also joining the SA as an Anwärter, after 
the Potsdam spectacle of March 1933.18  Probably motivated then by political and 
careerist opportunism, Birrenbach cited afterwards the “vacuum” of alternative starting 
points for political engagement, already highlighted by an Ermächtigungsgesetz of 24 
March 1933 that “was certainly no recommendation for the democratic parties at the 
time,” as well as a desire to avert disaster by influencing what he perceived as an 
incoherent and erratic party from the inside.  However, according to Birrenbach, he came 
to realize during his time in Berlin not only the criminal character of the regime but also 
the futility of attempting to shape it from within.  Key in his turn away from the party 
were the events, some in the capital itself, surrounding 30 June 1934, the “Night of the 
Long Knives,” which precisely confirmed the party’s dominant elements and led him to 
resign immediately from the NSDAP and SA via registered letter to the Reichsleitung.  
Birrenbach maintained that his consistently negative attitude towards the National 
Socialists also manifested itself in an earlier incident in 1934, when, as a still fairly new 
party member, he had brought about a vote among his colleagues in the Assessorenlager 
in Jüterbog directed at the dismissal of the SS-Lagerleiter.  Whether this episode was 
truly indicative of genuine resistance against Hitler and National Socialism, as 
Birrenbach later asserted, or stemmed from personal or institutional differences or 
something else entirely is not clear.  Though successful, the action resulted, as Birrenbach 
was informed by the justice authorities after passing his law exams, in a suspension of his 
legal career that left his prospects of becoming a lawyer or judge in tatters.19 
                                                
18 On Birrenbach’s “heavy heart,” see KB to Schelsky, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2. 
19  For those “fateful [schicksalvollen] years” which led to the National Socialist seizure of power, see KB 
to Brüning, 18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4.  On “the ragedy of National Socialism,” see KB to 
Bundestag President a.D. Prof. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, Oberwinter, 21 August 1981, ACDP K086/1.  For 
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Consequently, after some months, Birrenbach began working in 1935 at a 
consulting firm on Berlin’s Viktoriastraße as an economic, financial and foreign currency 
advisor for both big German and, especially, foreign f rms and banks, including 
American ones.  Aided by his ability to speak English and French, his work centered on 
legal matters pertaining to the flow of capital and goods at a time when German foreign 
trade, striving to control foreign exchange, was characterized by offset and linkage deals 
and parallel operations, all of which made possible certain transactions but, more 
importantly in Birrenbach’s future thinking, also presented obstacles to smooth trade.  A 
number of Birrenbach’s clients were, as he put it, affected “auf das Schärfste” by the 
National Socialist regime.  Birrenbach had already become acquainted with important, in 
some cases historic, personalities, prior to embarking on his professional career: Brüning, 
d’Ormesson, Galen.  During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Birrenbach also met his 
cousin Ernst Plesser, the Catholic scholar Goetz Briefs and the banker Carl Goetz, all in 
Berlin.  Now, through his professional work, Birrenbach continued to expand his contacts 
in Germany, for instance meeting the bankers Siegmund Warburg and Ernst Spiegelberg 
together in 1935.20  However, with a clientele comprising primarily foreigners and 
                                                                                                                                      
Birrenbach on the impossibility of “globally” judging the rise of Hitler, including the fact that “a people 
[Volk] does not consist of martyrs”; the considerable number who were neither for nor against Hitler but 
did not risk opposing him; the opportunistic careerists, especially in the “middle layers” that he presumed 
otherwise would have immediately rejected the regim; and those on Left and Right who refused to 
cooperate with and opposed the regime, see the interview “Zeugen der Zeit,” 27 December 1979, ACDP 
K213/1.  For Birrenbach’s argument, in the context of his defense of the industrialist Alfried Krupp, that 
“millions of Germans joined the National Socialist party because they hoped in this way to get the support 
of the state,” see the document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1.  About the sudden political “vacuum” from 
1933 on and Birrenbach’s negative assessment of the democratic parties’ role in the Ermächtigungsgesetz, 
again see the interview “Zeugen der Zeit,” 27 Decemb r 1979, ACDP K213/1.  
20 Before returning to the Deutsche Bank, Plesser would become directly engaged with the iron industry, 
and thus the August-Thyssen-Hütte, in his role as director of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau.  
Birrenbach henceforth developed a friendly, understanding relationship with Warburg, including after 
WWII, despite repeated temporal interruptions and the latter’s emigration to London.  In contrast, at some 
point, Birrenbach lost contact with Spiegelberg, an associate of Warburg, and never heard from him again.  
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foreign firms, Birrenbach only now established his fir t substantial international contacts, 
including a variety of prominent personalities, among them a number of ministers, not 
only in France but also in Britain and the United States.  Indeed, this appears to have 
been Birrenbach’s first extensive direct experience with Americans, the source of his 
later claims that these close connections dated back to the mid-1930s, the “Mittelalter,” 
as he put it.21  Birrenbach garnered further international experience and contacts through 
pre-war travels abroad connected to his work, for instance to Yugoslavia and Poland.22 
Meanwhile, Birrenbach maintained, for the most part, only a distant relationship 
to politics, such as it was, during the “fateful period” of National Socialist rule.  While he 
had still been politically active during his Referendar years in Berlin, these pursuits were 
mostly limited under the reign of National Socialism to the reading of various political 
literature.  As a form of political articulation prio  to 1939, as Birrenbach claimed, he also 
established, or in some cases maintained, contact with a number of figures who, unlike 
himself, would at least eventually play some role in the conspiracies against the regime.  
In fact, he was already closely connected with several such personalities prior to 1933, 
though he was never explicit about the identities, though perhaps he was referring to 
figures like Galen.  While he linked his contacts to the plot of 20 July 1944, he also 
pointed out that they were not at all with those who ultimately comprised and supported 
the assassination group itself, rather they were with several personalities who rejected the 
                                                                                                                                      
As of June 1975, there were also references to Birrenbach’s old acquaintanceship with Ferdinand 
Friedensburg and his connection to Friedensburg’s Elternhaus (Friedensburg to KB, 20 June 1975, ACDP 
K042/1).     
21 KB to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, 18 June 1980, ACDP K034/1. 
22 Among the initial firms for which Birrenbach functioned as financial and currency advisor was the 
National Krupp GmbH, which led to his making the acquaintance of the industrialist Alfried Krupp in 
1938.  Birrenbach’s expertise was especially in demand due to the severe currency restrictions existing in 
Germany during the late 1930s as a result of deep economic crisis [KB Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP 
K178/1]. 
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very idea of an assassination.23  Despite the nature of these contacts and his professed 
respect for the views of personalities like Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, Birrenbach 
came to believe, by his own account, that in light of the impending catastrophe, the 
opportunity to avert disaster had to be seized, regardless of the means.  Once it quickly 
became clear that the National Socialist regime would not to be overthrown by a 
revolution from below, Birrenbach pinned his hopes on a Staatsstreich by the 
Reichswehr.  However, with the regime moving from strength to s rength in the 1930s 
with its series of foreign policy successes in the Rhineland, Austria and the Sudetenland, 
he despaired that many in Germany had come to terms with the regime and abandoned 
any expectation of aPutsch by the armed forces.24   
D. Emigration 
Near the end of 1938, Birrenbach resolved to leave Germany, ultimately departing 
in March 1939 following the occupation of Prague.  He claimed to have decided on this 
course, which entailed renouncing his “excellent positi n” in Berlin as well as other 
opportunities in Germany, of his own free will and for strictly political reasons, assigning 
                                                
23 In the office on the Viktoriastraße, Birrenbach was closest to a Hubert Breitenfeld, who seems to have 
shared his attitudes regarding the Third Reich.  Birrenbach first met Hans Speidel in the summer of 1937 in 
the Berlin (Schmargendorf) residence of Max Horst, who was Birrenbach’s friend and Speidel’s brother-in-
law.  For Birrenbach’s vague mention of having met an adversary of Hitler in Berlin at the end of the 
1930s, see KB to John McCloy, 25 September 1980, ACDP K178/2.  Among Birrenbach’s earliest post-
WWII political contacts were Walther Hensel and Karl Arnold, who, along with Jakob Kaiser, Heinrich 
Körner (a victim of 20th July) and other members of the former Christian trde unions and personalities 
from the circle of the Kölner Ketteler-Haus, had participated in considerations about the shaping of new
political and social conditions after the then forese able end of the dictatorship.  Perhaps Birrenbach’s 
ambiguity with respect to the nature of his oppositi n contacts reflected the ambivalence that existed in 
postwar West German society regarding the 20th July assassination attempt. 
24 On the National Socialist foreign policy successes reconciling many, otherwise opposition-minded, 
Germans with the regime and on Birrenbach’s claim to having recognized, perhaps in National Socialism 
as a whole but at least in its foreign policy, a “dynamism” that at a certain point could not be braked, see 
the Birrenbach interview “Zeugen der Zeit”, 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1.  For Birrenbach’s 
references to the “freeing” of the Rhineland and “the reunification with Austria” (but also to “the conquest 
of the Sudetenland”), see again the Birrenbach interview “Zeugen der Zeit”, 27 December 1979, ACDP 
K213/1 and KB to Axel Springer, Berlin, 10 August 1981, ACDP K033/2.  Such phrases may indicate a 
certain fundamental sympathy with at least the goals f these particular efforts.   
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a crucial role in later years to the regime’s anti-Semitism, including the “profound” 
impression left on him by the Kristallnacht of November 1938.25  Moreover, the events 
of 30 June 1934 had already convinced him that Germany would meet a terrible end, that 
“National Socialism would bring our country to ruin.”26  In summation, nearly twenty-
five years after the fact, Birrenbach ascribed his emigration to the same reasons that had 
at least in part motivated the 20th July conspirators: reasons of conscience. 
[Hitler] was considered as a kind of anti-Christ.  I cannot explain to you the 
despair of the German patriots and the loneliness we felt in the midst of the 
National Socialist revolution.  Since that time I had to realize again and again how 
difficult it is for people from other countries, particularly in the West, to 
understand what it means to live in a totalitarian country.  Only a person who 
lived in such an environment knows how difficult it is to make an active 
opposition against such a kind of regime….  I left Germany in 1939 in complete 
despair because I did not see anymore a way out of that disaster.27 
 
Birrenbach’s attempts for his first-choice destination, North America, met with failure 
since the American firm to which he had switched, one he had advised in Berlin, believed 
it impossible to attain a work permit for him there.  Instead, Birrenbach sailed for Buenos 
Aires for a position at the firm’s South American headquarters.  Far from well-prepared, 
this undertaking had all the makings of a desperate le p in the dark.  At age thirty-two, 
                                                
25 For the racism and anti-Semitism of the regime as being among Birrenbach’s primary motives in quitting 
Germany, see KB to Eugene Rostow, 9 April 1980, ACDP K209/2 and KB to Axel Springer, 10 August 
1981, ACDP K033/2.     
26 KB to Prof. Dr. Helmut Schelsky, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2.  On further anticipated National 
Socialist foreign policy successes, including with respect to Poland (i.e. Danzig and the Polish Corrid ), 
and for Birrenbach employing the language of the “excesses” of National Socialism, see the Birrenbach 
interview “Zeugen der Zeit,” 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1.   
27 KB to Mrs. John McCloy, 23 December 1963, ACDP K210/1.  For Birrenbach’s reference to this 
“disastrous [unseligen]” period of German history from 1933-45, see his expositions at the press conference 
of 2 November 1962 staged for the publication of the first report on the activities of the Fritz-Thyssen-
Stiftung, ACDP K077/1.  Though Birrenbach had no direct experience of Germany during and immediately 
after the war, he believed that, having endured there until 1939, he had gained a clear idea of the 
functioning of the totalitarian state.  For example, as a currency and financial advisor of German firms, he 
had become acquainted with the interventions of the National Socialist regime in industrial plants and 
claimed to have never seen a single case where an economic decision by the regime was rejected by an 
owner or high official of such a plant.  Indeed, Birrenbach argued that the state “practically controlled the 
industry.” [KB Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1]. 
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Birrenbach voluntarily emigrated from his homeland under very difficult circumstances, 
indeed almost without means thanks to German foreign currency regulations.28  
Moreover, at the time, he had not even received a firm job offer in response to his 
request, only an oral commitment from the American firm’s vice-president in Berlin.29   
The move to South America obviously signaled major changes in Birrenbach’s 
life.  In 1939, after emigrating, he married Ida Wangemann, the partly Jewish woman 
who had left Germany with him.  They would later, within the span of a few years during 
the early 1940s, have two children there together, Thomas and Irene.30  At first, 
Birrenbach knew practically no Spanish, but, with the help of his classical training in 
Latin at the Gymnasium, learned the language within six months well enough to be able 
to give talks.  In July 1939, he began working for the American firm that, as described, 
had loosely offered him a job before his departure from Germany.  This firm in question 
was the National Cash Register Company of Dayton, Ohio, a large “world concern” that 
Birrenbach had formerly represented, beginning in February 1936, as one of his clients in 
his previous capacity as financial and foreign exchange advisor.31  Based in Buenos Aires 
throughout his stay in South America, Birrenbach, after a short time, took over the 
leadership of the NCR’s government business in Argentina in 1940 and appears to have 
enjoyed considerable success in his work, which focused primarily on sales.  
                                                
28 KB to Henry Kissinger, 28 May 1983, ACDP K146/3.  These foreign currency regulations prevented him 
from taking more than a mere ten Reichsmark in his pocket. 
29 Birrenbach received the offer of a position in theNCR’s regional headquarters from this American vice-
president, a Mr. George A. Marshall, through the int rmediary of the director-general of the National 
Krupp GmbH, a Mr. Luzius.  Given the circumstances, Birrenbach considered his emigration “a 
courageous step.” [KB Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1]. 
30 From 1947-52, Thomas attended elementary school at the Escuela Argentina General Belgrano in 
Buenos Aires.   
31 For Birrenbach’s involvement, beginning in 1938, in negotiations and transactions between the National 
Krupp GmbH, the National Cash Register Company and the Ministry of Economics (especially its 
Reichsdevisenstelle), culminating in the signing, in Birrenbach’s presence, of an agreement in Amsterdam, 
see KB Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1. 
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Nevertheless, he freely left the company in December 1941, upon the outbreak of war 
between Germany and the United States, explaining that, while he regretted the 
hostilities,   
to have a nationality as English, French or German, is a destiny which one has to 
accept, as well in good as in bad days.  In spite of being opposed to the actual 
regime I cannot deny my own origin.  This fact obliges me to remain in times of 
war at least neutral.  Furthermore, to remain in the Company would fall short of a 
kind of demonstration, which would endanger the situat on of my family in my 
country.32 
 
He resigned his position with the full understanding, apparently of the director-general of 
the American enterprise, that he would resume his work at the firm after the war.33  
In the meantime, Birrenbach required gainful employment.  An interim phase 
followed his NCR departure.  Two weeks after leaving, he was sought by Gen. Manuel 
Savio, whose planning would undergird the Argentine steel industry, as “controller” for 
the nation’s military factories, an enticing prospect squelched by the neutrality resolution 
emerging from the January 1942 Rio Conference.  In February, he opened an independent 
consulting office for company foundings, commercial and industrial organization, 
production and cost control, and corporation finance.  By the following year, it had 
developed into the coordination department in these fi lds of the Thyssen-Lametal SA, a 
big firm serving as the South American subsidiary and representation in Argentina of the 
powerful Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG (Düsseldorf), whic  controlled much of the 
Argentine iron market.  Here, Birrenbach assumed a top function of a scope beyond his 
narrow realm of sales at NCR, administering a large foundry and steel mill while 
supervising complementary firms and holding companies of the concern in Buenos Aires 
                                                
32 As recounted in KB to G.A. Marshall, NCR, London, 27 June 1942, ACDP K206/4. 
33 Birrenbach later presented his leaving the American firm “a question of tact.” (KB to F.J. Strauss, 
Minister-President of Bavaria, Munich, 26 March 1980, ACDP K034/1).  Birrenbach’s concerns about 
family in Germany were directed especially towards his mother, his sister and her children.    
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and elsewhere in Argentina.  For the first time, Birrenbach came into contact with 
Thyssen and the Stahlunion, the ThL’s exclusive German supplier.  The war, black lists 
and almost complete halting of iron imports impinged on the ThL, hindering material 
purchases and sales.  From 1943 on, it endured sharpening state intervention, including 
the appointment of new directors whose approval was needed for all transactions.  At the 
start of May 1945, once Argentina had declared war and imposed measures against 
numerous German institutions in the country, the concern was expropriated and 
nationalized with widespread summary dismissals, thoug  the government and Col. Vila, 
the firm’s new chief, requested Birrenbach, alone among leading men, continue in a top 
position to ease the management transition, retaining him almost a year as an advisor.34   
However, this, too, was not to last.  The revolutionary upheaval in Argentina that 
would bring Perón to power in 1946 then resulted in Birrenbach once again moving on to 
another position.  The board of directors, which Birrenbach advised and which he now 
considered to be composed of “excellent men,” resigned.  With the leadership posts now 
occupied by representatives of the Perónist party, the new Board was, for Birrenbach, of 
a completely different political and economic outlook from the previous one and not at all 
comparable in quality.  Considering it impossible to s ay on and cooperate with these 
personalities, he quickly resigned his position, in open defiance of the Foreign Ministry’s 
                                                
34 Bereft of any long-term organic growth, the VSt had come about in 1926 as a “Krisengründung”  
combining four large Montangruppen (Thyssen, Rheinstahl, Phoenix and Rhein-Elbe-Union).  Important 
figures included Fritz Thyssen (chairman of the Aufsichtsrat) and Albert Vögler (General Director).  The 
Thyssen-Lametal also came into being in 1926 through the fusion of the firm Thyssen with the La Metal 
Soc. De Resp. Ltda., with the shares owned by the NV Centrale Handelsvereinigung (Rotterdam) but sold 
during the war to the Soteria AG Maienfeld (Zurich).  The firm represented in Argentina the Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke AG, the Centrale Handelsvereinigung, Großrohr-Verband GmbH (Düsseldorf), Röhren-
Verband GmbH (Düsseldorf), Demag AG (Duisburg), Polte AG (Magdeburg-Armaturen), Weise & 
Monski (Halle), Linke Hofmann AG (Breslau), Deutsche Werke Kiel AG, Flohr AG (Berlin), and the 
Stahlwerks-Verband (Düsseldorf), as well as several firms based in Argentina itself.  Up to November 
1944, the Thyssen-Lametal was still functioning with a total personnel of about three thousand men.  For 
further information, see the undated Report on ThL, ACDP K207/4.   
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Board of Vigilance.  Almost immediately, within fourteen days, after the end of the war, 
he had again received, and accepted, an offer from the NCR, with which he had remained 
in close contact, to resume his managerial activity n that firm, indeed again in an 
executive capacity in the same field of work.  However, his return to his old firm was 
delayed by several months until 1946, in part by the American embassy’s insistence on 
continuing to enforce the anti-German wartime restrictions, especially the Trade With the 
Enemy Act, which prohibited the entrusting of members of the enemy states with such a 
responsibility.  The firm’s best efforts in Washington, DC, proved to be of little avail.  
Undeterred, the NCR thereupon adopted a somewhat devious solution, awarding 
Birrenbach the position de facto while, at least temporarily, withholding the formal title.  
In 1947, thanks to new American legislation, Birrenbach was finally able to accept the 
position openly.  He thus returned to his successful work at the NCR, his activities again 
based in the firm’s South American headquarters in Buenos Aires.35  
Not long after the end of the war, Birrenbach was already eager to return to 
Germany as soon as circumstances permitted.  This yearning was founded in no small 
part on his desire to assist in the process of reconstruction.  In the meantime, he kept an 
eye on the Politik and on international developments, especially as they related to his 
homeland.  In a letter of December 1945, Birrenbach gave some idea of the direction in 
which his thoughts were running in that regard: 
I hope that the experiences of European history since 1918 and particularly of the 
last two years will on the long run convince the European nations of the vital 
necessity to forget their old-aged feuds and to form a free federation of the 
European states, achieving in this way the goal of the best political thinkers of 
more than a century.  If this war really brings about the rule of law among the free 
                                                
35 For a certificate honoring Birrenbach for his work at the NCR in 1947, see ACDP K206/2.     
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nations of the world, either by the menace of atomic destruction or by mutual 
agreement, then the wounds struck by this cruel war will heal sooner.36 
 
From Argentina, Birrenbach also continued to nurture contacts in Germany, always 
seeking to facilitate his professional re-integration.  Nevertheless, a variety of factors 
precluded a rapid return: after long years away, Birrenbach no longer had sufficient 
relevant contacts and starting-points there, while t e state of war between Argentina and 
Germany persisted long after May 1945 as did his difficulties in acquiring a valid 
passport.37  The latter was a particularly thorny problem, since he wished to avoid 
renouncing his original nationality, but a new German passport had yet to be created and 
obtaining a “double nationality” was problematic.  Birrenbach’s efforts, in several 
countries, to obtain the coveted passport utilized his network of connections throughout 
the southern part of the continent, in Argentina, where he enjoyed the best such links, but 
also in Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay.  As he put it, “[y]ou can imagine that in the normal 
way it is impossible to settle such a matter.”38  Despite such efforts, Birrenbach, too, had 
to await the creation of a German passport from above.   
In addition to these impediments, there were the terribl  conditions of postwar 
Germany to consider.  Through his contacts and communication, such as they were, with 
official and private personalities in Germany and from the reports he received as one of 
                                                
36 KB to George A. Marshall, Vice-President in Charge of Overseas Operations, NCR, London, 13 
December 1945, ACDP K206/4.  For Birrenbach toying with the idea of returning already in 1945, “when 
everything there in Germany lay in ruins [daniederlag],” see the Birrenbach interview “Zeitgenossen,” 7 
September 1980, ACDP K213/1. 
37 A telling experience for Birrenbach was that with Hubert Breitenfeld, one of the first people Birrenbach 
would call on after his return to Germany, only now t  find that, after such a long period, distance, 
geographical but perhaps also in a figurative sense with regard to their respective current fields of activity, 
severely limited the extent of this renewed contact over subsequent decades to a pretty bare minimum.  The 
Argentinian government did not issue a declaration terminating the state of war with Germany until 195.    
For Birrenbach’s expectation that there would now be restitution of German institutions in Argentina by the 
Argentinian government, see KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP K207/4. 
38 KB to George A. Marshall, Vice-President in Charge of Overseas Operations, NCR, London, 22 
February 1947, ACDP K206/4. 
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the leading representatives, from 1946-52, of the Quaker’s American Friends Service 
Committee in Argentina for Relief in Central Europe, h  was well aware of the hardships 
that awaited on the other side of the Atlantic.39  For Birrenbach himself, this may not 
have been an overwhelming consideration, given his determined conviction that “it is 
necessary in this moment to direct the view forwards, in order to save from that which 
remains to us what still is to be saved.”40  Nevertheless, he also had to take into 
consideration the interests of his family members, and he hesitated to bring them back 
into the chaotic conditions of postwar Germany.  Birrenbach’s wife, in particular, was not 
ready to return just then, not least because she had been warned by those in Buenos Aires 
with knowledge of the current situation in Germany that such a step could very well 
prove fatal.  Possible solutions to this problem were further limited since Birrenbach was 
also plagued by serious money problems well into the postwar period.  This lack of 
money was in large part due to the fact that, as a result of the vagaries of history, he had 
either lost or resigned his position no less than four times within a span of less than eight 
years.  Therefore, it had not been possible for him to save enough money to maintain his 
family outside Germany for any considerable period of time, and he was unable to accept 
any position in Germany unless he received a significant portion of his pay in foreign 
currency.  This represented a daunting problem to solve in its own right.41 
                                                
39 Perhaps Birrenbach’s Quaker activity was related to the fact that Edmund Stinnes, a Quaker who was the 
oldest son of Hugo Stinnes and one of Birrenbach’s ontacts established in Argentina, engaged after World 
War II in a worldwide activity in the Quaker relief organization stretching from Argentina to Japan to 
Germany.   
40 KB to Waechter, 23 February 1947, ACDP K206/4. 
41 KB to George A. Marshall, 21 May 1948, ACDP K206/4.  For Birrenbach on the trying German 
conditions as he had gotten to know them in the postwar time and also, more recently, during a trip to 
Germany, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Franz von Papen, Jr., Düsseldorf, 4 June 1951, ACDP K207/4.  On 
Birrenbach’s dismal contemporary view of an “impoverished, beaten and shattered Europe”; of “the 
German catastrophe” following “total defeat,” with a German Volk “placed in question as a nation, 
occupied by foreign powers, disarmed and deprived of the crucial attributes of its sovereignty,” and 
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As it turned out, Birrenbach remained employed at the NCR until German trade 
with Argentina and the rest of South America was taken up again in 1949.  When such 
foreign trade with the Federal Republic became possible, he, along with several other 
German, Argentinean and French business partners, thus utilizing both domestic and 
foreign capital, co-founded and built up the Lametal-Union SA in Buenos Aires.  As an 
importer, this joint-stock company primarily represented in Argentina and, via sub-
agents, elsewhere in South America the interests of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, then the 
largest steel works in Europe, or, perhaps more accur tely, of its subsidiary, the 
Stahlunion-Export GmbH (Düsseldorf), the VSt’s largest German steel export 
organization, indeed the largest German steel export firm, period.42  While therefore 
essentially a new Thyssen branch in Birrenbach’s eyes, in many ways the successor of 
                                                                                                                                      
engaged in “the bitter struggle for the new acquisition of a precarious life basis”; of a former Reich 
experiencing “the shrinking of the eastern half” and “division into the Soviet and western Allied sphere of 
influence”; of a situation in which “[t]he Soviet troops control today as occupying power the center of 
Berlin, and the borders of the Soviet zone push rigt up to within a hundred miles of the Rhine,” leaving 
the Germans “as a nation… whose eastern half stands as security [Faustpfand] under the [USSR’s] iron 
control”; and belief that a “threat of war” had and still emanated “from the East,” see “Deutschland u
Europa zwischen West und Ost: Die Lage Deutschlands nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg,” by Kurt Birrenbach, 
7-10 February 1951, Freie Presse (Buenos Aires), ACDP K001/1.  For Birrenbach having “deeply 
regretted” not having experienced the first years of the Federal Republic, but also on the impact on him of 
the expectation in South America following World War II that the continuation of the war was imminent, 
see KB to Gerstenmaier, 21 August 1981, ACDP K086/1.     
42 The Lametal-Union functioned in an environment in which interaction and negotiations with the 
Argentinean government and state, whether individuals such as high-level cabinet members and provincial 
authorities or entities like the Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI) and the Transport 
Ministry, was essential to its undertakings.  The securing of government and state as a potential partner or 
customer in or supporter of capital goods operations and other deals (however unreliable it might be with
its payments) and efforts to attain certain certifications and registrations, for example marking the firm as a 
direct importer or as the exclusive supplier of Stahlunion articles, all hinged on such relations.  Therefore, 
Birrenbach’s attention was necessarily directed quite broadly, towards politics, elections, government 
composition, foreign and other policies, as well as economic situations, practices, activities and plans.  For 
Birrenbach analyzing the “situation in Argentina after the presidential elections of 11 November 1951, with 
special consideration of the German interests,” including a Perón regime whose political power, behind a 
“pseudo-parliamentary curtain,” was based on the army, the Perónist party, the CGT (“the trade unions 
brought into line [gleichgeschaltet] by the state”), and the church; a constitution that foresaw the American 
presidential system, meaning that “the power of the ex cutive is, in itself, already almost unlimited”; the 
development of Argentina, including forced industrialization, raw material shortages, foreign currency 
policy difficulties, inflation and foreign trade; the social revolution carried out under the Perón government; 
and a positive assessment of the possibilities for pr moting and improving the current German-Argentinian 
relations, see KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP K207/4.    
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the Thyssen-Lametal, the Lametal-Union retained a certain freedom of action and also 
represented, with lower priority and no objections from the Stahlunion, the interests of 
English, Dutch and American firms.43  From 1949 to 1952, Birrenbach served as an 
executive member of the board of directors and becam  head of the firm.  In 1950, the 
Stahlunion asked Birrenbach to continue leading the Lametal-Union for another year or 
two, after which it would grant him his wish and engage him in a corresponding position 
in Germany.  In the meantime, by June 1952, Birrenbach had became not only a delegate 
of the Stahlunion in Argentina but also the Stahlunion supervisor for the entire South 
American continent.  At a time when coal and steel were the principle products of 
Germany, France and other European countries, the Stahlunion kept its word and 
bestowed on Birrenbach the position of its deputy managing director.44 
                                                
43 For Birrenbach’s warnings about the potential for unavoidable collisions of interests within firms with 
other representations, in addition to the Stahlunion export program, clearly oriented towards other countries 
(including the United States), see KB, Buenos Aires, to the Geschäftsführung of the Stahlunion-Export 
GmbH, Düsseldorf, 30 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.   
44 In general, Birrenbach defended the work and achievements of the Lametal-Union and its staff and 
praised the high quality of his colleagues, the “excellent people,” there (KB to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o
Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 10 December 1951, ACDP K207/4).  For Birrenbach on the happy 
name established by the Lametal-Union for itself among hundreds of firms in Argentina, an “asset” whose 
acquisition was aided by its identification in the market with the goodwill that had accrued earlier to the 
Thyssen-Lametal and now the Stahlunion, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion 
Export, GmbH, Düsseldorf, 11 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.  However, for Birrenbach’s admission that the 
firm still left something to be desired in many regards and on the “holes and defects of our organization,” 
including limited personnel, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion Export, 
Düsseldorf, 25 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.  Birrenbach insisted that the firm’s failure yet to achieve the
hoped for success (indeed, in 1952, heavy losses and the decision of the board of directors, at Birrenbach’s 
proposal, to sell off the factory) was also due to specially difficult circumstances in South America and the 
“anormal and irregular” situation in Argentina in particular, including economic crisis, strikes, a lack of 
foreign currency, lengthy processes and procedures characterized by prolonged formalities, and “universal 
and total corruption.” [KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Wilhelm Riester, c/o Stahlunion-Export, GmbH, 
Düsseldorf, 23 May 1952, ACDP K207/4 and KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion 
Export, Düsseldorf, 25 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.  Pointing to the impact on the activities of the Lametal-
Union of the currently available capital means and the corrupt form of license-issuing in Argentina, 
Birrenbach argued that “in so far we all bear also here the consequences of the lost war.” [KB to Nyssen, 
25 June 1952, ACDP K207/4].     
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E. Assessment of the Argentina Exile 
In attempting an overall assessment, we can conclude that Birrenbach’s time in 
South America was something of a mixed bag.  Healthwise, it turned out to be nothing 
short of a personal disaster.  When he emigrated from Germany, the medium-statured 
Birrenbach seems to have been in reasonably good health, at least there does not appear 
to have been any significant propensity towards serious illness.  This was to change 
dramatically in Argentina, beginning quite early on during his stay when he suffered a 
two-year bout with fever.  We shall come back to the question of Birrenbach’s health 
later on.  For the time being, it suffices to establish that this health seems to have been 
shattered by his time in South America, an experience from which it never fully 
recovered.  This was compounded by the fact that in the mid-1940s, Birrenbach began to 
suffer from a serious, incurable, permanent insomnia.  Looking back many years later on 
his sojourn in Argentina, Birrenbach believed that e had “lost a good part of [my] bodily 
and mental [seelischer] substance, which, I fear, is irrevocable.  Everything in life has its 
price.  This price I have paid.”45  Aside from illness, Birrenbach’s overall physical 
experience in Argentina was an unpleasant one, due in no small part to the brutally hot 
temperatures that persisted, even at night at over 30 degrees Celsius, for most of the 
year.46  All of this contributed to Birrenbach’s departure, d spite a possibility that he 
might have remained longer on “a further temporary vacation,” courtesy of the 
Stahlunion.  Instead, he noted that his demanding toils for the sake of the Lametal-Union 
had taken him to the limit of his physical powers and insisted that his endangered health 
condition had deteriorated to the point that he, in tur , could do little more there for the 
                                                
45 KB to George Udvarhelyi, Johns Hopkins Dept. of Neurological Surgery, 20 July 1956, ACDP K116/1. 
46 KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/ .   
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Lametal-Union: “I can simply no longer physically survive [durchhalte] another summer 
in Buenos Aires.”47 
Birrenbach’s self-imposed exile also had a variety of professional drawbacks.  
However successful his endeavors, the positions that he occupied abroad, particularly 
with the National Cash Register Company, were generally a source of disappointment 
and frustration.  He was convinced that his busines talents were never properly utilized 
at the NCR and found himself frustrated by the small scope of his activities there, largely 
due to the currency restrictions that so limited at le st certain areas of the firm’s business 
operations in Argentina.48  We have already pointed out that the frequent changing of 
professional positions, both between Germany and Argentina and within Argentina itself, 
prevented Birrenbach, despite his diligent work, from accumulating any substantial 
wealth.  As of 1946, Birrenbach could still bemoan the fact that “my knowledge and 
experience…constitute the only capital which I own.” 49  Thanks to his time in Argentina, 
Birrenbach became acutely conscious of the difficulty of breaking through the “inhibiting 
layers of tradition” in a foreign country to achieve one’s due recognition.50  Finally, after 
so many years in South America, Birrenbach’s personal a d professional links to 
Germany were largely severed and he possessed almost no contacts in the Federal 
                                                
47 KB, Rio de Janeiro, to Boehtlingk, 8 October 1952, ACDP K207/4.  To cite one instance for the purposes 
of illustration, Birrenbach stayed in the hospital for six weeks from the middle of November 1951, 
including some of this time in the German hospital.  This stay included a serious operation on a double 
hernia with an intestinal loop that resulted in complications, among them post-operative abdominal 
hemorrhaging and a high traumatic fever.  Consequently, Birrenbach remained absent from the office for a 
lengthy period, only returning on 2 January 1952 for a few hours a day and even afterwards finding himself 
physically unable to keep an eye on everything goin  at the Lametal-Union.    
48 KB to George A. Marshall, Vice-President, Overseas Operations, NCR, London, 21 May 1948, ACDP 
K206/4.   
  
49 KB to Chickering, 4 May 1946, ACDP K206/4.  For Birrenbach working twelve hours per day during his 
time in Argentina and having only limited leisure time during the evening, see Dr. Tatjana Jelkic, Buenos 
Aires, to KB, 24 June 1975, ACDP K042/1; and KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP 
K158/1.   
50 KB to Siegmund Warburg, 16 June 1966, ACDP K066/1.   
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Republic, a place where, by his own account, he knew practically nobody at this point.  It 
was these professional disadvantages, incurred largely through his emigration, that led 
Birrenbach to see himself at the beginning of the 1950s, therefore at a time when he was 
already approaching his mid-forties, starting from “practically Null.”51 
The years Birrenbach spent in Argentina were agonizing years of alienation.  At 
no point did he ever believe there was a real chance of finding a new home there in South 
America.  On the contrary, he was constantly nagged by the sense, perhaps a guilty one, 
that it had been wrong to emigrate and that his true place remained in Germany.  These 
conflicted feelings troubled him during all these years in spite of, or perhaps because of, 
his “total anti-Hitlerism.”  Indeed, Birrenbach foll wed “with great intensity” the events 
of 20 July 1944, “one of the crucial days of my life,” through every possible broadcast.  
“A hope that I had cherished for more than a decade appeared to be fulfilled,” but he was 
“deeply shaken” when he learned a few hours later that the attempt to overthrow Hitler 
had failed.52  Then there was the dismal nature of his place of exile.  Years later, he 
would explain that he had lived, speaking of Latin America in general, on “a continent 
that always remained foreign [fremd] to me.”  Rather than being ameliorated with time, 
“this has, quite honestly, remained so to the end of our stay in Argentina.”  An important 
element in this regard was that Birrenbach existed th re “in an almost total intellectual 
                                                
51 KB to Heinrich Köppler, Chairman of the Landesverband Rheinland of the CDU Germany, 13 July 1972, 
ACDP K080/1. 
52 KB to Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, 30 May 1984, ACDP K031/2; and KB to 
Gerstenmaier, 21 August 1981, ACDP K086/1.  On Birrenbach being especially interested in and “deeply 
innerly moved” by expositions about and accounts of 20 July 1944, familiar to him from “a rich literature” 
and “contact with a series of participants,” again see KB to Weizsäcker, 30 May 1984, ACDP K031/2.  For
Birrenbach’s “deepest sympathy” for these “German heroes” of 20 July 1944, see KB to Prof. Alex 
Keynan, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 8 May 1981, ACDP K033/3.  Among those personalities 
involved in the active resistance and the 20th July, to one degree or another, with whom Birrenbach 
interacted in the postwar era were Gerstenmaier, Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Hans Speidel and Julius 
Speer. 
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[geistigen] vacuum.”53  This impoverishment was particularly striking forBi renbach 
since, as he would remark even decades later, the en ir atmosphere of his immediately 
preceding Berlin period of 1928-39, but especially the late 1920s and early 30s, was still 
“alive [lebendig]” in him and “[i]n the cultural respect, this time was the high point of my 
life,” an era in which he had been able to enjoy a wide variety of experiences, whether, 
for instance, appearances of the cabaret artist, writer and painter Joachim Ringelnatz or 
numerous theater performances, with stage sets created by the likes of Caspar Neher.54   
For Birrenbach the exile in Argentina was a time during which, despite his best 
efforts, he wanted desperately for worthwhile talks, iterature and theater.  “In the more 
than ten years [of our stay], we have, in Spanish-speaking South America, never seen a 
performance in the theatre of Calderón or Lope de Vega, to cite as examples only these 
authors, whom we could see annually in our home city, Münster.”  His repeated efforts to 
form a lecture- or reading circle resulted in failure, as Birrenbach found that he ended up 
having to give all the talks, “which was also not the point of the matter.”55  This 
dismaying situation was not much improved even by the fact that Birrenbach was in 
contact with the sizeable German emigrant community i  Argentina that already existed 
both in Buenos Aires as well as in the interior of the country.56  He found that of all these 
people, only one, an “outstanding” emigrant journalist named Dr. Silberstein, offered the 
                                                
53 KB to Heinrich Köppler, 13 July 1972, ACDP K080/1.  For Brüning and his sister symbolizing during 
Birrenbach’s stay in Argentina the possibility of overcoming “the feeling of frustration in a strange, 
unloved world through the return to the H imat,” see KB to Brüning, 18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4.  
54 KB to Staatsminister a.D. Otto Schmidt, Wuppertal, 11 July 1967, ACDP K080/3.  As a student in 
Munich, Birrenbach had personally met Ringelnatz, “so that he remained to me… an extremely familiar 
[vertraute] figure.” (KB to Walter Hesselbach, 7 July 1983, ACDP K082/2).   
55 KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/ . 
56 The German colony in Argentina could boast of, among ther organizations, an Argentinian-German 
chamber of commerce, German clubs, a German-Argentine cultural institute, schools and charitable 
institutions.   
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opportunity for interesting and intelligent political discussion.57  However, this particular 
acquaintance, not struck up until after the end of the war, lasted only about a year and a 
half, truncated by Silberstein’s death in 1946.  Birrenbach and other refugees from Nazi 
Germany represented only the latest wave of German i migration to Argentina, part of 
the larger, centuries-old, phenomenon of German colonies in Latin America.  Aside from 
Silberstein, Birrenbach found the Germans in Argentina completely out of touch with the 
realities in their homeland and the world.  “Pictures of Wilhelm II hung in the houses, or 
people still believed in Hitler.”58  This was not to suggest that he had not also come into 
contact with and befriended pleasant people.  “However, I found nobody from whom I 
could receive real and genuine stimulation.”  To exist in such an environment for a period 
of more than ten years was an “enormously difficult situation”, “for a man of my age, at 
that time, a very heavy burden.”59 
Given such experiences, it is probably not all thatshocking that in the future 
Birrenbach did not enthusiastically seek to maintain closer contact with Latin America.  
He certainly did not, indeed could not, cut himself off from the region entirely in later 
years.  He stayed in contact through the mail and even had the occasional meeting, on 
their visits to West Germany, with a number of personal friends, colleagues and 
acquaintances from his time in Argentina.60  However, in most of these instances, 
                                                
57 Silberstein was former head of the Berlin office of the liberal-democratic Frankfurter Zeitung.   
58 The Birrenbach interview “Zeitgenossen,” 7 Septembr 1980, ACDP K213/1. 
59 KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/ .  For Birrenbach’s assessment that, at the 
time he was in South America, the quality of the German immigration in Chile was better than that of most 
South American countries, yet his overall impression, again based on his own past experiences, that the 
German colonies in South America were “frozen and no lo ger very creative,” see KB to Amb. Horst 
Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1.   
60 Among the sporadic connections Birrenbach maintained, to one degree or another and sometimes even 
decades later, from his Argentina time were those t Edmund Stinnes (German industrialist, oldest son of 
Hugo Stinnes and Haverford College professor from 1942-46) and George Udvarhelyi, who would become 
a doctor at Johns Hopkins.  While some of these personalities were still in Argentina, others had since 
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Birrenbach appears to have been more a polite participant, primarily responding to the 
initiative of others, rather than a genuinely enthusiastic one.  Business matters also 
necessitated some involvement in and on rare occasions the odd trip to Latin America, 
and his stock holdings, amount indeterminate, in certain South American ventures were 
the subject of some correspondence.  As a result of his future positions, Birrenbach also 
often had to interact with and manage the relationships of the Thyssen family, and its 
surrounding entourage and business associates, centered on Buenos Aires.  He, thus, 
inevitably became a constituent element in the sometimes soap operatic lives of not only, 
for instance, the countess Anita but also of her two sons, the counts Federico and 
Claudio, an involvement whose frictions often contributed significantly to his worries and 
mental stress.61  However, on the whole, Birrenbach demonstrated no great desire to 
maintain his links to South America any more than absolutely necessary, rather he 
essentially sought to close the book on that chapter of his life.62  Many years later, 
Birrenbach’s view of Latin America, given its myriad political, economic and social 
                                                                                                                                      
moved on to other locations, for instance to the United States or Brazil.  Such communication often 
revolved around one another’s lives and families, with Birrenbach’s career and achievements in the Federal 
Republic being followed especially earnestly, as well as the conditions in their respective countries.  In or 
sometime shortly before June 1975, Birrenbach kindly secured a much-needed pension for a Frau 
Cerwenka in Buenos Aires.    
61 This is probably what Birrenbach was referring to when, reminiscing on his time at Thyssen, he 
remarked that “the human [menschliche] side was not always a pleasure.” (KB to Sohl, 16 July 1979, 
ACDP K160/1).  Some frictions emerged simply from the fact that personalities based in Argentina were 
not as familiar with, or at least did not view from the same perspective, certain problems as Birrenbach and 
other figures in Germany.  Other discord stemmed from Birrenbach’s support of measures, such as capital 
increases, where what he saw as the essential interest of the entire Thyssen firm, the common interest, 
clashed with the putative interest of the Thyssen family, a minority interest.  Claudio and Federico were 
being gradually groomed to participate in major roles in Thyssen business affairs.   
62 Writing to a friend on that continent, Birrenbach admitted that “[m]y desire to fly to South America is 
very low.” (KB to Federico Kobrak, Prov. Buenos Aires, 4 June 1965, ACDP K045/2). 
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problems, remained dim, leading him to remark that, “Argentina remains therefore, to 
quote Clemenceau, a country of the future.”63  
On the other hand, the balance sheet of Birrenbach’s exile in Argentina was not 
entirely negative.  His experiences abroad had left a beneficial mark on him in several 
important respects.  It was during this time in Argentina that Birrenbach seems to have 
especially developed his appreciation of and honed his valuable abilities at networking, a 
particularly indispensable element of business life in Latin America.  This aptitude at 
developing contacts, which we have already alluded to in connection with his passport 
difficulties, had enabled Birrenbach, for instance, to acquire accurate inside knowledge of 
the situations and goings-on within the principal government offices in Argentina.64   
Birrenbach’s exile from Germany also imparted to him a more robust perspective on the 
world.  His extensive experiences in South America underscored for him the significance 
in international relations of what would eventually become popularly known as “the 
                                                
63 For the Clemenceau citation, see KB to Freda Gräfin Douglas, Buenos Aires, 13 July 1983, ACDP 
K082/2.  On Birrenbach’s bleak assessment of a destabilized South America “in a process of upheaval,” 
characterized by left-progressive governments (“progressive in the Marxist sense”) in places like Cuba, 
Bolivia, Peru and Chile under Allende; the collapse of the three social pillars, namely the circle of the
“deux cents familles,” the army (which had functioned as a constitutional moderator), and the church 
(which had now begun to turn to left-progressivism); complicated economic problems that were in part the 
fault of the capitalist countries but also very much of the Latin American countries themselves; an 
exaggerated gap between rich and poor; violence as the trademark of active resistance; perhaps even worse 
than doctrinaire totalitarian states, anarchist tendencies in a general population that did not think in 
intellectual, and therefore Marxist, concepts; and, finally, on the need for reform, see KB to Amb. Horst 
Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1.  For Birrenbach seeing a situation in Brazil 
and Argentina in the early 1980s that was “anything but satisfactory,” see KB to Hans Graf Henckel von
Donnersmarck, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 30 September 1981, ACDP K032/1.   To Chancellor Kohl, who had just 
returned from a trip to the region, Birrenbach remarked “[i]t is only to be asked if by your next visit you 
will find the same heads of state.  That is always the problem in Latin America,” see KB to Kohl, 13 July 
1984, ACDP K029/2.     
64 For Birrenbach’s contact in Paraguay with the Banco del Paraguay, including helpful confidential 
information regarding the imminent issuing of foreign currency contracts, see KB, Buenos Aires, to 
Geschäftsführung of the Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 30 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.  For 
Birrenbach, on his periodic visits to Asunción, ascertaining the, quite good, relations of a certain business 
associate with the various government posts, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Wilhelm Riester, c/o 
Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 23 May 1952, ACDP K207/4.  For Birrenbach having had the 
chance to examine the local embassy’s correspondence with Bonn, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert 
Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion Export, Düsseldorf, 25 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.   
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Third World” and the multitude of challenges it confronted.  More broadly speaking, 
Birrenbach believed that as a result of his extended period in exile, as with his earlier 
university studies abroad, he had “learned to see th  world and our country from the 
perspective of other peoples [Völker].”  Far from being merely academic or philosophical 
in nature, this faculty to readily empathize with foreigners had practical application for 
the future, for “[t]hat makes it simpler to make clar the German matters of concern 
[Anliegen] to the politicians of other states and at the same ti e to recognize the latter’s 
own concerns [Sorgen].” 65  Birrenbach also developed a certain bond and empathy with 
others who, like him, had emigrated, regardless of their destination, “by all recognition of 
the hard fate which an emigration always means.”66 
Also essential for Birrenbach in the future was the development of his affectionate 
relationship to Americans and the United States during the stay in Argentina.  In this 
period, Birrenbach formed close, friendly links with numerous individual Americans, and 
                                                
65 KB to President Gustav Heinemann, Bonn, 10 July 1972, ACDP K080/1.  For Birrenbach’s conviction 
that “one must today know the development of the world in order to understand the future,” and his counsel 
that this, including extensive time abroad, was more important than working for a party in the Federal 
Republic, see KB to Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1.  Beginning 
in late Spring 1952, Birrenbach undertook for the Stahlunion a series of excursions to and generated reports 
about a number of significant South American countries, among them Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil 
(with plans for Venezuela and the possibility of Ecuador).  For Birrenbach’s desire to familiarize himself 
and deal with, beyond the immediate matters at hand, the entire state of affairs of each of these countries, in 
so far as they related to “our branch,” so that in the future he would be able to judge concrete questions 
from his own awareness of the conditions on the spot, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o 
Stahlunion Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 11 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.  Decades later, Birrenbach still 
asserted that the time he had lived in Latin America conferred on him special experience and knowledge of 
that region as well as insights into the way of thought there.  For Birrenbach’s familiarity with the 
circumstances in South America easing his argumentatio  with respect to certain business matters, see KB 
to Dir. Alberto Borchardt, Buenos Aires, 8 July 1958, ACDP K118/1.  On Birrenbach knowing South 
America since the 1930s and his claiming to know not only Argentina but most of the countries of this 
continent, including Chile, see KB to Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP 
K025/1.  For Birrenbach insisting that he, therefor, understood better than other Europeans what the 
current problems in that region meant for the United States, see KB to Haig, 24 February 1981, ACDP 
K146/2.  Finally, on Birrenbach boasting that, as an “authority [Kenner]” on Latin America and especially 
Argentina, he had correctly estimated the English intervention in the Falkland Islands already from the 
second day on and had also advised his firm in this sense, see KB to Federal President Prof. Karl Carstens, 
Bonn, 27 May 1982, ACDP K033/1.    
66 KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/ . 
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his interest in and rapport with the US, albeit from a distance, became quite strong.  
Already while in Argentina, Birrenbach was extensively examining the problems of the  
American Politik, including foreign policy, and acquired a comprehensive knowledge of 
American literature and press.67  Such developments were, of course, due in no small part 
to his employment in an American firm.  Whatever his grousing about the nature of the 
work, Birrenbach would years later describe the NCR as “an important and personally 
pleasant [angenehmes] refuge” during his years of emigration.  He, furthermore, would 
speculate that his engagement for the strengthening of European-American and German-
American relations was ultimately due not only to the objective necessity of the closest 
possible friendship between these entities, but also to more personal reasons: namely, his 
lasting gratitude for the fairness and friendship of the Americans when he had departed 
Germany in 1939; and the “extraordinarily good experience” he had had in the NCR at, 
for him, a critical time.68  During his employment with this American firm, Birrenbach 
also gained a certain sense of the American character, including what he considered a 
remarkable ignorance regarding international relations and the situation and concerns of 
other states and peoples (and sometimes vice-versa).69  Perhaps the fact that Birrenbach 
                                                
67 KB to John McCloy, 19 December 1968, ACDP K210/1. 
68 KB to Rolf Hennig, Buenos Aires, 21 February 1973, ACDP K039/1.  On the links between Argentina 
and the US, including considerable foreign trade, se  KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP 
K207/4.  Also, for the Lametal-Union’s current negotiations with an American finance group aimed at 
securing the financing of a particular transaction (u usually involving Südwerke), since the local, 
Argentinean, state authorities were not able to pay cash, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Franz von Papen, Jr., 
Düsseldorf, 4 June 1951, ACDP K207/4. 
69 KB to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von Staden, BKA, confidential, 18 June 1980, ACDP K034/1. 
Birrenbach’s later concerns about US protectionism were based in part on his having worked in an 
American “Weltfirma” where he had, nevertheless, seen the extent to which exports were treated “with the 
left hand” (KB to Wilfried Guth, Vorstand member, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 29 March 1978, ACDP  
K153/1).  Birrenbach saw the incomprehension and lack of understanding between Americans (more 
broadly, the North Americans) and Latin Americans, who themselves suffered from an inferiority complex, 
as mutual.  For Birrenbach explaining that during his many years of contact with South America he had 
repeatedly observed “how foreign these two worlds are to one another [wie fremd diese zwei Welten 
einander gegenüberstehen],” see “Die Herausforderungen der achtziger Jahre,“ by KB, intended for Dr. 
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had not witnessed the wartime destruction of Germany further curbed in him any of the, 
admittedly anyway remarkably little, animosity that existed between former German and 
American foes.  This sympathy appears to have been undented by what Birrenbach 
considered a certain neutralist, even anti-American, se timent in Argentina at the time.70 
Of course, Birrenbach’s time in South America also paved the way for his future 
business activities in the Federal Republic.  The knowledge of the steel industry that he 
gained during the war years and after 1949 was, in his own words, “invaluable,” and 
formed the foundation on which he later built his career in Germany.71  Even more 
specifically, as he himself remarked, “[t]he painful way of voluntary emigration became 
for me the bridge of my political activity and also of my contact to Thyssen.”72  As 
already noted, this contact with the Thyssen complex dated from his experiences in 
Argentina with the Thyssen-Lametal and the Stahlunion-Export.  Finally, though 
Birrenbach’s emigration was potentially problematic in ertain respects, in so far as even 
repatriates were viewed for quite some time thereafter with an irreconcilable suspicion in 
the Federal Republic by some German nationalists, he eems to never have had to 
                                                                                                                                      
Spethmann, 16 September 1982, ACDP K075/1.  On the serious psychological mistakes the US had 
committed in dealing with Central America, see KB to Brzezinski, 20 January 1982, ACDP K146/1.   
70 For Birrenbach’s analysis of Argentina’s foreign policy as being characterized by the idea of a neutralis  
“third position” vis-à-vis the two large power blocs onfronting one other in the world today, therefo a 
negative position towards Russia without identifying tself with the policy of the Atlantic powers; and by 
the government’s related stress on preserving its sovereignty and resisting all outside intervention and 
influence in the Argentinian Politik, whether by the UN, the United States (from which Argentina feared 
efforts at democratization) or others, to the point where it even rejected any financial relationship w th the 
US; and on the traditional Argentinian friendship with England in international politics having come to an 
end, see KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP K207/4.  On the constant propagandistic 
attacks and accusations against the US, which Birrenbach attributed to domestic political reasons, again see 
KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP K207/4.  For Birrenbach’s assessment that the South 
American’s relationship to the United States was generally worse than his good relationship to the large 
European nations, including a Germany, and then Federal Republic, that was still very beloved in Chile at 
the time Birrenbach was in South America; and the opportunities this offered a clever European policy to 
influence the situation favorably in the long-run in a place like Chile (unless Marxism really did triumph 
there), see KB to Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1.  
71 KB to Max Bade, Buenos Aires, 16 March 1956, ACDP K213/4. 
72 KB to Julius Speer, 18 July 1977, ACDP K173/1. 
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surmount noteworthy hurdles in this regard and was henceforth always able to claim, 
including to his American and other foreign contacts, that he had emigrated to Latin 
America on account of his wholehearted opposition to, indeed profound suffering under, 
Hitler and National Socialism.73  This was particularly advantageous in bolstering his 
credentials, given at least the perception that the German Wirtschaft without exception 
had been complicit with the National Socialist regime, a perception reinforced by the 
postwar incarceration and trial as major war criminals at Nuremberg of some of the 
leading German industrialists, also from the steel industry, and the dismissal of thousands 
of officials and skilled workers as part of the efforts at denazification, demilitarization 
and democratization.74  It does not seem that Birrenbach’s apparently short-lived National 
                                                
73 The controversial issue of whether repatriated émigrés from the Third Reich were treated as traitors or 
fellow citizens in the Federal Republic became something of a touchstone for the Allies regarding 
fundamental German attitudes toward freedom.  For Birrenbach boasting of his voluntary and principled 
departure from Germany in 1939 as a means of demonstrati g his moral rectitude, see KB to Prof. Helmut 
Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.  For Birrenbach’s later claim that he “detested” the
National Socialist regime, see KB to Hanna Holborn G ay, 7 February 1980, ACDP K158/1.  On his “total 
rejection of National Socialism,” which he had viewed as a “completely unacceptable,” “extreme Politik,” 
see Sowjetisch-westlicher Handel-Erfahrungen und Perspektiven, April 1981, ACDP K075/1.   
74 Among those current and future Thyssen personalities interned for extended periods after the war was 
Fritz Thyssen himself, as well as Hans-Günther Sohl and Ernst Wolff-Mommsen.  Radio Moscow and 
other Soviet propaganda consistently painted a picture of Birrenbach as a Nazi war criminal, with refence 
to his listing in the 1965 “Brown Book” authored bythe DDR’s Albert Norden, and the intermediary of the 
Ruhr monopolies to the American economic leadership.  He had allegedly not only joined the NSDAP in 
1933 and entered the ranks of the SA, but had also t ken part in anti-Jewish pogroms and left Germany for 
Argentina in 1939 at the behest of the Ruhr magnates, including the criminals of the chemical combine IG 
Farben, and established links there to the American mo opolists.  Birrenbach, for his part, denied any
contact with and even knowledge of possible war criminals, including any personalities linked to the Third 
Reich working in Buenos Aires (for instance for IG Farben), during the war.  As of 1981, Birrenbach 
claimed he had only once in the last twenty years hd an encounter in circles of the Wirtschaft with 
National Socialism, when, “startled,” he had left a unction with his wife shortly after surveying the ost’s 
library (KB to Prof. Hermann Lübbe, Birchli, Haus Claudia, Switzerland, 23 April 1981, ACDP K032/1).  
Nevertheless, Birrenbach could also be critical of postwar Allied measures directed at alleged war 
criminals.  For Birrenbach’s argument that the trial of Alfried Krupp was “no fair procedure,” see KB 
Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1.  As of 1951, with respect to German rearmament, Birrenbach 
regretted the plight of the only military element that remained fit for action in western Germany: the 
German soldier, whose army had been not only destroyed in the Second World War, but then dissolved, 
“defamed,” and many of its representative leaders branded “war criminals.”  At the same time, “[t]he 
solidarity of the western defense” was incompatible with “the existence of two kinds of rights and duties” 
that would have “a second-class soldier spread out in combat teams among foreign divisions from the 
North Cape to Sicily.”  Understandably, “[t]he echo to the Allies’ hitherto neither clear nor convincig 
twelfth-hour appeal is extremely mixed….  nobody will be ready to take up the weapons that one considers 
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Socialist affiliations ever resulted in real scandal or inhibited in the slightest his re-
integration into German society.   
F. At Thyssen 
The early 1950s formed a transitional period for Bir enbach between South 
America and Germany, during which he ever more actively prepared his return “from the 
New World.”75  Starting in 1950, he was able to visit the Federal Republic on several 
occasions, sometimes staying months at a time on busi ess, and finally returned for good 
in early December 1952.  Whatever the previous ups and downs of his life, Birrenbach 
quickly reacclimated himself to German conditions, and his business career advanced 
rapidly thereafter.  From his appointment at the end of 1952 until 1955, he served as the
deputy managing director of the Stahlunion in Düsseldorf.  In this position, he almost 
immediately assumed responsibility for significant operations, especially in the carrying 
out of consortium deals with governments and economic rganizations, both in Europe, 
including with East bloc states, and overseas, as well as in the initiation and promotion, 
despite certain resistance, of a policy stressing the sale of complete plants and facilities 
                                                                                                                                      
pressing into his hand full of misgivings and in insufficient extent.” (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen 
West und Ost,” by Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, 7-10 February 1951, Freie Presse (Buenos Aires), ACDP K001/1). 
75 Prior to departing South America, Birrenbach sought, at the desire of the Lametal-Union board of 
directors, to wrap up several remaining matters in the hope of securing the future of and minimizing the 
dangers confronting the firm.  These included the initiation of his successor on the board as well as 
negotiations regarding particular deals and talks related to the creation of a unified representation, between 
the Lametal-Union and Rofmadel, of the Stahlunion interests.  On Birrenbach’s influential role in the 
Lametal-Union/Rofmadel negotiations “as honest broke ,” practically acting as a “Stahlunion 
Vertrauensmann,” see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 
11 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.  For Birrenbach’s friendly, trusting but also businesslike contacts with key
figures at Rofmadel, which considerably eased his work in these negotiations, also see KB to 
Geschäftsführung of the Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 27 August 1952, ACDP K207/4.  On 
Birrenbach’s urgent efforts in Argentina rendering him unable to address a series of tasks in various other 
South American countries and on the recent Stahlunion request that, as arranged, he now, after repeatedly 
granted vacations, return to Germany to help reliev the hard-pressed Geschäftsführung there, see KB, Rio 
de Janeiro, to Boehtlingk, 8 October 1952, ACDP K207/4.  Finally, on Birrenbach’s earlier resolve to 
leave, even if all issues at the Lametal-Union were not entirely settled, see KB to Geschäftsführung of the 
Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 27 August 1952, ACDP K207/4.   
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(Anlagengeschäfte).  Thus, Birrenbach functioned in 1953-54 in an expert capacity to 
help guide a German steel industry consortium in delicat  negotiations, conducted by the 
Ostausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft, in Berlin and Vienna with a delegation from 
Romania about the extensive compensation arrangements that would undergird the first 
postwar trade agreements with that country, inclusive of a major sales operation with 
Canada.  Later, he was also influential in hammering out the deal leading to the sale and 
construction of the first German oil refinery in Greece, the state refinery in Aspropyrgos 
opened in November 1958, both in the meetings among the four German and American 
firms comprising the consortium and in that consortium’s talks, including in and around 
Athens, with the Greek government.76  Other, less important, operations in this vein 
included the sale, involving the firm Diehl, of a munitions factory, again, to Greece.   
In September 1954, in a core event for his career, Birrenbach was appointed by 
Anita Gräfin de Zichy-Thyssen, daughter of the deceased Fritz Thyssen, plenipotentiary 
(Generalbevollmächtigter) for the management of her interests in Germany.  As such, he 
became chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen (Düsseldorf), 
                                                
76 The Greek oil refinery venture, which benefited from a Hermes export credit guarantee, unfolded within 
the context of an increasing involvement of the German Wirtschaft in major development projects in that 
country after the conclusion of a November 1953 agreement on economic cooperation between the Federal 
Republic and Greece.  It also existed in a framework of efforts at collaboration on large oil refinery 
projects, both among German enterprises (e.g. Thyssen, Gutehoffnungshütte; Krupp, Mannesmann-Hoesch, 
Phoenix-Rheinrohr, Hydrocarbon) as well as on an international basis with, for instance, Belgian, English, 
American, French, Dutch and Italian firms.  Such undertakings planned during this period included the BP 
Ruhr refinery in Dinslaken, which came into operation n 1960.  The German firms in the Greek oil 
refinery consortium were the Stahlunion-Export GmbH (represented by Birrenbach), the Fried. Krupp 
Maschinen- und Stahlbau Rheinhausen and the Hydrocarb n Mineralöl GmbH (Düsseldorf), with the 
American member, the New York-based Hydrocarbon Research, Inc., functioning as a consulting firm.  
Among the matters Birrenbach dealt with on this project was the Kurssicherung (exchange-rate hedging), 
with respect to which he pushed for the contract to be converted to dollars rather than marks, based on his 
assessment that the dollar would be the more solid currency in the long-run.  As of November 1960, an 
impressed Birrenbach believed the work on the refinery in Greece “has borne such rich fruits” and saw fit 
to point out the undertaking to economics minister Ludwig Erhard and his Ministerialdirektor, Hermann 
Reinhardt, as a positive result of international private economic cooperation in development aid (KB to Dr. 
F. Ringer, 7 November 1960, ACDP K207/2).   
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the holding company for her inherited share of her father’s deconcentrated and restituted 
fortune, essentially large groups of securities of elect successor firms of the liquidated 
VSt.  In 1966, after the death of Amélie Thyssen, Aita’s mother, he would become chair 
of the Verwaltungsrat of the newly founded Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung GmbH 
(Düsseldorf), a fusion of the Thyssen Gesellschaft für Beteiligungen mbH (into which the 
AG had been transformed in 1964) and counterpart Fritz Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung 
AG (Cologne), that now administered the Thyssen family’s entire Aktienpaket.77  By 
1955, to fulfill his task of representing family and company in the firms in which they 
controlled sizeable capital, Birrenbach also entered, and over the next decades by and 
large remained in, the Aufsichtsräte of the enterprises belonging to the Thyssen group 
after the dissolution of the VSt.  These included, most importantly, the August-Thyssen-
Hütte AG (Duisburg), as well as the Deutsche Edelstah werke AG, Niederrheinische 
Hütte AG, Westfälische Union AG, Phoenix-Rheinrohr AG, Handelsunion AG and 
Thyssen & Co. AG.78  So, he embarked on his primary business career as a manager of 
                                                
77 Fritz Thyssen was the oldest son and, at least in some ways, truest successor of the steel magnate and 
firm founder August Thyssen.  The Allies had divided up the VSt into eighteen separate entities.  In line 
with the deconcentration plan, the Fritz Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung AG was founded on 18 December 
1953 with Amélie Thyssen, Fritz Thyssen’s widow, as the sole shareholder, and the Thyssen AG für 
Beteiligungen was founded (initially registered and based in Cologne) on 5 February 1954 with Anita 
Gräfin de Zichy-Thyssen as sole shareholder, with each initially containing shares of the VSt in the 
nominal amount of about RM 47.7 million.  From these shares emerged a claim of the Thyssen AG für 
Beteiligungen, with a Grundkapital set at DM 20 million, to shares of the VSt successor companies of 
approximately a nominal DM 145.8 million.  Other principal VSt shareholders engaged in the 
deconcentration process included the Rheinische Stahlwerke (Essen), the Koninklijke Nederlandsche 
Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken NV (Holland), the Opriba Handels- und Verwaltungs-KG, and the Allianz 
Versicherung AG.  On all this, see the Plan for the Deconcentration of the Thyssen Participation in the VSt. 
AG in Liquidation, 10 February 1953; the Note regarding the Gewerkschaft Preußen and Thyssen 
Deconcentration Plan; the Business Report of the Vorstand of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen about the 
First Business Year from 9 March to 30 November 1954; and the Overview about the exchange of VSt-
successor shares between the Thyssen I and Thyssen II, each in ACDP K206/5.  Birrenbach actually 
became a member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen on 15 July 1954 shortly before 
replacing the Cologne lawyer Anton Comes as chairman.    
78 In 1954-55, Birrenbach was a member of the Aufsichtsrat of the VSt, therefore during the process of and 
up to its final liquidation.  As of April 1976, the TVV GmbH held, since the ending of the deconcentration 
measures, shares (a Schachtelbeteiligung) in the ATH with a nominal value of 275 million DM.    
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the Thyssen industrial assets, a task he carried out jointly with Robert Ellscheid, initially 
the other pole of the Vermögensverwaltung as Generalbevollmächtigter of Amélie 
Thyssen and thus, up to 1966, AR chairman of the FTV.79  In this context, Birrenbach 
also cooperated with Hans-Günther Sohl, chairman of the ATH Vorstand, therefore a key 
figure at Thyssen, and one of the most eminent postwar German Unternehmer.   
Here, Birrenbach also found himself in contact and cooperating in various forms 
with those in fields beyond the Montanindustrie.  Unlike the US and Britain, West 
Germany featured a symbiotic system of inter-locking company directorates, with the 
ATH AR including over the years leading representatives from the boards of firms like 
Siemens and the Volkswagenwerk.  In line with the cozy relationship in West Germany 
between industry and the big banks, something that also differed from the US and Britain, 
Birrenbach found himself not only collaborating in a business sense with, for instance, 
the Commerzbank, but also sitting in AR meetings with personalities from the Deutsche 
Bank and serving from 1962 as a member of the Zentralbeirat of the Dresdner Bank AG 
(Frankfurt).80  As a member of numerous “mitbestimmten” ARs (such as that of the ATH 
                                                
79 Ellscheid had been the Generalbevollmächtigter and co-executor (along with the Buenos Aires-based 
Carlos Linck) of the will of Fritz Thyssen.  In 1966, following the death of Amélie Thyssen the previous 
year, Ellscheid entered the Verwaltungsrat of the TVV GmbH as one of the two deputy chairs.  Birrenbach 
was also in contact about business affairs with the Bu nos Aires-based Guillermo von Winterhalder, 
Anita’s Bevollmächtigter for her affairs outside of Germany, an often contentious relationship that 
prolonged Birrenbach’s peripheral involvement with South America and in which his prior experiences 
there, for instance with the Lametal-Union, played a prominent role in the discussions surrounding future 
decisions.  Birrenbach’s outrage at the potential impact of Winterhalder’s extravagant South American 
transactions resulted, in connection with the 1964 reorganization of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen, in 
the founding of the Südamerikanische Vermögensverwaltung GmbH in Luxembourg, with a capital of Lfrs. 
20 million, as a holding for Gräfin Anita’s South American shares and in which the, now, Thyssen 
Gesellschaft für Beteiligungen mbH held a 51% stake.  Later on, the Zichy-Thyssen Real Estate Ltd. was
founded in Canada as a subsidiary of the TVV.  In 1971, Birrenbach also became B vollmächtigter for 
Anita’s two sons, the counts Zichy-Thyssen.   
80 Birrenbach identified the origins of his links to the Dresdner Bank in his decades-long and, despite his 
lengthy time away, still close and personal connection to Carl Goetz.  Later on, from 1970-79, Birrenbach 
was also a member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Colonia Versicherung AG (Cologne), the second-largest 
German insurance company at the time. 
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itself), Birrenbach claimed that he had “always hadun erstanding for the questions of the 
co-determination” and that, in general, he always had very good personal and political 
relations to the trade unions, including being “on very good terms” [auf sehr gutem Fuße] 
with the successive DGB chairmen like Willi Richter, Ludwig Rosenberg and Heinz-
Oskar Vetter, who themselves belonged to these ARs.81  Embracing what he considered 
the great tradition created by Hans Böckler, the first president of the DGB, and the 
concept of a social partnership of Unternehmer and Arbeitnehmer, Birrenbach welcomed 
and saw himself promoting the harmonious climate ess ntial to the constructive solution, 
despite conflicting interests, of their mutual problems and tasks regarding the Thyssen 
group.  In a remark that applied not only to the development of the economy but also, in a 
socio-political sense, of the wider Gesellschaft, he even suggested “it is unthinkable we 
could have accomplished what we did without the complete cooperation of labor.”82  
Thus, Birrenbach could boast, “[n]obody has ever considered me unsozial.”83   
Birrenbach’s rise within the Thyssen complex, especially during the early years, 
was aided by a number of valuable contacts.  These included, perhaps most importantly, 
the Thyssen family itself, with which he had forged a “Vertrauens-” relationship in 
Buenos Aires after the war.  This manifested itself not only in a friendship with, but also 
in a personal advisory role to the family while he was in South America.  However, 
Birrenbach had also first begun encountering other key, Germany-based personalities 
during the very late 1940s and early 1950s that likew se facilitated his accession, initially 
                                                
81 KB to Prof. Hermann Lübbe, 25 June 1980, ACDP K034/2. 
82 Clipping about Birrenbach’s talk to representatives of the “West Coast business schools” in the United 
States on 1 July 1963, ACDP K157/1.  On the lack of pr tests, even the consent, of the labor unions with 
respect to reconcentration, see Pressespiegel Nr. 25, Rheinisch-Westfälische Eisen- und Stahlwerke AG,
Allgemeine Verwaltung Pressestelle, Mülheim, Ruhr, 26 January 1957, ACDP K078/2.   
83 KB to Prof. Hermann Lübbe, 25 June 1980, ACDP K034/2.  For Birrenbach’s belief that in the current 
situation it was important to support the DGB against “the rabble-rousers from above” [Aufrührer von 
oben], see KB to Prof. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1.  
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in the role of “Schützling,” within the Thyssen firm: from 1949, Robert Nyssen, the 
Geschäftsführer of the Stahlunion; Ellscheid, the Cologne lawyer and Thyssen family 
advisor, whom Birrenbach initially met in the Hotel Plaza in Buenos Aires in the early 
1950s; and Sohl, a Vorstand member of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke then given 
responsibility by the Allies for its liquidation, whom Birrenbach had first met in Buenos 
Aires after Fritz Thyssen’s death there in February 1951.  At various times, these 
individuals encouraged him to return to Germany, offered valuable business and career 
advice; brought him into connection with particular firms, for instance, Sohl with respect 
to the VSt and later the August-Thyssen-Hütte; helped ave the way for him to secure 
particular positions, notably Nyssen with regard to the Stahlunion and, then, Ellscheid 
with respect to the position of Generalbevollmächtigter for the Gräfin Zichy-Thyssen; 
and, finally, assisted him in developing further vital contacts with individuals and firms 
within the Thyssen area.  It is hard to imagine Birrenbach’s rise within the Thyssen 
concern without the essential aid provided by such personalities.84   
                                                
84 On the need to properly consider the interests involved in certain business undertakings so as to ensur  
that the friendly relations with the Thyssen family, “which are important for more than one reason,” not be 
endangered, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Wilhelm Riester, c/o Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 23 
May 1952, ACDP K207/4.  For Birrenbach’s consultations with the local advisors of Anita Thyssen and the 
Thyssen family and with the leading personalities within the Thyssen administration there in Buenos Aires, 
see again KB to Riester, 23 May 1952, ACDP K207/4 as well as KB, Buenos Aires, to Geschäftsführung of 
the Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 30 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.  It was a visit by Nyssen to 
Buenos Aires that had resulted in the transfer to the Lametal-Union of the Stahlunion representation and to 
Birrenbach’s being entrusted, at the behest of the S ahlunion Geschäftsführung, with the leadership of the 
Lametal-Union, at the expense of its apparently infer or earlier chief, Ernesto Nicolai [see, for example, 
KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. W. Riester, in Firma Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 14 September 1951, 
ACDP K207/4].  For Ellscheid’s role in 1954, along with that of other personalities, in successfully 
proposing Birrenbach, including to Winterhalder, for the position of Generalbevollmächtigter of the 
countess Zichy-Thyssen, see, for instance, Ellscheid to KB, 28 September 1954, ACDP K206/5.  Ellscheid, 
Sohl and Pieter Sanders formally offered Birrenbach the post, in the name of Gräfin Anita Zichy.  Sanders 
was a Dutch jurist who had administered the German assets seized by the Netherlands after World War II, 
including those of Fritz Thyssen, and then became a long-time member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Thyssen 
AG für Beteiligungen, the Verwaltungsrat of the Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung GmbH and the 
Aufsichtsrat of the August-Thyssen-Hütte.  Decisive in Birrenbach’s acceptance was his talk with Ellscheid 
on a long morning walk, with Ellscheid’s wife, along one of the Bavarian lakes.  On Birrenbach feeling 
great warmth for Ellscheid since they had known one a other, his insistence that “I personally have never 
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Meanwhile, Birrenbach absorbed and embraced the ethos prevalent at the time 
among these and other top personalities at Thyssen, and indeed in much of the West 
German business milieu.  He admired Generaldirektor Sohl and other particular 
Unternehmer that he worked with, especially those he considered self-made men, for 
their far-sightedness, breadth of activity, risk-taing, energy and leadership qualities.  His 
own international knowledge and experience were highly valued in this environment that 
was so indicative of the postwar structural changes that had imposed their stamp on the 
hitherto inward-looking industry of the Ruhr.  Stress was now placed on frequent travel 
abroad and on interaction with foreign shareholders.  Connections and cooperation with 
foreign companies, steel or otherwise, were sought out, with existing firms engaged and 
new branches founded abroad with the specific intent to preserve and promote interests 
there.  A keen sensitivity flourished towards variations in international Konjunktur, trade 
and currency order.  Efforts were undertaken to locate foreign sources of capital and 
financing as well as supplies of raw materials, like coal, ore and scrap metal, abroad.  Not 
only were foreign markets sought out as potential export opportunities but practices of 
acquisition, processing and production were also carried out in an international context.  
While Europe, including countries like Austria and Switzerland, played a significant role 
in all of this, North America, especially the United States and Canada, represented an 
overseas focal point.85 
                                                                                                                                      
forgotten nor ever will forget what you have done for me since my return to Germany,” and the affability 
existing between the Birrenbach and Ellscheid families, see KB to Ellscheid, 9 November 1955, ACDP 
K206/5.    
85 As of the late 1950s, the West German Hüttenwerke had discovered that, with the Wirtschaftswunder, the 
pre-war domestic, Swedish and (to a lesser extent) North African ore supplies no longer sufficed and also 
found themselves using large amounts of American coal.  Meanwhile, the desire to export may well have 
sparked Birrenbach’s objections during the mid- to la e-1950s to what he considered a dangerous revaluing 
of the mark, including relative to the dollar, and his stress on the need for an eventual all-European 
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Likewise, Birrenbach propounded the at times seemingly i coherent but, upon 
closer inspection, actually shrewdly self-interested p rspective of the state’s proper role 
in the economic world typically entertained in some way, shape or form by so many 
businesspeople.  On the one hand, he touted flexible market economic systems that were 
expected to provide indispensable stability, security [Sicherheit], freedom and growth to 
a strong private Wirtschaft.  He criticized and hoped to contain the public budget’s “flood 
of expenditures,” insisting that those expenditures d emed desirable should be oriented to 
the growth of the social product.  Birrenbach argued that the federal government should 
exercise reserve in its Wirtschaftspolitik and avoid hasty overreactions, via “a global 
steering [Steuerung],” to every short-term fluctuation of the data.  The Wirtschaft had to 
be shielded from “all disruptions of its normal course, regardless of from which side they 
come,” so that its “self-healing forces” could develop unhindered.  On the other hand, 
even in the midst of a tight budgetary situation, Birrenbach believed that “die öffentliche 
Hand” should utilize its expenditure, economic and finance policies to engage in “an 
active Konjunkturpolitik.”  He also insisted on collaboration in R&D between state, 
Wirtschaft and Wissenschaft to keep pace with technological developments and promoted 
a more trusting cooperation between the state and the two Tarifpartner, management and 
the labor unions, though without impairing free collective bargaining [Tarifautonomie].86  
Though hardly surprising in light of his vocation, Birrenbach thought, perhaps not 
exclusively, but certainly principally in terms of how the state at any given time could 
                                                                                                                                      
currency alignment involving a rectification of the exchange rates of the franc and, in the longer run, the 
pound.    
86 On “the flood of expenditures,” see Birrenbach’s speech at the ATH Hauptversammlung on 28 March 
1963, ACDP K077/2.  On the protection of the Wirtschaft from disturbances to its normal development, on 
the “selbstheilenden Kräfte,” and on the need for a “Sanierung” (rehabilitation) of the public budget, but 
also for “an active Konjunkturpolitik,” see Birrenbach’s speech at the ATH HV of 19 April 1968, ACDP 
K063/1.   
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benefit business and industry (and especially the ste l industry), whether through action 
or inaction.   
The two major processes molding Thyssen during Birrenbach’s career there were 
an intimately related rationalization and reconcentration.  With the “Entflechtungs”-
measures imposed by the victorious Allies, the prope ty of Fritz Thyssen, as contained in 
the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, had been broken up into smaller units.87  Especially for the 
Americans, decartelization and other organizational reforms of West German industry,  
including iron, steel and coal sectors, aimed not just at preventing an undue influence of 
particular individuals but also at integration into a liberal-capitalist international system 
dominated by the US.  Ironically, given his pronounced Atlanticism, Birrenbach at the 
very least served as an instrument of those still-powerful elements in the Wirtschaft who, 
adhering to older traditions, resisted these policies, which they saw as a discriminatory, 
economically nonsensical Politikum with, as Birrenbach put it, “fatal” impact.  In light of 
an increasingly competitive and constantly expanding national and international market 
in Europe and beyond, displaying extraordinary economic growth and technological 
development and an ever tighter interweaving of the large economic areas, Birrenbach 
considered it essential to reverse the deconcentration nd to rationalize the firms of the 
Thyssen group into more closely cooperative entities capable of enhancing productivity 
and investment and reducing costs.  He viewed this as part of an international trend 
actually towards concentration in the Montanindustrie, evident at West German firms like 
Mannesmann, Hoesch and Klöckner, and really in all capital-intensive growth industries, 
whether (perhaps especially) in the US and Britain, the nationalized economic branches 
                                                
87 These measures were based on orders issued by the Allied High Commission, including Law Nr. 27 of 16 
May 1950 and, more specifically, its Combined Steel Group’s order of 29 April 1953.   
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of the Western world or the Kombinaten of the Soviet bloc.  In the case of Thyssen, the 
process posed tough financial, legal, tax and human problems and, moreover, involved a 
struggle against the Allied conditions prohibiting just such a reconcentration.88   
Partial reconcentration, centered on the ATH Stammwerk, ultimately succeeded, 
largely due to the efforts of Birrenbach and Ellscheid, as the FRG attained a measure of 
sovereignty and US influence in this area waned.  Perhaps driven not only by old 
perspectives and conditions but also by changed circumstances, interests and needs, the 
process began in 1956 with the liquidation of the Gewerkschaft Preußen and the takeover 
of its assets, already seen as a “silent victory” in the struggle against the Allied 
conditions, followed over the years by other complicated “Einbringungs”-transactions 
involving the Niederrheinische Hütte, Deutsche Edelstahlwerke, Handelsunion and 
Phoenix-Rheinrohr.  While the takeover of Phoenix i 1964 represented a crowning act, 
the mergers continued into the late 1960s and beyond.  After Phoenix, reconcentration 
became mere concentration, involving firms outside the former “Stahlverein,” such as the 
Hüttenwerke Oberhausen AG (1968) and Mannesmann-Röhrenwerke AG (1969), and 
generating new constellations.89  This approach did not simply focus on horizontal 
                                                
88 For Birrenbach on the “fatal [verhängnisvoll]” effects of the “overly strong Entflechtung,” see KB to 
Winterhalder, Buenos Aires, 8 February 1954, ACDP K206/5.  On the size of American steel concerns far 
exceeding that of the VSt, see Pressespiegel Nr. 25, Rheinisch-Westfälische Eisen- und Stahlwerke AG, 
Allgemeine Verwaltung, Pressestelle, Mülheim, Ruhr, 26 January 1957, ACDP K078/2.  On the tax 
privileges enjoyed and the “extraordinarily high tax obligations” and possible prohibitions of the German 
Entflechtungs-law avoided thanks to a Thyssen Deconstruction Plaentailing that each of the two heiresses 
of Fritz Thyssen transferred their shares to new holding companies founded precisely for this purpose, 
instead of to their private assets, see KB to Guillermo von Winterhalder, Buenos Aires, 1 April 1955, 
ACDP K206/5.  For Birrenbach’s consultations with exp rts familiar with the complex Entflechtungs-
material, namely Georg Eichhorn, Finanzpräsident a.D. in the Oberfinanzdirektion Düsseldorf, and Erwin 
Rheinlaender, the tax expert of the VSt, with respect to particularly difficult tax and legal questions 
concerning the holding, again see KB to Guillermo von Winterhalder, 1 April 1955, ACDP K206/5.   
89 Such efforts go far in explaining the only mixed rsults borne by Allied decartelization measures, depit  
their being buttressed by legislation passed by the Federal Republic itself.  Perhaps also of relevence, even 
as they persisted in this course (still at least to ome extent as of 1957), the Allies themselves, influe ced by 
the drain on their own taxpayers and by initially bleak conditions in West Germany, increasingly 
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integration but also aspired to a degree of vertical (re)integration with coal, trade 
(Handelsunion AG) and, later, processing (Rheinstahl AG, 1973).90  The development of 
the ATH was that of a unique enterprise but also reflected the course of the German steel 
industry and Wirtschaft as a whole.  Almost entirely in ruins at its belated “re-founding” 
in May 1953 due to heavy war damage and the dismantling of its few intact plants, a 
vestige of the draconian Morgenthau Plan, the ATH underwent a rapid revival to become 
the biggest German steel company and private European st el group and to assume its 
place among the largest of German enterprises and Western steel firms.  Testament to a 
certain postwar continuity of elite personnel and organizational concept in the German 
steel industry, reconcentration stands as Birrenbach’s supreme achievement at Thyssen.91 
G. Into Politics 
While Birrenbach would maintain close ties with Thyssen throughout the rest of 
his life, he early on set about intensively expanding his horizons in the Federal Republic 
beyond the world of business into that of politics, befitting a man who described himself 
as “a politician from passion from childhood.”  Far from following a spontaneous path, 
                                                                                                                                      
questioned the value and feasibility of such policies in the Montanindustrie.  The Gewerkschaft Preußen 
(Mülheim/Ruhr) was a private holding company, a Gewerkschaft neuen Rechts, created by Fritz Thyssen 
that contained his shares in the VSt, namely an Aktienpaket of an approximate nominal value of RM 95.4 
million.  Representing 20.75% of the VSt Aktienkapital this had been reduced from the original 26% of the 
VSt Grundkapital due to measures taken against Thyssen by the National Socialist government.  
90 Major transactions intended to secure a sufficient coal basis involved, for instance, the GBAG 
(Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG) in 1957, therefore before the onset of the coal crisis, and the HABAG in 
1965, in the midst of the crisis.  The GBAG was the largest German coal-mining company at the time.  
Even prior to these transactions, the ATH had a majority share in the Erin Bergbau AG, while the property 
of the Gewerkschaft Preußen had also included coal fields.  Die GBAG and Essen-based Rheinstahl were 
erstwhile parts of the VSt.  The Handelsunion was the parent company of the Stahlunion.   
91 The Demontage of the ATH was halted on the basis of the Petersberg Agreement of November 1949, 
which also permitted West Germany to resume internaio l trade and obligated it to implement 
decartelization legislation in accord with the occupation statutes.  While the destroyed and dismantled ATH 
had a remaining annual production of just 400,000 tons of raw steel, by April 1973 it  had an annual 
capacity of 15 million tons (Excerpt from Birrenbach’s Speech at the ATH HV on 17 April 1973 in 
Duisburg, ACDP K067/2).  As of October 1980, the Thyssen AG (formerly the ATH) had 150,000 workers 
and annual sales of DM 25 billion worldwide (KB to Helmut Kohl, 20 October 1980, ACDP K032/1).  
Such a recovery lends some credence to Birrenbach’s claims that he had returned, after a long absence, to a 
Federal Republic in the midst of what he called its “founding phase.”   
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Birrenbach’s career evinces an explicit, though rudimentary, long-term plan, a blueprint 
bereft of a concrete timetable but consisting of bradly conceived, interrelated steps.  As 
he explained in these terms, his entrance into politics represented “the second stage of my 
goals.”  However, it was first necessary to complete the initial stage, that of establishing 
an economic base, a firm anchoring in the Wirtschaft, as the material foundation for his 
life and especially for autonomous political activity.  This desire for political 
independence, described by Birrenbach as his “motto,” was a corollary of his broader 
yearning for personal independence, which he considered “the deciding condition for me 
in life.”  Experiences in Weimar and National Socialist Germany and in Argentina had 
impressed upon Birrenbach the central import of politica  and economic independence.  
At the latest by the transitional period 1950-52, he had drawn the connection between the 
two and was already eyeing, upon his impending return, a career combining both 
business and politics, hopefully including a Bundestag seat.  Birrenbach’s belief that he 
himself had first of all “to earn my own basis [Boden] in the industry,” an essential part 
of his plan, explains in no small part the deliberat ness with which he entered politics as 
well as his continued activity in the Wirtschaft long after he had embarked on his political 
career.92  Fortunately, at Thyssen, Birrenbach could attain, w th his comfortable income, 
                                                
92 For Birrenbach’s passion “von Kindesbeinen an,” and his conviction that he had to “den Boden selbst 
verdienen,” see the Birrenbach interview “Zeugen der Zeit,” 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1.  For 
Birrenbach’s hope that he would be in a situation, beginning in January of next year, to devote himself to a 
greater extent to those things, presumably meaning politics, that really interested him, see KB to Brüning, 
18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4.  On his progress with respect to “the second stage of my goals,” see 
KB to Udvarhelyi, Johns Hopkins Hospital, 19 Decembr 1955, ACDP K116/1.  For Birrenbach’s motto 
[Devise] from the start that one should remain “independent” in politics, for this being the reason he would 
retain his position at the Thyssen concern even during his time in the Bundestag, and on such 
independence, as he had seen in Weimar, being a fund mental precondition for him being able to openly, 
clearly and objectively express his opinions, unhindered by party considerations, see the Birrenbach 
interview “Zeitgenossen,” 7 September 1980, ACDP K213/1.  On “the deciding condition,” see KB, 
Buenos Aires, to Brüning, Cambridge, MA, 5 September 1951, ACDP K001/1.  Birrenbach depicted his 
career decisions and itinerant existence in the framework of his desire for personal independence, the 
endangering of which he cited as a significant motive for leaving Germany in 1939, for resigning positi ns 
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financial security for himself and his family, as well as the related trappings, whether a 
healthy investment portfolio, a luxury car or a favorably located Düsseldorf-area home.93   
Almost immediately after his permanent return and even as he was establishing 
his all-important economic base, Birrenbach became engaged in politics, at least on the 
periphery, and started to prepare his grand entrance o to this stage.  In August 1953, the 
former Zentrum voter was taken up as a member of the Christian Democratic Union.  He 
began to make a name for himself in political circles and to attract his party’s attention 
through a variety of activities, especially in his own state of Nordrhein-Westfalen, the 
Federal Republic’s largest Bundesland and industrial zone.  By this point, he was too old 
for the Junge Union, the party’s youth organization and a typical path of advancement for 
aspiring politicians.  Forced to look elsewhere, Birrenbach seized the opportunity to give 
numerous talks, including at an assortment of party functions.  Intensifying the postwar 
journalistic activity he had undertaken intermittenly since 1950, both in Argentina and 
Germany, itself tracing its roots back to his student days, Birrenbach published a series of 
articles on contemporary international relations,94 opposing neutrality95 and advocating a 
                                                                                                                                      
several times in Argentina and for rejecting the initial offer made to him already in Buenos Aires in the 
early 1950s to become the Generalbevollmächtigter of the Thyssen daughter.  In the latter case, he beli ved 
that he should first stand on his own two feet and “earn my spurs” before accepting such an offer 
[Birrenbach Draft in ACDP K073/2].     
93 Birrenbach lived in Düsseldorf-Gerresheim, on the Bergische Landstraße and, later, on the Sauerweg, 
while his Thyssen office was located in the heart of Düsseldorf, on the Königsallee and, later, on the 
Berliner Allee.  From home, Birrenbach could also make the trip to Bonn in perhaps a bit less than an hour.  
For those curious about Birrenbach’s, and the German businessman’s, taste in such things, as of 1976, his 
primary car at home was a current model year Mercedes 450 SEL.     
94 See KB to R. Tüngel, Hauptschriftleiter of Die ZEIT, 12 September 1953, for an instance of Birrenbach’s 
efforts to have his work published.  Examples of such articles include “Deutschland und Europa zwischen 
West und Ost: Die Lage Deutschlands nach dem zweiten W ltkrieg,” 7-10 February 1951, Freie Presse 
(Buenos Aires); “Rußland nach dem Tode Stalins,” 10 September 1953; “Um das Schicksal der EVG”, 9 
May 1954; “Von London nach Paris”, 19 October 1954; and “Wird Frankreich ratifizieren?”, 26 January 
1955, all contained in ACDP K001/1.  Birrenbach had first written on such topics after the war in 1950 in 
Buenos Aires in the German-language Fr ie Presse and in Germany itself in the transitional period 1950-
52, when he had accepted, for instance, to write in a local newspaper on the issue of rearmament.  In these 
pieces authored during the first half of the 1950s, Birrenbach was making foreign policy proposals that
employed the language of Germany, Europe and the West, and their interests.  These works also featured 
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federative, continental, West European unification96 and a German rearmament97 in the 
context of a broader military buildup.98  By 1954, he had joined a multi-partisan working 
                                                                                                                                      
his detailed analyses of the domestic politics and foreign policies of countries like France and Russia, their 
interaction with and impact on one another, and their consequences for other nations.  On the cooperation 
Birrenbach had arranged in principle with Reinhold Heinen, the publisher and editor of the CDU-near 
Kölnische Rundschau, but also on one of Birrenbach’s articles not having appeared in this newspaper since 
it did not conform to the framework of the current CDU guidelines, and on the need for Birrenbach to 
clarify his views, see KB, currently at the private Munich clinic of Dr. L. Schmitt, to Heinen, 3 June 1954, 
ACDP K001/1.   
95 Birrenbach’s opposition to a neutralization of Germany, assuming no or insufficient armament, was 
seemingly in line with Adenauer’s policy.  As of Sept mber 1953, Birrenbach believed such a 
neutralization might be acceptable to the new Russian government since it would either leave unchanged or 
change in favor of Russia the existing power relationship in Central Europe.  On the other hand, it might be 
unacceptable if the government feared such a concession would lead to repercussions for the Russian 
position in the satellite states.  Earlier, in February 1951, Birrenbach had objected to the increasing “voices 
in all continental European countries, especially however in France and Italy and recently also in Germany” 
calling for the preservation of a Western European neutrality and himself urged a “voluntary joining with 
the West” in the context of “the great dispute between West and East.”  He justified this by arguing that
“[i]n the center of international fields of tension there never is and never was a genuine neutrality unless the 
neutral power was in the situation to earn respect for i s neutrality with its own military means.  Whic  of 
the West European powers could militarily assure its neutrality today in the case that the Soviet rulers 
should decide to actively employ the Red Army in Europe?”  At the same time, Birrenbach was warning of 
“the decline of European morale and the flight into an illusory neutrality….  [T]hen Soviet Russia would 
have certainly won the crucial battle in Europe without firing a single shot.  In such a case, nobody will 
save the advocates of European neutrality from the fate met by the Beneschs and Masaryks, the Tatarescus 
and Tildys in the Sovietized southeast belt of Europe.” (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost,” 
7-10 February 1951, Freie Presse, ACDP K001/1). 
96 As of 1951, Birrenbach believed continental Europe, “the old Europe,” had become “a no-man’s land 
between East and West,” “a military-political vacuum” exercising a “fatal” “attractive power on the forces 
of aggression.”  The political-military strength of the western half of the continent had been “weakened 
seriously, if not critically [lebensgefährlich].”  As national states, the European nations had, without 
exception, lost the character of great powers: “The vision of those great political thinkers of the 19th 
century, Alexis de Tocqueville, Donoso Cortés and Jakob Burckhardt has become bloody reality.”  
Dismayed by “the hopelessness [Ausweglosigkeit] of the current situation,” Birrenbach only found solace in 
so far as “[a]lso the recognition of this painful reality necessarily belongs to the process of a European self-
determination.”  The creation of a new Europe required a foreign political, political, military and economic 
“unity [Zusammenschluß or Einheit]” with the goal of overcoming on a higher level, through the “bona 
fide” integration of all the strength [Kräfte] of all the members of the European Staatengemeinschaft, the 
“capitis diminutio” and “disempowerment [Entmachtung]” of the European nations and the restoring to the 
continent “in the age of the Großräume” at least the political importance that was its due.  The mere 
aggregation of “antiquated [überlebter]” national states that retained their independence was insufficient.  
The fundamental condition was the mutual renunciation of “outmoded” sovereignty rights and their transfer 
to a European order recognizing the same rights and duties for all.  Such an integration would automatically 
safeguard against “the emancipation and striving for hegemony” of any of the integrating powers and 
meant “not the end of these historical nations, rather he only chance for their preservation.” (“Deutschland 
und Europa zwischen West und Ost,” 7-10 February 1951, ACDP K001/1).  In his pieces in the first half of 
the 1950s, Birrenbach concretized this advocacy for a vitally necessary Europapolitik and European unity 
by expressing his support at various points for the Brussels Pact of March 1948; a truly European solution 
to the problem of the Saar; the European Defense Community and a strong central Europe; in case of a 
French rejection of an EDC that he interpreted as being part of France’s own Europa concept, the creation 
of a European coalition army within NATO featuring, even if initially only limited, real integration; what 
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group, founded in the early postwar years by the SPD Finanzpolitiker Heinrich Troeger, 
                                                                                                                                      
he considered the new, clear, realistic and constructive approach of British Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden; and, finally, the Paris Agreements of October 1954.  
97 By February 1951, Birrenbach argued in support of West German rearmament that Europe had to “out of 
necessity mobilize Menschenreserven by its own efforts for the defense of the western half of the continent 
and these are, aside from Spain, only still available in Germany.”  At the same time, the unpopularity in 
Germany of the idea of a German army highlighted that “[t]he times of European national states are 
definitively over.  That is nowhere felt more clearly than in Germany.”  In acknowledging the objections 
among the majority of western European nations against German rearmament that had still not been 
entirely overcome, Birrenbach traced France’s “tenacious struggle,” with considerable success thus far, 
against the revision of the Allied Germany Politik in this regard.  Birrenbach fumed that the French 
directed their security concerns at those ten German divisions that would exist in a more or less distant 
future, “while the one hundred and seventy Soviet ones a few tank hours further to the east are almost 
overlooked.”  On the other hand, the Americans, especially Secretary of State Dean Acheson, had first 
raised and now assumed the leadership in the question of the inclusion of the Federal Republic in the 
Atlantic defense.  Meanwhile, and crucially in Birrenbach’s view, the “English” government followed the 
Americans “only very hesitantly” in this matter, despite his apparent belief that the British objections were 
relatively low in principle. (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost,” 7-10 February 1951, 
ACDP K001/1).  For Birrenbach’s view of the EDC as the most constructive form of German rearmament, 
as of early June 1954, but also his recognition that an alternative solution might become necessary if the 
EDC was not ratified, for instance by France, see KB to Heinen, 3 June 1954, ACDP K001/1.   
98 As of 1951, Birrenbach pointed to an “alarmingly thinned out continental European defense.”  Warning 
against “a further neglecting of the western defense,” he reproached the Anglo-Saxon nations and the 
leadership of the western states for having been “bli ded… regarding the task of re-establishing the 
disturbed military balance in the world.”  Continental Europe “persisted” in its defenseless condition, 
exhibiting (even when taking England into account) a “total military impotence.”  He no longer saw any 
European nation, not even the collective power of the European peoples [Völker] (again, including 
England), able to ward off the power of Russia, “that deadly danger which today threatens Europe.”  
Noting the limits of European military power, Birrenbach argued that the insufficient contingents the West 
Europeans currently deployed, especially the “Randvölker” (France, Belgium, Italy and Holland), were 
perceived by the USSR “not as a threat, but just as li tle as an obstacle to possible expansion.”  He believed 
that “[t]he hope of preserving the peace and the lack of agreement among the Atlantic powers about the 
tempo and extent of the necessary armaments are the greatest allies in the West of Soviet aggression.”  It 
was crucial that “the will to self-assertion and defense of its present, truly last European defense li e 
unanimously and without qualification fills all west rn nations.  The challenge of the western world is so 
immense in size and danger that only the absolute readiness of all free nations, oriented towards a single 
goal, would be in a position to prevent a decisive defeat of the West.”  Here, he promoted the creation of a 
military power in line with the concept of “classical military strategy,” requisite for the policy of 
“containment” of “communist aggression” and to assure the survival of the western nations.  The West 
needed to reconstruct “the European defense line” ad provide an effective, somehow comparable, military 
power for waging war “or better still for the avoidance of such a war,” as it was imperative “to dare the 
attempt” to induce the Soviet Union “to refrain from an open military action in Europe.”  According to the 
“estimates of military experts,” about sixty divisions from all the western nations would have to be 
stationed on the continent regardless of the readinss of further armed forces in their extra-continental 
home bases.  With respect to the forces now emerging on the continent (in “Atlantic positions”), including 
German contingents, he insisted on a size suited “only f r defense against an unprovoked attack,” one not 
felt as threatening, and on the “elimination [Ausschaltung] of any idea of a western preventive war.” 
Meanwhile, he welcomed all negotiations “that can be initiated with a minimal guarantee for a favorable 
outcome,” with the solution of all “territorial questions” reserved for “a future peaceful settlement.”  As 
Birrenbach asserted, “[a]ny preparation of a military ggression in West Europe would necessarily provoke 
the Soviets [auf den Plan rufen] and lead to a disastrously rash action [Kurzschluß], which must be avoided 
in the interest of all nations.” (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost,” 7-10 February 1951, 
ACDP K001/1). 
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that met from time to time to discuss foreign policy issues with the aim of bridging 
existing inter-party divides.99  In 1956, Birrenbach attended the CDU Bundesparteitag in 
Stuttgart, taking part in the plenary meetings as well as in those committee meetings 
pertaining to foreign policy, economics and finance.  That same year, he gained entrance 
into the CDU’s District Economic Committee in Düsseldorf.  International conferences 
provided yet another means for Birrenbach to “profile” himself, and from the mid-1950s 
on, he participated regularly in the British-German Königswinter Conferences.100 
At the same time, Birrenbach actively sought in this period to establish contacts, 
initially quite limited, in the German political firmament.  Especially from 1954 onwards, 
he strove to secure the support of the Union’s politica  apparatus by forming relationships 
with the party’s most important personalities in theBund and in Nordrhein-Westfalen.  A 
number of these contacts ultimately played a major role in paving his way into politics, 
including the two figures Birrenbach came to consider the “godfathers” of his political 
career: Heinrich von Brentano and Heinrich Krone, th  latter of whom also earned the 
distinguished sobriquet “Parlamentsvater” for his assistance in this area.  In addition to 
these figures, Birrenbach established contact during this period with a bevy of other 
                                                
99 SPD personalities in the Troeger circle, aside from Troeger himself, included Erwin Schoettle and 
Herbert Kriedemann.  Other figures belonging to the group included Ellscheid; Walther Hensel, the 
Oberstadtdirektor of Düsseldorf; and the Cologne publisher Joseph Witsch.  Once Birrenbach entered the 
Bundestag and the European Parliament and confronted a  accumulating workload, he attended meetings 
of the circle far less frequently.  Nevertheless, he would maintain contact for quite some time thereafter, 
and as late as January 1964, he gave a talk to the group about a trip to the United States as well as the bases 
of American foreign policy.  As of July 1967, Troeger, now vice-president of the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, 
and Birrenbach were both members of the DEW Aufsichtsrat, thus providing them with the opportunity, on 
some level, to continue their exchange of ideas.    
100 Birrenbach was taken up in the CDU’s Kreisverband Düsseldorf when he joined the party.  For 
Birrenbach’s various CDU membership cards (e.g. CDU Landesverband Rheinland, CDU Deutschland), as 
well as his membership cards for other organizations, including the Görres-Gesellschaft (Cologne), the 
Rhein-Ruhr Klub, e.V. (dated 1960) and the Wirtschaftsr t der CDU, e.V. (dated 7 June 1967), see ACDP 
K206/2.  For Birrenbach’s acknowledgement that when  returned to Germany he had, in a sense, “gone 
into politics on practically the first day,” see the Birrenbach interview “Zeugen der Zeit,” 27 Decembr 
1979, ACDP K213/1.   
 67
helpful personalities in the CDU, such as Karl Arnold, the minister-president of 
Nordrhein-Westfalen; Wilhelm Johnen, the chairman of the CDU in Nordrhein-
Westfalen; and Franz Etzel, the vice-president of the ECSC High Authority.101  Aside 
from such primarily party-political luminaries, Birrenbach also secured support in his 
political endeavors from the Wirtschaft in the form of the powerful Bundesverband der 
deutschen Industrie (especially its president, Fritz Berg, and its Hauptgeschäftsführer, 
Gustav Stein) and the Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und Stahlindustrie.102  As a whole, 
Birrenbach’s contacts offered him encouragement and v luable advice, provided him 
with their endorsement and valuable recommendation, aided him in establishing links 
with other important personalities, facilitated hisengagement within the party (for 
instance, his entrance into the party’s district economic committee), assisted him in 
obtaining particularly desirable positions and, generally, helped “prepare the field” for 
him and played an essential role in his political advancement. 
However, in identifying the contacts that provided such vital assistance in 
Birrenbach’s political rise, pride of place must go to the Cologne banker Robert 
Pferdmenges, the chairman of the ATH Aufsichtsrat with whom Birrenbach enjoyed a 
close, personal relationship.  Pferdmenges was Birrenbach’s first real contact and, more 
importantly, the key contact with regard to his political career.  After all, it was 
                                                
101 Arnold was a prominent figure on the party’s left wing.  On Birrenbach’s talks with Krone over the last 
ten years and on how much Birrenbach (and men like “your friend” [Johann Baptist] Gradl) were “obliged 
[verbunden]” to Krone, see KB to Heinrich Krone, Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben, Bonn, 
personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.  Other important contacts included: Generaldirektor Heinrich 
Kost, head of the CDU economic committee in Nordrhein-Westfalen; Walther Hensel, the 
Oberstadtdirektor of Düsseldorf, whom Birrenbach already knew personally; Josef Gockeln, 
Oberbürgermeister of Düsseldorf; and Artur Sträter, Finance Minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen.  
Birrenbach’s economic activities facilitated the acquisition of valuable contacts, not only within the 
Thyssen complex and with leading industrialists from ther concerns, but also early on with men such as 
Franz Meyers, the future minister-president of NRW whom Birrenbach met at a DEW function.     
102 Sohl was president of the Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie f om 1956-69. 
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Pferdmenges who, in addition to all his other support, first brought Birrenbach into 
connection, in some cases at Pferdmenges’ own home, with figures of the magnitude of 
Adenauer, Brentano, Erhard and Krone.  Beyond this,Pferdmenges served for Birrenbach 
as something of a model, or at least a stimulus of already existing tendencies.  In 
Pferdmenges, Birrenbach found a man of broad understanding, feeling and 
authoritativeness who combined business activities w th an extensive participation in 
politics and international affairs and who staunchly espoused the virtues of personal 
political independence.  Pferdmenges was not only a member of the Bundestag but also a 
trusted advisor, including in political matters, to the Chancellor himself, as well as to 
personalities like Sohl.  In fact, at Thyssen, Birrenbach entered a corporate culture that, at 
least among the top men, promoted a grasp not only of business matters but also political 
affairs, a culture shaped by the entwining of the two in areas like reconcentration.  While 
men like Sohl and Ellscheid also personified this attitude, Pferdmenges was undoubtedly 
the best exemplar.  Indeed, Birrenbach can be accurtely characterized as a successor in 
many respects to Pferdmenges, most obviously with regard to particular offices, for 
instance the influential ATH Aufsichtsrat chairmanship, which Birrenbach assumed in 
1962 following Pferdmenges’ death.  However, the process of succession also occurred in 
subtler, but no less significant, ways that will become clearer later in this account.103   
                                                
103 Pferdmenges died in September 1962 at the age of eighty-two.  It was not even unheard of for journalists 
to confuse Pferdmenges and Birrenbach from time to time in their articles.  Pferdmenges was part of, until 
1953 a long-time partner in, the Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie.  Pferdmenges’ banking activities were 
also international in nature and entailed his spending time abroad, for instance in Britain.  In addition to his 
other positions, Pferdmenges belonged to the Aufsichtsrat of the holding of Amélie Thyssen and to the 
Troeger circle.  For Birrenbach holding up the “deeply fulfilled [erfüllte] life” of the “loyal [treuen] friend” 
Pferdmenges, “a just as humanly [menschlich] as professionally [fachlich] important personality,” as an  
“obligation [Verpflichtung]” to himself (and others), see Birrenbach’s speech at t e ATH HV on 28 March 
1963, ACDP K077/2.  In part, Birrenbach’s respect for Pferdmenges centered on what he considered the 
latter’s outstanding abilities and gifts, among them his energy, experience, “careful acumen [behutsame 
Klugheit]” and judgment [“seiner überlegenen Kunst klugen Abwägens”] as well as his skill in the 
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Thanks to his political engagement and contact-building, Birrenbach had by 1957 
finally positioned himself well enough within the party to attain the coveted Bundestag 
mandate, thus joining a group of talented Union politicians who first secured mandates in 
that election.104   Triumph though this may have been, there were also sobering elements 
to consider.  Due to circumstances, Birrenbach was just beginning his political career 
proper as he approached the age of fifty, “twenty years too late,” as he put it, when others 
were already nearing their peak.  This was all the more difficult to swallow in light of the 
discovery that, as he would remark years later, “[w]hen you enter the Bundestag, it takes 
years to settle in and become known [bekanntwerden].”  Furthermore, Birrenbach found 
himself forced to enter parliament from the party list, having failed to acquire a 
Wahlkreis from which he could be elected, a blow to his cherished political 
independence.  Seeking to make the best of things, he immediately went to work to 
secure the Bundestag positions he desired, especially within the various committees, a 
largely successful endeavor in which his political and economic patrons provided 
                                                                                                                                      
“reconciling [Ausgleich]” of diverse interests in personal talks, “von Mensch zu Mensch.”  However, at 
various points, Birrenbach also professed to admire Pferdmenges for his embodiment and deeply rooted 
sense of the virtues: open-mindedness [“Aufgeschlossenheit”], modesty, selflessness, a readiness to 
sacrifice, honesty, integrity [“Lauterkeit”], simplicity and moderation in all things, notably including with 
respect to the possibilities and limits of the German state at each moment.  For Birrenbach citing 
Pferdmenges’ crucial advice always “to exercise moderation [Maß zu halten],” see Birrenbach’s speech to 
the ATH AR of 31 August 1965, ACDP K079/1.   
104 This group also included Rainer Barzel, Theodor von und zu Guttenberg, Bruno Heck and Gerhard 
Stoltenberg.  For Direktor Dr. Kurt Birrenbach speaking on 27 August 1957, at the high-point of the 
election campaign, as part of a trio of economic and fi ance experts running for Bundestag seats, also 
including Pferdmenges and the Aachen lawyer Gerhard Philipp (Hauptgeschäftsführer of the 
Unternehmensverband Steinkohlenbergbau Aachen), to a circle of more than two hundred local economic 
and political personalities at a large CDU economic conference in Oberbruch (by Aachen), see the relevant, 
but unidentified, newspaper articles in ACDP K001/1.  In together offering an overview of the acute issues 
of West German economic, finance and currency policy, these candidates adhered to the party’s now 
famous electoral slogan by opposing “experiments” in these fields.  Birrenbach, billed here as an intima e 
authority on the Ruhrwirtschaft and on the fine complexities and interactions of international economics, 
also discussed and presented proposals on the international economic and currency questions and problems 
the Federal Republic was facing with its partner countries.   
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invaluable support.105  He soon became a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee as 
well as the Fraktion’s Arbeitskreis V, which was responsible for formulating policy on 
foreign-political, defense-political, inner-German d development aid issues.  He also 
attained a seat on the Foreign Trade Committee (Ausschuß für Außenhandel und 
Wirtschaft), a position he would, however, relinquish within a short period of a few years 
due to a lack of time and relative interest.  Finally, on a related but larger, West European 
level, Birrenbach entered the Montanunion parliament, soon to become the European 
Parliament for the three communities, as a result of his co-optation on 22 October 1957, 
at a time when this Strasbourg-based institution did not yet have direct elections.106 
If these particular positions fell to Birrenbach rather quickly, his ascension to the 
role of “America expert” within his party and Fraktion occurred in a somewhat more 
roundabout manner.  While Birrenbach was clearly interested in international relations 
from the very beginning, the United States did not occupy his immediate focus.  Rather, 
                                                
105 In his push for his preferred Bundestag committees and committee positions, Birrenbach enjoyed the 
backing of Pferdmenges, Etzel and others, among them, as Pferdmenges indicated, even Adenauer himself, 
along with that of economic associations like the BDI and WVES (Pferdmenges to Direktor Hugo 
Scharnberg, MdB, 27 September 1957, ACDP K001/1).  For Birrenbach’s explanation that emigration had 
“paralyzed” his ambitions and activities, explicitly including those of a political nature, and his asessment 
that “National Socialism has taken twenty years from me that I am no longer able to recover,” see KB to 
Monnet, 8 November 1978, ACDP K158/2.   
106 The transformation in 1958 of the Montanunion’s “Common Assembly” into the European Parliament 
for the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM was a result of the 1957 Treaty of Rome.  For an example of a 
Birrenbach intervention at the Common Assembly, here engaging in a debate with the French Gaullist 
Michel Debré, see Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, Gemeinsame Versammlung, 26 
February 1958, Verhandlungen/Reden, ACDP K075/2.  Over the years, Birrenbach and other top 
personalities of the Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung and the August-Thyssen-Hütte, like those of the 
German steel industry and Wirtschaft as a whole, nurtured links to and often dealt with leading German 
public officials, whether in the federal government or he finance administration (e.g. federal finance 
ministry, NRW finance ministry, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), as well as non-German public 
institutions, like the Allied High Commission’s Combined Steel Group, and European bodies, including the 
ECSC High Authority and EC Court of Justice (both in Luxembourg).  Such institutions and the links to 
them had major ramifications for matters like the negotiating and implementation of the Thyssen 
Deconcentration Plan, the taxation of the holding companies of the Thyssen heiresses and the Akti n  
transferred to them, the reconstruction of the ATH, the approval of the often burdensome conditions 
impacting on the reconcentration of the VSt, the importing of American coal, and the creation of common 
European import policies and financial assistance funds.   
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that honor belonged to Great Britain, due largely to the especially strained Anglo-German 
relations existing early during Birrenbach’s tenure in the Bundestag.107  Though 
Birrenbach himself described his main area of interest in his very early Bundestag period 
as the Federal Republic’s relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries, especially Britain, 
one could even convincingly argue, based on his various activities, whether trips, articles, 
or conference participation, that well into the late 1950s, Birrenbach was at least as, and 
perhaps significantly more, interested in continental European affairs than in the United 
States, with his first and, to this point, only trip there (indeed to North America as a 
whole) coming in 1950.108  This changed dramatically by the end of 1958.  Largely as a 
                                                
107 Earlier, in February 1951, Birrenbach had approved of England’s refusal to participate in a federative 
European union since, due to its historical development and distant overseas interests, England belongd to 
“a different supranational unit” that could not be id ntical with continental Europe.  He included Engla d 
among those European nations that had, as national states, lost the character of great powers.  In world 
councils, it remained a first-rank political power merely as the center of the “Staatengemeinschaft” that was 
the Commonwealth.  Moreover, having lost its earlier military significance, “England has many tasks, 
which far exceed its physical possibilities.”  Not only were the British Isles themselves now on the “front-
line” but it was also necessary to defend the control of those “numerous positions of the globe” where th  
British Commonwealth had become weak and “vulnerabl” in the long-run in the face of a potential 
“breakthrough [Einbruch] of Soviet power” (e.g. the Mediterranean Sea, the Near East with the Suez Canal, 
Southeast Asia).  “In a global war, the former English empire [Weltreich] would be engaged on all 
continents of the world.”  Therefore, England simply lacked the military manpower to contribute 
substantial contingents to the continental European defense and in a military conflict between East and
West would be “only a factor of secondary importance.”  Nevertheless, Birrenbach was still cognizant of 
and desired the mobilization of the potential power, including military power, of the Commonwealth.  
Indeed, there existed a common interest in that the security of the European “Vorfeld” was just as vital for 
England as for Europe, itself, since the channel had ceased to form a natural border and “the inclusion of 
West Europe in the Soviet sphere of influence would result in the military and political paralyzation f 
England.”  Ultimately, Birrenbach argued in favor of a cooperation and association of Britain with the 
united European continent in a form in which its voice, although not officially represented in the councils 
of Europe, could never be ignored and that did not conflict with the interests of the Commonwealth.  This 
vital “partnership” would include a security alliance to guarantee the European union externally and the 
German-French border internally, thus contributing o the “solution of the European question” by helping 
overcome French feelings of worry and mistrust, especially in the military field, that any “community 
[Gemeinschaft]” would have to “transcend [sprengen]” in the long-term. [“Deutschland und Europa 
zwischen West und Ost,” 7-10 February 1951, ACDP K001/1]. 
108 Perhaps Birrenbach’s February 1951 series of articles sheds some light on his initial neglect of the 
United States.  Basing his analysis, in part, on “the experiences of the two first world wars,” Birrenbach 
noted the “limits” of the “Atlantic military power.”  Specifically, he bemoaned the spatial distance of the 
United States; the “in no way unlimited American manpower reserves”; the amount of time necessary 
“until the power of the USA… can be brought into action [zum Einsatz] on the European continent”; and 
the “isolationism” that had flared up in the US and was espoused by major personalities, like Herbert 
Hoover and Robert Taft, in the “profound debate [Auseinandersetzung]” following the defeat of the UN 
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result of the brewing confrontation over Berlin, it became clear to Birrenbach by this 
point that the relationship of the Federal Republic to the United States would be the 
crucial relationship for the foreseeable future.109  This realization occasioned a rapid and 
                                                                                                                                      
troops on the Yalu.  Especially this isolationism brought into question “the entire foreign policy of the 
United States since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 through the Marshall Plan to the 
Brussels and Atlantic Pacts” and represented a “danger emerging” that “cannot be taken seriously enough.”  
Even if the US went beyond employing its air and sea forces in Europe and supplying weapons to the 
European nations, the number of American land divisions that, judging by current discussions, might be 
stationed on the continent would be insufficient, even “symbolic.”  Furthermore, Birrenbach referred to 
“[t]he Maginot complex of the atom bomb possession” a d reproached the leadership of the western states, 
including the Anglo-Saxon nations, for the “criminal” frittering away of the “respite [Atempause]” granted 
the West by the American atomic bomb monopoly (since broken by the Russians in 1949) and for their 
stress on the “hopelessly obsolete” concept of defens  through a “push-button war.”  A skeptical 
Birrenbach remained uncertain about the ability of even the United States “to cause the Soviet Union to be 
content with the frontiers of its current zone of influence.”  Now, “[a]fter communism has not shied away 
from the risk of openly challenging the United States, transitioning from cold to hot war in Korea, the
remote impact [Fernwirkung] of a later American intervention [Einsatz] can no longer be relied upon 
without hesitation [bedenkenlos] for the deterrence of the Soviet Union.”  At least t this point, Birrenbach 
saw the United States as “an insular power whose military means, so far as the possession of large land 
armies stands in question, are extremely limited in view of the task to be dealt with.”  All this seemd to 
render the US unable to ensure the defense and security of Europe, in particular to stop an attack on the
Elbe, even more disturbing since, given the experiences from Poland to Korea, Birrenbach rejected a 
“liberation after a preceding Soviet occupation.”  No wonder Birrenbach believed that the USSR, implicitly 
not the US, “represents the only real world power today.” (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und 
Ost,” 7-10 February 1951, ACDP K001/1).  For Birrenbach’s later explanation and analysis of “the new 
American defense strategy” (Eisenhower’s “New Look,” including massive retaliation), its rationale but 
also his own criticism of that strategy, see “Die neue amerikanische Verteidigungs-Strategie,” by Kurt 
Birrenbach, ACDP K001/1.  Here, Birrenbach also pointed to and aligned himself with a lengthy list of 
doubters in the United States (including Democratic leader Adlai Stevenson, some members of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Robert Carney) and Canada (including Foreign Minister Lester Pearson) as 
well as in England and France.  Birrenbach’s concerns regarding American “isolationism” were probably 
exacerbated during the mid-1950s by the statements of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at the NATO 
Conference in February 1954 broaching the possibility of an “agonizing reappraisal” of American foreign 
policy and by a recent report of the Senators Stuart Symington and Styles Bridges, all referred to in KB to 
Heinen, 3 June 1954, ACDP K001/1.   
109 Though expressing grave doubts regarding the efficacy of the United States with respect to the defens 
of Europe, Birrenbach’s series of articles in 1951 also presented some justification for a heightened i terest 
in that nation.  After all, Birrenbach viewed US assistance as “the only alternative” available to Europe.  
The US was that “power of continental size” which, in addition to the Soviet Union, had emerged from the 
last world war as the only victor.  America had deci d the first and second world wars with its economic 
strength and, as the largest industrial country, was economically equal, if not superior, to all other 
hypothetical combinations in the world.  On the basis of its incomparable military-economic possibilities, 
the US could indeed become “the arsenal of the world.”  An air and sea power, the US was already the 
second greatest, potentially the greatest, military power in the world.  In the emerging, altered situation 
deriving from the current state of technology, the US could assume England’s historical role vis-à-vis the 
European continent, constituting a danger of the first order for any continental opponent and confronting 
the USSR and its immense land power with an ability to conduct operations on all the borders of its 
extended land mass.  A “coherent [i  sich geschlossenes] Europe,” supported by the US and successfully 
mobilizing the war potential of the Western hemisphere before it was too late, would represent a power that 
could prove to be superior even in comparison to the USSR.  Events in Persia, Greece and Berlin as well as 
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significant shift in his attention in the late 1950s towards the United States.  By 1959, he 
had immersed himself in this subject and, in March, assumed the role of Referent for his 
party and Fraktion with regard to the US, a position he would occupy throughout the 
1960s and well into the 1970s.  Birrenbach’s assumption of the Referat “America and 
Canada” in the AKV involved written and oral reports about relevant current events, 
problems and developments in that subject area, along with the establishing of contacts 
and regular discussions with the responsible Referenten in the Foreign Office (AA).110   
H. Conclusion 
This admittedly selective account of Birrenbach’s life up to the late 1950s serves 
not only a narrative function but also offers insights into the man’s nature and 
experiences which will prove of some significance lat r on.  Birrenbach was obviously a 
                                                                                                                                      
the Korean campaign had demonstrated that “[t]he rulers [Machthaber] of the Kremlin are cold calculators 
[Rechner], not at all concerned with prestige- or initial-[Anfangs-] successes whatsoever.  They have, to 
now, understood only one language, that of power.”  Indeed, Birrenbach recognized only one foreign-
political factor preventing the USSR from extending “the boundaries of Soviet rule [Herrschaft] up to the 
shores of the Atlantic: concern about a total military intervention [Einsatz] of the United States in the 
framework of a global war.”  Moreover, a vital American interest was also at stake here, since “seen from 
the USA, the inclusion of West Europe in the Soviet sphere of influence would result in… the total 
isolating of North America in the world.” (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost,” 7-10 
February 1951, ACDP K001/1).   
110 Nevertheless, during the period 1957-60, Birrenbach did travel on political matters to Britain, 
principally London, at least once a year, including at the arrangement of the British Conservative Party’s 
Overseas Bureau, for a few days at a time.  His trip in 1957 occurred in December, therefore after the 
Bundestag election.  For Birrenbach’s discussions in November 1958 with Foreign Secretary Selwyn 
Lloyd, Defense Secretary Duncan Sandys, and Paymaster General Reginald Maudling in locations like the 
House of Commons as well as the homes of the British hosts on themes such as the free-trade zone 
(including the alternative facing Britain to either join the Common Market or to create a European Free 
Trade Association) and the status of Berlin, and the role of Birrenbach’s English friends in enabling such 
talks, see KB, Düsseldorf, to Economics Minister Erhard, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2; and 
KB, Düsseldorf, to Foreign Minister Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2.  Birrenbach’s 
trip in July 1960 was undertaken with Kai-Uwe von Hassel (CDU), minister-president of Schleswig-
Holstein, and Günther Serres (CDU), chairman of the Bundestag’s foreign trade committee.  To cite an 
example of Britain’s ongoing importance early in this period, Birrenbach, at the CDU economic conference 
in Oberbruch in August 1957, stressed the pivotal role Britain would have to play in bringing about a 
desirable European currency-political agreement, also involving France, that would be based on the fre 
convertibility of the currencies and required the financial and tariff-political support of the United States 
(see the unidentified newspaper articles in ACDP K001/1).  On Birrenbach, in August 1959, also preparing 
for, among other urgent professional matters, a political visit in Warsaw, see KB to Hans Schäffer, Sweden, 
21 August 1959, ACDP K004/2. 
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well-educated and ambitious man, trained in law and the social sciences and willing to 
make considerable sacrifices to advance his career.  H  was a deliberate, methodical 
person, who felt most comfortable adhering to an overall plan.  Among the most salient 
motivating factors that can be traced throughout his actions was the desire to retain his 
personal independence.  Thanks to his experiences i Germany and Argentina, he had 
become quite adept at establishing and utilizing well-placed contacts, whether in the 
fields of business or politics.  In the former, Birrenbach honed his diplomatic and 
negotiating skills and gained an understanding of the complex, inter-related elements 
involved in the management of a work.  However, while quite successful in business, his 
passionate interest actually lay in the realm of politics, especially international relations.  
His cosmopolitan existence, as student, businessman and exile, nurtured in him a broad 
perspective on the world and enabled him to interac more effectively with foreigners.  
As we shall see, certain elements in his background, such as his birthplace, Catholicism, 
Gymnasium education and fascination with the classical world, might have suggested it 
was unlikely this man would become one of the most ardent of Atlanticists in the Federal 
Republic.  However, other aspects suggested a predisposition towards precisely this 
possibility: his frequent interaction with Americans in the business world, his 
employment for several years by an American firm and his long sojourn across the 
Atlantic, albeit in South, rather than North, America.  Perhaps it is not too surprising that 
by the late 1950s, Birrenbach found himself exceedingly interested in the United States.   
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Chapter 3: German Occidentalism - Abendland 
A. Introduction 
During the first part of the 1950s, at least into the middle of the decade, a 
powerful current of Conservative-Christian thought enjoyed considerable, even 
predominant, influence in the Federal Republic.  One of the defining characteristics of the 
atmosphere during this period was the quite pervasive presence (including in political 
discourse) of an Occidentalist sensibility centered on the concept of “Abendland.”  This 
was an idea embraced by a wide range of individuals stretching far beyond the narrow 
band of what might plausibly be dismissed as mere propagandists.  Nor was its appeal 
limited to Conservatives or to the influential Bi dungsbürgertum, though it appears to 
have enjoyed its warmest reception among these groups.  Given its rather nebulous 
character, the Abendland worldview conjured up a diverse spectrum of visions amongst 
its adherents, yet with a little effort, using primarily the available secondary sources, it is 
still possible to sketch a general outline and, most importantly, call particular attention to 
those elements of special importance for our own purposes.1  
                                                
1 The secondary literature dealing with the theme Ab ndland, on which this chapter heavily relies, includes 
Vanessa Conze, Das Europa der Deutschen:  Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition 
und Westorientierung, 1920–1970 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005); Wilfried Mausbach, “Erdachte Welten: 
Deutschland und der Westen in den 1950er Jahren,” in Manfred Berg and Philipp Gassert, eds., 
Deutschland und die USA in der Internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts: Festschrift für Detlef 
Junker (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004), pp. 423-448; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Occidentalism: Rhetoric, 
Process, and Postwar German Reconstruction,” Diss., Columbia University, 2001; Axel Schildt, Zwischen 
Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Idenlandschaft der 50er Jahre (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
1999); Maria Mitchell, “Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945-
1949,” in Journal of Modern History, vol. 67 (1995), pp. 278-308; Doris von der Brelie-Lewien, 
“Abendland und Sozialismus: Zur Kontinuität politisch-kultureller Denkhaltungen im Katholizismus von 
der Weimarer Republik zur frühen Nachkriegszeit,” in Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, eds., Politische 
Teilkulturen zwischen Integration und Polarisierung: Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), pp. 188-218; Heinz Hürten, “Der Topos vom Christlichen 
Abendland in Literatur und Publizistik nach den beiden Weltkriegen,” in Albrecht Langer, ed., 
Katholizismus, nationaler Gedanke und Europa seit 1800 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1985), pp. 131-54; 
Richard Faber, Abendland: Ein politischer Kampfbegriff (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1979); Klaus Schwabe, 
“Anti-Americanism within the German Right, 1917-1933,” Amerikastudien, vol. 21 (1976), pp. 89-107.   
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B. Content 
To put it briefly, in their efforts to find sources of a durable identity and models to 
rebuild their shattered world, the proponents of the Abendland idea gazed into the ancient 
and medieval past.  Especially prominent in their minds was the notion of Europe as 
Latin Christendom, particularly as it had existed in the early medieval empire, especially 
in the 8th and 9th centuries, of the Germanic-Frankish king Charlemagne.  In geographic 
terms, this empire, in some senses a medieval succesor of the cosmopolitan Roman 
empire, had stopped not far to the east of the Rhine and extended from Rome in the south 
to the English Channel in the north.  This Abendland had strived for, and to a large extent 
achieved, an unprecedentedly intimate and symbiotic relationship between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the state and was characterized by what was later described as a 
distinctively Christian humanist civilization.  Amidst all of the turmoil surrounding them, 
the fundamental aim of the contemporary Abendländler was to gather the still extant 
remnants and restore an updated version of this Carolingian sacrum imperium, this 
ancient unity and culture of continental Western Europe.  They perceived in this 
abendländisch project and identity a potentially regenerative force, including i  a 
spiritual sense, and an essential means to save their besieged civilization. 
And besieged it was, for the Abendländler saw a civilization in fundamental 
crisis.  Their perspective was marked by ambivalence, even hostility, towards many 
aspects of the modern world.  These ills, often interwoven with each another, comprised a 
rather lengthy catalogue: Vermassung; collectivization; atomization; secularization; 
industrialization; bureaucratization; alienation; urbanization; and Technisierung, by 
which they essentially referred to technology run amok, were amongst the more 
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significant ones.  In addition to these deleterious, es entially impersonal, processes, the 
Abendländler were also highly critical of the ideologies and misguided systems of 
thought so prevalent in the modern world: secularism, nihilism; Marxism; Socialism; 
Liberalism; capitalism; mammonism; militarism; nationalism; national-state etatism; 
rationalism; scientism and the belief in human progress; and, perhaps most fundamental 
of all, materialism in all its guises.  In their analysis, the adherents to the Abendland idea 
identified a series of baneful historical epochs that had resulted from or even had been 
crucial in setting these pernicious trends and ideologies in motion and in providing them 
with forceful impetus.  Particularly prominent in this regard were the Renaissance, the 
Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.  The upshot of all these 
phenomena had been a move away from a healthy Abendland and towards civilizational 
crisis, most recently manifested and intensified by the twin catastrophes of National 
Socialism and war.2 
Whatever its sweeping condemnations of the modern age, the Abendland 
worldview was actually a rather optimistic one, insofar as it offered a prescription for 
renewal through a return to the path of the Abendland.  In this sense, the entire postwar 
Abendland phenomenon lends some credence to the contention of the Conservative 
British political philosopher Michael Oakeshott that the most striking aspect of modern 
European politics is the pervasiveness of rationalism, even amongst those claiming to be 
strictly opposed to rationalism.  Within Germany (and beyond), where the ground seemed 
to have been cleared by recent events, the path to regeneration largely consisted of the re-
Christianization of society.  In general terms, the Abendländler understood this process as 
                                                
2 By portraying National Socialism as the product of a civilizational crisis, the Abendländler, whether 
intentionally or not, at least implicitly absolved the Germans of sole responsibility.   
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the rejection of the idea of the Gesellschaftsvertrag, the social contract, in favor of the 
construction of a traditional, pre-modern, God-ordained social order based on natural law.  
Broadly conceived, such a social order would be quasi-rural, family-centered, 
berufständisch, peaceful and cooperative: a genuine communal Gemeinschaft.  Great 
emphasis was placed in this regard on the notion of “distributionism,” namely a just 
distribution of wealth and, related to this, the according of the opportunity to each of the 
members of society to own and settle on one’s own property.  Significant as such overall 
visions of society may have been in their own right, t ey are only of tangential 
importance for our current investigation. 
C. The Political 
More directly relevant is that the vision of the Abendländler of such a traditional, 
pre-modern, re-Christianized social order extended into the political realm.  Here, they 
displayed ambivalence towards an ineffective, even open criticism of a destructive, mass 
parliamentary and party democracy, derisively referd to as a mere Formaldemokratie.  
They correspondingly harbored profound reservations t wards the Federal Republic’s 
Grundgesetz, dismissing it as an interim construct at best.  On a philosophical level, there 
was the infusion of a pronounced anti-rationalism and nti-materialism into political 
thought.  After all, the Abendländler traced the contemporary crisis in which modern man 
found himself in no small part to his arrogant presumption that he could comprehend the 
world solely through a resort to his own reason (Ratio) and sensory experience.  In 
opposition to this dogma, the Abendländler countered with the religious dogma of 
revelation, arguing that there existed phenomena, also in the political arena, only to be 
perceived and understood through faith.  Another effort to transcend Formaldemokratie 
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was the attempt to revive the idea of an abendländische Freiheit that emphasized inner, 
“geistige,” independence.  This concept stood in contrast not only to totalitarianism and 
fatalism but also to the nihilistic and delusional liberal notion of freedom, with its 
exaggerated stress on external, individualistic autonomy and on political freedom from 
the state.  For the Abendländler, freedom, to avoid resulting in man’s enslavement to his 
own worldly desires and natural evil, required a more definitive fixing of its content and 
values and was ultimately inseparable from Ordnung.  Given their concerns about the 
dangers posed by the impulsive masses, the Abendländler also supported a far-reaching 
federal structure in the Bundesrepublik that would have the added benefit of offering the 
individual a greater sense of proximity to and contr l over his or her government.   
As one of the most prominent aspects of their struggle against mass 
Formaldemokratie, the Abendländler placed considerable emphasis on the need for a 
robust abendländische lite.  In concrete institutional terms, ideas were ntertained, for 
instance, of a second parliamentary chamber endowed with extensive rights.  Reflecting 
the overall social structure, this chamber would be a Ständeversammlung, containing 
representatives of all branches of society, and would therefore better embody the desired 
Christian elite than was possible in a parliament comprising merely the representatives of 
the parties.  Plans were also broached for the reformation of the electoral process, aiming 
to ameliorate the insidious impact of mass elections characterized by the universal and 
equal right to vote, for instance through the establishment of indirect voting, intended to 
progressively circumscribe the electorate to the point where only a small elite circle 
would be entrusted with actually choosing the head of state.  Regardless of the particular 
institutional or electoral arrangements, the overarching idea was that a Christian elite 
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stratum would effectively offset the role of the a-religious mass man and of unlimited 
parliamentarism and contribute to the healthy spiritual orientation of the state.   
Closely linked to this idea of a Christian elite was the notion of the wise and 
benevolent Christian statesman serving as a powerful head of state.  This archetypal 
figure was characterized by his steadfast Christian faith and his devotion to the culture of 
the Abendland.  Rather than being dependent on a parliament, itself often essentially 
responsible to no one, such a statesman was primarily responsible for his actions to the 
divine authority of God.  Awareness of a later judgment by God was considered 
ultimately the best protection against the hubris of power.3  For many Abendländler 
(especially Catholics), their admiration for the Christian statesmen of the Iberian 
Peninsula, Francisco Franco and António de Oliveira Sal zar, was one of the main 
reasons that Spain and, even more so, Portugal repres nted for them healthy core models 
for the Abendland.  The extensive powers attributed to such a Christian statesman also 
meshed well with the view of the state held by the Ab ndländler, according to which that 
entity’s role was to be strictly limited in those are s of society that were able to function 
on their own, thus in harmony with the principle of subsidiarity, but was significantly 
enhanced in other areas, such as foreign policy, where this was deemed not to be the case.  
Taken as a whole, the salutary upshot of the extensiv  re-Christianization of society 
advocated by the Abendländler would be an organic, hierarchical and structured order 
that would hopefully contribute to overcoming the el ments of crisis that currently 
boasted the upper hand. 
                                                
3 Such ideas were closely linked to the work of the Austrian sociologist Othmar Spann, which had been 
quite influential in the interwar period.  However, the notion of the Christian statesman was actually a ate 
medieval model, had found expression in the papal encyclicals (for instance, Rerum Novarum in 1891) and 
was, in fact, anticipated at the latest by the pagan Stoic Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius in his famous 
Meditations.   
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D. Cosmopolitanism 
Glancing beyond the organization of domestic society, the Abendland concept, 
apparently so backward looking, actually favoured a particular form of the very modern 
and cosmopolitan project of West European unification as a means of confronting the 
external and internal threats to the Abendland.  Looking once more to the medieval 
Carolingian era, the Abendländler turned decisively against the national state, as well as 
against phenomena like militarism, ethnic prejudice and nationalism and embraced 
instead a vision of a united Christian Abendland, a supranational, organically structured 
Gemeinschaft based on the distinctive historical and cultural heritage of Western Europe.  
At the same time as it advocated a far-reaching supranational federalism, the Abendland 
vision continued to recognize the distinct identities and interests of the ancient nations of 
western Europe.  In actuality, at least some Ab ndländler were even willing, if dictated 
by practicality, to depart from supranational ideals nd to promote merely international 
and inter-governmental cooperation.  Western Germany’s own role in the supranational 
Abendland project varied in particulars, although it was often conceived of as a central 
one, at least in a spiritual or cultural sense.  Exhibiting the persistent German penchant 
for particularism, a few even stressed the unique mission within the Abendland of 
particular regions, especially Bavaria or the Rhinela d.4  Whatever the specific details, 
this western European unification was considered an essential element in the regenerative 
restoration of a version of the Carolingian sacrum imperium.     
The cosmopolitan nature of German Occidentalism, in both a temporal and 
geographical sense, was also reflected in the wide-ranging canon of intellectual works 
                                                
4 For instance, the CSU’s Hanns Seidel stressed the special Bavarian “mission” [Sendung] as an “outpost” 
[Vorposten] for Germany and Christendom; as a counterweight aainst the idea of a centralized, unitary 
German national state; and as a key part of the free Europe.   
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from which it drew sustenance.  From the distant pas , the Occidentalists embraced a 
broad range of European writers and thinkers, whether Virgil from antiquity, Dante from 
the Middle Ages, or Novalis from the Romantic movement.  More recently, there were 
the influential products of German thinkers such as Oswald Spengler (Untergang des 
Abendlandes, 1918 and 1922), Carl Schmitt, Theodor Haecker (V rgil: Vater des 
Abendlands, 1931), Ernst Robert Curtius (Europäische Literatur und lateinisches 
Mittelalter, 1948) and Albert Mirgeler (Geschichte Europas, 1953).  However, a 
prominent place was also accorded to the works of foreign figures, including many 
Spanish and, oddly enough as we shall see, British th nkers.  Amongst the former, there 
was the elitist Jose Ortega y Gasset, probably the most widely-read philosopher in West 
Germany from the 1930s to the end of the 1950s, with his warnings about The Revolt of 
the Masses; and Juan Donoso Cortés, the philosopher of freedom and order, particularly 
admired for his idea of the freedom of the moral personality.  From Britain, there were 
figures like the historians Christopher Dawson, who enjoyed a wide reception in 
Germany from the 1930s into the 1960s, and Arnold Tynbee as well as the Christian 
apologists C.S. Lewis and G.K. Chesterton, the poetand Catholic royalist T.S. Eliot and 
the novelist Aldous Huxley.   
With respect to its confessional basis, the Abendland worldview was intimately 
intertwined with Catholicism and Catholic thought.  This can be seen, for instance, in the 
reverence that existed for the state-philosophical concepts of St. Thomas Aquinas, the 
federalist ideas of St. Augustine and the social doctrine of the papal encyclicals Rerum 
Novarum (Leo XIII, 1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (Pius XI, 1931).  Granted, there 
were Catholic intellectuals who did not subscribe to the idea of Abendland, even 
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explicitly opposed it, for instance the circle of the Liberal-Catholic Frankfurter Heft that 
included Walter Dirks and Eugen Kogen.5  Nevertheless, the world of Catholicism, 
particularly the more conservative quarters, was the most fruitful source of Abendland 
thought as well as the forum in which it enjoyed its most positive reception.  In 
geographic terms, the Abendland idea correspondingly found its basis in the Catholic 
strongholds of the German West and South, such as te Rhineland, Westphalia and 
Bavaria, as evidenced whether in the influential role of Catholic intellectuals in, for 
instance, Cologne or Munich or in the locations of the various Occidentalist institutions.6  
However, despite the Catholic nature of Abendland thought and the fact that this tradition 
had previously been relatively foreign to them, Conservative Protestants after 1945 
increasingly turned to their own variation on Abendland.7  Of course, the Protestant 
vision differed somewhat from the dominant Catholic version due to theological 
considerations and the tempering of some of the more anti-Protestant aspects.8  However, 
whatever the variations and tensions, the Ab ndland idea, in a process actively facilitated 
by certain Catholics, ultimately performed a crucial integrative function between the 
                                                
5 Other Catholic critics of the Abendland worldview, many of whom engaged in heated debates with their 
Abendländler counterparts over themes as diverse as the Enlightenment and contemporary Spain, included 
the Austrian historian and journalist Friedrich Heer and the theologian Romano Guardini.  For criticism of 
the Abendland idea as an ideology bereft of historical understanding, see Walter Dirks, “Das christliche 
Abendland: Sein Nachwirken in den Konfessionen der Bundesrepublik,” in Klaus von Bismarck and 
Walter Dirks, eds., Christlicher Glaube und Ideologie (Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1964).   
6 For example, consider the sites of Neues Abendland (Augsburg), Deutsche Tagespost (Regensburg, later 
Würzburg), the Abendländische Akademie (Munich) and the Abendländische Aktion (Munich).   
7 Prominent Protestant Abendland advocates included the theologian Helmut Thielicke, th  canonist Hans 
Dombois, the bishop and theologian Wilhelm Stählin and the provost Hans Asmussen.   
8 With respect to the tempering of anti-Protestant aspects, Prussia was generally treated in a more positive 
light, there was a more benign view of the Reformation and the association of Protestantism and anti-
Catholicism with materialism and National Socialism was less manifest.  Regarding divergences stemming 
from theological considerations, Protestants tended to exhibit a more pronounced cultural pessimism and to 
exercise an even more intense criticism of modern innovations, from the electronic mass media to 
consumptionism, but also evinced a greater willingness to recognize the emerging parliamentary 
democracy.   
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confessions, at least their Conservative elements, albeit under a distinctly Catholic 
supremacy.9   
E. Dissociation 
However, in spite of such cosmopolitan-integrative aspects, the Abendland 
concept simultaneously exhibited significant inward-looking features, which had the 
effect of focusing the attention of its adherents on western Europe.  These probably 
contributed, for example, to the widespread indifference in the early Federal Republic 
towards wide swaths of the world not directly connected to its vital interests, especially 
what came to be known as the Third World.  Nearer to home, towards the East, the 
Abendland saw itself confronted with a persistent and threatening barbarism, currently 
assuming the form of a Bolshevism very much akin to National Socialism in its root 
causes.10  There was even a decidedly negative attitude towards the German East, 
especially what had been predominantly Protestant Prussia (actually dissolved in 1947), a 
sentiment deeply embedded in the Catholic worldview and focusing on that state’s 
myriad failings, among which were to be counted the oft-cited ones of materialism (the 
root of virtually all its other flaws), militarism, nationalism, secularism, Marxism, 
economic gigantism, and a faulty conception of an omnipotent state vis-à-vis the 
individual.  The unfortunate influence of the Prussian worldview had led Germany astray 
from its previous, and hopefully future, home in theAbendland, and ultimately to 
                                                
9 In terms of early domestic politics, this integration is especially noteworthy insofar as it helped bring 
Conservative Protestant groups into the CDU and the gov rnment camp.  
10 Although, to briefly return to the theme of integration, the interpretation of this danger from the East 
provided by the Abendland framework did help cement the loyalties to the new Federal Republic early in 
the postwar period of some otherwise skeptical Conservatives.   
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catastrophe.11  Their disastrous experiences with Prussian predominance further 
encouraged the Abendländler in their support for an extensive federalism that already had 
a broadly based tradition in Germany, especially in regions like Bavaria.   
Perhaps even more striking was the ambivalence and suspicion with which many 
Abendländler viewed the Anglo-Saxon nations, particularly the United States.  To be 
sure, the negative attitude towards the latter was less intense than it had been prior to 
1945.  Considerations of Realpolitik alone would have dictated close relations to the 
Anglo-Saxons, as the Soviet threat rendered an alliance of Carolingian Europe with 
especially the militarily, politically and economically superior United States necessary 
for the defense of the Abendland.  In addition to such strictly pragmatic considerations, 
and perhaps also keeping them in mind, there were some Abendländler who even 
attempted to reconceptualize the relationship betwen the United States and the 
Abendland, for instance depicting the former as an offshoot, admittedly a degenerate one, 
of the latter.  These efforts exhibited also a geographic element insofar as stress was 
placed on the abendländischen character of certain regions of the United States, such as 
the Midwest or the South, in contrast to the decidedly un-abendländischen ature of the 
Northeast and the East Coast.  Drawing on such ideas, blueprints were drafted of a trans-
Atlantic alliance characterized by an “abendländischen Geist” in which Europe was 
assigned a key position as a “geistige Wirkungseinheit.”  At the very least, this all meant 
that the Abendland idea did not outright preclude a temporary trans-Atlantic alliance with 
                                                
11 Such claims served as the subject of passionate pos war historical debates with politicians like Kurt 
Schumacher and with Gerhard Ritter, Hans-Joachim Schoeps, Friedrich Meinecke and the Prussian-
national historians, who pointed to the Prussian Enlightenment, Weimar Prussia and the plot of 20 July
1944 in defending the “inner values” of the “other Prussia” against German Abendländler as well as 
foreign, including Anglo-American, detractors.  
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the Anglo-Saxons and could, to some extent, even form a subtle buttress of such a 
grouping. 
Nevertheless, as a whole, the proponents of Abendland viewed the United States 
as an entity standing apart from their vision, certainly not as an element proper in a 
restored sacrum imperium.  Whatever allowances might be made, the United States was 
ultimately lacking in the essential bendländischen heritage and Geist (spirit).  In the 
field of international politics, this conception contributed, at its most extreme, to a view 
that equated the United States and the Soviet Union, whatever the differences in their 
tactics, as atheistic, power-hungry entities.  For other Abendländler, the lack of the 
necessary spiritual weapon of Christian humanism seriously crippled the value of the 
Anglo-Saxons in tackling the problems facing the Occident and especially as allies in the 
pseudo-religious struggle of Weltanschauungen with the totalitarian atheism of the East.  
Not only did this failing undermine their resistance to this danger, it rendered them 
unable even to properly understand the true nature of the threat and to recognize the 
underlying, long-term and decisive spiritual element of the struggle.  Consequently, the 
Americans found themselves misguidedly focused on the merely practical, esoteric 
minutiae of political and security issues, distressingly liable to distraction (also, in a 
geographic sense, by their world concerns), and vulnerable to foolish ideas like détente.  
Furthermore, whatever the short-term practical military and economic advantages, close 
trans-Atlantic cooperation or integration, especially under American aegis, threatened to 
occur within the framework of the much-despised Liberal ideas, values and phenomena; 
the superficial, soulless Zivilization; the frivolous, vulgar Unkultur; and the meaningless, 
non-idealistic, conformist, regimented way of life naively purveyed by the degraded and 
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decadent Anglo-Saxons, especially the Americans.  Far from being conducive to 
regeneration, these could only undermine the basis of the Abendland.   
Thus, for the Abendländler, profound differences cast serious doubts on the 
prospects for a fruitful integration or even the desirability of an intimate and durable 
cooperation in international affairs between the Anglo-Saxon nations and the peoples of 
the Abendland.  True, very few explicitly advocated a political, in addition to a cultural,  
equidistance from both the East and the Anglo-Saxons.  However, the subtle upshot of 
such perspectives was the ever present idea of an esse tially independent Christian 
Abendland, tentatively allied with the Anglo-Saxons against the East but diligently 
maintaining a healthy distance from the United States nd warily avoiding integration 
with or any kind of subordination to or dependence on the Anglo-Saxon powers.  
Assuming this posture and modus operandi, the nations of the Abendland would resist the 
competing ideologies of both American-style capitalism and materialist secularism, on 
the one hand, as well as Soviet communism and totalitari nism, on the other.  This, then, 
was a variation on the theme of the “Third Way” or the “Third Force,” here emerging not 
from a German nationalist perspective, but rather deriving from an intense cultural and 
civilizational consciousness of the existence of a discrete Christian Abendland.  It was 
believed that the successful execution of the necessarily delicate balancing act vis-à-vis 
the Anglo-Saxon powers would help preserve the distinct interests, ideas, values and 
identity of the Abendland, not just from the East but also from the Anglo-Saxons.   
F. Practice 
Far from being mere theory or rhetoric, the desire to return to the path of the 
Abendland manifested itself in many spheres of postwar West German life, indeed too 
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many to cite more than just a few examples.  For insta ce, in a departure from the 
positivist tradition of German jurisprudence but in line with the abendländischen stress 
on natural law, the Federal Republic’s Grundgesetz recognized the existence of 
fundamental human rights and an unwritten moral law superior to the laws of the state.  
Meanwhile, the state made extensive efforts via social policy to accommodate itself to 
and support those pre-political institutions key to the divinely endowed abendländischen 
order, such as the traditional Christian family and the church.  In economic life, the stress 
of the Abendland perspective on cooperation, rather than conflict, contributed to the 
institution of Mitbestimmung, worker co-determination, in West German industry.  
Employers broadened their training of, for example, miners well beyond technical 
instruction in an effort to avert Vermassung.  The inspiration of the Abendland concept 
also revealed itself in the heated debates surrounding popular consumer culture, usually 
imported from or at least influenced by the United States, and the messages and values 
implicit in that culture, particularly as they impacted on West German youth.  
Conservatives considered the crass, sometimes salacious, products of this repugnant 
Massenkultur, prominently featuring modern dance, movies and rock music, potentially 
subversive of the ideal of the abendländischen individual and destructive of the 
Abendland itself.12  Moreover, the Abendland worldview, with its concept of the state and 
of the Christian statesman, played an indispensable role in shaping the 
Kanzlerdemokratie, a towering fact of political life in the Adenauer period, as we shall 
see later on with respect to Birrenbach’s own experiences.     
                                                
12 In some cases, physical action was taken against such offensive products, for instance the protest 
activities and police interventions directed against the 1951 German film Die Sünderin. 
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Finally, and significantly for our purposes, the Abendland idea markedly stamped 
the foreign policy and international relations of the Federal Republic.  As alluded to 
earlier, this concept is vital in explaining the enthusiasm of German Conservatives for a 
supranational project of European integration based especially on close relations with 
France.  In stark contrast, it simultaneously encouraged a certain distance to the Anglo-
Saxon powers and even contributed to the rising strains in ties with the United States.  Of 
great importance here was the role of the Rhenish Cat olic Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, 
in whose policies the former American High Commissioner John McCloy believed to 
detect “a certain lack of understanding for the Anglo-Saxons… or too much thinking in 
terms of the renovation of the ‘Reich of Charlemagne.’”13  A man whose political thought 
was not at all attuned to the categories of Weltpolitik, Adenauer was an unwavering 
Europäer whose Eurocentric perspective was only further buttressed later on by his 
personal contact with de Gaulle.  Over time, Adenaur was increasingly plagued by 
doubts about the vigor and resolve of the United States in the confrontation with the 
Soviet Union; constantly feared American overtures and appeasement, at German 
expense, in the arms race and on reunification; criticized the technocratic American style 
of policymaking; and raised the specter of a subservient dependence on the United States.  
Reinforcing Adenauer in these convictions were his reservations from the start towards a 
looming Americanization and, then, in the Kennedy years by his low regard for and lack 
of a strong relationship with the President and his, often academically oriented, 
advisors.14  Though Adenauer may have realized that the defens of Europe would 
                                                
13 See Birrenbach approvingly quoting McCloy’s contribut on to the book Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), in KB to McCloy, 8 October 1976, ACDP K210/1. 
14 Adenauer’s wariness with respect to Americanization was, for instance, partially reflected in his 
preference for Bonn as the new capital of the Bundesrepublik rather than what he considered a much more 
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require United States support for quite some time, he also entertained what one close 
observer, perhaps not so charitably, termed a “long-term European Wunschdenken.”15   
At times, Birrenbach himself implicitly addressed the appeal for and the, to him, 
often detrimental impact on Adenauer of theconcept Abendland.  In assessing the 
Chancellor’s worldview, Birrenbach argued that “Adenauer had, from his inner 
disposition [Einstellung] as a Rhinelander, continental European and Catholic, no real 
inner relationship to the Anglo-Saxon world in general, with which he had also never 
come into immediate contact before the war.”16  With regard to Adenauer’s overall 
perspective and his relationship to the United States, Birrenbach remarked: 
For his part, Konrad Adenauer had, before the assumption of his postwar political 
tasks, no personal or political relations to the United States.  In the Weimar 
Republic, his thoughts [Gedanken] were concentrated, on the basis of his origin 
and experiences as a Rhinelander, on western [westliche] continental Europe.  The 
fact that control [Herrschaft] over the Rhine was for centuries the subject of 
German-French disputes and wars, decisively stamped the foreign political profile 
of his personality.  The Prussia-idea as well as the political vision of Stresemann 
of pursuing an independent policy between West and East were foreign to him.  
To a great extent, this attitude [Haltung] was and, up to his death, remained for 
him life-determining [lebensbestimmend].  He viewed the Weltpolitik 
fundamentally from a continental European perspectiv .  Naturally, the enormous 
change of the power constellation after the Second World War and especially the 
fact that the friendship and power of the United States were the only effective 
protection against a Soviet policy of expansion, were plainly clear to him.  
However, the access [Zugang] to the American world and to its way of thinking 
[Denkungsart] only first emerged for him from the personal contacts with men 
like Dean Acheson, General Lucius D. Clay, John J. McCloy and others.17   
                                                                                                                                      
thoroughly Americanized Frankfurt.  Adenauer strongly preferred Nixon to Kennedy during the 1960 
presidential election campaign.    
15 Among the key events impacting negatively on Adenau r’s attitude with respect to the reliability of the 
United States were the Suez Crisis in 1956, the launching of Sputnik in 1957 and the Berlin Crisis of 1958-
62, especially the aftermath of the construction of the wall in August 1961.  On Adenauer’s 
“Wunschdenken,” see the letter from an unidentified source to KB, 4 August 1975, ACDP K162/1. 
16 Undated KB speech, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus function on Adenauer and the United States 
and Britain, ACDP K164/1.  For another example of Birrenbach lamenting Adenauer’s lack of an “i neres 
Verhältnis” to the Anglo-Saxon world, see KB to Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 14 October 1975, ACDP K162/1. 
17 Kurt Birrenbach, “Adenauer und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Periode seiner Kanzlerschaft,” in Konrad 
Adenauer und seine Zeit: Politik und Persönlichkeit d s ersten Bundeskanzlers, eds. Blumenwitz, et al. 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), p. 478.   
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In examining “the nature [Art] of his political thinking,” Birrenbach found it to be 
“focused purely on the European continent” and argued that Adenauer “thought 
essentially in continental, not however in extra-continental, concepts [Begriffen].” 18   
Briefly put, we can say that Birrenbach rendered a mixed verdict on Adenauer.  
On the one hand, he repeatedly praised the Chancellor’s accomplishments, for example 
the “extraordinarily difficult negotiations” during the early 1950s that eventually led to 
the replacement of the Occupation Statute and the elimination of almost all Allied 
prerogatives in the Federal Republic, as well as his achievements with respect to 
European unification.19  On the other hand, Birrenbach also noted the “essential” 
character, in Adenauer’s mind, of the relationship es ecially with France (along with the 
other “neighboring states”) and, therefore, Adenauer’s exaggerated “inclination” towards 
that country, leading Birrenbach to admit that “I was of a different opinion than he in the 
assessment [Einschätzung] of the position of de Gaulle and of Gaullist France.”20  
Birrenbach pointed out that, even after Adenauer’s belated initiation into the American 
world, any evaluation of his “attitude” [Einstellung] towards German-American relations 
had to account for the  paucity of his genuine “personal contact” to individual Americans 
and for the fact that “the intellectual leadership stratum” of the United States in the 
                                                
18 KB speech, SBKAH function on Adenauer and the United States and Britain, ACDP K164/1.  In this 
talk, Birrenbach also rejected the hypothesis that Adenauer had an “aversion” towards England due to a 
“political Einzelaktes of an occupation power,” namely his dismissal as myor of Cologne by the British in 
October 1945. 
19 On the negotiations of the early 1950s, see Birrenbach’s introduction of Wilhelm Grewe before the 
DGAP on 24 January 1967, ACDP K061/1.  For an expression of Birrenbach’s admiration for Adenauer’s 
efforts, along with those of personalities like Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi and (especially) Jean 
Monnet, in the field of European unification, see KB to Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 19 
March 1982, ACDP K033/1.  On Adenauer’s engagement in 1923 in talks between Loucheur, Stinnes and 
Thyssen regarding the founding of a type of Montanunion, see KB to Hallstein, 12 January 1976, ACDP 
K042/1. 
20 On the “essential” nature of the relationship with and Adenauer’s “Neigung” towards France, see KB 
speech, SBKAH function on Adenauer and the United States and Britain, ACDP K164/1.  For Birrenbach’s 
“different opinion” on these themes, see KB to Kiesinger, 14 October 1975, ACDP K162/1. 
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Kennedy period was “completely alien” to him.21  At least in part, this was due to the fact 
that “[t]he American mental approach [Geisteseinstellung], its thought in global concepts 
[Globalbegriffen], particularly in view of its history that was so different from its 
European counterpart, were and remained foreign to Konrad Adenauer.”  This was 
essential in explaining what Birrenbach considered Adenauer’s “lack of understanding,” 
indeed his “extremes of incomprehension [Unverständnisses] of the American Politik.”22  
Whatever he deemed to be Adenauer’s great merits, Birrenbach was, at the same time, 
clearly distressed that the Chancellor’s outlook, significantly shaped as it was by the 
perspective of Abendland, diverged considerably in many key respects from his own.    
G. Sources of Strength 
The widespread influence exercised by the Ab ndland concept in the Federal 
Republic can be attributed to a variety of factors, including some quite external to the 
content and virtues of the worldview itself.  One must also ponder, for instance, the 
physically devastated and spiritually deprived condition of postwar Germany and, more 
broadly, western Europe.  In the vacuum created by the collapse of nationalism and many 
other traditional beliefs, the notion of Abendland offered plausible explanations as well as 
the possibility of a desperately needed orientation at a dire time of crisis and confusion.  
It contained not only a coherent account of how this errible stage of history had been 
                                                
21 KB speech, SBKAH function on Adenauer and the United States and Britain, ACDP K164/1.  
Birrenbach did acknowledge certain exceptions, such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, John 
McCloy and Lyndon Johnson.  See, for example, Birrenbach pointing to Adenauer’s “close relations to a 
series of prominent [bedeutender] Americans, especially Dulles,” in KB to Kiesinger, 14 October 1975, 
ACDP K162/1.  Nevertheless, Birrenbach also swiftly dismissed the significance of such exceptions, as 
when he pithily remarked, “America is not Dulles,” in KB to Bruno Heck, 30 January 1975, ACDP 
K162/1.  In reality, Adenauer’s friendship with Dulles was quite fragile and marred by frequent bouts f 
distrust.  Adenauer’s relatively positive contact with Johnson was symbolized by his time at the latter’s 
Texas ranch in Spring 1961. 
22 KB speech, SBKAH function on Adenauer and the United States and Britain, ACDP K164/1.  In this 
context, Birrenbach referred to a conversation he claimed to have had in 1961 with the Chancellor, perhaps 
mistaking the year in the retelling, after Eisenhower had suffered a heart attack.   
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reached but, furthermore, provided a promising program for the future.  Certain historical 
parallels also contributed to its allure.  As so often before, whether it be with respect to 
Huns, Muslims or Magyars, Western Europe appeared to be once again confronted by a 
threatening mass of Eastern barbarians.  It therefore appeared necessary to restore the 
united Abendland that had proven so effective in former times at fending off such 
dangers.23  The demographic impact of two world wars and of considerable economic 
upheaval during the 20th century also contributed to the impressive strength of the 
Abendland idea, insofar as they helped produce a proportionately more elderly German 
population, including leadership strata, than would otherwise have been the case.24  It was 
in these older elements, frequently entertaining an outlook still rooted in the Kaiserreich 
or Weimar and more receptive to traditionally anti-modernist attitudes and critiques, that 
the Abendland concept tended to find its generational basis.  Probably also due in part to 
a less extensive contact with the abroad, these morsenior groups often held a view of 
international politics that still considered Europe th  center of world affairs and perhaps 
underestimated, for instance, the dramatically increased significance of the United States.   
The German Abendland concept also existed in the postwar period within a larger 
context of trends that proved very hospitable to it.  In rather general terms, it enjoyed the 
benefit of existing in an age of pervasive and increasing historical consciousness, with the 
past serving as an object of intense scrutiny and investigation as an essential means of 
understanding the present and perhaps, ideally, the fu ure.25  Moreover, the post-1945 era 
                                                
23 Regarding the threat from the East and its historical parallels, reference was often made, for instance, to 
the cooperation between Franks, Gauls and Romans to save the Abendland from Attila and to the triumphs 
in 955 over the Magyars and Slavs then standing before the gates of the Abendland.   
24 Moreover, many in the younger generations were politica ly tainted.  
25 On historical consciousness, see John Lukacs, Historical Consciousness: The Remembered Past (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1968).   
 94
was an environment in which re-Christianization movements, whether explicitly 
abendländisch or not, sprouted up and flourished elsewhere in the Western world outside 
of the Federal Republic, including in the United States.26  Finally, throughout the 20th 
century, the concept of a Third Way or a Third Force in which Europe, or parts thereof, 
could traverse and survive on a path between both American capitalism and Soviet 
communism, formed a dominant theme of political andsocial thought in Germany and 
indeed throughout Europe.  Such ideas, including their ambivalence towards and, often, 
open criticism of the United States, were not limited o any one particular segment of the 
political spectrum, rather they existed on both the Right and the Left.  Though not 
entirely compatible with Abendland, personalities like the CDU’s Jakob Kaiser, the 
SPD’s Kurt Schumacher and the politically nomadic Gustav Heinemann even made 
proposals for a “Dritten Weg” for a, hopefully, reunited Germany.  Such sentiments led in 
the 1950s to the founding of the Gesamtdeutschen Volkspartei (1952) and of a multi-
partisan Gesamtdeutschen Bewegung (1954).  All of this suggests that the Abendland 
perspective was not an isolated anachronism, but rather meshed quite well with a variety 
of other tendencies within as well as beyond the borders of the Bundesrepublik.     
Another reason for the widespread diffusion of the Ab ndland idea was the 
concept’s sheer flexibility and lack of ideological stringency.  The complex Abendland 
worldview consisted of a remarkably diverse array of elements, whether of a political, 
cultural, religious, intellectual or historical nature, and moved on a multiplicity of 
analytical levels.  It was not necessary for indiviuals to subscribe to all these elements, 
                                                
26 See the ever more religious flavor of this post-World War II, American-style conservatism as 
exemplified in the works of William F. Buckley, Jr. (God and Man at Yale, 1951) and Russell Kirk (The 
Conservative Mind, 1953).  Compare this with the irreverent a-religious or even anti-religious attitudes of 
writers of the Old Right like Albert Jay Nock and H.L. Mencken.  Earlier, the French renouveau catholique 
had significantly influenced German ideas of Abendland.   
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rather one might embrace particular aspects, conceptions or interpretations.  Thus, the 
concept of Abendland could indeed signify among some a desire for the reestablishment 
of the medieval Sacrum Imperium, but it might also merely reflect among others an 
intense anti-Bolshevism.  Not surprisingly, debates even existed among the Abendländler 
themselves, revolving around a broad assortment of topics, some of them potentially of 
considerable practical importance, with respect to the Abendland: its exact geographic 
extent, its proper role in the world, the impact on it of technology, and so forth.   
Birrenbach himself provides ample demonstration that t e Abendland worldview 
is more aptly characterized as a sensibility, rather t an a stringent ideology.  After all, he 
had grown up in predominantly Catholic Münster at atime when, at least early on, 
Protestant and Catholic children still hardly played with one another.  Though not a son 
of the Rhineland, Birrenbach did profess admiration for the personality traits he believed 
sprang from the Rhenish landscape.  Even late in life, he remained conscious of his own 
Catholic identity.27  Of course, we have already noted his fascination with the classical 
world and languages and with classical formulations.28  Through his experiences in the 
                                                
27 On Protestant and Catholic children in pre-1914 Münster, see the remembrance of the deceased banker 
Clemens Plassmann offered by the Protestant native of Münster Werner Schütz, enclosed with Schütz to 
KB, 22 December 1971, ACDP K038/2.  It was at the behest of Charlemagne that the Christian missionary 
Ludger established in the area the monastery from which Münster derived its name, in that city’s official 
founding year of 793, and then established the Gymnasium Paulinum around 797.  Birrenbach’s reference 
to the Rhenish traits was directed at the deceased Pfer menges, a native of Mönchengladbach, in a speech 
at the ATH HV on 28 March 1963, ACDP K077/2.  Among these qualities, Birrenbach cited human 
[“ menschliche”] warmth, goodness and readiness to help, a soft heart and a cheerful, kind nature.  For 
Birrenbach elsewhere praising the virtues of deep rligiosity, piety [Frömmigkeit], purity and a moral ethos 
as well as an attachment to nature [Naturverbundenheit] and Menschenliebe, see his speech at 
Rheinlaender’s funeral, 14 December 1971, ACDP K065/4.  Far from being a denizen of the city, 
Birrenbach lived, in Düsseldorf-Gerresheim, in a rather isolated, even wooded, location, approximately t n 
kilometers from his office in the center of Düsseldorf.  For one of Birrenbach’s open references to the fact 
that he was a Catholic and not a Protestant, see KB to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, 24 June 1981, 
ACDP K033/3. 
28 In addition to flaunting his etymological knowledge, Birrenbach at times alluded to quotations of Pericl s 
and other classical figures and often inserted into his correspondence Latin phrases, favorites among them
being gratulor, ultra posse nemo obligatur, expressis verbis, pacta sunt servanda nd circulus vitiosus.  For 
Birrenbach claiming to see in Greece not only a “political partner” but in the “Hellenic culture one of the 
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Wirtschaft, Birrenbach became well aware of the patent disparities between German and 
foreign, especially Anglo-Saxon, approaches, including with respect to industrial 
structure, as reflected for example in their differng board systems.  As an educated man, 
Birrenbach evinced a considerable historical consciousness, manifested in his passion for 
history, a belief in a historical process, an insistence on a critical evaluation of historical 
events in order to form proper judgments, and his expressed respect for those of universal 
historical learning.  His favorite leisure activity was reading not only “schöngeistige 
Literatur” but especially history and biographies, his familiar ty reaching back to works 
of the 19th century, including those of, in his mind, its most important historian, Ranke.  
Birrenbach was competent to exchange views on cultural problems and saw himself as a 
lover of and fairly expert in the fine arts, including many non-German works.  His artistic 
interests embraced painting, such as that of the 17th and 18th centuries and the French 
impressionists; architecture, especially from the Renaissance and Baroque; sculpture; and 
music, whether Beethoven, Mozart, Schubert, Brahms or Bach.  Clearly, Birrenbach was 
steeped in the Catholic and western European life and culture so central to Abendland.29   
                                                                                                                                      
cornerstones of Western civilization” and, therefor, his belief that “the spiritual character [geistige Bild] of 
a Europe hopefully one day united in the form of a European Union will be in part stamped [mitgeprägt] by 
this origin,” see Birrenbach’s introductory speech for the Greek Foreign Minister at the DGAP on 7 May 
1981, ACDP K075/1.  For his 60th birthday, Birrenbach received, in addition to a photo volume on the 
Catholic Xanten Cathedral, the book Die Irrfahrten des Odysseus in Bildern a d a book about Roman art.  
For the regret of one of Birrenbach’s business associates that, though they had spent pleasant hours in and 
around Athens (in connection with the Greek oil refin ry deal), they had been almost exclusively, even in 
the middle of the night [“zur nachtschlafender Zeit”] occupied in the ministry so that there had been only a 
brief time for the study of classical sites, see Peter Schaefer, Rheinhausen, to KB, 16 January 1959, ACDP 
K207/2. 
29 Birrenbach was well acquainted with literature from especially the 19th and, to a lesser extent, 20th 
centuries.  By all appearances far from a modern art enthusiast, Birrenbach populated his own personal art 
collection with works purchased from galleries.  On Birrenbach’s plans to travel to Ansbach for several 
days for the upcoming Bach Woche, see KB to Bundesmini ter a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 
July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  Birrenbach regularly gave, and received, books, music and wine, among other 
items, as gifts.    
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Moreover, Birrenbach had early on come into contact with the explicit concept of 
Abendland and had developed an affinity for some aspects of that worldview.  As already 
noted, he familiarized himself with the ideas of Prince Karl Anton von Rohan and his 
Europäischen Revue, founded in 1925, of which the notion of Abendland was a central 
component and which Rohan raised up against what he considered the artificially 
constructed “Pan-Europa” that was advocated by Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi.  
As a young student at the end of the 1920s, Birrenbach had read Spengler’s Untergang 
des Abendlandes, confessing many decades later that, “in the mood one was in at the 
time,” he had been “impressed, even if not fully convinced,” by the work; had later read 
Spengler’s Preußentum und Sozialismus and Jahre der Entscheidung; and even as late as 
1980 planned to again buy and re-read Untergang.  Over the years, Birrenbach had also 
read and re-read the works of Toynbee.30  Already during his Berlin period, Birrenbach 
had been close, “albeit [allerdings] with certain reservations [Vorbehalten],” to Der Tat 
and the Tat-Kreis and had links to personalities like Hans Zehrer, Giselher Wirsing and 
others.31  Birrenbach also claimed that at that time he had found “great” a certain “Edgar 
Johann Jung” [probably referring to Edgar Julius Jung], a man he considered “a parallel 
figure” to the personalities of the Tat-Kreis and with whose work in the 1930s he had 
                                                
30 For Birrenbach reading Spengler and Toynbee, see KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübbe, c/o Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung, 25 June 1980, ACDP K034/2.  Here, Birrenbach also admitted that after reading one of Lübbe’s 
essays (entitled “Historisch-politische Exaltationen”), “practically nothing remains of Spengler [bleibt von 
Spengler so gut wie nichts übrig]” and that “also by the re-reading of Toynbee, similar ideas [Gedanken] 
come to me [Birrenbach] as to you [Lübbe] by Spenglr.”  However, for Birrenbach elsewhere professing 
to “think not so negatively as Lübbe” about Spengler, also including with regard to the book Preußentum 
und Sozialismus, see KB to Prof. Schelsky, 16 March 1981, ACDP K033/2.   
31 For Birrenbach’s “reservations” and for his having been “less [weniger] impressed” with Ferdinand 
Fried, see KB to Prof. Schelsky, 16 March 1981, ACDP K033/2.  Schelsky had also apparently been close 
to the Tat-Kreis.  In 1957, Birrenbach sent the Griechische Tagebuch (1936) of Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann 
as preparatory reading for an upcoming trip to Greece (KB to Dr. F. Richter c/o Klinik Dr. Schmitt, 
Munich, 25 September 1957, ACDP K116/1).  In Decembr 1980, Birrenbach still referred to Zehrer as an 
“outstanding personality.” (KB to Axel Springer, 5 December 1980, ACDP K033/2).   
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been “very impressed.”32  Likewise, Birrenbach acknowledged having been “very 
impressed in the youth” with the likes of Hans Freyer and Hellmuth Plessner.33  The 
eminent Catholic scholar Goetz Briefs, whom Birrenbach had met in Berlin by the early 
1930s and who would become a long-term contact, was among the editors of the Weimar 
journal Abendland.  Finally and much later on, in the Federal Republic, Birrenbach 
became a member of the Catholic Görres-Gesellschaft, which was based in Cologne.34 
The impact of such activities and encounters seems to have left a mark on 
Birrenbach and continued to manifest itself long afterwards.  Some passages of his early 
1950s journalism, though never outright employing the term “Abendland,” rather 
referring to the “West” and a “Europe” that was clear y geographically larger than and at 
least subtly culturally different from a strictly delineated Abendland, might still have 
been at home in works emerging from that worldview.  Such passages included his 
bemoaning “the destruction of the dams [Dämme] on which the ostslawische flood [Flut] 
tended to break in history” and which had represented the “’Limes’ of the European 
mainland towards the East.”35  Though we will come to know Birrenbach as a convinced 
                                                
32 KB to Prof. Schelsky, 16 March 1981, ACDP K033/2. 
33 KB to Prof. Schelsky, 16 March 1981, ACDP K033/2. 
34 For an example of Birrenbach explicitly engaging with the concept Abendland in the Federal Republic, 
see his assessment of what he considered the historian Peter Berglar’s “brilliant” and “entirely accurate” 
piece addressing the “politisch-staatengeschichtliche development” from the “abendländischen 
Christenheit” to the “European Machtordnung,” which included an overview dealing with the 
“abendländischen development” up to the start of the 19th century, see KB to Berglar, 5 November 1977, 
ACDP K151/2.  Birrenbach considered reading this work “ f great profit,” especially due to its linking of 
“political and geistesgeschichtlicher development.” 
35 “Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost: Die Lage Deutschlands nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg,” 
by Kurt Birrenbach, 7-10 February 1951, Freie Presse (Buenos Aires), ACDP K001/1.  In this February 
1951 series, Birrenbach defined a Europe that consisted of “all these countries, in which according to their 
tradition the human being [Mensch] is or was a value in itself [Wert an sich]” and that in his view, 
therefore, also comprised at least much of Eastern Eu ope (but apparently not the USSR) and the Balkans.  
On the other hand, he also referred here to a “European core [Kern]” that appeared to not encompass these 
areas, rather that was centered more on Western Europe.  Elsewhere in this series, Birrenbach mourned “the 
shattering [Zerschlagung] of the historic European defense bastions” and the “breakthrough [Einbruch] of 
the Soviet flood into the Central European area [R um].”  This had become possible, in part, because “th
West itself has, in a misjudgment [Verkennung] of the historical development, eroded [abgetragen] the 
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Atlanticist, he entertained at times a view of the United States that was far from 
uniformly rosy.  While exhibiting a great respect for some aspects of American life, such 
as its Wissenschaft, he was distinctly unimpressed when the subject turned to other areas, 
such as its culture.36  As of the early 1950s, Birrenbach was arguing that “t e power of 
the USA… rests fundamentally [im wesentlichen] on its economic-technical [technisch]-
organizational ability [Potenz]” and that a certain political importance “was due 
[zukommt]” the European continent on the basis of its “cultural primacy [Vorrang],” 
which was “even today still effective [wirksam].” 37  Furthermore, Birrenbach’s often 
                                                                                                                                      
dams which history had erected [aufgerichtet] between the Europe of Western Kultur and the Ostslawen.” 
For Birrenbach, these “dams” included Poland, “erodd” in the partitions “around the turn of the 19th 
century and at the start of the Second World War”; the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, “in the peace treaty 
of Trianon” [actually concluded only with Hungary], and “the German Bastion,” at Versailles, Yalta and
Potsdam.  “None of the Western powers, including Germany, can absolve themselves of the guilt of having 
misjudged [verkannt] the signs [Zeichen] of history.”  Now, Birrenbach argued for the need “to construct 
[aufbauen] the dam there against the communist flood where it can, and must, be held [gehalten] if 
everything should not be lost, i.e. in Europe.”  With respect to borders, Birrenbach insisted that “Europe 
ends not on the Elbe, rather there, where once those dams [Dämme] have stood that have constituted the 
‘Limes’ of the European mainland [Festland] towards the East [nach Osten].”  The lines along which the 
new Lime should be erected were “fluid.”  Their fixing would probably only be possible by taking into 
account the historical development that had occurred in the last decades.  Meanwhile, Birrenbach expressed 
his related belief that continental Europe, if one included England in this assessment, was still superior, 
even today, to “the Soviet colossus” in the quantity and quality of its human [“menschlichen”] potential.  
However, Birrenbach also emphasized that none of the nations of the Brussels Pact [of which the Federal 
Republic was not a member] disposed of “experiences in the struggle with Eastern peoples [Völkern].”   
36 For Birrenbach sending a standard American volume on conomics [“Volkswirtschaftslehre”] as a 
“stimulus” to carry out future study “in the necessary breadth and depth” but also to demonstrate “in what 
vivid [anschaulicher] way the Anglo-Saxons are in the situation to treat difficult economic themes,” see 
KB to Claus-Gerrit, 22 March 1957, ACDP K116/1.  For Birrenbach being astonished that in the long-term 
“the American way of life” did not fully satisfy Udvarhelyi “in the scientific [wissenschaftlicher] respect” 
but not being at all surprised at Udvarhelyi’s dissatisfaction with it “in the cultural respect,” see KB to 
George Udvarhelyi, Johns Hopkins Dept. of Neurological Surgery, 20 July 1956, ACDP K116/1.  
Nevertheless, setting the bar rather low in his owneyes, Birrenbach did concede to the wife of the historian 
Hajo Holborn that “[h]owever, when one compares [to Argentina], in what an intellectual environment 
[geistige Umgebung] you and your husband have come, one can envy you… for the intellectual [geistige] 
atmosphere that you have found in the United States.”  Birrenbach further stated that “the tremendous 
abundance [ungeheure Reichtum] of people [Menschen] of quality with whom you interacted in the United 
States has impressed me.  Be happy that it has been so….  There [in Argentina], your life could not have 
been so rich as it has developed in the USA.  Therefore, I am pleased for you that fate has brought 
[verschlagen] you to North America.” (KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/1). 
37 “Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost: Die Lage Deutschlands nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg,” 
by Kurt Birrenbach, 7-10 February 1951, Freie Presse (Buenos Aires), ACDP K001/1.  In this same piece, 
Birrenbach warned against a “too far-reaching fragmentation [Zersplitterung]” of the American manpower 
[“ Menschenreserven”] since the structure of the American military power, in contrast to the continental-
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negative perspective on modern life included components typical of the Abendland 
outlook.  For instance, he complained at times about the “competitive struggle of all 
against all in the modern mass society” and bemoaned the “complete materialization of 
life” characteristic of the present time.38  While Birrenbach was most definitely not to be 
counted amongst the die-hard Abendländler, it is also clear that he, too, subscribed, even 
if only implicitly, to particular elements of their worldview.   
Furthermore, the notion of Abendland did not suddenly emerge in the wake of 
World War II, rather its history in Germany stretches back at least to the 16th century 
when it surfaced as a constitutive antithesis to the Morgenland (Orient) in the Gospel of 
Matthew in Luther’s translation of the bible.  This was a history principally characterized 
by gradual evolution and transformation.  During the 19th century, actually beginning 
around the turn of the century with the ascendance of Romanticism, the Abendland 
concept acquired a more specific meaning, coming to be associated with the ideal of the 
medieval unity of Christendom and Europe.  By the second half of the century, it had 
become intertwined, culturally, with the idea of an amalgamation of antiquity, 
Christianity, and the Germanic and Romance peoples and, spatially, with central and, 
especially continental, western Europe, essentially excluding the Slavs and maintaining a 
                                                                                                                                      
European ones, especially however to the Eastern armies, “grants the crucial priority to highly technisierten 
troop units [Teilen].”   
38 On the “competitive struggle [Konkurrenzkampf] of all against all” as well as the dangers of “falling 
victim to the dehumanization of life by a suppression of the development of extremely personal qualities by 
a total clamping in [Einspannung] in a profession,” see KB to Ernst Hase, Münster, 24 September 1959, 
ACDP K047/2.  On the “complete materialization of life,” see KB to Gräfin Renate Hardenberg, 28 
December 1955, ACDP K213/4.  In the same letter to the Münster painter Ernst Hase, Birrenbach stated 
that “the engagement with spiritual forces [geistigen Kräften]… is ultimately the vital principal 
[Lebenselement] for every person [Menschen] who does not live solely in the purely material order of 
things” and expressed admiration for those inextricably linked, with “love and devotion [Liebe und 
Anhänglichkeit],” to their home cities as well as for those involved in professions that fulfilled them 
“inwardly [innerlich]” and that offered their practitioners the opportuni y “to live to some extent on the 
periphery of the era [am Rande der Zeit],” to nurture their own “artistic development” and to occupy 
themselves with and base their lives on “art and nature.” (KB to Ernst Hase, 24 September 1959, ACDP 
K047/2).   
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reserved attitude towards the Anglo-Saxons.  Thus, Abendland had by this point shed its 
earlier reference to the entirety of Christian Europe.  Aside from pieces of a more 
journalistic bent appearing in the F uilletons and elsewhere, key works in the evolution 
of the Abendland perspective in the 19th century included those by Novalis (Europa, 
1799), Friedrich Schlegel (Philosophie der Geschichte, 1828), Leopold von Ranke 
(Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation, 1839) and Jakob Burckhardt.  
Throughout this history, whatever its other content may have been, the Abendland 
outlook was also usually linked with the imperative of the defense of the threatened 
Abendland against a variety of enemies, both external and internal, whether it be hordes 
of heathens, especially those of Arabic and Turkish Islam prior to the 19th century, or 
later on, for example during the Metternich era, the ideas of the French Revolution.   
However, it was not until after World War I, during the interwar years, that the 
Abendland concept truly cohered into an explicit, concrete and, at least sometimes, 
political program.  This was primarily the work of Catholic-Conservative intellectuals, 
based above all in the Rhineland in centers like Bonn, whose university was home at the 
time to essential personalities like the Romanist Hermann Platz and the political and legal 
theorist Carl Schmitt; the Benedictine monastery Maria Laach, located in the Eifel region 
and led by the abbot Ildefons Herwegen; and, of course, Cologne.39  Their feverish 
activity was largely a response to the horrors of the recent war and its chaotic aftermath 
as well as to the sensational work of Oswald Spengler.  Following in the footsteps of 
Nietzsche’s ominous prophecies of nihilism and cultural decay, Spengler’s Untergang 
des Abendlandes, with its elaborate Kulturmorphologie, first brought widespread 
                                                
39 Herwegen was Adenauer’s old Cologne schoolmate, and Adenauer was able to stay for a year at Maria 
Laach as a guest following his dismissal as mayor of Cologne and president of the Prussian State Council 
by the National Socialists in April 1933. 
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currency to the expression and concept of “Abendland” and also functioned as a catalyst 
for an outpouring of kulturkritischer literature and other such related efforts.  These 
Catholic intellectuals, sometimes employing the virtually equivalent Reich concept, 
propagated a vision of Abendland with crucial similarities to that which thrived after 
1945.  Strikingly different was the openly authoritarian, imperial and Germano-centric 
character of these ideas, elements that were considerably tempered after World War II.40  
Noteworthy journals propagating the Abendland worldview during the Weimar era 
included Abendland, founded in 1925 by Platz in Cologne, as well as Die Tat, especially 
in the heyday of the influential “Tat-Kreis” once Hans Zehrer had assumed leadership of 
the publication in 1929.41 
While at first glance a singularly inhospitable environment, the Catholic 
Abendland idea, or at least elements of it, lived on during the Third Reich in a diversity 
of forms and forums and with varying degrees of proundity or lack thereof: despite the 
obvious contrasts with National Socialist ideology, in the regime’s anti-Bolshevik, anti-
Semitic and anti-plutocratic propaganda, including that emanating from Hitler and 
Goebbels themselves42; the interpretation of the war by even some non-Nation l 
Socialists as a heroic defensive struggle of the united Abendland, under German 
leadership, against the dual mortal threats posed by Bolshevism (or Sovietism) and 
Anglo-Saxonism (or Americanism); in the Catholic Church itself, where it helps explain 
the resistance towards certain Nazi policies, such as the euthanasia campaign, as well as 
                                                
40 For many, an authoritarian Germany was expected to play an indispensable role, not least as continental 
hegemon, with the German ruler serving as Emperor of the Abendland.  Such an arrangement was 
considered a cosmological requisite to maintain the ord r of the universe and the essential balance with the 
popes.   
41 The journal Abendland was subtitled Deutsche Monatshefte für europäische Kultur, Politik und 
Wirtschaft, while Die Tat styled itself an Unabhängige Monatsschrift zur Gestaltung neuer Wirklich eit. 
42 See Hitler’s Reichstag speech of 11 December 1941 declaring war on the United States and Goebbels’ 
front-page article of 19 July 1942 on “Die sogenannte russische Seele” in the weekly Das Reich. 
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the support proffered for others, among them the invasion of the Soviet Union43; among 
the members of the Conservative resistance, for instance within the Kreisauer circle, as 
reflected not only in their opposition to the regime but also in their broad designs for a 
future Germany and Europe44; and among those intellectual “internal emigrants” like 
Max Bense, Reinhold Schneider and Werner Bergengrue, some of them befriended with 
one another, engaged in their wide-ranging, seemingly nocuous and obscure 
undertakings, whether of a literary, historical or philosophical nature.  All this meant that, 
aside from some necessary adaptation to circumstances, the Abendland concept evinced 
deeply rooted continuities and enjoyed a firm foundation in German thought, a state of 
affairs that contributed mightily to the flourishing of Abendland after 1945.  In fact, one 
can detect a certain continuity from Weimar to the Federal Republic not just in 
philosophy and social basis but also with respect to the personalities that comprised the 
respective Abendland circles, as we shall soon see, for instance, in the journalistic field.   
H. Institutions 
When assessing the impressive durability of the Ab ndland concept, one must 
keep in mind that within the Federal Republic there xisted a number of institutional 
pillars striving to maintain and propagate the idea.  Among the most important of these 
was the Abendländische Akademie, founded in 1952 in Munich.  This institution was 
structurally well developed, with its own Vorstand, Kuratorium, Beirat, Sozialreferat and 
Studienleitung, as well as a full body of officers.  It could boast of a considerable number 
of influential and eminent individuals from diverse walks of life occupying these bodies 
                                                
43 An example combining both praise (of the invasion) a d criticism (including of euthanasia) is the well-
known pastoral letter of Münster’s Bishop von Galen of 14 September 1941. 
44 See, for instance, the record of the results of the Kreisauer circle discussions of 22-25 May 1942, calling 
for “den Neuaufbau des Abendlandes.” 
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and amongst its friends.45  The Akademie staged speeches, discussion sessions, seminars 
and conferences with the centerpiece of its activities being the annual multi-day 
conferences usually held in the Bavarian Bischofsstadt of Eichstätt and attended by 
several hundred members of the abendländischen intelligentsia.  As was typical in much 
of the Abendland movement, academy organizers made conscious efforts to overcome 
hyper-confessionalism and to ensure at least a limited bi-confessional participation in the 
leading organs and in the various events.  Engaged in many of the same types of activities 
and also of significance was the Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz, which 
emerged in 1950 from the work of the Arbeitskreis christlicher Historiker.  From 1953 
on, this institute was housed in the Domus Universitatus at the University of Mainz, thus 
underscoring the assistance provided by certain Hochschulen, with the annual 
conferences of the Abendlandische Akademie also held at least at times in such venues.  
These institutions were intended as forums where the Abendland tradition could be 
nurtured and a broad spectrum of fundamental themes and problems of Abendland 
thought explored in a Christian spirit on a theoretically ambitious level, with the aim of 
rendering such ideas fruitful, whether in a political, cultural or some other sense.  
Naturally, the churches, especially the Catholic Churc , a great proponent of the 
Abendland concept, represented a powerful institutional strength of Occidentalism in the 
Federal Republic.  In the postwar years, the Catholic Church especially enjoyed great 
prestige and authority, due in large part to its resistance against the National Socialist 
                                                
45 Chairman of the academy’s Vorstand from 1952-56 was its co-founder Friedrich August Freiherr von der 
Heydte, professor of law at the University of Mainz and then, from 1954, at the University of Würzburg.  
Members of the academy’s Kuratorium included Heinrich von Brentano (MdB, CDU), Richard Jaeger 
(MdB, CSU), Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (MdB, DP), Hermann Weinkauff (president of the 
Bundesgerichtshofs), Basilius Ebel (abbot of Maria Laach) and Paul Wihelm Wenger (Rheinischer Merkur 
editor). 
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regime and, later on, against many of the measures of the Allied occupying powers.  The 
Catholic Church was also revered due to its remarkable continuity, particularly when 
contrasted with numerous other seemingly transient institutions of society, and not least 
the very forms of the state itself.  The influence of the Catholic Church was further 
enhanced in West Germany during this period since natio al division and the loss of the 
primarily Protestant East meant that Catholics no longer found themselves in such a 
pronounced minority position in the new Federal Republic.  In an effort to further 
augment this far-reaching sway, Catholic academies were founded, beginning in 1951 in 
the diocese Rottenburg-Stuttgart, aimed at creating nd reinforcing linkages between the 
Church and the leadership strata of other elements of society.  The number of these 
Catholic academies, themselves modeled in part on the Evangelical academies that had 
already first appeared in 1945 in Bad Boll, steadily grew to seventeen by 1960.  Among 
their activities, these confessional academies staged many conferences that served, at 
least to some extent, the propagation of the Ab ndland idea.  Meanwhile, clergymen also 
took part in entities like the Abendländischer Akademie.46 
While Occidental-minded Germans may have looked to the medieval past for 
their models and identity, and vehemently criticized the propaganda and mental 
engineering aspects of mass marketing and advertising, they were also quite skilled in the 
use of modern instruments and institutions of media and public relations to further their 
cause.  The Abendland idea and culture were disseminated on public radio, for instance in 
the influential cultural and evening programs, as well as in various print outlets, including 
                                                
46 Among the co-founders of the Akademie was the Jesuit Father Franz Georg Waldburg.   In addition to the 
already mentioned Basilius Ebel (abbot of Maria Laach), the Kuratorium of the academy included Hugo 
Lang (abbot of the cloister St. Bonifaz in Munich), Lorenz Jaeger (archbishop of Paderborn), Josef 
Schröffer (bishop of Eichstätt) and Father Gilbert Cormann (Institut für katholische Sozialarbeit, 
Dortmund).   
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books, newspapers and journals.  The ab ndländischen institutions carried out their own 
publication activity.  Key Occidentalist publishers included the Verlag Eugen Diederichs, 
which thus pursued some of its long-cherished themes, and the Verlag Neues Abendland, 
just founded in 1951.47  Among the many postwar periodicals and journals focused on 
Abendland, a pivotal position was occupied by Neuem Abendland, which first appeared in 
1946 and saw itself upholding the tradition of the W imar journal Abendland.  The 
extensive Catholic press, including the diocese newspapers as well as publications such 
as Hochland, Neue Ordnung and Stimmen der Zeit, was a reliable source of Conservative 
Abendland thought.  Other publications that could be expected to trumpet Abendland 
included the CSU’s Bayernkurier, the Rheinische Merkur, the Münchner Merkur, the 
Deutsche Tagespost, and the Protestant Christ und Welt and Sonntagsblatt.48  The 
admittedly short-lived Abendländische Aktion (1951-53), founded in Munich, intensified 
these efforts to shape public opinion by staging public rallies, gatherings of journalists 
and other functions, and generally circulating Occidental ideas.49  Symbolic Abendland 
imagery, often conveyed via photographs, such as the emotional presence of Adenauer 
                                                
47 The Verlag Eugen Diederichs was located since 1948 in Düsseldorf and Cologne, while the Verlag 
Neues Abendland, founded by Erich Fürst von Waldburg z  Zeil und Trauchburg, was based in Munich. 
48 Neues Abendland was founded and initially published by Johann Wilhelm Naumann in his Verlag 
Naumann (Augsburg).  Beginning in 1951, it was published by the Verlag Neues Abendland (Munich).  
Editors-in-chief included Emil Franzel from 1948 and Gerhard Kroll from 1951, both of whom had close 
links to the CSU.  Other periodicals appearing in the mid- to late-1940s that endorsed a restoration of 
Abendland included Aussaat, Begegnung, Besinnung, Sammlung and Zeitwende.  Franzel, a Sudeten 
German whose book Abendländische Revolution: Geist und Schicksal Europas had already appeared in 
1936, represents just one example of post-1945 continuity with respect to Abendland personalities, not just 
at the Neuen Abendland but in the journalistic profession in general.  Also exemplary in this regard were 
the postwar careers of the Weimar-era editors of Der Tat, with figures like Hans Zehrer, Ferdinand Fried 
and Giselher Wirsing assuming central positions at publications like Die Welt (Hamburg), Christ und Welt 
(Stuttgart, founded in 1948 by the then-theologian Eugen Gerstenmaier and other figures close to the 
church, with the support of Theophil Wurm, the Landesbischof in Württemberg), and Sonntagsblatt 
(Hamburg).  Such postwar continuity was certainly not limited to journalists, as can be observed, for 
instance, in the cases of the philosopher Alois Dempf and the writer Werner Bergengruen.  
49 Gerhard Kroll, the editor of Neuem Abendland, also served as chairman of the Abendländischen Aktion.   
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and de Gaulle at the High Mass in Reims Cathedral in July 1962 and at the signing of the 
Élysée Treaty in January 1963, fortified the Occidental appeal among a broader audience.   
Of particular significance for our purposes, one can to a certain extent also 
classify specific political parties and indeed the state itself as institutional foundations 
and proponents of the Abendland worldview during this period.  Many federal ministers, 
members of the Bundestag, as well as political personalities at the Land level, were 
considerably influenced by such conceptions.  While Ab ndland perspectives might have 
been found amongst Social Democrats and Free Democrats, this characterization applies 
in the political realm especially to elements of the mainstream bürgerlichen parties, most 
prominently the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister the Christian Social 
Union, a dual grouping that was, by its own account, inspired by and descended from its 
Christian, and especially traditional Catholic, heritage of both a political and moral 
nature.50  With regard to the eminences at the heart of governm nt and power that dealt 
with matters of international affairs, one can point to the impact of Abendland on the 
thought of not only “dem Alten,” Konrad Adenauer, but also of other prominent figures in 
the CDU like Heinrich von Brentano, Heinrich Krone, Eugen Gerstenmaier and Kurt 
Georg Kiesinger as well as in the CSU, so proud of its south German Catholicism, like 
Franz-Josef Strauß, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, Richard Stücklen and Richard Jaeger.51  
As already implied in our earlier brief discussion of the broad weight of such ideas in 
postwar West German society, with the Union and other like-minded parties in power and 
especially under Adenauer, the institutions of state, including the governmental centers of 
                                                
50 Other parties noticeably influenced by the Abendland concept at this time were the Deutsche Partei, the 
Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten and the Bayernpartei. 
51 Some examples in other fields of federal ministers hat embraced Abendland perspectives: Franz-Joseph 
Wuermeling (CDU, Familienminister), Hans Schuberth (CSU, Postminister), Joachim von Merkatz (DP, 
Bundesratsminister) and Prof. Dr. Theodor Oberländer (BHE, Vertriebenenminister).     
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some of the Chancellor’s closest advisors such as te Chancellery and the Foreign Office, 
became hotbeds of Abendland thought and practice.   
Far from operating in isolation, the individuals and i stitutions that exalted and 
promoted the Abendland worldview existed in an environment characterized by extensive 
linkages and mutual arrangements.  Within this context, they served as officers and 
members simultaneously in multiple Occidentalist organizations, exerted powerful 
influences upon one another, and participated in and supported each other in their various 
abendländischen endeavors.52  Such aid might comprise, for example, monetary and 
logistical backing, with the latter including the provision of meeting and work rooms, the 
securing of accommodations for conferences, as well as assistance in publications and the 
like.  In some cases, the facilities of the state were utilized to provide such logistical and 
financial support for abendländische organizations.53  This reciprocal assistance was not 
confined to within the Federal Republic, rather the alr ady-noted cosmopolitan face of 
German Occidentalism also manifested itself in the efforts on the part of Abendländler 
and their institutions to work actively with like-minded counterparts abroad.  Leaving 
aside the cross-border links and contacts existing between government figures, clergymen 
                                                
52 At least while he was still a professor at the University of Mainz, Friedrich August Freiherr von der 
Heydte of the Abendländischen Akademie enjoyed considerable influence on the Institut für Europäische 
Geschichte.  The CDU MdB Hermann Pünder was a member of the academy’s Kuratorium and president 
of the German section of the Internationalen Comité zur Verteidigung der christlichen Kultur in Bonn.   
The academy also maintained links to the Int rnationalen Gesellschaft für christlichen Aufbau, founded in 
1952 in Heidelberg by Max Ilgner.   
53 For instance, the federal government permitted the Abendländische Akademie to hold its approximately 
quarterly round-table discussions dealing with natural law and legal positivism in the Bundesgerichtshof in 
Karlsruhe.  This can be traced back to the role of Hermann Weinkauff, president of the BGH, in the 
academy and as the leader of its working group on these themes.  Moreover, the Bundeszentrale für 
Heimatdienst subsidized the academy, covering half the costs of it  annual conferences, a practice that 
would ultimately provoke considerable controversy.  The academy also nurtured ties to the 
Arbeitsgemseinschaft demokratischer Kreise, which had been founded by the federal government in 1951.  
Wealthy individuals like Erich Fürst von Waldburg zu Zeil und Trauchburg and, following his death in 
1953, his son Georg were essential in the funding of Abendland institutions and activities.  Firms 
represented in the Kuratorium of the Abendländischen Akademie, which assisted in financing matters, 
included the Duisburger Kupferhütte and the Bossong-Werke (Düsseldorf).        
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and so forth, this phenomenon can be readily observed with regard to the Abendländische 
Akademie, which was intended after all as a forum for international cooperation and 
discussion.  Therefore, several foreign members graced the Kuratorium, while non-
German speakers and participants were regularly invited to the academy’s major events.  
Collaboration was particularly intense with a number of foreign Occidental-minded 
institutions located elsewhere in Europe, most notably the European Documentation and 
Information Center (CEDI) in Madrid, which had also been founded in 1952 and staged 
its own annual congresses.54  Ultimately, a semblance of an Occidentalist network 
developed both within the Federal Republic as well as on an international scale.   
I. Conclusion 
The impact of the Abendland worldview represents one of the most prominent 
elements in the history of the Federal Republic during a considerable stretch of the period 
we shall be exploring.  While Occidental ideas may indeed have waned somewhat in 
force, at least in the broader society, after the mid-1950s, they did not simply vanish 
thereafter but remained an influential factor for years to come, including in the realm of 
politics and foreign affairs.55  For instance, it seems that Abendland fed significantly into 
                                                
54 Other such institutions included the European Forum (Austrian College) that, starting in 1945, annually 
carried out “International Summer Seminars” in Alpbach; the Forschungsinstitut für Fragen des 
Donauraumes (FID), which had been founded in 1953 in Salzburg and moved to Vienna in 1957; as well as 
the Comité der Beneluxstaaten.  The Sudeten German Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, a member of the 
Kuratorium of the Abendländischen Akademie and chairman of the Verbandes der Landsmannschaften 
(Munich), played a major role in the founding of the FID.  The academy’s Kuratorium also included Albert 
Karl Simon of the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft.  In this spirit, the academy also maintained a Referat 
für übervölkische Ordnung.  Otto von Habsburg, the first president of the CEDI and grandson of the last 
emperor of Austria (and, therefore, the Austrian heir apparent), was a regular participant at the academy’s 
conferences.  His fellow Austrian Georg von Gaupp-Berghausen functioned as general-secretary of both 
the CEDI and the Abendländischen Akademie as well as director of the Verlag Neues Abendland.  I  West 
Germany, the CEDI published the Dokumentation der Woche, which was intended as a source of political 
information.     
55 This ongoing relevence is demonstrated by the continued appearance of books and essays on the subject 
Abendland, for instance Erich Przywara, Logos, Abendland, Reich, Commercium (Düsseldorf: Patmos-
Verlag, 1964); Walter Dirks, “Das christliche Abendland: Sein Nachwirken in den Konfessionen der 
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the Gaullist phenomenon well into the mid-1960s, therefore even after the rise of 
personalities like Ludwig Erhard to Chancellor and Gerhard Schroeder to Foreign 
Minister and the virtual exclusion of Gaullist stalw rts from the federal government.56  
Birrenbach was well aware of this still precarious situation when he remarked in the mid-
1960s with respect to one especially salient aspect of the Abendland perspective: 
Many by us, and especially a part of the Catholic elem nt of my party, forget the 
basics [das Einmaleins] as a result of the fascination in regard to the “Christian 
statesman”….  I consider that very dangerous, especially in a divided country like 
Germany.  In open battle [Feldschlacht], these people always lose here, but 
domestic and foreign political events could change that.  Therefore, the utmost 
attention is in order [am Platze].57 
 
Whatever the personal political enmity, party-political calculations and inter-confessional 
rivalries that played a role, Birrenbach fully recognized that genuine convictions and 
substantive differences were also at the roots of the Gaullist-Atlanticist rift, including the 
intra-Union conflict.58  Whatever the state of the Abendland idea at this time in society as 
                                                                                                                                      
Bundesrepublik,” in Klaus von Bismarck and Walter Di ks, eds., Christlicher Glaube und Ideologie 
(Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1964); and Hugo Rahner, Abendland: Reden und Aufsätze (Freiburg: Herder, 
1966). 
56 A notable exception was the remaining presence of Heinrich Krone as Bundesminister throughout the 
Erhard Chancellorship.  On apparent strains and disagreements between Birrenbach and Krone, which 
Birrenbach characterized here as regrettable and unusual, and for Birrenbach’s surprise that Krone’s name 
was repeatedly linked “with certain people [mit bestimmten Leuten],” perhaps an allusion to Abendland or 
Gaullist personalities, see KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 
13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2. 
57 KB to Strausz-Hupé, 6 August 1964, ACDP K015.  Birrenbach expressed himself elsewhere around the 
same time in a similar manner: “The minority either as succumbed to [unterliegt] the fascination with the 
‘Christian statesman à la Salazar’ and in the process forgets the basics [das Einmaleins], or makes personal 
profit [Geschäfte] with the strange [fremden] fascination.  I reject both, just like the majority in the Federal 
Republic.” (KB to Dr. Karl Brandt, 4 August 1964, ACDP K013/1).  For Birrenbach’s criticism to Henry 
Kissinger that, with respect to the importance of the alliance with the United States, including in the matter 
of defense, as “the vital basis of our existence” and even while he acknowledged France as essential 
[“ unsubstituierbar”] for the construction [“Aufbau”] of Europe, “[t]here are people in Germany, whom you 
know well [gut kennen], who on the basis of the fascination [perhaps intended in general terms or again 
with reference to the “Christian statesman” but possibly referring specifically to a fascination with de 
Gaulle] forget the ABCs [das Einmaleins] or also profit from them [mit ihm Geschäfte machen; “ ihm” 
perhaps referring as translated here to “the ABCs,” but also possibly referring to de Gaulle, or perhaps even 
a grammatical error actually intended to be “ihr” referring to “fascination”],” see KB to Prof. Henry 
Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.   
58 With respect to such party-political calculations, the late 1950s and 1960s was a period during which t e 
SPD was increasingly advocating Atlantic cooperation, while at the same time seeking to reconcile with the 
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a whole, for Birrenbach it clearly continued to play an influential role in political thought 
in West Germany well into the 1960s and, far from abruptly disappearing, was poised to 
play an even larger one if care was not taken.  In no small part, this work is a study of the 
efforts of Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists to counter the persistent impact of 
Abendland thought in the Federal Republic and especially in its international relations. 
                                                                                                                                      
Catholic church and attract Catholic voters.  Some in the Union, including Adenauer, Strauß and 
Guttenberg sought to differentiate their own respectiv  parties from this apparently moderating SPD. 
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Chapter 4: Integrating a German Atlanticist Elite - The Emergence of an Atlanticist  
      Infrastructure 
 
A. Introduction 
The vitality of German Atlanticism, of its organizations and activities during the 
post-1945 period did not exist in a vacuum; rather it constituted part of a broader Liberal 
trend in West German society.  As alluded to in the previous chapter, Conservatives 
remained vocal well into the late 1950s and 1960s, but by then the strength of the 
Occidental Abendland perspective was noticeably beginning to wane in favor of 
increasingly ascendant Liberal conceptions of politics, economics, society, culture and, in 
general, of a modern Western world.  This development found broad expression in 
German society, both in the general population as well as in specialized fields such as 
politics, academia and the media.  Historians have attributed the dawn of a more Liberal 
era in the Federal Republic and the concomitant decline in the appeal of the Conservative 
worldview to a number of causes: a thaw in the international Cold War that also 
contributed significantly to a relaxation of the domestic atmosphere; the prosperity and 
material abundance unleashed by the Sozialen Marktwirtschaft and Wirtschaftswunder; 
the changes in official Catholicism that occurred with the passing away in October 1958 
of Pope Pius XII, the directly following ascension f Pope John XXIII and the approach 
of the Second Vatican Council that would eventually occur from 1962-65; and, finally, 
the inexorable process of generational succession.  While all were significant factors, our 
aim in this chapter is to illuminate yet another element contributing to this sea change 
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from Conservative Abendland thought to more Liberal perspectives, particularly in the 
realm of foreign policy and international relations.1 
To begin to illustrate this, we can sketch the biography of Kurt Birrenbach in a 
direction considerably divergent from that taken in Chapter 2.  There, we focused on the 
progress of Birrenbach’s career in the worlds of business and politics.  However, even as 
Birrenbach was enjoying some measure of success in those areas, his career was also 
developing in a somewhat different, albeit related, field.  In 1955, Birrenbach joined the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik and in 1957 the Deutsch-Englische 
Gesellschaft.  In December 1960, Birrenbach was unanimously elect d at the Atlantic 
Institute’s first Board of Governors meeting to be one of the vice-presidents of that body.  
From the outset, he was also a member of the AI’s important Policy Committee and, in 
November 1963, was selected by that committee as its chairman.2  Meanwhile, 
Birrenbach, who had already represented Heinrich Krone at one recent meeting, had 
accepted the invitation of the Frenchman Jean Monnet i  1961 to join his Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe, and in 1962, he became a member of the 
Atlantik-Brücke.  As we shall see, Birrenbach did not merely join but also advanced 
within these organizations.  What is being alluded to in this brief alternative career 
                                                
1 On this development, see the works of Axel Schildt, ncluding Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien 
zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschasft der 50er Jahre (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999).  The Liberal trend was 
manifested in the media, for instance, in the more elevated journalism and in the cultural radio programs; in 
academia, for example, in the works of the sociologist Helmut Schelsky and the treatises of Economics 
Minister Ludwig Erhard; and, to some extent, even within the churches and their related academies, 
particularly on the Protestant and less so on the Catholic side.  In this environment, Liberal definitions of 
freedom, culture and the like noticeably gained ground in the discourse, while phenomena like civilization 
(as opposed to community), capitalism, industrialism, technology, mass culture, consumptionism and social 
change came to be viewed in a more positive light that in some ways, though only in some ways, embraced 
a greater pluralism.  Meanwhile, the distinctively Liberal notion of an “end of ideologies,” effectively 
directed at undermining both Conservatism as well as Socialism, was gaining currency not only in the 
Federal Republic but also in the United States and elsewhere in Western Europe, its most prominent 
advocates abroad including the sociologists Daniel Bell, Edward Shils and Raymond Aron.     
2 Birrenbach succeeded the deceased American Eric Johnston as chairman of the AI Policy Committee.     
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outline is one of the most significant undertakings, arguably the most significant 
undertaking, of the German Atlanticists and their like-minded friends abroad: the creation 
of and participation in a rather elaborate Atlanticis  infrastructure.  Birrenbach and his 
fellow German Atlanticists played a key role in theconstruction and functioning of both 
the primarily German elements of this infrastructure that existed within the Federal 
Republic as well as of many of those international elements located beyond its borders 
elsewhere in the Atlantic world.3  
B. Components 
The Atlanticist infrastructure that came into existence consisted of a number of 
basic elements of varying nature.  Among the key comp nents were the large-scale 
conferences that began to emerge in the early 1950s, some of which proved to be merely 
one-time affairs, but also a number of others that developed into ongoing series over the 
subsequent years.  Among the latter, the most important for Birrenbach were the annual 
spring Königswinter Conferences, launched in 1950 and staged by the DEG; the annual 
spring Bilderberg Conferences begun in 1954; the annu l fall NATO Parliamentarians 
Conferences first held in 1955; and the German-American Conferences inaugurated in 
1959 and staged by the AB.  These conferences were multi-day gatherings conducted in 
both large plenary sessions as well as smaller panel me tings and provided Birrenbach 
and other delegates with plentiful forums for frank speeches, discussion and debate about 
                                                
3 For studies of individual institutions, see Daniel Eisermann, Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion: Die 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1955 bis 1972 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999); Ludger 
Kühnhardt, Atlantik-Brücke: Fünfzig Jahre deutsch-amerikanische Partnerschaft, 1952-2002 (Berlin: 
Propyläen, 2002); Ralph Uhlig, Die Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, 1949-1983: Der B itrag ihrer 
“Königswinter-Konferenzen” zur britisch-deutschen Verständigung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1986); and Albrecht Zunker, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Entwicklungsgeschichte einer 
Institution politikbezogener Forschung (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2007).  Birrenbach was 
also a rather half-hearted member of a number of other organizations, serving for instance as a vice-
president of the Europa-Union Deutschland (Bonn) from 1957-65.     
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overarching themes along with more specific issues.  Birrenbach’s real initiation into the 
Atlanticist conference system came in 1959, when he attended not only the KWC, but 
also the Atlantic Congress in June in London (at the arrangement of the Union delegates 
to the NPC), and the NPC itself in Washington, DC.  Thanks to the intervention of Prof. 
Arnold Bergstraesser, Birrenbach also secured an invitation to the first German-American 
Conference, though he was ultimately unable to attend.4  In May 1960, Birrenbach 
attended his first Bilderberg Conference, in Switzerland, thanks to an invitation obtained 
for him by Fritz Berg and Otto Wolff von Amerongen, personalities who also took the 
time to educate him about the conference itself.5  Finally, in February 1961, he 
participated in his first (and the second overall) German-American Conference, in 
Washington, DC.  Among other things, all of this served Birrenbach in part as an 
indispensable means to “profile” himself still early in his political career.6 
Another vital element of this Atlanticist infrastruct re was the action committee.  
These bodies consisted of a relatively limited number of influential individuals who met 
periodically to formulate recommendations and then returned to their respective realms of 
endeavor to promote their implementation.  While the Action Committee for the United 
States of Europe, founded by Monnet in October 1955, was undoubtedly the most 
significant such organization, having already contributed to the “Relance of Europe” as 
embodied in the ratification of the Treaty of Rome in Spring 1957 and the birth of the 
Common Market and EURATOM, it was far from the only Atlanticist-minded action 
committee operating during this period.  Over the years, Birrenbach himself was also an 
                                                
4 Birrenbach had already missed the 1958 KWC due to illness.   
5 Berg was president of the Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie, while Amerongen was leader of the 
Ostausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft.   
6 Birrenbach ceased attending the NPCs from the mid-1960s onward.   
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engaged member of similar bodies focused on issues like economic integration in Europe, 
peace in the Middle East and economic development in the border regions of Greece and 
Turkey.7  Beyond this, in 1963, Birrenbach, together with Hans von der Groeben (a 
member of the EEC Commission in Brussels) and Hellmuth Wagner (the BDI 
Hauptgeschäftsführer), created the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle, essentially his own 
German action committee that met in Cologne and sought to influence, depending on the 
framework situation, the government or the Union lead rship.8  One example of an 
Atlanticist action committee of which Birrenbach was not a member but of which he was 
aware was the Atlantic Action Committee for Economic Growth, which was created in 
1967 and sought, most immediately, to help achieve a maximum success of the Kennedy 
Round of GATT talks and its aftermath.9   
Finally, a number of research institutes emerged as essential components of the 
Atlanticist infrastructure.  Among the most important of these, the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Auswärtige Politik was constituted in March 1955.  In addition to the activities of its 
research institute proper, the DGAP created a pair of landmark study groups during the 
                                                
7 For instance, at the invitation of the Vorstand of the Deutschen Rat der Europäischen Bewegung, 
Birrenbach joined an economic commission set up in January 1959 by that body to monitor the measures 
for European economic integration taken by the European communities as well as by organizations like the 
OEEC and to make independent proposals.  This commission was led by Wilhelm Beutler (BDI).  The 
other members were Otto Bach, Walter Bauer, Willi Brkelbach, Heinrich Deist, Rudolf Meimberg, Hans 
Niehaus, Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim, and Johannes Semler.  On a broader level, the 
“Aktionskomitee der Internationalen Europäischen Bewegung” had formed an international economic 
commission, of which Birrenbach was not a member (but of which other Germans were), for the same 
purpose.  This Commission d’Application du Marché Commun du Mouvement Européen held its 
constitutive meeting on 30 January 1960 in Brussels.   
8 As we shall see, this procedure appears to have worked to a satisfactory extent while the Union remained 
in the government but was far less effective once it moved into an opposition role.  Aside from its three 
founders, the original members of the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle were Generaldirektor Josef Rust 
(Wintershall AG), Professor Ulrich Scheuner (University of Bonn), and Rechtsanwalt Hans-Helmut 
Kuhnke (Klöckner).  Other members would include Josef Hermann Dufhues (Geschäftsführender 
Bundesvorsitzender of the CDU).  
9 Also known as the Action Committee for Atlantic Economic Cooperation, this entity aimed to influence 
governments as well as the private sector and was composed of internationally prominent businessmen.  
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first half of the 1960s: Study Group I, which dealt wi h issues of international security 
and arms control in Europe, held its first meeting in January 1962, while Study Group II, 
focusing on Western, and particularly German, relations to the Soviet Union and the 
other countries of the East, staged its first meeting in December 1965.10  Meanwhile, the 
Atlantic Institute began operating in January 1961 and distinguished itself from national 
institutes like the DGAP through its aspiration to a tain a truly broad international 
character.  Finally, though the final settling of its institutional position occupied many of 
the following years, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik was founded in Fall 1962 to 
function closely with the federal government in thefields of international politics and 
security.  Such research institutes, taken as a whole, generated a considerable number of 
significant studies.11   
The creation of this infrastructure occurred in a decades-long series of stops and 
starts, driven largely by perceived necessity and a sensitivity to the fluid domestic and 
international environment.  The first wave occurred oughly in the late 1940s and first 
half of the 1950s, a period in which such undertakings became viable given the gradual 
improvement of political and economic conditions in postwar western Germany and, 
moreover, were even given impetus by events like the Berlin blockade (1948) and the 
defeat of the European Defence Community (1954).  This initial flurry of institution 
building included the founding of the DEG (1949) and its Königswinter Conferences 
(1950), the AB (1951), the Bilderberg Conferences (1954), the Monnet Committee 
(1955), the NPC (1955) and the DGAP (1955).  After a pause during the latter half of the 
1950s, a second wave commenced around 1959 and laste until the mid-1960s, 
                                                
10 The successive chairmen of the DGAP Study Group I (West), all SPD personalities, included Fritz Erler, 
Helmut Schmidt, Karl Mommer, Alfons Pawelczyk and Egon Bahr.  
11 Works of the SWP were especially utilized by the Wst German Foreign and Defense Ministries.  
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stimulated by the accession of a Kennedy administration embracing novel foreign policy 
ideas, including in the fields of security and development aid; détente and its impact on 
the German Ostpolitik; and the disturbing role played by Adenauer and de Gaulle, for 
instance their rejection of the British application f r entrance into the EEC in 1963.12  
This phase saw the initiation of the AB’s German-American Conferences (1959) and the 
constitution of the AI (1960), the SWP (1962), the DGAP Study Groups (1962 and 1965) 
and the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle (1963).  By 1965, this second period of intense 
activity had concluded, and another stretch of relative calm ensued until the early 1970s, 
when quite new structures, especially the Trilateral Commission, were created (see 
Chapter 8).  While the founding of individual institu ons was often a difficult and 
lengthy process involving years of planning and effort (“Vorarbeit”), no long-range, 
overall blueprint existed, and a certain spirit of improvisation reigned.13  
Absent or otherwise preoccupied, Birrenbach played virtually no part in the first 
wave of institution building but a major role in the latter two.  This was the case not only 
with respect to the creation of the AI (as a constituting member of the Board of 
Governors), the DGAP Study Groups and the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle, but also with 
regard to the SWP.  Here, Birrenbach was a member of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Wissenschaft und Politik, the Munich-based organization, constituted in January 1962 at 
                                                
12 In particular, the Kennedy administration jettisoned the familiar and easily understood doctrine of 
massive retaliation, replaced it with a more complex olicy of flexible response, and embraced the notio  
of arms control, all of which added particular impetus to the creation, for instance, of the DGAP Study 
Group I.   
13 Already in 1957, a “continuing committee” was established to explore the idea of and determine the 
preconditions for founding an Atlantic Institute, and it was more than a year from the time of the October 
1959 meeting in Brussels to organize a provisional committee and the actual beginning of the AI’s 
operations.  The German members of the provisional committee were Fritz Berg (one of its vice-
presidents), Wilhelm Beutler and Prof. Ulrich Scheun r, while Arnold Bergstraesser was the German 
member on the related steering committee.  To cite another illustrative example, the preparation of the 
DGAP Study Group II required approximately two years.   
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the proposal and under the leadership of Prof. Bergstraesser, that played a crucial role in 
the establishment of the SWP, its most central task and achievement.  Birrenbach’s 
interest in infrastructure was stimulated by his extensive travel and contacts abroad (see 
Chapter 6), which contributed to his and his fellow German Atlanticists’ recognition of 
relevant international developments.  Thus, his impression of the strategic policies of the 
Kennedy administration, including its strong interest in disarmament agreements with the 
Soviet Union, impressions he had gathered in part on his October 1961 Sondermission to 
the United States, encouraged his support for the construction of the DGAP Study Group 
I.  As a man intensely interested in international affairs but who never himself entered the 
actual government, Birrenbach exemplifies the sort of personality so essential to this 
overall process of creation.  Whether one assesses the parts played by groups of 
Atlanticist-minded German citizens (DEG, AB, DGAP, SWP), multi-national groups of 
parliamentarians (NPC), or personalities like Jean Mo net (Monnet Committee) and 
Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands (Bilderberg), this Atlanticist infrastructure was not 
primarily the product of government action, rather it was largely founded and then 
maintained at the initiative of a significant movement of politically conscious, but non-
governmental and ultimately private, individuals.14     
 
                                                
14 Suggestive is the Vorstand of the AWP, which comprised Prof. Arnold Bergstraesser (University of 
Freiburg), Prof. Hans Raupach (University of Munich), Dr. Richard Freiherr von Weizsäcker (C.H. 
Boehringer Sohn, Ingelheim) and Dr. Hans Kruse (the Geschäftsführer).  Likewise, the successive 1st
Chairmen of the Atlantik-Brücke were the journalist Ernst Friedlaender, the scholar Arnold Bergstraesser 
and the banker Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen.  Meanwhile, the successive DEG 1st Chairmen 
included Prof. Emil Lehnartz (University of Münster), who was also one of the organization’s founding 
members, and the former State Secretary Hans von Herwarth (Munich).  To provide yet another example, 
Monnet only founded his famed action committee several months after his resignation as President of the 
ECSC High Authority.  Finally, the NPC was created by parliamentarians from the fifteen NATO states, 
with strong impetus provided by a Canadian parliamentary group.  It was established by ad hoc agreement 
among the national legislatures, as opposed to the in er-governmental agreements that launched, for 




Within the individual elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure, Birrenbach 
interacted with members and participants that varied considerably in number depending 
on the organizations and activities in question as well as over time.  To take an extreme 
example on the high end of the quantity scale, the June 1959 Atlantic Congress in 
London was attended by about seven hundred private delegates, including about seventy 
Germans.  However, far more typically, even the rather larger international conferences, 
such as the German-American and Königswinter Confere ces, though still welcoming 
well over a hundred participants, were much more restricted in size, and Birrenbach’s 
first Bilderberg Conference, in May 1960 in Switzerland, played host to only about forty 
to fifty attendees.  Meanwhile, a body like the Monnet Committee comprised only about 
thirty members, and some of the smaller action committees might even consist of as few 
as around ten.  An expanded membership, with well-chosen new members enjoying 
outstanding connections, offered to an institution enticing prospects of greater influence 
in both the Federal Republic and abroad, ideally including in the United States, as well as 
a boost in funding.  On the other hand, certain factors dictated adherence to a quite 
cautious overall plan and against a rapid, haphazard expansion, namely the desire of these 
organizations both to preserve the proper quality and balance of the various components 
of their membership or participant circles and to prevent such circles from becoming 
bloated in their overall size and, therefore, unwieldy.  Given these considerations, the 
Atlanticist institutions and functions in which Birrenbach was engaged, even those in 
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which interest in membership ran strong, far from becoming mass organizations, always 
remained stringently affairs of a relatively small elite stratum.15  
The composition of officers, members and participants with which Birrenbach 
dealt in the Atlanticist infrastructure was also quite variegated.  While the strictly German 
elements naturally consisted almost exclusively of German citizens (aside from guests), 
the international elements comprised a broader spectrum of nationalities, primarily 
hailing from throughout the North Atlantic basin and otably including Americans and 
Britons as well as a considerable German presence.16  Whatever the particular 
imbalances, the infrastructure as a whole brought together many professions largely, 
though not exclusively, from the private sector: politicians, Wirtschaftler, bankers, trade 
union leaders, Wissenschaftler, military officers, and media and even cultural figures.17  
Given the stress on non-partisanship, Birrenbach, serving as an independent individual 
but also, at least in theory, as a representative of the Union, industry and the FRG, found 
himself regularly cooperating not only with similar personalities but also with members 
and sympathizers of the SPD, FDP and trade unions.18  On at least some level, a common 
                                                
15 With respect to variations over time, the DGAP Study Groups manifested a considerable rise in at leas
nominal membership during the 1960s.  By the middle of the decade, the number of members in the Study 
Group I had swelled to about fifty from approximately thirty at the start.  By mid-1971, Birrenbach’s Study 
Group II, originally expected to encompass thirty-two members, had increased in size to fifty-six.  
Nevertheless, the hard core of regularly active participants in these DGAP Study Groups was actually quite 
a bit smaller.   
16 The nationalities involved in the Atlanticist infrastructure also included neutrals to a certain extent, as 
becomes manifest when one closely examines, for instance, the Atlantic Institute.    
17 Among the Wissenschaftler were usually to be found international relations specialists, political 
scientists, contemporary historians, economists and jurists.   
18 Such non-partisanship or, perhaps more accurately, multi-partisanship was evident, for example, in the
Monnet Committee, whose German members over the years, aside from Birrenbach, included prominent 
figures from the CDU (e.g. Rainer Barzel, Heinrich von Brentano, Franz Etzel, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, 
Heinrich Krone), the SPD (e.g. Willy Brandt, Fritz Erler, Erich Ollenhauer, Helmut Schmidt, Herbert 
Wehner), the FDP (e.g. Erich Mende, Walter Scheel), the DGB (e.g. Willi Richter, Ludwig Rosenberg, 
Bernhard Tacke, Heinz-Oskar Vetter) and the individual trade unions, among them the IG Bergbau und 
Energie (e.g. Walter Arendt, Heinrich Gutermuth) and the IG Metall (e.g. Otto Brenner).  The efforts of the 
Atlanticist institutions to embrace representatives from each of the major political parties and trade unions 
were the subject of a variety of formal and informal rules.  At the DGAP, the occupation of the top offices 
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Atlanticism united these figures, whatever their disagreements on domestic political, 
economic and other issues.19  Harmonious relationships were facilitated by links in the 
business world, for instance the ATH-Klöckner cooperation involving DGAP president 
Günter Henle or the presence of key labor personalities, like Heinz Oskar Vetter, in the 
ATH Aufsichtsrat.20  While both the German and international elements of he Atlanticist 
world were almost exclusively male, reflecting elite composition, some notable German 
exceptions did exist, most significantly for Birrenbach the journalist Marion Gräfin 
Dönhoff.21  In integrating such diverse and authoritative figures via its organizations, 
                                                                                                                                      
was divided up in such a manner that, in practice, h  president and one vice-president were drawn from the 
field of industry, while the other vice-president was furnished by the SPD (Erler from 1956-67, then 
Helmut Schmidt).  In the SWP Stiftungsrat, the presence of a personality from each of the three major 
Bundestag Fraktionen was explicitly ensured.  The participation of their party’s representatives thus 
secured, key FDP figures engaged in the Atlanticist nfrastructure included the already mentioned Erich 
Mende and Walter Scheel as well as Wolfgang Mischnick, therefore comprising, at the time of their 
activity, members of the Bundestag, chairmen of the party Fraktion, and chairmen of the party itself.   
19 Birrenbach captured this spirit when he remarked upon the death of the SPD’s Fritz Erler in 1967 that
“His death is a loss for our country and our mutual cause [gemeinsame Sache].” (KB to Hajo Holborn, 9 
March 1967, ACDP K098/1).  With regard to disagreemnts, Birrenbach over the years repeatedly 
expressed his opposition, for instance, to wage demands and wage increases that exceeded productivity 
increases.  As early as 1963, Birrenbach was complaining about West German labor costs being the highest 
in Europe and that profits were thus being squeezed at a time when business “desperately” needed to build
up its reserves.  In the last couple of years, West G rmany’s “disciplined” labor force had forgotten that 
“you cannot have your cake and eat it too.” (Clipping from 1963, ACDP K157/1).  For his later referenc to 
the “worrying [beunruhigend]” rise in German wages in 1970, which was “not only to be explained with a 
certain catching-up [Nachholbedarf] of the wages,” see Birrenbach’s expositions at the 17th Ordentliche 
Hauptversammlung of the ATH AG, 27 April 1971, ACDP K065/3.   
20 Henle was president of the DGAP since its founding a d enjoyed extensive national and international 
connections.  Prior to becoming head of the important Klöckner steel concern in the post-1945 era, he had 
spent extensive time abroad during the interwar period in the German foreign service, including at the 
embassy in London.  From 1949-53, he had also been a CDU member of the Bundestag.  For the good 
personal relations, even much later on, between Birrenbach and Henle, see Henle’s “regret” at having to 
decline Birrenbach’s invitation to a party in January 1975 in Düsseldorf, perhaps at Birrenbach’s home, 
since, as Henle put it, “we have always especially enjoyed ourselves at your place,” in Henle to KB, 30 
December 1974, ACDP K042/1.  To cite another example of such external business links, Birrenbach 
interacted from the mid-1970s into the early 1980s with both Jürgen Ponto as well as the former FDP 
Economics Minister Hans Friderichs not only at the DGAP, where Ponto and, then after him, Friderichs 
functioned as treasurer during this period, but also within the context of the Dresdner Bank Beirat, due to 
the position of Ponto and, then again, Friderichs as pokesman [Sprecher] of the bank’s Vorstand.  With 
respect to labor, the successive chairmen of the Düsseldorf-based DGB (Walter Freitag, Willi Richter, 
Ludwig Rosenberg and Heinz-Oskar Vetter) were all involved in the Atlanticist infrastructure.   
21 Dönhoff worked as an editor at and eventually became editor-in-chief of Die Zeit.  A number of female 
members of the Bundestag also took part in the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.  Birrenbach himself 
was not generally fond of a female participation in politics, citing their role in terrorist movements 
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German Atlanticism secured itself a solid foundation, ensured a wide range of ideas, 
interests and perspectives and established links and influence in vital areas of society.22   
Birrenbach’s own experiences attest to the efforts t  impart some measure of 
Überparteilichkeit and political balance within the Atlanticist infrastructure.  During the 
early 1960s, he was compelled to hear out the concerns of Konrad Kraske, the CDU 
Geschäftsführer, regarding SPD and trade union predominance in the Monnet 
Committee.  Birrenbach’s entrance into the DGAP’s Geschäftsführendes Präsidium in 
1964 seems to have somewhat allayed the CDU/CSU Fraktion’s expressed frustration 
regarding the seeming relegation of a number of major Union politicians, including some 
leading Fraktion members, like Rainer Barzel, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Hermann Kopf, 
Ernst Lemmer and Gerhard Schröder to the mere Präsidium.23  Birrenbach’s 
chairmanship of the DGAP Study Group II, which he assumed from its inception despite 
his real desire to chair the Study Group I, was in part designed as a means to offset Fritz 
Erler’s SPD chairmanship of the Study Group I, in which Birrenbach also served from 
the start as the key CDU representative.24  With his excellent connections to the German 
political left, Birrenbach played a significant role in the attempts, of varying degrees of 
success, to rectify the numerical deficits in the institutions and functions of the 
                                                                                                                                      
(including in West Germany during the 1970s) and arguing, for instance, that “in National Socialism, 
women in emotional form belonged among the most radical elements.” (KB to Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 
January 1978, ACDP K153/1).  In later years, Birrenbach was rather, though perhaps for him not 
outlandishly, critical of Margaret Thatcher, assuring others that, having personally been around her at times 
in small circles, “the contact with the British Prime Minister is no pleasure” (KB to Kohl, 14 June 1984, 
ACDP K029/2) and judging her an “icy lady,” who “cannot understand, due to her temperament, the way 
of thinking of the Criollo nation [here referring to Argentina]” (KB to Haig, 7 June 1982, ACDP K146/2).  
Summing up his attitude towards Thatcher, Birrenbach remarked “[m]asculine women are always dreadful 
[schrecklich].” (KB to Kohl, 28 June 1984, ACDP K029/2). 
22 As Birrenbach put it, here regarding the D utsch-Atlantische-Gesellschaft (see Chapter 7), “[t]he more 
überparteilich our Gesellschaft is, the greater will be its importance in the Federal Republic.” (KB to 
Jaeger, 14 May 1962, ACDP K009/1).   
23 Such irritation appears to have been stoked by the domination, at least at times, of the 
Geschäftsführenden Präsidium by figures from the SPD and the private Wirtschaft.   
24 Birrenbach did occasionally get to chair the Study Group I, in the absence of the regular chairman.   
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infrastructure called attention to at different points by prominent Atlanticists like Helmut 
Schmidt and Erler, who insisted on the imperative of an increased SPD and trade union 
representation in the memberships of the AB, of certain DGAP organs and of the AI 
Board as well as among KWC participants. 25  Nevertheless, striking imbalances, not 
exclusive to any particular political or trade union tendency, emerged or persisted in 
many Atlanticist organizations, and, spurred on by the protests of aggrieved elements on 
the right or left, the necessity of an adequate politica  balance remained an ongoing theme 
that considerably influenced personnel decisions.26 
D. Structure 
Over his many years of activity within the elements of the Atlanticist 
infrastructure, Birrenbach advanced into virtually each of their relatively small internal 
executive committees.  These included the AI Board of Governors (which he entered in 
1961), the DEG Präsidium (1962), the Präsidium and Geschäftsführendes Präsidium of 
the DGAP (1962 and 1964, respectively), the AI Policy Committee (1963), the AB 
Vorstand (1964), the SWP Stiftungsrat (1964), and the international steering committees 
                                                
25 For instance, Birrenbach was in contact during the early 1960s with his friend Ludwig Rosenberg, at the 
time vice-chairman of the DGB, for advice on the matter of the occupation of the Atlantic Institute board.   
26 To cite a few examples, in 1961, the Atlantic Institute, perhaps in response to Schmidt’s urgings, 
explicitly sought to appoint more left-wing governos, and Schmidt himself eventually became a member 
of the AI board.  Also by the early 1960s, Erler was suggesting that the Atlantik-Brücke take on more 
members close to the SPD, since, aside from Prof. Karl Schiller, all the others either belonged to or we e 
close to the middle-class parties.  While the Brücke would seek to retain Schmidt and other SPD politicians 
as members of the organization when, for whatever reasons, they departed the Vorstand, the AB 
membership continued to demonstrate a preponderance of businessmen, and as of February 1971, of the 
AB’s total of ten members who were politicians, sixof these, including Birrenbach, came from the 
CDU/CSU, just three from the SPD, and one from the FDP.  Meanwhile, the Deutsch-Englische 
Gesellschaft repeatedly attempted to attract personalities from the German trade unions.  Finally, the FDP 
found itself somewhat underrepresented in certain organizations, with Birrenbach’s DGAP Study Group II, 
for instance, not only evincing a pronounced CDU dominance among its parliamentarians but also a virtual 
dearth of figures from the FDP.  In his own work, Danial Eisermann has referred to a pronounced 
“ Industrieklub-Atmosphäre” at the DGAP [Eisermann, Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion, p. 241].   
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that organized the German-American and Königswinter Conferences.27  However 
formally democratic their statutes and even in those rganizations with general member 
bodies, usually docile entities engaged in largely unanimous rubber-stamp elections and 
votes, these influential supervisory organs in practice determined overall development 
and substantive policy: high-level personnel decision , membership co-optations, 
conference agendas and work programs, structural modifications, scheduling, budgets, 
indeed all those decisions crucial to achieving the aims of a given institution.28  As in the 
Thyssen firm, Birrenbach and other figures of his stature could simultaneously occupy so 
many top-level positions (along with his Bundestag seat and Thyssen duties) thanks to a 
division of labor that saw administrative entities, for instance a Sekretariat or 
Geschäftsführung, handling time- and effort-consuming day-to-day affairs while the 
executive bodies usually came together no more than several times a year for relatively 
brief periods of at most a few days at a stretch.  Ultimately, Birrenbach’s leadership roles 
in the international elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure, for instance at the Atlantic 
Institute, powerfully testify to the trust that German Atlanticists enjoyed from their 
foreign counterparts and amply manifest a quite prominent West German presence in this 
particular environment.         
                                                
27 Technically, Birrenbach was an honorary member of the DEG Präsidium, actually a member of the 
Ehrenpräsidium.  Among the other Honorary Presidents of the DEG were Karl Arnold, Heinrich von 
Brentano, Marion Dönhoff, Willi Eichler, Fritz Erler, Ernst Friedlaender, Otto Friedrich, Marie-Elisabeth 
Lüders, W. Alexander Menne, Rudolf Pechel, Ludwig Rosenberg and Theodor Steltzer.  With the 
unanimous acceptance of the DGAP Präsidium’s proposal by the Mitgliederversammlung of 27 June 1962, 
Birrenbach along with Brentano assumed the spots in the DGAP Präsidium previously occupied by Prof. 
Ulrich Haberland (Bayer AG, Leverkusen) and Hans Goudefroy (Allianz-Versicherung AG, Munich), both 
recently deceased.  In the SWP Stiftungsrat, Birrenbach (Union) served with personalities like Fritz Erler 
and, then, Helmut Schmidt (SPD) and Thomas Dehler (FDP).        
28  The Policy Committee, which consisted of six peopl  including Birrenbach, was the actual 
Steuerungsorgan of the Atlantic Institute.  From his position as chairman, one could argue that Birrenbach, 
along with the AI Director-General, exercised the decisive influence within the entire organization.   
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As a member of these high-level executive bodies as well as of certain dedicated 
structures and also in a more informal individual capacity, Birrenbach gradually assumed 
the role of an influential gatekeeper for the Atlanicist world.  This essential screening 
task entailed identifying and recruiting the best possible officers, members, participants 
and other vital personnel, while denying access to or dismissing those deemed 
unqualified or undesirable.  Of course, to enter and dvance within the Atlanticist 
institutions, Birrenbach himself had first had to secure the approval of such key 
gatekeepers prior to joining their select group (see Chapter 6).  As a gatekeeper whose 
insight and judgment were often solicited, Birrenbach was well positioned to determine 
an individual’s access to the Atlanticist infrastructure and, therefore, represented a 
valuable contact for aspirants.  In fulfilling this role, Birrenbach stressed the importance 
of inducting personalities of stature who enjoyed connections with the United States and 
who would enhance the national and international reputation of the Atlanticist 
infrastructure and, not surprisingly, looked particularly favorably on individuals generally 
sharing his own political and economic views.29  Birrenbach’s exercise of this crucial 
function was facilitated not only by his prominent position within the Atlanticist 
infrastructure but also by his outstanding connections across the political spectrum as 
well as in the realms of Wirtschaft and Wissenschaft, not just at home but also abroad, 
especially in the United States.30  Thanks to these connections, he was also able to act in 
                                                
29 For some of Birrenbach’s considerations in this process, see KB to Jaeger, 14 May 1962, ACDP K009/1.   
30 Dedicated organs of which Birrenbach was a member included the various DGAP Admission 
[“ Aufnahme”]  Committees that played a central part in deciding the co-optation of members into the 
organization as a whole as well as into its individual study groups; the DEG’s Königswinter Conference 
Steering Committee, which met in London (including  the House of Commons) well before the actual 
conference and consisted of regular conference participants; and the AB’s German Preparation Committee 
for the German-American Conferences, which included th  AB Vorstand as well as representatives from 
the Bundestag.  Birrenbach, along with Amb. a.D. Walther Becker (DGAP Geschäftsführender vice-
president), Wilhelm Cornides (director of the DGAP Research Institute), Fritz Erler (chairman of the study 
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this gatekeeping capacity with respect to the German political left and on an international 
level, in the latter case often in cooperation with American, British, and other foreign 
counterparts.31 
Birrenbach’s rise in the Atlanticist infrastructure partly reflected a process of 
politicization within certain organizations, notably the DEG, AB and DGAP.  Most 
striking during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when it received impetus from larger 
events, this trend manifested itself in the composition of these institutions, particularly 
the gradual increase in the relative weight of politicians both in the leadership organs and 
                                                                                                                                      
group) and Prof. Ulrich Scheuner (chairman of the DGAP Research Committee), was one of the initial 
members of the Admission Committee for the DGAP Study Group I.  Birrenbach first entered the KWC 
Steering Committee in the approach to its upcoming meeting of 25-26 January 1961, in place of and at the 
request of his colleague the CDU MdB Johann Baptist Gradl and at the invitation of the British 
Conservative MP Evelyn Emmet.  Birrenbach became a ember of the AB’s German Preparation 
Committee for the first time in 1962, therefore even before he entered (but apparently at the request of) the 
AB Vorstand, and thus played a pivotal role in proposing to that Vorstand the Union members, essentially 
parliamentarians and minister-presidents, who would take part in the forthcoming German-American 
Conference.  In structural terms, the entities engaged in the gatekeeping process were not all institutions of  
the Atlanticist world per se, rather were in part the organizations that individual participants, often 
informally, represented.  For instance, the Bundestag Fraktionen, including that of the Union (and 
especially particular elements thereof, among them the chairman), exercised such functions to some extnt 
regarding their own members’ involvement in Atlanticist activities, whether it be DGAP Study Groups, 
German-American Conferences or the NATO Parliamentarians Conference (as was the case with 
Birrenbach’s selection for the latter in October 1959).  Likewise, the federal government played a certain 
part, for example insofar as it proposed its own representatives in the SWP Stiftungsrat (see later in this 
chapter). 
31 For instance, with respect to the representation of the SPD and the German left, Birrenbach’s negative 
assessment of Karl Schiller, more specifically of his lack of political activity and influence, early in the 
history of the Atlantic Institute contributed greatly to the appointment of Ludwig Rosenberg to the Board of 
Governors, despite the hesitance of the SPD leadership.  As another example of such processes in action, 
Birrenbach was planning to talk with Heinz-Oskar Vetter as of April 1979 about the candidacy of an 
appropriate trade union representative in the DGAP Präsidium.  With respect to the international aspects of 
gatekeeping, Birrenbach and his fellow Germans made suggestions and undertook efforts to help the 
Americans put together as high-quality a delegation as possible for the German-American Conferences.  In 
this, Birrenbach consulted with and was assisted by key personalities and contacts such as Chris Emmet 
(American Council on Germany), John McCloy, Shepard Stone, George Ball, Lucius Clay, Robert Murphy 
and Jacob Javits and other American senators as well as the respective German ambassadors in the United 
States, for example Rolf Pauls beginning in the lat1960s.  The ACG, taking into account the Atlantik-
Brücke Preparation Committee’s proposals and the particular emphasis of the AB on the quality of the 
American congressional delegation, was crucial in organizing and securing the participation of the 
members of the US delegations to the German-American Conferences, and Birrenbach’s efforts included 
contacting and recruiting American congressmen and politicians on the ACG’s invitation list.  Other 
German figures similarly involved in such a wide array of gatekeeping activities, also with respect to the 
German side, included the CDU MdB Erik Blumenfeld.   
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in particular functions; as well as in the more explicitly political nature of AB and DEG 
activities, with the former, for instance, initiating its German-American Conferences and 
the latter focusing its KWCs on more concrete contemporary events and political goals, 
especially paving Britain’s path into the EEC.32  Particularly instructive are Birrenbach’s 
experiences with the AB, where despite his close connections and services rendered, he 
found his entrance blocked due to a policy, stressing the organization’s strictly private 
character, against co-opting politicians.33  Only in 1962, when the AB altered this rule 
and welcomed several parliamentarians, did he becom a ember.  In February 1964, he 
finally entered the Vorstand, part of an expansion of that body that again included other 
parliamentarians.34  This testifies to an AB evolving during this period into an institution 
significantly active in the political arena and accounting for this in its composition, not 
least to enhance its influence in that realm.  However, the expansion of the Vorstand was 
the subject of extensive discussion among AB members, with questions raised about the 
advisability of such a politically tinged organ.  Long afterwards, the AB still prohibited 
its chairman from being a profilierter politician, insisted that Vorstand members belong à
titre personnel rather than as representatives of a particular inte es  group or political 
                                                
32 Hitherto, the DEG and AB had essentially focused on general, fundamental goals, including analyzing 
the mistrust and misunderstandings that had burdened German relations with the Anglo-Saxon nations in 
the past and reducing still extant mistrust and misunderstandings.  In explaining the shift, the DEG’s own 
literature cited the decade or so “experienced under the shadow of de Gaulle.”  Another example of these 
more overt political activities was the open letter he Atlantik-Brücke published in American newspapers in 
response to the dismaying events of early 1963 (see Chapter 7).  Though the crucial change came during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Königswinter Conferences had actually been undergoing a certain 
process of politicization with respect to themes and participants for much of the 1950s, especially as a
result of the Korean War and what was seen as the incr ased salience of the German Question.  In contrast, 
the first KWC (1950) was a relatively small conferenc  of social workers dealing with the theme “Social 
Work,” while the second had consisted primarily of journalists addressing the “Responsibility of the Pr ss.”   
33 Stahl to KB, 12 January 1960, ACDP K002/2.   
34 Proposed by Falkenhausen (the AB 1st Chairman), the 1964 expansion of the AB Vorstand ensured that 
there would be at least one member from each Bundestag Fraktion in that organ.  The SPD MdB Fritz Erler 
was among those that also joined the Vorstand at that time.  By this point, Birrenbach had already 
contributed significantly to the preparation, execution and, it was believed, success of projects and 
activities like the German-American Conferences and the 1963 open letter (see Chapter 7).   
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party, and imposed a low ceiling on the number of politicians in its membership.35  Thus, 
despite the overall trend, some resistance to politicization endured, at least in the AB.   
Largely due to his myriad leadership positions, Birrenbach developed a persistent 
institutional network centered on directing the Atlanticist organizations.  This network 
consisted of key German and foreign personalities in this field, among them Monnet and 
Max Kohnstamm (Monnet Committee); Walter Stahl (Atlantik-Brücke); Lilo Milchsack 
(Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft) and Evelyn Emmet (Königswinter Conferences); the 
MdBs Richard Jaeger and Georg Kliesing and Senator J cob Javits (NATO 
Parliamentarians Conference); Paul van Zeeland, John McCloy and John Loudon 
(Atlantic Institute), and the successive AI Directors-General (Henry Cabot Lodge, Walter 
Dowling, John Tuthill and Martin Hillenbrand); Prof. Klaus Ritter and Hans Speidel 
(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik); Walther Becker and Gebhardt von Walther (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik); and James Huntley.36  Within this context, 
                                                
35 Of the Atlantik-Brücke’s total of sixty-four members as of February 1971, only ten were politicians, as 
already noted six of these, including of course Birrenbach, from the CDU/CSU, three from the SPD and 
one from the FDP.   
36 Monnet served as president and Kohnstamm (Netherlands) as vice-president of the Monnet Committee.  
Stahl was the executive director (Geschäftsführer) of the Atlantik-Brücke.  Lilo Milchsack was the 
secretary-general (geschäftsführende Vorsitzende), and one of the co-founders, of the DEG.  The MP 
Evelyn Emmet chaired the Conservative Overseas Bureau and was the key person on the British side in 
organizing the KWCs.  Jaeger (CSU) and Kliesing (CDU) functioned for periods as members of the NPC 
Standing Committee and as NPC vice-presidents.  Javits chaired the NPC Economic Committee and 
various NPC Special Committees.  Zeeland, former Belgian prime minister and foreign minister; McCloy, 
former US High Commissioner for Germany; and Loudon (Netherlands), connected to the Royal 
Dutch/Shell petroleum concern, were successive chairmen of the AI’s Board of Governors.  Lodge, 
Dowling, Tuthill and Hillenbrand were all Americans, and both Dowling and Hillenbrand were former US 
ambassadors to the Federal Republic in Bonn, while Tuthill had been an envoy and head of the economic 
department at the embassy and Lodge would later becom  ambassador there.  According to the Atlantic 
Institute, President Kennedy had personally asked Lodge to assume the Director-General post.  Ritter 
became the director of the SWP Institute in 1965.  Speidel, a retired general, was chairman of the SWP 
Stiftungsrat.  Walther, a former ambassador (a.D.) including by NATO, succeeded Becker, also a former 
ambassador (a.D.), as the DGAP’s Geschäftsführender vice-president.  Huntley (US) was an Atlanticist 
theorizer and organizer who, among other things, played a noteworthy role in the establishment of the AI.  
While Prince Bernhard functioned as the Bilderberg chairman, more familiar to Birrenbach within the 
Bilderberg organization were Prof. Ernst van der Beugel (secretary-general for Europe, in the Hague) and 
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Birrenbach was able to significantly contribute to shaping the nature of the Atlanticist 
organizations and activities by exchanging information, proposals and advice on virtually 
all the crucial matters concerning the infrastructure, even during the often lengthy 
intervals between formal meetings.  In addressing each of these issues, Birrenbach 
became one of the most explicit proponents of the uilitarian ethos and of an 
infrastructure that did not devolve, for instance, into a mere debating society, rather one 
whose raison d’être was the exercise of practical political influence and the achievement 
of immediate, concrete results.37  Indeed, Birrenbach departed from the European 
Parliament in 1961 and, at approximately the same ti , eagerly entered the Monnet 
Committee not only due to the overburden of work but also as a result of his sheer 
boredom and lack of interest in dealing with what he considered merely theoretical 
resolutions.  
Often complementary in function, the German Atlanticis  organizations, in 
addition to their internal synergies, maintained relatively harmonious relations with one 
another at both the national and international levels.  There existed not only a far-
reaching symmetrical and asymmetrical cooperation between themselves but also with 
their mainly national “sister” institutions located in the US and elsewhere abroad (e.g. 
Council on Foreign Relations, American Council on Germany, Atlantic Council of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Joseph E. Johnson (secretary-general for the United States and president of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace in New York City).   
37 To cite an example of the impact of such a perspective, Birrenbach explained, with respect to the need to 
secure an American Director-General for the AI, “[t]his is the decisive precondition for the success of our 
institute.  I feel that the institute cannot gather political importance unless an American will be in charge of 
the general directorship.” (KB to William Foster, 25 March 1961, ACDP K128/1).  Along the same lines, at 
the AI Policy Committee meeting of 27 November 1966, Birrenbach insisted with regard to the proposed 
Atlantic Action Committee for Economic Growth (a pro osal that had emerged from a June 1966 
conference in Geneva sponsored by the AI), “the group must come up with specific recommendations and 
not merely study the situation.” (Draft Minutes of PC Meeting on 27 November 1966, ACDP K107/2).  For 
Birrenbach’s approval of the early efforts in the Policy Committee “to make the Atlantic Institute into a 
political action center and not into a political academy,” see KB to Foreign Minister Heinrich von 
Brentano, Bonn, 19 December 1960, ACDP K128/1.   
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United States, Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (London), Royal Institute of Inter ational Affairs (London), Istituto 
Affari Internazionali (Rome), Centre d’Études de Politique Étrangère (Paris)).  
Birrenbach was among those regularly nurturing the links to these foreign institutions.38  
Such partnerships facilitated the coordination and joint execution of studies, conferences 
and other projects, for instance with respect to their organizing and staging or the 
providing of space and participants from the Wissenschaft and elsewhere.39  Birrenbach 
played a central role in proposing, consulting on, and organizing several joint 
conferences, including one, in which he also participated, on “Europe and America in the 
World of Tomorrow,” carried out by the Atlantica and the Evangelische Akademie 
Loccum in November 1963 at the EAL in Lower Saxony.40  In 1961, the German 
                                                
38 Founded in 1952, the American Council on Germany was essentially headed by Chris Emmet, its 
executive vice-president, and served as the main part er institution of the Atlantik-Brücke in the United 
States, especially assisting in organizing the German-American Conferences.  The Atlantic Council of the
United States emerged in 1961 from a fusion of the Atlantic Union Committee (itself founded in 1949), the 
American Council on NATO and the US Committee for an Atlantic Institute.  The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies was founded in 1958 and boasted an international membership, though primarily 
hailing from Britain and the Commonwealth.  Birrenbach was himself a “corresponding member” of the 
IISS, while the IISS International Advisory Council included the Germans Fritz Erler (SPD) and General 
Frido von Senger und Etterlin (at this point a prominent military commentator).  The successive directors of 
the IISS included Alastair Buchan (a journalist), François Duchêne (from the United Kingdom) and the 
German Dr. Christoph Bertram.  The Royal Institute of International Affairs, also known as Chatham 
House, was founded in 1920.  Among the personalities associated with it during the 1960s and 1970s were 
Sir Duncan Oppenheim (chairman), Kenneth Younger and Andrew Schonfield (successive directors), and 
Prof. Roger Morgan (assistant director).   
39 With respect to the provision of space, Chatham House at times hosted the KWC Steering Committee 
meetings.  At the start of 1961, at the arrangement of the Italian government, the Istituto per gli Studi di 
Politica Internazionale, chaired by the industrialist Alberto Pirelli, temporarily made office space in Milan 
available to the fledgling Atlantic Institute at noc st, in addition to permitting, at Birrenbach’s pro osal, 
Prof. Gerolamo Bassani, the Italian institute’s director, to function briefly as interim AI director.  The 
DGAP study groups featured prominently in the institutional linkages and cooperation.  For instance, th  
work of the DGAP Study Group I was connected from an e rly point with the activities of the European 
Study Commission, an international study group addressing similar issues that had been organized by the 
IISS, DGAP and CÉPÉ but also included representatives from other West European countries.   
40 See Chapter 5 for more information on the Atlantica.  The conference on “Europe and America in the 
World of Tomorrow” ended on the morning of the day of President Kennedy’s assassination and had 
approximately 170 participants, among them German personalities from the relevant federal ministries, the 
European communities and state and local public life as well as figures from certain foreign 
representations, including American and British embassies and consulates in the Federal Republic (US 
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Atlanticists began to foster collaboration domestically through annual conferences staged 
by the AB and other German organizations and interna io ally via conferences conducted 
especially by the AI, all of which brought together k y institutional representatives.41  
With his presence in virtually each of the major German Atlanticist organizations, 
Birrenbach’s experiences attest to the further cementing of this institutional cooperation 
through an extensive implicit and explicit interlocking of personnel.42   
E. Integration    
In line with their striving to integrate various professional and party groupings, 
one of the key endeavors of personalities like Bergstraesser and other German 
Atlanticists was the pronounced effort to strengthen what they considered the tenuous and 
hitherto insufficient connection between Wissenschaft and Politik in the Federal 
Republic, particularly with regard to the field of international affairs.  Confronted with a 
rapidly changing contemporary environment characterized by broad, complex political, 
                                                                                                                                      
Ambassador George McGhee was one of the speakers).  Bi renbach helped prepare the conference 
especially with the EAL’s Dr. Alard von Schack, soon t  become director of the academy’s 
Außenpolitischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft (APAG), which was founded the following year (1964) and of 
which Birrenbach was among the informal “Protektoren.”  The Atlantik-Brücke occasionally conducted 
conferences with other institutions in the Federal Republic, including the Evangelical Academies at 
Hofgeismar (Hesse) and Loccum, Inter Nationes, the Akademie für politische Bildung in Tutzing (Bavaria), 
and the Haus Rissen (Hamburg).   
41 The domestic conferences were staged in various locales, with the first one being held in Munich.  In 
September 1968, the Atlantik-Brücke and the Amerika-Gesellschaft, in cooperation with the Haus Rissen, 
carried out the conference in Hamburg at the Haus Rissen.  The international conferences were placed on a 
firmer foundation when the Atlantic Institute, in conjunction with the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, decided in 1970 to convene annual meetings.   
42 As an example of explicit interlocking, certain personalities, by virtue of their positions in other 
Atlanticist organizations, were automatically accepted as ex officio members of the Atlantic Institute’s 
Board of Governors (e.g. the presidents of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference and the Atlantic Treaty 
Association).  Somewhat more implicitly, the presence of Birrenbach and other figures, among them 
Speidel, Ritter, Erler, Schmidt and Uwe Nerlich, simultaneously in both the DGAP and the SWP helped 
reduce any overlap, rivalry or friction between these two institutions, despite Birrenbach’s own initial 
concerns.  In addition to their roles at the SWP, Speidel, for instance, was also a member of the DGAP 
Präsidium, while Ritter was a member of the DGAP Study Groups, and Nerlich functioned as the 
Rapporteur of the DGAP Study Group I, a task which entailed preparing working papers and question 
catalogs.  Later on, Gebhard Schweigler, whose American education included stints at Harvard and 
Berkeley, served not only as a wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter responsible for the United States at the 
DGAP Research Institute, but also, beginning in 1979, as a Referent on the United States at the SWP.   
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technical and scientific developments, the political executive was seen as increasingly 
disoriented and thus prone to serious foreign policy setbacks.  While decision-making 
should remain in the hands of the constitutionally determined organs, the statesman that 
aspired to be something more than a mere artist-leader, operating by an instinctual 
Fingerspitzengefühl, required in this unique age the expert assistance, clarification and 
advice of a methodical Wissenschaft so as to be able to act as a liberated and constructive 
subject.  This stress on the Wissenschaft-Politik linkage involved not only the stronger 
utilization of scholarly knowledge in political life but also an approach to research and 
study that eschewed a purely academic perspective for its own sake in favor of one that 
produced results of clear political utility.43 
Birrenbach was likewise a strong proponent of a closer relationship between 
Wissenschaft and the practical Politik, a subject that, he claimed, had interested him his 
entire life and one that supplemented his insistence on a cooperation between the  
Wissenschaft and Wirtschaft.44  For Birrenbach, Geist and Macht had existed in a healthy 
relationship in Germany during only a precious few historical epochs.  In addition to the 
first quarter of the 19th century, one of these brief periods was the Weimar Republic, 
particularly in Berlin during his time there as a young Referendar.  In these years that he 
later described as the most impressive of his life, Berlin had been blessed with a society 
in which a single gathering would find professors, intellectuals and artists ineracting 
with politicians and soldiers.  Unfortunately, the current period was not such an era, as 
Birrenbach lamented that “a part of the G ist, in particular that which one calls 
                                                
43 For a general discussion of this theme by one of the primary actors from this period, see the essay by 
Klaus Ritter, “Wissenschaftliche Politikberatung-Hilfe oder Alibi der Politik,” ACDP K195/1.   
44 Birrenbach considered this cooperation of the Wissenschaft with industry necessary, in part, to further 
develop the Sozialstaat hat had been built up after the war (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 27 
July 1972, ACDP K080/1).   
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intellektuell, which is not to be equated with professors, has no normal relationship in 
Germany to the Politik.”  In tracing the roots of a situation in which Wissenschaft and 
Politik existed generally bereft of mutual communication, Birrenbach mourned the loss of 
a now utterly dissolved Prussia, a tragedy that he felt had deprived the Germans of much 
of their Substanz, as well as the lack of a real capital, a deficit that now denied them a 
concentration point where all the tendencies of Kraft and Geist could fruitfully 
intersect.45  Far from being a negligible affair, Birrenbach saw the deficiencies in the 
relationship between Wissenschaft and Politik in the Federal Republic as “one of the most 
critical elements of our current situation.”46   
Central to the critique of the German Atlanticists with respect to the theme 
Wissenschaft-Politik was their dissatisfaction with the types and results of the research 
and other activities undertaken by the institutions currently existing in the Federal 
Republic.  Loosely organized Gesprächskreise seemed of only limited fruitfulness in this 
regard since such sporadic, unwieldy bodies generally lacked the stable, efficient, long-
term capacity, the critical mass, to produce detaild research based on extensive work in 
specialized materials.  Though stable and powerful, governmental and inter-governmental 
bodies and bureaucracies were bloated and lethargic, stifled in thought and expression, 
preoccupied with short-term issues, administrative processes and political considerations, 
bereft of an adequate expert capacity to ponder long-term concerns in their full scope, 
                                                
45 For these quotes, see Birrenbach’s address on his 65th birthday, ACDP K207/1.  The Berlin of his 
Referendar period there during the Weimar Republic had been a time and place in which, as Birrenbach put 
it on this occasion, “[t]here sat in one party [Gesellschaft] next to your [Professor Helmut Coing’s] 
predecessor, Professor Butenandt, Professor Planck, General Seeckt, there sat the conductor Nikisch, there 
sat the painter Liebermann, there sat the actor Kraus, there sat the politician Brüning, all sat together….  
These minds [Köpfe] have never again appeared together in pictures in Germany.”  Birrenbach 
acknowledged that “[t]rue, that was in a declining [verfallenen] Staatsordnung, but also in the decline 
[Verfall] of Rome the Geist blossomed.”   
46 Need citation.   
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and inhibited in the necessary research inter-discipl narity by traditional Ressortgrenzen.  
Here, Birrenbach expressed the consensus when he referred to even the mere word 
“bureaucracy” as “belittling [herabsetzend]”. 47  In addition to neglecting to include a 
sufficiently wide range of professions in their endavors, German universities were 
likewise hampered by their traditional Fächergrenzen and narrow specialization as well 
as by simultaneous teaching and educational responsibilities, a plethora of differing work 
forms, and a traditional ideal of knowledge opposed to the nature of the Politik that left 
them too divorced from the practical interests of gvernment.  Despite calls for university 
reform, this internal structure seemed, if anything, to be further calcifying.  Even many 
years later, Birrenbach would refer to “the clumsy apparatus [der schwerfällige Apparat] 
of the universities” that rendered it difficult to carry out certain projects.48  As a whole, 
therefore, the Atlanticists found extant institutions incorrigibly ill-suited to perform the 
functions they had in mind.   
Rather than accept this framework, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists opted 
for other avenues to promote the reciprocal engagement of Wissenschaft and Politik, most 
notably the creation of their own infrastructure of, ideally, lean, dynamic, flexible, private 
organizations.  Here, their ambition to overcome the cleft between Geist and Macht found 
expression in countless ways.  One such manifestation was, of course, the inclusion in 
Atlanticist undertakings of both Wissenschaftler and practitioners.  For instance, within 
                                                
47 KB to Milchsack, 9 November 1971, ACDP K103/2.   
48 KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 February 1978, ACDP K210/2.  The university institutes that were developing 
parallel to the Atlanticist infrastructure came in for criticisms from the German Atlanticists similar to those 
expressed about the universities in general.  However, Birrenbach was appointed to the V rwaltungsrat of 
the Gesellschaft zur Förderung des Forschungsinstitutes für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische 
Fragen der Universität zu Köln at the constituting assembly of the G sellschaft on 30 July 1962 (which he 
did not attend).  With Prof. Dr. Fritz Burgbacher (CDU MdB) as chairman (succeeded in January 1964 by 
Direktor Theo Hieronimi) and Dr. Fritz Schäfer (SPD MdB) as deputy chairman, the Förderergesellschaft 
was intended to support the research institute (itslf founded in 1960) substantively and in securing 
financing.  The director of the Forschungsinstitut at the time was Prof. Dr. Ferdinand A. Hermens.   
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the research institutes and the advisory councils they established to consult on their work, 
Birrenbach came into regular contact and cooperated with scholars and learned figures 
like Bergstraesser, Ulrich Scheuner, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Wilhelm Cornides, Wolfgang 
Wagner, Karl Carstens and Karl Kaiser (all DGAP); Pierre Uri and Curt Gasteyger (AI); 
and Jürgen Nötzold and Hubert Feigl (SWP).49  Even those institutions not directly 
engaged in research benefited from the products of the Wissenschaft, with the DGAP, for 
example, not only establishing specific Referate to provide its study groups with the 
requisite research capacity but also, along with other such institutes, supplying the 
international conference system with crucial working papers.  Birrenbach often cited the 
Monnet Committee as a model, including the “Monnet m hod” of relying on outstanding 
academics to provide sound research as the basis for concrete recommendations.  A 
number of ventures explicitly promoting the Wissenschaft-Politik nexus also enjoyed the 
support of Birrenbach and the Atlanticists, among them the Kennedy Memorial Library 
during the mid-1960s and the AB-EAL conference of June 1968 on “The Political 
Importance of the Wissenschaft.”50  Indeed, Birrenbach captured a defining feature of the 
Atlanticist infrastructure in remarking, about the DGAP Study Group II, that “[t]he 
                                                
49 Prof. Bergstraesser, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Cornides, Wagner, Prof. Carstens and Prof. Kaiser were 
successive directors of the DGAP Research Institute.  As we shall see, Carstens had previously been state
secretary in several ministries of the federal government.  Bergstraesser (up to 1960) and Prof. Scheuner 
(from 1960 on), the latter based at the University of Bonn, served as the chairmen of the DGAP Research 
Committee, dissolved in 1969, and Wissenschaftlichen Direktorium, created in 1969.  Other personalities 
on the Research Committee included the deputy chairmen Prof. Hans Rothfels (University of Tübingen), 
Dr. Charlotte Lütkens and Prof. Karl Dietrich Bracher (University of Bonn).  The AI and SWP both had 
Research Advisory Councils.  Prof. Uri (France), who was a long-time collaborator of Monnet, and Prof. 
Gasteyger (Switzerland) functioned as the successiv AI Directors of Studies.  Dr. Nötzold and, beginning 
in November 1975, Dr. Feigl functioned as the successiv  speakers of the SWP Research Committee. 
50 See Chapter 7 for more on Birrenbach’s efforts with respect to the KML, whose institute proclaimed its 
aim to help bring together the worlds of political affairs and scholarship.  The AB-EAL conference featured 
a program drawn up by Pastor Dr. Hans Bolewski (director of the EAL) in conjunction with Max 
Horkheimer, of Frankfurt School fame, and younger Gman and American scholars.  Birrenbach acted as a 
consultant on this conference.   
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point… is to translate wissenschaftliche knowledge into theoretical possibilities for the 
practical Politik.”51   
 Despite its principally elitist nature, the German Atlanticists intended the 
integration of particular social groups within the infrastructure not only to further the 
Atlanticist cause but also, a partially related interest, to strengthen democracy in the 
Federal Republic.  This was an urgent task given th fears among many that, regardless 
of current constitutional forms, the internal situation was in reality dangerously fragile.52  
While on a broader scale such efforts were also directed at German labor and the military, 
Birrenbach was most openly worried in this regard about the condition of the Wirtschaft 
and the Wissenschaft.53  With respect to the former, the ideal was the “new businessman,” 
a type characterized not only by corporate self-interest but also by political and social 
awareness and an extensive engagement in national and international affairs beyond the 
narrow business realm.  The Atlanticists detected serious defects in this regard in West 
Germany (and Europe), with Birrenbach arguing that “[a]s a rule, Unternehmer are not 
politically well versed and sometimes not good psychologists in political questions.  That 
                                                
51 Birrenbach remarks in the DGAP Study Group II meeting of 12 February 1966, ACDP K079/2.   
52 The perception that the Federal Republic was a “democracy without democrats,” whose support rested 
primarily on its postwar economic achievements and whose passive citizens required a “geistige 
Aufrüstung” or an “innere Festigung” in the context of the East-West confrontation, gave birth to the 
phenomenon of “politische Bildung,” involving public as well as private figures and i stitutions.  Though 
not particularly active, Birrenbach was a member of the Kuratorium of the privately financed, Düsseldorf-
based Stiftung Die Mitarbeit (Stiftung für staatsbürgerliche Mitverantwortung), which was founded in 1963 
as a Stiftung des bürgerlichen Rechts and funded relevant private initiatives.  Other personalities in the 
Kuratorium included Siegfried Balke (CSU), Willy Brandt (SPD), Walter Scheel (FDP) and Albrecht 
Düren (DIHT Hauptgeschäftsführer, Bonn).  Key figures at the related Stätte der Begegnung e.V. included 
Werner Rietz (1st chairman) and Dr. August Sahm (2nd chairman), both of whom were also in the SDM 
Vorstand.  The SDM Stiftungsrat included Birrenbach’s contact Walther Hensel (from 1964 on 
Oberstadtdirektor a.D., Düsseldorf).  In October 1958, the DGAP Research Institute assisted with a 
seminar in Kronberg (Taunus) of the Staatsbürgerliche Vereinigung e.V.   
53 DGB chairmen, like Böckler, Richter and Rosenberg, were especially active in efforts to integrate 
German labor into the democratic Federal Republic.  Birrenbach himself thought in terms of state and 
Gesellschaft, with the latter represented by the two major social partners: business and labor.  For 
Birrenbach on what he considered, at least as of 1977, the difficult but successful integration of the army 
into the state, see KB to Johannes Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, ACDP K173/1. 
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was also the case earlier, perhaps to an even greater extent.”54  Particularly in light of the 
“earlier” behavior of the Wirtschaft, indifferent at best, during the Weimar Republic, 
Birrenbach, himself an exemplar of this new businessman, considered this an eminently 
serious matter.  Likewise, in assessing the potential implications of an alienated 
Wissenschaft, Birrenbach once again looked back to his experiences in the Weimar 
Republic and, years later, still singled out professor  as being among those who had 
“stood there on the chairs with enthusiasm” when Hitler had given speeches.55  The 
Atlanticist infrastructure was expected to facilitate  hitherto abortive “sachliche” 
involvement of these social forces in the process of political judgment and decision-
making and thus consolidate a key basis of the young democratic order.   
While impossible to portray a consensus of views among the diverse groups 
existing within the Atlanticist infrastructure, some overall tendencies can be delineated.  
Most significantly, these fundamentally Liberal personalities rejected notions of 
Abendland and the related idea of a European “Third Force” and instead propounded the 
concept, openly promoted by the Eisenhower administrat on, of an extant or incipient 
Atlantic Community in which the US was not a mere appendage but a vital member.56  
This community’s encompassing nature was evident in the breadth of themes addressed 
by the Atlanticist institutions as a whole, whatever their sometimes narrow and evolving 
                                                
54 KB to Prof. Dr. Helge Pross (Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg), 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1.  In 
1971, dealing with the theme “Unternehmer und Gesellschaft,” Birrenbach remarked that “[i]n the 
ideologized Gesellschaft of today, the Unternehmer must be able to argue [sich auseinandersetzen] with his 
opponents ideologically.  I realize that the Unternehmer cannot do this.  On the other hand, individual 
Unternehmer who can do this must be at the fore.” (KB to Sohl, 28 July 1971, ACDP K038/2).   
55 The Birrenbach interview “Zeugen der Zeit”: Kurt Birrenbach im Gespräch mit Werner Hill, 27 
December 1979, recorded on 20 October 1979, ACDP K213/1.  Though Birrenbach also referred here to 
“the devil knows whom,” he did not specifically identify any other professions.  It is not clear whether 
Birrenbach actually witnessed these scenes first-hand, for instance in Berlin or Münster.   
56 For Birrenbach’s assessment of the essential relationship between the Eisenhower administration and the 
concept of Atlantic Community, see his Speech for the Steering Committee for Königswinter, 3-4 
November 1966, ACDP K061/1.   
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specialties, comprising the military, political and economic issues that were Birrenbach’s 
forte, but also to some extent social, cultural andscientific affairs.57  Said framework was 
buttressed by the perception of a burgeoning interna io al interdependence, a prospect 
that led the Atlanticists to prefer multilateral, esp cially supranational, approaches over 
unilateral and even inter-governmental ones.58  Rejecting totalitarianism, the Atlanticists 
propagated Liberal versions of the Western principles of democracy, freedom and 
individualism.  Focused on the world of business rather than agriculture, they 
championed market capitalism, economic growth and a free international flow of trade 
and investment while opposing communism as well as autarchy.  Of an empiricist and 
materialist bent, they embraced the widespread application of science and technology, 
whether it be with respect to nature or man.  Shunning overt revolution, the Atlanticists 
placed their faith in optimistic vistas of gradual progress, welcoming the processes of 
modernization, industrialization and secularization and displaying an affinity for 
phenomena an Abendländler would have reviled as universalism, rationalism, gigantism,  
                                                
57 A significant underpinning in this regard were theproposals for NATO reform, including possible 
cooperation and consolidation beyond the military field (in the spirit of Article Two of the original NATO 
charter), made in 1956 by the committee of the NATO ambassadors Gaetano Martino (Italy), Lester 
Pearson (Canada) and Halvard Lange (Norway), the “Tree Wise Men” of the alliance.  As of 1971, 
Birrenbach still considered their report the most important political document ever issued by NATO 
[Birrenbach introduction for Manlio Brosio speech before the DGAP, 22 April 1971, ACDP K065/3].  
Such thematic diversity was especially characteristic of the NPC, which boasted a Science and Technology 
Committee and a Cultural Affairs and Information Committee.  However, in March 1959, the DGAP 
Research Institute also held a conference in Bergneustadt (NRW) with representatives of the 
Kultusverwaltungen about kulturpolitische questions.  As an example of a certain specialization among 
particular Atlanticist organizations, the studies of the Atlantic Institute by the mid-1960s exhibited a 
pronounced, though far from exclusive, emphasis on economic matters.  
58 Closely related to this, the Atlanticists looked ask nce at some aspects of national sovereignty and 
remained alert to signs of what they denigrated as a narrow hyper-nationalism or obsolete “national-stte 
egoism.”  For Birrenbach’s complaints about the “sacro egoismo,” see KB to Eugene Rostow, Yale 
University Law School, 28 January 1974 (cc John McCloy and Karl Carstens), ACDP K211/2.  On the 
negative impact of the “national egoisms,” see KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Mosler, Judge at the 
Internationalen Gerichtshof, Heidelberg, 29 November 1982, ACDP K036/1.     
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managerialism  and social engineering.  The abundant substantive wrangling among 
Atlanticists largely occurred within the parameters of this mutual worldview.59   
F. Americanization 
The emergence of the German Atlanticist infrastructure was a constituent element 
in the overarching process of Americanization in the Federal Republic and continental 
western Europe.  In this, Birrenbach and other Atlanticists were influenced by a broadly 
triumphant American hegemony that provided the prima y norm against which to judge 
allegedly acute deficits in their homeland, for instance the startling ignorance in fields 
like security, Westintegration and development; the dearth of an expert governmental 
capacity to analyze and plan policy; and the insufficient engagement of certain social 
elements, among them Wirtschaft and Wissenschaft, with the Politik.60  With an emphasis 
on their essentially private, non-partisan, integrative character, on their autonomy from 
the state, and on all the rest, these institutions flaunted innovative features similar to their 
antecedents that had emerged in the US in previous decades.  In adopting American 
notions of the intimate link of Wissenschaft and Politik, the German Atlanticists, though 
not wholeheartedly Birrenbach, abjured the classical humanistic strivings of the 
Abendländler and instead embraced American methodologies, namely a t chnocratic 
                                                
59 Such squabbling was evident, for instance, in the scramble of activity prior to the meetings of the Monnet 
Committee, as Birrenbach and other members crafted drafts of the overall resolution and Monnet strived, 
not always successfully, to achieve some semblance of unanimity.  The potential difficulty of such an 
undertaking even within the context of the Atlanticist institutions is intimated by Birrenbach’s memorably 
succinct dismissal of the British Labourite Richard Crossman’s comments at the 1971 Königswinter 
Conference as “intolerable, as always.” (KB to Lord Gladwyn, 3 April 1971, ACDP K066/2).   
60 Indeed, the distinctly Atlanticist notion of a “new businessman” was ultimately based on an American 
model.  The efforts to ameliorate what were at least perceived to be gaping voids in German knowledge 
found expression in a variety of ways.  Thus, the German Atlanticists were particularly eager to include 
foreign participants or guests, among them American and British experts in the relevant fields, in the
activities of institutions like the DGAP Study Group I.  Given his own lack of specialist knowledge about 
the East, Birrenbach relied heavily on the personalities of the DGAP Research Institute, for instance Dr. 
Wilhelm Haas (Amb. a.D.) as head of the preparation committee as well as Prof. Ulrich Scheuner, Prof. 
Eberhard Schulz and Wolfgang Wagner, to assist in pla ning the work of and providing background papers 
and other documentation to the DGAP Study Group II.   
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approach to the study of international relations, marked by confidence in the application 
of human reason and modern social scientific tools to practical problem-solving.61  Far 
from being an impersonal, even unconnected and parallel phenomenon, as some have 
hypothesized regarding aspects of Americanization, Birrenbach and other Atlanticists 
were well aware of and made frequent reference to the nature of their undertaking.  
Organizations like the AB and the action committees w re held to be patterned on 
American models, and Birrenbach repeatedly identified genealogies linking particular 
institutions with specific counterparts across the oc an, for instance designating the SWP 
and DGAP the “German RAND Corporation” and the “German Council on Foreign 
Relations,” respectively.62 
In so far as the infrastructure adopted not only American ideas, such as Atlantic 
Community, but also American forms and methods, it not only promoted through its 
proposals and other activities a broad, ambitious program of trans-Atlantic integration 
under American auspices but by its very existence represented an element of such 
integration.  Ultimately, the enthusiastic German introduction of Americanized 
institutions and practices as part of an effort to banish a persistent Occidentalism bears 
structural parallels to the efforts in the United States of Wilsonian internationalists in the 
post-World War I and post-World War II eras to undermine the staunch American 
                                                
61 With regard to the origins of the American affinity for the Wissenschaft, Birrenbach referred to the 
“unshakeable” American faith in the “’American way of life,’ born in the Enlightenment, in the birth hour 
of the American nation.” (KB to Prof. Hans Leussink, Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, 15 
February 1971, ACDP K025/1).  Perhaps dismayed by what might be seen as a relative Atlanticist neglect 
of the humanities, including history aside from that of a narrowly contemporary nature, and a 
complementary overstress on the social sciences, Birrenbach remarked, “[t]hat [Hajo Holborn] viewed all 
historical studies as a ‘humanistic endeavor’ was always especially reassuring for me in view of the fact 
that today the sociologists make history.  About the results I need waste no words.” (KB to Annemarie 
Holborn, 29 July 1971, ACDP K158/1).     
62 For Birrenbach on the “German RAND Corporation,” see KB to Hajo Holborn, 3 January 1964, ACDP 
K098/1; KB to Admiral Arleigh Burke, Center for Stra egic Studies, Georgetown University, 7 May 1965, 
ACDP K187/1; and KB (dictated by phone) to Walter Dowling, Director-General of the Atlantic Institute, 
22 August 1966, ACDP K107/2.   
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tradition of a supposedly exceptionalist isolationism and to encourage the US to accept 
the responsibilities of a world power.63  While primarily endorsed for their substantive 
virtues, Americanized traits also possessed a demonstration value both at home and 
abroad (especially, of course, with Americans), among key public and private figures and 
institutions as well as the general publics, helping the infrastructure attain a position of 
trust and prestige and reassuring foreign allies that non-governmental German elites were 
also active in constructively shaping their international relations.64  True, the German 
Atlanticists did not simply reproduce exactly American structures, themes and practices, 
but rather adapted them to their own peculiar tradiions and milieu.65  Furthermore, 
Birrenbach’s additional references to the DGAP as the “German Chatham House” and his 
acknowledgement that with respect to the relationship of Geist to Staat also countries like 
England and, to a lesser extent, France “were a model [Vorbild] for us” suggest not an 
exclusive Americanization, rather also a certain degre  of Anglo-Saxonization and even 
                                                
63 On the traditions of American diplomacy, see Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State 
(Boston: Mariner, 1997).  These Wilsonian internationalists were part of an Eastern Establishment focused 
on Europe and especially Germany and would prove valuable allies for the post-World War II German 
Atlanticists.  The upshot of their efforts included the birth of international relations as an academic 
discipline and the related construction of a private infrastructure that comprised institutions like th Council 
on Foreign Relations (founded in 1921), the numerous research institutes housed at prestigious East Coast 
universities, as well as organizations like the Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute 
that also dealt at times with foreign affairs.  In many ways, the United States had already undergone and 
was perhaps still undergoing, mutatis mutandis, an evolution similar to that occurring in the Federal 
Republic.     
64 As one German Atlanticist put it, speaking of a single characteristic but in a fashion that could easily 
have applied to other traits of the infrastructure: “We all know, of course, how much better private 
initiatives are received [ankommen] in the USA, precisely because the Americans themselve  are the people 
of the private initiatives.” (Walter Stahl to Hellmuth Wagner, 20 January 1971, ACDP K112/1).   
65 For instance, even as they explored new strategic ideas and methods, the West Germans generally 
evinced less enthusiasm than their American counterparts about concepts and approaches like game theory, 
realism à la Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, and the possibilities for the mastery and calculability 
of modern military technology, as well as the schools of thought that relied on them.   
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Westernization.66  Nevertheless, despite these undeniable nuances, the overall process in 
the Federal Republic is still most aptly characterized as one of Americanization. 
G. Obstacles 
In creating and maintaining their infrastructure, Birrenbach and the German 
Atlanticists struggled in this period to overcome daunting obstacles in the Federal 
Republic.  Most strikingly, a profound traditionalist resistance to such novel institutions 
flared in government and university quarters.  At least early on, elements in the 
Auswärtigem Amt held to the vision of a “classical Staatsaufbau” and skeptically opposed 
the penetration of what they saw as ignorant outsider  into the field of official 
diplomacy.67  Perhaps motivated in part by similar conceptions, the finance ministry 
                                                
66 With respect to Vorbilder, see KB to Prof. Adolf Butenandt, 16 March 1981, ACDP K141/2.  Earlier, in 
1962, Birrenbach pointed to the waxing role of the Wissenschaft in the Politik in England and, to a lesser 
degree, in France, for instance in the field of arms control (Birrenbach Expositions in the Press Conference 
of 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the 1st Fritz Thyssen Stiftung Activity Report, 
ACDP K077/1).  Among its various qualities, the D utsch-Englische Gesellschaft was also seen by its 
advocates as corresponding to “the English mentality.”  For an envious reference to the more widespread 
knowledge of security and disarmament questions in “the Anglo-Saxon countries,” see “New Publications 
of the DGAP Research Institute,” August 1962, ACDP K009/1.  For Henle noting the long traditions of the 
DGAP’s older and larger “Vorbilder” in New York and London, see the Minutes of the DGAP Member 
Assembly on 27 June 1962, ACDP K009/1.  At least in a broader sense, Birrenbach and other German 
Atlanticists, rather than conceiving of such processes as ideally an exclusively one-way street, sincerely 
believed that their most important allies could likewise learn, to great benefit, in specific, perhaps other, 
respects from particular German methods and approaches.  For example, as of 1967, some German 
Atlanticists were proposing that certain institutions of the Bundestag might prove to be of use in current 
English conditions.  Similarly, as of 1980, Birrenbach was arguing that the United States should consider 
adopting discrete elements present in the Federal Republic, including the system of worker co-
determination, the intense efforts devoted towards export, the complete autonomy of the federal reserve 
bank (Bundesbank), and a system that assured both “a maximum of free economy” as well as, “in a 
restricted way,” interventions by the government in the economic process (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 
March 1980, ACDP K134/1).     
67 On the early frustrating experiences with the AA, its desire for a “classical Staatsaufbau,” and its 
“anxious frown [besorgtem Stirnrunzeln],” at least regarding the initial efforts that surrounded the DGAP, 
see Theodor Steltzer, Sechzig Jahre Zeitgenosse (Munich: List, 1966), p. 231.  Steltzer was an essential co-
founder, a “Stammvater,” of the DGAP and from 1955-60 functioned both as its Geschäftsführender 
Präsident (an office whose duties were looked after in the future by a Geschäftsführenden Stellvertretenden 
Präsident) as well as president of the German UNESCO Commission.  For an example of AA criticism of 
the KWCs with respect to the one-sidedness of the composition and attitudes expressed, especially insofar 
as they deviated from government policy on controvesial questions (including the Hallstein Doctrine), see 
the report on the 1961 KWC by VLR I. Schwörbel, 23 March 1961, ACDP K076/1.  The distrust and even 
hostility the Atlanticist infrastructure encountered were not limited to the German government and 
officials.  For instance, though arduous lobbying eventually secured its support, elements in the American 
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continued its role of exercising a tight rein over budget expenditures, including any 
funding for Atlanticist institutions.  Reservations al o existed regarding efforts to 
strengthen the Wissenschaft-Politik linkage, with prevailing attitudes, still impacted by
Occidental views of a social order legitimized by laws of God or Nature, considering the 
relationship an antithetical one.  Mutual contempt between academy and bureaucracy 
entrenched the persistent opposition between G ist and Macht.  Compounding the 
relative backwardness and youth of international rel tions as a discipline in West 
Germany, many conscientious Wissenschaftler, stung by the collaboration of some of 
their own with the Nazi regime, saw their proper role as preserving a critical distance 
from the state and its activities.68  Many in government regarded Wissenschaftler in 
general as incompetent “egg-heads,” oblivious to power-political realities, and those 
engaged in policy-making as a species of lobbyist, all he more suspect as they sought to 
subordinate the Politik not to tangible interests but to alien ideas and methods.69  Even 
Birrenbach gave vent to such tensions, implicitly acknowledging some culpability of the 
Politik for the defective relationship to the Geist, but reserving his most biting criticism 
                                                                                                                                      
government, more specifically in the executive branch, at first assumed a reluctant posture towards the 
NPC’s ADELA project (see Chapter 8).  The NATO governments, both in Europe and America, also 
consistently opposed proposals to transform the NPCinto a more potent Atlantic Assembly.   
68 On these themes, see Gisela Gantzel-Kress and Klaus Juergen Gantzel, “The Development of 
International Relations Studies in West Germany,” in Ekkehart Krippendorff and Volker Rittberger, eds.,  
The Foreign Policy of West Germany: Formation and Contents (London: Sage, 1980), pp. 197-269.  
Bergstraesser held the first chair of political scien e at the University of Freiburg from 1954 until his death 
in 1964 and played a central and pioneering role in promoting the systematic study of international 
relations.  Even with the significant “progressive” contribution made by the Atlanticist infrastructure, the 
overall state of the discipline in West Germany well into the 1970s can largely be measured by the dearth 
of relevant Wissenschaftler, including professors at the universities, dealing with such topics.  A number of 
historical factors help explain the sluggish development: the conservative tradition of the German 
Wissenschaft; the illiberal nature of the Kaiserreich and National Socialism, which limited the possible 
independent involvement of the Wissenschaft in such issues; the relatively late and, after the def at in 
World War I and the consequent loss of colonies, abortive German political engagement with the world; 
and the narrow focus in the early Federal Republic on the German Question.   
69 On this, see “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: Motive und Absichten,” ACDP K149/1.  Such 
suspicions partially reflected concerns about utopian proclivities and, in connection with them, a privileged 
role of experts in the political decision-making of a parliamentary democracy.   
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for the intelligent but “uncontrollable, unrealistic Intellektueller” and insisting that 
“politics is action and not contemplation.”70   
Birrenbach experienced such obstacles to Atlanticist infrastructural ambitions in 
various forms.  For one, Atlanticist research institutes encountered a lasting mistrust 
among some professors and universities that saw them as propaganda organizations and 
challenged the wissenschaftlichen character of their work.71  Considerably more 
frustrating for Birrenbach was the government bureacr cy’s occasional withholding of 
support from or even efforts to stymie the construction of the infrastructure as originally 
conceived.  The most blatant example of this was the obstructionism towards the SWP of 
the finance ministry, which, citing the work of well-remunerated government officials 
and alarmed at the implications of the appellation “German RAND Corporation” for 
                                                
70 In expressing his sometimes conflicted attitudes, Birrenbach referred to the desirability in general of 
“[t]he engagement with intellectual forces [[d]ie Auseinandersetzung mit geistigen Kräften], so heated and 
infuriating [erregt und erregend] as it may be.” (KB to Ernst Hase, 24 September 1959, ACDP K047/2).  
On uncontrollable, unrealistic intellectuals (in this case an unwelcome German candidate for the European 
Commission), see KB to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 16 May 1984, ACDP K029/2.  On politics, action and 
contemplation, see KB to Gerard Smith, 8 October 1979, ACDP K209/1.  In 1973, while generally praising 
an “excellent” memo by Robert Triffin (Yale University), Birrenbach also objected, “why should we then 
make a recommendation in a resolution of our next meeting based on the perfect theory of Professor Triffin 
passing by the real facts of life?” (KB to Monnet, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2).  Birrenbach openly 
expressed his skepticism about even those he considered first-class Wissenschaftler occupying policy-
making positions, for instance with regard to W. Michael Blumenthal as President Jimmy Carter’s 
Secretary of the Treasury.  In contrast, Birrenbach f ncied himself a political Praktiker, operating from 
experience (KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2).   
71 This was true, for instance, for at least much of the DGAP’s history.  Though the Atlantic Institute 
claimed at the start that most professors were pleased with its existence and ready to help, there was also an 
admission that some remained wary, at least in part due to suspicions that the AI might simply be engaged 
in NATO propaganda (see, for example, the summary of the meeting of AI Board and Policy Committee 
members, 25 September 1960, ACDP K128/1).  As of April 1960, even Ludwig Rosenberg, the Atlanticist-
minded vice-chairman of the DGB, wondered whether t AI was some covert US government action 
(Record of Interview, 27 April 1960, ACDP K003/2).  Such suspicions might have found sustenance in the 
remarks about the institute’s role made by the Frenchman Jacques Rueff (an AI vice-president) in the 
December 1960 board meeting that “to make propaganda you must have something to propagate,” though 
Rueff obviously did not mean this in a pejorative sen e (Confidential Minutes of the Meeting of the Board 
of Governors of the Atlantic Institute, 12 December 1960, ACDP K128/1).  The AI’s early desire to 
convene conferences involving directors of the major foreign affairs research institutes and, with 
Birrenbach’s support, to welcome figures from non-NATO countries into its Board of Governors was 
initially related to the organization’s efforts to demonstrate the genuinely scholarly nature of its work and 
to refute the notion among some academic and intellectual circles that it was, in reality, a propaganda 
instrument.  
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future expansion and costs, questioned the very need for such an institution.  Imagining 
the SWP as a mere Vermittlungsorgan that did not conduct its own research, the ministry 
proposed organizational measures to limit the institute’s size and budget and to ensure 
that the government, especially itself, maintained maximum control over operations and 
expenditures.  For Birrenbach and other SWP proponents, such ideas threatened the 
fundamental nature of the robust organization they had in mind and the very notion of an 
institutionalized government-Wissenschaft partnership.72  As Birrenbach complained: 
I must openly confess to you that I recall few projects in my life, which have 
taken their course with such difficulty as this.  Political and menschliche questions 
appear to have played a role here.  However, I would say that the bureaucratic 
action of the finance ministry has been and still is the greatest obstacle.  What has 
happened here is probably only to be explained through it that, seen as a whole, 
the German Politik has still not found a proper relationship to the Wissenschaft.  
That… is however not new, rather is characteristic for the past hundred years.73 
 
In so far as these obstacles in government and Wissenschaft stemmed significantly, 
though not exclusively, from Occidentalist perspectives, the Atlanticist challenge to 
Abendland occurred not only over substantive issues, but also over form and practice.   
H. Facilitating Factors 
On the other hand, a number of circumstances in West G rmany at this time 
actually facilitated the creation of the Americanized infrastructure envisioned by 
Birrenbach and the Atlanticists.  While powerful, deep-rooted traditions, like the 
                                                
72 The finance ministry broached several possibilities o achieve its goals, among them the establishment of 
a Verwaltungsrat that would remove from the SWP Stiftungsrat decisions about the approval of the 
research program and the economic plan; the application of the Bundesangestelltentarif (rather than that for 
Beamte), which would result in less remuneration, material compensation and respect for SWP personnel 
and, consequently, hinder the ability to attract the requisite talent; and a significant reduction in the size of 
the institution as measured in number of departments, leaders and personnel.  Such proposals were opposed 
by Klaus Ritter, members of the Stiftungsrat and the Wissenschaft, and even the other substantively 
interested Ressorts, also in part because they impinged on their own authority.  Faced with the conception 
of the “Finanzamt,” one that had major consequences for the classification of SWP Mitarbeiter, Birrenbach 
was particularly active in those efforts to secure a formal position for Ritter in the Auswärtigen Amt or the 
Defense Ministry.  Nevertheless, the ideas of the Finanzamt did find implementation to at least a certain 
extent.   
73 KB to Ministerial Director Herbert Müller-Roschach, 18 April 1966, ACDP K017/1.   
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Abendland concept itself, stood opposed to such a project, there also existed long-
standing, though admittedly weak, traditions, some str tching back at least to the 19th 
century, favoring such an endeavor.  Furthermore, the overall process of Americanization 
enjoyed a prior history as well, beginning forcefully in the 1920s and resuming, after its 
interruption by war and defeat, in areas of society well beyond those considered here.74  
Therefore, whether with respect to civic associations, inter-disciplinarity, international 
conferences, or the complementary relationship of the Wissenschaft and Wirtschaft to the 
Politik, the Atlanticists did not simply import wholesale nd spontaneously from abroad 
the elements of their undertaking after 1945, rather to some extent sought to reinvigorate 
often dormant elements, whatever their foreign or native origins, that already had legacies 
in Germany.75  Also, the postwar reaction against a regime with to alitarian aspirations 
shattered much of the traditional respect for the sate and engendered a greater 
receptiveness towards independent, private undertakings.  Finally, within the Wirtschaft 
in particular, Birrenbach inhabited an environment that, at least in business endeavors, 
stressed the mutual dependence between Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft and Politik, with 
                                                
74 The German fascination with America included, for instance, management and production techniques, 
and Birrenbach himself was among those keeping an eye on American business practices.  For the Weimar 
period, see Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).   
75 For instance, a desire for the unity of a growing a d increasingly specialized Wissenschaft had existed in 
Germany from at least the late 19th century onward.  The Atlanticist conference system borrowed from 
Locarno-era diplomatic procedures, including the emphasis on informal, periodic meetings outside normal 
diplomatic channels (admittedly featuring ministers and other officials in that earlier period), candid and 
reasoned discussion and debate and close personal relationships (for instance, those between Stresemann, 
Briand and Chamberlain), even when no clear result or resolution of particular problems was anticipated.  
The German Atlanticists could also look back on certain interwar efforts to institutionalize a closer linkage 
between Wissenschaft and Politik with respect to international relations such as the Deutsche Hochschule 
für Politik, founded in 1920 in Berlin, and the Institut für Auswärtige Politik, established in 1923 in 
Hamburg as a research institute patterned on those in th  United States and Britain.  Finally, the Wirtschaft, 
including Spitzenorganizationen like the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie and the Deutsche 
Industrie- und Handelstag, had already demonstrated some inclination to playan independent role in the 
foreign affairs of the Weimar period, maintaining contacts with counterparts abroad, for instance in Br tain, 
Austria and especially France, and stressing the significance of economic power as a tool of German 
foreign policy during an era in which issues like reparations were of salience.   
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German industry continuing torepresent one of the most Wissenschaft-oriented in the 
world, reliant with regard to both R&D as well as economic analyses, and with 
Birrenbach himself emphasizing the need in such respect  for a tight relationship between 
Wirtschaft and the applied Wissenschaft.   
Furthermore, whatever their initially obstructionist behavior, at least elements of 
the federal government and bureaucracy, with the passage of time and especially with the 
ascent of the Atlanticist-minded Ludwig Erhard to the Chancellorship in 1963, also 
played a more salutary role in the construction and fu ctioning of the infrastructure in the 
Federal Republic.  This went far beyond the often formal and peripheral activities as 
speakers, guests and observers; as hosts of receptions and other entertainment; or as 
transmitters of messages of appreciation, all of which were partaken in by German 
presidents, chancellors, ministers, civil servants, ambassadors and other embassy 
personnel, as well as by their foreign counterparts, nd all of which undoubtedly 
conferred a greater credibility and respectability on the Atlanticist institutions.76  For 
instance, following successful negotiations enabled y Birrenbach’s establishment of the 
main contacts to the government and in response to the Bundestag’s request of 21 
January 1965, the cabinet decided on 4 May 1966 that the already extant SWP would 
now primarily serve the government as an independent research center for strategy, arms 
control and related areas.  The SWP thus acquired the requisite access to secret materials 
and became part of a larger bureaucratic reorganization that included the prior creation of 
                                                
76 For instance, Chancellor Erhard demonstrated his support for the Monnet Committee by attending its 
meetings in Bonn in June 1964 and in Berlin in May 1965.  Likewise, Chancellor Willy Brandt hosted a 
reception in the Bundeskanzleramt for the participants in the Monnet Committee’s meeting of 15-16 
December 1969 in Bonn.  To offer a foreign example, th  Atlantic Congress of June 1959 included an 
opening meeting in Westminster Hall with Queen Elizabeth II and Prime Minister Harold McMillan in 
attendance.  
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a Foreign Office planning staff in 1963.77  Meanwhile, a deliberately circumscribed 
number of diplomats and other high-ranking civil servants from a broad range of relevant 
government departments also became more significantly involved, especially as members 
of the DGAP Study Groups and the SWP Stiftungsrat, among them key members of the 
AA planning staff like its leader, Ministerial Director Herbert Müller-Roschach, and the 
disarmament commissioner (Abrüstungsbeauftragte), Swidbert Schnippenkoetter.78         
While Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists functioned as central initiators and 
actors in the emergence and maintenance of this infrastructure, they also welcomed 
benevolent support over the years from the victor powers, particularly the US and, to a 
lesser extent, Britain.  Prior to Birrenbach’s involvement, Allied military governments 
and high commissions helped establish contacts and promoted participation, both abroad 
and among the Germans themselves, made rooms available for functions, provided 
                                                
77 The creation and functioning of the AA planning staff involved talks between its leader, Ministerial 
Director Herbert Müller-Roschach, and the leader of the US State Department planning staff, Walt Rostow.  
Hajo Holborn contributed by securing a promise from Rostow that US agencies would make more of their 
research material available to the AA planning staff (Holborn to KB, 18 December 1963, ACDP K098/1).  
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder viewed the SWP as a valuable aid for the AA planning staff and the 
cabinet decision of 4 May 1966 was in accordance with a proposal of that planning staff.  Both before and 
after this, the government (including the Foreign Office) developed and maintained cooperative 
relationships regarding foreign policy with a number of university institutes, including the “Institut für 
Öffentliches Recht in Kiel,” the institutes for political science at the universities in Bonn, Kiel and 
Erlangen, the economic college in Mannheim, the technical college in Darmstadt, as well as the Otto-Suhr-
Institute at the Free University in Berlin.  As already alluded to, the German Atlanticists judged the work of 
these institutes, with rare exceptions, to be unsatisfac ory.   
78 Those thus significantly involved included Beamte from the Bundeskanzleramt, Auswärtigen Amt, 
Bundesnachrichtendienst, and the ministries of defense (with Herbert Trebesch in the DGAP Study Group I 
of particular importance for Birrenbach), economics, finance, research and inner-German relations.  Later 
successive leaders of the AA planning staff that also took part in such capacities included the Minister al 
Directors Dirk Oncken, Guido Brunner and Klaus Blech.  For the related encouragement and support by the 
federal government (AA) of a close cooperation betwe n German Atlanticist institutions like the DGAP 
(including its study groups) and the SWP, as well as between them and the West German universities, se 
for instance the Planning Staff Note Pl-18/65 of 1 February 1965, ACDP K149/1.  The temporal dividing 
line with regard to governmental attitudes is not entir ly clear-cut, as in an earlier period, even if with some 
hesitation, elements of the Auswärtigen Amt (including Walter Hallstein and Wilhelm Grewe) offered 
support for the establishment of the DGAP, while th concept originally envisioned later on by the AA 
foresaw a far less important role for the SWP than it ctually attained.  As of January 1964, Birrenbach was 
referring to the circulating, but still amorphous, idea of forming a “brain trust” for Erhard (KB to Hajo 
Holborn, 3 January 1964, ACDP K098/1).   
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financial support and, with the founding of institutions like Amerika-Häuser and German-
American Clubs, even created some semblance of their own Atlanticist infrastructure in 
the Federal Republic.79  Later, foreign counterpart institutions, especially research 
institutes, encouraged further infrastructural expansion and offered assistance and advice 
on themes ranging from particular projects and research directions to broader institutional 
relationships (for instance vis-à-vis government).  The receptiveness of Birrenbach and 
other German Atlanticists was enhanced, perhaps with a dose of naivety, by the exciting 
developments they witnessed on the American scene, esp cially regarding the Politik-
Wissenschaft link.  In the United States, dominated by a belief in the instrumental nature 
of reason and in man as the maker of his own destiny and where a warm relationship had 
existed from the start between politicians and intellectuals, distinct disciplines rapidly 
emerged to address postwar phenomena like nuclear weapons.  Most conspicuously with 
the accession of the Kennedy administration, academic xperts enjoyed a celebrated 
role.80  Birrenbach served as a conduit throughout this period for such prodding and 
assistance due to his contacts with relevant American institutions, including figures like 
Arleigh Burke and David Abshire at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and 
International Studies and Henry Kissinger at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.81  
                                                
79 The first postwar German-American Clubs were opened i  1947.  The educational advisor Robert Birley 
was among those British occupation officials from whose support the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft 
benefited.   
80 As of November 1962, Birrenbach was especially impressed by the “remarkable” and “modern” 
achievements and discoveries of the American Wissenschaftler in the “extraordinarily important” field and 
Problematik of “arms limitation and arms control” (particularly in comparison with that field’s non-
existence to that point in the Federal Republic) and by the fact that “[a]ll disarmament proposals that ve 
been made in recent years are actually the result of this Abrüstungswissenschaft.” (Birrenbach Expositions 
in the Press Conference of 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the 1st Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung Activity Report, ACDP K077/1). 
81 Unlike their assessment of the universities in the Federal Republic, the German Atlanticists were very 
impressed by the research being done at these and other American universities, like MIT.  Admiral Burke 
was the director and Abshire the executive secretary at the CSIS.  Over the years, a number of Germans 
participated in CSIS projects and belonged to the CSIS Board (e.g. Karl Carstens) and Research Council 
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The Atlanticist infrastructure also benefited from the participation and even 
membership of prominent personalities from the major inter-governmental organizations 
in its institutions and activities.  For instance, NATO personalities, including figures 
political (e.g. Secretaries-General, the NATO Council) and military (e.g. SACEUR and 
SACLANT), frequently gave speeches, closed briefings and receptions for the delegates 
at the NATO Parliamentarians Conference and other on -time conferences, while the 
NPC sessions and committee meetings were often held, as a courtesy, at the NATO 
headquarters and facilities, at the time in and around Paris.  Not only did many NATO 
figures, among them the Belgians Paul-Henri Spaak (Secretary-General) and Ambassador 
André de Staercke (Chairman of NATO’s Cultural and I formation Committee), strongly 
encourage the creation of what they hoped would be a complementary Atlantic Institute, 
but the AI’s close cooperation with international organizations, similarly as that with 
certain other Atlanticist institutions, was formalized by the presence of the NATO and 
OECD Secretaries-General as ex officio members of its Board of Governors.  Finally, and 
of particular significance for Birrenbach, the AI Policy Committee eventually, beginning 
in the AI director-generalship of John Tuthill (whic  ran from 1969 through 1976), held 
                                                                                                                                      
(e.g. Prof. Richard Löwenthal).  The CSIS Senior Staff also included a European Coordinator (for instace, 
Joseph Godson during the 1970s).  As of early 1962, Birrenbach’s advocacy for the DGAP Study Group I 
was fortified by the repeated complaints he had heard while in the United States about the lack of 
constructive West German arms control proposals.  As an example of the broader activities in this regad, 
from 15 October-15 November 1962, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Uwe Nerlich, as well as two men of the 
federal defense ministry, went on a trip to the United States, during which they took up contact with thirty-
five free and state [staatlichen] institutes and universities working especially in the areas of international 
relations, security and Ostforschung, spoke with about a hundred Wissenschaftler and other personalities 
engaged in these questions, and initiated an exchange program with respect to material and personnel 
(Minutes of the Meeting of the Präsidium of the DGAP on 19 December 1962 in Düsseldorf, ACDP 
K010/2). 
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substantive annual fall meetings in Brussels with the members of the NATO Council and 
the European Commission.82   
Yet another vital factor was that some key German Atlanticists of the post-World 
War II era had already spent significant time in the United States, as well as Britain, 
during the Weimar Republic and the National Socialist reign.  Those that had traversed 
the Atlantic thus formed part of a larger international flow of people between Germany 
and America in the twentieth century.  Such extended encounters with the Anglo-Saxon 
world encompassed a wide range of experiences.  Arnold Bergstraesser emigrated to the 
United States in 1937 to escape the Third Reich and live  and taught there in exile until 
1954.  Hans Raupach, his colleague on the AWP Vorstand, had studied in the US during 
the mid-1930s, prior to his Habilitation.  Marion Dönhoff had travelled extensively in 
America, as well as Europe and Africa, while the banker Friedrich Carl von Oppenheim 
had undergone part of his training at the National City Bank in New York.  From 1929-
31, Ernst Friedlaender, then a businessman, had live in the US as co-director of AGFA, 
a subsidiary of IG Farben.  Meanwhile, personalities like Günter Henle, Ludwig 
Rosenberg, W. Alexander Menne and Eric Blumenfeld ha  spent considerable time in 
Britain, often in similar capacities.  In some cases, these Atlanticists seem to have been 
inspired first-hand by the institutions, perspectives and practices they encountered 
overseas, experiences that were perhaps even essential in their efforts, upon their return, 
after the war in the Federal Republic.  While Birrenbach himself had not spent any time 
in the United States prior to the 1950s and in his entire life never remained there for a 
                                                
82 The Atlantic Institute meeting of 26 September 1960 was also held at NATO headquarters in Paris.  The
AI Policy Committee meetings in Brussels with the NATO Council were held in the space of the latter.  On
4 May 1973, the Monnet Committee press conference oc urred in the press hall of the EC Commission in 
the Berlaymont building in Brussels.  The Dane Thorkil Kristensen was the OECD Secretary-General from 
1960-69.   
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genuinely extended period, his considerable interacion with Americans in the business 
world, including his years abroad working in an American firm, likely rendered him more 
positively inclined towards American forms and approaches.83 
As the German Atlanticist infrastructure expanded, its development acquired a 
certain dynamic of its own.  The Atlanticists engaged in an informal process of inter-
institutional learning and adoption, with efforts to reproduce patently successful elements 
or at least their essential qualities.  For instance, Birrenbach largely founded his DGAP 
Study Group II, including its structure and methods, on the model of what he considered 
the fruitful Study Group I, while the joint AB-EAL conference of June 1968 was 
consciously patterned on the Königswinter Conferences.  Even more striking was the 
impact of the Monnet Committee, which functioned for Birrenbach and his fellow 
Atlanticists as a template for subsequent action committees and even for organizations 
that were not action committees per se, among them the Atlantic Institute.84  
Furthermore, something of a “snowball effect” develop d as already existing 
organizations contributed decisively to the birth of further institutions.  For instance, the 
                                                
83 Bergstraesser came from a Protestant family but also had Jewish ancestry.  Long before her birth, 
Dönhoff’s father had been a diplomat, who for a period of time was stationed in Washington, DC. 
Menne was president of a chemical firm in London from 1929-39.  After graduating from Germany’s  
renowned Salem School on Lake Constance, Blumenfeld underwent commercial and linguistic training in 
England, as well as in France and Scandinavia, from1933-35.  Though certainly a different experience, 
Ernst Majonica and Helmut Schmidt had spells as prioners of war of the Americans and British, 
respectively.     
84 Oppenheim pointed out that “the Atlantic Institute works on the Atlantic level in similar ways as the
Monnet Committee on the European.” (Oppenheim to Rosenberg, 28 June 1963, ACDP K108/2).  This was 
alluded to at the AI Board meeting of December 1960, with its stress on the “action-oriented” character of 
the institute’s studies (Confidential Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Atlantic 
Institute, 12 December 1960, ACDP K128/1), and echod in an AI brochure of January 1972 with the 
assertion that “the work of the Institute is geared to action.” (AI Brochure, January 1972, ACDP K057/2).  
As late as July 1968, Birrenbach himself gave expression to some of the resultant ambiguity in wondering, 
“[i]s the purpose of the Institute a political one or is it political research?…  In reality the Institu e seems to 
me partly a political, partly a research Institution.” (KB to McCloy, 8 July 1968, ACDP K210/1).  For the 
inspiration drawn by the DGAP Study Group I from the European-American disarmament and security 
conference held in July 1961 in Bürgenstock (Switzerland), both with respect to themes to be investigated 
and the type of joint functions that should be staged with foreign institutions, see the undated “Arbeitsplan 
der Studiengruppe der DGAP zum Thema Rüstungsbeschränkung und Rüstungskontrolle,” ACDP K007/1.   
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basic concept of an Atlantic Institute was explored an  promoted throughout the 1950s 
by a number of Atlantic Community Congresses, the NATO Parliamentarians 
Conference, the Atlantic Treaty Association (see Chapter 7) and the signers of the first 
Declaration of Atlantic Unity (1954).  In October 1959, it was a meeting in Brussels of a 
group significantly comprised of delegates from the Atlantic Congress in London that 
June that organized the Provisional Committee which, in turn, established a permanent 
Board of Governors and ultimately proved so crucial in the construction of the AI.  Thus, 
the creation of the Atlanticist infrastructure gained momentum with each new addition.85  
Not surprisingly, such momentum also encouraged efforts to enhance the role, formal and 
informal, of existing institutions, as demonstrated, for example, by the hopes of 
Birrenbach and others with respect to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.86  
                                                
85 Other such Atlantic Community Congresses had already occurred in Copenhagen (1953) and in Bruges 
(1957), the latter of which was sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania along with the College of 
Europe (including by personalities like Robert Strausz-Hupé, Hans Kohn and Henri Brugmans).  Richard 
Jaeger was the leader of the German delegation to the Atlantic Congress of June 1959 (approximately the 
10th anniversary of NATO), which made recommendations for, among other things, an Atlantic Institute, 
the expansion of the OEEC into a broader Atlantic organization (realized in 1961 as the OECD), and a 
special Atlantic Convention.  Following the meeting of a preparatory committee in London in October 
1961 (at the invitation of the British government), in which Count Raban Adelmann and Helmut Schmidt 
served as the German delegates, this Atlantic Convention, modeled in at least some minds on the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia, w s convened from 8-20 January 1962 in Paris.  
Among the approximately eighty participants, under th  chairmanship of former US Secretary of State 
Christian Herter, was a ten-member German delegation led by Martin Blank (vice-president of the Deutsch-
Atlantischen-Gesellschaft, see Chapter 7).  This convention produced the Declaration of Paris, which in 
April 1962 appeared as the Second Declaration of Atlantic Unity, now signed by approximately 240 
personalities, including Birrenbach among the nineteen from the Federal Republic.  This second declaration 
called for the establishment of a governmental commission to draw up a charter for an Atlantic 
Community; the creation of a permanent Atlantic High Council at the ministerial level to determine policy 
by a weighted majority on definite matters of common c ncern; the formation of an Atlantic Economic 
Community; the expansion of the Atlantic Institute; the founding of an Atlantic High Court of Justice to 
decide specific legal controversies arising under international treaties; and the development of the NPC into 
a consultative Atlantic Assembly.  To a certain extent, the NPC itself was the result of a similar 
groundswell of support from other Atlanticist institu ons, for instance the powerful impetus received from 
the appeal of the original Declaration of Atlantic Unity, which had been signed by 244 personalities from 
the NATO states.  As of May 1966, Dowling, the AI Director-General, was arguing in favor of 
strengthening the NPC Secretariat, though the AI was not directly involved in this.   
86 Birrenbach, as already intimated by his signing of the Second Declaration of Atlantic Unity but also 
spurred on for instance by what he considered a crisis in NATO as of May 1966, was among those 




Deciding upon the proper location for institutions significantly exercised the 
minds of Birrenbach and other Atlanticists.  A plethora of factors dictated a certain 
geographic diversity within Germany and western Europe for the elements of their 
infrastructure.  Contingent necessity and advantage in finding suitable accommodations 
proved crucial at times, as with the dismal early postwar conditions, caused for instance 
by Allied bombing damage, that largely resulted in the DEG siting its conferences in 
Königswinter, near rather than immediately in Bonn; or the favorable opportunity that 
presented itself around the time of the SWP’s inception to acquire the Haus Eggenberg in 
Ebenhausen near Munich.  Symbolism or atmospherics sometimes contributed, for 
instance the attraction to the Atlantik-Brücke of the hospitable environment of liberal, 
commercial, cosmopolitan Hamburg, a Hanseatic city boasting close, centuries-old 
relations with the United States and Britain; or the desire to flaunt the Atlanticist banner 
in the heartland of Gaullism, as reflected in the pr sence in Paris of the headquarters of 
organizations like the NPC, the Monnet Committee and the AI.87  More tangible 
considerations of financing (see Chapter 5) occasion lly loomed large, whether it be the 
benefits the DGAP derived in Bonn from its close proximity to Förderer from Rhenish-
Westphalian industry; or those accruing to the AI through its direct vicinity to important 
                                                                                                                                      
NATO reorganization, ultimately into a more powerful, though at least initially an advisory or consultative, 
Atlantic Assembly.  Such ambitions led to proposals to trengthen and expand the body’s International 
Secretariat and to the NATO Parliamentarians Confere ce changing its name in 1966 to the North Atlantic 
Assembly.  On these aspirations, see, for example, the Proposal for the Reorganization and Strengthening 
of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference Secretariat, ACDP K049/2.   
87 Indicative of Hamburg’s orientation was a number of the city’s other institutions, including the Hotel 
Atlantik and the Übersee-Club (e.V.).  For the obstacles presented by the French government, as well as the 
Institut de France, in securing a suitable building for the Atlantic Institute in Paris, see KB to Foreign 
Minister Heinrich von Brentano, Bonn, 19 December 1960, ACDP K128/1. 
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French funding sources.  Given the intense scrutinizing of similar, already existing 
institutions, German but especially American, including organizations like the Council on 
Foreign Relations and the American Council on Germany (both in New York City) and 
the RAND Corporation (in Santa Monica, CA) not situated in the national capital, one 
can even speak with respect to bodies such as the AB and the SWP of the intentional 
Americanization of the geographic spread of the German Atlanticist infrastructure.88   
 The example of Bonn demonstrates perhaps most strikingly the extent to which 
spatial distance and the geographic location and chara teristics of a particular Atlanticist 
institution or activity could uniquely affect, for better or worse, the numerical weight and 
structural composition of its members and participants.  Beyond the process of 
Americanization, the Federal Republic also approximated the US insofar as it, too, lacked 
a genuine national capital as a focal point in the typical European sense.  Like 
Washington, Bonn was really little more than a political hub, rather than a full-fledged, 
versatile metropolis, like London, Paris or Rome.  While organizations and functions 
based in this small, beautiful city consequently found it relatively easy to attract certain 
groups, like ministerial civil servants, parliamentarians and others involved in politics, 
they found it more difficult to interest figures from other branches, such as journalism, 
academia and parts of the Wirtschaft, than might have been the case elsewhere, say in the 
banking and commercial center of Frankfurt.  Having studied as a young man in Paris and 
then, during the late 1920s and 1930s, lived in Berlin, which at that time had supplanted 
Paris as Europe’s cultural hotspot, Birrenbach moaned that he “suffered” in provincial 
                                                
88 Although certain American organizations, like the Atlantic Council of the United States and the 
Brookings Institution, were indeed located in Washington, DC.  
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Bonn.89  On the other hand, Weltstadt Berlin still held a special place in his heart many 
years later, so that whenever he visited, as he put it, “I can never forget… its cultural 
background and its political and social life which I ad so enjoyed.”90  Indeed, 
Birrenbach cited the absence of a real capital as contributing to the lack of an integrated 
Gesellschaft as a whole and even believed the contrast Bonn-Paris fed into French 
feelings of superiority.91  That said, for all its peculiarities and apparent flaws, Bonn did 
exhibit certain advantages as a site, offering, probably more than any other German city, 
the opportunity to bring together numerous representatives of a wide variety of political 
and professional groupings.92   
 Though all these considerations were major determinants at times, probably the 
crucial long-term factor the German Atlanticists had to account for in locating their 
institutions was the relative merit of being near or far from the centers of political power, 
whether of a governmental, inter-governmental or non-g vernmental nature.  For some 
Atlanticists, a desirable geographic spread extending well beyond Bonn symbolically and 
substantively bolstered their independence from government as well as organizations like 
the respective party headquarters and “party-near” Stiftungen.93  Such arguments were 
nourished by experiences under the National Socialist regime, including the 
                                                
89 KB to Hans [Speidel], 28 March 1978, ACDP K145/1.  The original German, literally “how much I have 
suffered under Bonn [unter Bonn gelitten],” perhaps better conveys Birrenbach’s sense of oppression. 
90 The entire quote reads as follows: “I can never forget the slow decomposition of Berlin in the times of 
the National Socialist regime, its cultural background and its political and social life which I had so enjoyed 
before the 30th of January, 1933.  You cannot imagine how deep this date has changed my whole life.” (KB 
to John McCloy, 26 May 1976, ACDP K210/1).   
91 On the latter, see KB to Hans [Speidel], 28 March 1978, ACDP K145/1.   
92 For the DGAP’s successful efforts to attract new members in the “Raum Köln-Bonn” (including a large 
fraction that had approached the DGAP at their own initiative) and its increased contacts with members in 
this area, see the Minutes of the DGAP Member Assembly on 27 June 1962, ACDP K009/1.  
93 These considerations gained even more force during the early and mid-1970s with the construction of 
imposing party Zentralen in Bonn, namely the Konrad-Adenauer-Haus (CDU) and the Erich-Ollenhauer-
Haus (SPD).  Parteinahe Stiftungen in and around Bonn included the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (CDU), 
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (SPD) and the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FDP).   
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concentration and Gleichschaltung of foreign policy research institutions, as did exist, in 
Berlin.94  In contrast, Birrenbach and others tended to advocate positioning infrastructure 
in the capital, stressing the possibilities such proximity offered for extensive influence on 
or cooperation with the diverse bodies and personalities there, including government, 
bureaucracy, Bundestag and embassies.  While the location of the SWP was frequently 
criticized in these quarters, Birrenbach’s primary coup in this respect only came with his 
successful push in the late 1970s to shift the main headquarters of the Atlantik-Brücke to 
Bonn, where it joined, among others, the DGAP and the Königswinter Conferences 
(actually based in that suburb).95  Outside of Bonn, the lure of beneficial links with other 
institutions also played a role in determining the founding of the DEG in Düsseldorf, 
home of the British occupation government at the time; the seat of the AI in Paris, close 
to NATO and the OECD; and even the site of the SWP near the University of Munich.96  
After de Gaulle’s eviction of NATO from Paris in 1966, exhaustive debates ensued into 
                                                
94 This Gleichschaltung included the Hamburg-based Institut für Auswärtige Politik and the Berlin-based 
Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, the former of which was transferred to Berlin.  The founders of these 
generally liberal, democratic, bourgeois, pro-Weimar institutions were nearly all forced into emigration.   
95 Long before this shift, consummated in 1983, the Atlantik-Brücke already held member assemblies in 
Bonn.  The Institut für Europäische Politik und Wirtschaft, a precursor of the DGAP Research Institute 
founded in 1952, was initially based in Frankfurt in he erroneous belief that this city would become the 
future seat of government for the new state.  The res arch institute itself of the DGAP did not complete the 
move from Frankfurt to Bonn until Fall 1960, a conce tration of all DGAP organs in a single building 
offered to the Gesellschaft hat was also intended to enhance internal performance and save on rent 
(Minutes of the DGAP Member Assembly on 8 July 1959 in Bad Godesberg, ACDP K002/2).  The DGAP 
property in Bonn was located on the Adenauerallee, on the same street as and close to key buildings of the 
federal government, including the Bundeskanzleramt and the Foreign Ministry.   
96 The DEG was actually based in Düsseldorf-Wittlaer.  In a concession to federalism and localism, the 
DEG departed somewhat from a centralized structure through the existence of its Landesgruppen and 
Arbeitskreise.  Along with the DEG’s founding members as well as specifically co-opted members, the 
chairmen of these Landesgruppen and Arbeitskreise served on the DEG Beirat, which over the years 
included personalities like Wilhelm Beutler (Cologne), Christoph Freiherr von Imhoff (Cologne), 
Wolfgang Pohle (CSU, Düsseldorf), Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz (Bonn), Hans Stork (BDI, Frankfurt), and 
Friedrich Vogel (Düsseldorf).   
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the following Spring in Birrenbach’s AI Policy Committee regarding a possible transfer 
of the Institute, with Brussels of course considere a potential alternative.97  
 With this geographic spread, Birrenbach’s infrastructural activities took him far 
afield.  Between organizational meetings, conferences and other functions, he found 
himself traveling about Germany (especially Bonn, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, 
Munich and Berlin), the key capitals of Europe (especially Paris, Brussels and London), 
and the United States (especially Washington, DC, and New York City).98  In such 
locales, the Atlanticists came together not only on the premises of their own institutions 
but also at embassies, houses of parliament, conferenc  centers, hotels, restaurants, clubs 
and lounges, with the Bonn-Bad Godesberg area alone featuring the Bundeshaus, the 
Hotel Königshof, the Redoute and the Rheinhotel Dreesen.99  The spread of its magnet 
points also contributed to the infrastructure’s conscious integration of Atlanticists not 
only from a variety of widely dispersed countries but also from the diverse regions of the 
                                                
97 Amsterdam and Rome were also broached as possible locations, though the AI ultimately remained in 
Paris.  Opponents of an AI departure in 1966-67 included the Frenchman Jacques Rueff.  Factors militating 
against this and other such contemplated relocations included the paralysis of institutional activity for an 
extended period of time as well as prohibitive additional financial expenditures.  On the other hand, the 
NPC International Secretariat did move quite rapidly from Paris to Brussels.   
98 From their inception through the mid-1970s, the German-American Conferences (October 1959, 
February 1961, November 1962, November 1964, May 1967, January 1970, November 1971 and 
November 1974) were held in Bonn-Bad Godesberg, Berlin and Washington, DC.  During the period that 
Birrenbach attended them, the NPCs were generally he d in Paris, but also at times in Washington, DC 
(1959) and New York City (1965, though Birrenbach did not attend due to a board meeting).  Later on, as 
the North Atlantic Assembly, such conferences were held in a wider variety of locations, for instance 
during the first half of the 1970s in Ottawa (1971), Bonn (1972, with Birrenbach as an observer), Ankara 
(1973), London (1974) and Copenhagen (1975).  The Bilderberg Conferences did take Birrenbach to some 
unusual destinations, including Bürgenstock (Switzerland, 1960), Williamsburg (Virginia, 1964), 
Wiesbaden (West Germany, 1966), Cambridge (England, 1967), Mont Tremblant (Canada, 1968) and 
Knokke (Belgium, 1972).  Monnet Committee meetings generally occurred in one of the major western 
European capitals, though the committee held its 12th meeting on 8-9 May 1965 in Berlin in the Rathaus 
Schöneberg, with the final gathering in the meeting hall of the Bezirksverordnetenversammlung.   
99 Other sites included parliamentary houses like the Palais du Luxembourg (Paris) and the House of 
Commons (London), hotels like the Hotel Mayflower (Washington, DC), the Hotel Ritz (London) and the 
Hotel Palais d’Orsay (Paris), restaurants and clubs like the Cercle Interallié (Paris) and assorted venues like 
the Bâtiment Cortenberg (Brussels).  The KWCs were usually held at the Adam-Stegerwald-Haus, a 
conference center of the Christian trade unions that was later taken over by the CDU’s social committees.   
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FRG itself, for instance linking the Rhenish/Ruhr-based Birrenbach with distant clusters, 
whether in and around Hamburg, Munich, Berlin, Frankfurt or southwest Germany.100  A 
bevy of formal and informal activities sprang up on the periphery of the institutional 
framework proper, as participants and non-participants like attended social events like 
meals, parties and small gatherings in private homes.  Myriad factors influenced the 
choice of specific location for functions, from calulations of adequate space to the sheer 
pleasantness of the surroundings.101  However, the eagerness of many German 
Atlanticists to site conferences in the US, especially when there was a new 
administration, was largely attributable to the usef l opportunity afforded to engage 
figures of government, Congress and press in the context of these peripheral activities as 
well as in personal visits.  For Birrenbach, conferences themselves were often of 
subordinate importance to the external discussions they facilitated since, “[a]s a rule, 
more comes of bilateral talks.”102   
J. Other Characteristics 
The upshot of all this was the emergence during the 1950s and 1960s of a unique, 
well-developed, generally private Atlanticist infrastructure, both inside and outside the 
Federal Republic, in which Germans played a major role.  Atlanticist-inspired institutions 
comprised, among others, conferences, action committees and research institutes.  
Through their structures, composition, practices and rhetoric, these organizations were 
tailored to suit the Atlanticists’ often innovative, and Americanized, ideas regarding 
                                                
100 For example, important Hamburg Atlanticists with wom Birrenbach regularly interacted within the 
context of the infrastructure included Helmut Schmidt (SPD), Erik Blumenfeld (CDU MdB), Marion 
Dönhoff and Eric Warburg.   
101 Other considerations included suitable privacy, intimacy, accommodations, accessibility and 
transportation possibilities, as well as surrounding resources, such as libraries.   
102 KB to Kissinger, 11 July 1962, ACDP K159/2.  One disa vantage of staging such conferences in the US 
was the frequent distraction, and even absence for long stretches, of certain American participants, for 
instance congressmen rushing back to Washington, DC, to tend to pressing congressional business.   
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scholarly knowledge, inter-disciplinarity, non-partisanship and the like.  Key were the 
efforts, including in a socially turbulent postwar West Germany, to integrate previously 
disparate elements, whether professions (especially Wissenschaft and Politik), parties, 
religions, regions or nationalities, to mold a broadly anchored and coherent coalition of 
Atlanticists within and beyond the Federal Republic.  With their emphasis on problem-
solving through the flexible combination of elements (also including disciplines) to form 
new hybrids, rather than “merely” relying on those el ments already at hand, the 
Atlanticists represented “clever” actors as described through the ages in the ultimately 
neutral typologies of thinkers like Aristotle, Machiavelli and Pareto.  This heterogeneous 
infrastructure featured a largely harmonious and cooperative relationship between its 
components on both a domestic and international level as well as with a larger 
internationalist infrastructure thriving abroad.  Seeking to overcome the flaws inherent in 
existing institutions, the German Atlanticists saw it as essential to carve out their own 
space distinct, though not entirely separate, from the university and the government 
bureaucracy.  While a number of factors obstructed this endeavor, others facilitated it, 
including the support of foreigners (initially as occupiers), who warmly and rapidly 
welcomed German Atlanticist institutions into the Western international community.   
True, narrower loyalties persisted within this infrastructure.  Birrenbach and his 
fellow German Atlanticists viewed their organizations as significantly furthering the 
enlightened national interest and, at times, even th  aims of particular social groups, such 
as the Politik and the Wirtschaft.  Given its difficult postwar position and specifi 
conditions, the Federal Republic benefited mightily from the existence of a prestigious 
international framework in which broad trends, such as détente, could be accurately 
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gauged; knowledgeable, innovative and appropriate policies in crucial fields, like 
security, arms control and the Ostpolitik, developed; and fundamental German interests 
openly presented, sometimes in concert with other natio s, to the Western allies, all of 
which helped the Bundesrepublik attain a more influential, less subordinate role in the 
alliance.  As we shall see in Chapter 6, whether within the context of the Monnet 
Committee or elsewhere, Birrenbach strove, often in tandem with other like-minded 
Germans, to preserve the vital interests of the Federal Republic, at least as they 
interpreted them, as pertained to key issues like reunification.103  However, all this 
acknowledged, the infrastructure at the same time also manifested an incipient pan-
Atlantic identity, a newly awakened sense of simultaneously belonging to a larger order, 
surely of vast size and extraordinary complexity but nevertheless an intermediate 
attachment more tangible than that of, say, “the human race,” a civilization possessed of 
overarching political, economic, military, social and cultural interests, characteristics and 
values and, ultimately, a shared fate.  
Taken as a whole, the creators and members of the various institutions of the 
German Atlanticist infrastructure, often with similarly disposed groups abroad, 
entertained numerous motives that found expression in everything from their particular 
events and activities to their personnel decisions.  These inter-related functional 
objectives included the crystalization of opinion among participants; the provision of 
impulses to stir inherently inert governments into implementing necessary policies and 
undertaking crucial measures; the establishment (or, in some cases, reconstitution) and 
                                                
103 National loyalty still played some role in elections within the international Atlanticist institutions, for 
instance the bloc-vote delivered by Birrenbach and the Germans in Fall 1967 to their candidate, Graf 
Adelmann, for the NPC Secretary-Generalship, though Birrenbach also promised Lord Gladwyn (Britain) 
his subsequent support if Adelmann, as expected, did not reach the second round of voting (the Italian 
Count Sforza was the third candidate).   
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nurturing of close, constant personal contacts, an increasingly thick and binding web of 
social tissue, with like-minded fellows outside of the Bundesrepublik; the opening up on 
multiple levels of rapid, durable, multi-directional channels of trans-Atlantic 
communication and osmosis; the overcoming of historical animosities and the 
encouragement of peaceful reconciliation and mutual understanding between peoples, 
including conspicuously the improving of West German relations with the Anglo-Saxon 
nations, first among them the United States; and the modernization of foreign policy 
thought and methods and the acquisition of the knowledge required to reduce or eliminate 
the apparently gaping deficits existing in the Federal Republic with respect to new and 
central fields of contemporary international relations.104  Meanwhile, whatever their 
particular functions, the German Atlanticist institutions substantively served to promote a 
strengthening of the allegedly vital but seemingly chronically precarious and 
centrifugally troubled trans-Atlantic relationship and, specifically, the overall goal: a 
more outward-looking, Liberal notion of a broadly yet deeply integrated and evolving 
Atlantic Community transcending the inward-looking, Conservative Abendland 
perspective in the political culture of the Federal Republic.  
K. Contexts 
The precise impact of the German Atlanticist infrastructure on Birrenbach’s 
political activities will be explored in Chapter 6.  For now, we can acknowledge in a 
                                                
104 In November 1965, Birrenbach alluded to the crystallization of opinion when he attributed his 
unsurprising agreement with Erler to their repeated tr atment of the relevant topics over the years within 
the DGAP Study Group I (Birrenbach account of his talks after his America trip of Fall 1965, ACDP 
K117/1).  The desire for reconciliation was symbolized, for instance, at the 1962 Atlantic Convention by 
chairman Christian Herter placing a wreath, at German request, at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 
beneath the Arc de Triomphe.  The diligent efforts of the German Atlanticists to rectify at least what they 
perceived as rampant ignorance manifested themselves, for example, in the distribution of the 
chairmanships of the DGAP Study Groups I (SPD) and II (CDU), including Birrenbach’s chairmanship of 
the Study Group II, an arrangement intended in part to help the Union as a political party grouping to 
overcome its presumed shortcomings with respect to the Ostpolitik.  
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narrow sense the virtual impossibility of definitively gauging the exact role of these 
organizations in the individual policy decisions of states, while also admitting that 
particular Atlanticist recommendations were by no means immediately or even at all 
implemented by governments and other actors.105  Nevertheless, clear achievements did 
exist, with Birrenbach pointing, for instance, to the stimulus provided by the DGAP 
Study Group I to the April 1964 establishment of the office Abrüstungsbeauftragter, a 
notable expansion of the AA’s capabilities.  However, rather than such lone episodes, a 
better prima facie indicator of the infrastructure’s often subtle effects is the strenuous 
engagement, in whatever capacity and for no immediat  material gain, of committed 
individuals like Birrenbach, even when faced with busy schedules and limited time.  In 
their ambition to exercise direct and indirect influence from the vorpolitischen Raum on 
Willensbildung at the highest levels, such organizations focused th ir efforts, for example 
personal interventions and the transmitting of studies, on the competent public and, at 
times, private figures, both German and foreign, whether in governments, bureaucracies, 
legislatures, parties, international bodies (e.g. NATO, OECD, EEC), businesses or trade 
unions.  Their prescriptions thus achieved a presence in the Bundesrepublik in these 
institutions, where they were explicitly cited and discussed.106  Despite certain 
                                                
105 For instance, only in 1973 were the first steps taken that the Monnet Committee had already 
recommended in 1959 regarding the creation of a unified European currency reserves fund (the European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund), and even then the committee’s actual influence on these measures remains 
ambiguous.   
106 For example, thanks in part to the efforts of Birrenbach and others (e.g. Rainer Barzel (CDU), Helmut 
Schmidt (SPD), Wolfgang Mischnick (FDP)), the Bundestag overwhelmingly approved on 2 April 1968 the 
Monnet Committee’s resolutions of 15 June 1967 and a motion of all three Fraktionen that the government 
take into account the resolutions in its policies.  This process also included an address by Monnet on these 
resolutions to a session of the Bundestag on 13 October 1967.  The Monnet Committee resolutions of 15 
June 1967 were also submitted for approval around this time to the other parliaments of each of the Six.  
For Birrenbach’s attempts to persuade certain doubtful MdBs, in this case Siegfried Balke (CSU), who 
objected to several of the proposals as vague and unrealistic in the current situation of Europe and the 
Federal Republic, see Balke to KB, 5 February 1968, ACDP K052/2, and KB to Balke, 9 February 1968, 
ACDP K052/2.  This overall procedure was based on the precedent of March 1956 in the Europe of the Six, 
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complaints, Birrenbach and other Atlanticists were generally proud of the effectiveness, 
quality and even international recognition attained by the infrastructure, its personnel and 
products.107  All this suggests that the Atlanticists had forged a valuable instrument for 
promoting their cause, one bestowing a considerable advantage over competing 
conceptions of international affairs.   
As already alluded to, the Atlanticist project reprsented an important symbiotic 
element in regard to a number of overarching trends i  West German society and the 
surrounding world.  It was facilitated by but also functioned as a catalyst vis-à-vis related 
phenomena like Americanization, Liberalization, thepostwar re-construction and 
flowering of civil society, and the spread of Wissenschaft and social science as tools in 
the reshaping of many spheres of human life.  In contrast to the Occidentalists, who saw 
such a citizens participation in realms like international affairs as at best undesirable and 
even harmful, the German Atlanticists, expressing a different form of anti-statism unique 
to themselves, saw their institutions existing in amutually essential relationship with 
democracy.  The Atlanticist infrastructure was also closely linked in the field of foreign 
                                                                                                                                      
when the Bundestag had approved the Monnet Committee’s declaration of 18 January 1956 on EURATOM 
thanks to a joint resolution of the CDU/CSU, SPD, GB/BHE, DP and DA Fraktionen.  Birrenbach also 
argued that the BKA and high-ranking personalities in the AA carefully read and discussed the studies 
produced by the SWP (KB to MdB Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU), 28 July 1970, ACDP K023/2).  For an 
instance of the federal government itself acknowledging that it considered in its decision-making the work 
results of the DGAP Study Groups, see the Planning Staff Note Pl-18/65 of 1 February 1965, ACDP 
K149/1.     
107 Birrenbach’s admiration for Monnet and his action c mmittee as of 1969 was reflected in his description 
of the Monnet Committee as “the political conscience of the Europe which we desire” (KB to Hellmuth 
Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1) and his conviction that its activity was “of great importance.  It is 
the only recognized forum that, in the hour of confusion, holds high the flag of the sole European policy 
which has a prospect ofpacification [Befriedung] of the continent.” (KB to Fritz Berg, 13 March 196 , 
ACDP K126/1).  To cite another example, Birrenbach considered Uwe Nerlich (SWP) “an excellent man 
with very much imagination and obviously a very careful analyst.” (KB to Prof. Klaus Ritter, 20 August 
1979, ACDP K200/2).  For Henle’s belief that the DGAP, though still quite distant from its institutional 
goals, was making encouraging progress, see the Minutes of the DGAP Member Assembly on 27 June 
1962, ACDP K009/1.  For the DGAP still lacking in wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeitern as of late 1962 but 
also for its confidence from an early point that its Study Group I was gradually growing into “the 
Gesprächspartner” for the American institutes, see the Minutes of the Meeting of the DGAP Präsidium on 
19 December 1962, ACDP K010/2.   
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affairs to the popular concept of an “end of ideology,” insofar as it helped overcome 
notions of Abendland, especially in the Union, and played a substantial role in the 
jettisoning of the SPD’s Marxist heritage, as signified by the Godesberg Program of 
1959, all in favor of something of a Liberal Atlanticist ideological consensus across 
parties.108  Finally, there was an intimate connection with the building, in some instances 
rebuilding, of elite, trans-national Atlanticist networks on myriad planes and in diverse 
fields in an increasingly interwoven world.  Indeed, the Atlanticist infrastructure existed 
within the context not only of numerous governmental and inter-governmental bodies in 
which Germans as well took part, among them the Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(Strasbourg), the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly, but also of a multitude of 
other, non-governmental infrastructures and institutions, for instance the economic 
research institutes and the international professional rganizations devoted to politicians, 
businessmen, trade unionists, Wissenschaftler and so forth.109 
L. Conclusion 
Birrenbach’s role within the German Atlanticist infrastructure was a significant 
and multi-faceted one.  True, he was not an original institutional conceptualizer and 
rather embraced the visions of Wegweisern like Arnold Bergstraesser, Jean Monnet and 
                                                
108 Even in later years, Birrenbach praised Herbert Wehner for his work in the Bundestag and his great 
services to the Federal Republic, including his contribution in bringing about the “decisive turn 
[entscheidende Wende]” leading to the Godesberg Program that henceforth f rmed the basis of the SPD 
Politik (KB to Wehner, 4 March 1983, ACDP K120/3).   
109 For a contemporary Liberal account of some of these trends, see Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and 
Democracy in Germany (New York: Norton, 1967).  German economic research institutes included the 
Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung i  West Berlin, led from 1945-68 by its president, and 
Birrenbach’s acquaintance, Ferdinand Friedensburg.  With respect to international professional 
organizations, one can point for instance to the Int r-Parliamentary Union, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (as well as bilateral chambers of commerce), th  International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (in addition to the DGB’s own Hauptabteilung Ausland) and the International Political Science 
Association.  Birrenbach attended a conference of the IPU in Warsaw in 1959 and was a member of the 
Anglo-German Parliamentary Group, which was one of the groups within the IPU framework and which, 
among other things, held the Wilton Park Conferences several times a year at Wiston House in Britain 
(Steyning, Sussex).    
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Theodor Steltzer.  Nevertheless, even disregarding for the moment his indispensable 
financing activity (addressed in Chapter 5), Birrenbach was deeply involved “mit Rat und 
Tat” in the infrastructure’s emergence and development as a creator, organizer, officer, 
gatekeeper, member, participant, speaker, promoter and consultant.  He repeatedly 
pointed to such roles, as well as his relationships with personalities like his “old friend 
Monnet,” as a badge of his Atlanticist credentials.  With his vast experience and sterling 
international reputation in this regard, a willing Birrenbach was also very much sought 
out over the years for advice and support and as a prestigious reference by others engaged 
in institution-building, Atlanticist or otherwise.  His extended periods in such capacities 
testifies to the potential, and often real, personnel continuities of such organizations, 
while also highlighting the possible risks posed by a deleterious uniformity and 
conformist “group-think.”  In no small part, Birrenbach serves as an exemplary subject of 
inquiry insofar as he was crucial to the institutionalization of Atlanticism, in some sense a 
“bottom-up” phenomenon that nevertheless proved central to the integration of a German 
Atlanticist elite, to that elite’s integration, in turn, into a larger multi-national Atlanticist 
elite and to the particular form of the initially isolated Federal Republic’s far-reaching 
reacceptance into the Western international community.  Ultimately, the Atlanticist 
infrastructure became a successful feature of the multi-tiered trans-Atlantic fabric, a 
crucial matrix within which Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists functioned and an 
essential element in the post-1945 evolution of German Atlanticism. 
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Chapter 5: Financing the Atlanticist Infrastructure 
 
A. Introduction 
The proper maintaining and functioning of the Atlanicist infrastructure that we 
have described in the previous chapter, one that essentially consisted of non-profit 
organizations, required a certain amount of financil wherewithal.  Funding was needed 
to pay for expenses incurred, whether they be with respect to staff, equipment, premises, 
meetings, travel, administration, research or any of the other necessities and activities 
engaged in within the context of this infrastructure.1  To some extent, such financing 
could be internally generated, with organizations like the Atlantik-Brücke and the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik producing a not inconsiderable share of 
their funds from the sale of their own publications.  However, external financing always 
remained predominant and critical.  Not surprisingly, outside West German sources 
played a crucial role in funding those Atlanticist institutions based in the Federal 
Republic.  However, such German financing was also vital to those organizations located 
abroad in which the German Atlanticists also took part, such as the Monnet Committee, 
the Atlantic Institute and the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.  Among those 
Germans heavily involved in these financing activities, Birrenbach was, without question, 
one of the most important.  Indeed, in exploring the t eme of financing in this chapter, 
primarily of the external kind, we are at the same ti e examining the sphere in which 
                                                
1 Some illustrative examples: the NATO Parliamentarians Conference projected a budget for financial year
1961 of 550,000 new French francs (Draft Budget for he Financial Year 1961, ACDP 055/1).  As of 
September 1964, the estimated minimum budget of the A lantic Institute was about $350,000, while actual 
expenditures in 1971 amounted to approximately $500,000.  The budget estimate for the Monnet 
Committee for the two-year period from 1966-68 came to 720,000 nfrs (KB Memorandum, 12 July 1966, 
ACDP 050/2).   
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Birrenbach arguably exercised his most indispensable function with regard to the 
Atlanticist infrastructure. 
B. Birrenbach and the German Sources of Financing 
The German sources of financing for the Atlanticist infrastructure were numerous 
and varied from institution to institution.  Birrenbach played his key role to a large degree 
as a link between the infrastructure and these sources.  Such sources included the major 
political parties represented in the Bundestag.  While the funds provided by any one of 
these political parties were rather small individually, when taken together with financing 
from other parties and sources, they did form a significant component of the funding for 
the eminent Monnet Committee.2  Within this committee, Birrenbach, almost 
immediately upon his entry, became the unofficial contact man to the Union regarding 
such financial matters.3  Henceforth, in what became something of an annual rit l, 
Birrenbach duly received the requests from Ludwig Rosenberg, the head of the Monnet 
Committee’s administration committee, for payment from the CDU and ensured that 
these funds were forthcoming, an occasionally difficult process sometimes entailing 
delay, confusion and controversy.4  Another relatively secondary German source of 
funding, at least when observed in the context of the overall infrastructure, were the labor 
unions, especially the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund.  For instance, the DGB annually 
made a quite modest, one is tempted to say nominal, contribution to the Atlantic Institute 
and, like the political parties, a rather small payment to the Monnet Committee, though, 
                                                
2 The contribution of the CDU for 1967 amounted to FF 13,500 (Undated letter of Ludwig Rosenberg to 
KB, ACDP K052/2.  Special contributions were also requested in this letter beyond the annual contribution. 
3 Birrenbach, almost necessarily, assumed this role during the period between Heinrich von Brentano’s 
departure from the committee in 1961, virtually conmitant with Birrenbach’s entrance, and Rainer 
Barzel’s entry into that same body years later.   
4 This was the case, for example, in 1961-62 and 1968, though successfully resolved in each instance by 
Birrenbach. 
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like that provided by the political parties, one supplemented at times by additional 
“special” contributions and ultimately essential for the functioning of that organization.  
Thanks to his close contacts with Rosenberg and others in the trade union movement, 
Birrenbach took on the task, especially initially and successfully with respect to the 
Atlantic Institute, of encouraging and persuading the DGB in this regard.5   
However, whatever their crucial role in financing particular institutions, the 
aggregate contributions made by the German political parties and labor unions to the 
Atlanticist infrastructure paled in comparison to th se provided by several other sources.  
One such major source in funding German Atlanticist organizations and activities was the 
state.  Again, the proportion of such public financing varied from institution to institution.  
An entity such as the Monnet Committee explicitly eschewed any government funding.  
At the other extreme, an institution like the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik was 
financed exclusively and quite substantially by the Bund, a mode virtually inevitable 
insofar as this organization worked on confidential projects primarily in the service of the 
federal government.  Far more common, however, wereinstances where government 
provided a partial financing.  For example, while primarily funded through private 
means, the Atlantic Institute also received a certain percentage of its budget from the 
various governments, including an annual contribution from the West German federal 
government that, during the first half of the 1960s, amounted to approximately $5,000.6  
The German government also financially supported indiv dual activities and projects such 
as the conferences and publications of organizations l ke the Atlantik-Brücke, the 
                                                
5 Walter Stahl to KB, 30 January 1962, ACDP K007/1. 
6 Walter Stahl to KB, 14 May 1962, ACDP K108/2.  During the 1960s, the annual contributions from all 
governments made up about 15% of the estimated yearly AI budgets.  See, for example, the Protocol of the 
Atlantica e.V. Annual Assembly on 19 June 1963 in Cologne, ACDP K108/2. 
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Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft nd the Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik.7  
In many cases (though not that of the SWP), these wer seemingly modest but often 
essential sums, therefore ostensibly adhering to yet also somewhat undermining the 
claims of the Atlanticist infrastructure to be composed of strictly private organizations 
independent of government.  To the extent that suchfinancing of the Atlanticist 
infrastructure occurred during the Chancellorship of K nrad Adenauer, we can even see 
elements of the federal government working at cross-purposes with one another. 
With respect to the federal government, Birrenbach played a pivotal role in the 
initial securing of financial contributions to various Atlanticist organizations and projects.  
Thereafter, he regularly reminded and nudged the gov rnment to follow through 
promptly on its promised funding assistance and, at times, even to make extraordinary 
expenditures.  The key departments that Birrenbach h d to deal with in this regard were 
the Auswärtige Amt, the Bundesfinanzministerium and the Bundespresseamt, in each of 
which he consistently enjoyed good connections to the relevant ministers and Beamten.  
As an example of Birrenbach’s numerous efforts, we can cite his part during 1960-61 in 
arranging the government financing for the Atlantic Institute.  Here, Birrenbach contacted 
Finance Minister Franz Etzel and his State Secretary K l Hettlage, who in turn 
approached Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, thus leading eventually to 
Brentano’s agreement in December 1960 to a government contribution of the 
aforementioned $5,000 a year for five years.  In support of Lilo Milchsack (the 
                                                
7 Of note here is the governmental support for the German-American Conferences (Atlantik-Brücke) and 
the Königswinter Conferences (Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft) as well as for the publications of the 
Atlantik-Brücke and the DGAP.  For instance, the Auswärtige Amt paid for the total expenses that had been 
incurred for the 1966 Königswinter Conference, which had been ultimately cancelled due to British 
parliamentary elections.  As of October 1965, the Atlantik-Brücke had received DM 20,000 from the 
Auswärtigen Amt, with the approval of Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, for the upcoming German-
American Conference and was requesting an increase to DM 30,000.  The Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
auswärtige Politik was financed by the Bund particularly with respect to its documentation projects. 
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Geschäftsführenden Vorsitzenden of the Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft) and in contact 
with officials in the Auswärtigem Amt (especially a Dr. Koch), Birrenbach succeeded in 
bringing the Foreign Office to cover the entire cost f the 1966 Königswinter Conference, 
which had been cancelled due to the British parliamentary elections.  Earlier, in October 
1964, Birrenbach was prodding Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to ensure that the federal 
government furnished a larger sum as its contribution to the German collection for the 
Kennedy Memorial Library in Boston, Massachusetts, and to dissuade the government 
from its plan to distribute that sum over an extended period of ten years (see Chapter 7).8      
Among Birrenbach’s most significant undertakings vi-à-vis the government with 
respect to financing, and certainly the most prolonged discrete effort, was that in support 
of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.  Here, securing the requisite funding entailed in 
part an indirect approach, as Birrenbach, in his capa ity as representative of the Union 
Bundestagsfraktion on the SWP Stiftungsrat, lobbied that Fraktion, especially members 
of the parliamentary budget committee as well as the foreign affairs and defense 
committees, on behalf of the SWP and its “gravamina.”9  In cooperation with other SWP 
proponents, Birrenbach also took a more direct tact and repeatedly petitioned what 
appeared to him an often unsympathetic government, including at the cabinet level, in the 
hopes of utilizing his connections in this area to overcome the hurdles confronting the 
SWP, not least the bureaucratic stand-off existing between the Finance Ministry and 
other departments, such as the Auswärtigen Amt.  Already by September 1962, 
Birrenbach had contacted Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder in this matter and, over the 
next years, kept him as well as Finance Minister Rolf Dahlgrün, Research Minister 
                                                
8 KB to Erhard, 29 October 1964, ACDP K052/1. 
9 In his efforts within the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Birrenbach was especially assisted by its chairman, R iner 
Barzel.  See, for instance, KB to Barzel, 14 September 1967, ACDP K149/2.   
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Gerhard Stoltenberg and several relevant Beamte apprised of the SWP’s status, urged 
them to forestall budget cuts, and generally strove t  combat “an overly strong 
Fiskalisierung” and “to reduce somewhat the staatlichen brakes that are to be imposed on 
this organization.”10  While eliciting some positive indications and responses, Birrenbach 
lamented in April 1966 his seemingly interminable efforts: “I must openly confess… that 
I recall few projects in life that have been so arduous as this.  Political and menschliche 
questions appear to have played a role here.  However, I would say that the bureaucratic 
action of the finance ministry has been and still is the largest obstacle.”11  The upshot was 
a rather extended and frustrating case, dragging on thr ugh much of the 1960s, of 
Birrenbach’s, on the whole successful, endeavors to ob ain funding from the state for the 
construction and functioning of Atlanticist infrastructure.   
 Another key German source for the financing of the Atlanticist infrastructure was 
the Wirtschaft.  The centrality of funding from this sector was particularly evident with 
respect to organizations like the D utsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, he 
Atlantic Institute, the Atlantik-Brücke and the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft.12  Indeed, 
we can assert with confidence that money flowing from the Wirtschaft was more crucial 
to more of the Atlanticist institutions under consideration here than that emanating from 
any other single source.  Such financial support, originating from individual firms or 
                                                
10 Birrenbach acted largely on the basis of information and papers provided to him by the institute’s 
director, Dr. Klaus Ritter.  On the primary threats posed by and Birrenbach’s current efforts vis-à-vis the 
Finance Minister to defend against “an overly strong Fiskalisierung” and “the staatlichen brakes,” see KB 
to Hajo Holborn, 3 January 1964, ACDP K098/1.   
11 KB to Ministerial Director Herbert Müller-Roschach, 18 April 1966, ACDP K017/1.  It might also be 
worth revisiting the continuation of this quote, alre dy cited in Chapter 4: “What has happened here can 
probably only be explained through it that, seen as a whole, the German Politik still has not found a correct 
relationship to the Wissenschaft.  That… is however not new, rather is characteristic for the past hundred 
years.”   
12 For example, the private German contribution to the Atlantic Institute as of September 1964 amounted to 
approximately $26,000 per year (Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim to Dr. Wolfgang Pohle, Flick KG, 
Düsseldorf, 16 September 1964, ACDP K108/2).   
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from the Spitzenorganizationen of the West German Wirtschaft, including the Cologne-
based Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, often assumed the form of periodic 
donations, membership dues and special contributions f r specific projects and activities.  
Rooted in fields like industry, banking, transportation and insurance, the firms in question 
tended to be internationally-minded, typically export oriented and especially interested in 
maintaining close international relations and a free t affic in trade and services within the 
trans-Atlantic realm.13  In no small part due to Birrenbach’s urging, the Thyssen group, 
which also saw itself potentially reaping considerable material benefits (including with 
respect to the United States) through such a program, was among the regular and 
substantial contributors of the Wirtschaft to the institutions of the Atlanticist 
infrastructure.14  Indeed, the prominent engagement of the West German Wirtschaft in the 
financing of the Atlanticist infrastructure reflectd striking, broader post-World War II 
and Cold War trends, namely the integration of the Federal Republic into the Atlantic, 
and even world, economy and, within the Wirtschaft itself, the rejection of notions of a 
                                                
13 For the Deutsche Bank AG (Frankfurt) making a special contribution of DM 10,0 0 to the Atlantica to 
help finance an Atlantic Institute study on Latin America (see Chapter 8), for the bank’s expectation that 
this study would also be of interest to other large German firms active in the South American market, and
for the bank’s desire, therefore, that several of these firms also be approached to assist in funding 
specifically this project, see Wilfried Guth to Walter Stahl, 16 July 1971, ACDP K106/1.  
14 At Birrenbach’s suggestion, the August-Thyssen-Hütte AG (Duisburg) became a member of both the 
Atlantik-Brücke and the Atlantica (intimately linked to the Atlantic Institute; see later in this chapter), to the 
tune of DM 5,000 annually to each.  Meanwhile, the T yssen Röhrenwerke AG (Düsseldorf) and the 
Handelsunion AG (Düsseldorf) annually transferred sums of up to DM 3,000 to those organizations as well.  
On this theme, see Dr. Horst Keller (ATH) to KB, 1 August 1966, ACDP K108/2.  While the ATH was 
thus one of the largest contributors to the AB and the Atlantica, such amounts do not appear to have been 
far out of line with those provided by other individual firms, with members of the Atlantik-Brücke, for 
instance, usually giving from DM 3,000-5,000 per year, although financing from the BDI could, in certain 
instances, be considerably higher.  Within the same sphere of activity, Birrenbach was also central in 
responding to a plea from James Huntley (then Executive Secretary of the AI Provisional Committee) in 
October 1960, securing $500 from the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen (Düsseldorf) to help tide the Atlantic 
Institute over during its provisional period, which had had to be extended due to the postponement of a 
major decision of the Ford Foundation.   
 175
European Third Way, including those of an bendländischen character, and the general 
acceptance of a pragmatic, pro-American, Atlanticist outlook.15   
Given the dependence of many Atlanticist organizations on the Wirtschaft for 
financial support, recruiting new members and canvassing for donations from this sector, 
whether for the overall budget or specific projects, represented a major priority.  With his 
knowledge of the business landscape, particularly of the Rhenish-Ruhr Wirtschaft and the 
Montanindustrie, Birrenbach played an essential role in identifying those firms and 
organizations, along with the individuals within them, to whom it was most suitable to 
make recruiting pitches and to request contributions, as well as in personally approaching 
them in these matters.16  Furthermore, thanks to his numerous friendships and 
connections abroad, Birrenbach could attract prominent international figures, including 
Americans, to attend recruiting functions, always a factor in impressing potential 
members and donors.  While Birrenbach may have beenespecially inclined and equipped 
to undertake all this, he was definitely not alone, rather other Atlanticist-minded Germans 
like the Klöckner chief Günter Henle and the Cologne banker Friedrich Carl Freiherr von 
Oppenheim also vigorously raised funds for their infrastructure.17  Indispensable in 
helping Birrenbach collect money from the broader Wi tschaft were his close contacts 
with particular personalities working in other economic branches and geographic regions, 
                                                
15 On these trends within West German business, see Volker Berghahn, The Americanisation of West 
German Industry, 1945-1973 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Volker Berghahn, ed.,  
Quest for Economic Empire: European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century 
(Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996).  For the BDI’s view in September 1959 that all promising endeavors 
aimed at the fostering [“Förderung”]  of the idea of an Atlantic Völkergemeinschaft (“which should in no 
way only be limited to NATO members”) deserved to be supported, especially at a time in which the 
danger was emerging in Europe of the formation of wirtschaftspolitischen blocs, see Dr. Beutler, BDI, the 
Geschäftsführende Präsidialmitglied, Cologne, to KB, 26 September 1959, ACDP K002/2.   
16 As an example of some aspects of this process, see Walt r Stahl to KB, 19 July 1971, ACDP K106/1.   
17 Henle’s activities focused on financing the DGAP, of which he was a co-founder and the first president 
(1955-73).  Among his other positions, Oppenheim was chairman of the AI Finance Committee, which 
supervised the budget and fund-raising campaigns of the Atlantic Institute.   
 176
for example Hermann Josef Abs of the D utschen Bank in Frankfurt, as well as with the 
economic Spitzenorganizationen, including key figures at the BDI such as Fritz Berg, 
Gustav Stein and Hellmuth Wagner.18  Thus, Birrenbach molded and functioned within a 
financing network that itself consisted of several interlinked sub-networks.  Even if all of 
this had been its only mode of operation, the private financing of the Wirtschaft would 
already have been an essential ingredient in the creation and survival of the infrastructure, 
at least as the relatively independent entity conceived of by the German Atlanticists.19   
C. The Flourishing of the Private Stiftung: Framework Conditions 
However, in addition to the funds that flowed directly from individual firms and 
from the Spitzenorganizationen, the West German Wirtschaft also made a major 
contribution to the financing of the Atlanticist infrastructure and activities through an 
institution that experienced a sudden, rapid development in the Federal Republic: the 
private, philanthropic Stiftung.  The remarkable languishing of this institution in 
Germany over the previous decades can be traced, to some extent, to factors specifically 
impacting on that nation in its recent past, especially the economic upheaval during the 
Weimar Republic and the coercive measures of the totalitarian National Socialist regime 
directed at virtually all such private initiative that might have emerged from the 
Wirtschaft, the Wissenschaft and, indeed, the entire Gesellschaft as a whole.  Observing 
the situation from a somewhat broader temporal and spatial perspective, we can readily 
discern that the stagnation in the development of the German Stiftungen simultaneously 
                                                
18 See, for instance, Walter Stahl to KB, 14 May 1962, ACDP K108/2.  Fritz Berg was president of the 
BDI (1949-71), while Prof. Gustav Stein and Hellmuth Wagner, among their other roles, successively 
occupied the position of Hauptgeschäftsführer.  For Birrenbach’s reference to Wagner as the “chief whip” 
for industry, see KB to Wagner, 14 June 1965, ACDP K052/1. 
19 The significance of funding from the Wirtschaft is attested to, for instance, in the suddenly precarious 
financial situation of the Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft er the BDI in 1959 halved its previous annual 
support of DM 20,000, thus increasing the importance of the contribution of individual firms.    
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formed part of a more widespread and deep-seated weakness with respect to private 
initiative in the field of philanthropy that had historically characterized the European 
continent, certainly in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon countries.  This particular quality 
was primarily due to, or at least complemented by, the traditionally expansive role 
assigned to the state over the centuries in Germany and the rest of continental Europe, 
where the promotion of the sciences, arts and welfare h d been considered principally the 
responsibility of government and the churches.  Consequently, even as of the mid- to late-
1950s, private Stiftungen in the Federal Republic continued to face legal, tax-related 
(“steuerpolitischen”) and psychological obstacles, and the total financi l means available 
from them was correspondingly limited.20   
Nevertheless, whatever the lack of historical preced nts, there also existed an 
environment in the Federal Republic by the late 1950s that increasingly favored the 
founding of Stiftungen.  During the 1950s, more and more stress was being placed by 
politicians and the public on the political, economic and social importance of the 
Wissenschaft, an emphasis initially connected most directly with the desire for economic 
recovery.  However, this particular linkage found itself supplemented to great effect in 
the latter half of the 1950s, with the first international thaw in the East-West 
confrontation occurring around the middle of the decade but then especially after the 
“Sputnik shock” of October 1957.  Henceforth, the promotion of the Wissenschaft also 
came to be seen as a vital desideratum in a situation whose upshot was now expected to 
be not an imminent hot war but rather a prolonged, drawn-out cold war with the Soviet 
Union and communism, in which technology, economy and culture would ultimately play 
                                                
20 On these obstacles, see the Report about the Efforts of the WIPOG for a Mobilization of the Stiftung 
Initiatives, Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, Frankfurt am Main, ACDP K015.    
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a more decisive role than short-term military means.  I  this context, many considered the 
public expenditures in the Federal Republic devoted to the fostering of the Wissenschaft 
too paltry, especially in comparison to those allotted in the United States and other 
western industrial countries as well as in the Soviet Union.  Accordingly, the absolute 
necessity of remedying these deficits in the Wissenschaft and in its promotion became a 
commonplace in the Bundesrepublik during this period.  Finally, the Wirtschaftswunder 
and the accompanying prosperity and wealth contributed substantially to the willingness 
to establish Stiftungen in West Germany. 
During the 1950s, private philanthropy was certainly not unknown to the Thyssen 
firm.  Indeed, the concern had been donating several hundred thousand marks each year 
to a variety of charitable causes and research endeavors.  From within the firm, 
Birrenbach himself, as a man of industry well acclimated to the far-reaching benefits of 
technical research, advocated the support of the Wissenschaft, and considerable sums 
were transferred for such purposes to the Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft 
(which essentially functioned as the “clearing place” for the funds flowing from the 
private Wirtschaft to the Wissenschaft) and to the respective Betriebsgesellschaften.21  
Furthermore, the Thyssen concern financed its own research institutions, admittedly 
focused rather narrowly on the enterprise’s primary area of self-interest, namely the 
problems and issues confronting the coal and steel industry.  Meanwhile, at the beginning 
of 1958, Birrenbach’s Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen (Düsseldorf), together with its sister 
company, the Fritz Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung AG (Cologne), had set up a Stiftungs- 
fund to finance research into questions regarding the law of the Montanunion and the 
                                                
21 On the Stifterverband, see Winfried Schulze, Der Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, 1920-
1995 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).   
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European Economic Community.  Thus, Birrenbach and the Thyssen firm, already by the 
end of the 1950s, had something of a tradition of pr moting the Wissenschaft.22   
D. Founding the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung 
It was in this gradually more hospitable and moderately encouraging 
environment, both on an overall societal level as well as within the Thyssen concern 
itself, that the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung was established on 7 July 1959 with its seat in 
Cologne.  Parallel to his other activities with resp ct to Thyssen donations for the benefit 
of the Wissenschaft, Birrenbach had been advocating such an ambitious undertaking from 
quite an early point in his Thyssen career.  In fact, he had espoused the idea of founding a 
Stiftung almost immediately after taking over the management of Thyssen assets 
[“ Vermögen”], indeed had openly done so in the very first meeting he had chaired of the 
Aufsichtsrat of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen, in 1954.  Birrenbach had been 
encouraged in these efforts by a number of factors.  In harmony with the broader 
atmosphere in the Bundesrepublik that we have already discussed, he was convinced that 
the promotion of the Wissenschaft had to be granted one of the highest priorities if the 
Germans hoped to keep pace in this regard with the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviet 
Union.23  Along with Robert Ellscheid, he also believed that even a private entity like the 
Thyssen Vermögen was of such a magnitude that it was virtually compelled by its nature 
to assume something of a public function.  Particularly if such a massive fortune had been 
                                                
22 According to Birrenbach, his firm in 1957, to take just one year, had transferred DM 37,000 to the 
Stifterverband, and several times this sum had been raised for the same purpose by the 
Betriebsgesellschaften, in which his company (including the August-Thyssen-Hütte, Deutsche 
Edelstahlwerke, Niederrheinische Hütte and Handelsunion) substantially took part (KB to Fritz Steinhoff, 
Minister-President (NRW), 6 February 1958, ACDP K170/1).  On the necessity of a tight cooperation 
between Wissenschaft, research and industry to enable the further development of the Sozialstaat hat had 
been constructed in the Federal Republic after the war, see KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 27 
July 1972, ACDP K080/1.     
23 KB to Fritz Steinhoff, Minister-President (NRW), 6 February 1958, ACDP K170/1. 
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simply inherited, Birrenbach considered it only correct and “decent [anständig]” to make 
a large part of it available to serve the interests of the general public, for instance through 
means of a private foundation.  Perhaps also from a public relations standpoint, always 
prominent in his consciousness, Birrenbach viewed th  Thyssen Stiftung as proof that 
opposition to a planned or socialist economy did not necessarily entail a fundamental 
denial of the obligations of the “Großbesitz” towards the wider society around it.24 
Like the explicitly Atlanticist infrastructure that we have previously examined in 
Chapter 4, the founding during this period of private Stiftungen, including the Fritz 
Thyssen Stiftung, and their forms owed a great deal to American (and, to a lesser extent, 
British) inspiration.  Already since many decades, the holders of sizeable private fortunes 
in the United States had taken steps to make all or part of their incomes available for the 
benefit of the general public through the funding of the Wissenschaft as well as of diverse 
cultural and charitable endeavors.  American foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, 
served as a stimulus and as archetypes for their soon-to-be and newly established German 
counterparts, a process sometimes facilitated by firsthand experience, including that of 
returned exiles, along with actual assistance from the American foundations themselves.  
For some Germans, the construction of Sti tungen was also seen as a means of keenly 
professing their support for and of arousing sympathies in the United States.  Though no 
evidence exists that this latter consideration influenced Birrenbach, he was well aware of 
the lack of German Vorbilder and did look across the Atlantic to American foundations in 
                                                
24 On the obligations of the Großbesitz, see KB to Dr. Friedrich Kobrak, 22 July 1960, ACDP K047/2.   
For Birrenbach on the potential public relations rewards of a Stiftung, here specifically with reference to the 
reputation of Krupp, see KB to Generaldirektor Hans L. Merkle, Robert Bosch GmbH, 6 October 1967, 
ACDP, K019/1.  Of course, such public relations pers ctives took into account the association in the 
public mind between firms like Thyssen and Krupp, on one hand, and militarism and National Socialism, 
on the other.  
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his search for appropriate models and in assessing the proper role and the achievements 
of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and other European foundations.25  It was also explicitly 
from American conceptions that Birrenbach derived his ideas about 
“Witwenkapitalismus” and the responsibilities and need for a legitimation of the 
inheritors of such immense fortunes.26  While the notion of large Stiftungen based on the 
American pattern, of what was sometimes referred to as a “Stiftungskapitalismus,” was 
not universally beloved in the Federal Republic, even in industrial and banking circles, 
the increasing propagation of foundations like the Thyssen Stiftung appears to be yet 
another manifestation of the ongoing “Americanization of West German industry.”27 
Central to Birrenbach’s understanding, the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung was a distinctly 
private undertaking, an independent institution existing alongside but separate from the 
traditional instruments wielded by the state in the system of Wissenschaftsförderung in
West Germany.  In guiding principle and in practice, th  Stiftung would limit its activity 
insofar as it would eschew responsibilities that should be fulfilled by the state.  Despite 
the “universal presence of public institutions” and its quantitatively superior financing 
resources, the state remained incapable of fostering the Wissenschaft alone, and therefore 
the private Wirtschaft, in this case a foundation the size of the T yssen Stiftung, could 
                                                
25 For Birrenbach on relevant conditions in the United States, see his address at the 10th Ordentlichen 
Hauptversammlung of the August-Thyssen-Hütte at the Mercatorhalle in Duisburg on 17 April 1964, 
ACDP K077/3.  Supporting a proposal of the Fondation Royaumont (Paris), Birrenbach also argued 
elsewhere in favor of the establishment of a new type of foundation in Europe along the lines of (with the 
requisite modifications) the American Community Trusts that would enable active foundations to secure 
substantial financial assistance.  
26 Birrenbach shared his thoughts about the so-called Witwenkapitalismus at the first meeting he chaired of 
the Aufsichtsrat of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen, in 1954.  On this meeting, see Birrenbach’s speech 
upon receiving the Harnack Medal, 26 June 1981, ACDP K141/2. 
27 For Birrenbach on the necessity of a close relationship between Wissenschaft and Wirtschaft, and on the 
especially tight bond existing between these two factors in the United States (despite the setback this 
linkage had suffered in the last five years, due in part to the “Vietnam trauma”), see KB to Prof. Dr.Adolf 
Butenandt, Munich, 27 July 1972, ACDP K080/1.   
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and, indeed, had to play a vital and unique role in this realm.28  Here, the FTS focused on 
those tasks that could not be, or at least were not being, properly assumed by the state.  
Beyond acting as a simple stopgap regarding the deficits in state financing, the Thyssen 
Stiftung also developed and stimulated vital initiatives on its own with respect to 
particular research programs; encouraged the uniting of the confusing multitude of 
scattered individual endeavors into more coherent wholes; and even hoped, through its 
own initial patronage, to trigger an influx of state funding for specific long-term research 
projects.  Birrenbach was also convinced that, thanks to their private nature, the Thyssen 
Stiftung and others like it were especially distinguished by their ability to approach 
particular subject areas and tasks with a greater speed, decisiveness and flexibility, free of 
political considerations and certain temporal, legislat ve and budgetary constraints, and 
from a more objective distance than the state.  Ultimately, he saw the Thyssen Stiftung as 
functioning at most in a complementary relationship to the state, in select instances 
providing funds to essential projects either at the dir ct request of the government or as a 
replacement for anticipated financing lost due to government budget-cutting.29 
The founding of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung required a considerable amount of time 
and the surmounting of formidable obstacles.  In addition to Birrenbach, two other like-
minded men proved key: Ellscheid, Birrenbach’s partner in administering the Thyssen 
                                                
28 On the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung as a pronounced but still quite rare example in the Federal Republic of 
“private initiative” in this field, see Birrenbach’s address at the 10th Ordentlichen Hauptversammlung of the 
August Thyssen Hütte, 17 April 1964, ACDP K077/3. 
29 For instance, in Spring 1962, Birrenbach responded favorably to Chancellor Adenauer’s request that the 
Thyssen Stiftung support the Weizmann Institute (Israel).  Shortly thereafter, in July 1962, the Kuratorium 
of the Stiftung approved a sum for an exchange program with the United States, which had originally been 
foreseen in the budget of the Foreign Office but had since been removed.  On the freedoms that 
distinguished a private Stiftung, see Birrenbach’s Text for the ATH-Werkszeitung, 1 December 1970, 
ACDP K065/2.  On the need to maintain the principle of the self-administration of the Wissenschaft in the 
face of the demands of the Politik and on the Wissenschaftsförderung in the totalitarian states failing, 
therefore, “to secure the potential [Leistungsfähigkeit] of the Wissenschaft in its entire breadth and diversity 
[Breite und Vielfalt],” see KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 27 July 1972, ACDP K080/1.   
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Vermögen; and Robert Pferdmenges, who primarily functioned in an advisory capacity.  
Further support came from Hans-Günther Sohl and, ironically, Chancellor Adenauer.  
Still, the process involved almost two years of grueling negotiations with the responsible 
public authorities about details.  It was also necessary, and quite difficult, to convince 
Amélie Thyssen and her daughter, Anita Gräfin Zichy-T ssen, to give their approval for 
such an undertaking.  Not too long after, Birrenbach deemed the success he and Ellscheid 
finally achieved in persuading the Thyssen women “one f the most beautiful, if not the 
greatest, successes of my professional career.”30  Great care was taken in the construction 
of the foundation’s various organs, especially thatof the important Wissenschaftlichen 
Beirat, a process, occurring after the appointment of the Kuratorium, in which 
Birrenbach played a central role.  Because there had been “attempts to defame the 
motives and methods of our action,” it appeared all the more essential to Birrenbach to 
impart to this scientific advisory council a character of absolute independence.31  In part 
through the targeted selection of the personalities of this body, Birrenbach sought to 
ensure that the humanities enjoyed a high priority among the concerns of the Stiftung.  
Thanks above all to Birrenbach’s impetus and his early recognition of urgent needs, the 
founders, after much deliberation, bestowed upon their creation the general purpose of 
promoting the research of the (initially, exclusively German) Wissenschaft, with 
                                                
30 KB to Dr. Friedrich Kobrak, Prov. Buenos Aires, 22 July 1960, ACDP K047/2.  As Birrenbach, years 
later and well after the death of Amélie, described the attitude of the Thyssen family: “The Gesellschafter 
[of the Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung GmbH] are Argentinian and not interested in German problems… 
especially as the understanding for Stiftungen (confidentially spoken) is low.” [KB to Ludwig Erhard, 19 
July 1974, ACDP K190/2].   
31 KB to NRW Kultusminister Werner Schütz, 7 September 1960, ACDP K004/2.  Schütz would later 
become a member of the Vorstand of the Thyssen Stiftung.  On the Wissenschaftlichen Beirat s the “soul 
of this Stiftung,” see Birrenbach’s speech at the meeting of the FTS on 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2. 
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particular consideration for the Nachwuchs.32  For Birrenbach, the FTS would offer the 
opportunity to express his striving for the linkage of Wissenschaft, Kultur, Politik and 
Wirtschaft. 
E. Functioning of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung  
All of this resolved to a satisfactory extent, the organs of the Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung finally began their activity in the fall of 1960.  With regard to its structure, the 
Thyssen Stiftung approximated in many respects the organizations we hav  already 
encountered in Chapter 4 when evaluating the explicitly Atlanticist institutions.  The FTS 
comprised three interacting and, usually, cooperating bodies: the Vorstand, in this case 
essentially a Geschäftsführung that dealt with the day-to-day administration of the
Stiftung; the Kuratorium, akin to the executive steering organs of the Atlanticist 
organizations; and the aforementioned Wissenschaftlichen Beirat.33  Birrenbach’s rise 
within the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung was a fairly rapid one, although the distance he was
required to scale to reach the peak was, admittedly, not a particularly daunting one.  From 
                                                
32 Here, the purpose of a broader philanthropy was con idered no longer relevant to the necessities of the 
mid-20th century, having been supplanted by the social activity of öffentlichen Rechtsträgern, ranging from 
the level of the overall state down to the G meinden.  With respect to the Nachwuchs, the FTS made 
available means for Doktoranden- and Habilitanden-Stipendien, aimed at strengthening the corps of 
budding college and university instructors; for “orientation” and research stipends; for editions of scholarly 
texts; and for the support of additional tasks of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung. 
33 Dr. Ernst Coenen functioned as the Vorstand of the Stiftung from its founding, temporarily joined for the 
period 1963-68 by the NRW Kultusminister a.D. Werner Schütz.  The Kuratorium consisted of 
approximately seven figures from the Wirtschaft, many already directly involved with Thyssen in other 
capacities.  In addition to Birrenbach, these figures included at times: Fritz Berg, Robert Ellscheid, Julian 
Freiherr von Godlewski, Harald Kühnen, Robert Pferdmenges, Hans-Günther Sohl, and Nikolaus Graf 
Strasoldo.  This organ determined the overall guidelines of the Stiftung within which its purposes should be 
achieved; rendered the final decision on individual research proposals and the awarding of funds; appointed 
and supervised the Vorstand; and appointed and dismissed its own members.  The Wissenschaftliche 
Beirat, initially nineteen members strong, included personalities (largely professors) from the fields of 
Wissenschaft, research, education and Wirtschaft, among them over the years: Prof. Dr. Helmut Coing, the 
first chairman; Prof. Dr. Arnold Bergstraesser, prior to his passing away in February 1964; Prof. Dr. Adolf 
Butenandt, a Nobel Prize winner in biochemistry; Hans Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, a Thyssen family 
friend; Prof. Dr. Karl Hettlage; Dr. Hans Reuter from the DEMAG AG (Duisburg); Theodor Schieder, the 
Cologne historian; Prof. Dr. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker; and Prof. Dr. Theodor Wessels of the 
Energiewirtschaftlichem Institut at the University of Cologne.   
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1959 onward, therefore from the very inception, he was a member of the Kuratorium, the 
highest body of the Stiftung.  In 1961, he became a deputy chairman of the Kuratorium, 
and following the death in September 1962 of its fir t chairman, Robert Pferdmenges, the 
Kuratorium decided on an arrangement whereby the two current deputy chairmen, 
Ellscheid and Birrenbach, would henceforth alternate over extended periods of time as 
chairman of that body.  However, after Ellscheid hathen served as chairman for about 
two years, Birrenbach succeeded him in July 1965 and never relinquished the position, 
another case of Birrenbach following in the footstep  of Pferdmenges.  It was in this role 
as chairman of the Kuratorium and as one of only two members of that organ who als  
took part in the meetings of the scientific advisory council that Birrenbach came to be the 
most influential figure within the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.  Meanwhile, Birrenbach’s 
activity at the Stiftung, especially as chairman of the Kuratorium, also considerably 
expanded his contacts with leading American Wissenschaftlern.34  
Seen in a wider geographical perspective, the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung might not 
have ranked among the largest private foundations in existence during this period.  The 
financial means available to it in any given year were quite a bit smaller than those at the 
disposal of the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk or the Krupp-Stiftung, to mention two other 
major foundations established in the Federal Republic during the 1960s (which we shall 
return to soon), or, abroad, the Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon and the big American 
                                                
34 With respect to some of those American scholars pos essing German backgrounds, members of the initial 
Wissenschaftlichen Beirat included Prof. Dr. Goetz Briefs, who had emigrated during the National Socialist 
period and continued on as a professor at Georgetown University in Washington, DC; and Prof. Dr. Hans 
Rothfels, who had since returned to Germany from his ex le in the United States but during his time at the 
Thyssen Stiftung (which lasted until June 1965) retained his American itizenship.  For Birrenbach 
welcoming it if Karl Brandt (another refugee from Nazi Germany) of Stanford University’s Food Research 
Institute would speak at the next meeting of the Wissenschaftlichen Beirat, see KB to Prof. Dr. Karl Brandt, 
22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.   
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foundations.35  Operating within these natural limits, the Stiftung primarily, though with 
exceptions, financed well-defined, medium-sized, temporally limited research projects, 
avoiding more general grants, for instance those aimed at the founding or expansion of 
institutes.36  Yet while it could not be compared in size to the world’s largest foundations, 
the FTS was still a powerful financing instrument wielding not inconsiderable funds.  
Upon the founding, the Stifterinnen, the two Thyssen women, had endowed the FTS from 
their private fortunes via their Vermögensverwaltungen with a package of stock shares of 
the August-Thyssen-Hütte AG in the nominal sum of DM 100 million and a then-stock 
market value of DM 270 million.37  Through the participation of the Stiftung in the capital 
increase of the ATH in 1969, the foundation increased its stock holding to a nominal sum 
of DM 105 million.  It was primarily with the dividends returned on these shares and, to a 
much lesser extent, from the interest accrued on financial investments that the FTS went 
                                                
35 Founded in 1956 through the will of the recently deceased oil magnate Calouste Gulbenkian, the private 
Portuguese Gulbenkian Foundation was the largest European foundation of the era. 
36 Such exceptions, expensive one-time or long-term actions in which the FTS financed large individual 
undertakings, indeed included the significant participation in the setting-up, survival, upgrading, and 
expansion of important institutes (e.g. the purchase of buildings), for instance with respect to the 
Kunsthistorische Institut in Florenz; the Zoologische Station Neapel; institutes of the Görres-Gesellschaft 
(Cologne) in Rome, Madrid and Lisbon; the Orient-Institut of the Deutschen Morgenländischen 
Gesellschaft in Beirut; the Deutsche Studienzentrum in Venedig; the Nepal Research Center in Kathmandu 
(Nepal); the Serengeti Research Institute in the Tanzania National Parks in East Africa; and the Marine 
Biological Laboratory on the Gulf of Aqaba.  For example, see the Expositions of Herr Dr. Kurt 
Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the Kuratorium, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the 
Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP K077/1; and 
Birrenbach’s Speech at the Meeting of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2.      
37 Birrenbach later claimed, though almost certainly referring to the time at which the Stiftung actually 
began its work, that this Paket of ATH Aktien had a stock market value of DM 350-400 million 
(“Förderung der Geisteswissenschaften: Aufgaben der Fritz Thyssen Stiftung,” by Kurt Birrenbach, Das 
Parlament, 12 October 1968, ACDP K063/3).  Initially, there existed an irrevocable Nießbrauchrecht (right 
of usufruct) granted by the Thyssen Vermögensgesellschaften to the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.  With the 
merger of the August-Thyssen-Hütte and the Phoenix-Rheinrohr in 1964 the Fritz Thyssen 
Vermögensverwaltung AG (Cologne) and the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen (Düsseldorf) carried out their 
obligations entered into upon the founding of the T yssen Stiftung to transfer in this case the actual shares 
of stock to the FTS.  Henceforth, the Thyssen Stiftung had fully available its own Vermögen of a nominal 
DM 100 million in August-Thyssen-Hütte shares (with a market value as of mid-April 1964 of about DM 
245 million).  The merger of the August-Thyssen-Hütte and the Phoenix-Rheinrohr thus belatedly cleared 
the way for what might be considered the final stage in the establishment of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.   
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about its work.38  Therefore, the actual income of the Stiftung varied annually to some 
extent, creating considerable uncertainty and renderi g it even more hesitant to commit to 
long-term projects.39  During the 1960s and into the early 1970s, the FTS distributed on 
average about DM 10 million per year.40  By October 1970, it had dispensed in all about 
110 million DM in fulfillment of its statuary purpose, the promotion of the 
Wissenschaft.41     
F. The Emergence of a German Stiftung System 
The Fritz Thyssen Stiftung was the first large private Einzelstiftung set up in the 
Federal Republic since the end of World War II devot d to the fostering of the 
Wissenschaft.  Beyond its own importance as a financing instrument in this field, the 
establishment of a private foundation of the magnitude of the Thyssen Stiftung 
represented a significant breakthrough at the time for the development of a private West 
German Stiftung system.  As has already been alluded to, foundations, based like the 
Fritz Thyssen Stiftung on American models, intended to cultivate science, art, education 
and the like were a rather new phenomenon in German history, indeed in continental 
European history, during this period.  At least for s me time after its founding, the 
Thyssen Stiftung would remain one of the few large private West German foundations.  
However, the establishment of the Stiftung did become a source of considerable imitation 
                                                
38 From 1960-69, approximately DM 94.24 million flowed to the Thyssen Stiftung in dividends from these 
shares.  From 1961-69, the Stiftung took in approximately DM 6.12 million in interest from its financial 
investments.  Its total income between 1960-69 came to approximately DM 100.36 million. 
39 During the 1960s, the percentage amount of the dividends: 1961-63=12%; 1964=10%; 1965 and 
1966=11%; 1967 and 1968=8%; 1969=10%; and 1970=12%.   
40 As an example of the variations that existed, the Stiftung distributed DM 14 million in 1970.   
41 Corresponding to the requirements of the FTS statutes, more than DM 30 million were made available 
for the natural sciences, first and foremost in the area of medicine, while more than DM 70 million 
benefited the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) and the promotion of the wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchs 
(Birrenbach Speech at the Meeting of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2).   
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and was followed by the creation of further notable private foundations in the 
Bundesrepublik, even if in many cases these institutions were not so financially powerful.  
On the other hand, we have already pointed to two founded in its wake that were indeed 
finanzstärker, namely the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, actually a semi-private foundation 
established in 1961, and the Krupp-Stiftung, founded in 1967.42  From its very founding, 
the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk was the most potent Wissenschaft-promoting Stiftung in 
West Germany.  The financial means of this Stiftung came from its own Vermögen, over 
a billion marks in 1965, and therefore it received no public sums nor was it dependent on 
the profits or losses of a business enterprise.43  Not least due to the existence and 
activities of the Thyssen Stiftung, the perception of an urgent necessity for also the private 
sector to help support the Wissenschaft became significantly more prevalent during the 
1960s and after than it had been at the turn of the decade, the time of its founding. 
While none of the handful of important German foundations operating in the 
1960s, including the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk and the Krupp-Stiftung, could be 
compared in scope with their large American counterparts, a discernible foundation 
system was beginning to develop within the Federal Republic.  Aside from the founding 
of individual Stiftungen, the emergence of such a system manifested itself in part in the 
various foundation conferences, including those staged by the Frankfurt-based 
Wirtschaftspolitischen Gesellschaft.44  Of course, given his prominence in the realm of 
                                                
42 The Stiftung Volkswagenwerk was set up in May 1961 by the Bund and the Land of Niedersachsen with 
the proceeds from the privatization of the Volkswagenwerk.  Its Kuratorium, consisting of fourteen 
members, met for the first time in February 1962.   
43 On the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, see Rainer Nicolaysen, Der lange Weg zur Volkswagenstiftung: Eine 
Gründungsgeschichte im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Wrtschaft und Wissenschaft (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002). 
44 The WIPOG’s attempts into at least the mid-1960s to explore and help overcome the obstacles facing 
private Stiftungen in the Federal Republic are summarized in the “Report about the Efforts of the WIPOG 
for a Mobilization of the Stiftungsinitiativen,” Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, Frankfurt am 
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West German Stiftungen, Birrenbach was regularly invited to these functions, along with 
other major figures from the areas of Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft and the foundations.  At 
the same time, Birrenbach’s interactions also suggest th  emergence of less formal 
networks and methods of consultation and advising among those involved with the 
Stiftungen regarding the full range of issues and problems that confronted them in that 
field, one such nexus existing, for instance, betwen Birrenbach and Ernst Coenen of the 
Thyssen Stiftung, on the one hand, and especially Ulrich von Pufendorf of the WIPOG, 
on the other.45  Moreover, with the founding and evident success of the Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung, Birrenbach himself became something of an informal consultant with respect to 
wider questions pertaining to foundations.  Quite of n this personal advisory role 
involved rather small Stiftungen, but Birrenbach also served, for instance, as a consultant 
                                                                                                                                      
Main, ACDP K015.  The WIPOG’s interest in such matters had been piqued already by the mid-1950s as a 
result of its own mounting difficulties in attaining sufficient financing through member contributions and 
donations from Fördererkreisen of the Wirtschaft, especially to carry out long-term tasks that did not hold 
out the promise of immediate results.  Beginning in 1961, the WIPOG staged a series of annual 
Arbeitstagungen dealing with and seeking to further the discussion about the theme Stiftungen: in March 
1961 on “New Forms of Cooperation [Zusammenwirken] of Wirtschaft and Wissenschaft in Educational 
[Bildungs-] and Development Tasks”; in July 1962 on “Mobilization of the Stiftung Idea in Our Legal and 
Economic Order”; and in November 1963 on the current state of legislation and law (including tax-law) 
surrounding the founding and management of charitable Stiftungen.  The organization claimed that circles 
of the Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft, Pädagogik and Publizistik had all demonstrated great interest in these 
Arbeitstagungen.  Such conferences were also linked with other undertakings of WIPOG personnel, for 
instance a trip to the United States (and subsequent report) by Dr. Gernot Gather at the end of 1960 to study 
the Stiftungswesen there, as well as the successful efforts of Dr. Rudolf Mueller to bring the annual 1962 
conference of the Deutschen Juristentag to take up on its agenda themes and problems of Stiftung law.  The 
Juristentag henceforth formed a standing stiftungsrechtliche commission, to which Gather belonged and 
which was closely connected with the WIPOG’s third Arbeitstagung (November 1963).  The WIPOG’s 
stiftungspolitische work also consisted of scholarly analyses, for insta ce of the social-psychological, 
social-economic, legal and political preconditions for Stiftung initiatives.  Furthermore, the WIPOG 
engaged in a constant Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, aimed at informing a broader public of its findings and, in 
general, at promoting the concept of the Stiftung.  The WIPOG’s conferences were covered and their results 
published in its own journal, Offener Welt.  Finally, the WIPOG provided advice and materials to those 
broadcasters and other media putting together programs and pieces on the Stiftungen.  Thus, in a series of 
in-depth articles on the topic Stiftungen, the weekly Die Zeit heavily utilized materials and referred to the 
works of the WIPOG.    
45 Pufendorf was the Geschäftsführende Vorstandsmitglied of the WIPOG.  On the Stifterverband für die 
Deutsche Wissenschaft s a source of judgment and expertise with respect to taxation measures in relation 
to foundations and other philanthropic institutions, see the Remark Regarding the Meeting of 
Representatives of Philanthropic Organizations at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 7-8 February 
1973, ACDP K039/1.    
 190
at times to the eminent Berthold Beitz with respect to the founding of the Krupp-
Stiftung.46  As part of our ongoing treatment of the personal a d functional relationship 
between the two of them, it is worth noting that here again Birrenbach in a sense 
followed a trail previously blazed by Robert Pferdmenges, who had earlier assisted in 
smoothing the path for the creation of the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk.   
Another characteristic of the emerging Stiftung system was that, as with the 
explicitly Atlanticist institutions, integration and cooperation significantly defined the 
relationship of the FTS and its organs to major foundations and wissenschaftlichen 
organizations at home and abroad.  Within the Federal Republic, close coordination of 
programs and the like existed, for instance, with the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, the Robert 
Bosch Stiftung, the Krupp-Stiftung, the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, the 
Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft, the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, the 
Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft and the various Hochschulen.  Again, such 
collaboration was facilitated through friendly personal relations, as those between 
Birrenbach and other prominent figures in thesystem like Gotthard Gambke and Hans 
Merkle.47  However, the connection between Stiftungen and wissenschaftlichen 
organizations was also cemented through personnel overlap.  Within the FTS, the 
institutional expression, as well as a basis, of this cooperation was to be found in the 
                                                
46 For Birrenbach and Beitz, see KB to Generaldirektor Hans L. Merkle, Robert Bosch GmbH, 6 October 
1967, ACDP K019/1.  Beitz became chairman of the Kuratorium of the Krupp-Stiftung.  On Birrenbach’s 
assessment of the successful work and impact of the Thyssen Stiftung in its first decade and the name the 
Stiftung had made for itself in the “Welt der Stiftungen” even beyond Europe, which he viewed as a tribute 
to the quality of the projects financed, see Kurt Bi renbach Speech, Meeting of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 
17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2.  Broadly speaking, the role of Coenen as Vorstand at the FTS highlights 
the increasing number of salaried employees engaged in the modern philanthropic foundations, while the
existence of both larger and smaller Stiftungen underscores the diversity of organization among such 
foundations during this period.   
47 These institutions were located throughout the Bundesrepublik, for example: the StVWW in Hannover;  
the RBS in Stuttgart; the AHS and DFG in Bonn; the Stifterverband and the Krupp-Stiftung in Essen; and 
the MPG in Munich.  Gambke was the general secretary of the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk.  Merkle was head 
of the Robert Bosch Stiftung, which was founded in 1964.   
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composition of the Wissenschaftlichen Beirat, whose members had been consciously 
selected and pursued, in part by Birrenbach, not only as outstanding representatives of the 
Wissenschaft and Wirtschaft, but also for their links to other large Wissenschaft-
promoting organizations.  This body comprised, for instance, the leaders of both the MPG 
and DFG as well as personalities of the StVWW.48  In addition to his own tight 
connections to both the MPG and DFG, Birrenbach becam  a member of the MPG 
Senate in 1964.49  It was largely due to such cooperation and integration that the FTS was 
able to mange with a relatively small and cheap administrative apparatus, instead relying 
on that of organizations like the DFG and MPG or, in some cases, the Hochschulen.50  As 
a whole, institutional cooperation and integration enabled the FTS to operate much more 
efficiently and effectively with its considerable, though far from inexhaustible, means.51 
G. Internationalization of the Stiftungen 
Among the most remarkable trends that we can detect a  the Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung, as well as at other West German foundations, during the 1960s, one that 
Birrenbach promoted and significantly advanced, wasthe internationalization of its work.  
                                                
48 These figures included, at times, Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt (MPG), Prof. Dr. Gerhard Hess and Prof. Dr. 
Julius Speer (both DFG), and Prof. Dr. Hans Peters (University of Cologne and a member of the 
Kuratorium of the StVWW), as well as Dr. Ernst-Hellmut Vits (Stifterverband) and Prof. Dr. Hermann 
Jahrreiß (Westdeutsche Rektorenkonferenz).  Birrenbach referred to Butenandt as “one of the eminent 
[bedeutenden] Wissenschaftler of our time” and believed there existed a “personal closeness 
[Verbundenheit]” between the two of them [KB to Butenandt, Munich, 27 July 1972, ACDP K080/1].   
49 Birrenbach’s membership in the MPG Senate provided him deeper insight into the functioning of the 
MPG: its institutes, research activities and policies, goals, budget, and annual publications and assemblies.  
Birrenbach attended MPG annual member assemblies, for instance in Bremen in June 1972.  The MPG was 
the successor organization to the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft.   
50 For instance, the money dispensed by the T yssen Stiftung for the natural sciences and medicine was 
actually given to and, by all accounts, “achlich” and reliably administered by the DFG as part of its own 
programs in these areas.  Likewise, the stipends of the Stiftung for Doktoranden and Habilitanden were 
awarded through the Hochschulen and the DFG.  The entire costs for the administration of the Thyssen 
Stiftung amounted to only about one percent of its total income during the period 1960-69.   
51 On the cooperation of the FTS with other German Stiftungen as a means to avoid “double work” and to 
enable “Gemeinschaftsprojekte” and thus to achieve a higher degree of efficiency, see Birrenbach’s speech 
at the meeting of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2.  In this speech, Birrenbach 
also pointed to the “most valuable aid” provided to the FTS by the DFG and the MPG.     
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A key element of this process was the geographic expansion of the field in which the 
Thyssen Stiftung could operate.  The original version of the foundation’s statutes, limiting 
the domain of activity of the Stiftung to the promotion of wissenschaftlichen projects of 
the German Hochschulen and research centers, soon proved itself to be unsuitable in light 
of what was increasingly viewed as the international nature of the Wissenschaft.  Equally 
conscious of the undertakings of American foundations all over the world, Birrenbach 
came to consider it an “Ehrenpflicht” that West German foundations also make a relevant 
contribution in this field.52  Therefore, the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung carried out, at 
Birrenbach’s initiative, a fundamental revision of its statutes quite early on in its history, 
in 1962.  As a result, the purpose of the Stiftung was no longer restricted to the promotion 
of exclusively the German Wissenschaft, but rather expanded to the fostering of the 
Wissenschaft primarily, but not exclusively, in Germany.  Henceforth, the Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung became extensively engaged beyond the borders of the Federal Republic, for 
instance through the financing of foreign or international research projects, and thus 
further embraced the tradition of the large American foundations.  Above all, German 
Wissenschaftler, especially the wissenschaftliche Nachwuchs, were hereby proffered the 
opportunity to conduct research abroad, but foreign Wissenschaftler also received 
considerable support from the FTS.53 
                                                
52 On this “Ehrenpflicht,” see Birrenbach’s speech at the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung meeting of 19 July 1965, 
ACDP K079/1. 
53 For the FTS modifying its statutes, see the Expositions of Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman 
of the Kuratorium, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the 
First Activity Report of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP K077/1.  In these same remarks, Birrenbach cited 
the projects of “international importance [Bedeutung]” financed by the FTS, those dealing with “a series of 
universal [allgemeiner] problems which can only be seen from the internatio l perspective [Sicht] and 
which interest all nations equally,” including the significant sum provided by the Stiftung for the promotion 
of the “übernationalen Hochschularbeit” of the Deutschen Rektorenkonferenz.  He also observed the 
impossibility, now, of solving many contemporary problems “in a national sense [Sinne],” meaning by the 
German Wissenschaft alone, “rather only in cooperation with the Wissenschaftlern of the other countries.”  
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Another vital aspect of the internationalization process with respect to the Fritz 
Thyssen Stiftung was the integration during the 1960s of the foundation, along with other 
recently created German Stiftungen, into a cooperative system with foreign, most 
importantly American, private foundations.  Various obstacles hindered the conduct of 
joint international projects by foundations of differing nationalities, including disparities 
in their charters, aims, methods and languages as well as sheer geographic distance.  All 
this contributed to a distinct tendency “to go it alone.”  Yet, as Birrenbach argued, clear 
benefits existed in cooperation, coordination and communication among foundations on 
an international level.  In addition to ensuring enha ced resources and avoiding wasteful 
duplication, such collaboration opened up the prospect of more effectively promoting 
common institutional interests.  These included the securing of further tax privileges, the 
adapting of the legal frameworks in which they operat d and the improving of their 
relationships vis-à-vis state and society, mainly to limit state supervision and assure 
themselves maximum independence.  Along with a more fluid exchange of information, 
Birrenbach endorsed an expanded exchange of personnel between the foundations on an 
international scale.  Among other things, he proposed the establishment of a small 
European information center that would also eventually exchange information with the 
Foundation Library Center in New York.  He advocated as well the permanent institution 
of well-prepared, periodic, informal bilateral or multilateral meetings between the 
executives of the larger European and American foundations, seeing these as particularly 
                                                                                                                                      
Of course, Birrenbach also addressed in his comments the applications to the Thyssen Stiftung from 
professors at the German universities, as well as tho e projects financially supported by the FTS that 
pertained to “the Problematik of the inner geistigen, religious, political and wirtschaftlichen structure of our 
Gesellschaft in the Federal Republic itself.”  Indicative of the internationalization process is the funding 
provided by the FTS to the institutes mentioned earlier in this chapter (page 186, note 36), which were 
located abroad, were in general of international significance in their specialized fields and functioned, at 
least in part, as sites bringing together not only German but also international scholars for joint work within 
their particular research areas.  
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valuable to the former.  For Birrenbach, cooperation with American foundations was of 
crucial significance for their German and other European counterparts insofar as it 
allowed them to draw on the Americans’ precious advice and abundant experience.54   
In line with Birrenbach’s wishes, a series of major international conferences were 
staged during the 1960s, in which key European and American foundations took part to 
discuss the problems confronting private foundations a d to help facilitate this process of 
international cooperation.  The first such conference was staged in November 1964 in 
Berlin, held at the joint initiative of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and the Ford Foundation.  
Birrenbach convened this gathering in consultation with the president of the Ford 
Foundation, John McCloy, and the director of its inter ational affairs program, Shepard 
Stone.  Chaired by McCloy, the conference was attended by thirty representatives of the 
foremost international foundations from nine countries.55  By the spring of 1969, a total 
of six such international foundation conferences had been held in Europe, including those 
following in the wake of the Berlin meeting, namely in London (September 1965), Rome 
(April 1966), Entstone (near Oxford, November 1966), Bad Godesberg (May 1968), and 
Bellaggio (May 1969), the latter considered the most important such gathering since the 
original conference in Berlin.  Participants at various times comprised representatives of 
the chief European and American foundations, again among them the Ford Foundation, 
                                                
54 On the cooperation of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung with foreign (“international”) Stiftungen, especially the 
Ford Foundation, as a means to avoid “double work” and to make possible Gemeinschaftsprojekte and thus 
to achieve a higher degree of efficiency, see Birrenbach’s speech at the meeting of the Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2.  Much later on, Birrenbach pointed out that in its support since 
[“ einigen”] years for the research program “Koronarsklerose und Herzinfarkt,” the FTS had been “advised 
by an international commission of Wissenschaftlern.” (Kurt Birrenbach, Greeting and Remarks, 
Symposium on the Occasion of the 25-Year Anniversary of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung in the Schnütgen 
Museum, Cologne, 26 March 1984, ACDP K110/2).   
55 On this event, see the address of the dean on the occasion of Birrenbach’s reception of an honorary 
doctorate from the medical faculty of the University of Düsseldorf, ACDP K047/3.  Stone had previously 
been the deputy editor-in-chief of the Sunday edition of the New York Times and, from 1949-52, the 
director of the Office of Public Affairs under McCloy, at the time the US High Commissioner for Germany.   
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which demonstrated a particular interest in such undertakings.  German organizations 
participating in the series of conferences included, of course, the Thyssen Stiftung as well 
as the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft.56 
These conferences could boast a number of significat achievements.  Thanks to 
the discussions they enabled, considerable light was shed on the diverse roles, 
organization, methods, activities, legal and fiscal position, goals and problems of private 
foundations in their promotion of Wissenschaft and on the possibilities and appropriate 
modalities for future cooperation, including on an international scale.  At the Berlin 
conference in 1964, a standing committee was set up to produce studies on foundation 
law and the current legal conditions of the foundations in the individual West European 
states.  These studies formed the basis of a report by the committee, complete with 
proposals regarding the legal preconditions and legislative measures required in the 
various countries for the establishment of an effectiv  and liberal foundation policy in the 
national and international fields and for enhanced international cooperation.57  Finally, 
the late 1960s saw the appearance of notable publications, directly emerging from or at 
least partly stimulated by the conference series, on the state of the European foundations 
and airing ideas how best to improve their lot.  In the German language from 1969 on, the 
Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft w s especially active with its newly created 
Schriftenreihe zum Stiftungswesen, publishing volumes like a general index of German 
                                                
56 The September 1965 and May 1968 gatherings were essentially German-British affairs.  The November 
1966 meeting at Entstone was staged at the invitation of the Ditchley Foundation.  For further planned 
conferences, especially an upcoming one “of the European Stiftungen,” see Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 
17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2. 
57 The study process was coordinated by Dr. Reinhard Goerdeler (Frankfurt), the youngest son of Carl 
Friedrich Goerdeler.   
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foundations, a Vademecum providing an international overview of the large Stiftungen in 
Europa, and the studies stemming from the 1964 standing committee.58  Abroad, these 
latter studies were also published in English and French, while the Fondazione Giovanni 
Agnelli played a pivotal role during this time, for instance with the release of a directory 
of European foundations.  All of this, the discussion , the studies, the reports, the 
publications, facilitated the flow of information ad provided a basis for joint action by 
the foundations, including vis-à-vis the governments and parliaments in Europe.59   
Indeed, cooperation did substantially intensify between the participating 
foundations as a result of the crucial impetus provided by these international foundation 
conferences and their products.  Regular communication, not just at such conferences, 
improved significantly.  Personal contacts, including of a trans-Atlantic nature, were 
established and expanded.  There was an increased exchange of personnel, including 
between the large American and the West German foundations, a development that 
included German work visits to the United States.  A greater international cooperation 
manifested itself with respect to joint research projects.  Naturally, all this applied to the 
Thyssen Stiftung, as well as to the other major foundations in the Bundesrepublik.  The 
collaborative efforts of the FTS with similar institu ions on an international scale were 
pursued especially with the Ford Foundation, where Bi renbach, as already alluded to, 
enjoyed close contacts in McCloy and Stone.  For insta ce, together with Ford, the 
                                                
58 On the existence also of a newsletter on the natiol level in the Federal Republic focused on bringing 
the accomplishments of the foundations to the attention of the public, see the Report on the Meeting o 
Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1.     
59 For a very positive assessment of the Agnelli Foundation’s Guide to European Foundations a  an 
exemplary effort of horizontal information (i.e. betw en foundations), see the Report on the Meeting on 
Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1.  About the 
comparative study on the steuerliche [tax-related] treatment of foundations worked out in August-
September 1970 by the Faculté Internationale pour l’Enseignement du Droit Comparé with the support of 
the Agnelli Foundation, see the Remark regarding Interphil (the International Standing Conference on 
Philanthropy), ACDP K039/1.   
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Thyssen Stiftung established the Serengeti Research Institute in East Africa and, also with 
the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk and the Krupp-Stiftung, supported the activities, including 
conferences, of the International Association for Cultural Freedom (Paris).60  Among 
European foundations, the economic and political integration of the western half of the 
continent ever more facilitated such collaboration.  Moreover,  by the early 1970s, non-
governmental bodies, like Interphil and the Hague Club, and inter-governmental 
organizations, such as the OECD, the European Communities, the Council of Europe and 
UNESCO, had taken an interest in modern philanthropy and, more specifically, were 
contributing to the field of international cooperation among foundations through sundry 
meetings, studies and proposals, aiming for instance t a harmonization or at least an 
elucidation of certain practices (e.g. terminology) and conditions (e.g. tax-fiscal).61   
 
                                                
60 For an overview of the recent history of and suggestion  for future international cooperation among the 
foundations, see Birrenbach’s Referat at the Internationalen Stiftungskonferenz, Bellagio, 4 May 1969, 
ACDP K063/4.   
61 Created in 1969, Interphil (the International Standing Conference on Philanthropy) was an association for 
the officers of and sought to deal with all types of philanthropic organizations, among them the 
foundations, in Europe, the United States and Canada.  As of March 1973, Amb. Pierre Forthomme 
(Belgium) was president of Interphil, which at that time was located in Brussels.  On Interphil’s early 1970s 
draft “Charter on Philanthropy” as an element of public relations work and a means to call attention to the 
political and social developments in Europe that it believed threatened philanthropic private initiative, see 
the Remark regarding Interphil, ACDP K039/1.  For the potential value of an exchange of experiences and 
results with Interphil, in line with our earlier reference to the emergence of a foundation system equipped 
with consultative and advisory linkages, see again the Remark regarding Interphil, ACDP K039/1.  The 
Hague Club, founded in 1971, comprised the executive d rectors (Geschäftsführer) of major foundations.  
For a restricted conference of about twenty key representatives and experts held at the Council of Europe, 
see the Report on the Meeting on Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, 
Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1.  Among the participants in th s gathering was Gotthard Gambke (General 
Secretary of the StVWW), who here posed the question  whether the harmonization of foundation law was 
feasible in Europe and whether foundations with an international scope could not have a European status.  
Following this conference, whose attendees also included the editor-in-chief of the Tribune de Genève 
(Geneva), the Council of Europe, which planned to examine the possibility of launching a relevant 
newsletter, issued a press communiqué.  On the studie  conducted by the Council of Europe and the OECD, 
including the latter’s analysis of “The Research System,” whose preparation had entailed contact with 
German, Italian and English foundations, see again the Report on the Meeting on Foundations and other 
Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1 and the Remark regarding Interphil, 
ACDP K039/1.   
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H. Schwerpunkte and Atlanticism 
Seeking to maximize the efficacy of its varying and fi ite amount of funds in 
carrying out its program, the Thyssen Stiftung devoted itself to particular Schwerpunkte 
deemed especially worthy of promotion.  Not only was Birrenbach a strong proponent of 
this approach but, as chairman of the Kuratorium, he played a pivotal role in actually 
determining these concentrations.  Ardently endorsed by Birrenbach and of marked 
significance for our purposes was the principal stress placed by the Stiftung on supporting 
the humanities, the result of several important considerations.62  The Nazi regime had 
dealt a terrible blow to the formerly so internationally respected German Wissenschaft in 
the humanities, rendering it a sphere in particularly di e need of assistance.63  In relation 
to the enormous growth of the natural sciences in the age of the egalitarian industrial 
society, the humanities appeared to be uniquely shortc anged in the allocation of funds.  
Even with its limited financial support, the FTS could achieve a major impact in this field 
since researchers did not require huge expenditures fo  apparatus.  Birrenbach pointed to 
yet another compelling reason: devoting the Stiftung to the fostering of the humanities, as 
well as the area medicine, along with the renouncing of unternehmensbezogenen projects 
(a rather innovative development in the world of German Stiftungen), was also intended 
to stave off any charges of the Thyssen firm’s direct s lf-interest.64  Noteworthy for the 
                                                
62 In addition to the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), the other key overall Schwerpunkte (though 
individually of a lower priority than the humanities) were medicine and the natural sciences.  For 
Birrenbach’s advocacy of a strictly limited number of Schwerpunkte so as to achieve a greater effect, see 
Birrenbach’s speech at the meeting of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2.   
63 Indeed the repercussions of the Third Reich, during which there had been blatant attempts to politicize 
the Wissenschaft as well as a mass exodus of eminent scholars, continued to radiate to some extent 
throughout the entire Wissenschaft in the Federal Republic, including, but not only, at the universities.    
64 This principle of renouncing an overarching purpose and specific research directly related to the firm’s 
interests, in spite of the nature of its namesake and founding family and the source of its income, 
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Atlanticists was not only that the FTS specialized in the humanities but that this domain 
was broadly interpreted by the Stiftungsgremien, encompassing, in no small part due to 
Birrenbach’s efforts, urgent and aktuelle themes of international relations, foreign policy 
and the social sciences within its purview.65  Between 1961 and 1969, the FTS distributed 
roughly DM 31.8 million for research projects to this Schwerpunkt humanities, with a 
frequent emphasis on research plans of an interdisciplinary and international nature.66   
While Birrenbach publicly argued that the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung necessarily had 
to orient itself solely towards “the quality of the supported matter [Sache]” and insisted 
that he had never contemplated carrying out a “politicization” of the Thyssen Stiftung, he 
also explicitly asserted that European foundations, especially if they cooperated with one 
another, could help develop the spirit of community within as well as between the 
European societies and nations and, furthermore, contribute to a better understanding 
                                                                                                                                      
differentiated the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung from earlier, otherwise comparable, organizations clo ely linked to 
the Großunternehmen of private German industry like the social welfare institutions of the Friedrich Krupp 
enterprise in the second half of the 19th century or the Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung, founded in 1889 in Jena.   
65 While perhaps not immediately connected to the Thyssen firm’s self-interest, the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung 
did finance economics and other social science projects dealing with the contemporary Wirtschaft.  These 
included a study by the Ifo-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Munich) that investigated “the interaction f 
öffentlicher Finanzwirtschaft and privater Wirtschaft”; a research work of Prof. Goetz Briefs (Georgetown 
University, Washington, DC) on “Probleme der wirtschaftlichen Grenzen von pluralistischer Gesellschaft 
und Sozialstaat”; and a project of Prof. Wilfrid Schreiber (University of Cologne) on “Die 
Sozialversicherung und ihr Einbau in die Gesellschaftsordnung der sozialen Marktwirtschaft.”  For details 
on these endeavors, for the growing and “extraordina y importance” of these themes (among the “central 
questions of our time”) and for Birrenbach’s patent interest in them (in some cases already as of November 
1962, based on his experiences in very recent years) as a means to underscore, for example, the dangers of 
inflationary forces due to wage and profit trends in pluralistic market economies and the necessary limits of 
the modern Sozialstaat and Sozialpolitik “in order to come to a healthy and, in the long-run, promising 
[zukunftsträchtigen] development of the [industrial] Gesellschaft,” see the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt 
Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the Kuratorium, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the 
Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP K077/1 and 
Birrenbach’s Text for the ATH-Werkszeitung, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2.  Such studies explored, 
among other themes, the changing interaction between Staat/Politik, Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft, including 
the relations between Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat and within the context of what Birrenbach referred to as 
“the age of the interest Verbände.”  Finally, the studies on international relations funded by the Thyssen 
Stiftung also addressed, at times, relevant issues of economics, as well as other areas like politics and law. 
66 This approximately DM 31.8 million was part of the total of about DM 69.8 million expended by the 
FTS between 1961 and 1969 expressly on the support of research projects (i.e. also those pertaining, for 
example, to medicine and the natural sciences).  The often interdisciplinary and international nature of such 
research was reflected, in part, in the backgrounds of the researchers themselves. 
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between Europe and the United States, including in fields other than politics.67  In reality, 
the Thyssen Stiftung, as well as a number of other major German foundations, became a 
significant source of funding that proved crucial to sustaining and advancing the activities 
of the German Atlanticists.  No surprise then that e more finely detailed Schwerpunkte 
of the Thyssen Stiftung comprised at various times the theme areas European integration, 
Atlantic security, and development aid.68  This pronounced Atlanticist character is 
particularly striking in view of the fact that according to its statutes, indeed at the 
expressed wish of the two Stifterinnen, the Thyssen Stiftung was expected to devote itself, 
in addition to the promotion of the Nachwuchs, to the preservation of the “christlich-
abendländischen Kultur,” suggesting at least the possibility of a dramatically divergent 
course for the Stiftung from the path actually followed.  Facilitated by his own presence 
and contacts within so many of the key Atlanticist in titutions, Birrenbach exercised a 
profound influence on this Atlanticist inclination f the Thyssen Stiftung, a tendency to 
which he provided both general support as well as a more targeted championing of 
                                                
67 On the primacy of “the quality of the supported matter,” see Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 17 September 
1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2.   
68 For the extraordinary interest of the FTS, “in a historisch-soziologischen sense,” in contributing to “the 
illumination [Erhellung] of the great problems of the present [großen Gegenwartsprobleme],” the many 
projects supported and significant sums made available long these lines, the role of the FTS as an “inspirer 
[Anreger],” also in this regard, and the resonance its “stimul  [Anregungen]” had found in the 
“Gelehrtenwelt,” see the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the Kuratorium, in 
the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report 
of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP K077/1.  In these same remarks, Birrenbach cited the FTS financing 
provided for the projects, evincing considerable “international importance [Bedeutung],” conducted by 
Prof. Ferdinand Hermens (University of Cologne, Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und 
Europäische Fragen) and Prof. Goetz Briefs (Georgetown University, Washington, DC) that investigated 
the “Interdependenz von Verfassung und Wirtschaftsordnung in Europa,” which would be “of great 
importance” in judging the effects of integration in Europe, and the “Entwicklung der V. Republik 
Frankreichs,” a work that took into account all thesalient “constitutional-political” problems that had 
emerged from the most recent developments in France in the course of studying the completely new 
phenomenon on the European continent of a “presidential state [Präsidialstaates].”    
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specific projects, including some in which he was himself deeply involved, prominent 
among them, as we shall see, the DGAP Study Groups.69   
While a comprehensive list is not feasible nor desirable, it may be instructive to 
cite some examples of significant projects supported by the Thyssen Stiftung specifically 
related to the Atlanticist infrastructure that we have already delineated and in which the 
German Atlanticists directly participated.  Beginnig in the early 1960s, for instance, the 
FTS became prominent in the financing of the DGAP and its activities, providing vital 
funding for research programs, publications as wellas study groups, indeed from the 
outset the entire financing necessary for the Study Groups I and II, amounting to DM 
200,000 per year for each group from 1962 and 1966 onward, respectively.70  Of the 
various German foundations, the FTS was the largest contributor for projects of the 
Atlantic Institute, for example financing an AI study, carried out under the direction of 
the institute’s director of studies (Pierre Uri), tha  explored the possibilities of a new 
conception for the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy.  In 1967, the Thyssen Stiftung 
supported the Greek-Turkish Evros-Meric project, which had been initiated by the NATO 
Parliamentarians Conference and especially promoted by Birrenbach’s contact US 
Senator (NY) Jacob Javits, a study (also concluded that year) intended to analyze the 
                                                
69 Birrenbach’s links with members and other figures of these Atlanticist institutions played a salient role 
in the various stages of the FTS grant process.  Among other things, Birrenbach assisted these personalities 
in crafting their applications and also regularly intermediated on their behalf at the FTS.   
70 This funding also included the setting up and financing of the new Referate in the DGAP Research 
Institute needed to provide the study groups with the requisite research capacity.  Birrenbach, with his 
contacts to the DGAP and his position in the Thyssen Stiftung, played a major role in securing this funding 
through his support of the application.  On the substantial contribution from the FTS to the DGAP to lay
the foundations for exploring the Problematik of “arms limitation and arms control,” see the Expositions by 
Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the Kuratorium, in the Press Conference on 2 November 
1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP 
K077/1.  For the DGAP’s tackling of the far-reaching and expensive special tasks associated with the 
complex of arms control, arms limitation and international security, including the study group, being 
enabled through the considerable means made available by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung for that purpose, and 
for the DGAP’s gratitude, see Günter Henle, DGAP eV, President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die 
Mitglieder,” intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1. 
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future possibilities for economic development and cooperation in the border area between 
Greece and Turkey and to contribute to peaceful relations between those two quarrelsome 
NATO countries.71  While not part of the Atlanticist infrastructure in which Birrenbach 
himself regularly and directly participated, the Stiftung also supported the seminars 
staged by the International Association for Cultural Freedom, headquartered in Paris and 
led by Birrenbach’s contact Shepard Stone, formerly of the Ford Foundation.72  Finally, 
as we shall see in Chapter 8, the Thyssen Stiftung became one of the most important 
contributors to the studies authorized by the Trilater l Commission during the 1970s. 
Beyond these projects specifically related to those elements of the Atlanticist 
infrastructure in which Birrenbach himself was immediately involved, the Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung was also prominent in financing the research programs and projects of 
Atlanticist-minded institutions in the United States.  For instance, the Stiftung provided 
funding to a German Research Program established by the Center for International 
Affairs at Harvard University, which was designed to s udy and promote a better and 
more widespread knowledge of German problems, particularly in the fields of foreign 
and domestic politics and defense strategy.73  Over the years, the Thyssen Stiftung also 
funded individual studies undertaken at such Atlanticist-minded institutions across the 
                                                
71 The leader of this project, also referred to as the German-Greek-Turkish Arbeitsgemeinschaft, was Prof. 
Dr. Hans Wilbrandt of the University of Göttingen.  The Evros-Meric endeavor was part of a larger 
“Greek-Turkish Cooperation Project,” much of it financed by the Ford Foundation (Draft Report, NPC 
Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries, October 1966, ACDP K049/2).  Birrenbach’s 
knowledge of the tensions between Greece and Turkey was brought home by the situation in the Thyssen 
plants, where the Greek guest workers were kept separate from the Turkish workers [KB to Eugene 
Rostow, 22 July 1974, ACDP K211/2].   
72 On Shephard Stone and the International Association for Cultural Freedom, see Volker Berghahn, 
America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shephard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and 
Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
73 For details on this, and on many other FTS funding efforts, see the report Zehn Jahre Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung, 1960-1970 (Cologne: Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 1970).   
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ocean like the Council on Foreign Relations; Harvard’s Center for International Affairs74; 
the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy Studies Program75; and the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Foreign Policy Research Institute.76  The grants of the Thyssen Stiftung 
and other German foundations were welcomed by such American recipients as yet 
another valuable source of funding, particularly in times when such financing was 
difficult to come by.77  As so often in other areas, the support and observation of such 
projects by the Thyssen Stiftung was facilitated by Birrenbach’s numerous contacts wi h
American Wissenschaftlern at these institutions, including figures like Henry Kissinger, 
Robert Bowie, Guido Goldman, Stanley Hoffmann (all at Harvard); Robert Owens 
(Brookings); Robert Strausz-Hupé, Walter Hahn and William Kintner (all at FPRI); and 
Goetz Briefs (Georgetown).78   
As an essential component of its funding of such research projects and programs, 
the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung also distributed considerable sums in support of various 
international exchange programs for individual students and scholars, particularly with 
                                                
74 For instance, the Thyssen Stiftung, in conjunction with other foundations, financed a research project of 
the center during the 1970s (a study that ultimately appeared in the Fall 1975 edition of Daedalus) on the 
oil crisis, its political and economic effects and the differing positions vis-à-vis the crisis of the various 
regions and countries of the world (KB to Prof. Raymond Vernon, Director, Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard University, 10 November 1975, ACDP K155/1). 
75 KB to Robert Owens, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution, 6 September 
1976, ACDP K083/1.  Thanks to Birrenbach’s assistance, the Thyssen Stiftung also helped finance, along 
with American sources, a small, private conference staged by the Brookings Institution in Bellagio in 
March 1980 addressing new forms of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy (Gerard Smith to KB, 28 
December 1979, ACDP K209/1 and Gerard Smith to KB, 29 April 1980, ACDP K209/1). 
76 For example, studies on “The Atlantic Community in Crisis: Toward a Redefinition of the Atlantic 
Partnership” (Walter Hahn to Dr. Gerd Brand and Dr. Hugbert Flitner, Fritz Thyssen Stiftung (Cologne), 15 
July 1975, ACDP K155/1 and Robert Schaetzel to KB, 29 June 1976, ACDP K083/1) and on British 
perspectives on Atlantic relations, the latter conducted by Prof. James Dougherty, a member of the FPRI
staff (Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, to KB, 8 January 1976, ACDP K083/1).  
77 Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, to KB, 6 August 1974, ACDP K184/1. 
78 Kissinger, Bowie, Goldman and Hoffmann were all especially involved in the German Research 
Program, Hoffmann (Director of the West European Studies Program at Harvard) as its leader.  Birrenbach 
had met Hoffmann at the Bilderberg Conference held in Cambridge (England) in late March and early 
April 1967.  Owens was formerly head of the Policy Planning Staff in the US State Department.   
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respect to the United States, but also in regard to other foreign universities and 
institutions.  For instance, during the 1960s, grants d other awards [Stipendien] from 
the Stiftung to Harvard University’s German Research Program, Stanford University’s 
Hoover Institution and Food Research Institute and Georgetown University provided 
especially German students and scholars, with a typical stress on youth, the often vital 
opportunity to travel to the United States in order to study and research certain themes 
within their own special areas of interest on the spot.  FTS grants to the internationally 
renowned Bologna Center of Baltimore’s Johns Hopkins U iversity enabled German 
students to participate there on work addressing the diverse problems of modern 
international economics and politics and, at the same time, ensured the taking onf 
Germans into the center’s faculty.  The Stiftung also financed trips of young 
Wissenschaftlern to international conferences so as to enable them, among other things, 
to establish contact with the major international wissenschaftlichen institutions and with 
other significant international bodies.  These efforts f the Thyssen Stiftung were 
explicitly intended, in part, to promote international cooperation, including with 
Americans.  Whether or not the actual research and other work conducted in their 
framework was of an overtly Atlanticist character, such activities ultimately furthered the 
causes of German Atlanticism and trans-Atlantic relations even by simply creating 
linkages between the protagonists involved and encouraging the relatively smooth 
transfer and adoption of previously unfamiliar methods and approaches.79   
                                                
79 On such endeavors, see especially the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the 
Kuratorium, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First 
Activity Report of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP K077/1 and Zehn Jahre Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 1960-
1970 (Cologne: Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 1970).  For FTS financing enabling two German Stipendiaten to 
work at the Food Research Institute (Stanford) on the problems of South American agriculture, see again 
the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the Kuratorium, in the Press Conference 
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Aside from these projects that directly concerned the explicitly Atlanticist 
infrastructure and other Atlanticist-minded institutions and programs, the Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung also funded a number of endeavors that aimed, in the spirit of the Atlanticism of 
this period, at expanding the horizons of the German worldview.  These included projects 
that provided Germans with detailed information about and positive perspectives on the 
United States and its culture80; dealt with practical development policy in the Third 
World81; opened up to German scholars the chance not only t  take part in international 
scholarly and scientific congresses but also to work within the context of international 
organizations such as the World Bank, the OECD, and the EEC; promoted the advance of 
                                                                                                                                      
on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the Fritz Thyssen 
Stiftung, ACDP K077/1.   
80 For instance, seeking to rectify the dearth of books available in German on the history of American 
painting, the Stiftung made a grant for the publication of a work on American painters of the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  Although Geschichte der amerikanischen Malerei (Munich: Prestel, 1974) did appear in 
Germany, this study was actually never completed in its originally intended sense due to the death in 
January 1973 of its author, Prof. Alfred Neumeyer, a German Catholic art historian of Jewish background 
who had emigrated to the United States in the mid-1930s and saw in the work an expression of gratitude o 
America (KB to US Amb. Martin Hillenbrand, Bad Godesb rg, 7 October 1975, ACDP K155/1 and KB to 
John McCloy, 23 December 1975, ACDP K210/1). 
81 On the support of the FTS for the Arnold Bergstraesser project “Enzyklopädie der Weltzivilisation,” 
which comprised an exploration of the historical foundations of the “Weltzivilisation” as well as a 
comparative sociological analysis of the economic, so io-political and cultural processes in the developing 
countries, and on the significance of this project for the task of development aid, see the Expositions by 
Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the Kuratorium, in the Press Conference on 2 November 
1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP 
K077/1.  As a complement to this undertaking, the FTS also funded the work carried out by the Ifo-Institut 
für Wirtschaftsforschung (Munich) on the “Erforschung von Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsproblemen in 
Entwicklungsländern,” which, using “Ostafrika” (especially Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) as a model, 
analyzed the process of socio-economic development in and studied the effect of aid on these countries 
(including on growth and production).  By September 1970, the results of this research were summarized in 
over fifty volumes, available in German and, in part, in English.  On the “great importance” of this project 
and its themes “for the practical policy of today and tomorrow,” see the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt 
Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the Kuratorium, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the 
Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP K077/1.  For 
this project as “an important contribution” (including of the German Stiftungen) to practical German 
development policy and, more broadly, to Third World development itself, see Birrenbach’s foreword, 
dated 17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2 and Birrenbach’s Text 
for the ATH-Werkszeitung, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2.  The FTS financed as well the efforts of the 
Research Society for the World Refugee Problem (whose German section was located in Bad Godesberg).   
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European unity82; and expanded the understanding of the historical evolution of Eastern 
Europe.83  Facilitated by the linkages of personalities like Arnold Bergstraesser and Karl 
Hettlage (Chairman of the Ifo-Institut) to the FTS Wissenschaftlichen Beirat, such 
endeavors offered Germans a greater knowledge and experi nce of a wide range of 
geographical regions, themes, and institutions relevant to the Atlanticist outlook.  With its 
heavy involvement in Israel, the Thyssen Stiftung also played a notable role in cultivating 
Jewish opinion, an undertaking that was itself, in part, a central element of the Atlanticist 
efforts.84  Such grants were not always based on strictly scholarly criteria, with 
Birrenbach remarking regarding one particular application that “the scientific 
qualification appears somewhat doubtful to us.  We se  in it more a political gesture and 
a help action for the benefit of Israel.”85  In this respect, the foundation served not merely 
as a scientific-financial instrument but, as in many other projects and areas that we have 
                                                
82 For instance, the Stiftung supported the setting up [“Aufbau”]  of a research center at the University of 
Cologne aiming at the standardization of European law and involving three institutes for international law 
that had come together there for this purpose.  TheLand NRW had acknowledged these efforts by 
allocating the means for the construction of a commn institute building [Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 17 
September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2]. 
83 Here, the Thyssen Stiftung financed the formation and works of a commission devoted to the exploring 
of the intellectual-historical [“ geistesgeschichtlichen”] development of Eastern Europe, a project that 
produced numerous publications [Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year 
anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2]. 
84 Over the years, the Thyssen Stiftung made considerable grants for specific projects to universities and 
institutes in Israel, including the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the University of Tel Aviv, the Marine 
Biological Institute in Eilat, the Weizmann Institue in Rehovot, and the Ecumenical Institute of Jerusalem 
for Higher Theological Studies.  For example, already in 1961, the Stiftung was supporting the cooperation 
of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft with the Weizmann Institute.  The Thyssen Stiftung also funded the work 
of the Leo Baeck Institute in London, including a project on German-Jewish relations in the 19th century.  
On the significant financial assistance provided by the FTS to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the 
Weizmann Institute for the purpose of scientific research and development and on Birrenbach’s visits to 
these two institutions in his capacity as chairman of “the Thyssen Fund” on his trip to Israel in the spring of 
1971, see the article “Die EEC wird vor Frankreich nicht kapitulieren,” by Dan Patir, Davar, 17 May 1971, 
ACDP K096/1.   
85 KB to Axel Springer, 17 December 1973, ACDP K029/1.  This assessment referred to a DM 500,000 
grant to the Hebrew University for a program on “The Relief of Pain.”     
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been describing, also as a political one.  Here, the FTS functioned within the larger 
framework of German-Israeli economic and wissenschaftlicher cooperation.86   
Other Atlanticist-minded German foundations aside from the Thyssen Stiftung, 
and sometimes in conjunction with it, also proved valuable in providing the necessary 
funding for Atlanticist institutions and activities and for further international endeavors.  
For instance, additional German foundations joined th  Thyssen Stiftung in financing the 
Atlantic Institute’s special projects.  Of particular importance in this regard was the 
Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, which was not only internationally oriented but in its grants 
also attached great emphasis to the necessity of promoting German-American relations.  
In fact, the StVWW enjoyed certain advantages over the T yssen Stiftung insofar as it 
dwarfed the latter in size and was, therefore, more abl  and willing to devote money to 
projects beyond that of mere research, including the li eral building up of infrastructure.  
Along with the Thyssen Stiftung, the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk was, for example, among 
the most generous of the new German foundations in funding a variety of activities and 
                                                
86 On the existing economic cooperation with Israel, including trade and German private investment, that 
involved many sectors of the Wirtschaft and on the interest of the president of the Weizmann Institute in 
collaborating with German firms in researching the exploitation of solar energy, see the Report of the Israel 
Delegation of the BDI, March 1976, ACDP K096/2.  Onthe scientific cooperation between the Federal 
Republic and Israel, including the personal contact especially between young Wissenschaftlern from both 
countries (e.g. the Minerva-Stipendien program), on the pioneering role in this cooperation of Dr. Josef 
Cohn, on the significant and desired impact of such cooperation (itself older than the diplomatic relations 
between the two countries) in the political realm, and on the salient role of a number of private and public 
institutions and individuals in supporting, including financially, such wissenschaftliche collaboration (i.e. 
the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung; StVWW and its then General Secretary, Gotthard Gambke; Alexander von 
Humboldt Stiftung; Bosch Stiftung; Bertelsmann Stiftung; MPG; DFG; DAAD; and Bundesministerium für 
Forschung und Technologie), see “Die wissenschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen D utschland und Israel,” 
Referat of Dr. H. Lehr (BMFT) by the opening of the German-Israeli Conference on 11 November 1980 in 
Bonn, ACDP K094/1.  According to Lehr, the Minerva-Stipendien program, which had been initially 
funded by the “Volkswagen-Stiftung” but whose financing had since been taken over by the BMFT, had 
now reached an annual volume of DM 1 million.  On German institutions as major sources of funding for 
German-Israeli wissenschaftliche cooperation during the years 1976-79, see “Leistungen deutscher 
Institutionen für wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit Israel,” dated March 1980, ACDP K094/1.  
According to this document, institutions providing sums during this period for such projects included the 
Stiftung Volkswagenwerk (DM 7.71 million); the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung (DM 0.6 million); the 
Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (DM 0.7 million, including in 1979 the Martin Buber-chair at 
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem); and the DFG (DM 9.8 million).   
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needs of the Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik.87  Indeed, some of the 
Atlanticist projects that we have already mentioned with respect to the Thyssen Stiftung 
were in reality joint operations also financed at the same time by further German 
foundations.  For example, the Evros-Meric project was actually supported by the FTS in 
conjunction with the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, involving a total grant from these two 
institutions of approximately $100,000.88  Naturally, Birrenbach’s knowledge of and 
connections to these other Stiftungen, particularly Volkswagen, could also prove useful in 
acquiring essential funding for Atlanticist projects.  Birrenbach not only helped direct 
Atlanticist proposals for research or infrastructural development to the appropriate 
foundations, whether to Thyssen, Volkswagen or wherev r, but also offered a respected 
reference, sage advice and his own personal backing for many such applications.89   
The upshot of the developments we have been depicting in this section was the 
construction of a German foundation system that was outward looking and, with respect 
to the individual major German Stiftungen and especially taken as a whole, extremely 
                                                
87 The Stiftung Volkswagenwerk’s linkage to the DGAP was given institutional expression, for instance, 
through the membership of DGAP President Günter Henle o  the StVWW Kuratorium.  In March 1963, 
the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk approved DM 300,000 for various DGAP projects over th  upcoming years to 
1965, including DM 210,000 for the continuation of the Jahrbücher (see Chapter 7).  In 1965 and 1968, 
further considerable means were granted for the Jahrbücher and a large research project exploring the 
Federal Republic’s available foreign policy options.  Even more vital was the munificent support, about 
DM 2 million, of the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk for the acquisition of the DGAP building on the 
Adenauerallee in Bonn. 
88 Draft Report, NPC Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries, October 1966, ACDP K049/2.  
Likewise, the support of the Thyssen Stiftung for the conferences of the International Association for 
Cultural Freedom was undertaken with the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk and the Krupp Stiftung, as well as the 
Ford Foundation. 
89 As the Thyssen Stiftung was unable to assist as of the spring of 1966 with respect to funding for the 
development of the Atlantic Institute library, Birrenbach thus pointed the AI Director of Studies at the time, 
Prof. Leslie Lipson (a naturalized American citizen originally from Britain), towards the Stiftung 
Volkswagenwerk (Lipson to KB, 6 April 1966, ACDP K107/2 and KB toLipson, 21 April 1966, ACDP 
K107/2).  The significance to the Atlanticist infrastructure of Birrenbach’s connections to the various 
German foundations is demonstrated once more, again with regard to the funding of the Atlantic Institue, 
by the plan of Walter Dowling, the AI Director General, to approach with Birrenbach’s help the 
Volkswagen and Thyssen foundations with an outline of a proposed study on the US-West European 
technological gap (Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Committee at the Atlantic Institute, 28 Novemb r 
1966, ACDP K107/2).  This project would indeed be realized and its results published by 1970.      
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valuable in helping to finance Atlanticist infrastructure and causes.  Thus, citing just one 
case among many, West German foundations, the Thyssen Stiftung among them, provided 
approximately $52,700 in 1971 alone solely for the abovementioned special projects of 
the Atlantic Institute.  This overall construction process began in institutional terms with 
the founding of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung in the late 1950s and continued at least 
throughout the 1960s.  Birrenbach played a major role in this phenomenon both through 
his work within the Thyssen Stiftung and through his broader efforts to impart a 
cosmopolitan perspective to the German foundations and to promote cooperation on an 
international scale.  To a certain extent, as with the other Atlanticist institutions we have 
already discussed in the preceding chapter, the German Stiftungen not only promoted the 
cause of Atlanticism through their grants as well as their contacts and cooperation with 
foreign, especially American, foundations and such but also represented an element of 
Atlantic integration in and of themselves due to their considerably Americanized form.  
Like the Atlanticist advocates of the linkage between Wissenschaft and Politik, some of 
whom, like Birrenbach, were directly involved with the Stiftungen, the Atlanticist-minded 
foundations also strove through their grantmaking to encourage interdisciplinarity and the 
acquisition of distinctly practical knowledge.  Whatever its other functions may have 
been, we can assert with conviction that the foundation system, including the Fritz 
Thyssen Stiftung, formed a key sub-network within the overarching Atlanticist financing 
network of which Birrenbach was such a central part.   
I. Contexts of German Atlanticist Financing 
Among the significant questions with respect to financing that confronted the 
German Atlanticists was the issue of taxes, a concern that had institutional consequences.   
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For example, and perhaps most importantly, that German foundations enjoyed special tax 
privileges represented one of their primary attractions and a definite stimulus to their 
development.90  This concern with taxation was also the main motive for the founding of 
the Atlantica eV in December 1961 in Hamburg, an endeavor in which B rrenbach played 
a key role.  This organization largely grew out of his efforts during 1961, including 
contacts with the Federal Finance Ministry and the NRW Finance Ministry, to secure a 
tax-exempt status of the private German contributions f r the Atlantic Institute in the 
Federal Republic.  The Atlantica Vorstand, comprising the original German members of 
the AI Board of Governors, Friedrich Carl von Oppenh im (Sal. Oppenheim Jr. & Cie), 
Fritz Berg (BDI President) and Birrenbach, was testament to the institution’s essentially 
fundraising mission within the Wirtschaft.91  The Atlantica, as noted in Chapter 4, shared 
its Geschäftsführung (essentially Walter Stahl) with the Atlantik-Brücke, an arrangement 
designed to save on costs and one in which Birrenbach also had a notable hand.  The 
success of the Atlantica in attaining charitable status, rendering contribuions through it 
to the AI tax-deductible (as was also the case in the US), facilitated the canvassing of 
donations and the recruiting of new members from major business firms and, further, 
gave the German Atlanticists a considerable advantage in fundraising vis-à-vis many of 
their European counterparts.92  Henceforth, the Atlantica concentrated primarily on 
raising the German contribution to the AI, which entailed not only securing a sufficient 
                                                
90 On Stiftungen as optimal financial sources for many due to their “charitable status [Gemeinnützigkeit],” 
see the Report about the Efforts of the WIPOG for a Mobilization of the Stiftungsinitiativen, 
Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, Frankfurt am Main, ACDP K015.   
91 Within the Atlantica, Oppenheim was 1st Chairman, Birrenbach 2nd Chairman, and Berg Treasurer.  The 
Cologne-based Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim Jr. & Cie, with figures like Oppenhim, Robert Pferdmenges, 
Harald Kühnen, and Nikolaus Graf Strasoldo of special relevance in a variety of capacities to Birrenbach, 
was the “Hausbank” of the Thyssen group.   
92 This matter of taxation was also one of the reasons that the Europeans taken as a whole, even with the 
Canadians factored in on their side of the account, had so much difficulty matching the American 
contributions to the Atlantic Institute.   
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private donation, though this was its main task, but also, when necessary, prodding an 
occasionally delinquent Auswärtiges Amt to transfer its contribution, as well.93   
Whatever its obvious advantages with respect to the nettlesome problem of 
taxation, the creation of the Atlantica also contributed to the multiplicity of Atlanticist 
institutions facing uninitiated potential German members and contributors, a situation 
occasionally presenting difficulties of its own regarding fundraising.  Among the results 
of such prolific Atlanticist institution-building was the existence of so many private 
Atlantic organizations, often possessing such similar names (Atlantica, Atlantik-Brücke, 
Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft, A lantic Institute, etc.), that some contributors from 
the Wirtschaft, like Wolfgang Pohle, eventually became confused and, quite bluntly, fed 
up.  This state of affairs even led some figures and firms to offer negative responses to 
the approaches of the German Atlanticists, including for instance of the Atlantica, to 
recruit members and secure contributions.  By the early 1960s, a quite clear sense existed 
in quarters of the always vital Wirtschaft that there were too many apparently similar 
Atlanticist organizations, that such a great multitde would lead to waste and, to the 
detriment of the contributors themselves, that there r igned in effect a “double money 
requirement” for what was essentially the same purpose.  Therefore, demands could be 
heard for a more effective coordination or, better yet, a fusion.  In reaction to such 
complaints, Birrenbach and the other members of the A lantica Vorstand examined this 
dilemma as well as possible solutions, especially pertaining to that institution.  However, 
they concluded that the various Atlanticist organiztions, given their complementary 
                                                
93 The importance of the Atlantica’s work in sustaining the Atlantic Institute is suggested by the fact that 
during the 1960s the AI was funded 85% by private contributions from the member countries (primarily 
individuals, business firms and foundations) and only 15% by government contributions.  See, for example, 
the Protocol of the Atlantica eV Annual Assembly on 19 June 1963 in Cologne, ACDP K108/2.   
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natures, were simply too different to bring even just a few under a single roof.  Despite 
plentiful attempts at explaining this, the confusion and frustration about the similar 
names, diverse functions and specific goals of the myriad Atlanticist organizations 
persisted among certain personalities of the Wirtschaft at least into the late 1960s.94 
To now, we have focused on the German financing of the infrastructure in which 
the German Atlanticists directly took part.  Of course, non-German financing also played 
an important role in maintaining some of these institutions, particularly those elements 
primarily international in character.  For organizations such as the Atlantic Institute, the 
Monnet Committee and the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, German funding was 
just one source among many, albeit, regardless of what method was employed to 
determine relative shares, almost always a considerable one.  Private and public 
contributions for this purpose were obtained from each of the participating countries, 
varying in their exact proportions from institution to institution.95  This financing flowed 
from essentially the same types of sources as did the German financing, namely political 
parties, trade unions, businesses, foundations, a few individuals, and governments as well 
as, at times, from inter-governmental organizations.96  In some cases, even a strictly 
                                                
94 On this theme, see Walter Stahl to KB, 4 May 1962; Dr. Wolfgang Pohle, Generalbevollmächtigter of 
the Flick KG, Düsseldorf, to Oppenheim, 2 September 1964; and Oppenheim to Pohle, 16 September 1964, 
all contained in ACDP K108/2.   
95 The Atlantic Institute, for instance, was funded by the countries, nineteen members in 1961, of what as 
deemed the Atlantic Community, with these specific pr vate and/or public contributions proportionately 
drawn according to the economic strength of those cuntries, naturally meaning that Birrenbach and the 
West Germans were charged with raising a comparatively substantial sum.  Meanwhile, in the NATO 
Parliamentarians Conference, the relative contributions were determined by applying NATO’s Civil and 
Military Budget Cost-Sharing Formula.  As of 1961, according to this measure, West Germany’s share 
would be 16.10% or a projected N.F. 88,550 of a totl projected budget of N.F. 550,000, fourth most 
behind, in order, the United States, the United Kingdom and France (NPC Draft Budget for Financial Year 
1961, ACDP K055/1).   
96 To cite just one case of governmental support and financing, the German participants in the expanded 
extraordinary KWC Steering Committee meeting in Lond  in November 1966 were treated as guests of 
the British government, which also defrayed the travel expenses.  Particular government agencies also did 
their part, with the US Information Agency, for instance, helping the Atlantic Institute early on by 
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German organization like the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik received 
funding for its activities from abroad, in the DGAP’s case from American foundations.  
In fact, early American and British financing of certain German Atlanticist institutions, 
such as the DEG and the DGAP, during the years of the occupation and of the High 
Commission proved critical to their creation and survival.97  Over the years, prestigious 
American foundations, including especially the Ford Foundation but also the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for Internatio l Peace, played a particularly 
prominent role in financing the Atlanticist organizations.  A grant from such a foundation 
provided not only immediate and often substantial funding but also burnished the 
reputation of the recipient project or institution, along with the accompanying benefits, 
and was therefore coveted all the more by the elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure.98 
                                                                                                                                      
providing $10,000 for the institute’s library (AI Progress Report on the Institute’s Program, 26 April 1961, 
ACDP K107/1).  With respect to inter-governmental organizations, we can point to occasional assistance 
from the Inter-American Development Bank, for example to the Atlantic Institute, including a grant for the 
study A Monetary Policy for Latin America, which would be first published in 1965 (Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Policy Committee held at the Atlantic Institute in Paris, 5 December 1965, ACDP K107/2).  
Though not strictly financing, early meetings of the Atlantic Institute, including of the Board of Governors 
and of the Policy Committee in 1960-61, were held at the NATO and at the OECD headquarters in Paris.  
97 Thus, the British occupation government subsidized th  early Vorträge of the Deutsch-Englischen 
Gesellschaft.  Similarly, the American High Commission played a noteworthy role, particularly financially, 
in the creation (July 1952) and the future viability of Theodor Steltzer’s Institut für Europäische Politik und 
Wirtschaft, the predecessor of the DGAP. 
98 The DGAP received financial support for its projects and activities not only from the Ford Foundation, 
but also from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  See, for 
early examples, the Draft for a Budget Estimate 1956 of the DGAP eV, 16 April 1956, ACDP K213/4 and 
the Minutes of the Mitgliederversammlung of the DGAP eV on 16 July 1958 in Bad Godesberg, ACDP 
K118/1.  For Birrenbach on a considerable portion of the expenses of the Monnet Committee being funded 
by the Ford Foundation (“a major American foundation”), see Birrenbach’s Memorandum, 12 July 1966, 
ACDP K050/2.  With regard to the Atlantic Institute, which had sought long-term financing from Ford 
from the very start, the Ford Foundation shouldered a sizeable burden of the budget (1969: 42.2%; 
projected 1973: 25.7%) (Kurzprotokoll of the Atlantica Member Assembly on 16 June 1969, ACDP  
K106/1).  In 1965, Ford provided the Atlantic Institu e with a grant of (in German terms) DM 2 million, 
with a chunk of this sum earmarked “for meetings of young men and women who will achieve in the 
coming years leadership positions within the Atlantic world” (Walter Stahl circular letter to Atlantica 
members, 25 June 1965, ACDP K108/2).  Into the early 1970s, and perhaps beyond, the Bilderberg 
Conferences were financed, at least to some extent, by the Ford Foundation.  As we shall see in Chapter 8, 
the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (technically distinct from the Rockefeller Foundation) would play a central 
role in financing the Atlantic Institute’s “Young Leaders” conferences, while the Rockefeller Foundation 
itself would assist such functions as well, for instance by making available and playing host at the facilities 
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In the previous chapter, we alluded to the reality that the emergence of an 
extensive Atlanticist infrastructure as well as its a tendant networks and, at times, 
rhetoric, while intimating the advent of certain aspects of an incipient Atlanticist identity, 
did not truly indicate, at least yet, the simultaneous emergence of a full-blown, genuine, 
predominantly Atlanticist identity.  This situation is further borne out by the competitive 
nature of much of the fundraising pertaining to the Atlanticist infrastructure, predicated 
on a desire not to be outdone by one’s party-politica  or national counterparts, fellow 
Atlanticists though they may have been.  Birrenbach was acutely conscious of this factor 
and played on such considerations in his fundraising efforts, for instance with respect to 
the Monnet Committee vis-à-vis his own party in 196-62 and 1968 as well as with 
regard to the West German contribution for the Kennedy Memorial Library in 1964 (see 
Chapter 7).  In the latter case, Birrenbach even utilized his contacts abroad, for instance 
in Washington, DC, to remain abreast of the amounts of he donations being provided 
from other countries and exploited such information in his appeals to ensure that greater 
sums were forthcoming from West German sources, among them the federal government.  
Here, Birrenbach urged Chancellor Erhard while explaining his fundamental logic: 
“Since few countries in the world are so vitally interested in a good relationship to the 
United States as the Federal Republic, I believe that, in view of the… given figures, a 
scrutinizing [Überprüfung] of the cabinet decision regarding this is justified.”99   
                                                                                                                                      
of the Villa Serbelloni at Bellagio in the spring of 1966.  On the substantial financing the WIPOG enjoyed 
in 1955 from the Ford Foundation, see the Report about the Efforts of the WIPOG for a Mobilization of the 
Stiftungsinitiativen, Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, Frankfurt am Main, ACDP K015.  
Finally, on the generous support provided since deca s by the large American “Stiftungen”  to the German 
Wissenschaft, see Birrenbach’s Text for the ATH-Werkszeitung, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2.  The 
Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace were all 
headquartered in New York City (Carnegie would eventually move to Washington, DC).   
99 KB to Erhard, 29 October 1964, ACDP K052/1.  The final West German total ultimately placed second 
behind the British among the nations taking part in th s KML donation action. 
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Of course, the subject of Atlanticist financing is s multaneously and intimately 
wrapped up with themes of influence and power.  Along with financial clout and 
assistance also came some measure of control over Atlanticist activities.  Particularly the 
case, since this was an Atlanticist infrastructure not blessed with an endless abundance of 
funds; rather, these institutions generally relied upon limited financial resources to carry 
out their activities and projects, leading them to treasure all the more the sources of 
income vital to their very existence.  Therefore, it should come as no surprise, for 
example, that the Ford Foundation exercised considerable sway over the staging of the 
Atlantik-Brücke’s German-American Conferences, in which it regularly played such an 
essential role in covering the American expenses through its grants to the American 
Council on Germany.  Such influence was exerted especially by Shepard Stone and John 
McCloy, along with the ACG’s Christopher Emmet, on the organization, agenda and 
format of the conferences and on the size and composition, including age, of the 
American, and even to some extent German, delegations.  It is also no coincidence that 
Birrenbach became a member of the DGAP’s räsidium at approximately the same time 
that the Thyssen Stiftung, thanks largely to his efforts, began providing in the early 1960s 
significant and crucial sums for that organization’s endeavors.  Indeed, no assessment of 
Birrenbach’s influence and position within the Atlanticist infrastructure would be 
complete without recognizing his centrality in the realm of financing.   
J. Conclusion 
The German, and in some cases non-German, financing for the Atlanticist 
infrastructure that we have depicted in the preceding chapter originated from a variety of 
sources: trade unions, political parties, certain individuals, government, and the 
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Wirtschaft.  The desire to attract funds was a constant thread running through the 
discussions and efforts of the German Atlanticists and impacted on their organizations in 
myriad ways.  Notably, the matter of taxation encouraged the establishment of certain 
new or, at least previously, rarely utilized institutions and organizational forms in the 
Federal Republic, including the Atlantica but more significantly the private Stiftung.  
Indeed, when analyzing the Atlanticist infrastructure in which Birrenbach operated, it is 
not sufficient to simply refer to action committees, research institutes, conferences and 
the like.  There also existed an elaborate financing network and infrastructure providing 
essential funding, of which the system of major West German foundations that emerged 
beginning in the late 1950s functioned as an integral sub-network.  As we discovered, the 
origins and operating of the German Stiftungen in close connection with the Wirtschaft 
belies general notions, propounded by some, of foundations as virtually subordinate to 
the state or, alternatively, as a genuinely “third sector” of public life not only divorced 
from the state but also somehow from the business and economic world.  Like the 
elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure already examined in Chapter 4, the inspiration 
and models of the funding bodies and methods employed, most notably, but not only, of 
these West German Stiftungen, allows us to speak of an Americanization of the financing 
of that Atlanticist infrastructure.  Naturally, fina cial contributions were also tantamount 
to power within the infrastructure, something worth keeping in mind, also when assessing 
the claims of many Atlanticist institutions to be completely independent of the state.   
Birrenbach’s role in this financing of the German Atlanticist infrastructure was an 
essential one, arguably his most crucial within these organizations.  Most striking was 
Birrenbach’s part in the creation and development of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, which, in 
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no small degree due to his influence, itself became  significantly Atlanticist-minded 
institution, as reflected in its grantmaking, and stimulated the creation of further such 
foundations in the Bundesrepublik.  Furthermore, Birrenbach was a central figure in 
promoting the internationalization of the Thyssen Stiftung and of the German foundation 
system as a whole, thus integrating them into an eve  broader network that also included 
preeminent American foundations.  Thanks largely to his outstanding contacts, which 
often transcended political divisions, throughout the various sectors of society, 
Birrenbach served, less spectacularly but no less significantly, as a link between the 
Atlanticist organizations and activities, on one hand, and their indispensable 
aforementioned financial wellsprings, on the other, p rhaps most vitally, but by no means 
only, the Wirtschaft (including the foundations).  Frequently acting with the 
encouragement of and in consultation and cooperation w th the administration of the 
explicitly Atlanticist organizations, Birrenbach consistently demonstrated a remarkable 
proficiency and sure sense in his fundraising of where the necessary money could be 
found and precisely how to go about securing it.  Without Birrenbach’s strenuous work, 
institutions like the Atlantic Institute, the DGAP Study Groups and the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik would likely have never found a firm financial footing and 
rapidly crumbled.  Moreover, without the efforts of Birrenbach, and others at least 
approximating him in some respects, the German Atlanticist infrastructure would 
certainly have never obtained the substantial funding v tal to sustaining itself.100 
                                                
100 Though not directly addressed in this chapter, Birrenbach’s financing endeavors stretched beyond those 
relating to strictly Atlanticist institutions and activities and included assistance in locating funding for 
historical collaborations, cultural conferences, publishing ventures as well as others’ health and family 
expenses.   
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Chapter 6: Kurt Birrenbach and the Political Functioning of the Atlanticist Network 
A. Introduction 
Having explored the institutional elements of the German Atlanticist 
infrastructure, the financing of that infrastructure and Birrenbach’s crucial role in both, it 
is now time to turn to the more strictly political activities of the trans-Atlantic network, to 
Birrenbach’s actual political efforts within this network and to the functioning and impact 
of this Atlanticist network in the political realm of the Federal Republic.  In the process 
of examining these subjects, we shall integrate and stress some of the earlier themes 
investigated in this study, particularly the significant role and effects of the Atlanticist 
infrastructure.  As in previous chapters, the aim will not be to give a detailed account of 
Birrenbach’s political activity, but rather to highlight certain aspects of it that shed light 
on the evolution of German Atlanticism in the Bundesrepublik and on the world of the 
West German politician of Atlanticist stripe.     
B. Birrenbach, Atlanticism and Foreign Policy Thought 
Having referred to Birrenbach repeatedly as an Atlanticist, it is now necessary to 
explore in some detail his Atlanticist thought and proposals.  For Birrenbach, Atlanticism 
comprised no vague Tagespragmatik, something he considered a “great temptation,” but 
also a “dangerous” one.1  Beyond his efforts for the closest possible cooperation between 
the United States and Western Europe, Birrenbach’s Atlanticism consisted of ambitious, 
forward-looking constructs, such as Atlantic Community and, especially and more 
concretely, Atlantic Partnership.  Seeking to transce d the obsolete form of a classical 
military alliance, these Atlanticist conceptions involved a “global” consultation and 
cooperation between the United States and Western Europe in a wide variety of areas, 
                                                
1 KB to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1. 
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including on foreign political, security, economic, monetary, scientific, development, 
energy, social and cultural issues.2  Related to this desire for cooperation and 
consultation, Birrenbach foresaw, especially with respect to the Community idea, the 
creation of entirely new institutions as well as the functional expansion (NATO, OECD) 
and upgrading (NATO Parliamentarians Conference) of xisting ones.3  Ultimately, 
Birrenbach hoped that a strong, integrated Western Eu ope, united not just economically, 
in the EEC, but also politically and “speaking with one voice,” would become a real 
partner for the US in a close, equal, interdependent, global relationship in the conduct of 
world affairs.4  Birrenbach’s adherence to these ambitious blueprints was consistent, even 
                                                
2 For example, KB to US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 28 June 1974, ACDP K184/1 and the 
Protocol of the KB-Helmut Sonnenfeldt Talk during Birrenbach’s Trip to the United States of May 1975, 
ACDP K155/1.  On the insufficiency of a classical alliance, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP 
K184/2.  On the view of those American personalities especially positively oriented towards the Federal 
Republic that American relations with Europe, and particularly with the Federal Republic, were more than 
a purely military “Zweckbündnis,” see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, 
ACDP K021/1.   
3 See Birrenbach’s book, The Future of the Atlantic Community: Toward European-American Partnership 
(New York: Praeger, 1963) or his article “Pulling Atlantica Together,” Freedom & Union, Vol. 16, No. 10, 
October 1961.  As noted in Chapter 4, Birrenbach advocated the upgrading of the NPC into a legislative 
assembly, initially at least into an advisory body.  For Birrenbach’s stress on the need for an 
institutionalization of US-EEC relations, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-
Fraktion, 12 November 1970, ACDP K140/2. 
4 On the need for European economic and monetary union and political integration, see KB to Monnet, 
Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2.  On the need for supranational elements in a European political 
union, see KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 
1964, ACDP K014/2 and KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, 
ACDP K013/1.  Birrenbach saw the EEC forming the basis of a future political unity, believing that an 
EEC that eventually reached the stage of an economic union with a common trade policy would itself 
represent such a far-reaching process of political integration that it would form the starting point (ot 
automatically, but via a “Sachzwang”) for a further political integration, including the development of 
political institutions with respect to foreign and defense policy.  Indeed, for Birrenbach, this represented the 
main goal of economic integration.  Such a political unity would seek to implement common policies with 
respect to areas like foreign trade and arms development and production [KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-
Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1].  
Birrenbach’s desire for a European political union placed significant limits, in his mind, on the prospects 
for expansion, for it excluded the possibility of neutrals entering as full members since they would 
undermine the process of Willensbildung in such a political unity [KB to Müller-Armack, 6 August 1969, 
ACDP K023/1].  Birrenbach’s stress on political unio  was also probably responsible for his insistence that 
the countries of Eastern Europe would have to change their political systems and take on the principles of 
freedom valid in the West in order to enter the EEC (Birrenbach remarks made at the June 1972 meeting in 
Cologne of the Conference Group on German Politics in Panel III, dealing with “Germany, Common 
Market, United States,” ACDP K028/1).  For Birrenbach’s belief that a closely integrated Europe, speaking 
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with one voice, would automatically become a partner of the United States in a way impossible for 
individual European nation-states the size of France, England or Germany, see KB to Marc Ullmann, 
L’Express, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  Birrenbach viewed the desired further development 
towards a European unification within the context of, even encouraging or compelling, an increased and 
partner-like coordination of American-European interests (KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 
September 1969, ACDP K023/2).  On West European unification, including political unity, as a 
precondition and largely motivated by the desire for the creation of equal relations between Europe and the 
United States, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2 and KB to Barzel, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 20 November 1969, ACDP K126/1.  For the element of equality 
between the EC and the US in this Atlantic Partnership, with the unified Europe that Birrenbach had in 
mind, including Britain, not being a dependent or satellite, rather a power that would automatically be a 
relatively equal [gleichwertiger] partner of and exercise a greater independence in its relations with the US, 
see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  On the economic, monetary and 
political union of Europe as vital to the creation of a new power center in the world that would become a 
real partner of the United States, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For 
Birrenbach’s expectation that a politically unified Europe would cooperate with and significantly ease the 
position of the US, see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, 
ACDP K188/2.  On the danger of a potential “dissoluti n of American-European relations into bilateral 
relations,” see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupe, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  
Birrenbach believed that an expanded, united Europe, namely one including Britain and one including the
“widening and strengthening” of its institutions, even if that Europe initially only comprised economic 
matters and never reached the stage of a federation, would become a real foreign political “power factor,” 
something that it still was not today, which could make itself felt in its relations to the United States, the 
Soviet Union and the Third World and would contribute to changing the fundamental conditions on which 
the East-West conflict rested (KB to Schieder, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2).  For Birrenbach’s 
hopes for progress in “the European development…, which sooner or later could lead to confederative 
forms” comprising a “Konzertierung of the foreign and defense policy,” see again KB to Schieder, 29 
September 1969, ACDP K023/2.  For Birrenbach on the Atlantic Partnership as the fundamental and 
principal goal of the Federal Republic, see KB to McCloy, 27 February 1973, ACDP K210/1.  On the need 
for the United States government and a single European organ to work together from the perspective of 
common interest, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. 
One prominent element of Birrenbach’s ideas regarding an Atlantic Partnership among equals, in 
this case representing its extension into the fieldof nuclear defense, was that of a European nuclear option 
that would come into being with and was indeed one f the incentives for the creation of a future 
(politically) united European federation.  With command and control of nuclear weapons not left entirely to 
the United States, this second nuclear decision center a d component in the West would exist alongside but 
remain closely integrated with that of the US and would closely integrate its nuclear forces with the nuclear 
deterrent power of the US within the Atlantic alliance on the basis of common institutions in a way 
acceptable to the US.  On these issues, see, for example, KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in 
Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2; KB to 
Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; KBto Prof. Edward Teller, University 
of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1; KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, 
ACDP K139/2; KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 
November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  Birrenbach referred to the Anglo-American cooperation during World 
War II as a possible model for the relationship of the United States to a European nuclear option, 
suggesting the possibility of the American President becoming the “executive agent” of a Western nuclear 
partnership [KB to Kiesinger, 13 January 1967, ACDP K117/2].  On the European nuclear component 
representing no genuine alternative to the American component vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (“due to the 
technological deficit, the enormous financial burden and the geographical disadvantages”), and therefore 
the need for continued full American nuclear protection in combination with the all-European nuclear 
component, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Dir ctor of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP 
K184/1.  Birrenbach also foresaw the future possibility of a European ABM system of purely defensive 
nuclear weapons, a national anti-rocket defense being t chnically unthinkable for a state the size of the 
Federal Republic (KB to Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1).  For Birrenbach’s argument that an 
integrated Atlantic collective nuclear weapon system should contain a European clause providing for the 
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as he found himself increasingly isolated in this regard, including even at Atlanticist 
gatherings.5  Birrenbach realized that such elaborate conceptions c uld not be attained 
overnight, yet they also provided him in the short-te m with an orientation by which to 
judge events and policies.6  Ultimately, much of Birrenbach’s political activity aimed at 
facilitating the emergence of these overarching Atlanticist constructs.7 
                                                                                                                                      
re-negotiation of the agreement as soon as a political y united Europe came into being, see KB to Chet 
Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 
1966, ACDP K117/1.   
5 On Birrenbach’s laments that such ideas were, for example, either no longer mentioned (in the case of 
Community) or thinned out “in a dangerous way” (Partne ship), see KB to William Diebold, Jr., Council on
Foreign Relations, Inc., 25 June 1963, ACDP K157/1; KB to Christian Herter, Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations, 3 April 1964, ACDP K155/3 (here with reference to his impressions in Washington 
and at the Bilderberg Conference in Williamsburg in 1964); KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, 
ACDP K068/1; Hahn, FPRI, to KB, 5 October 1973, ACDP K184/1.  Birrenbach also sensed in the United 
States under President Lyndon Johnson (a man under whom America “thinks more in purely American 
concepts”) a loss of interest in Europe, not only because of Vietnam, and even suggested that “the times of 
the ‘Grand Designs’ are over” (KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International 
Affairs, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2).  Berndt von Staden, in the German embassy in the United States, 
agreed with Birrenbach in December 1966 that “the ‘wo pillars theory’ of Atlantic Partnership meets with 
increasing skepticism” (apparently at least in the US), particularly due to European failures, and believ d 
that “time is running out” for “the Atlantic Partnership of the Monnet stamp” (Botschaftsrat I. Kl. Berndt 
von Staden to KB, 3 December 1966, ACDP K139/2).  However, for Birrenbach continuing to raise the 
idea of Atlantic Partnership, see for instance KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2; 
the Protocol of the KB-Helmut Sonnenfeldt Talk during Birrenbach’s Trip to the United States of May 
1975, ACDP K155/1; and Kurt Birrenbach, “Amerika-fühlt es sich alleingelassen?”, Die Welt, 14 June 
1975.  For Birrenbach’s frustration that the notion of a partnership had never been sufficiently defined, yet 
for his argument still in January 1974 in favor of an Atlantic Partnership with its two pillars “corresponding 
to the old Kennedy project,” see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 
January 1974, ACDP K184/1. 
6 As of the early 1960s, Birrenbach anticipated a rather lengthy process of about two to three decades for 
the attainment of a true Atlantic Community.  For Bi renbach acknowledging the obstacles still to be 
overcome on the way to an integrated Atlantic nuclear weapon system in which the Federal Republic could 
take part, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  On the long process required 
for European political integration, see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at 
the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.  For Birrenbach’s belief that the current time 
point was not ripe for a definitive political union f the Six in constitutional form given the fundamental 
differences between the Federal Republic and France o  crucial political questions, including on NATO 
integration, the multilateral NATO armed force, defense policy and East Asia, see KB to Bundesminister 
a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  On Birrenbach’s admission that the 
time was still not ripe for the creation of an effective European nuclear option, see Birrenbach’s Report on 
a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  On the lacking readiness of the 
European nations to take measures necessary to advance European unity, see KB to Monnet, Paris, 23 
March 1973, ACDP K140/2.  For Birrenbach’s rejection of those statements he read coming from the 
United States that Europe had become a great power, for his argument that Europe was an important factor 
in the world in a trade and monetary sense but “anythi g but a world power politically and militarily,” and 
that Europe would remain for the foreseeable time a “Zusammenschluss of sovereign states, still lacking a 
common concept and a genuine political integration,” see again Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. 
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Birrenbach’s desire for a British entry into the EEC requires some explanation.  
According to Birrenbach, he had supported Britain’s participation in Europe since the 
1950s, at one point even dating it to Churchill’s well-known speech at The Hague in May 
1948.8  In Birrenbach’s mind, the British presence would encourage a healthy evolution 
of the EEC’s internal structure.  Britain, with itsdemocratic tradition and pragmatic 
approach to institutional questions, would facilitate the community’s political integration 
and democratization.  A British presence in the EEC would also lend greater impetus to 
efforts to change certain “untenable policies,” not only the Luxembourg Compromise but 
also the Common Agricultural Policy.  Moreover, Birrenbach considered Britain’s entry 
                                                                                                                                      
Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  For Birrenbach’s reference to “the long process of 
[European] political integration,” see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at 
the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.   
7 For Birrenbach, such efforts included the further institutional strengthening and supranational integration 
of Europe, not just in the economic realm, but also in the political, monetary and military realms.  On
Birrenbach’s support for an integrated, multilateral Atlantic nuclear weapon system (such as the MLF or 
ANF), in which the Federal Republic and other nuclear and non-nuclear powers would take part, as to some 
extent a means to strengthen the trans-Atlantic bonds between Europe and the United States, see KB to 
William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 
21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2; KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International 
Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2; KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 
August 1965, ACDP K187/1; and KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  For 
Birrenbach’s support of improved European and trans-Atlantic consultation and coordination of foreign, 
military and trade (including East-West trade) policy and his proposals for mechanisms and such, see KB to 
Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; KB to Sen. Thomas 
Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to State Secretary Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 
December 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at the 
University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1; and Birrenbach’s remarks at the June 1972 meeting 
in Cologne of the Conference Group on German Politics n Panel III, dealing with “Germany, Common 
Market, United States,” ACDP K028/1.  For Birrenbach’s argument that, until a political integration tha  
would make Europe into a real partner of the United States, the Americans and Europeans should create a 
unifying framework, including whatever special channels were necessary (such as an EDC), based on a 
constant high-level dialogue, flow of information ad consultations between Europe and the United States, 
including in emergencies, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On 
Birrenbach’s proposal for the creation of a political onsultation mechanism, still not a political union, in 
the form of a transfer of the essential features of the Franco-German Treaty (January 1963) to the othr 
EEC member states, see KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 
13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.   
8 KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at the University of Cologne, 6 August 
1969, ACDP K023/1.  For the reference to the Churchill speech, see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 
1972, ACDP K068/1.  Birrenbach expected Britain would enter the EEC while still connected to the 
Commonwealth. 
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crucial to the external relations of a united western Europe.  In contrast to inward-looking 
France, Britain (like West Germany) was an outward-looking nation, one with great 
insight into world problems, that would nudge Europe in a similarly extroverted 
direction.  Furthermore, the presence of Britain, with its military, economic and 
demographic strength would enable Europe to play the role assigned to it of equal partner 
with the United States.  Without Britain, Birrenbach repeatedly insisted, a united Europe 
would be merely a “torso.”9  However, while Birrenbach generally took a benign view of 
British intentions, he also denied any attributions f Anglophilie, insisting that such a 
thing “is completely far from my mind,” and was well aware of the persistent difficulties 
with respect to Britain.  In this regard, the British economic and monetary situation, the 
state of affairs in Ireland and British attitudes towards Europe, including the lack of “a 
clear vision of the future,” were all the subject at imes of considerable concern and 
criticism.10  Nevertheless, securing Britain’s entrance into the EEC remained a central 
element of Birrenbach’s political activity until the ultimate success of 1973.11 
                                                
9 KB to Col. William Bass, London, 11 September 1972, ACDP K068/1.  For Birrenbach’s assessment that 
the entire European construction would be placed in question if Britain did not enter the EEC, see KB to 
Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.    
10 For the Anglophilie quote and for an example of Birrenbach’s insistence on Britain’s benign intentions, 
see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  
Also with respect to Birrenbach’s benign view of Britain, see his analysis that, especially due to the bad 
Anglo-French relations, Britain felt, rightly or wrongly, pushed away from the continent in KB, Munich, to 
Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  While there were positive factors, such 
as personalities like the Conservative Edward Heath, the primary villains in Birrenbach’s understanding of 
Britain over time were the irresponsible trade unions, an indolent population, the Labour Party and an 
inefficacious British government.  All of this undermined Britain’s potential role as a functioning partner in 
the EEC (KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU Deutschland, Chairman of the CDU/CSU- 
Fraktion, 10 July 1972, ACDP K026/1) and even led a frustrated Birrenbach to suggest in 1964 that, with 
respect to European issues, “the English are the weak spot” (KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard 
University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2) and to proclaim that same 
year that “at the moment England is simply no partner” (KB to Prof. Brandt, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1).  
On Britain’s poor economic situation and those respon ible for it, see KB to Barzel, 10 July 1972, ACDP 
K026/1.  For Birrenbach’s fears of the beginning of “an English period” (actually a reference to a Barzel 
phrase) with respect to labor difficulties, combined with industrial crisis, in the Federal Republic, see KB to 
Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1.  On the British 
attitude towards Europe and lack of a clear vision of the future, see KB to Prof. Brandt, 22 July 1964, 
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Birrenbach’s attitude towards France, for him the key continental West European 
nation, was less benign.  More than any other country, Birrenbach saw de Gaulle’s 
France intentionally undermining the principles and structures of European and Atlantic 
integration.  Rather than supranational integration in Europe, France sought hegemony 
                                                                                                                                      
ACDP K013/1 and KB to Prof. Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  Even in 1973, Birrenbach was 
still wondering whether “Britain is ready to accept a curtailment of her sovereign rights, which is the
indispensable precondition for a successful unification process” (KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP 
K184/2).  On Birrenbach’s frustration at the repeated British failure to take the lead in Europe, for instance 
by renouncing its national nuclear strike force to nter a multi-lateral European atomic strike force and thus 
to  preclude a solution of the current Brussels criis along the lines foreseen by Birrenbach, see KB to 
William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 
21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.  On Britain’s desire for national nuclear forces, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 
1973, ACDP K184/2.  On Britain’s “egocentric nuclear policy,” see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard 
University, Center for International Affairs, 30 Aug st 1965, ACDP K017/1.  For Birrenbach’s complete 
familiarity with the British attitude regarding Europe, about which he claimed “I do not have the least 
illusion,” on an indecisive Britain’s “policy of imobility” with respect to Europe, for the French rejection 
as a partial explanation and excuse for the lack of positive British attitudes towards Europe, and on 
Birrenbach’s desire to remove the question of British entrance into the EEC from the agenda for several 
years so as to avoid the blocking of a future larger Europe through a new, unqualified English “no,” see KB 
to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  For Birrenbach’s 
fears regarding the danger of a “veering off [Ausscheren]” of Britain with respect to Europe, namely the 
giving up of its intent to enter the EEC, if entrance negotiations were postponed beyond 1970, see KB to 
Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.  On Birrenbach’s continued hope 
that British policy would finally reflect “a realistic viewing of the situation of England in the second half of 
the twentieth century,” see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, 
ACDP K187/1.   
11 For an early example, see Birrenbach’s failed efforts in 1958-59 to convince the relevant German 
officials to bind Britain to the Federal Republic and the continent via a free-trade zone and an increased 
integration of armaments (KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP 
K074/2).  On the creation of a larger Europe as a precondition for a true partnership with the United States 
as well as on the need to leave the door to a political union open to those states that did not currently belong 
to the Six (including Britain) and to offer them the chance for entrance upon acceptance of the conditi s 
without the need for unanimity among all the participants, see KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von 
Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  While Birrenbach embraced the entrance of Britain 
and seems to have agreed with the widening of the EEC in principle, there were also limits or preconditions 
with respect to the entrance of further states.  Although we have already noted his rejection, for politica  
reasons, of the entrance as full members of neutral states such as Austria and Portugal, he was inclined to 
consider an association of these states with the EEC.  However, the American rejection of such association 
arrangements as violations of the GATT, unless such tates took part in political integration, represented a 
serious obstacle in this regard.  Furthermore, Birrenbach insisted that the EEC could be undermined if it 
became too large, beyond the entrance of Britain, without making the necessary internal adjustments.  Even 
the inclusion of Denmark, Norway and Iceland would require the strengthening of the European 
institutions, such as a strengthening of the position of the European Commission, a reactivating of the 
majority rules in the Council of Ministers and a strengthened prerogative of the European Parliament (KB 
to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, 
ACDP K023/1).  Despite all of this, Birrenbach did not object to the idea of opening negotiations with 
other countries seeking entrance into the EEC, following the conclusion of negotiations with England (KB 
to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 20 November 1969, ACDP K126/1).  For 
Birrenbach, the development of Europe could still fa  i  the problems of vertical and horizontal expansion 
were not solved (KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1).   
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over an order of loosely connected, non-integrated, sovereign national states.12  
Moreover, de Gaulle’s Europe was not an outward looking one, rather it was a 
continental “European Europe” that largely excluded the Anglo-Saxons.13  For 
Birrenbach, such policies were not only anachronistic and impractical in the second half 
of the 20th century, they were “incredibly dangerous” in the context of “the East-West 
conflict.”14  Therefore, despite Birrenbach’s professed respect for the general’s personal 
                                                
12 KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  The structures being undermined by de Gaulle 
included the EEC and NATO.  As Birrenbach put it, “[n]o country is more up in arms [Sturm läuft] than 
France against the principle of integration both in NATO as well as, unfortunately, also in the EEC” (KB to 
Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1).  On 
Birrenbach’s opposition to a hegemonic order of loosely linked European nation-states, a “policy… not 
identical with the position of France in the great years of the development of the European institutions,” see 
KB to Marc Ullmann, L’Express, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  On the striving for hegemony 
and the harmful results “which you have observed for three years in Europe,” see KB to Prof. Henry 
Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1.  For 
Birrenbach’s rejection of French plans for a non-integrated NATO, see KB to Bundesminister a.D. 
Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  For Birrenbach’s fears that de Gaulle’s 
policies would in the long run affect the attitude of other nations as well, particularly harmful since “[a] 
community is only possible if all act in communitaran way,” see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP 
K107/2.  Likewise, in July 1966, Birrenbach complained that “[t]his attitude of de Gaulle is beginning to 
become the accepted thing [Schule machen], and I see in that the even larger danger (KB to Robert Strausz-
Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1).  For the pursuit of national interest by the French 5th Republic, 
see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  On the French (and British) desire for national 
nuclear forces, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For the French use of nuclear 
weapons only to protect their national interests, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP 
K184/2.  On the “egocentric nuclear policy” of France (and Britain), see KB to Kissinger, 30 August 1965, 
ACDP K017/1.  For Birrenbach’s stress on the German desire for multilateralism in its relations (in contrast 
to the French desire for bilateralism), see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. 
13 This idea of an independent “European Europe,” or of a “Third Force,” stood in opposition to the notions 
of interdependence forming the basis of ideas such as t e Atlantic Community and Atlantic Partnership.  At 
one point, Birrenbach professed his desire for a “European Europe” but made the crucial qualification hat
this would be such “which does not treat the Atlantic relations as France does at the moment” (KB to Prof. 
Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2). 
14 On the “incredibly dangerous” underestimation of the seriousness of the East-West conflict by the 
French, see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP 
K013/1.  As Birrenbach remarked in 1966, “Nobody has thrown off the vestments [Gewand] of the Cold 
War more strongly than the French President” (KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP 
K117/1).  Birrenbach believed that a “Europe of the states” could only form a unity if it were led in a 
hegemonic fashion, yet he detected a deep disinclinatio  on the European continent against any hegemonic 
order and was also convinced that neither France nor Britain was powerful enough to realize such a 
hegemony (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2).  For Birrenbach’s early 
recognition in France of what he considered a completely new and “extremely dangerous” NATO 
conception, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  On 
Birrenbach’s view of de Gaulle’s policies as a divergence from previous French policy of the 1950s, see 
KB to Marc Ullmann, L’Express, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  On the “rigid mercantilistic 
attitude” exhibited by France in economic matters, see KB to State Secretary a.D., Dr. Günther Harkort, 
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qualities, France came to represent a significant impediment to the attainment of his 
goals.15  While Birrenbach hoped to “survive” de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic, simply 
waiting would be “extremely dangerous,” and he insisted on the need not only to preserve 
the fundamental principles and existing institutions, but to energetically push forward 
                                                                                                                                      
Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2.  On the fundamental nature of the attitude of de Gaulle’s France 
and the difficulties this presented for American-French relations, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard 
University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On the impracticality of de 
Gaulle’s policies and goals of national independence and hegemonic order in the second half of the 20th 
century, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, hiladelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP 
K021/2.  On the conditional and limited nature [“Bedingtheit”] of the concept of sovereignty, especially in 
continental Europe, in the age of the Großmächte of international magnitude and the mutual dependence of 
all national states, see European Coal and Steel Community, Common Assembly, Meeting on Wednesday, 
26 February 1958, Proceedings/Speeches, KB versus Debré, ACDP K075/2.  For integration, including 
within NATO, as an adequate way to overcome the specific problems of the European nation-states, see 
KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  For Birrenbach, France 
and England were the two klassischen European nation-states and still formed a brake on political 
integration (KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at the University of Cologne, 
6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1).  On the French rejection of British approaches towards Europe, “which 
will probably remain a constant under de Gaulle,” se KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, 
Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  For de Gaulle’s demands that the Federal Republic adopt his 
European and World Politik, see KB to Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  For Birrenbach’s 
fundamental and explicit rejection of De Gaulle’s policies, which if adopted by the Federal Republic would 
bring its entire foreign policy into difficulties, ee KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, 
Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1 and KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben Heinrich 
Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2. 
15 For Birrenbach’s reference to “the Brillianz of such a still outstanding [hervorragenden] personality,” 
see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  On Birrenbach’s assessment of 
de Gaulle as a realist, see KB to Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1.  On
Birrenbach’s conviction that “de Gaulle is not Europe,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP 
K109/1.  For examples on the centrality of French attitudes to progress in Europe, see KB to Prof. Alfred 
Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.  
On the centrality of de Gaulle and France for the process of European unification, see KB to Prof. Henry 
Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1 and KB to 
Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  Key events in 
Birrenbach’s narrative of de Gaulle’s destructiveness were the general’s rejection of a British entrance i to 
the EEC in January 1963, one of his repeated such rejections and a manifestation of his attitude towards the 
Anglo-Saxons, and the French departure from NATO in 1965-66.  For Birrenbach’s assessment that the 
French decision of January 1963 to reject the British effort to join the EEC rendered impossible a 
partnership between a united Europe (including Britain) and the United States, prevented the development 
of the political Europe he desired and even endangered the future of the EEC itself, see KB to William 
Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 
1963, ACDP K186/2 and KB to Strausz-Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  In the same vein, Birrenbach 
remarked in July 1966 that “[de Gaulle] has shaken NATO in a way that makes me doubt whether the 
alliance will ever recover from this blow”(KB to Strausz-Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1).  For 
Birrenbach’s assessment that de Gaulle was not merely a symptom but also an actor and cause, admittedly 
not the sole cause, in the current crisis in NATO, see again KB to Strausz-Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP 
K117/1.  
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with the further construction of the Atlantic Partnership.16  However, whatever his 
frustrations, Birrenbach continued to view France as the Federal Republic’s second most 
important ally (after the United States) and the essential ally with respect to the 
construction of Europe.  Therefore, through it all, Birrenbach encouraged cooperation and 
conciliation, rather than open confrontation, with France.17  Despite his efforts, 
                                                
16 On Birrenbach’s hope “to survive” de Gaulle, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, 
Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1.  For the need to “survive de Gaulle and to save the institutions up 
to the time when he will disappear from the historical scene,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, 
ACDP K109/1.  On Birrenbach’s desire to outlast the Fifth Republic, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, 
FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  About such themes, see also KB, dictated by phone 
from Oberstdorf, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 22 
August 1972, ACDP K026/1.  As Birrenbach put it to Brentano in July 1964, “I would consider it wrong if 
we were now to slacken the reins of European development and leave Europe to its fate.  If we did that, all 
that has been achieved in the past years could be in vain” (KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von 
Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1).  For one of Birrenbach’s proposals to push forward 
the progress of the EEC and a true and full political union, see again KB to Heinrich von Brentano, 16 July 
1964, ACDP K013/1.   
17 On the significance of Europe in West German foreign policy (“The European card, aside from the 
Atlantic card, is the most important one which we have in our foreign policy”), see KB, dictated by phone 
from Oberstdorf, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 22 
August 1972, ACDP K026/1.  For Birrenbach’s view of a future united Europe being unthinkable without 
France (and Britain), see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2.  On the Federal 
Republic’s foreign political goal of “Europe” on the basis of a German-French understanding, see KB to 
Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  For the need to preserve European 
cohesion, including with France, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for 
International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On the necessity to “do everything conceivable to 
bind France to us” with the crucial exception of not destroying the foundations of the Federal Republic’s 
policy, see KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 
1964, ACDP K014/2.  For Birrenbach’s regret about what he considered temporary differences in the 
Franco-German relationship regarding the construction of the future Europe and the relationship to the 
United States and on the need for the Federal Republic not to endanger relations to France and to seekar as 
of constructive cooperation, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  
Expressed another way, Birrenbach insisted that the Federal Republic could not choose politically between 
the United States and France, rather it had to carefully maintain an equal distance to both powers (KB to 
Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1).  On the need for the Federal 
Republic to avoid a choice between the two powers, thi  time in the context of the Franco-German Treaty, 
see KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  At the 
same time, Birrenbach’s advocacy of a two-track policy USA/France also meant not overvaluing the 
French component (KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2).  In Birrenbach’s mind, the 
Federal Republic “steers between Scylla (USA) and Charybdis (France),” a practice that resulted in a lack 
of both genuine decision and clear course (KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2).  This was 
the difficult “game with several balls” with France and the United States.  While there were atmospheric 
elements to this game, it was primarily one of practic l politics in all concrete issue areas (for or against), 
including for example NATO integration, European integration, recognition of China, long-term credits for 
the East and Cuba trade, all of which could directly and vitally touch the Federal Republic’s relations with 
those two countries (KB to Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2).  On the need to 
conciliate France to avoid disastrous consequences for the alliance and the cohesion of the European 
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powers, see KB to Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1.  For the difficult 
position of the Federal Republic with respect to France (“How can we stop de Gaulle if not even the United 
States is able to do so?”) and for Birrenbach’s desire to avoid conflict with France “since the Federal 
Republic is politically highly vulnerable,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.   
For Birrenbach’s professions of his continued affection and friendship towards France and his 
desire for a very close relationship between France d the Federal Republic, including at times with 
reference to his membership in the Monnet Committee as proof, see KB to Marc Ullmann, L’Express, 
Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  For Birrenbach’s view that the friendship between the German and 
French peoples was deeper than the political contact between the governments, see KB to Prof. Alfred 
Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  For Birrenbach’s insistence that German public 
opinion was clearly pro-French in spite of disputes b tween the governments, see KB to Ullmann, 4 
February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  Perhaps not surprisingly given Birrenbach’s involvement in the Atlanticist 
infrastructure, one of Birrenbach’s  ideas to smooth out differences in the Franco-German relationship was 
to hold close meetings between personalities on both sides to discuss the differences “in an atmosphere of 
mutual understanding and trust and to look for areas of common action.”  Unfortunately, the representatives 
of the UNR had been talking in Germany for years with the wrong people, not with people like Birrenbach 
who thought as the great majority thought (KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2).  For 
Birrenbach’s stress that the concrete time point of the Franco-German Treaty, rather than the matter itself, 
was wrong, see KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 
1964, ACDP K014/2. 
Birrenbach’s efforts for conciliation and cooperation with France manifested themselves in his 
various proposals and initiatives.  For Birrenbach on the lookout in general for diplomatic, economic and 
political devices to bring de Gaulle’s France to revis  her decision of 29 January, see KB to William Tyler, 
Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, 
ACDP K186/2.  While as of July 1964 Birrenbach disagreed with Adenauer’s attitude in the last weeks and 
even considered it dangerous, he did agree with the former Chancellor on the need to enter into an in-depth 
discussion about all aspects of foreign policy with “our French friends” (KB to Bundesminister a.D.  
Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1).  In contrast to his proposals designed to 
find a common denominator that could be accepted by France as well as by Italy and the Benelux countries, 
Birrenbach saw “the Bavarian efforts” moving in a direction that would propose a formula that would have 
to be rejected by Italy and the Benelux countries (KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben Heinrich 
Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2).   
During the “preamble episode” of 1963 (see later in th s chapter), Birrenbach convinced Monnet 
that it was better not to insist on the latter’s idea of making the Bundestag’s approval of the treaty 
conditional on a declaration of both governments that integrated the treaty into the existing framework of 
European integration and the Atlantic alliance, since Birrenbach believed that no prospect existed that the 
French government would make such a declaration, and he was convinced that it was not possible to reject 
ratification of the treaty due to the effects of such an action on Franco-German relations.  As Birrenbach 
put it, refusing to ratify the treaty would “completely, nonsensically smash china [unsinnigerweise 
Porzellan zerschlagen].”  Birrenbach also travelled to Paris to consult with personalities he knew in de 
Gaulle’s cabinet in an effort to determine the French attitude to a preamble, from which it emerged that e 
French government would not greet such a preamble but would not jeopardize the treaty over it.  On this, 
see Kurt Birrenbach, Meine Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik 
(Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1984).   
For Birrenbach’s proposals and approval of efforts for the Federal Republic to conciliate France 
through important concessions in agrarian questions, including in the wake of the events of January 1963, 
with the aims of preserving the EEC and securing French support for the Kennedy Round of GATT talks, 
see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2 and KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, 
Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  On the need to “ o everything conceivable to bind France to us” 
with the crucial exception of not destroying the foundations of the Federal Republic’s policy, and on 
Birrenbach’s European initiatives at this time including proposals hopefully acceptable to all, including 
France, among which was the rapid fixing of the agrarian price, see KB to Bundesminister für besondere 
Aufgaben Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.     
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Birrenbach retrospectively remarked, “we have lost the ten years of the de Gaulle 
period.”18  Moreover, while there were occasionally encouraging signs, Gaullism’s 
impact persisted well after the general’s departure from power in 1969, and in 1973, 
Birrenbach could still glumly note, “[i]n Paris, the 19th century is still not ended.”19 
However, while Britain and France were important from Birrenbach’s 
perspective, the foreign nation that occupied the center of his attention was the United 
                                                                                                                                      
This was also the case with respect to nuclear issues.  On Birrenbach’s idea in 1963 for the 
creation of a European multilateral atomic strike force (European atomic deterrence) open to France, which 
he agreed did not make any military sense, as an element of his efforts to conciliate France and to bring her 
to revise her decision of 29 January 1963 and thus solve the Brussels crisis, see KB to William Tyler, 
Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, 
ACDP K186/2.  On the importance of the United States tr ating France with fairness and consideration in 
the negotiations and making concessions to France within the context of American proposals for nuclear 
control and an Atlantic nuclear system (e.g. MLF), for instance limited American assistance to the French 
nuclear program and with respect to the current generation of weapons, in “a serious and unbiased 
[unvoreingenommener] attempt” to come to an acceptable arrangement with France, see KB to Prof. Henry 
Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2; KB to 
Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; and KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 
16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. 
18 KB to John McCloy, New York City, 27 February 1973, ACDP K183/2.  Birrenbach expressed these 
sentiments specifically with respect to European political and economic integration.  For Birrenbach’s 
assessment that “the development of the last ten years of the de Gaulle epoch have been extremely 
disappointing,” here with respect to progress towards European unification, see KB to Prof. Theodor 
Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.  On Birrenbach’s doubts about whether it would be 
at all possible to recover from the ten “lost” years of the de Gaulle era, see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 
September 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to McCloy, 27 February 1973, ACDP K183/2.  For de Gaulle’s 
blocking of the supranational principle, his negative impact on NATO and the European institutions, 
including his altering of the character of the European institutions, and the danger of a relapse into a  rder 
of sovereign states under French hegemony, see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.     
19 KB to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda, MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1.  In this same letter, 
Birrenbach argued that, not least due to the continued Gaullist influence in the wake of the election, France 
continued to resist constructive plans for Europe.  For Birrenbach in 1969 still not seeing prospects for an 
intensifying of European cooperation even under the new French government, see KB to Prof. Theodor 
Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.  In July 1972, Birrenbach referred to “France’s 
falling back into Gaullism,” something that left little scope for an Europa-Politik in the future (KB to 
Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU Deutschland, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 July 
1972, ACDP K026/1).  For Birrenbach’s reference to the French tendency to take decisions from a purely 
European (“you can also say: French”) perspective, se  KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of 
Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.  On the continued impossibility in the foreseeable future 
of a “genuine unification of Europe across the board,” including a European federation, since the French 
insisted on a “purely French Europe,” and for Birrenbach’s conclusion that “the French have not learned 
enough since the start of the de Gaulle regime,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On
the other hand, with respect to encouraging signs regarding security questions and the possibility of a
European Defense Community, see KB to State Secretary a.D. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, 
ACDP K028/2 and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For de Gaulle’s relations 
with Germany, see Wilfried Loth and Robert Picht, eds., De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa (Opladen: 
Leske+Budrich, 1991).   
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States.  Birrenbach found a great deal to value there as well as in the larger Anglo-Saxon 
world.  Just as Atlanticism took a broad approach to integration, Birrenbach embraced 
and promoted Anglo-Saxon practices as models in a variety of crucial areas.  Beyond the 
fields of Atlanticist infrastructure and financing that we have already explored, this was 
particularly the case with respect to domestic politics and democracy.  For example, he 
especially admired the Anglo-Saxon methods and traditions of political interaction both 
inside and outside of parliaments.  Even during touh political confrontations, Birrenbach 
consciously adhered to these, stressing the need for purely “sachliche” discussion and 
debate and for prohibiting such confrontations from impairing the menschlichen relations 
between the participants.  His “intimate knowledge” of the Anglo-Saxon world and his 
admiration for its two-party systems was a key elemnt in his argument favoring a reform 
in this direction of the Federal Republic’s own electoral system.20  Finally, he explicitly 
promoted respect for the opposition as a central princi le of Anglo-Saxon democracy.21   
Beyond such domestic practices, Birrenbach especially v lued the enormous 
strength of the United States.  As the most exposed country of western Europe, the 
Federal Republic relied on American power, including its enormous conventional and 
nuclear arsenal, and the alliance with the United States formed the “vital basis” for the 
security and existence of the Federal Republic and Europe.22  However, Birrenbach 
                                                
20 For Birrenbach’s “intimate knowledge” of the United States, see KB to Westrick, 25 May 1964, ACDP 
K015.   
21 Birrenbach was especially disturbed by what he considered the violation of this principle by the Social 
Democrats during the debates over the Brandt Ostpolitik.  Birrenbach specifically cited Herbert Wehner, 
himself an important Atlanticist, as one who expressed his disdain for the opposition during these debates 
(KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 10 April 1972, ACDP K068/1).   
22 On the support of and the alliance with the United States as “the vital basis” of the Federal Republic’s 
existence and the related need, therefore, to always choose the US when it came to questions of defens, 
see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, 
ACDP K014/2 and KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  For the United States as “the crucial 
pillar and guarantee of our freedom,” see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 
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recognized that American strength comprised other components beyond sheer military 
might.  In his view, the United States possessed grate  “political substance” and greater 
financial and human resources, including a people distinguished by their vitality and 
                                                                                                                                      
December 1963, ACDP K014/2.  On the necessity of a close American-German relationship for the 
maintenance of “an effective defence posture in Europe,” see KB to Marc Ullmann, L’Express, Paris, 4 
February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  On the lack of any substitute for the United States with respect to defense 
questions, especially the military power to offset the Soviet Union in the East-West conflict, see KB to 
Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  For the 
United States as the “only truly decisive military factor” and the need for the Federal Republic to take this 
fact into account [“anlehnen” but not necessarily dependent], rather than being totally independent, in 
making its policy, see KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP 
K013/1.  On the cardinal importance of a substantial presence of American troops in Europe and the need 
to prevent a unilateral reduction of the American military presence there, see KB to Bundesminister 
Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU 
Deutschland, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1; and KB to John 
McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On the necessity of he American presence in Europe for the 
cohesion of the alliance, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  For the presence of American conventional 
forces on the European continent as the triggering element of the American nuclear guarantee, without 
which that guarantee would be “extremely doubtful” and any reduction of which would reduce the 
connection of European defense with American nuclear power, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 
September 1967, ACDP K018/2 and Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 
September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  For the key role of nuclear weapons in the security of Europe, see KB to 
Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 
10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1.  On the presence of American troops in the Federal Republic as not only an 
important element of military security and a symbol of the American military commitment in Europe but 
also as an element of the internal cohesion in the Federal Republic see KB to McCloy, 12 August 1966, 
ACDP K117/1.  On the lack of a sufficient place forthe United States, as guarantor and the key to security, 
and the militarily predominant position accorded the USSR as a serious error in the idea of a Europe “from 
the Atlantic to the Urals” (or “from one end of Europe to the other”) and the lack of American interest in 
and in guaranteeing such a construct in whose creation it did not take part, see KB to Grosser, 25 
September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  For Birrenbach’s argument that even the East European countries 
expressed a certain interest in a continued American presence in Europe, see again KB to Grosser, 25 
September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  For Birrenbach’s recognition of the “extraordinarily complicated 
problems” with respect to the NATO guarantee in the framework of the NATO alliance, see KB to Barzel, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1.  In Birrenbach’s 
mind, the classical military alliance represented an obsolete and insufficient form in the nuclear age, for 
instance with regard to ensuring the American use of nuclear weapons in case of a conventional war (KBto 
Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP K068/1).  For m e on Birrenbach’s belief that a “klassische”  
alliance did not sufficiently guarantee the nuclear protection of Europe, see “Gespräch T.-B.,” 28 
September 1972, ACDP K027/1.  On what Birrenbach considered the essentially false main argument of 
the critics of the current American presence in Europe that the American defense effort there stood in 
significant disproportion to the European contributions and his attempts to refute such arguments 
(especially with respect to the conventional military effort, less so with respect to the nuclear deterr nt), see 
Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2; KB to 
McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  
For the possibility of the Europeans increasing their d fense efforts, including a pulling together of the 
European defense forces to make the European contribution more effective, see Birrenbach’s Report on a 
Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  On American troops as a symbol of 
the American military commitment in Europe, particularly at a critical moment when the United States was 
involved in a major war in Southeast Asia, see KB to McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1.   
 232
willingness to sacrifice, than any other country of the West.23  Such qualities enabled the 
United States to execute a robust policy abroad, even as it tackled long-term challenges 
like the Vietnam War, the race crisis and the constitutional crisis surrounding Watergate, 
“which would almost overwhelm a European nation.”24  Therefore, one of Birrenbach’s 
key short-term goals was to ensure that the United S ates provide strong, constructive 
leadership in the world and especially continue its active military, political and other 
engagement in Europe.25  Such initiative was crucial to achieving numerous immediate 
aims, such as preserving close trans-Atlantic relations, warding off the Soviet threat and 
settling world problems potentially harmful to the West.26  In the longer term, American 
                                                
23 For instance, KB to Col. William Bass, London, 22 November 1974, ACDP K068/1.  As an example 
specifically related to the situation of Israel, also referring by contrast with the United States to “the
notorious European weakness” as “one of the C arakteristika of our time,” see KB to Israeli ambassador 
Eliashiv Ben-Horin, 8 November 1973, ACDP K096/2.   
24 KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 19 September 1968, ACDP K098/1, as well as KB to Amb. Shinar, Tel-
Ganim, 21 January 1974, ACDP K096/2 and KB to Georg McGhee, 7 March 1974, ACDP K184/1.  For 
example, Birrenbach, despite his fears, was amazed that the United States had been able to operate so 
effectively in the Near East crisis of 1973 at the height of the Watergate constitutional crisis (KB to Sen. 
Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2).  On Birrenbach’s belief that the regenerative ability of 
the United States, with its tremendous human and economic reserves, incomparable to those of any 
European country, made it likely that, with the possible exception of the “race conflict,” it would 
successfully deal in the 1970s with the critical developments manifested in internal crisis, see KB to 
Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.  
For Birrenbach’s assessment that despite the internal c isis in the United States, the democratic order, th  
social contract (here citing McGeorge Bundy) between society and state, and the Bill of Rights had not 
been placed in doubt and a political landslide or arevolution was not in the offing, see again KB to 
Leussink, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. 
25 See the Protocol of the Birrenbach-Sonnenfeldt Talk during Birrenbach’s trip to the United States in 
May 1975, ACDP K155/1.  For Birrenbach’s view that a guarantee of American protection was realizable 
only within the framework of the alliance and his central interest in keeping the Americans within that 
framework, see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion of the Bundestag, Bonn, 
Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, K020/1 and KB to Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, 
ACDP K028/1.  On Birrenbach’s rejection (in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty) of collective 
security, particularly that potentially provided bythe United Nations, as a substitute for the security of the 
Federal Republic, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2; KB to Sen. John 
Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2.   
26 On the need for American leadership and initiative o preserve the cohesion of the alliance and close 
relations between Germany/Europe and the United States, to ward off the Soviet threat as well as to setle 
those Atlantic issues and those world problems, such as the Middle East conflict, potentially deleterious to 
the West, see for example KB to Mrs. Evelyn Emmet, MP, House of Commons, 8 August 1961, ACDP 
K076/1; KB to Richard Ullman, Director, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York City, 8 September 
1976, ACDP K083/1; and KB to Gerard Smith, 8 October 1979, ACDP K209/1.  For Birrenbach’s stress on 
the importance of American leadership and initiative and his encouragement of his American contacts and 
 233
leadership and engagement were essential to the gradual construction of the Atlantic 
Community and Partnership.27  This need for close ties with the United States spurred on 
a variety of Birrenbach’s efforts, including those for a more generous burden-sharing on 
the Federal Republic’s part, European (especially po itical) unification, the elimination of 
trade barriers to American goods, and his rejection of a “European Europe.”28  
                                                                                                                                      
talk partners to exercise these with respect to issue  uch as nuclear control/MLF and East-West trade, see 
KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1; KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 
November 1965, ACDP K117/1; and KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens, AA, 11 December 1965, 
ACDP K117/1.  For Birrenbach, American leadership was necessary since, speaking in this case about the 
MLF, “the European nations are neither united nor resolved enough to approach the United States 
themselves with joint concrete proposals” (KB to Carstens, 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1).  On the 
need for American leadership, namely a proposal resting on the authority of the American President, to 
have any chance of bringing about a collective nuclear weapon system (including a nuclear organization in 
Europe and participation of non-nuclear powers in nuclear control), see KB to Bundesminister  Heinrich 
Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1.  For Birrenbach’s reference to the American President as “the 
responsible leader of the Western Alliance,” see KB to Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  On the 
Federal Republic’s willingness to follow American leadership, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 
1965, ACDP K117/1.  For the United States as a source of support for the Federal Republic in its 
negotiations with the Soviet Union, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP 
K023/1. 
27 For instance, Birrenbach argued that it was up to the United States to define the structure of a real 
partnership with Europe: “I can’t see that the Europeans on their own initiative will be able to defin a real 
European identity including a sufficiently strong interdependent link with the US.  For me Europe withou  
the United States is not imaginable” (KB to Prof. Guido Goldman, Executive Director, Harvard University, 
West European Studies, 19 March 1974, ACDP K184/1). 
28 On the connection between Birrenbach’s efforts with respect to burden-sharing, European unification, 
and the reduction of trade barriers and his desire for a continued strong American engagement in Europe, 
see his Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  Burden-sharing included creating additional military 
units, increasing efforts regarding armaments, as well as currency and budgetary measures.  The stress on 
the elimination of trade barriers to American goods was particularly important if European political 
unification did not make significant progress.  On the impossibility of reconciling the French concept of 
and demand for a “European Europe” with the current American military presence in Europe, the alliance 
with the United States, and close European-American and German-American relations, see KB to Prof. 
Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  
As Birrenbach put it, “[c]omplete independence in the sense that France practices it at the moment vis-à- i  
the United States can only endanger the European-American relationship in the long-run” (KB to Prof. 
Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2).  On Birrenbach’s belief that a German policy 
independent of the United States, such as de Gaulle’s, would cause the US government to reduce its 
engagement in Europe, see KB to Bundesminister aD Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, 
ACDP K013/1.  For a favorable comparison of the power of the United States vis-à-vis France, see KB to 
Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On the inadequacy of French nuclear weapons, see KB to 
Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On the path to France being “always only a limited 
one” unless the Americans would come to an understanding with the Soviet Union over the head of and at 
the expense of the Federal Republic, see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  On the 
security provided by the Americans as a key reason for embracing an interdependent (mutually dependent) 
relationship with the United States and for rejecting de Gaulle’s demands for a complete independence of 
Europe, see KB to Grosser, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  For the inability of France to serve as a 
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Birrenbach argued, “free peoples everywhere look to America for safety and progress.  
Their greatest fear is not America’s involvement in he world, but its withdrawal.”29 
Atlanticist though he was, Birrenbach was no uncritical admirer of the United 
States and its policies.  Seeming at times not verydistant in this regard from a typical 
Occidentalist, he was well-aware of the differences distinguishing the United States from 
Western Europe with respect to culture, perceptions of history and the world, and 
geopolitical situation.30  Moreover, the United States, inexperienced on the world stage, 
demonstrated what he considered disturbing tendencies in foreign affairs often harmful to 
the Atlanticist cause, including an imprudent belief that “everything in the world is 
feasible,” frequent misperceptions, including a failure to recognize the serious nature of 
the threat posed by the totalitarian Soviet Union, and a rashness that manifested itself in a 
failure to consult properly with the European allies.31  Furthermore, beginning especially 
                                                                                                                                      
substitute for the United States with respect to military-security-defense questions vis-à-vis the USSR, see 
KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  On 
the Federal Republic’s interest in a currency offset to forestall the Senate’s approval of a new Mansfield 
proposal, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Bonn, 15 October 1971, ACDP K024/1.  
On the need for the Europeans, especially the Germans, to free the United States from a part of its military 
and financial burden as a means to secure the mainten ce of a substantial American military presence, se  
KB to Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP 
K025/1. 
29 KB to Henry Kissinger, 6 May 1985, ACDP K146/3.  For Birrenbach’s description of himself as a 
“dedicated friend of the United States,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On 
German and American views of one another, see David Barclay and Elisabeth-Glaser Schmidt, eds.,  
Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America since 1776 (Washington, DC: German 
Historical Institute, 1997). 
30 As already alluded to in Chapter 3, though he did not offer an in-depth critique of American culture, 
Birrenbach seems to have considered it inferior to that of Europe.  Birrenbach saw the differences in the 
perception of history and the world rendering it very difficult, for instance, for an American, even oe of 
German origin, to communicate with a German audience.  In this regard, he referred to figures “caught 
between two worlds,” such as the emigrant scholars Fritz Stern and Hajo Holborn.  As Birrenbach put it, 
“[t]he view from the ‘second world’ is no longer understood here, or in any case is no longer identifid 
with.  It is regarded as an Aliud” (KB to Thomas Nipperdey, Institut für Neuere Geschichte of the 
University of Munich, 2 June 1978, ACDP K158/1; also KB to Prof. Nipperdey, 18 April 1978, ACDP 
K158/1 and KB to Prof. Schieder, 21 July 1978, ACDP K158/1). 
31 On the American lack of thoughtfulness and a propensity to believe that “everything in the world is 
feasible [machbar],” see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP 
K155/1.  With respect to US rashness and failure to consult adequately with the Europeans to forge 
common strategies, see KB to Prof. Robert Bowie, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 31 
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with the Johnson administration, the United States found itself too often distracted from 
Europe, failing to provide the necessary leadership there.32  Birrenbach also saw certain 
phenomena in the United States, for instance the Goldwater candidacy in 1964 or the 
embracing of détente, feeding troubling trends in the Federal Republic and elsewhere in 
                                                                                                                                      
December 1963, ACDP K160/2.  On Birrenbach stressing to the Americans in a meeting of 8 November 
1965 the need for “discrete diplomatic preparation” prior to making their proposals regarding nuclear 
control, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. 
32 KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 January 1967, 
ACDP K117/2.  Here, Birrenbach complained to Kissinger that for years the voice of the United States had 
no longer been audible, that American leadership had been absent in Europe, contributing significantly to 
the vacuum there.  On Birrenbach’s frustration in seeing the US largely pursuing a “policy of laissez-faire,” 
see KB to Christian Herter, 8 February 1965, ACDP K155/3.  For the failure of the United States, the 
leading power of the Western alliance, to bring about or even to have plans for a much-needed NATO 
reform; for the lack of American leadership, especially under Johnson, as a root explanation for the 
mistakes of American policy; for the political vacuum created in Europe as a result of American attention 
being distracted by Vietnam; for Birrenbach’s complaint that “[w]e have not heard the voice of your 
President in years”; and for the “fatal consequences” that this must have, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 
FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  On Birrenbach’s acknowledgement that 
the reduced American interest in Europe was due in part to disappointment in the European development, 
but also on the role of the Vietnam War in diverting American attention from Europe and towards 
Southeast Asia, and on the lack of the requisite American, and British, leadership in Europe (with the 
British remaining instead on the periphery under th Labour government) in enabling de Gaulle to become 
the central figure there, see again KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  On the contribution 
of the US feeling of being abandoned by all its allies and being morally and politically isolated and of the 
deep American disappointment about the European development (which was viewed in simplified form as 
Gaullism since the United States currently saw no other power in Europe acting on the world stage aside 
from Gaullist France) to what Birrenbach perceived as a significant approaching transformation 
[“ Wandlung”] of American policy, “which cannot be taken seriously enough by the Federal Republic,” a 
historic examination and “agonizing reappraisal” of the overall American position and situation that would 
certainly result in a reduction of the American engagement in the world, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1.  For Birrenbach’s assessment of the Johnson years as 
years of disintegration for NATO that had to be reversed, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University 
of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  With respect to the 
Johnson administration, Birrenbach also referred at times to the “unfortunate American policy of the last 
years.”  More generally, during periods of despair when the United States seemed to be drifting aimlessly 
and failing to provide the necessary leadership, Birrenbach often alluded to Raymond Aron to the effect 
that the United States was an imperial power no more.  For Birrenbach’s belief that “[i]f the United States 
does not again assume the leadership of the alliance, and it does not look like it will, it will one day face a 
bitter awakening,” see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  Despite his 
frustration with the United States, Birrenbach did argue that “[n]o extra-European power has worked more 
for European integration than the American one” (KB to Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1).  On the 
desire of the Nixon administration, despite the military confrontation on the East Asian mainland as still the 
first concern, to assign Europe priority in its foreign policy, as in the 1950s and in contrast to the “Johnson 
period,” see Birrenbach’s Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  For Birrenbach’s complaint that 
the United States was even intervening too much in t e “querelles européennes” rather than looking on 
from a greater distance and employing a “tactical Mittelform,” see KB to West German ambassador Berndt 
von Staden, Washington DC, 15 March 1974, ACDP K184/ .   
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Europe.33  Supportive in public, Birrenbach frequently criticized the United States in 
private on a variety of specific issues, such as nuclear strategy, détente and the Vietnam 
War.34  Finally, while willing to compromise with the Americans, he staunchly opposed 
                                                
33 Birrenbach saw political events in the United States, including the Goldwater phenomenon, contributing 
to the “Gaullist infection” in Germany.  On the important impact of the American perception of a détente i  
Central Europe on the belief in détente in the Federal Republic and elsewhere in Europe, see KB to John 
McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1.  For the difficulties of halting the dynamics of détente in the 
Federal Republic “when President Nixon declares again and again that now peace is settled for our time” 
and on the effect in Europe of the American administration’s claims of a dramatic change in the US-USSR 
relationship and of the President’s declarations “to have reached peace for our generation,” see KB to 
McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On the contribution of “foreign applause” regarding the West 
German Ostpolitik, even if with reservations, to the Brandt governmet’s popularity and its 1972 election 
victory, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.   
34 For Birrenbach, as a result of actual American policies as well as those under consideration, warning that 
“the faith in the United States begins to waver,” without explicitly attributing such an attitude to himself, 
see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  For Birrenbach’s admission that the 
Americans and their policies and practices, not solely the French, deserved some blame for the current 
condition of the alliance, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International 
Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  As an example of Birrenbach’s criticism of the American 
handling of the MLF, including American attitudes with respect to nuclear control, see again KB to 
Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  For Birrenbach’s displeasure with the United States playing 
with the idea of a large withdrawal of troops from Europe, see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP 
K117/2.  On Birrenbach’s judgement that it was “inexcusable” that, due to financial reasons, reductions n 
the vital presence of American troops were being considered, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 
July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  For the dubious détente policy of the United States, along with France and 
Britain, see again KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  Nevertheless, with respect to the ne d 
to publicly support the United States even when doubts existed about particular policies, Birrenbach 
remarked, here with regard to Vietnam, “if we depend almost exclusively on American protection in the 
East-West conflict, then it is a matter of fact and decency to support morally a country which is in a
difficult position” (KB to Marc Ullmann, L’Express, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2).  For 
Birrenbach explicitly contradicting Adenauer with regard to his judgement of President Kennedy and the 
American involvement in Vietnam and for Birrenbach’s professions regarding the support of the German 
government, all the parties, the press and himself for the American effort there (but also addressing his own 
reservations), see KB to John McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1.  Examples abound of other issues 
on which Birrenbach could be quite critical of the United States.   
Consultation: For Birrenbach’s criticism of the United States with respect to American attitudes on 
“global political consultation in the framework of the alliance,” and specifically for not properly consulting 
with Europe and/or the Federal Republic with respect to the Test Ban Agreement in 1963 (resulting in a
revaluation of the GDR), the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Middle East crisis of October 1973, see KB 
to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2; KB to Kissinger, 
12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2; KB to Prof. Robert Stausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, 
ACDP K021/2; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For this failure to carry 
out proper consultations as a failure of the United States to treat the American-European relationship as a 
genuine partnership, see KB to Strausz-Hupé, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  However, Birrenbach was 
also well aware of the difficulties created by a disunited Europe with respect to consultation.  For 
Birrenbach’s recognition that a coordinated foreign policy and unified strategy was inhibited by the 
provincialism of the individual, disunited European national states and his hope that “[i]f the USA has
grown into the role of a Weltmacht, so Europe could also do that, in case it should unite,” see KB to Prof. 
Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1.  On
the difficulty of informing and consulting nine countries when a decision was urgent (as on 25 October 
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1973), see KB to Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On the need to bring about genuine NATO 
reform, including the creation of necessary structures, with respect to the coordination of foreign and
military policy, see KB to Kissinger, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1 and KB to Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 
University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.   
Nuclear strategy: On differing geopolitical situations as a factor in disagreements on nuclear 
strategy, something Birrenbach acknowledged the French had correctly pointed out, see KB to Prof. Robert 
Bowie, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 31 December 1963, ACDP K160/2.  For 
Birrenbach’s criticism of American attitudes with respect to strategy in Europe, see KB to Kissinger, 12 
October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  For persistent differences between American and European concepts of 
nuclear strategy in Europe as the reason for his ins tence on a NATO reform with regard to nuclear control 
and in particular for pushing for a greater voice and influence for the Federal Republic (and other European 
non-nuclear powers) in every stage of the nuclear planning and decision making process, thus offering the 
FRG a chance to inject its views from the very start, see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1; KB to Robert 
Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1 and KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, 
ACDP K139/2.  On the continued existence of significant differences between the United States and 
Europe regarding the time and circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used as a major factor in 
Birrenbach’s stress on the need for a future European nuclear option, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 
November 1966, ACDP K139/2.  For Birrenbach’s complaints about the United States considering the de-
nuclearization of the continent, see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  For Birrenbach’s 
recognition that “the large Schlagaustausch with intercontinental weapons remains doubtful since it would 
result in the destruction of the territories of thewo world powers,” see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 
25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  On European doubts during the early 1970s with respect to the 
American “nuclear umbrella,” enormously increased by the US-USSR nuclear accord in June 1973, and 
Birrenbach’s fears that European security would suffer due to such developments, see KB to McCloy, 29 
June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On the seriously weakening credibility of the deterrent power of American 
nuclear weapons over the previous several years and the related need for a future European nuclear option 
(admittedly impossible at the moment but possible if one day the European states “could awake from their 
dreams”), see KB to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1; KB to 
McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2; and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, 
FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.  Regarding Birrenbach’s doubts about American nuclear strategy, 
especially the tendency in the US towards a greater “restraint” in the “Verbindung” of strategic nuclear 
weapons (decoupling), a sparing of the two “sanctuaries” (the United States and Soviet Union), as well as a 
stronger concentration on a theater nuclear war, and about its ability to guarantee “for an unlimited 
duration” the continued territorial existence of Europe, and on his support for a stronger American stres  on 
a counter-force strategy that would include selectiv  strikes of a strategic nature, see KB to Hahn, 29 
January 1974, ACDP K184/1.   
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Birrenbach’s criticism of the NPT, which he considered an inflexible 
treaty of practically unlimited duration, and the American treatment of it related not only to the specific 
content of the treaty but also to the overall philosophy on which it was based.  On the faulty American (and 
British) philosophy behind the NPT, namely that of a universal treaty, see KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 
1968, ACDP K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2.  On the crucial 
concessions and commitments the United States had made to the Soviet Union in the context of the NPT, 
see KB to Kissinger, 30 August 1965, K017/1 and KB to Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, 
Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  On Birrenbach’s belief that the NPT would 
block the future possibility of a European ABM system see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP 
K109/1.  For Birrenbach’s view that in the fall of 1966 the Americans, as a result of their NPT 
interpretations (regarding the version negotiated with the Soviet Union) or changes to the original trea y 
(Articles I and II), had unnecessarily blocked the future possibility of an effective European nuclear force 
(the “European option”), see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 
1972, ACDP K188/2 and KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For Birrenbach’s complaints 
about the United States expecting a signature of the current NPT version, see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 
1967, ACDP K117/2.  For Birrenbach’s criticisms of the final text of the NPT, see KB to Sen. John 
Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2.   
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unilateral or disproportionate concessions.35  Nevertheless, even in criticizing the United 
States, Birrenbach explicitly distanced himself from especially the German Gaullists, and 
from others he believed to be openly purveying unjustifiably harsh assessments of the 
US, and urged them to exercise greater circumspection in their own critiques.36 
To some extent, Birrenbach attributed the American failure to provide the 
requisite leadership to extraordinary short-term factors and developments such as 
Vietnam and Watergate, but he also identified deeper-seated and more disturbing 
problems in the United States.  Among these was the deplorable quality of the American 
leadership class, which during the postwar era had peaked with President Harry Truman 
and his advisors, especially George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson, but, despite some 
                                                                                                                                      
Vietnam: For Birrenbach’s criticism of the war in Vietnam, especially insofar as, beginning in 
1965, it drew American attention almost completely away from Europe to Southeast Asia, see KB to John 
McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1 and KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  
On Birrenbach’s fears that in the context of negotiations over Vietnam the United States might try to bring 
the Russians to exercise pressure on Hanoi by offering additional concessions with respect to an NPT, see 
KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  For the entanglement of the United 
States in a “hopeless [ausweglosen]” land war on the Asian mainland as a contributing factor to the 
“agonizing reappraisal” of the American position in the world and an upcoming reduction of the American 
engagement in the world, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP 
K021/1.  For Birrenbach’s later description of the Vi tnam War as “pointless” and “harmful,” see KB to 
Kissinger, 6 May 1985, ACDP K146/3.  On the other hand, for Birrenbach’s somewhat more benign view 
that the United States was simultaneously an Atlantic and a Pacific power, able to be engaged in both 
oceans at the same time, and had not considerably weakened its military position on the European 
continent, only conducting the war in Vietnam “with the left hand,” see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, 
ACDP K117/2.   
35 Yet another example of Birrenbach’s resistance to American proposals was his opposition to a 
revaluation of the West German mark as a means of helping to consolidate the American trade position.  As 
Birrenbach put it, “I have never belonged to those Atlanticists, who were ready to accept every American 
idea indiscriminately [unbesehen]” (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP 
K018/2).  In any case, he was convinced that with unilateral concessions “one would not impress the 
Americans” (KB to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1).    
36 For instance, even while criticizing US policy, Birrenbach insisted that he did not identify himself with 
Adenauer, “who, as so often in his criticism of American policy, has far overshot the mark” (KB to Prof. 
Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1).  
For Birrenbach rejecting what he considered Guttenberg’s “inaccurate” criticisms and reproaches of 
American attitudes and policy that had been made in an interview in the Rheinischen Merkur and lecturing 
Guttenberg on the need to exercise “particular caution” in such critiques, see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr 
zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2.  On Birrenbach’s worries about the degree 
and form of criticism against the United States in recent months in “a certain part of our Fraktion” and the 
alarm it caused to a number of “our best friends” in the US, see again KB to Guttenberg, 9 December 1963, 
ACDP K014/2.   
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apparent affection for John Foster Dulles, had never attained that level since.37  Sizing up 
President Gerald Ford, Birrenbach moaned that “the tim s of the kings have passed.”38  
He came to doubt the very method of selecting those leaders, suggesting that while the 
existing system had been suitable for choosing a President (and Vice-President) for a 
19th-century continental state, it was totally inadequate for a 20th-century world power.  
Frustrated with the unpalatable candidates and dreadful outcome of the 1976 election in 
the United States, Birrenbach expressed his doubts “that direct democracy offers all [the] 
advantages one could expect from a democratic system of representative character.”39  In 
all of this, Birrenbach typically cited the British historian Lord Acton’s chapter on “The 
American Revolution” in his “Lectures on Modern History” regarding the total failure of 
the rules laid out in the American Constitution with respect to the selection of the 
President and Vice-President.40 
Another fundamental element contributing to what Birrenbach judged the less 
than satisfactory performance of the United States on the foreign stage was the gradual 
shift of power away from the Northeastern elite, amongst whom Birrenbach’s own 
contacts were concentrated, southward and westward to other areas of the country.  This 
                                                
37 On this theme, see for example KB to John McCloy, 26 November 1975, ACDP K210/1 and KB to 
Robert Bowie, 11 August 1976, ACDP K160/2.  For some evidence that Birrenbach looked favorably on 
the Dulles period, see his argument that the American-German relations were less close than in the past, 
particularly in the times of Adenauer and Dulles in KB to Marc Ullmann, L’Express, Paris, 4 February 
1966, ACDP K107/2.  For President Richard Nixon’s trip o Bonn and his appearance in Berlin awakening 
German memories of the Dulles period, yet Birrenbach’s recognition that there could be no going back to 
that era, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  On the 
need for a still not discernible “statesmanlike” and “moral leadership” (citing the Scranton Commission’s 
use of this latter phrase in its report about the crisis of the universities), along with references to the civil 
rights commission and the examples of Lincoln in the mid-19th century and Roosevelt in the Great 
Depression, to help overcome America’s internal crisis and disunity by combining legal order with refom, 
“to keep under control and, at the same time, to humanize those forces desiring change [di  auf Änderung 
gerichteten Strömungen],” see KB to Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft Prof. H. Leussink, 
Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. 
38 KB to John McCloy, 7 November 1975, ACDP K210/1. 
39 KB to Eugene Rostow, 5 November 1976, ACDP K211/2.   
40 For instance, KB to George Ball, 4 November 1976, ACDP K160/3. 
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geographic trend contributed to the distraction of American attention, readily discernible 
at the latest by the mid-1960s, away from Europe by affairs in other parts of the world, 
for example Vietnam, the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World, and the decline 
in American conversance with and sympathy for Europe and its problems.  Symbolic of 
this was Birrenbach’s inability to meet with Secreta y of State and National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger (admittedly, a member of the northeastern elite) in 1974 due to 
the latter’s Middle East shuttle diplomacy.  At thevery least, Birrenbach was suspicious 
of many of the political figures emerging from these other parts of the United States, 
personalities like Barry Goldwater (Arizona), Mike Mansfield (Montana), J. William 
Fulbright (Arkansas) and Jimmy Carter (Georgia).  Areas outside of the Northeast also 
witnessed the rise of troubling new political movements, in particular the “new American 
conservatism,” associated with Goldwater.41  Thanks in part to his business contacts and 
especially to his experiences in California in the fall of 1962 (see Chapter 7), Birrenbach 
recognized this significant “new conservative” trend earlier and more accurately than 
even some of his American contacts (e.g. Holborn) and perceived this “Grundstimmung,” 
                                                
41 Birrenbach entertained serious doubts about many of Goldwater’s, at least alleged, foreign and domestic 
policy views, was skeptical about his ability to lead the Western alliance and considered him one factor 
among many working against the Atlanticists.  Despite all of this, Birrenbach urged his party and his 
friends in the West German government to act with rese ve and open-mindedness vis-à-vis the 
development of the 1964 Republican (Goldwater) ticket.  For Goldwater’s relatively positive views in 
questions of policy with respect to Germany but also on the almost universal rejection, unprecedented i  
the post-World War II era, the Goldwater candidacy (rightly or wrongly) met with in Europe, on the 
“indigestible” nature of Goldwater’s overall political program for the typical European and on the 
Goldwater candidacy’s unfortunate aggravating of the overall international situation, see KB to Prof. Karl 
Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  Senator Mike 
Mansfield was well known for his campaign to reduce th  presence of American troops in Europe via his 
Mansfield Amendment.  His retirement from the Senat in 1977 contributed greatly to a decline in this 
theme as a political issue.  Fulbright chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1959-74.     
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whether it pleased him or not, as a “deep [tiefgehenden]” current, an integral element in 
the US that could not be simply dismissed but had to be studied and influenced.42 
Aside from his Atlanticism, several other elements of Birrenbach’s outlook 
deserve mention.  For Birrenbach, properly understanding the policies of a foreign 
country as well as international affairs in general w s a broad, holistic endeavor.  Such a 
“global” approach to international, including trans-Atlantic, relations encompassed 
political, military-security, economic, trade, and currency issues and their inter-
relationship.  Birrenbach stressed that his focus on the US was never limited, for instance, 
to narrow political questions, rather he sought to observe the overall development of 
American society.43  Particularly noteworthy with respect to this approach was his stress 
                                                
42 KB to Karl Brandt, 4 August 1964, ACDP K013/1 and KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of 
California, 11 August 1964, ACDP K187/1. 
43 KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1.  Over the years, Birrenbach dealt with a 
considerable number of wide-ranging issues, whether i  be Ostpolitik, trade, the NPT or burden-sharing, to 
name just a few.  On the need for a “global perspective” with respect to foreign policy, see KB to State 
Secretary a.D. Dr. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2.  For the importance of 
European-American relations under a “global perspectiv ,” see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, 
ACDP K140/2.  On the necessity of also including military-security, economic, trade, and currency 
questions as well as the relationships between themas part of such a global perspective on internatiol 
relations, including those of the Atlantic alliance and partnerships, see Birrenbach’s Report of 20 February 
1973, ACDP K183/2; Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, 
ACDP K188/2; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  Birrenbach’s wide-
ranging analysis of the NPT, including its impact in he civil, military and foreign policy realms, indicated 
as well his broad view of foreign affairs (KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-
Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1).  Onthe tendency of foreign trade 
policy to become the means of foreign policy, yet another reason Birrenbach opposed the entrance of 
neutrals into the EEC, as well as for Birrenbach’s acknowledgement that economic, social and fiscal policy 
was also European policy (in agreement with Hallstein), along with his insistence that there remained a 
qualitative difference between the “Vergemeinschaftung” of the foreign, defense and economic policy (as 
demonstrated by the fate of the EDC), see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik 
at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.   
Birrenbach’s sophisticated, holistic analyses of the situation of the United States and of particular 
issues pertinent to it took account of, among other factors, the White House (including the President); 
Congress; the relevant governmental departments (among them those of an economic nature); the political 
parties, leaders and candidates; other key bodies (such as the AEC with respect to nuclear issues like the 
MLF and NPT); and public opinion.  On the very complicated process of consensus in the United States 
(citing Acheson) being similar to that in an alliance in which various departments, Congress and other 
constitutional institutions made up the partners of that alliance, see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1.  For 
Birrenbach’s knowledge of the typical practices of American presidential candidates, see his confidental 
memo of 30 April 1974, ACDP K184/1.  On Birrenbach’s regret regarding the “strained” and “difficult” 
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on the need to understand history.  Birrenbach fancied himself a man “who has a sense of 
                                                                                                                                      
relations between the President and Senate, the dangerous possibility of Senate resolutions that would tie 
the President’s hands as commander-in-chief, and the administration’s need for the full trust and 
cooperation of Congress in its future operations in Europe and Asia, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, 
ACDP K138/2.  For the pressure being exercised by Congress on the President with respect to troops in 
Europe, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For Birrenbach’s knowledge and 
explanation of American Staatspraxis with respect to the ratification of international treaties, see KB, 
dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the 
CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.  For Birrenbach on the generally valid Anglo-Saxon 
international legal norms with respect to the relationship between the moral judgement and the recogniti n 
of foreign countries, see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On 
the danger that the pressure of public opinion in the United States in connection with certain forces in the 
Senate and the efforts of particular NATO partners, among them Britain, could cause the American 
President to go beyond the current wording of the NPT to bring the Soviet Union to accept the treaty, see
KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  On an important part of public 
opinion pushing the American administration towards further concessions to the Soviet Union with respect 
to the NPT and nuclear options, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  On 
pressure from the Senate (Mansfield Resolution) and public opinion as likely bringing about soon an 
American reduction of its engagement, including its contingents, in Europe, see Birrenbach’s 
Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  For Birrenbach’s analysis of a polarized American public 
opinion, including unrest at the universities and ueasiness of the liberal intellectual community on the East 
Coast; his assessment of its potential electoral impact; the need for the President “to bridge the gulf 
between the silent majority and the protesting minority” in the United States; and the protest movement in 
the world, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.  On the necessity for an assertion of the 
Middle (which had spoken to some extent in the last election) to heal the disunity of the American nation 
between Right and Left (an element of internal crisis) and on Birrenbach’s interpretation with respect to the 
internal American crisis of a “tectonic quake which shakes the society” and that was symptomatic of a 
serious and complex social “Krankheitsherde,” see KB to Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft 
Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.   
Birrenbach’s holistic approach also encompassed the psychological realm.  For instance, on the 
continued importance of psychological factors, even in the nuclear age, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant 
Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP 
K186/2.  On the psychological mistakes of the American administration (in contrast to the fundamental 
nature of the French position), see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for 
International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On the need for an especially delicate treatment of 
the American problem in light of the politically, militarily, economically and psychologically difficult 
situation of the United States, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP 
K021/1.  For the emotions evident from the American side in the past year, the emotional reaction in the 
United States to Kiesinger’s reference to a “North-A lantic Imperium” in his report about the state of the 
nation of 11 March 1968, and the fact that any, even only apparent, identification with the policy of 
Gaullist France penetrated “into deep layers of the political consciousness” of the American people and
triggered potentially dangerous reactions, see again KB to Kiesinger, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1.  On 
the “traumatic experience” of America in the Vietnam War prompting an imminent reconsideration of the 
American military engagement in the world, including Europe (Nixon Doctrine), see Birrenbach’s 
Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  For Birrenbach’s remark that “I have the impression since 
two or three years that your country the first time since decades has somewhat lost the faith in itself” and 
that no American President since Roosevelt was facing such enormous problems as Nixon, see KB to Chris 
Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.  On America’s unprecedented doubt and loss of faith in itself, in the 
“American way of life,” in its “manifest destiny,” in the idea of progress as the law of America, and in its 
ability to solve all the problems that confronted it in its history, as the essential content of its in ernal crisis 
at the start of the 1970s, see KB to Leussink, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.  On the deep sense of 
frustration and introversion Birrenbach sensed in the United States in the wake of Vietnam and Waterga, 
see the Protocol of the KB-Helmut Sonnenfeldt Talk on Birrenbach’s Amerikareise of May 1975, ACDP 
K155/1 and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1.   
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history and thinks in longer terms than one decade or so.”  For Birrenbach, the study of 
history was, like that of foreign policy, a broad end avor, comprising “not only political 
but also intellectual history [Geistesgeschichte] and social development.”44  Rightly or 
wrongly, Birrenbach’s historical consciousness informed his judgement and 
understanding of a variety of themes such as isolatonis  trends in the United States, the 
totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union, and French support for the “terrible” Brandt 
Ostpolitik.45  The flip side of this holistic approach was that Birrenbach thought almost 
                                                
44 KB to William Bass, 20 November 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, 
ACDP K158/1.  For Birrenbach on his “very personal relationship” with Hajo Holborn, which included 
talks about problems of the Weltpolitik, of the United States and of the German Politik, and for 
Birrenbach’s desire that the German public be made f miliar with German history, especially as “seen from 
the perspective of a man of the Format and with the Weltblick” of Holborn, see KB to Karl Cornides, 
Vienna, 1 October 1970, ACDP K158/1. 
45 For Birrenbach having “always highly appreciated your [Kissinger’s] foreign policy, which has been 
executed from a historical perspective,” see KB to Henry Kissinger, 28 May 1983, ACDP K146/3.  On 
Birrenbach’s conviction that “historical knowledge is more necessary than ever,” here with respect to a 
proper judgment of the Soviet Union, see KB to Prof. Schieder, 21 July 1978, ACDP K158/1.   
For Birrenbach’s knowledge of American history, including that between the two world wars, 
rendering him particularly sensitive to what he perceived to be isolationist trends in the United States, see 
KB to Eugene Rostow, 18 February 1976, ACDP K211/2.  Birrenbach’s knowledge of 20th-century history 
also contributed to his understanding of the United States as simultaneously an Atlantic and Pacific power, 
engaged in both areas at the same time (KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2).  On 
Birrenbach’s triumphalist understanding of American history as one of many historical tests passed and 
difficult internal and external crises overcome (most recently two world wars and the Great Depression), 
the mastery of much of the continent, and the building up of a world power, see KB to Bundesminister für 
Bildung und Wissenschaft Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.  In Birrenbach’s 
mind, the First and Second World Wars had demonstrated that a European balance on a continental basis 
was no longer thinkable and the need for extra-European powers to re-establish the balance (KB to Prof. 
Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2). 
In December 1974, Birrenbach remarked “Russia has been all over the last centuries an imperialist 
power, and the Soviet Union is only more powerful and furthermore ideologically more aggressive than 
Russia has been, which thought only in the times of the czars of the extension of the Russian borders and 
power and did not dispose of the ideological weapon the Soviet Union is using in such an extremely adroit 
form.  If men like Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn give us the advice to insist on our policies and not to give in 
too quickly, we should follow their advice and not the advice of Willy Brandt” (KB to Eugene Rostow, 3 
December 1974, ACDP K211/2).  For Birrenbach’s insistence as of December 1974 that only self-
enforcing treaties be concluded with the Soviet Union, based on his knowledge of the experiences of the 
United States in its negotiations with the USSR over th  past twenty years, and for his negative assessm nt 
of the potential impact of economic cooperation on the policy of the USSR, an impact he believed was 
widely overestimated in many countries, based on Germany’s long experience over the past five decades in 
trade with the Soviet Union, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, 
ACDP K184/1.  Ultimately, Birrenbach considered theeffects of the Berlin Agreement, along with other 
products of the Ostpolitik, an “entirely deep cut [Einschnitt] in the historical development in Germany” 
(Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2).  More 
broadly, Birrenbach’s skeptical, even negative, attitude towards détente and its potentially serious 
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exclusively in international terms, with his judgment of particular issues, personalities 
and policies ultimately related to and viewed through the prism of foreign affairs.  For 
instance, looking abroad, he judged foreign leaders, r gardless of their political stripe, 
primarily on the basis of their statesman-like ability to execute what he considered the 
necessary policies, in the case of American presidents, to lead both the United States and 
the Atlantic Alliance.46  Birrenbach’s extensive knowledge of foreign countries also 
encouraged a comparative approach in understanding the Federal Republic’s condition.47  
                                                                                                                                      
consequences was shaped in no small part by the experi nces of the late 1930s.  For instance, he compared 
Nixon’s statements regarding “peace for our generation” with Neville Chamberlain’s declaration of “peace 
for our time” after the infamous Munich Conference (KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2 and KB 
to Kissinger, 7 January 1977, ACDP K146/3).  On the Munich myth, see Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser, 
eds.,  Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1998).   
On the need for historical knowledge to truly understand the world’s reaction to the West German 
Ostpolitik, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  Birrenbach’s own historical 
knowledge was essential to his interpretation of what he considered the anti-German policies, the interes  in 
keeping Germany down [“Kleinhalten”] that had been reawakened after Hitler and still existed, of the 
neighboring European nations, including with respect to the German Ostpolitik [KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 
23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1].  Regarding the French policy towards the Federal Republic, especially 
its approval of the Brandt Ostpolitik, Birrenbach bitterly remarked, “they are doing this since the times of 
Richelieu” (KB to John McCloy, 15 February 1971, ACDP K210/1).  As of October 1964, Birrenbach 
viewed the current French desire for hegemony and a hier rchical form of European unity as part of a series 
of such attempts in the past (KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International 
Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2).   
Other historically based assessments abounded.  For instance, in March 1959, Birrenbach 
remarked that the Anglo-French relations were as bad as they had ever been since Faschoda (KB, Munich, 
to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2].  Birrenbach’s stress on the creation 
with the EEC of a “community of stability” (and his criticism of inflationary developments in the Federal 
Republic under Brandt) was based not least on his knowledge of how “fateful” a continuous inflation could 
be, not only for the well-being of the economy but also the state (KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 
1973, ACDP K140/2).   
46 For these criteria applied especially to candidate Jimmy Carter, see KB to John McCloy, 8 October 1976, 
ACDP K210/1.  The linkage in Birrenbach’s mind betwen domestic and foreign affairs manifested itself 
clearly in his analysis of the United States.  As Birrenbach put it, “[w]hat happens in the United States 
affects everybody in the world, no country more than the Federal Republic” (KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 
1970, ACDP K138/2).  On not only the tremendous costs f the Vietnam War but also enormous internal 
problems pushing the United States down the path of arms limitation, see Birrenbach’s Memorandum, 9 
March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  On the “internal crisis” and the Vietnam War having brought about an 
unfortunate change in the American relationship to the world, in particular a reduction of the role of the 
United States (Nixon Doctrine), including in the next few years in Europe, and in this sense “the end of an 
epoch” and a “changed world constellation,” see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Bonn, 
15 October 1971, ACDP K024/1.  For Birrenbach’s prediction that the overcoming of the internal US crisis 
would require years and all the nation’s strength, so that the clear priority of the foreign- and defens -
political goal of the 1950s would not be manifest in he 1970s, see KB to Bundesminister für Bildung und 
Wissenschaft Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.  On the connection between the 
internal crisis in the United States and the “Kurswechsel”  in American foreign policy under Nixon, 
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especially the reduction of the American (particularly military) engagement in the world (especially in Asia 
but also Europe), the setting of the American priority on Europe as an important consolation, and 
Birrenbach’s denial that all this amounted to a neo-isolationism, like after World War I, or that the collapse 
of American power was imminent, see again KB to Leussink, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.  On the 
endangered condition of the American currency, the financial and economic basis of the American 
Weltmacht, as a contributing factor to the “agonizing reappraisal” of the American position and a future 
reduction of the American engagement in the world, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 
March 1968, ACDP K021/1.  On the need for Nixon to bring inflation in the United States under control, 
important not only from an internal perspective butalso externally with respect to the American balance of 
payments, see KB to Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.  For the contribution of the “race conflict,” 
which touched the very foundations of the American “Lebensordnung”  and could lead that summer to a 
“serious explosion” in the slums of the American cities, to the “agonizing reappraisal” of the American 
position and a future reduction of the American engagement in the world, see again KB to Kiesinger, 18 
March 1968, ACDP K021/1.  For Birrenbach’s concern regarding the “race conflict” and “wave of crime 
and violence” in the United States and their implicit potential impact on external affairs and international 
relations, see KB to Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.   
Birrenbach’s tendency to link domestic and foreign affairs was quite noticeable with respect to 
Watergate.  Birrenbach especially feared that a prolongation of the constitutional crisis and the weakening 
of the executive vis-à-vis Congress (a crisis of authority) that he perceived would have a broad and 
deleterious impact on American foreign policy in a variety of areas: the undermining of Nixon’s position in 
his negotiations with Brezhnev; the dimming of the prospects for the ideas that Kissinger had developed in 
his “Year of Europe” speech of 23 April 1973; and a serious weakening of the deterrence function of 
American nuclear weapons.  Therefore, Birrenbach hoped for a “normalization” of the situation with a 
return to the American system of checks and balances in the constitution, but no more.  “This would be in 
the interest of the whole world” (KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2 and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 
28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2).  On Watergate as a “collapse of executive authority” and a relative 
shift in power from “an unconstitutionally almighty presidency” to the Congress, a shift which was to ome 
extent indispensable but which on the whole represent d a “pretty dangerous” impairment of the normal 
functioning of American institutions, with adverse effects that were tangible all over the world, see KB to 
William Bundy, Editor, Foreign Affairs, New York City, 17 July 1974, ACDP K184/1; KB to McCloy, 23 
October 1974, ACDP K210/1; KB to Kissinger, 6 May 1985, ACDP K146/3.  For Watergate and the 
recognition in Europe, including the Federal Republic, and elsewhere of the President’s loss of authority, 
see KB to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1.  On the negative 
impact of strained relations between the President and the Senate, even prior to Watergate, on American 
operations in Europe and Asia, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.     
47 For Birrenbach’s comparative international orientation, for instance with respect to determining the 
feasibility of an increased progressive taxation in the Federal Republic, in comparing the German tax rate 
to the rest of the world, and with reference to the extraordinary mobility that existed with regard to jobs in 
the United States, see KB to Prof. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP 
K028/1.  For Birrenbach on the highest taxes in the world in the Federal Republic, the differences between 
the tax systems in the FRG and the United States, and the much more negative picture exhibited by the 
liabilities of the German stock corporations than those of neighboring countries and the United States, see 
KB to Javits, 14 March 1966, ACDP K090/1.  On Birrenbach’s assessment that the West German steel 
industry paid, with Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the highest wages in the Montanunion and had the 
shortest work time, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, 24 March 
1966, ACDP K016/1.  On the tendency for countries governed by Socialist governments, including the 
Federal Republic, towards inflationary developments, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, 
ACDP K039/1.  For Birrenbach placing the reaction of the SPD and FDP to the American incursion into 
Cambodia in the context of the depth of the reaction of the world’s liberal and left-wing parties, see KB to 
Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.  For Birrenbach demonstrating his knowledge of Anglo-Saxon 
ideas in international law, see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, 
ACDP K014/2.  For Birrenbach elsewhere comparatively r ferring to the conditions in the United States, 
see European Coal and Steel Community, Common Assembly, Meeting on Wednesday, 26 February 1958, 
Proceedings/Speeches, KB versus Debré, ACDP K075/2.   
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Likewise, Birrenbach viewed issues that might have se med primarily of 
domestic importance to the Federal Republic through the same international prism.  For 
example, his desire to move from the current federal st ucture towards a more centralized 
form of state was closely related to his aim of enhancing the Federal Republic’s 
effectiveness in foreign affairs.  Similarly, his support for a Grand Coalition, whatever 
domestic advantages he perceived in such a grouping, stemmed largely from his hope that 
“such a majority would neutralize the internal differences [between his party’s north and 
south wings] as far as foreign policy is concerned” and reestablish the Federal Republic’s 
capacity for action in international affairs that hd been damaged by what he saw as the 
internal crisis of the late 1950s and early 1960s.48  For Birrenbach, the need to accelerate 
the resolution of the Chancellor-succession question in the wake of the events of January 
1963, including the signing of the Élysée Treaty, was also largely a question of 
international politics, since “[a] German-French agreement has a completely different 
aspect with Erhard or Schröder at the head of the German government than if Adenauer 
were still there.”49  Even as Birrenbach insisted that legal, domestic-political and moral 
concerns motivated him with respect to the statute of limitations on war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, his position in this regard was likewise primarily determined by 
international political considerations.50  International considerations also contributed to 
                                                
48 KB to Dean Acheson, 19 August 1966, ACDP K155/3.  Birrenbach saw the domestic advantages of such 
a grouping in the strength it would provide for a long-term political and economic program and for 
electoral and other essential reforms. 
49 KB to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1.  Birrenbach suggested this to American contacts 
such as John McCloy and Shepard Stone in February 1963.  As Birrenbach put it several months later, “by 
solving the problem of succession we have made quit clear to General de Gaulle that we do not want an 
inward-looking Europe,” this being one of several step  taken to clarify their position (KB to William 
Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 
1963, ACDP K186/2].   
50 Birrenbach deemed it an “unbearable idea” that Nation l Socialist criminals might “escape earthly 
justice” simply because the Verjährungsfrist had expired.  He opposed an extension as an undesirable 
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determining Birrenbach’s views with respect to economic policy, for instance 
Mitbestimmung, in the Federal Republic.51  Finally, virtually any negative event or 
condition in the Federal Republic, such as what Birrenbach viewed as the decline of his 
party and Staat in the early 1960s, was cause for concern in part due to the distressing 
impression created among observers abroad.52   
In addition to this all-encompassing, holistic approach to international affairs, 
Birrenbach’s thought often displayed, as befitted a person trained in law, a pronounced 
and often excessively legalistic quality.  Legal issues especially comprised a central 
element of his treatment of the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and the Ostverträge.53  At times, this legalistic approach was linked to a strangely 
deferential attitude towards the Soviet Union.  Forinstance, Birrenbach’s legalistic 
outlook largely triggered his concerns regarding the potential impact of a Soviet 
interpretation of the Ostverträge as a final recognition of the division of Germany and his 
search for and insistence on a legally binding instrument that would commit the USSR to 
                                                                                                                                      
manipulation of the fundamental rules but favored instead a de facto extension through a change of the 
temporal starting point (KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2).   
51 As of October 1970, Birrenbach saw the current German Mitbestimmung regulation, especially that in the 
Montan industry, as having hindered the efforts for a harmonization of national company law in Europe, 
essential for an economic and currency union.  Moreover, he believed that a far-reaching expansion of this 
Mitbestimmung would hinder further economic integration in the EEC (KB to Thomas Ruf, MdB, 
Chairman of the CDU Program Commission on Mitbestimmung, 8 October 1970, ACDP K025/1).   
52 On Birrenbach’s concerns at the end of the 1950s regarding developments and foreign-policy 
(Deutschland) plans within the SPD, the possibility of “macabre scenes” in the context of resultant foreign 
policy debates and their impact on the international rel tions of the Federal Republic (“If the government 
alternative is not reliable and credible, this country must inevitably lose respect”), see KB, Munich, to Prof. 
Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.   
53 Having discussed the possibilities of modifying or interpreting the Franco-German Treaty with Monnet 
beforehand, Birrenbach investigated the legal problems regarding the passage by the Bundestag of the 
treaty’s Ratification Act and found the options limited, due to constitutional restrictions on the Bundestag’s 
power.  “For this reason there are only two ways to do what we had discussed, either by the passage of a 
resolution by the Bundestag or by putting a special clause into the preamble of the Ratification Act.”  
Birrenbach rejected the first possibility because “w  have abused this device in the past and nobody has 
trust anymore in resolutions of this kind.”  Therefore, Birrenbach made clear that “I prefer the second way 
in spite of the fact that this method, without being  contradiction to our Constitutional Law, is 
constitutionally unusual.  The last fact does not dis urb me at all.”  He therefore proposed to Monnet to do 
just that (KB to Jean Monnet, 16 March 1963, ACDP K051/1).  
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an interpretation of the treaties as a modus vivendi.54  Likewise, Birrenbach’s efforts to 
modify the NPT and to secure interpretations binding vis-à-vis the USSR rested in part on 
his fears that by citing certain articles of the trea y as well as by invoking a narrow 
interpretation of international law, the Soviet Unio  could transform itself into the arbiter 
of the future structure of the Atlantic Alliance.55  Finally, Birrenbach was horrified at the 
                                                
54 See KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2.  For Birrenbach’s judgment of the legal 
situation regarding the Ostverträge, see also KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman 
of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 14 May 1972, ACDP K026/1.  For Birrenbach’s proposals to Barzel from the 
start involving an exchange of letters or notes; hi rejection of a resolution as a suitable instrument with 
respect to an authentic interpretation of the treaty since such a resolution (along with the government’s 
submission process with respect to the USSR) had only mi imal international legal relevance and, rather 
than binding, left the Soviet Union its freedom of action both politically and in an international legal sense; 
his assessment that certain elements within his party (including the Union’s top party committee, the 
Bundesvorstand, which voted “yes” to the treaties) were overestima ing the value of the resolution 
proposed by the government and agreed upon by all the Bundestag Fraktionen; and the crucial role this 
(including his failure to reach the goal he had strived for in this regard) all played in his refusal to approve 
the Ostverträge as the final vote in the Bundestag approached, see again KB to Barzel, 14 May 1972, 
ACDP K026/1 and KB to Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2.  Incidentally, Birrenbach considered a 
preamble to the ratifying resolution, as had been done with the Franco-German Treaty in 1963, 
unacceptable since a unilateral preamble would not change the treaty, while a bilateral preamble would not 
have been accepted by the Russians (KB to Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2). 
55 With respect to the universal NPT turning the USSR into the arbiter of the future structure of the alliance 
(including the nuclear status of the Federal Republic), see KB to Robert Bowie, 8 September 1965, ACDP 
K160/2 and KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  Regarding Birrenbach’s fears 
that the Soviet Union, through the NPT, would become the arbiter over the military development in Europe, 
to the detriment of the non-nuclear powers, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 
16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1.  For the serious consequences of the NPT (draft) on the non-nuclear 
member states of NATO with respect to the security arrangements within NATO, especially regarding the 
European option and the creation of a European ABM system, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of 
the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1.  On Birrenbach’s warnings that the NPT 
(especially if a European Staatsverband id not come about) made the Soviet Union the arbiter of a future 
structure of the Atlantic alliance and of a European union and perpetuated the American policy of under o 
circumstances relinquishing its veto with regard to the nuclear control system, see KB to Prof. Henry 
Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1.  Clearly, 
Birrenbach believed the NPT impacted on the possibilities for European political unification.  For 
Birrenbach’s concern regarding the NPT blocking a possible stage on the path to European unity based on 
his belief that the doctrine of state succession would not serve as a suitable basis for a European nuclear 
solution given the probable development in Europe, se  KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP 
K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2.  On Birrenbach’s worries that the 
Soviet Union might invoke the much stricter and more formal continental European version of international 
law, rather than the more pragmatic Anglo-Saxon version, and thus in combination with the NPT hinder the 
implementation of the doctrine of state succession, thereby preventing the future creation of a European 
nuclear force, see KB to Eugene Rostow, 5 November 1973, ACDP K211/2.  For Birrenbach’s criticism of 
the NPT as eliminating the possibility of a European nuclear option, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, 
ACDP K184/2.  On the need to keep open the future possibility of a European nuclear option for a 
European Zusammenschluß on the threshold of a political union on the basis of the doctrine of state 
succession, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Dir ctor of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP 
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USSR’s continued insistence on its rights of intervention in the Federal Republic, 
bestowed on the victors of World War II and spelled out in Articles 53 and 107 of the UN 
Charter, and devoted an inordinate amount of effort over the years to having these 
eliminated.56  True, Birrenbach was not totally consumed by this mode of thought, 
                                                                                                                                      
K184/1.  For differing interpretations of a “temporally practically unlimited” NPT as a potential threat to 
peace, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. 
On Birrenbach’s preference for an NPT among the NATO countries alone, which could then be 
easily modified on the basis of the self-evident clausula rebus sic stantibus to take account of 
developments such as a European unification, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, 
Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1.  As part of his efforts to minimize the deleterious effects of the
NPT, Birrenbach sought “verfahrensrechtlichen” measures and changes to the procedural rules of the treaty 
(drafts) to which he objected, including a shortening of the “practically unlimited duration,” the expanding 
of the right of resignation, and an increase in the frequency and a strengthening in the competencies to 
change the treaty of the periodic review conferences (in case the nuclear weapon states did not fulfiltheir 
obligations stemming from the treaty) (KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 
February 1968, ACDP K020/1).  For Birrenbach’s efforts to attain an improvement in the interpretation of 
the European option based on the doctrine of succession, see his Memorandum to Gerard Smith, 24 
February 1969, ACDP K209/1.  On the need to negotiate about and settle certain points regarding and prior
to the signing of the NPT, not only with the Federal Republic’s Western partners (especially the United 
States) but also with the Soviet Union; Birrenbach’s suggestion that it should be ascertained with the 
United States whether the Federal Republic could give its own interpretation, prior to signing the NPT, of 
the European option which would be based on the doctrine of state succession and would avoid 
unnecessary restrictions; and his suggestion that the Federal Republic should at the signing of the treaty 
submit a reservation with respect to the possible case of the development of purely defensive nuclear 
weapons that would later justify its exercise of the reservation clause, see KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 
June 1969, ACDP K023/1.  For Birrenbach’s insistence on securing the legal validity and binding nature of 
any interpretations and assurances, American or German, regarding the NPT (e.g. nuclear arrangements 
within NATO, unhindered use of atomic energy for peac ful purposes) and the often convoluted procedural 
issues involved (often including with respect to a USSR that might contradict them), see for instance KB to 
John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; KB 
to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP 
K023/1; and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 6 March 1974, ACDP 
K184/1.     
56 Birrenbach explained the Federal Republic’s reluctan e to enter into the NPT in part through the Soviet 
Union’s continued insistence on these “obsolete” rights (KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP 
K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, K187/2).  For Birrenbach’s desire to secure some sort 
of guarantee or protection within the context of the NPT against “threat and blackmail,” see KB to Rainer 
Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1.  For Birrenbach 
seeking to ensure that in exchange for what he considered the extraordinary sacrifices the Federal Republic 
would make by accepting the NPT that the Soviet Union would renounce these intervention rights, see KB 
to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP 
K020/1.  On Birrenbach’s belief that the statements of the Soviet ambassador of 6 February 1969 did not 
suffice in their legal effects regarding the UN articles and that prior to the signing of the NPT the USSR 
would have to issue a statement that the Federal Republic enjoyed all rights from the NPT in the same way 
as all the other treaty states, that after the signing and ratification of the treaty by the Federal Republic the 
reproach that the FRG was seeking “access to nuclear w pons” would cease, that the Federal Republic 
enjoyed the same status as all other states, and tht the Soviet Union recognized that Article 2 of the UN 
charter fully applied to its relations with the Federal Republic, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 
16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.  Birrenbach considered it a s gnificant achievement of his Sondermission to 
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admitting, for instance, that with respect to an Atlantic Partnership “the spirit of 
cooperation which will dominate this unifying framework will be still more important 
than its legalistic structure.”57  Still, Birrenbach often exhibited an exaggerated legalistic 
quality, admittedly not entirely uncharacteristic of West German foreign policy as a 
whole in the post-1945 era.58     
C. Motivations 
 Having outlined Birrenbach’s pronounced Atlanticist views, it is now time to 
identify in an impressionistic, rather than a comprehensive, manner some of the 
                                                                                                                                      
the United States in September 1968 that, shortly thereafter, the American and British governments made 
statements declaring that a unilateral Soviet intervention would justify the casus foederis (the French 
declaration of September 1968 was somewhat vaguer).  In later years, Birrenbach seems to have placed less 
stress on these intervention articles, not only characterizing them as “obsolete [überholt]” but also arguing 
that while the Soviet Union might refer to them as a justification, “it would convince nobody” (KB to 
Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2). 
57 KB to US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 28 June 1974, ACDP K184/1.  Likewise, Birrenbach 
at least occasionally acknowledged that with respect to the relationship between the NPT and European 
unification “in extremis this is a question of power and will depend on onesid  upon the situation of the 
Soviet Union in that moment and on the other side on the mood of countries like France and Britain” (KB 
to Robert Bowie, 4 October 1973, ACDP K160/2).  Birrenbach also admitted that the resolution and 
procedure of submission pertaining to the Ostverträge were not completely irrelevant insofar as they might 
serve internal purposes and put the treaties into a perspective of general West German policy.  On 
Birrenbach’s recognition of the political effect and importance of a resolution supported by all the parties 
and declared by the government to be the Federal Republic’s view regarding the Ostverträge, especially 
with respect to the attitude of the Western world towards the treaties and the outcome of a plebiscitary 
election on the Ostpolitik, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the 
CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 14 May 1972, ACDP K026/1.  In this letter to Barzel of 14 May 1972, Birrenbach 
also referred to “the gray zone between Politik and Recht,” here with respect to the Moscow Treaty, and 
noted the difficulty of familiarizing the broader West German public with “extraordinarily complicated” 
international law.  
58 Birrenbach’s stress on legal factors was in part determined by his conviction that the Federal Republic, 
of all countries, had to conscientiously fulfill treaties.  Furthermore, while the Federal Republic had a vital 
interest in reaching understandings with the Soviet Union about major questions, such as those linked to 
Deutschlandpolitik, any divergence in the interpretation of treaties involving the Soviet Union and the 
Federal Republic, for example those he believed exist d regarding the NPT, would provide the Soviet 
Union with “room to maneuver (Spielraum)” which it would certainly exploit, thus burdening the Federal 
Republic’s relations to the USSR as well as its relations within the alliance, and ultimately harm the
relatively weak and vulnerable Federal Republic, rather than, for instance, the more powerful United States.  
Therefore, Birrenbach insisted it was essential that tre ties with the Soviet Union only be signed when they 
were precisely formulated and unanimously interpreted (KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP 
K023/1).  For Birrenbach’s analysis of Anglo-Saxon concepts of international law with respect to de facto 
recognition, in this case vis-à-vis the GDR, see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 
December 1963, ACDP K014/2.  On legalistic tendencis in West German foreign policy, see Waldemar 
Besson, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Erfahrungen und Massstäbe (Munich: R. Piper, 1970). 
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motivations that inspired him, always bearing in mind the nature of our study and sources 
as well as highlighting certain particularly interesting factors.  Probably the most 
immediate impetus driving Birrenbach’s Atlanticist conception was the need to ward off 
the threat from the East and, ultimately, to win the Cold War.  Based on often faulty 
impressions, Birrenbach beheld the Soviet Union and its ependent empire with 
considerable fear and awe.59  At least to some extent an extra-European power, th  USSR 
represented an aggressive admixture of traditional centuries-old czarist imperialism, bent 
on the extension of borders and power, and new communist ideology.60  Birrenbach was 
impressed by, indeed overestimated, the “tremendous” power and dynamics of the Soviet 
bloc, not just in military but also in political terms.  He likewise exaggerated the 
advantages in international relations enjoyed by the USSR, and totalitarian systems in 
general, vis-à-vis the democracies of the West, seeing the Soviet Union as “extremely 
adroit” in its use of ideological weapons and untroubled by peace movements, public 
opinion, and parliamentary control in its foreign policy-making.61  With these strengths 
and the very real prospect of an imbalance of military power favoring the Soviets, the 
                                                
59 On the dependence relations of the Eastern bloc, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 
1967, ACDP K018/2.  On the question of misperception, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception 
in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
60 For Birrenbach’s perception of the USSR as a not purely European power, see KB to Prof. Alfred 
Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  On the “constant direct or indirect threats from the 
USSR” against the “vulnerable” Federal Republic, see KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP 
K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2. 
61 On these themes, see for example KB to Eugene Rostow, 3 December 1974, ACDP K211/2 and KB to 
Gerard Smith, 13 May 1982, ACDP K209/1.  For Birrenbach on the constant underestimation of the 
military technology of the Soviet Union, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP 
K117/1.  With respect to the USSR’s “extremely adroit” use of ideological weapons, see KB to Prof. 
Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.  In May 1980, Birrenbach 
remarked that “[t]he Soviet Union, as a totalitarian state without parliamentary control, is able to act 
deliberately wherever it can if a power vacuum is opening in one part of the world or the other” (KB to 
Eugene Rostow, 28 May 1980, ACDP K209/2).  Likewise, Birrenbach argued that it was unwise to base 
policies on “the apparent intentions” of the USSR, in part because, as “a totalitarian state,” it could “move 
from one policy to another, irrespective of the reactions of an almost not existing public opinion in that 
country” (KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2).   
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danger even existed by the early 1970s, apart from any threat of outright attack, that the 
USSR would attain hegemony over Western Europe by means short of war.62  Given 
these concerns and this conception of the USSR, the military balance naturally occupied a 
central position in Birrenbach’s thought.63  While not averse to negotiations and insisting 
                                                
62 In June 1973, for instance, Birrenbach professed himself “deeply worried” and “afraid” about the 
possibility of a “Finlandization of Europe” (KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2).  On 
Birrenbach’s fear that “the USSR may in a series of years (five or ten years or less), on the basis alone of its 
sheer predominance of power, get such an influence in Europe as is connected with the concept of 
Finlandization,” see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  On the potential for a 
preponderance of Soviet military power to lead to Soviet influence on the political development of the
European continent, see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, 
ACDP K188/2.  On the threat of growing Soviet influence on the policy of the European states as the 
principal danger for Europe, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, 
ACDP K184/1.  For Birrenbach’s prediction of a bandwagoning, rather than a balancing, response of the 
European states (equating balancing with an increase in European defense contributions and a moving 
together of the European states), see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 
September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  In this respect, Birrenbach was fond of quoting Dean Acheson’s 
reference to “a mad race towards Moscow”  (for insta ce, again Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. 
Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2).  On the contribution (albeit insufficient alone) of a 
unification of Europe “across the board” (including political and military unification) in averting such 
developments, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For the essential role of Atlantic 
Partnership and the United States in protecting Europe, along with factors like a proper defense budget and 
nuclear strategy, and thus preventing Europe from falling into the orbit of and reaching an accommodation 
with the Soviet Union, see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, 
ACDP K188/2; KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP 
K184/1; and KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On Birrenbach’s warning that if Europe got the 
feeling that any nuclear confrontation would be limited to European territory, something he sensed 
happening due to American strategy, “then a flight nto accommodation with the Soviet Union is 
unavoidable,” see KB to Hahn, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.  On the willingness of the Soviet Union to 
use or threaten force in the pursuit of its interests, ee KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  
63 For Birrenbach’s insistence on the maintenance of the military balance in Europe, see for instance KB to 
Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  
For Birrenbach’s reference to the “power political European game,” see KB, Munich, to Prof. 
Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  On the worrisome threat posed by Soviet 
ballistic missiles, see KB to Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1.  On
Birrenbach’s concerns regarding Soviet technological developments in the military realm undermining the
military equilibrium and changing the whole military-strategic situation, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 
November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  For Birrenbach on the importance of the presence in the immediate 
neighborhood of the nuclear superpower Russia, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, 
ACDP K139/2.  On Birrenbach’s concern that the Russians had overtaken the West in almost all military 
areas in the last years (“in spite of détente!”), see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP 
K039/1.  On the role of the American presence in Europe in maintaining the military balance there, see 
Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  For the 
need to base policy towards the USSR on its power capabilities, rather than its apparent intentions, the 
military superiority of the USSR in many fields, Birrenbach’s concerns regarding and the need to offset the 
conventional superiority of the USSR, and a negative v ew on the present state of the power equilibrium in 
the world, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  Indeed, Birrenbach’s fear about the 
“precarious” military balance in Europe was a key rason for his skepticism regarding MBFR (he agreed 
here with the French), negotiations he believed might lead to a substantial, perhaps even unbalanced, 
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that “I am no ‘cold warrior’,” Birrenbach consistently urged a hard line in the face of this 
daunting Soviet threat, one that firmly eschewed unilateral concessions.64  In his view, 
                                                                                                                                      
reduction of American troops (KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2).  Birrenbach’s anxiety 
regarding the military balance led him to generally embrace American “hawks,” like Senator Henry 
“Scoop” Jackson, while dismissing “doves,” like Senator George McGovern and Paul Warncke 
(Birrenbach’s confidential memo of 30 April 1974, ACDP K184/1).  For instance, Birrenbach opposed 
McGovern’s plans for major reductions in the American defense budget (Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk 
with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2).  On Birrenbach’s belief that a system 
“from the Atlantic to the Urals” or “from one end of Europe to the other,” would give to the Soviet Union 
such a militarily predominant position that it would be unacceptable for all the other European states except 
France, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  The “hardly to be 
redressed [aufholbar]” superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional arms led Birrenbach to doubt 
whether it was in the Federal Republic’s interest, and that of the European alliance partners, at all to have a 
reduction of nuclear weapons in the context of the NPT or SALT (KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 
16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1).  For Birrenbach on the ne d for the United States to not renounce a first use 
of nuclear weapons, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On the other hand, for Birrenbach’s 
assessment that the discrimination of the NPT was only acceptable if the nuclear weapons states also made 
sacrifices, especially with respect to a limitation of nuclear arms, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairm n 
of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1.  Also for Birrenbach’s recognition of the 
greater importance in some situations, in this case Berlin, of political means rather than force see KB, 
Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.   
64 According to Birrenbach in August 1965, he had been aware for years that the current 
Deutschlandpolitik had to be reconsidered (KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for 
International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1).  On the support of the whole non-Gaullist majority 
in West Germany for a less rigid policy in the East nd the resistance to such a course by the “so-called 
Gaullist element,” see KB to Marc Ullmann, L’Express, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  While 
admitting that the changes in the East bloc as of the mid-1960s were not of a fundamental nature, 
Birrenbach argued that change had occurred there and required a more differentiated policy than that of the 
1950s (KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1).  For 
Birrenbach’s approval, provided certain preconditions were met, of a détente or offensive Ostpolitik, see 
KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.   
However, for Birrenbach’s opposition to an immediate recognition of the Oder-Neisse border 
without anything in return, since it would “take from us the last card in our game,” as well as to Britain’s 
proposal of a “thinned zone” that he saw as sacrificing “our only card” (here “the size of our army and its 
atomic armament”) only for the sake of détente, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26
March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  For the willingness of Birrenbach and others, “with a certain reluctance,” to 
conduct a less rigid policy towards the East, but one that did not involve making concessions in advance “in 
vital questions of our national existence,” see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  On the 
failure of the NPT to oblige the USSR to any quid pro quo, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 
1966, ACDP K139/2.  On Birrenbach’s characterization of Nixon’s efforts to enter into negotiations with 
the USSR as “unavoidable”; the need for the principle of do ut des in negotiations with the USSR; and the 
necessity of combining any fundamental settlement of military questions, like disarmament and arms 
control, with a solution of the political problems and sources of tension in Europe, such as Berlin, see KB 
to Prof. Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP 
K021/2.  On his opposition to greater concessions with respect to the Berlin negotiations, see KB to FRG 
Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1.  With respect to firmness vis-à-
vis the USSR regarding the carrying out of the Moscow Treaty and Birrenbach’s opposition to unilateral 
American withdrawals of troops from Europe, with an eye towards both the military balance in Europe and 
the negotiating position of the United States and the West, for instance on MBFR, see Birrenbach’s Report 
on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  On Birrenbach’s criticism of the 
Brandt government’s serious mistakes in negotiating treaties with the USSR that were not self-enforcing; 
the need for firmness towards the Soviet Union, including on human rights (“If men like Sakharov and 
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the Soviet Union’s totalitarian nature precluded a fundamental change of attitude towards 
the West and limited any détente to, at best, a fragile coexistence dogged by differing 
interpretations of its very meaning.65  Such a flawed détente would merely erode the will 
of the European and Atlantic nations to come together and to provide for their own 
security.66  Instead, the first priority of the United States and West Europe should be the 
Atlanticist goals of Community and Partnership.  “This will be the best Ostpolitik.”67     
                                                                                                                                      
Solzhenitsyn give us the advice to insist on our policies and not to give in too quickly, we should follow 
their advice and not the advice of Brandt”); an admission of the limits of such a policy; but also theJackson 
Amendment as a confirmation of his views, see KB to Pr f. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 
December 1974, ACDP K184/1.   
65 For example, the Protocol of the KB-Helmut Sonnenfeldt Talk during Birrenbach’s Trip to the United 
States of May 1975, ACDP K155/1 and KB to James Schlesinger, 16 December 1975, ACDP K155/1.  On 
doubts regarding the results of détente, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  
For the lack of any effective results for the forese able time for the Federal Republic from détente, se  KB 
to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  On Birrenbach’s skepticism regarding the USSR’s 
“all-out attempt to induce the Western world to believe she does not constitute a danger anymore for 
peace”; the lack of any real Soviet concessions during the process of détente; and the need to act soberly 
and cautiously vis-à-vis the USSR (also because of the USSR military superiority in many fields and 
experiences with the USSR in recent decades), see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For 
events like the Near East conflict in 1973 demonstrating that détente and the declared special relationsh p 
between the United States and the Soviet Union “has not yet created a new world,” see KB to Sen. Jacob 
Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  Obviously, Birrenbach was quite wary of détente with the 
USSR, which to him consisted merely of a deceptive relaxation of tensions and completely differing 
interpretations by East and West (for the East, only peaceful coexistence).  He saw the resultant deep
dissensions in East-West relations and their significance being brought home to the Germans as a result of 
their experiences with the Ostpolitik.  Ultimately, Birrenbach was extremely doubtful of the chances of a 
totalitarian state like the USSR changing its fundamental attitudes toward the West, for which his litmus 
test (and, for him, one of the unjustified expectations of détente) was the ending of the USSR and GDR 
policy of Abgrenzung and the opening of their frontiers to the free flow f men and ideas (for instance, as 
provided for in Basket 3 of the CSCE), since such a policy would endanger the regimes themselves.  On 
these topics, see also KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1 and KB to Prof. 
Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.  
66 For instance, KB to Sen. Edward Kennedy, 19 April 1974, ACDP K184/1.  For Birrenbach’s argument 
that the détente policy had slowed down the trend towards Atlantic cooperation and integration, see KB to 
Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.  On the impact of the Brandt 
Ostpolitik, which would “work like an infection” on the Scandi avian nations, the Benelux states and 
possibly Italy; and the potentially deleterious impact of a European security conference, see KB to Thomas 
Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  For Birenbach’s stress on the military, political and 
economic strength of the West as the basis for every kind of détente, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy 
Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.   
67 KB to US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 28 June 1974, ACDP K184/1 and KB to Richard 
Ullman, Director, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York City, 8 September 1976, ACDP K083/1.  
On the priority of the alliance and its cohesion over efforts for a détente (such as for the NPT), see KB to 
Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2 and KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, 
ACDP K117/1.  On the need for Atlantic Partnership, including West European unity, as a precondition for 
building bridges to Eastern Europe, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP 
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While the Soviet Union may have threatened the Atlantic world as a whole and 
while Birrenbach might have felt some abstract attachment to that world, he remained a 
realist for whom international relations was based principally on national interests, in his 
case what he perceived to be the interests of the West German state or the German 
nation.68  With even the other major Atlantic nations, their national traditions unbroken, 
still pursuing their own, sometimes anti-German, interests, it was essential that the 
Germans, despite their broken national tradition, ctinue to do this as well.  Otherwise 
“certain [negative] developments become inevitable.” 69  Birrenbach’s robust defense of 
                                                                                                                                      
K018/2.  On the need for a complete clarification of issues, in so far as possible, between the Federal 
Republic and its western partners prior to negotiating with the USSR or signing the NPT, see KB to 
Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.  Elsewhere in this document intended for 
Kiesinger, Birrenbach stressed the need to discuss and negotiate relevant questions pertaining to the NPT
with the governments of the United States, Britain, the EURATOM partners (including France) and, to 
some extent, the Soviet Union prior to and in some qu stions after signing the treaty.    
68 One element of this realism was Birrenbach’s argument that foreign policy could not be reduced simply 
to morality.  For Birrenbach’s views on the importance of concrete national interests in Indian foreign 
policy under Nehru, a policy ostensibly based on moral foundations, and for a general rejection of a foreign 
policy based on “die Moral,” see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP 
K023/2.  For Birrenbach’s stress on the need to seek practical political paths, rather than moralische ones, 
to solve the problem of the recognition of Israel by the Federal Republic, his emphasis on considerations of 
interest over moral claims in this regard and his argument “that the view point ‘fiat justitia pereat mundi’ 
has nothing to do with practical Politik,” see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, 
ACDP K014/2.  On the other hand, Birrenbach did not deny the role of morality in politics.  For the 
considerable moral pressure the Federal Republic would be subjected to if it did not sign the NPT, seeKB 
to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 18 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  For Birrenbach’s argument that the Federal 
Republic’s non-recognition of Israel did not imply any moral devaluation of that state and for his rejection 
of the claim that “non-moral principles must govern the Realpolitik,” see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, 
Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.   
69 KB to John McCloy, 22 January 1973, ACDP K210/1.  De Gaulle’s France was certainly a focus of 
Birrenbach’s attention in this regard.  On the harm caused to the Federal Republic by de Gaulle, see KB to 
Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  For the potentially negative impact of the “unrealistic” 
policies proposed by de Gaulle on the prospects for German reunification, see KB, Munich, to Prof. 
Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  For Birrenbach’s rejection of the French 
government’s demands that the Federal Republic essentially change the fundamental basis of its policy, 
thus abandoning the principles of the entire policy of postwar Germany, and sacrifice its vital interests (and 
the interests of many other countries in Europe), see KB to Marc Ullmann, L’Express, Paris, 4 February 
1966, ACDP K107/2.   
More broadly, Birrenbach was quite disturbed by the willingness among the Western Allies to 
engage in a strategy of détente with the Soviet Union and especially opposed the sacrifice of German 
interests to achieve it.  For Birrenbach’s displeasure that all the NATO powers around the Federal Republic 
were on a détente course, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.  On 
the British desire for détente and the deleterious potential impact of their proposals on the prospects for 
German reunification, here with respect to the idea of  “thinned zone,” see KB to Friedensburg, 26 March 
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German interests infused virtually all of his positions on the various issues of the time.70  
In certain instances, these efforts led him even to cooperate with German Gaullists, such 
                                                                                                                                      
1959, ACDP K074/2.  For Birrenbach’s frustration that the majority of the NATO partners attached priority 
to the NPT rather than to a German Mitspracherecht in the framework of a nuclear organization, see KB to 
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  On the efforts of Britain and some other 
NATO partners to push the American administration towards further concessions to the Soviet Union with
respect to the NPT and nuclear options, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  
For Birrenbach’s rejection of French advice to the Germans with respect to a less rigid policy towards the 
East that he considered tantamount to making advance concessions in vital questions of the German 
national existence, see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  On Birrenbach’s concerns that 
French policy under de Gaulle contained a hidden threat of possibly “going over our heads,” see KB to 
Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  To his dismay, Birrenbach found the yielding vis-à-vis the 
USSR and the easing of détente at the expense of th Federal Republic being well received as to their own
advantage among the states “in our neighborhood” an co siderable elements in the United States (KB to 
Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1).   
Birrenbach was particularly troubled by the approval he discerned of the Brandt Ostpolitik.  As he 
bitterly put it, “[t]he attitude of a series of West rn partner states in the course of the negotiations has not 
been so as the German people could have expected after twenty years of integration” (Birrenbach’s Report 
on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2).  On Birrenbach’s regret about 
“the opinions [Stellungnahmen]” of a number of Western governments [but speaking to Chayes: “not the 
American one”] regarding the Federal Republic’s Ostpolitik and surprise that “vital German interests have 
been so little respected [geachtet] by several of our partner states,” see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, 
Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1.  For the 
concerns of individual personalities inside and outside of the American administration regarding the Brandt 
Ostpolitik, but also the general approval of the goal of the fed ral government’s Ostpolitik (as well as that 
of the earlier Grand Coalition) and the American satisf ction about the federal government’s clear 
statement that its Ostpolitik was firmly anchored in the European and Atlantic Politik, see Birrenbach’s 
Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  Perhaps not surprisingly, Birrenbach favored a “gradual 
development of European political unity” because it would require “a long adaptation process in Europe,” 
part of which would be “an organ like the Commission that would include the consideration of the vital 
interests of the individual states in its proposals to the European executive,” for the Federal Republic to 
subject the question of reunification to the vote of its neighbors (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, 25 September 
1967, ACDP K018/2).     
70 On the Federal Republic’s foreign policy pursuing ad seeking to reconcile the three goals of security, 
Europe and reunification, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  For 
Birrenbach’s agreement with McCloy that the Federal Republic should affirm more strongly than in the 
past its own interests vis-à-vis France, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.  On 
Birrenbach’s concerns for the Federal Republic’s vital interests, in this case with respect to the impact of 
the NPT, see KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2 and KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 
1968, ACDP K109/2.   
Security: Birrenbach’s major concerns regarding the Federal Republic’s security were heightened 
by his consciousness of its position as the most exposed country in Western Europe in the context of “he
East-West conflict.”  For security as “our top preoccupation in the world today,” see KB to Marc Ullmann, 
L’Express, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  On the vulnerable Federal Republic (and Berlin) 
constantly threatened, directly or indirectly, by the USSR (and GDR), see KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 
1968, ACDP K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2.  For the greater security 
vulnerability of the Federal Republic than France, Britain and Italy, as demonstrated by the Berlin crisis of 
1958-62; the continuing great importance of the issue of security (admittedly less over recent years) for the 
Federal Republic due to the unreduced mass of Soviet troops across the border in the zone; the need to base 
defense policy on capabilities and not “intentions that can change daily”; and the link between the Federal 
Republic’s foreign political goal of security and the resultant close relationship to the United States, s e KB 
to Grosser, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  With respect to the NPT, Birrenbach sought improvements 
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that would enhance the position of the Federal Republic, and its partners in the EEC and NATO, in the civil 
as well as the security fields.  For Birrenbach’s worries regarding the potentially detrimental impact of an 
NPT with respect to military and security matters, including the denying to the Federal Republic of 
essential armaments of the future (such as small caliber atomic shells) and the obstructing of the building of 
ABM weapons, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1 and KB Memorandum, 
10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2.  On Birrenbach’s explanation of the Federal Republic’s objections to an 
NPT that would exclude the non-nuclear powers once and for all from the possession of nuclear weapons 
without guaranteeing to them as a corresponding quid pro quo an effective nuclear protection, see KB to 
Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1.   
Reunification: For the “fundamental German interest” in maintaining the “German option,” see 
KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 
1972, ACDP K026/1.  On the idea of Atlantic Partnership as a precondition for bridge-building to Eastern 
Europe and on German reunification presupposing, somewhat abstractly, the framework of a European 
peace order resting on a European security system requiring the United States as guarantor and protector 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  In 
this letter to Grosser, Birrenbach imagined that such a reunification could only take place in the framework 
of a marchandage global on a world scale, for which the United States, rather an the continental 
European states, could better offer the USSR concessions.  On West European unification, including 
political unity, as a precondition and in large part motivated by the desire for bridge-building to and 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see again KB to Grosser, 25 September 1967, 
ACDP K018/2 and KB to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 20 November 1969, ACDP 
K126/1.  Birrenbach’s opposition to any revaluation of the GDR’s status formed a significant aspect of his 
efforts for reunification.  On Birrenbach’s criticism of the Rapacki Plan for encouraging disarmament and 
disengagement while leaving unsettled the reunificat on of Germany and promoting the recognition of the
GDR, see KB to Foreign Minister Brentano, 22 Novembr 1958, ACDP K001/2.  For Birrenbach’s 
objection to a recognition of Israel by the Federal Republic and the precipitate withdrawal of German 
technicians working in Egypt due to his fears of a recognition of the GDR by the Arab world (“I am not 
ready to recognize Israel whatever the consequences may be for the Federal Republic”), see KB to Prof. 
Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On Birrenbach’s efforts to prevent such a 
revaluation with respect to the procedural conditions f the NPT, see KB to Barzel, Chairman of the 
CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1.  Birrenbach was also highly critical 
of the Brandt Ostpolitik for its impact on the possibility of German reunification.  For Birrenbach’s 
criticism of the Berlin Agreement as a crucial worsening of the all-German situation and the status of 
Berlin and as part of the process of sanctioning the division of Germany, see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk 
with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.   
 Discrimination: Birrenbach’s efforts in a variety of contexts to thwart a discrimination against and 
to ensure the equality of the Federal Republic vis-à-vis its Western Allies represented another element of 
his defense of German interests.  On Birrenbach’s opposition to what he considered proposals for a 
discriminatory regime exclusively for German troops, a  proposed in an article in the well-known French 
publication Politique étrangère in Fall 1958, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 
March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  On the need to maintain the structural principle of equality, especially vis-à-
vis France and England, within the future European order and the framework of the NATO alliance 
(including the command structure), see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 
1965, ACDP K117/1.  For Birrenbach’s insistence on the principle of equality in the control apparatus of a 
future collective nuclear force, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for 
International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1.  For the “crucial” importance of a definitive solution 
of the issue of nuclear control to ensure equal rights to the European states, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig 
Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  On Birrenbach’s support for the establishment of an 
integrated, collective Atlantic nuclear weapons system in which the Federal Republic would take part with 
equal rights as and through which it would achieve a status of relative equality with the other larger 
European alliance nations (i.e. Britain and France, perhaps Italy), see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 
November 1965, ACDP K117/1 and KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1.  For the discriminatory 
character of the NPT drafts, including the division of the world into nuclear weapon and non-nuclear st te , 
see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP 
 258
                                                                                                                                      
K020/1.  On Birrenbach’s insistence and proposals with respect to the NPT that the Federal Republic (and 
other non-nuclear states) not be discriminated against or its endeavors impaired in the peaceful civilian use 
of nuclear energy and namely that all free Western nations, including the nuclear weapon states like the 
United States and Britain, subject themselves and their peaceful nuclear facilities to the same safeguards 
and controls, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, 
ACDP K020/1; KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 
1968, ACDP K020/1; and Birrenbach’s Memorandum to Gerard Smith, 24 February 1969, ACDP K209/1.  
For Birrenbach’s hostility to the revival of the idea of a tripartite directorate (first broached by de Gaulle to 
the United States and Britain in September 1958), see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 
7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  On Birrenbach’s oppositi n to a special control zone with regard to MBFR 
in Europe, particularly in Germany, that would again split Western Europe and weaken it further, see KB to 
John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.   
Directly related to these anti-discriminatory efforts were Birrenbach’s attempts to preclude a 
hegemony in Europe, especially on the part of France.  On Birrenbach’s desire for a non-hegemonic 
community, see KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 
1964, ACDP K014/2.  For discrimination and qualitative inequality between states within the European 
community, particularly with respect to nuclear power and weapons (e.g. nuclear inspections (including 
those related to the NPT), possession or sharing of uclear weapons), as inevitably leading to exaggerated 
claims, hegemonic tendencies and hierarchical forms that would prove dangerous and destructive for 
European unity, especially with reference to France but also Britain; and for collective nuclear contrl 
systems, such as the MLF, the ANF and the European option, as a means of bringing France and Britain 
(the sole possessors of national nuclear weapons in Europe) to abandon the idea of and integrate these 
national nuclear forces into that collective system, thus establishing equality between the states and 
undermining strivings for hegemony, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European 
Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2; KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, 
Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2; KB to 
Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; KBto Prof. Edward Teller, University 
of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1; KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, 
Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1; KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 
1966, ACDP K139/2; KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 12 November 
1970, ACDP K140/2; KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2; KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 
November 1973, ACDP K184/2; and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 
January 1974, ACDP K184/1.  For Birrenbach’s argument that “[a] divided community is no community” 
and his stress on equality as a major reason he objected to the French claims to privileges also in the 
peaceful nuclear sector, “which appears extremely unwise and not very communitarian,” see KB to Prof. 
Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.   
Decision-making: Birrenbach also worked assiduously to ensure a West German participation in 
the larger, especially American and NATO, decision-making processes.  For the idea of the coordination of 
foreign and arms control policy within NATO as a means by which the Federal Republic could attempt to 
influence (though not alone stem) from within the course of détente pursued by the other NATO powers, 
see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.  On the need for coordination of 
foreign policy, especially in times of crisis and in arms control questions, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 
FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  Regarding the necessity of close 
consultation and agreement, including with respect to American-Soviet negotiations, not least to ensure the 
maintenance and proper development of NATO, see KB to Prof. Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 
March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  On the desirability of information and consultations and the need for the 
Europeans and Americans to “create a ‘unifying framework’” [an expression of the US Secretary of State] 
based on a constant high-level dialogue between Europe and the United States until “a political integration” 
transformed Europe into “a real partner of the United States,” see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 
1973, ACDP K184/2.   
Birrenbach’s efforts pertaining to decision-making were particularly intense with respect to 
nuclear weapons.  On the Federal Republic’s desire for a “right of co-determination” with regard to nuclear 
weapons fired from European territory, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of 
European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.  On the interest in 
and need for a closely meshed coordination, consultation and direct participation of the Federal Republic in 
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as Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg and Franz Josef Strauß, a group with which he, however, 
never established much of a genuine relationship and with whom he often disagreed on 
                                                                                                                                      
every stage of the planning and decision-making process in NATO and the United States regarding nuclear 
strategy, arms control negotiations and crisis management, especially insofar as they impacted on the 
Federal Republic’s own security, see KB, Munich, to Pr f. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, 
ACDP K074/2; KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 18 November 1965, ACDP K090/1; KB to Sen. Thomas 
Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to State Secretary, Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 
1965, ACDP K117/1; and KB to Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.   
Birrenbach’s interest in collective nuclear weapons sy tems was also largely dictated by this desire 
to attain West German influence in decision-making processes.  On the need for and the right of a united 
Europe to have a greater say in nuclear matters vis-à-  the United States; and on the related importance, 
“based on its experiences of the past,” of a membership (“insider” status) for West Germany, along with 
other non-nuclear European countries, in a limited, integrated, collective Atlantic nuclear weapons sytem, 
a “hardware solution” that would involve the renunciation here of a monopolistic American nuclear veto 
and enable these non-nuclear powers to exercise a robust and durable control (Mitspracherecht) over 
nuclear forces, see KB to Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; KBto Prof. 
Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1; KB to Prof. Henry 
Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1; KB to 
Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of 
Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1; KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1; and KB to Sen. Robert 
Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2.  For Birrenbach’s proposals (“an optimal solution for us”) 
regarding and within the framework of an MLF, including the creation of a control mechanism acceptable 
for Europe, a reorganization of the NATO Council, an American renunciation of a unilateral veto and a 
greater degree of consultation and Mitbestimmung for the Europeans within the entire structure of the 
alliance, all of which would result in an incentive for the pooling of European nuclear forces in full
integration and coordination with the United States, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, 
Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On Birrenbach foreseeing the possibility 
that a NATO combination, without becoming a Staatsverband, could acquire a weighted Stimmrecht within 
a nuclear control system, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International 
Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1.  On the MLF as a possible, though now doubtful, basis for a 
larger Mitspracherecht in NATO questions, sought by the federal government, a d on the need for a clear 
German stress in December 1965 vis-à-vis the Americans (and British) on a German participation in the 
framework of an integrated nuclear organization (not least to evoke an American initiative in this field), see 
KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  For participation in a nuclear 
weapons system as a means to help “find an organizational basis” for a “tighter coordination of foreign 
policy among the more important [bedeutenderen] NATO states” and to prevent the United States from 
making overly large concessions to the Soviet Union with respect to the NPT in the future negotiations f 
the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens 
(AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1.  For Birrenbach on the “painful development” leading from the 
Norstad proposal to the decline of the MLF plan, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of 
Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.   
Such considerations of influence also played a significa t role in Birrenbach’s worries about the 
NPT.  On Birrenbach’s concerns regarding the possibility of the NPT blocking his proposed solutions to 
enhance the Federal Republic’s role in decision-making (including an integrated Atlantic nuclear weapon 
system) if the United States went beyond the present wording of Articles I and II in the current draft by 
making further concessions to the Soviet Union, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP 
K117/1.  On the future nuclear arrangements in NATO and Birrenbach’s (and the Federal Republic’s) 
concerns regarding the impact of a universal NPT in effectively crowing the Soviet Union arbiter of the 
structure of the alliance or of a united Europe in the future, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 
1966, ACDP K139/2.  For Birrenbach’s fears regarding the possibility of the NPT impairing the activity of 
the McNamara Committee, see Birrenbach’s Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2.   
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trans-Atlantic issues.71  While, at times, the defense of German interests seemed to clash 
with larger Atlantic imperatives, Birrenbach ultimately saw the Atlanticist project 
meshing well with the national perspective and serving the Federal Republic’s properly 
understood interests: “I have always supported seeing the future of Germany in the 
European and Atlantic integration….  Outside of this conception, the situation of the 
Federal Republic… is dangerously vulnerable.”72  While Birrenbach referred openly to 
his foreign contacts to “the cause of my country,” this staunch defense of German 
interests was a delicate affair given recent history.  Birrenbach pointed repeatedly to the 
Federal Republic’s peaceful, benign intentions as well as to his own lack of nationalistic 
feelings and when possible, as with the NPT, attempd to cloak German interests behind 
those of larger groups of nations.73  While Birrenbach may have cited Atlanticist or 
                                                
71 On the lack of contact between Birrenbach and Strauß, see KB to Franz Josef Strauß, CSU-
Landesvorsitzender, 18 July 1974, ACDP K184/1.  For an example of a particular disagreement indicative 
of more fundamental Atlanticist-Gaullist differences, one can cite the episode surrounding the opinion of 
the Fraktion’s Arbeitskreis V on nuclear non-proliferation that the AKV, on 19 April 1966, had entrusted 
Guttenberg, Birrenbach and Werner Marx with editing.  Though Birrenbach presented the draft, agreed 
upon by the three participants, to the AKV on 28 June, the document had to be supplemented due to 
disagreements among the three over the extent to which t e American draft NPT hindered a future 
European nuclear option, with Birrenbach arguing that it rendered it more difficult to establish and 
Guttenberg, along with Strauß as well as a few other members of the AK, insisting that it made it 
impossible.  Regarding this episode, see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 7 July 
1966, ACDP K087/2. 
72 KB to Henry Kissinger, 19 December 1968, ACDP K146/3.  On the need for a West German policy of 
Atlantic and European integration and the vulnerability of the Federal Republic outside integrated 
structures due to Germany’s division and the last thirty years of its historical past, see also KB to Kissinger, 
30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2 and KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, 
Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  Birrenbach explicitly recognized a connection 
between economic and political power, including in the long-run case of a Germany operating within an 
integrated Europe, even more so if the “vertical proliferation” of the United States and Soviet Union n 
nuclear arms continued at such a rapid pace that the nuclear arsenals of a financially limited Britain d 
France were rendered “weltpolitisch irrelevant” and thus reduced the significance of their nuclear edge over 
the Federal Republic in Europe.  On these possibilities and the English and French concerns regarding them
as well as on the prospect of a widened and united Europe, even one that initially only comprised the 
economy, as a political factor, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP 
K023/2.     
73 In this context, Birrenbach often stressed to his contacts the desire of his compatriots, and especially of 
his own party (or at least the majority in that party and the overwhelming majority of his colleagues in the 
AKV), for close relations to the United States, to toe the American line and to exist as part of the larger 
Atlantic Community.  With respect to his own personal attitudes, Birrenbach repeatedly insisted to the 
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effect that “as you know, somebody with my past has no nationalistic feelings” (KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 
10 April 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2).  In part, 
Birrenbach’s efforts along these lines consisted of assertions that German history was not repeating itself.  
For Birrenbach’s claim that the Federal Republic did not want to again become a nation-state in the proper 
sense of the word, including with its own army, seeKB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26
March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  On Birrenbach’s explanation, in the context of the issue of Verjährung, that 
all responsible political personalities in the Federal Republic agreed on the need for an “innere Reinigung” 
with respect to the crimes of the National Socialist regime, see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research 
Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  Likewise, Birrenbach insisted to his American 
contacts that the principle of equality on which he insisted had nothing to do with a desire for prestig  (KB 
to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1).  For Birrenbach’s claim 
that the idea of a second Rapallo had not emerged in the Federal Republic and that there was a recogniti n 
there that the historical-political preconditions for such a constellation no longer existed, see his 
Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  On Birrenbach insisting to his talk partners that National 
Socialism was dead, see his Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP 
K188/2.  For Birrenbach’s view that, with the Federal Republic having tied up its sovereignty in NATO and 
the European Communities, the preconditions for the crimes of the “Hitler regime” or of a national-state 
that could dominate others no longer existed, see KB to Thomas (his son), 23 November 1972, ACDP 
K039/1.  For Birrenbach’s stress on the democratic and peace-loving nature of the Federal Republic, see 
KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.  On the 
other hand, for Birrenbach’s concerns regarding “latent, still-existing anti-Semitism in Germany” that 
might be “kindled again,” see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.   
Another aim of Birrenbach’s efforts in this regard was to convince his contacts that West Germany 
had no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.  For Birrenbach’s insistence that the Federal Republic did not 
desire to produce, physically control or possess its own (national) nuclear weapons, at times with reference 
to its renunciation of the production of such weapons and of “the national option” in 1954, in connection 
with the Paris Agreements and the establishment of the WEU, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretay 
in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2; KB to 
Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center fo International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP 
K017/1; Birrenbach Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3; KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, 
ACDP K184/2; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  The desire to quell any 
such fears was also among the “obvious reasons” that Birrenbach was reluctant to create a multilateral 
atomic strike force based on surface ships with the Federal Republic as the principal nucleus, instead 
wishing for a larger British contribution (KB to Tyler, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2).  For Birrenbach’s 
claim that nobody in the Federal Republic desired sole power of disposal [“Verfügung”] over nuclear 
weapons, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1.  
For the Federal Republic’s renunciation of 1954 towards its Western Allies regarding the production of 
ABC weapons as a model for a proper non-proliferation agreement, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 
November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  On the danger that the opponents of a “hardware solution” in the 
American administration could get the impression that e Federal Republic was essentially out “to get a 
finger on the trigger of nuclear weapons” if the hardware solution was overstressed at the expense of the 
goals pursued via such a hardware solution, see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 
December 1965, ACDP K117/1.  With respect to Birrenbach’s profession to recognize (even while he 
pushed for the Federal Republic to be consulted and to participate in every phase of the NATO decision-
making process regarding nuclear strategy as well as arms control negotiations and crisis management and 
for a “hardware solution” like an integrated, collective Atlantic nuclear weapon system), for the time being, 
the American veto with respect to nuclear weapons as “a fact of life” and his assertion that the Federal 
Republic did not seek any kind of majority voting procedures for a collective nuclear weapon system, se 
KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2; KB to Sen. Thomas 
Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1; and KB to Robert Strausz-
Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  For Birrenbach’s stress when 
depicting his ideas, especially to Americans, that e membership of the Federal Republic (and other non-
nuclear European powers) in an integrated, collectiv  Atlantic nuclear weapon system (a “hardware 
solution”) was primarily a means to a vital political and military end, namely the strengthening and making 
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more durable of their participation in the nuclear decision-making process, rather than an end itself and that 
the ultimate decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons would remain in the hands of the American 
President, see for instance KB to Carstens, 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to Holifield, 10 May 
1966, ACDP K117/1; KB to Strausz-Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1; and KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 
8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2.  For Birrenbach’s insistence that the Federal Republic did not want to 
get its “finger on the trigger” of nuclear weapons or a strategic weapon system, see again KB to Kennedy, 8 
November 1966, ACDP K139/2.  On Birrenbach’s belief that only a European nuclear option, but never a 
national one, would be open to the Federal Republic in the future, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.   
Many of Birrenbach’s efforts along these lines also took place within the context of the NPT.  For 
Birrenbach’s emphasis over the years in his talks with the federal government, in the Bundestag’s foreign 
affairs committee, in his Fraktion, and especially with his foreign contacts that all responsible figures in the 
Federal Republic fully agreed with the basic principle underlying the NPT, whatever their criticisms and 
proposals for improvement of its details, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1; KB to 
Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; 
and KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1.  For the Federal Republic’s 
agreement that the spread of nuclear weapons to many other individual nations could have disastrous 
consequences, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2.   
Finally, Birrenbach regularly sought to demonstrate the coincidence of the Federal Republic’s own 
interests with those of other nations.  For his insistence that the importance of the European continet for 
the United States, not least in the context of the East-West conflict, justified an Atlantic priority for the 
United States, rather than a Pacific one, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, 
FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  With respect to certain measures that 
would not be in the interest of Europe and the Federal Republic nor in that of the United States; the 
deleterious impact on the possibility of a “global defense of the West” of a potential major reduction in the 
American defense budget; a potential preponderance of Soviet military power that would alone suffice to 
allow the USSR “to influence the political development on the European continent in a sense also 
detrimental for the United States”; and Birrenbach’s view that many critics in the US overlooked the fact 
that “the United States also defended itself in Europe [its “European Vorfeld”], not only the European 
states,” against the Soviet Union, see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 
September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  On the danger that without the United States the Europeans would 
eventually fall into the orbit of the Soviet Union, thus reducing or eliminating the American influenc in its 
forward strategic area in Europe, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  Such an approach 
was also typical with regard to Birrenbach’s treatment of the NPT.  On his and the Federal Republic’s 
“serious objections,” “together with many other states,” with respect to the NPT and their efforts to make 
the NPT “universally acceptable” or “acceptable worldwide,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, 
ACDP K109/1; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 
1968, ACDP K109/2; and KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1.  In 
attempting to modify the NPT, Birrenbach recommended the Bundesrepublik join similar efforts of other 
non-nuclear powers like Japan, India, Sweden and Brazil because “[i]n this way we would find cover 
behind the screen of other powers with our reserve vis-à-vis the Atomsperrvertrag” (KB to Chancellor Kurt 
Georg Kiesinger, 19 January 1967, ACDP K117/2).  With respect to the advice Birrenbach received from 
his American talk partners that the Federal Republic should remain reserved in at least certain criticisms of 
the NPT and allow other powers to go first in that regard, see Birrenbach’s America Report, “Vor einem 
Wandel der amerikanischen Politik?”, 17 May 1967, ACDP K139/2.  For Birrenbach’s argument that his 
reluctance to support a recognition of Israel by the Federal Republic was “in the well-understood higher 
interests of the state of Israel” since any gains Israel might enjoy through a diplomatic recognition by the 
FRG would be far outweighed, if this led to the Arab League’s recognition of the GDR, by the consequent 
repercussions in the Bundesrepublik detrimental to the cause of Israel, see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, 
Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.   
In such contexts,  Birrenbach often utilized the rhtoric of “the West.”  On such rhetoric, see 
Wilfried Mausbach, “Erdachte Welten: Deutschland un der Westen in den 1950er Jahren,” in Manfred 
Berg and Philipp Gassert, eds., Deutschland und die USA in der Internationalen Geschichte des 20. 
Jahrhunderts: Festschrift für Detlef Junker (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2004), pp. 423-448.  For the 
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European concerns, this did not indicate a deep evolution in identity.  Whatever affinities 
he may have had with the Anglo-Saxons or the broader Atlantic world, his German 
identity motivated him in his endeavors far more than any abstract Atlantic identity.   
In assessing Birrenbach’s motivations, we must also consider his position in the 
Wirtschaft.  While he would not have disputed the influence of the concept of national 
interest in his thinking, Birrenbach positively bristled at the notion that he was a “captain 
of industry” working politically for narrow economic nterests, something he considered 
beneath his dignity.74  Indeed, several episodes do seem to underscore a certain narrowly 
defined independence from the Wirtschaft, particularly when larger Atlanticist interests 
were at stake.  Probably the best example is his beavior during the pipeline embargo 
controversy of 1962-63.  In the interest of alliance solidarity, particularly against the 
backdrop of the events of early 1963, Birrenbach supported the American efforts aiming, 
at least ostensibly, to deny the Soviet Union critical strategic-military goods.  This was 
especially noteworthy as the embargo triggered widespread opposition in the Federal 
Republic, including that of important industrial interests (not least within the CDU), and 
most directly affected steel firms, such as Phoenix-Rheinrohr, Mannesmann and Hoesch, 
seeking to expand their exports to the East.  Birrenbach’s “Gewissensentscheidung” 
triggered intense and widespread criticism from his colleagues in industry.75  Another 
                                                                                                                                      
tendency to conflate German interests with those of larger entities, see Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s 
Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993). 
74 The expression “captain of industry” headlined, for instance, an article on Birrenbach written by Walter 
Henkels, “Ein Industriekapitän von Rhein und Ruhr,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 March 1963.  
For Birrenbach’s displeasure with certain elements of this article, see Walther Hensel to KB, 1 April 1963, 
ACDP K010/2; KB to Walter Henkels, 3 April 1963, ACDP K010/2; Walter Henkels to KB, 17 November 
1965, ACDP K016/2; and KB to Walter Henkels, 22 November 1965, ACDP K016/2.  In many other 
contexts, Birrenbach repeatedly stressed that, despite his position by the Thyssen concern, his political 
interest did not lie in wirtschaftspolitischen questions but rather in the realm of foreign policy. 
75 On the pipeline embargo, see Bruce Gentles, Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-
West Energy Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Robert Mark Spaulding, Osthandel and 
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example of Birrenbach’s measured independence from the Wirtschaft was his early and 
sustained support for exploring the possibility of a temporary Grand Coalition, an idea he 
began entertaining and propounding around the turn of the year 1961-62 and especially 
after the Spiegel Affair (1962), therefore a time when this notion was still taboo.  As with 
the embargo, the opposition of many colleagues in the Wirtschaft to whom he advocated 
such a solution contributed to making this decision “extremely painful.”76  Given these 
positions, taken in the face of considerable criticism, Birrenbach cannot be viewed as 
primarily a narrow lobbyist for the immediate short-term interests of the Wirtschaft. 
However, it would be foolish to believe that Birrenbach’s activities contained 
absolutely no element of patent lobbying in favor of the direct interests of the Wirtschaft 
or, more specifically, the immediate interests of the steel industry and the Thyssen group 
in particular.  Indeed, one of the striking features of his role in the European Parliament 
from 1957-61 was his fierce opposition to measures that required the approval of the 
ECSC High Authority to carry out mergers and concentration in heavy industry.  
Birrenbach’s efforts in this regard were undertaken at a time when the Thyssen 
conglomerate was engaged in just such a process.77  At home, Birrenbach intervened in 
                                                                                                                                      
Ostpolitik: German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer (Providence, RI: 
Berghahn Books, 1997); and Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West 
German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).  For Birrenbach’s 
later objections with respect to the “race to Moscow” and his long-held belief that trade policy with the 
East had to be clearly coordinated and not carried out according to purely private interests, see KB to 
Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. 
76 As we have already noted, this apparently domestic political position was taken in no small part due to 
Atlanticist foreign policy concerns.  With respect to Birrenbach’s arguments in favor of a Grand Coalition, 
see for instance the Fraktion debate of 3 December 1962, in which he cited a combination of “Staat”  and 
foreign policy motivations. 
77 See, for instance, European Coal and Steel Community, Common Assembly, Meeting on Wednesday, 26 
February 1958, Proceedings/Speeches, KB versus Debré, ACDP K075/2.  This debate was primarily 
stimulated by the processes of concentration and reconcentration, cartelization and re-cartelization in the 
Ruhr, including the activities revolving around thenew formation of the Thyssen group.  In his speech 
here, Birrenbach denied the need for High Authority approval to carry out mergers and concentration, 
insisting that such undertakings should be determined by the initiative of firms and Unternehmer 
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the Vorstand of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion and with the chairman of the CDU Program 
Commission with respect to the issue of Mitbestimmung in an effort to influence the party 
on that theme.78  Finally, during difficult economic times, Birrenbach readily exploited 
                                                                                                                                      
themselves and be based on the often changing and dynamic economic, technological and competitive 
conditions of the market economy, not just in Europe but also in the world markets, where they faced 
competition from countries like the United States, England and the USSR.  At the same time, he 
downplayed any political threat posed by such concentration in the iron and steel industries, particularly in 
an age of rockets and the like, and especially disputed the authority of the High Authority and the 
Assembly to deal with such an issue, placing such at ority instead with the national governments and 
parliaments.  In addition to defending horizontal mergers in the steel industry, Birrenbach also argued 
against restrictions on vertical mergers between coal and steel.  In early 1959, despite his poor healt  at the 
time, Birrenbach took part in the most significant committee meetings in the European Parliament, 
including in some committees in which he was not even a member (e.g. the market committee), since 
important questions regarding key issues like concentration, French steel prices, the application of Article 
58 MUV and the free-trade zone were addressed (KB to Finance Minister Franz Etzel, 4 March 1959, 
ACDP K001/2).  On the significance to the West German steel industry of the ECSC, for instance with 
respect to crafting a common import policy regarding coal (the prospects for which Birrenbach doubted in 
the short term), and the High Authority in Luxembourg, for instance with respect to the possibility of 
creating a European coal fund in part to assist financially the German Bergbau (a solution that Birrenbach 
considered extremely uncertain), see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 
Bonn, 24 March 1966, ACDP K016/1.  For Birrenbach’s talks with the Gesandten Leduc and Ambassador 
Seydoux on the question of sales conditions and German-French steel prices (it is unclear whether on the 
periphery of the committee meetings of the European P rliament or at the annual French-German 
Conference in 1959), see again KB to Etzel, 4 March 1959, ACDP K001/2. 
78 In the fall of 1970, Birrenbach spoke at a meeting of the Vorstand of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion on the 
potentially harmful impact of an expanded Mitbestimmung on the position of the West German Wirtschaft 
at a time of strong international competition and icreasing international integration [“Verflechtung”].  
Expressing similar ideas, Birrenbach also intervened around the same time with Thomas Ruf, the chairman 
of the CDU’s Program Commission on Mitbestimmung, in order to raise objections to a particular draft, to 
influence the future decisions of the commission and, ultimately, to avoid undesirable and detrimental 
elements in the new CDU party program.  Birrenbach rgued that already the Mitbestimmung regulations 
for firms in the Federal Republic had no comparable parallel in other EEC partner states and in other 
Western industrial states in general.  The proposals of the commission that he had seen would further 
increase these existing differences or those that would exist with respect to a future unified European law.  
In particular, Birrenbach urged a European reservation clause that would replace the Mitbestimmung in the 
Federal Republic with the European Mitbestimmung regulation as soon as this came into being (KB to 
Thomas Ruf, MdB, 8 October 1970, ACDP K025/1).  On Birrenbach’s criticism of a paritätischen 
Mitbestimmung, especially the fact that it “does not work,” see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 
1972, ACDP K039/1.  For Birrenbach’s intervention with the MdB Fritz Burgbacher (CDU) with respect to 
the worrying decisions of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion’s sub-committee “Eigentum” on 30-31 January 1959 
with respect to the question of an Aktienrechtsreform, especially the promotion through tax measures of the 
issuing of Belegschaftsaktien (Birrenbach had learned about these decisions from a protocol), and his 
objections to the foreseen new arrangement, see KB, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Fritz Burgbacher, Cologne, 9 
March 1959, ACDP K001/2.  On Birrenbach contacting Pferdmenges to explain his objections and so that 
those two and “our friends” could prevent this particular arrangement from coming into being, see KB to 
Robert Pferdmenges, Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie, 5 March 1959, cc: Henkel and Dr. Wecker [both 
of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen], ACDP K002/1.  For Birrenbach repeatedly pointing out in meetings 
of his Fraktion’s AKV that the Wirtschaft would definitely be ready to “woo away [abwerben]” German 
technicians in Egypt for activities in the Federal Republic, see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 
December 1964, ACDP K014/2.   
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his connections with the Chancellor and other prominent officials to alert them to the 
plight of the steel industry and the measures he beli ved necessary to return it to 
prosperity.79  These examples represent some of Birrenbach’s cruder efforts to lobby on 
behalf of the Wirtschaft, especially his own branches.   
More importantly, Birrenbach’s connections with theWirtschaft, obviously 
including his position with Thyssen, subtly yet subtantially influenced his Atlanticist 
perspectives.  We have already briefly discussed th interest of the Wirtschaft, in contrast 
at least sometimes to agriculture, in promoting the tenets of Atlanticism.  Particularly 
                                                
79 According to Birrenbach, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, for instance, consulted him not only on a variety of 
foreign policy questions but also on issues regarding the shaping of the economic and social order.  Fo  
Birrenbach’s report on the Federal Republic’s Konjunkturpolitik, assigned to him by the economic 
committee of the European Parliament, presented in January 1960 and evidence of his interest in analyzing 
broad economic matters and disseminating his views on uch, see “Die Konjunkturpolitik der 
Bundesrepublik,” ACDP K002/2.  Though he was obviously overwhelmingly active in the steel industry, 
Birrenbach provided Federal President Lübke, at the latt r’s request, with an account of the attitude of the 
mineral oil industry on Energiepolitik, including some relevant documents and his own personal views on 
questions of energy policy (KB to Bundespräsident Heinrich Lübke, Bonn, 25 January 1963, ACDP 
K011/1).  For Birrenbach describing to Barzel in March 1966 the “difficult” situation of a West German 
steel industry that was “extraordinarily krisenanfällig,” debt-ridden and capital-poor; paid high wages and
social expenditures; had short working hours; suffered from high energy costs (since the federal 
government’s coal policy forced it to use overpriced German coal and thus “subsidize” the German 
Bergbau while preventing it from exploiting world market conditions by importing cheap coal from the 
United States); and was burdened with distorted tax disadvantages; also explaining the fundamental 
burdens this situation created for the German steelindustry in the context of its international competition, 
including with others, mainly France, in the Montanunion; but at the same time proposing courses of action 
to overcome these problems, including a subsidy (optimally from those countries, apparently in the 
Montanunion, importing American coal) to the German Bergbau to enable it to offer coal to the German 
steel industry at American prices, a federal law to rectify the tax system (including the increase of the offset 
tax rates at the Steuergrenzen until these Grenzen were definitively reduced or eliminated), and the rapid 
passage of the value-added tax currently being discussed in the finance committee; as well as offering to 
bring Barzel into contact with Generaldirektor Sohl, Chairman of the Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und 
Stahlindustrie, for further information on and depictions of the plight of this economic branch, see KB to 
Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, 24 March 1966, ACDP K016/1.  On 
Birrenbach’s later defense to Barzel of the policies ( .g. wages, prices, dividends) of a steel industry he 
portrayed as still struggling to recover from a years-long crisis (here in 1967-68); plagued by labor c nflict, 
including wild strikes and violence, low prices (still below those of 1960) vis-à-vis rising costs of living, 
high and rising wages, rising coal prices and low (r even non-existent) profits, and unjustified criti ism at 
the hands of the press and political opposition (especially the SPD Bundesminister Georg Leber); and his 
concerns regarding a “very serious” development at the moment insofar as the trade unions had lost control 
over a part of the workers and the quick giving-in of individual firms like Hoesch had impacted on other 
firms “like an infection,” see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 15 
September 1969, ACDP K023/1.  This same letter to Barzel also makes reference to the telex Birrenbach 
had sent in that month (September 1969) to the Chancellor regarding the problem of violence that had 
emerged within the framework of the labor struggles in the steel industry.   
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with the loss of the German East, steel firms like Thyssen were especially interested in 
creating a world open to the free movement of goods and capital, facilitating the export 
not only of their own products but also of those that utilized their steel and enabling 
foreign investment.  Furthermore, Birrenbach was convinced of the general vulnerability 
of the overall West German economy and strikingly sensitive to that economy’s reliance 
on foreign markets and trade and its susceptibility to an ebbing of the export boom.80  
Indeed, Birrenbach even saw the outward-looking qualities of a country like the Federal 
Republic as well as the inward-looking characteristics of one like France as being largely 
determined by their trading patterns, in this case with respect to the EEC.81  Therefore, 
                                                
80 Regarding vulnerability with respect to foreign trade, Birrenbach was very aware as of January 1963 of 
the high share of exports in the Federal Republic’s GNP (about 24% at this time) and of the importance 
foreign trade consequently played for the Wirtschaft as a whole as well as of the need for German industry 
to maintain its competitiveness in international markets.  Energy costs played a significant role in th s, with 
German industry requiring an economical and secure energy supply to avoid facing disadvantages vis-à-vis 
other countries with lower energy costs (KB to Bundespräsident Heinrich Lübke, Bonn, 25 January 1963, 
ACDP K011/1).  For Birrenbach’s concerns about the impact on West German industry of revaluations of 
the currency (including repeated revaluations betwen 1969 and 1972), particularly the competitive 
disadvantages thus brought about vis-à-vis France, Britain and the United States, see KB to Jean Monnet, 
Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2.  With respect to a more general vulnerability, Birrenbach pointed to 
the Federal Republic’s “unconsolidated” economy, characterized by cost inflation, high wages, short 
working hours, high taxes, a lack of reserves (exhausted in two world wars and two inflations) and the 
liabilities of German stock corporations, and consequently to the susceptibility of German industry, 
including the steel industry, in a crisis (KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 14 March 1966, ACDP K090/1).  For 
Birrenbach on the Ruhr area as not only the industrial heart of the Federal Republic but also a social-
politically extremely sensitive organism, see KB to Bundespräsident Heinrich Lübke, Bonn, 25 January 
1963, ACDP K011/1.  For Birrenbach on the economic situation as one of the grave problems of the 
Federal Republic, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.  For Birrenbach on the Federal 
Republic having the highest wage costs per product unit, the extraordinary difference between wage 
increase and productivity, and his concerns regarding the strains being placed on the economy 
[“ Belastbarkeit”], see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  With respect to 
European vulnerability due to its far greater dependence, compared to that of the United States, on Middle 
Eastern oil supplies, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  Indeed, by 
December 1974, Birrenbach saw an undermining of European strength due to the problems of energy and 
inflation (KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1).   
81 Birrenbach also explained Britain’s outward-looking qualities in a similar fashion.  For Birrenbach’s 
hopes regarding the imminent entry of Britain into the Common Market, including “the great insight of 
your country into the worldwide problems” as “a very important contribution to the evolution of a united 
Europe,” see KB to William Bass, 19 July 1972, ACDP K068/1.  However, in this letter, Birrenbach also 
expressed “great concern” regarding the British economic situation, which threatened its role as “an 
effective partner in an economic and monetary union.”  Likewise, on the need for Britain to “get… under 
control” its economic problems, about which Birrenbach was “alarmed,” if it was to exercise “great” 
influence in Europe, see KB to Bass, 20 November 1972, ACDP K068/1.   
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Birrenbach’s opposition to revaluations of the D-Mark nd his support for free trade, the 
European Economic Community, close cooperation withthe United States (including in 
the economic realm), the Soziale Marktwirtschaft, the peaceful development and use of 
nuclear energy and the export of nuclear equipment on the world market (related to the 
NPT) all corresponded to his view of the enlightened s lf-interest of the Wirtschaft.82  
Given the professional environment in which he operated, Birrenbach’s notion of the 
national interest did not stand in contradiction to these private economic interests, rather 
it was informed and infused by them.  As a whole, Birrenbach’s perception of the 
                                                
82 For Birrenbach’s support of the Atlanticist tenet of “liberal trade” (including the Kennedy Round of 
GATT talks), see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secr tary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.  OnBirrenbach’s fears of an American 
protectionism, which might have harmful consequences to the world economic development, if American 
concerns about obstacles and discrimination against American goods in Europe (especially those not 
connected with European political unity) were not properly addressed, see Birrenbach Memorandum, 9 
March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  On Birrenbach’s assessment that the Federal Republic, “as a labor-oriented 
industrial state interwoven into the international division of labor,” could not afford a level of energy prices 
above that of the other comparable countries with which it stood in competition; on the possibility of 
worsening the situation of the West German Bergbau by importing large amounts of American coal for the
West German steel industry (and the need, instead, for subsidies to the Bergbau); and on the desired 
reduction or elimination of the existing Steuergrenzen within the framework of European unification 
(desirable for the West German steel industry’s ability to resist crises and its competitiveness, particularly 
vis-à-vis France) having “noticeably slowed,” see KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, 24 March 1966, ACDP K016/1.  On Birrenbach’s fears of the 
NPT’s deleterious impact in the civilian sector, see his Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2.  
For Birrenbach on and his objections to the “extremely serious” civilian and military-security consequences 
of the NPT drafts for the Federal Republic, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-
Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1.  On Birrenbach’s concerns regarding the NPT and “the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy” with respect to the supply monopoly of the Anglo-Saxon states (especially 
the United States) in fissionable materials and the future delivery of those materials to EURATOM 
(including the Federal Republic), for instance in case of a failure of the IAEO-EURATOM negotiations 
with respect to nuclear controls, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 
February 1968, ACDP K020/1; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Sen. John 
Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; and KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP 
K023/1.  For Birrenbach’s proposal that this problem could also be dealt with through the building up of 
one’s own stocks and through the creation of one’s own enrichment capacity (an endeavor that could be 
prepared in negotiations with the United States), see KB to Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.  On 
Birrenbach’s insistence with respect to the NPT that private West German firms have access to nuclear 
explosives for peaceful purposes at the same conditi s and costs as American firms, see KB to Chancellor 
Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.  For Birrenbach’s argument that one could not deny 
to the Federal Republic, “as one of the great industrial states of the world,” a share in the development and 
production of armaments (linking this to burden-sharing) or “an unrestricted research, development and use 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” see KB to John McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1 and 
Birrenbach’s Memorandum to Gerard Smith, 24 February 1969, ACDP K209/1.   
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national interest, influenced by his conception of the Soviet Union and the interests of the 
Wirtschaft, is essential to fully understanding his Atlanticist outlook.   
Aside from material incentives such as national and economic interest, some less 
obvious mental and intellectual factors seem to have significantly motivated Birrenbach.  
While it may fall short of a true motivation, Birrenbach’s affinity for Atlanticist ideas and 
his lack of interest in notions of Abendland can be explained in part by the fact that, while 
disturbed by the decline of religious faith in general, Birrenbach assigned a less 
prominent role to religion in the political realm, including his own Catholicism, 
compared to those who subscribed to Abendland.  While recognizing and understanding 
the strong role of Catholicism in Germany prior to W rld War I and even in Weimar, he 
argued that times had changed and that now “while te religious element is important in 
politics, even paramount, it is not the all-dominati g one.”83  Rather than being 
underpinned by his Catholicism, Birrenbach explicitly conceived of his activities as 
resting on inter-confessional, liberal-conservative views.  In fact, Birrenbach was 
consistently skeptical of those who assigned a large role to religion in public affairs.  
Naturally, this was the case with the promoters of the Abendland concept circulating in 
the Federal Republic.  Related to this was his suspicion with respect to “the fascination 
with the Christian statesman à la Salazar.”84  However, this skeptical outlook stretched 
well beyond the borders of the Federal Republic.  Looking, for instance, to the Middle 
East, Birrenbach saw aggressive Zionism, personified in figures like Begin and Sharon, 
                                                
83 KB to NRW Kultusminister Werner Schütz, 7 September 1960, ACDP K004/2.  For Birrenbach’s 
analysis of the SPD-FDP election success in 1972 through the prism of religious groupings, including the 
coalition’s penetration, to a certain extent, into Catholic areas and the strong support enjoyed by the 
coalition among Protestants and the entire Protestant Church, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 
1972, ACDP K039/1.   
84 KB to Dr. Karl Brandt, 4 August 1964, ACDP K013/1.  Birrenbach may also have been giving 
expression to this skepticism when he referred at times to Adenauer as “die Stimme vom Himmel” (KB to 
Erich Straetling, West German embassy, Washington DC, 22 June 1962, ACDP K157/1). 
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and the “renaissance of Islam” threatening disaster for the West in the region.85  
Unfortunately, disturbing religious elements also existed in American political life, 
manifested for instance in the rise of Jimmy Carter, a man with a “religiously founded 
belief in himself.”86  For Birrenbach, such religious elements often represented a 
disruptive factor in politics and hindered a reasoned understanding and practice of foreign 
policy.    
Birrenbach’s intense, only briefly dispelled, pessimi m was probably more of a 
genuine motivating factor.87  This pessimism permeated his mental worldview on a 
variety of levels.  On a short-term, “day-to-day” level, he was consistently pessimistic 
and critical about individual leaders and personalities, policies and events (e.g. failed 
summit meetings) and his outlook was dominated by unceasing worries and concerns 
(e.g. the state of German/European-American relations), frustration at the lack of 
progress towards his desired goals, a stress on the risks of particular situations and 
policies (e.g. détente), and a perpetual sense of crisis.88  In part, this pessimism can be 
                                                
85 For instance, KB to Robert Bowie, 10 December 1973, ACDP K160/2; KB to Israeli ambassador 
Eliashiv Ben-Horin, 8 November 1973, ACDP K096/2; and KB to Bernhard Plettner, 12 August 1975, 
ACDP K096/2. 
86 KB to John McCloy, 8 October 1976, ACDP K210/1.   
87 For examples of rare bouts of selective optimism, ee KB to Minister E. M. Rose, British embassy, Bonn, 
17 November 1960, ACDP K076/1; KB to Prof. Robert Bowie, Harvard University, Center for 
International Affairs, 31 December 1963, ACDP K160/2; and KB to Siegmund Warburg, 30 December 
1974, ACDP K068/1.  
88 For examples of such pessimism, see KB to Amb. Shinar, Tel-Ganim, 21 January 1974, ACDP K096/2 
and KB to George McGhee, 7 March 1974, ACDP K184/1.  On the Federal Republic’s endangered position 
in all fields, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  For 
Birrenbach’s references in the wake of the events of January 1963 to the “Brussels crisis” and the “present 
dangerous crisis of the free West” as well as his proposals (such as a nuclear EDC) to solve them, see KB 
to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC,
21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.  For Birrenbach’s assessment of the worsening domestic and foreign political 
situation of the Federal Republic and his overall assessment that “I have not been so pessimistic in more 
than a decade than I am now,” see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 
1966, ACDP K117/1.  On Birrenbach’s belief that recent experiences had demonstrated that the European 
nations were not ready to take certain necessary measur s towards European unification, see KB to Jean
Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2.  For the “ errible” current situation and prospects as well as 
Birrenbach’s statement that “I have never been so worried as now,” see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, 
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attributed to a quest for decisive solutions, rather an an acceptance of the need to 
sometimes muddle along in the midst of a typically complicated and often messy 
reality.89  While at times Birrenbach did display a certain optimism about what had been 
and what could still be accomplished, this short-term pessimism also stretched temporally 
into the longer-term, leading him to muse repeatedly, for instance, about the possibility of 
an end to NATO and even to question the likelihood f a genuine construction of the 
Atlantic Partnership or Community.90 
                                                                                                                                      
Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.  On the risks the United States wa
running in the SALT negotiations, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, 
ACDP K184/1.   
89 For instance, Birrenbach doubted, on the basis of what had been published as of early December 1974, 
that the recent Vladivostok arms control agreement was a real “breakthrough” since “the arms race will go 
on” (KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1). 
90 For Birrenbach “full of doubts at least today” about “any real prospects” in this regard, see KB to Lord 
Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP K068/1.  On Birrenbach’s at least occasional doubts regarding the 
feasibility of some of his own proposals for progress towards European economic and political unity (a key 
element of Atlantic Partnership), see KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 
July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  For Birrenbach admitting that “the hope of some fathers of NATO, in no way of 
all, that from NATO a type of Atlantic Community would develop has not been fulfilled” and that success 
had not been achieved in institutionalizing the entir  foreign policy, economic, currency and development 
cooperation and integration (citing NATO Article 2), see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 
September 1969, ACDP K023/2.  For Birrenbach’s pessimi tic assessment of the prospects within the 
foreseeable future for a European (political) unificat on, see his Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes 
on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  On Birrenbach’s skepticism and doubt regarding the possibilities 
and substance of an Atlantic Partnership offered by the United States (most recently in Kissinger’s speech 
of 23 April 1973) in light of alleged dramatic changes and developments in American-Soviet relations 
(including the nuclear accord of June 1973), which indicated that the United States now had “two 
priorities” (NATO and the bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union); and on Birrenbach’s fears that e 
American bilateral relationship with the Soviet Unio , which was “more dangerous” to the United States 
and able to “speak with one voice,” would be a far more influential and significant priority in American 
policy in the long-term, also with respect to the possibility of Atlantic Partnership, than the relationship 
with a Europe that, despite Nixon’s statements, was “not a fifth world power,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 
June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For Birrenbach’s negative assessment of “how far we are from a federal state” 
in Europe; that Europe did not exist economically in the extent he hoped for; and that the chances for an 
economic, monetary and real political union were “prhaps today somewhat better, but not good at all, at 
least for the time being,” due to a number of obstacles, including the still very powerful idea of sovereignty 
in some European countries, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.   
For Birrenbach’s musings on a possible end of NATO, see for instance KB to Rainer Barzel, 
MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1; KB to Rainer Barzel, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1; KB to 
Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; 
and KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.  For Birrenbach on the “serious 
situation” in which NATO found itself, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for
International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On Birrenbach’s assessment that “if nothing 
crucial changes in the coming year, I consider the disintegration of NATO unstoppable,” see KB to Robert 
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However, Birrenbach’s psyche was also plagued by a deeper, even cultural, 
pessimism that colored his view of the state of the Western world.  This perspective 
identified a myriad of ills undermining the vitality and strength of the West, including in 
the realm of world affairs.  Among these was the “rebi th of the idea of the nation-state,” 
especially in France (also after de Gaulle’s departure) but even in Great Britain, a 
                                                                                                                                      
Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  For Birrenbach on “the 
process of disintegration in NATO,” especially worrying since France left the NATO organization, see KB 
to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2.  For Birrenbach’s doubts whether NATO was 
“fully reparable,” see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 Janu ry 1967, ACDP K117/2.  For Birrenbach wondering 
what would happen if NATO did not survive the 70s and 80s, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, 
ACDP K109/1.  For Birrenbach on the need for precautions in case of a “premature ending” of the NATO 
treaty (in the context of the NPT), see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP 
K023/1.  Moreover, Birrenbach was convinced, and ha it confirmed by prominent American personalities, 
that the United States would not assume a guarantee for Europe outside of an alliance structure (KB to Pr f. 
Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2).  This fear of the end of the alliance made 
Birrenbach even more skeptical of an NPT “of unlimited duration,” since Europe, especially the Federal 
Republic, could not defend itself without American nuclear support (KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman 
of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1; KB to John McCloy, 29 March 
1968, ACDP K109/1; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; and KB to Sen. John 
Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2).  For the connection between Birrenbach’s concerns regarding a 
“termination of NATO” and of the American guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic 
and his interest in a European nuclear option, since “a European defense system would be the only 
conceivable way out for Europe,” see Birrenbach’s Memorandum to Gerard Smith, 24 February 1969, 
ACDP K209/1.   
On the other hand, for Birrenbach’s cautiously optimistic assessment of at least the chance “to 
survive the period of the renaissance of the nation state in Europe” and on the possibility that the EEC had 
reached “the point of no return” (once the problems of the CAP and the Kennedy Round were solved), see 
KB to Marc Ullmann, L’Express, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.  For Birrenbach’s belief that a 
European Staatsverband was still imaginable, “if England and France accept r ason,” see KB to Prof. 
Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1.  
For Birrenbach’s assessment (the “only ray of hope” in an overall pessimistic analysis) that the EEC “as a 
pure economic organization” appeared to have reached “t  point of no return,” see KB to Robert Strausz-
Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  On Birrenbach’s cautiously 
positive evaluation of the common interests and interdependence as well as important progress (especially 
in comparison to the prewar time) in cooperation, integration and the development of an Atlantic network 
of bilateral and multilateral relations that existed between the NATO states (including of course the United 
States and the European states) in the foreign policy (e.g. Harmel exercise in détente, disarmament and 
arms control policy), economic (OECD, GATT), currency-political (Club of Ten, IMF) and development-
political areas (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD), thanks largely to the existence of the 
principally military NATO alliance itself, and his belief even in a “certain compulsion [Zwang] to 
cooperation,” see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.  For 
Birrenbach seeing “starting points [Ansatzpunkte]” with the new French government for progress with 
respect to European development and unification, provided that the European states (among them the 
French) reached constructive agreements and solutions about extremely difficult problems like the revision 
of the entire agrarian policy, including the possibility that the French would recognize and behave in a
manner commensurate with “the proportions of their true power” and would no longer reject entrance 
negotiations with Britain, see again KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP 
K023/2.  
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psychological persistence of the “illusion of sovereignty” entertained by these medium-
sized nations that was potentially “fatal” for Europe and the Atlantic Community.91  
Related to this was the nature of the modern Western w lfare state, which merely lived 
from day to day or, more accurately, from election  election and, unable to operate in 
long-term perspectives, was incapable of solving the potentially disastrous problems 
relating to issues such as defense, energy and investment.92  A disequilibria existed in 
which each individual asserted his own rights and claims vis-à-vis state and society while 
feeling no obligation towards the general well-being.93  The Staatsgefühl was in decline, 
leading Birrenbach to remark that “if the well-being of the individual and the interests of 
the Gesellschaft stand before those of the state, then it becomes very difficult to make 
                                                
91 For examples, see especially KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Policy Planning Council, State Department, 
Washington DC, 31 July 1967, ACDP K146/1 and KB to Eugene Rostow, 20 May 1975, ACDP K211/2; as 
well as KB to E.W. Mommsen, 13 September 1971, ACDP K158/1; KB to Joseph Kaskell, 27 April 1963, 
ACDP K157/1; KB to Col. William Bass, 24 April 1974, ACDP K068/1; KB to John McCloy, 30 May 
1974, ACDP K210/1; and KB to Eurgene Rostow, 18 February 1976, ACDP K211/2.  On the “age of 
increased national interests,” see KB to State Secretary a.D. Dr. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, 
ACDP K028/2.   
92 Especially KB to Prof. Edward Teller, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, University of California, 27 
November 1975, ACDP K155/1.  On Birrenbach’s concer r garding the difficulty of transforming 
“national ambitions into communitarian ones,” rendered obvious by the energy crisis (in connection with 
the Middle East crisis) and also the product of the “exaggerated welfare state system in all European 
states,” see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP 
K184/1.  On the harmful consequences for European dfense efforts of “the welfare thinking,” see KB to 
John McCloy, 23 July 1975, ACDP K210/1.  Birrenbach viewed the approval by the West of a policy of 
giving in to the USSR and the facilitating of détente at the expense of the Federal Republic as being closely 
linked to the welfare state (KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1).  For 
Birrenbach attributing German mistakes to a lack of political leadership and financial (budget) and 
currency weaknesses (offset agreement), with the later two deriving from a lack of clear political prio ities, 
see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  On the need for the Federal Republic 
“to cut social and other expenditures,” see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 14 March 1966, ACDP K090/1.  For 
“the present deplorable situation in Europe” and Birrenbach’s fears that the “military efforts of the 
European NATO partners will be reduced,” see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 19 December 1974, ACDP K068/1.  
For a Britain plagued by financial crisis, inflation, trade unions and lack of investment potentially hindering 
it from becoming “an effective partner in an economic and monetary union,” see KB to William Bass, 19 
July 1972, ACDP K068/1.  For Birrenbach’s worries about internal problems, including a people not 
“really ready to face the fact of becoming a member,” potentially rendering Britain “a difficult partner” in a 
united European Community, see KB to Col. William Bass, London, 11 September 1972, ACDP K068/1.  
Most likely, Birrenbach’s perception of a West unable to think in long-term perspectives also encouraged 
him in his efforts with respect to research institutions like the DGAP, SWP and AI.     
93 KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1. 
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power-political predictions in our favor.”94  A rampant permissiveness manifested itself 
in widespread violence and the lack of a proper respect for authority.95  Western societies 
had been lulled into a complacency and indiscipline by détente and Ostpolitik, which, far 
from ending the threat from the East, had merely rendered it more subtle.96  Simply put, 
the West was losing its Substanz, and Birrenbach regularly used expressions like “in 
decline [Zerfall]” to describe the state of the West and its various components and 
institutions.97  This pessimism was differentiated to some extent, with the United States 
included but emerging better in Birrenbach’s analysis than Western Europe, which by the 
mid-1970s at the latest exhibited “serious symptoms f disintegration.” 98 
                                                
94 KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1. 
95 KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1.  
96 For example, KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP K068/1; KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, 
Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/; and KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 10 April 1972, 
ACDP K068/1.  For the detrimental impact on European defense efforts of “the euphoria created by an 
unrealistic Ostpolitik in most European countries,” see KB to John McCloy, 23 July 1975, ACDP K210/1.  
On the unpopularity of “large-scale defense spending” at the moment, with every nation in Europe, 
including the Federal Republic, feeling that “it must first solve more urgent tasks,” see KB to John 
McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1.  On the relationship between security and détente, see Helga 
Haftendorn, Security and Detente: Conflicting Priorities in German Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 
1985).  For Birrenbach criticizing the ongoing negotiations surrounding and the expected shape of the still 
not concluded Berlin Agreement, see KB to John McCloy, 9 July 1971, ACDP K210/1.    
97 On this theme, see for instance KB to Prof. Robert Bowie, Harvard University, Center for International 
Affairs, 31 December 1963, ACDP K160/2; KB to Prof. Guido Goldman, Executive Director, Harvard 
University, West European Studies, 19 March 1974, ACDP K184/1; and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy 
Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1.  Other expressions Birrenbach used in this context, in 
these and further documents, included “Verfallserscheinungen”, “ schrecklich”, “deplorable”, “in the 
process of erosion”, and “malaise.”   
98 On Western Europe and “serious symptoms of disintegra ion,” see especially KB to Richard Ullman, 
Director, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York City, 8 September 1976, ACDP K083/1.  As of 
January 1974, Birrenbach asserted that “[t]he situation in Europe is worse than it has been in the last twenty 
years.  The Auflösungserscheinungen have entirely serious character” (KB to Joseph Kaskell, New York 
City, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1).  On the “current total European Misere” that made “a European 
option” appear “unrealistic” at the moment as well as on the currently low prospects in Europe for all 
“communitarian” relations, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 
1974, ACDP K184/1.  For the Americans “facing very serious problems” but nevertheless Birrenbach’s 
belief that “the situation in the United States is in a limited way better than that of the European ntions,” 
see KB to Col. William Bass, London, 22 November 1974, ACDP K068/1.  On Europe as the site of the 
West’s basic weakness, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP 
K184/1.  For Birrenbach’s criticism of the trends in Italy, the Benelux countries and Scandinavia towards 
weak leadership, destabilization, delusional euphorias and an ignorance or dismissal of military facts, see 
KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  However, for an example of Birrenbach including the 
United States in such pessimistic assessments, see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP 
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Of course, the Federal Republic was also part and prcel of this pessimistic 
critique of the West.  For instance, by the early 1960s, Birrenbach had already diagnosed 
there not just the decline of his own party but also of the state and bemoaned the lack of a 
sufficient Staatsgefühl, a condition that had existed and not considerably improved since 
the founding of the Bundesrepublik and which contributed significantly to the crisis being 
experienced in that period.99  At the same time, Birrenbach’s assessment also displayed 
some unique elements with respect to his own country.  In the Federal Republic, the 
Atlantic and European ideas enjoyed greater support than in some other areas of the West 
while the national idea was less convincing since “our national tradition was broken in 
the times of national-socialism and went up in flames in the nights of the bomb attacks on 
our cities.”100  However, this process had perhaps gone too far as “the understanding of 
‘ raison d’etat’ is underdeveloped,” and the “feeling for the nation” was “in decline.”101  
                                                                                                                                      
K068/1.  On disturbing phenomena in “the entire Western world” and a “situation in the United States,” 
including “the wave of violence,” that “gives rise to many worries,” see KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 
1972, ACDP K158/1.  For Birrenbach on “symptoms of fatigue” (here with regard to the Near East 
conflict) in France, Britain, the United States and other countries in the West, symptoms “typical for the 
attitude of the Western nations in which nowadays welfare is the top priority,” see KB to George McGhee, 
7 March 1974, ACDP K184/1.  On the West’s “low” readiness to act, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, 
ACDP K184/2.  For “the weakening of the Western world” (“that goes also for the United States”) 
gradually assuming proportions that were “alarming [besorgniserregend],” see KB to Israeli ambassador 
Eliashiv Ben-Horin, Brussels, 9 January 1976, ACDP K096/2.   
99 For instance, KB to Paul Lücke, 10 December 1962, ACDP K011/1.  For more from Birrenbach on the 
“deeper critical elements” in the Federal Republic, in luding “the further erosion of state loyalty… and of 
authority,” with the latter affecting “the whole structure of society,” see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, 
ACDP K138/2.  Birrenbach’s concern about the “decline of the Staatsgefühl” is somewhat ironic for a man 
who, as we have seen, worked in a variety of ways to strengthen the private elements vis-à-vis the stat .   
100 KB to Mrs. Evelyn Emmet, MP, House of Commons, 8 August 1961, ACDP K076/1.  
101 KB to John McCloy, 8 October 1976, ACDP K210/1 and KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP 
K158/1.  For Birrenbach on the further erosion of the feeling of national identity as a “deeper critical” 
element in the Federal Republic, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.  Birrenbach 
believed the Grundvertrag and the recognition of the division of Germany would have been completely 
unthinkable for the major Western democracies if they ad been in the same situation as the Federal 
Republic (KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1).  On the other hand, for 
Birrenbach conjuring up fears of a European and German nationalism, in this case if the Americans came to 
an understanding with the Soviet Union over the heads and at the expense of the Europeans and Germans, 
see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  Likewise, on the role of French policy in 
summoning a new German nationalism, “extremely dangerous in a divided country,” see KB to Prof. Karl 
Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  In such contexts, 
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As a man convinced of the importance of history, Birrenbach was also appalled by “the 
almost completely lost historical consciousness” among the Germans.102  Particularly 
galling to him in this respect was the rejection or ignorance of the great history, traditions 
and virtues of now-vanished Prussia, a striking contrast to the anti-Prussian attitudes of 
the Abendländler.  On the other hand, Birrenbach seems ironically to have embraced a 
cultural pessimism not so different from that of many Abendländler.103  At times, this 
negative outlook assumed proportions that clouded his analytic capabilities and became 
the subject of admonishment by his contacts.  However, while such pessimism regarding 
the West occasionally evoked sadness and despair, it was not necessarily final, and 
                                                                                                                                      
Birrenbach also often conjured up the specter of the Weimar Republic.  With reference to his own personal 
experience, Birrenbach warned the Federal Republic’s allies against treating the situation that had emerged 
as a result of the Brandt Ostpolitik as definitive, for this would encourage a development such as that which 
had occurred with respect to the decline of Weimar as a result of the Treaty of Versailles and would thus 
undermine Western unity (Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, 
ACDP K188/2).  For Birrenbach’s concerns regarding the developments and foreign-policy (Deutschland-) 
plans in the SPD and the possibility of them having “ calculable consequences for the entire democratic 
life in Germany” and even indicating a potential retu n to Weimar (“With that, we will land again in 
Weimar with unpredictable long-term consequences on the foreign political situation”), see KB, Munich, to 
Prof.  Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  On the similarities between the “bitter 
experience in the Hitler time” with respect to the G rman universities and current developments at these 
universities, which Birrenbach now experienced “with bitter feelings for the second time,” see KB to 
Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  For a contemporary study of national 
consciousness, see Gebhard Schweigler, Nationalbewußtsein in der BRD und der DDR (Düsseldorf: 
Bertelsmann, 1973), along with Harold James, A German Identity, 1770-1990 (New York: Routledge, 
1989).   
102 KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1. 
103 For Birrenbach explaining the ability of the SPD-FP coalition “to awaken a euphoria of peace” in the 
West German population in part due to the erosion of national feeling, Staatsgefühl, historical 
consciousness, the understanding of the limits and possibilities of freedom, and authority, an erosion that 
existed in the Federal Republic to a greater extent than in the other major Western democracies, see KB to 
Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  In this letter to his son, Birrenbach also cited 
examples of these same “symptoms” of decadence in other major Western democracies, albeit in a much 
weaker form than in the Federal Republic, in particular in the United States during the Vietnam conflict 
from 1964-70, in the unrest in France in 1968, and currently in England (“decline of loyalty to the state”); 
criticized the manipulation of public institutions; and condemned the trends towards insatiable expectations 
in the economic-political, social-political and similar realms, including “unlimited” wage demands, 
Mitbestimmung in all areas (especially paritätische), the “catastrophe” of the universities, reductions i  
work time, a stress on “better quality of life,” (his quotation marks here) the decriminalization (Strafschutz) 
of abortion, the relaxation of the prosecution and punishment of crime, and the elimination of restrictions 
(Freigabe) on pornography.  Birrenbach’s musings that “unfortunately developments today go quicker than 
usual” (KB to Amb. Karl-Günther von Hase, London, 10 December 1973, ACDP K068/1) and “perhaps 
people today are no longer like me” (KB to Heinz Barth, Washington DC, 14 January 1974, ACDP 
K184/1) suggest a personal alienation from and pessimi m towards the contemporary world in general.   
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therefore this very pessimism, with rays of hope, also drove Birrenbach, a great believer 
in the power of the will, onward in his efforts to strengthen trans-Atlantic relations.104 
Finally, Birrenbach’s workaholic nature was yet another important factor 
impelling him onward in his activities.  William Bundy, for one, described him as a man 
of “volcanic energy.”105  The multiple professions Birrenbach engaged in entailed a hefty 
workload and a considerable amount of travel.106  Periods of intense political activity, for 
instance the debates in the first half of the 1970s regarding the Ostpolitik and the NPT, 
were especially stressful for him.107  With respect to his activities regarding the Brandt 
Ostpolitik, Birrenbach remarked wearily, “I am astonished that I survived this hell.”108  
At times, Birrenbach’s massive work load over weeks and months brought him all the 
way “to the limits of my strength.”109  Even while on much-needed vacations (which he 
did without for extended periods) or from his hospital sickbed, Birrenbach continued to 
write and dictate letters, talk on the phone, read over papers and other materials and 
                                                
104 For Birrenbach working “with all my strength” so that “the trans-Atlantic relations remain intact” in a 
time of “crisis,” see KB to Joseph Kaskell, 27 April 1963, ACDP K157/1.  On the even greater significance 
of Birrenbach’s efforts with respect to the American foreign, economic and defense policy given the 
“desolate” situation in Europe, see KB to Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU Germany, Minister-
President of Rheinland-Pfalz, confidential, 29 May 1974, ACDP K184/1.  For Birrenbach’s argument that 
in light of the terrible state of the West, American leadership was “more important than ever” (but also less 
likely: “Does it still exist?”), see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, 
ACDP K155/1.  As of April 1976, Birrenbach moaned “I have the impression that the ideals for which we 
have fought the last decades are now to a certain degree in danger.  The realization of this possibility makes 
me very sad” (KB to John McCloy, 15 April 1976, ACDP K210/1).  For overwhelming pessimism slightly 
tempered by elements of hope, see KB to Hahn, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1 and KB to Richard 
Ullman, Director, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York City, 8 September 1976, ACDP K083/1.   
105 William Bundy, Foreign Affairs, to KB, 29 June 1974, ACDP K184/1.  For Birrenbach’s remark that 
“[m]y motor is stronger than my chassis,” see KB to John McCloy, 11 February 1980, ACDP K178/2.  For 
Birrenbach’s general contempt for “fatigue,” see KBto George McGhee, 7 March 1974, ACDP K184/1.   
106 On Birrenbach’s business efforts in the framework of the Thyssen firm and his need to “get a bit of air,” 
see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.   
107 On Birrenbach’s “enormous work load [Beanspruchung] of almost up to twelve hours daily” and on  
“stress” in recent months “which I in this form still never have experienced,” especially in connection with 
the Ostverträgen, see KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/ .  For Birrenbach tied-up over 
extended periods in Bonn working on the theme NPT, see KB to Staden, 11 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. 
108 KB to Lord Gladwyn, 20 May 1972, ACDP K068/1. 
109 KB to Diest, 1 December 1970, ACDP K158/1.   
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engage in a variety of other work.  As Birrenbach described it during an extended illness 
keeping him away from Bonn, “my impatience is worse than my illness.”110  Assessing 
the source of Birrenbach’s workaholism is a difficult task given the relatively crude 
sources available and the complexities of the human ind, but one significant factor 
appears to have been his remarkable perfectionism.  As he once explained, “I hesitate to 
submit a report which is not really perfect. I am not accustomed and I do not like to do 
things which are not very well prepared.”111  However, an even deeper source seems to 
have been Birrenbach’s terrible insecurity.  While fruitless to speculate on the origins of 
this insecurity, it was constantly present and manifested itself in many of his letters.  
Birrenbach’s workaholic nature served in some ways as an element of strength, perhaps 
even an essential ingredient in his efforts to advance his career and master his fields of 
endeavor.   
However, at the risk of venturing into the realm of psychobabble, this compulsion 
was also a self-destructive element in Birrenbach’s per onality.  While he often pointed 
fatalistically to “bad luck,” the health problems Birrenbach labored under, including 
frequent relapses, were at the very least aggravated, nd often caused, by the manic, 
workaholic nature of his existence.  Birrenbach waspl gued throughout his career in the 
Federal Republic with an ill-health consisting of a rather wide variety of ailments.  Many 
of these were admittedly of a non-threatening or at le st short-term kind.112  However, 
                                                
110 KB to Robert Bowie, 8 April 1970, ACDP K160/2. 
111 KB to Javits, 7 October 1963, ACDP K157/1.  Also see, for instance, KB to Helmut Kohl, Chairman of 
the CDU Germany, Minister-President of Rheinland-Pfalz, confidential, 29 May 1974, ACDP K184/1. 
112 At different times, for instance, Birrenbach suffered from fevers, sinusitis, bronchitis, laryngitis (not all 
that surprising for somebody who spoke and gave dictation so much), the flu, and inflammation of the liver 
and gall bladder.  For an example of Birrenbach enduri g a constant fever, in this case in July 1964, see KB 
to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  For an 
example of Birrenbach suffering a collapse, in April 1973, see KB to Prof. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil 
Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1. 
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Birrenbach also suffered very serious longer term difficulties, such as recurring back and 
heart problems, including multiple heart attacks.113  A debilitating, chronic insomnia, 
limiting sleep to at best a few hours a night and often none at all, further exacerbated his 
other ailments.  All efforts to overcome this insomnia, including hypnosis, drugs 
(barbiturates) and even acupuncture proved to be invain.  Of course, these health 
problems, aside from their human impact, were not just aggravated by but also created a 
serious impediment to Birrenbach’s activities.  He frequently required medical treatment 
and attention, whether in the form of medication, cures or operations.  He underwent 
numerous compulsory vacations and stays at medical cl nics, hospitals, sanatoriums and 
healing spas.114  He was forced, sometimes for weeks or even months at a time, to stay 
away from the office and to limit his work, although this was a relative concept.115  
Correspondence and other communication was inhibited, participation in various 
meetings, Atlanticist and otherwise, was cancelled, important speeches had to be read by 
colleagues, trips to the United States were interrupted, truncated, postponed and even 
cancelled.116  However, even as Birrenbach recognized the link between his overwork 
and health difficulties, he refused to heed the pleading of his doctors or of his body.117   
                                                
113 These began at the latest by 1964.   
114 For example, as of June 1973, Birrenbach had just fini hed up a six-week hospital stay.  For another 
instance of a lengthy hospital visit for Birrenbach, see KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP 
K185/2.  Some of Birrenbach’s stays were in the United States, for instance at the Mayo Clinic. 
115 See, for instance, KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, 
ACDP K013/1.  In addition to Birrenbach’s health problems themselves, such difficulties, particularly 
extended ones, were followed by “catching-up” periods f transition back into work.  For instance, after 
being sick for (and largely losing) virtually the first half of 1970, Birrenbach spent the period from mid-
June into September reacquainting himself with business and political matters (Birrenbach returned from 
Munich to Düsseldorf in early June 1970).  See, for example, Birrenbach’s reference to the amount of mail
that awaited him when he returned to his office in KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. 
116 Thus, Birrenbach’s America trips of Fall 1964 and 1970 were truncated or interrupted due to illness.   
For an example of a 1964 trip to the United States postponed due to health reasons, see KB to Henry 
Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  Indeed, a 
long sickness in 1964 rendered Birrenbach incapable of action for weeks.  Later, Birrenbach’s short stay in 
New York in 1970 was strongly hindered by illness.  In 1973, Birrenbach had to leave an Amsterdam 
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D. Sources of Birrenbach’s Foreign Policy Influence 
Naturally, embracing Atlanticist ideas and harboring an extraordinary compulsion 
to toil assiduously for them is not the equivalent of possessing genuine influence.  To 
acquire this, it was necessary for Birrenbach to attain a political position of some 
prominence to promote his Atlanticist ideas effectively.  Of course, this position was that 
of a member of the Bundestag and the subsidiary roles that accompanied it.  Within the 
Union, Birrenbach served as one of the party’s premier foreign policy experts, indeed the 
de facto expert with regard to that all-important ally, the United States.118  From his 
entrance into the Bundestag in 1957, he served as a member of that body’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee and of his Fraktion’s Arbeitskreis V, which focused on foreign policy 
and security issues.119  In 1965, Birrenbach became a member of the Vorstand of the 
CDU/CSU-Fraktion.  Aside from these long-term positions, he also occupied a number 
of more transitory ones over the years pertaining to particular issue areas.  For instance, 
Birrenbach served as his Fraktion’s main reporter on issues such as the EEC-Free Trade 
                                                                                                                                      
conference because certain heart troubles he had been suffering from since the start of January had become 
more acute.  Even after six weeks of vacation he had not yet fully recovered (KB to John McCloy, 29 June 
1973, ACDP K184/2).  In 1974, a Birrenbach speech in t e Bundestag on the NPT had to be read by Alois 
Mertes.  During Birrenbach’s illness of the first half of 1970, he read and answered only very urgent letters 
(KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2).  For Birrenbach as of late January 1974 having been 
sick since the middle of December and having had to limit himself “to a minimum in the sending of 
Christmas wishes,” see KB to Joseph Kaskell, New York City, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. 
117 For Birrenbach having recently had to cancel a trip to the United States due to circulation difficulties he 
attributed to “an enormous work overburden” during the last month, including that connected to his NPT 
activities, along with a parallel, weeks-long viral flu, against which he had fought “arbeitenderweise”; and 
for his being “still not 100% again in order” and requiring a “medical examination” in a week but, 
nevertheless, already going “a few hours per day into the office,” see KB to Staden, 28 February 1974, 
ACDP K184/1.  On Birrenbach’s recognition of the linkage between poor health and overwork, here that 
undertaken with respect to the Brandt Ostpolitik (“After my long illness two years ago, I am astonished that 
I survived this hell”), see also KB to Lord Gladwyn, 20 May 1972, ACDP K068/1. 
118 For much of what this entailed already by 1962, specifically here to be “responsible” for United States 
matters in the Fraktion, see KB to Erich Straetling, Washington DC, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1. 
119 Birrenbach also participated in the working groups of the AKV, including the group on “All-German 
Questions” in 1966, where he dealt especially with the theme “The Political Aspects of the Germany 
Question within the Alliance and the Relationship Washington-Moscow.”  The chairman of the AKV from 
1960-69 was the Atlanticist Ernst Majonica. 
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Zone (May 1960), the Atlantic Convention (1962), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the UN Convention on the Statute of Limitations with Respect to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity.120  Birrenbach also served on a number of the Fraktion’s 
commissions, including those pertaining to the NPT (as chairman) and the Ostpolitik 
(Ostkommission).121  With the approach of the final vote in the Bundestag on the 
Ostverträge in May 1972, it was Birrenbach who was selected to examine the negotiation 
records for the Union to help the party arrive at abetter judgment.122  Finally, Birrenbach 
                                                
120 For Birrenbach on the “passionate debate” within “my party” on what was to be done about the NPT, 
see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.  As Berichterstatter for the NPT, Birrenbach 
attempted to bring the diverging opinions to a common denominator while leading his Fraktion in the 
direction he desired.  He succeeded only partially n this effort due to the wide range of opinions that 
existed, stretching from Strauß to Brandt (KB to Prf. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, 
FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2).  According to Birrenbach, it was on the 
basis of his report that the majority of the Fraktion approved the NPT, but only by a small majority (113:90 
votes) (KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 6 March 1974, ACDP K184/1). 
121 On this, see for example KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2.  The NPT committee 
(Arbeitsgruppe NPT) was set up in early 1967 by Rainer Barzel (Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion) to 
examine and deal with the treaty for the Fraktion.  In addition to Birrenbach as chairman, the committee 
also comprised the chairmen of the foreign affairs nd defense committees, a representative of the CSU and 
a German representative from the WEU parliament (Birrenbach Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP 
K117/2).  For an example of Birrenbach reporting to Barzel on the opinions of the NPT group (and of the 
AK) on the treaty, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 23 
February 1968, ACDP K020/1. 
122 On 5 May 1972, Birrenbach received the assignment from Barzel to examine the records of the 
Moscow negotiations.  At 5 PM that day, he met with S ate Secretary (AA) Paul Frank and began a process 
that continued for many hours over several days until 7 May.  Rather than being allowed to read the fil s 
himself, the texts/protocols of the negotiations conducted by Foreign Minister Scheel and State Secretaries 
Frank and Egon Bahr (BKA) were read aloud to Birrenbach by the responsible state secretary while 
Birrenbach asked questions.  According to Birrenbach, “[t]he process was extraordinarily strenuous.”  
Moreover, Birrenbach was far from satisfied with this process.  Despite his desire for insight into all the 
files, not just excerpts, and the fact that he receiv d far more information than that provided to the
Bundesrat, Birrenbach still only received insight into a fraction of the protocols (and no position papers) 
due to the shortness of the available time with the final vote on the treaties fast approaching.  On top of this, 
Birrenbach restricted himself to several hours per day as a result of the limited “Aufnahmefähigkeit”  by 
such an oral process.  It was impossible for him to ascertain what remained unread and even whether the 
files were complete or whether there had been any secret agreements.  Birrenbach remained in contact with 
and depicted his impressions to Barzel during the days of this process, while Barzel then reported to the 
Fraktion in Birrenbach’s name.  Birrenbach himself finally reported back to the Fraktion in its meeting of 
Tuesday 16 May about his “examination” of the protoc ls for the Ostverträge.  Birrenbach admitted that 
since he only had access to a fraction of the negotiations, leaving his knowledge of them fragmentary nd 
“full of gaps [lückenhaft],” the process had not shed much light on said negotiations and that “[a] 
conclusive objective judgment was not possible.”  Ultimately, Birrenbach’s previous judgment had not 
changed as a result of his exposure to and knowledge of the protocols.  He continued to believe that “a deep 
divergence” existed between the Soviet Union and the s atements of the Bundesregierung with respect to 
the treaties.  Birrenbach’s judgment of the Moscow negotiations and the treaties, especially the Moscow 
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represented his party or F aktion abroad at a number of conferences and functions, fr 
instance the Conference of the Non-Nuclear Weapon Powers in Geneva in 1968 and the 
announcement of the German Marshall Fund in Boston in June 1972.  However, while 
these positions were both a manifestation and an element of Birrenbach’s influence, they 
were not its ultimate source. 
Nor can Birrenbach’s influence be attributed to a powerful party Macht standing 
behind him, for one of the defining aspects of his political activity was the lack of just 
such a basis of support.  In his view, this deficien y was due to his independence and lack 
of full engagement for the party.  Even had Birrenbach coveted the role of “party man,” it 
would have been virtually impossible for him to fulfill due to his overburdened schedule, 
one that included not just his political work but also his activities in the Wirtschaft and 
the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, his “two and a half professions” as he often put it (sometimes 
referring to three such full professions!).  More importantly, Birrenbach simply lacked 
the desire and interest to become such a party man.  For one thing, he was not especially 
fond of or adept at public speaking, avoiding it as much as possible, and he was generally 
appalled by electioneering and campaigning.  When he did take active part in such 
campaigns, as in 1969, he found himself speaking for weeks on end “evening after 
evening in smoke-filled rooms in various parts of Germany and hav[ing] to go about my 
                                                                                                                                      
Treaty, remained negative, and he proposed to the Fraktion the rejection of the treaty unless it proved 
possible to achieve binding interpretations addressing its political concerns via the federal governmet with 
the Soviet Union.  Birrenbach’s judgment following his fragmentary examination of the protocols was one
factor in the ultimate refusal of the Union to approve the Ostverträge as a whole (Birrenbach Report, 19 
May 1972, ACDP K133/1 and KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2).  For a description of 
this episode, including Birrenbach’s intense anger about not being allowed to look at the files himself, see 
Arnulf Baring, Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982).  Also 
see Christian Hacke, Die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU: Wege und Irrwege der Opposition 
seit 1969 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik von Nottbeck, 1975).  This all was part of 
Birrenbach’s important role in the final Ostpolitik debate and in the negotiations with the government. 
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professional activity during the day.”123  Entering and remaining in the Bundestag 
exclusively through the lists, Birrenbach did not need to campaign nearly as intensely as 
if he had been contesting a particular geographical area.  However, the lack of his own 
Wahlkreis constituted a significant component of Birrenbach’s lack of party Macht.124  
Nevertheless, this personal political situation result d from more than a simple dearth of 
time and a dislike of campaigning.125   
Odd as it may be to say of a parliamentarian, Birrenbach was largely apolitical or 
even anti-political.  In general, he considered mere political calculations beneath him, and 
he evinced a fundamental contempt for those characterless politicians, even those of 
                                                
123 KB to Louise Holborn, Watertown (Massachusetts), 18 September 1969, ACDP K098/1.  On the 
burdens of the election campaign of 1969, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, 
ACDP K023/2.  For Birrenbach being “unfortunately… very much occupied in the election campaign,” see 
KB to Robert Bowie, 20 August 1969, ACDP K160/2.  Birrenbach was also involved in the election 
campaign in 1965.   
124 Birrenbach did attend Parteitage, for instance in 1971 in Wiesbaden, where he saw Gerhard Schröder 
(Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee), and in 1972 in Saarbrücken, where he talked with 
Rainer Barzel (Chairman of the CDU).  When it served to enhance his real or apparent influence and 
prestige, Birrenbach was also quick to note his role in the Union, for instance stressing to US Rep. Chet 
Holifield at the Bilderberg Conference in Wiesbaden in 1966 that the CDU/CSU that he represented in the 
Bundestag was the largest party in West Germany.  On the recognition by the majority of his party of 
United States support as the essential basis of the Fed ral Republic’s existence, see KB to Henry Kissinger, 
30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  For Birrenbach’s emphasis that no criticism of the American incursion 
into Cambodia had emerged from “my party,” while noti g the condemnation of this operation at the SPD 
and FDP national conventions, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.      
125 None of this is to suggest that Birrenbach was “party blind” or “party neutral.”  For Birrenbach’s 
criticism of the “catastrophic” new Deutschland-plan of the SPD, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, 
MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  For Birrenbach’s contention that the statements of the 
opposition, especially of Bundesminister Georg Leber, on the situation and problems of the s e l industry 
were almost all wrong, see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairm n of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 15 
September 1969, ACDP K023/1.  On the inability of the Social Democratic government to overcome the 
current crisis in the Federal Republic, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.  For 
Birrenbach’s fears with respect to the SPD-FDP governm nt of not merely a cabinet change but rather a 
“Regimewechsel”; and his criticism of the “flood of expectations” et in course by the SPD-FDP 
government in the economic-political, social-political and similar areas, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 
November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  Also, Birrenbach’s trip of 27 May-9 June 1962 in the US, for one, was 
taken in agreement with the Chancellor and the chairman of “our Fraktion.”  For Birrenbach having gone 
to the US to inquire and get an impression for “my party” what American policy would be after Saigon’s 
fall, see KB to Harry Bergold (Jr.), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO 
Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 24 June 1975, ACDP K155/1.  It is a bit ironic, of course, 
that a man who considered himself so independent of his party should have sat in so many Atlanticist 
bodies at least ostensibly representing that party. 
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Format, who engaged in them.126  He was repeatedly dismayed by the flawed policies 
and positions adopted by ignorant or unprincipled politicians, both German and 
American, largely focused on domestic political or electoral calculations.  With respect to 
policy-making, Birrenbach believed that “[e]lection campaign managers are bad 
advisors.”127  While he recognized the need in a democracy for aleader to be able to 
communicate effectively with the masses, he disliked the politician who “is not 
experienced in any field, but knows principally to m ve the hearts of his audiences.”128  
Those in power, especially neophytes in internationl affairs like a Helmut Kohl or a 
Jimmy Carter, should appoint to advisory positions a d accept the counsel of the most 
                                                
126 Touching on some of this, see KB to H. Kullak-Ublick, West German Embassy, London, 28 October 
1974, ACDP K127/1. 
127 KB to Eugene Rostow, 11 December 1975, ACDP K211/2.  For another example of Birrenbach’s 
criticism of short-sighted, “wahltechnischen” motives, see KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben 
Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On Birrenbach’s assessment of the 
difficulties of a coordination of Western policy as result of the “unavoidable power vacuum” at the top 
that would exist in the United States until new presid ntial elections, see KB, Munich, to Prof. 
Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  For the impact of an election year on the 
“agonizing reappraisal” of the American position in the world, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 
Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1.  On the election year as one reason that the ratification of the 
Ostverträge was a pleasant fact for the American government insofar as it “eased the bilateral American-
Soviet efforts for détente,” see KB, Düsseldorf, Berlin r Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the 
CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1.  For many 
mistakes of American policy (e.g. the “hurrying up” of the SALT I negotiations; the “Übersteigerung”  of 
the US-USSR relationship) being traceable to President Nixon’s domestic political calculations (“Peace for 
the next generation (that means for the next election)”), see KB to Heinz Barth, Washington DC, 14 
January 1974, ACDP K184/1.  In this letter to Barth, Birrenbach also cited the role of the “Watergate 
scandal, which should be covered up through peace,” nd attributed the “quick settlement of the Vietnam 
question after the mining of the Haiphong harbor” t “electoral reasons.”  For further criticism along these 
lines of Nixon and his détente policies (including the SALT negotiations), see KB to Eugene Rostow, 11 
December 1975, ACDP K211/2.  Birrenbach could also be disparaging of West German politicians on the 
same score, for instance Franz Josef Strauß in 1980 with respect to the issue of nuclear power.  Whatever 
his dislike of the distortions in policy-making introduced by electoral considerations, Birrenbach was not 
averse to following German elections or offering election analysis.  See, for instance, KB to Thomas 
Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1, in which Birrenbach attributed the Union’s election loss, 
in part, to the lack of a strong, authoritative lead r, ruing that “[o]ne does not always have such men.”     
128 KB to William Bass, 19 July 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to John McCloy, 8 October 1976, ACDP 
K210/1.  Birrenbach made this particular remark with respect to Helmut Kohl (and Jimmy Carter) as partof 
an effort to analyze the Union’s election defeat in 1976.  About Brandt’s election victory in 1972 and 
Birrenbach’s conviction that this did not prove Brandt right, rather Birrenbach remained convinced Brandt 
was wrong, Birrenbach remarked “[m]ajorities prove nothing about the correctness of a solution.  I have 
seen that again and again in the last fifty years to the point of exhaustion” (KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 
November 1972, ACDP K039/1).     
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experienced, capable and independent men in the field of foreign policy, in other words 
men like Birrenbach.129  For Birrenbach, parliamentary tactics and party-political 
expediency were of subordinate importance to his own considered views.  At times, he 
simply refused to fall into line to suit the parliamentary tactics as determined by the 
party’s parliamentary leaders.130  Not surprisingly, Birrenbach found parliamentary 
activity by its very nature less enjoyable than his executive activity in other areas.  This is 
ironic insofar as he was vigorously working through various avenues, as we shall 
continue to discover, to reduce or impinge upon the power of the government executive, 
time-consuming efforts that, as noted, were a fundamental reason for his own lack of 
party Macht.  Birrenbach’s quite apolitical outlook may also contribute to explaining his 
stark pessimism about and occasional incomprehension of political affairs.   
Rather than being rooted in his political position, whether it be his offices or his 
party Macht, Birrenbach’s influence can be traced back ultimately to another source: his 
expertise.  The notion of Birrenbach as an expert was based on the idea that he uniquely 
(or among a select few) possessed valuable, specializ d knowledge, in this case related to 
foreign affairs and, even more specifically, to trans-Atlantic relations.  Birrenbach clearly 
embraced and promoted this personal role of expert.  In the early 1960s, he reproached 
his party for its dilettantism, which he attributed to deficiencies in the leadership and the 
Fraktion’s personnel composition.  Birrenbach regularly dismised those who entertained 
                                                
129 In this regard, Birrenbach saw Harry Truman as a model.  For Birrenbach’s disappointment, based on 
relative experience, with the selection of William Rogers as Secretary of State under Nixon over 
personalities like Nelson Rockefeller, Douglas Dillon and William Scranton, see KB to Prof. Robert 
Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. 
130 For instance, during the debates over the Brandt Ostpolitik, Birrenbach outright refused to alter a speech 
to suit the needs of parliamentary tactics, as determined by the CSU’s Richard Stücklen (Deputy Chairmn 
of the Fraktion), preferring instead to give the speech later.  On this episode, see KB to West German 
Ambassador Karl-Günther von Hase, London, 2 March 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to Robert Bowie, 14 
June 1972, ACDP K160/2.   
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views on particular issues that diverged from his own as lacking his knowledge and 
overview of the facts.131  Even in the face of occasional complaints regarding the length 
of his reports, Birrenbach stubbornly insisted thate wealth and complexity of the topics 
he addressed demanded an in-depth, differentiated and extensive treatment.  Likewise, 
the concept of “objectivity” was a key element in hs thinking, and he regularly 
questioned the objectivity of those whose accounts, i erpretations and judgments of 
international affairs did not jibe with his own.132  In addition to largely explaining his 
legalistic tendencies, Birrenbach’s legal training, i  the German positivist tradition, 
probably also contributed to this stress on objectivity.133  Given its centrality to 
                                                
131 For an example of Birrenbach dismissing those who disagreed with him, here with respect to the Brandt 
Ostpolitik, because they were not as familiar as he was with the Gesamtproblematik, thus rendering their 
views untenable, see KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 10 April 1972, ACDP K068/1.  On Birrenbach’s proposal for 
the creation of a European community consultation organ consisting of several select political personalities 
who would make proposals with respect to unity from a community perspective, see KB to Prof. Alfred 
Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.   
132 For instance, KB to Berend von Nottbeck, 1 October 1970, ACDP K096/2. 
133 For Birrenbach’s efforts to obtain an “objective picture” of the situation, see KB to Bundesminister a.D. 
Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  One manifestation of Birrenbach’s 
emphasis on objectivity was a stress on the “facts” and a proper knowledge of them as a means of 
understanding texts, treaties, events and the like as well as being the ultimate and sufficient tool of 
persuasion.  With respect to this stress, in various guises, see for example KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food 
Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, 
Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1; KB to 
Brentano, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; and KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for 
International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  A corollary of Birrenbach’s accent on objectivity 
and facts was the recurring notion of the sheer lack of objectivity, the ignorance and the irrationality of 
those who disagreed with him on virtually any of a multiplicity of issues.  On the mistaken perceptions f 
the “eindeutig gefühlsbetonten Kleineuropäer in our ranks” with respect to the French and on the 
“rudimentary” knowledge of Birrenbach’s French Gaullist talk partners so that a deeper discussion, at least 
on particular issues, proved to be out of the question, see KB to Finance Minister Franz Etzel, 4 March 
1959, ACDP K001/2.  For Birrenbach enlightening Guttenberg on the true meaning of the concept 
“Absicht,” a knowledge of which he attributed to his training as a Jurist, see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr 
zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2.  On Birrenbach’s belief that he had a 
particularly good understanding and knowledge of the United States but also that few of his compatriots 
really understood the US, see for instance KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  With 
respect to German sympathizers with France, Birrenbach described how “a more emotional-feeling part of 
the German Politik presses on the side of France” (KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP 
K117/2).  On Birrenbach detecting a German “Egozentrik” or “Provinzialität” resting on the Federal 
Republic’s vulnerability and division, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP 
K018/2.  On the underestimation in Germany of the domestic political importance of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
see KB to Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, 
ACDP K025/1.  Based on his personal experience of the last fifty years and referring to experts in 
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Birrenbach’s influence, it is worthwhile outlining in general terms the factors that 
contributed to the attainment of this expertise.   
Prosaic as it may sound, Birrenbach’s extensive knowledge of foreign affairs, and 
of the United States in particular, derived in no small part from the mass media, a 
resource also readily available to the general public.  Television and radio provided not 
just news but also coverage of debates, press conferenc s and interviews at home and 
abroad.134  Birrenbach also accumulated a considerable number of press releases and 
communiqués issued by various conferences and organizations dealing with foreign 
affairs, as well as copies of important speeches and interviews.135  Birrenbach read 
widely in the press, including many of the most prominent newspapers and 
newsmagazines in West Germany (e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Die Welt; Der 
Spiegel; Die Zeit; Handelsblatt; Das Parlament), as well as abroad (e.g. the International 
                                                                                                                                      
psychology for confirmation of his views, Birrenbach riticized the German people as being and always 
having been “emotional and rarely rational.  It tends to extremes, in whatever direction, in its 
Emotionalität” (KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1).  Likewise, on the 
irrational attitudes of the Americans, see KB to State Secretary a.D. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 
1973, ACDP K028/2.  Finally, related to all this, Birrenbach saw himself as a practical man opposed to 
dogma even, or perhaps especially, on matters dear to his heart.  For instance, regarding his doubts aout 
Hallstein’s “dogmatic maximal thought” on European political coordination, see KB to Prof. Alfred 
Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.   
134 For Birrenbach, radio included the broadcasts of the BBC and of Paris radio.  For Birrenbach hearing 
parts of a de Gaulle press conference over the latter, see KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, 
Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.   
135 Birrenbach kept an eye on interviews, proceedings, hearings, press conferences, debates, speeches, 
reports and statements at, in or emerging from a wide array of venues, among them: the United States 
Congress, including the Senate and its pertinent committees (especially the foreign relations committee); 
the Supreme Soviet; institutions and gatherings in Brussels and Geneva (NPT, Disarmament Conference); 
NATO and IMF meetings; the European Parliament; the WEU Assembly; the United Nations; diverse 
conferences (like the MBFR talks in Vienna, the 6th International Arms Control Symposium in 1973, and  
the February 1974 Washington International Energy Conference); Atlanticist organizations; various 
institutes; and the American universities.  Key American figures of interest in this respect included the 
President (as well as the White House spokesperson), vital cabinet secretaries (State, Defense, Treasuy), 
the head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, influential Senators, top military personalities, and certain lower level bureaucrats.  Within 
the Federal Republic, Birrenbach was attentive in this regard to the relevant ministers as well as foreign 
(including the American and Soviet) ambassadors and, elsewhere in Western Europe, to crucial leaders 
(such as de Gaulle) and ministers (e.g. foreign and defense), especially from Britain and France, along with 
personalities like the NATO and OECD Secretaries-General.       
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Herald Tribune, Le Monde, Neue Züricher Zeitung, Financial Times, The Times 
(London), and the Economist).136  Meanwhile, from the American press, he read 
publications such as Time, Newsweek, the New York Times, and the Wall Street 
Journal.137  Among the publicists with whom he was familiar, Birrenbach especially 
admired the Frenchman Raymond Aron (Le Figaro and then later L’Express). 
Particularly noteworthy from our perspective in regard to the valuable reading 
material that crossed Birrenbach’s desk and certainly more specialized than these 
aforementioned mainstream publications were the materials that he received from or that 
were generated by the various Atlanticist institutions, many of which we have already 
                                                
136 For Birrenbach’s references to articles he had reain the English press (“the independent and liberal 
press”), including The Times, the Economist, the Observer and the Manchester Guardian, see KB to 
Foreign Minister Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2.  On Birrenbach reading excerpts of 
a de Gaulle press conference in the German press, se KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, 
Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  For Birrenbach’s reference to part of an interview given by 
Edward Heath to Le Figaro, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 
January 1974, ACDP K184/1.  In later years at least, Birrenbach described the FAZ as “the best German 
newspaper” (KB to Henry Kissinger, 31 May 1983, ACDP K146/3).  Birrenbach also received, and quoted 
from, the Economist’s confidential “Foreign Report.”   
137 See, for instance, KB to John McCloy, 26 November 1975, ACDP K210/1.  The press played an 
important role in helping Birrenbach gauge the atmosphere and opinion abroad and was thus significant n 
his activities as revealed by his regular references to it.  For example, Birrenbach was dismayed with
respect to the commentary of certain streams in the English press, particularly within “the independent a d 
liberal press,” that “had attracted my attention now f r months” favoring the second version of the Rapacki 
Plan as a starting point for future disarmament negotiations, which “would make a disengagement possible 
to some extent” but without settling “the political problem of German reunification,” and moving closer 
towards a “recognition of the GDR” (KB to Foreign Minister Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP 
K001/2).  On Birrenbach later also being disturbed to find the American press “strongly interested” in an 
NPT, “skeptical” vis-à-vis the MLF, and generally misjudging the relationship of the NPT to the cohesion 
of NATO, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  In the summer of 
1966, Birrenbach believed that the press on both sides of the Atlantic reflected such a nervous atmosphere 
that it was high time to solve the offset problem in a manner acceptable to the United States and the Fed ral 
Republic (KB to McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1).  For Birrenbach’s distress with respect to what 
he considered the inappropriate reaction of the American press to a declaration of Chancellor Kiesinger in 
July 1968, see KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2 and KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 
July 1968, ACDP K109/2.  Birrenbach used a Chalmers Roberts article in the IHT on a meeting of McCloy, 
Acheson, Clay and Dewey with President Nixon and Nation l Security Advisor Kissinger as the point of 
departure for his Bundestag speech of 29 January 1971.  On alarming reports in the press (including in the 
Agence France Presse and a Jan Reifenberg article in th FAZ) about alleged statements of Walter Stoessel 
(US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) in a “briefing” before a selected circle of foreign 
correspondents, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of 
the CDU, Chairman of CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.  The Nachrichtenspiegel 
provided Birrenbach with further press reports from utlets like the AP, ddp, dpa, and AFP/dtsch.   
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encountered.138  These materials included products of foreign or international Atlanticist 
and Atlanticist-inclined institutions, such as the Atlantic Institute, the Council on Foreign 
Relations (Birrenbach subscribed to the CFR’s journal, Foreign Affairs), the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Atlantic Council 
of the United States, the Hudson Institute and the Brookings Institution, as well as from 
specifically German Atlanticist organizations, such as the Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik and the Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, with their German-
Atlanticist perspectives on the most significant of hemes.139  These materials, comprising 
books, journal articles, studies, reports, papers (including those presented at conferences), 
as well as other varied pieces authored or published by Atlanticist-minded individuals 
and think tanks (see Chapter 7), proved essential to Birrenbach’s understanding of the 
complex political, strategic, and technical issues at take in foreign affairs, for instance 
troop offset, nuclear power and international currency issues.140  Beyond this, Birrenbach 
also read a considerable number of books in general on foreign relations, literature 
invaluable in shaping his ideas.141  Thus, in many cases, the organizations that Birrenbach 
                                                
138 See, for example, KB to Gerard Smith, 22 May 1974, ACDP K209/1. 
139 To this list can be added the Monnet Committee, insofar as expert reports were generated within its 
framework by personalities like Guido Carli (Governor of the Bank of Italy) and Robert Triffen (Yale 
University) (KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik at the University of Cologne, 
6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1). 
140 For example, from the SWP Research Institute, Birrenbach had among his reading material reports and 
Lagenotizen regarding themes such as nuclear power, troop offset, and the domestic political reasons and 
economic-political consequences of the French departure from the EC currency bloc (this last one: SWP 
Lagenotiz, February 1974, ACDP K194/2).  On Birrenbach’s inquiry by Hahn whether “the Brookings 
Institution’s version” had some substance with regad to reductions of warheads on the European contine t, 
see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1. 
141 On Birrenbach’s praise of and having “learned much” from Kissinger’s The Troubled Partnership 
(1965), particularly with respect to its ideas regarding a structure for the coordination of military and 
foreign policy, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harv rd University, Center for International Affairs, 30 
August 1965, ACDP K017/1.  Birrenbach was also famili r with Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons and 
Foreign Policy (1957).  For Birrenbach’s knowledge of a number of b oks about NATO and his request for  
literature and publication references that would enable him to write a speech “with substance” on the topic 
of “Integration in NATO or Classical Alliance,” see again KB to Kissinger, 30 August 1965, ACDP 
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helped found and maintain provided him, in turn, with information crucial to his political 
activity.142 
 In addition to the information gleaned from the mass media and more specialized 
books, reports and studies, Birrenbach also garnered us ful information from his 
extensive contact with his compatriots located both wi in the Federal Republic as well 
as abroad.  These contacts spanned the spectrum of the West German elite: the 
governmental bureaucracy (Bundeskanzleramt, Bundespresseamt and the various 
ministries), including the ministers and state secretaries themselves143; representatives of 
                                                                                                                                      
K017/1.  Birrenbach was frustrated at this time since he could not find an in-depth treatment of “the 
problem of integration, which specifically interests Germany.”  For Alfred Grosser sending Birrenbach  
copy of his book Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland-Bilanz einer Entwicklung, which contained many ideas 
that had been presented in Grosser’s “outstanding” Referat in the early summer of 1967 in Düsseldorf, see 
KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.     
142 Birrenbach also received a variety of helpful information, reports, recommendations and resolutions 
pertaining in some way to international, principally Atlantic, affairs from a number of other reliably, often 
or at least sometimes Atlanticist-minded organizations that we have not addressed in much detail.  These 
included the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, which for example produced and supplied four 
papers intended for the joint meeting of the American and German Beratergruppe for the NATO 
Parliamentarians Conference Economic Committee: “Zusammenarbeit in Südamerika” (Dr. Li/Gör, 11 
September 1961, ACDP K007/1), “Die Rolle der Privatwirtschaft” (Dr. Li/Gör, 11 September 1961, ACDP 
K007/1), “Die Politik der beiden Regierungen” (Dr. Li/Gör, 7 September 1961, ACDP K007/1), and 
“Lindsey-Plan: Neue Wege der Entwicklungshilfe” (Dr. Li/Gör, 7 September 1961, ACDP K007/1).  From 
CEPES, for instance, Birrenbach received works, sent to the members of the German CEPES group, on the 
“Auslandshilfeprogramm der Regierung Kennedy” (date 19 March 1962, signed by Joachim Willmann, 
Europäische Vereinigung für Wirtschaftliche und Soziale Entwicklung (CEPES), Deutsche Gruppe e.V., 
ACDP K007/1) and “Possibilities and Problems of the Atlantic Economic Community” (dated 28 February 
1962, signed by Bernhard von Loeffelholz, CEPES, Deutsche Gruppe e.V., ACDP K007/1) as well as 
confidential (not for publication) statistical tables on “Die Exporte der Vereinigten Staaten und der 
erweiterten Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (bisherige EWG-Länder und Grossbritannien im Jahre 
1960 im Verhältnis zum Netto-Weltexport und der gemeinsame Aussentarif der EWG” (ACDP K007/1), 
with the products listed here including iron and steel.  Finally, the Deutsche Rat der Europäischen 
Bewegung provided Birrenbach with, among other things, unpublished drafts of its resolutions (DREB, 
dated 8 February 1962, Bonn, ACDP K007/1).  Of course, Birrenbach was also buffeted with information 
from any number of lobbying organizations (e.g. the Mineralölwirtschaftsverband e.V., ACDP K198/2). 
143 For Birrenbach receiving useful information on thesituation from Heinrich Krone on the basis of the 
latter’s participation in a recent cabinet meeting, see KB to Minister a.D. Josef-Hermann Dufhues, 13 
December 1963, personal, confidential, private letter, ACDP K011/2.  On the assistance Birrenbach 
received in carrying out his Israel mission in 1965 from the government bureaucracy, including help in 
preparing his negotiations from Ministerdirigent Prof. Meyer-Lindenberg, during the negotiations in Israel 
from State Secretary Karl Carstens, and in being allowed to take along the files of the BKA to aid him, see 
KB to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, 24 March 1966, regarding German-Israeli negotiations about 
economic aid, ACDP K017/1 and KB to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, confidential, cc Amb. Pauls, 
7 March 1966, ACDP K017/1.  For Birrenbach gathering from State Secretary Werner Knieper (BKA) that 
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the Federal Republic at the various international organizations, such as NATO and the 
European Communities (e.g. Wilhelm Haferkamp, Vice Pr sident of the European 
Commission (Brussels); Helmuth Cammann of the ECSC Delegation of the High 
Authority in England (London))144; the ambassadors and other personnel at the West 
German embassies and consulates abroad, especially in Washington DC, New York City 
(including the West German mission at the UN) and London, who tended to share, at 
least generally, Birrenbach’s Atlanticist goals145; correspondents for German newspapers 
in the United States, such as the Stuttgarter Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung146; and figures from the Wirtschaft, at home and abroad, including Günther 
Drechsler of the Thyssen office in New York City.147  Such contacts were important in 
procuring and providing Birrenbach with valuable materials, books and information and 
in enabling him to stay apprised of the current world situation in their respective spheres 
                                                                                                                                      
Chancellor Kiesinger had decided, against Birrenbach’s advice, to operate in a very reserved fashion with
respect to the question of community solutions (NPT), see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP 
K117/2.  Prior to his Sondermission to the United States in September 1968, in addition to his conversation 
with Chancellor Kiesinger, Birrenbach was given detail d briefings by the Bundeskanzleramt, he Foreign 
Office and the Defense Ministry about the situation and concerns stemming from the Warsaw Pact invasion 
of Czechoslovakia.   
144 On Cammann providing Birrenbach with a copy of a report dealing with negotiations for British 
entrance into the EEC, see H. Cammann, ECSC, Delegation of the High Authority in the United Kingdom, 
London, to KB, Düsseldorf, 27 April 1959, ACDP K001/2.  For Birrenbach being in contact with Ralf 
Dahrendorf (European Commission) before and during the former’s stay in the United States in questions 
of American foreign policy, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, 
Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.   
145 See, for example, KB to West German Ambassador Herwarth (London), 31 July 1961, ACDP K076/1 
and Ambassador Herwarth, Embassy of the Federal Republic, London, to KB, 4 August 1961, ACDP 
K076/1.  On Staden (in the Washington embassy) sending Birrenbach a speech of Sen. Frank Church on 
non-proliferation, see Botschaftsrat I. Kl. Berndt von Staden to KB, 3 December 1966, ACDP K139/2.  In 
the United States, such personalities also included, for instance, the Ambassador Rolf Pauls (1968-73).   
146 On Jan Reifenberg (FAZ) informing Birrenbach about his impressions regarding statements of Walter 
Stoessel (US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) in a briefing before foreign corresponde ts, 
see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.   
147 For an example of Birrenbach’s contacts in the Wirtschaft helping him size up world affairs, particularly 
in regard to economic issues, see KB to H. Kullak-Ublick, West German Embassy, London, 25 November 
1974, ACDP K068/1.   
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of competence.148  To a certain extent, Birrenbach received his information, including 
from some of the aforementioned sources, through the positions he occupied.149   
 Additionally, Birrenbach had access to a number of West German contacts that 
provided valuable assistance to him in complex technical questions.  To a certain extent, 
these were also located in the governmental bureaucacy (often the ministers or state 
secretaries) or the German embassies abroad (particul ly the specialized attachés and 
Gesandte).150  Having already mentioned the legalistic quality of Birrenbach’s thought, it 
is not surprising that he frequently sought necessary legal advice.  For instance, to 
establish the legal consequences of a possible preambl  to the Élysée Treaty of 1963, 
                                                
148 To cite just a few more examples of these particular contacts in action: for Birrenbach obtaining a better 
understanding of the situation (e.g. agricultural questions and the Kennedy Round) through his having 
gotten in touch with two state secretaries (Lahr and Carstens), the agriculture ministry, the European 
Commission and a series of other experts of the matrial, see KB to Minister a.D. Josef-Hermann Dufhues, 
13 December 1963, personal, confidential, private le ter, ACDP K011/2.  On Birrenbach’s contacts with 
multiple members of the cabinet, the G schäftsführenden Chairman of the CDU and the leaders of the most 
important Referate in the Auswärtigem Amt, from whom he received valuable information, for instance 
regarding the content of meetings between Chancellor Erhard and de Gaulle, see KB to Bundesminister 
a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.   
149 For the in-depth reports to the AKV (including Birrenbach) about the state of the disarmament 
negotiations in Geneva by the West German observer at the conference, Amb. Swidbert Schnippenkötter, 
on 15 February and 19 April 1966, see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 7 July 
1966, ACDP K087/2.  On the informative, but to Birrenbach not always convincing, presentations and 
answering of questions by Foreign Minister Brandt i the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee on the 
state of the NPT, see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2 and KB to Chancellor Kurt 
Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.  For Barzel (Chairman of the Fraktion) making available 
to Birrenbach (as Chairman of the Fraktion’s Arbeitsgruppe NPT) the cabinet submission [Vorlage] of 
Foreign Minister Brandt about the NPT, for Bundesminister Gerhard Stoltenberg giving Birrenbach access 
to his cabinet Vorlage regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and for Birrenbach’s judgment on these 
Vorlagen, at Barzel’s request, to the Chancellor, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, 
ACDP K023/1.  On Foreign Minister Scheel’s confidential informing of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs 
Committee on 13 November 1969 of the American interpretation (NPT) presented to the NATO Council, 
see KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1.  For the talk of the Soviet 
minister Samjatin with colleagues of the Union Bundestag Fraktion and Samjatin’s negative remarks 
[Ostverträge] on the question of the binding nature of West German resolutions, on possible [border] 
revisions and on self-determination, in some cases to Birrenbach’s own questions, see KB to Rainer Barzel, 
MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 1972, 
ACDP K026/1.  On a three-hour meeting in Bonn in February 1973 between some members of the Union 
Fraktion (Birrenbach, Erhard, Narjes, Bismarck, Blumenfeld an  Sprung) and the former American 
Secretary of Commerce and current Special Ambassador Peter Peterson, along with the Americans Amb. 
Malmgreen (the President’s Deputy Representative for trade questions in the White House), Amb. 
Hillenbrand and “Gesandter”  Wootton, see KB Report, 20 February 1973, ACDP K183/2.   
150 See, for instance, the note for Birrenbach regarding MRCA from the Luftwaffe attaché at the German 
Embassy in London, signed Schroth, Oberst i.G., 12 December 1968, ACDP K189/3. 
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Birrenbach contacted the head of the Foreign Office’s L gal Department, Botschafter 
Hermann Meyer-Lindenberg.151  Birrenbach’s own personal assistants, such as Dr. 
Alfons Titzrath, could be useful in offering him analysis of economic and other 
matters.152  On technical economic and monetary issues, such as t ose related to the 
Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, he was assisted by a number of bankers at the 
Bundesbank (including Otmar Emminger and Karl Blessing) and the Deutschen Bank 
(Wilfried Guth and Franz-Josef Trouvain); the large economic organizations, such as the 
BDI (especially Fritz Berg and Hellmuth Wagner) and the DIHT (President Prof. Ernst 
Schneider); his own assistants; as well as his conta ts in the Wirtschaft at home and 
abroad.153  With this bevy of contacts to consult on technical ssues, Birrenbach was in a 
                                                
151 Birrenbach was also assisted with suggestions and arguments on legal issues by Prof. Dr. Hermann 
Mosler (as well as Prof. Karl Carstens), for instance with respect to the binding nature of the Bundestag 
resolution in connection with the Moscow Treaty (KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, 
MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 14 May 1972, ACDP K026/1). 
152 Titzrath authored memos for Birrenbach on subjects such as the treatment of dumping in the GATT, the 
OECD, the EEC and the United States (including criticisms and a reference to an “Atlantic trade 
partnership” and the realization of the Trade Expansion Act); the situation after the breaking off of the 
Brussels negotiations in 1963; and possible transitio  solutions up to a British entrance into the EEC 
(Vermerke of 28 January 1963, 1 February 1963 and 11 February 1963, all by Titzrath, Düsseldorf, ACDP 
K064/2).  Dr. Klaus Mangold, another of Birrenbach’s assistants, was valuable for instance in drawing up 
papers and proposals on the energy situation as of the mid-1970s based on a wide variety of German and 
foreign government, business, institute, and press sources, including: information in the federal 
government’s energy program and from the Economics Ministry; Otmar Emminger (Vice President of the 
Bundesbank); plans of the French government; a statement of President Ford in presenting his energy 
program; proposals of Secretary of State Kissinger on the occasion of an International Energy Agency 
conference; US Treasury estimates; references of US Treasury Secretary William Simon; estimates of the 
US Deputy Treasury Secretary (Gerald Parsky); the US Federal Energy Administration (information drawn 
from Newsweek); the American embassy in the Federal Republic (letter of Mr. Winder); studies of the US 
State Department and the World Bank; estimates of the EC Commission; the OECD; a Vortrag by Wilfried 
Guth (Deutsche Bank) on “The International Financial Scene One Year After the Oil Crisis”; ESSO AG 
(Hamburg); Shell (statement of Gerrit Wagner, Chairm n of the Royal Dutch Shell Company; and letter 
from J.H. Loudon of 3 January 1975); a new study of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Corporation (an 
American bank); a paper of the Trilateral Commission; the Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft; information of 
the Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft; the Institute of Development Studies; an item from the Neuer Zürcher 
Zeitung (itself based on information of The Conference Board, n American research organization); Die 
Zeit; an analysis of the Handelsblatt that rested primarily on surveys of firms and on VDMA documents; 
the “respected” French business newspaper Les Échos; Time magazine; Petroleum Economist; and the 
Petroleum Press Service (see ACDP K198/2).     
153 For instance, KB to Director Dr. Otmar Emminger, Deutsche Bundesbank, 17 July 1961, ACDP K051/1.  
Later, Emminger provided useful information on the absorption of the flow of petrodollars and the views, 
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considerably better position to master the complexities of a variety of political, economic, 
military, legal, scientific and other subjects.  To the extent that Birrenbach modified his 
own expressed views and incorporated the views of these technical advisors, including 
those of government officials, into his own reports, speeches and publications (even 
while presenting them as his own personal views), which was quite often, he became an 
important route through which outside ideas penetrat d nd possibly indirectly influenced 
the activities of the Atlanticists and their organizat ons.154   
Perhaps most interesting in regard to the subject of outside technical assistance is 
the rather extensive network of advisors that Birrenbach utilized with respect to the issue 
of nuclear energy, which played a prominent role in the international relations of this 
period.  This was particularly the case with regard to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and Birrenbach’s efforts to assess its potential impact on the peaceful civilian use 
of atomic energy in the Federal Republic.  As a result, he was in touch with a number of 
scientists and institutes, located both in the Federal Republic and in the United States.  
Such Americans included personalities like Paul Doty of the Chemistry Department at 
Harvard University and Edward Teller at the University of California’s Livermore Lab.155  
Meanwhile, these Germans included Carl Roland Rabl (Max-Planck-Institut für 
                                                                                                                                      
plans and activities of central banks and governments (i cluding, but not only, the Bundesbank and the 
Bundesregierung) in this respect (ACDP K198/2).  In February 1975, the ESSO AG, Hamburg (Herr 
Elfert), provided information on the energy situation, particularly mineral oil dependencies (ACDP 
K198/2).  At Birrenbach’s request by phone, John Loudon (Shell), based in London, provided him in early 
1975 with useful estimates of crude oil imports for 1974 (ACDP K198/2).  On 22 March 1974, Birrenbach 
had a phone talk with Trouvain about the working paper by Prof. Robert Triffin on “Erdöl, der 
Währungswirrwarr und die Europäische Gemeinschaft” (ACDP K198/2). 
154 While admittedly no technical wizard himself, Birrenbach was well-aware of the role of technology and 
technical innovation in international relations, for instance with respect to accelerating the rapid nuclear 
arms race between the superpowers (KB to Prof. Dr. phil. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, 
ACDP K023/2) and the possibilities for a technological breakthrough that might permit an ABM system for 
Europe in the next ten or twenty years (KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1).   
155 For Birrenbach turning to Teller about the NPT and future technological developments in nuclear 
weapons, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1.   
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Physikalische Chemie, Göttingen); Dr. Klaus Ritter (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik); 
Prof. Dr. Heinrich Mandel (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG, Essen); Prof. 
Dr. Karl Heinz Beckurts (Chairman of the Board of the Kernforschungsanlage Jülich 
GmbH); Prof. Dr. Wolf Häfele (Kernforschungszentrum, Karlsruhe); Helmuth 
Burckhardt (Eschweiler Bergwerksverein, Aachen); Prof. Dr. Fritz Burgbacher (MdB); 
and of course, indirectly, their own contacts.156  From these personalities, Birrenbach 
received valuable, sometimes confidential, information and reports originating from these 
men themselves, as well as studies produced by institutions like the SWP and the RAND 
Corporation.157  All of this highlights the key phenomenon of the existence of other 
networks operating simultaneously and sometimes overlapping or linked with the 
Atlanticist network.  In the case of the “nuclear energy” network just touched upon, two 
networks with trans-Atlantic ties interacted with and influenced one another, at least 
temporarily, for their mutual benefit.  Birrenbach was among those individuals serving as 
a vital link between the Atlanticist and other such networks (here, nuclear energy).158  
However, while factors such as mass media, specialized books and materials and 
widespread West German contacts all contributed significantly to Birrenbach’s expertise, 
there was yet another, even more crucial, element.  Essential to understanding 
                                                
156 Birrenbach’s friend Edmund Stinnes, who had spent y ars as an émigré in the United States, also dealt
with the question of nuclear power and was in contact with Heinrich Mandel (RWE), AMF Atomics 
(Washington DC), and American & Foreign Enterprises (Stinnes to KB, 6 September 1957, ACDP K170/1 
and Stinnes to Mandel, 17 December 1957, ACDP K170/1).  For Birrenbach having a long discussion in 
January 1967 regarding the effects of the NPT on the civilian sector with the leader of the 
Kernforschungsinstituts in Karlsruhe, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 13 January 1967, ACDP 
K117/2.  Häfele was also involved in the NPT negotiations.  On Birrenbach trying to arrange a meeting for 
Beckurts with Gerard Smith in Washington DC (Beckurts ultimately met with Smith’s associate Philip 
Farley), see KB to Gerard Smith, 26 June 1978, ACDP K209/1.   
157 See, for example, KB to Prof. Edward Teller, Lawrenc  Livermore Laboratory, University of California, 
27 November 1975, ACDP K155/1.   
158 The partial value to Birrenbach of such linkages emerges from his admission, here with respect to his 
lacking the technical knowledge to judge certain SALT matters, that “I belong still to the generation that 
understands nothing of technology” (KB to Hubert Feigl, SWP, 21 August 1979, cc Ritter, ACDP K200/2).   
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Birrenbach’s significance and that of the Atlanticist infrastructure is the extensive array 
of regular foreign contacts he enjoyed.  Given his own political predilections, it is not 
surprising that his closest such contacts tended to be f a generally Atlanticist bent.  
These were plentiful in Western Europe, where the key contact was without question the 
Frenchman Jean Monnet, along with his Dutch assistant, Max Kohnstamm.  Others were 
to be found also in France (Zbigniew Rapacki, Raymond Aron, Alfred Grosser) as well as 
Belgium (Paul van Zeeland) and especially in Great Britain (Lord Gladwyn, Siegmund 
Warburg, William Bass).159  He also enjoyed solid links with the leadership of the most 
important international organizations, especially NATO (Secretaries General Dirk 
Stikker, Manlio Brosio and Joseph Luns) and the European Communities.  Furthermore, 
Birrenbach also maintained steady contact with the personnel of the key Western 
embassies in Bonn.160   
However, Birrenbach’s regular contacts were especially concentrated in the 
United States, where, as he often said, he had morefriends, “in the highest positions,” 
than in any other foreign country.161  Here, the key man was John McCloy, the still- 
                                                
159 On Monnet, see Jean Monnet, Memoirs (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978).  While not necessarily 
full-fledged contacts, Birrenbach also enjoyed extensive access to foreign government officials from an 
early date.  For instance, during his stay in London in November 1958, Birrenbach spoke with British 
Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Defence Minister Dunca  Sandys and Paymaster General Reginald 
Maudling.  
160 Thus, Birrenbach directly obtained from the embassies of the Western nations in Bonn useful 
information and materials on those specific countries as well as on international affairs in general, for 
instance acquiring from the American and French embassies the records of the proceedings of the US 
Senate along with information about energy consumption and dependence.  For Birrenbach rejecting the 
notion that he viewed himself as an “English advocate [Anwalt]” by stressing his good contact with the 
official French side in Bonn, especially the fact that, as of early March 1959, he had been invited five times 
to the French embassy in the previous three weeks, s e KB to Finance Minister Franz Etzel, 4 March 1959, 
ACDP K001/2.  Among other things, Birrenbach was invited to evening receptions at these various 
Western embassies, including those of France, Britain and the United States.   
161 For instance, KB to Walter Stoessel, US Ambassador, Bad Godesberg, 11 January 1977, ACDP K100/1; 
KB to Mr. and Mrs. Thro, 30 March 1978, ACDP K100/2; and KB to Shepard Stone, 24 May 1976, ACDP 
K191/2. 
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influential former US High Commissioner for Germany.162  Within the field of 
government and politics, aside from McCloy, these regular contacts included: Secretaries 
of State (Dean Acheson, Christian Herter, Henry Kissinger, later Alexander Haig, and to 
some extent Dean Rusk); Secretaries of Defense (James Schlesinger); National Security 
Advisors (McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski); the successive 
chairmen of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (William Foster, Gerard 
Smith)163; key figures in the State Department (Eugene Rostow, George Ball, William 
Tyler, John Leddy, Henry Owen) and the Defense Department (Paul Nitze); prominent 
military figures (Lucius Clay, the SACEURs Gen. Lauris Norstad and Gen. Alexander 
Haig); influential members of Congress (Representative Paul Findley, Senators Jacob 
Javits, John Cooper, Henry Jackson, Thomas Dodd, Robert Kennedy)164; and, as already 
alluded to, the crucial representatives in the American embassy and consulates in the 
Federal Republic, including the ambassadors (James Conant, George McGhee, Henry 
Cabot Lodge) and general consuls (especially in Düsseldorf (Edmund Kellogg)), as well 
as to international organizations like the European Communities (J. Robert Schaetzel) 
                                                
162 Birrenbach considered McCloy “one of the greatest and t the same time most powerful friends of the 
Federal Republic in the United States” (KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 13 January 1967, ACDP 
K117/2).  On McCloy, see for instance Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy & The Making of the 
American Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Thomas Schwartz, America’s Germany: 
John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); 
and Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1986). 
163 By this point, Acheson was, of course, a former Secretary of State.  On Acheson, see Dean Acheson, 
Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969).  McCloy drafted the 
bill in 1961 leading to the creation that year of the ACDA and then chaired the ACDA’s General Advisory 
Committee on Disarmament well into the Nixon White House.   
164 Dodd was particularly valuable as the sharpest of the critics of the NPT in the Senate and also provided 
Birrenbach with his correspondence with the disarmament agency in this respect.   
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and NATO (Harlan Cleveland).165  Furthermore, Birrenbach also took up contact with 
major American political candidates and their relevant advisors.166 
However, Birrenbach’s political contacts in the United States were imparted 
particular depth by the plethora of personalities byond the realm of government and 
                                                
165 For Birrenbach’s opportunity to speak with an American delegation at a reception held by US 
Ambassador Walter Dowling, see KB to Erich Straetling, West German Embassy, Washington DC, 22 June 
1962, ACDP K157/1.  On Birrenbach giving US General Consul Edmund Kellogg (General Consulate, 
Düsseldorf) his opinion and proposals regarding the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, see Kellogg to KB, 14 
March 1963, ACDP K157/1.  On 28 May 1965, Birrenbach ttended a dinner given by Ambassador George 
McGhee for John McNaughton (Paul Nitze’s successor a  Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs), in which Martin Hillenbrand (the American “Geschäftsträger” at the time) and SPD 
Senator Helmut Schmidt (Hamburg) also took part.  For the points discussed that evening, including the 
solution of the problem of the non-nuclear powers in NATO, see KB to Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, 
Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1.  For Birrenbach being in contact with US Ambassador Martin 
Hillenbrand, as well as personalities like Peter Peterson, Harald Malmgren, Peter Flanigan, Lawrence Fox 
and Paul Volcker, see KB to Staatssekretär a.D. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2.  
On Birrenbach’s constant contact with the American embassy with respect to the NPT, at least as of late 
1973, see KB to Robert Bowie, 10 December 1973, ACDP K160/2.  On Birrenbach checking with Amb. 
Hillenbrand before publishing a piece on the United States to make sure he agreed with its contents, see KB 
to John McCloy, 16 June 1975, ACDP K210/1.  On McGhee, see George McGhee, At the Creation of a 
New Germany: From Adenauer to Brandt (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).   
166 For instance, prior to the American presidential election of 1968, Birrenbach had spoken with those he 
considered the likely candidates for the post of Secretary of State in a future Nixon administration: Nelson 
Rockefeller, Douglas Dillon and William Scranton (KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of 
Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2).  For Birrenbach on his talk
in early 1972 with Paul Warncke, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs and one of Sen. Edmund Muskie’s foreign policy advisors (at a time when Muskie was still the 
leading Democratic presidential candidate), about the future policy of a possible Democratic 
administration, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU 
Deutschland, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1.  Within several 
months later during the campaign, in his capacity as Chairman of the Democratic Party’s Military-Political 
Commission, Warncke would become one of the two relevant advisors to the actual Democratic 
presidential nominee Sen. George McGovern (the other being Prof. Abram Chayes).  On Birrenbach’s in-
depth talks (about one-and-a-half hours) with McGovern’s foreign policy advisor Prof. Abram Chayes 
(Chairman of the Democratic Party’s Foreign Policy Commission) on 6 September 1972 in Bonn about the 
current situation and future American policy, see KB Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 
September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  Chayes, impressed by the talk, asked Birrenbach to send him an exposé 
depicting what he had just told him (expositions and figures) so that he could pass it on to McGovern (KB
Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2 and KB to Barzel, 8 
September 1972, ACDP K026/1).  According to Birrenbach, this talk with Chayes had been proposed “by 
the American side” (KB to Barzel, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1).  According to Birrenbach in 
September 1972 (in connection with his Chayes talk), however the 1972 election turned out, the Democrats 
(who had been the majority party in the United States for decades) would, according to the current opini n 
polls, certainly get 40% of the vote, meaning that it was in “our interest” [that of the Union] to strive to 
influence also the part of the population that would vote Democratic (KB to Barzel, 8 September 1972, 
ACDP K026/1).  On Birrenbach’s talks with Sen. Ted Kennedy, a potential American presidential 
candidate on a trip to Europe, at a meal given to Kennedy by the American ambassador, then alone in a 
private conversation, and finally during a meal at the Hotel Königshof (Kennedy had asked Birrenbach to 
arrange for him a dinner and a speech in Bonn), see KB Confidential Memo of 30 April 1974, ACDP 
K184/1. 
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politics, at least narrowly defined, with whom he spoke and corresponded about political 
matters.  These included prominent, usually policy-oriented, academics and international 
affairs research institutes, such as Harvard’s Center for International Affairs (Robert 
Bowie, Henry Kissinger, Guido Goldman), the University of Pennsylvania’s Foreign 
Policy Research Institute (Robert Strausz-Hupé, William Kintner, Walter Hahn), Yale 
University (Hajo Holborn, Eugene Rostow), the Brookings Institution (Henry Owen), 
Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and Inter ational Studies (David Abshire, 
Arleigh Burke), the Institute for Advanced Study (Karl Kaysen), Columbia University 
(Zbigniew Brzezinski), Stanford University (Karl Brandt), and MIT (William E. 
Griffith).167  They also comprised political contacts at many of the Atlanticist 
organizations we have already encountered: the Council o  Foreign Relations (William 
Diebold, William Bundy), the American Council on Germany (Chris Emmet) and the 
Declaration of Atlantic Unity.  Birrenbach also engaged politically with important figures 
in the American foundation system (Shephard Stone).  Finally, Birrenbach discussed 
political issues with friends and business contacts broad.168  Of course, Birrenbach 
interacted, at one time or another, with a large number of prominent personalities, 
especially when one considers the various functions and conferences in which he 
participated.  Rather than listing all of Birrenbach’s German and foreign contacts, the aim 
                                                
167 Among his numerous roles at the university, Goldman w s part of Harvard’s Center for European 
Studies.  Likewise, Karl Brandt was part of Stanford’s Hoover Institution and Food Research Institute.  As 
earlier suggested, Birrenbach also read various books, papers, publications and studies produced or 
published by individuals and think tanks like FPRI, the Brookings Institution, or the Hudson Institute, 
in part due to his contacts who sent him such works, among them Hahn and Owen.   
168 These included Dimitri Mica in Athens (Greece) and Edmund Stinnes, based in Ascona (Switzerland), 
but not averse to travelling.  Stinnes, who emigrated to the United States during the National Socialist 
period, was also a member of the Lametal-Union Direktorium (KB, Buenos Aires, to Franz von Papen Jr., 
Düsseldorf, 4 June 1951, ACDP K207/4).   
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here is simply to delineate the network of his most intense and fruitful contacts.169  Their 
central personal significance in Birrenbach’s life can be gauged by his repeated assertion 
that “[t]he most beautiful experience of my life has been the contact with outstanding 
men in many countries in politics, economy and science.”170   
The construction of Birrenbach’s tight-knit Atlanticist political network required 
some time and effort.  What was earlier generally stated regarding the significant impact 
of Atlanticist institutions in facilitating the establishment of linkages can now be stated 
more specifically with regard to Birrenbach.  Namely, that Birrenbach’s participation in 
the various international Atlanticist institutions previously described, including the 
international conferences, action committees and research institutes (especially the 
Atlantic Institute), proved essential in developing and maintaining his wide range of 
contacts.  The relationships forged in these settings were of a variable nature.  On the one 
hand, Birrenbach established numerous relatively transitory contacts through these 
channels.  One such instance involved the US Represntative Chet Holifield (CA), co-
chairman of the Congress’ Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a valuable contact with 
significant influence in the United States on nuclear issues and therefore of considerable 
importance to Birrenbach in his efforts specifically pertaining to both the MLF and the 
NPT.  As part of a conscious effort, Birrenbach first established contact and spoke 
extensively with Holifield at the Bilderberg Conference in Wiesbaden in late March 
1966.  On the other hand, many of the relationships B rrenbach established in these 
                                                
169 Among Birrenbach’s passing contacts in France, for instance, were Michel Salomon and Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber (KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, in French, to Michel Salomon, Ville d’Avray, 
France, 4 June 1969, ACDP K023/2 and (with respect to orrespondence with Servan-Schreiber) KB, MdB, 
dictated by phone from Oberstdorf, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the 
CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 22 August 1972, ACDP K026/1).    
170 KB to Robert Bowie, 18 July 1977, ACDP K160/2. 
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settings turned out to be of a more permanent nature.  For instance, Birrenbach first met 
Henry Kissinger, who remained a key contact over th years, at the German-American 
Conference staged by the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany in early 
October 1959 in Bonn.  Similarly, Birrenbach’s mutual participation in the Atlantic 
Institute with the American Gen. Lauris Norstad was es ential to the forging of their own 
long-term link.171 
Just like the construction of the Atlanticist infrastructure we have explored in 
Chapter 4, Birrenbach’s networking exhibited something of a snowball effect, as contacts 
begot more contacts.  For example, at the Bilderberg Conference in Wiesbaden in early 
spring 1966, Robert Bowie and John McCloy not only urged Birrenbach to speak to Rep. 
Chet Holifield about the West German nuclear Mitspracherecht, they were also both 
essential to actually arranging Birrenbach’s important meeting and talks there with that 
influential congressman.172  Likewise, Robert Strausz-Hupé and Chris Emmet facilit ted 
                                                
171 With respect to the maintenance of contacts, for insta ce, Birrenbach periodically saw and was able to 
exchange views with John McCloy in Paris at meetings of the Atlantic Institute and, likewise, had the 
opportunity to express his concerns to McCloy in Amsterdam at the European-American Conference in 
March 1973 (KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2).  On Birrenbach’s discussion about a 
series of important questions with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns (Netherlands) in Paris at a 
meeting of the Atlantic Institute Board of Governors and at a following meal given for Luns and the 
Secretary General of the OECD, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the 
CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 July 1972, ACDP K026/1.  In this July 1972 letter to Barzel, Birrenbach also 
explained that, as the Chairman of the Atlantic Institute’s Foreign Policy Committee, he would have th
chance on the coming Wednesday to speak in Brussels about European-American relations before and with 
the members of the European Commission and the ambassadors there of the United States, Britain and 
Canada on the occasion of a meal to be given for this purpose by Comte Boël in the Château Chenoy.    
172 Such a meeting appeared “all the more useful” as Holifield had asked a number of “concrete questions” 
and propounded what Birrenbach considered “a very na row interpretation” of the relevant American laws 
in the discussion at the Bilderberg Conference in response to statements by Birrenbach and Fritz Erler.  
Indeed, Birrenbach’s “American friends” even considered Holifield and his Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, aside from “the still undecided attitude” of President Johnson, to be “the main obstacle to the 
setting through of our plans.”  In addition to this meeting at Bilderberg, Birrenbach arranged with Holifield 
to depict to him in writing “the German standpoint” so that the latter could discuss it with his colleagues in 
the committee and then reply to Birrenbach in writing.  On all of this, see KB to Foreign Minister Gerhard 
Schröder, 4 April 1966, ACDP K117/1. 
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Birrenbach’s contact with Senator Christopher Dodd’s office in November 1965.173  
During Birrenbach’s London stay in November 1958, it was his “English friends” who 
provided him the opportunity to talk with two British ministers, Foreign Minister Selwyn 
Lloyd and Paymaster General Reginald Maudling.174  Likewise, it was Henry Kissinger 
who promised “dead or alive” to bring Birrenbach together with National Security 
Advisor McGeorge Bundy on his trip to the United States in May 1962.175  Indeed, 
Birrenbach’s experience indicates that even outside of the various Atlanticist institutions 
and functions themselves, membership or participation in such served as an entrance 
pass, virtually sufficient in itself to secure meetings with other members and participants, 
even if the individuals in question had hitherto not been particularly close.176   
While high-level Atlanticist affairs obviously stood at the heart of many of 
Birrenbach’s contacts, such relationships sometimes acquired further dimensions beyond 
their strictly Atlanticist elements.  Business dealings, for one, occasionally added another 
such dimension to the links that existed between Birrenbach and those Americans and 
other Atlanticists involved in the business world.  While business and economic matters 
could occasionally be a source of dissension between, for instance, Americans and 
Germans, even those of an Atlanticist stripe, the relationships that existed between 
                                                
173 Strausz-Hupé and Emmet asked Birrenbach to see Doddduring his stay in Washington DC in 
November 1965 (Sondermission), but Dodd was out of town.  Instead, Birrenbach spoke twice on the phone 
with a Mr. Martin, who sent him some of Dodd’s speech s, including in the Senate and on East-West trade, 
as well as Dodd’s correspondence with Adrian Fisher (D puty Director of the ACDA). 
174 KB, Düsseldorf, to Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2.   
175 KB to Erich Straetling, Washington DC, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1.  To cite yet another example, on 
his 1963 trip to the United States, Birrenbach had a breakfast at the invitation of Sigismund Freiherr von 
Braun (the FRG’s Standing Representative at the United Nations in New York) with the UN mission chiefs.   
176 Some examples: Birrenbach’s link to Gen. Lauris Norstad (US) was primarily due initially to their 
mutual participation in the Atlantic Institute, so that the mention of this institution was central to 
Birrenbach in obtaining a meeting between the two of them on his trip to the United States in 1963 (KB 
telex to Drechsler, 23 September 1963, ACDP K210/1).  On his Sondermission of 1971-72, Birrenbach was 
able to see a considerable number of prominent foreign political luminaries, in large part due to his 
participation in the Atlanticist organizations, espcially the Monnet Committee. 
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Birrenbach and other Atlanticist-minded businessmen w re at the very least fleshed out, 
perhaps even strengthened, at times by the business t es and activities existing between 
them and their firms.  Thanks to his position in the Wirtschaft and his contacts within the 
Thyssen firm, elsewhere in the Wirtschaft (including the major economic organizations) 
and with the government, Birrenbach was frequently able to offer his foreign contacts 
valuable assistance and advice regarding the conduct of business in West Germany.177   
In addition to the serious policy matters at the center of Birrenbach’s activities 
and contacts within the Atlanticist network, there also existed at times an element of 
personal affection and friendship.  In Birrenbach’s eyes, mutual frankness was a 
precondition for true friendship, whether it involved individuals or nations.  Friendship 
did not consist of simply telling somebody what they wanted to hear, as Birrenbach put it, 
“I have never thought much of this type of friendship.”178  However, whatever their 
occasional disagreements on policy, Birrenbach genuin ly liked, even admired, many of 
his contacts, especially Jean Monnet and John McCloy.  F r instance, he considered 
Monnet a “fatherlike friend…. This man was unique, v ry modest, full of energies, a 
great idealist and a man with an enormous power to abs rb all set-backs…. [A] great 
                                                
177 For examples of the business dimension among Atlanticists, see for instance KB telegram to John 
McCloy, 15 March 1971, ACDP K210/1; John Diebold, The Diebold Group Inc, Management Consultants, 
to KB, 20 June 1963, ACDP K157/1; KB to John McCloy, 23 July 1979, ACDP K210/1.  On discussions 
between Hans-Günther Sohl, George Ball and a Mr. MacGregor on, among other things, an ongoing 
Australian steel mill deal/project, with which Birrenbach was “generally familiar”; “some interesting 
developments” in this regard involving “the play of political forces” becoming clearer in Australia (rivalry 
of the separate states in a federal system in Western Australia); as well as Birrenbach “clarifying” the 
Moscow negotiations for Ball and MacGregor, see Georg  Ball, Lehman Brothers, to KB, 19 August 1970, 
ACDP K160/3.  For helpful advice and assistance regarding potential contacts in the Federal Republic (all 
in Frankfurt) from the DIHT to Birrenbach, intended for the latter’s American “visitors”; potential avenues 
for cooperation but also existing competition between particular US and German firms; as well as concerns 
regarding the “active” promotion and favoring of the “unilateral interests” of American companies, seeDr. 
Meyer (DIHT) to KB, 18 March 1971, ACDP K210/1.  For an example of Birrenbach’s German political 
contacts being supplemented by economic interests, see H. Cammann, ECSC, Delegation of the High 
Authority in the United Kingdom, London, to KB, Düsseldorf, 27 April 1959, ACDP K001/2.  Cammann 
expected to see Birrenbach at the annual assembly of the WVES on 15 May 1959 in Düsseldorf. 
178 KB to Botschaftsrätin Hava Bitan, Israeli Embassy, Bonn, 15 October 1973, ACDP K096/2. 
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friend.”179  Birrenbach even adorned his personal library with photos of some of his 
eminent and admired contacts.180  His correspondence is sprinkled with birthday wishes, 
gift-giving (often books), congratulations on special occasions, get-well wishes and the 
like.181  This personal aspect of the Atlanticist network was promoted by the fact that, 
while I have to this point stressed formal institutions and functions, there was also a 
somewhat more casual and social side to its activities.  In addition to conferences, study 
groups and the like, there were meetings of individuals or small groups in private homes, 
exclusive clubs, offices and hotels, sometimes on the periphery of conferences and other 
functions.182  While Atlanticist policy and issues could hardly not be discussed amongst 
such individuals, it could be done in a different, more private setting where there was also 
a chance to eat a meal, chat and generally socialize.  Birrenbach’s Düsseldorf home, to 
take just one example, was a place where visitors we e able to not just discuss “business” 
but also to relax to a certain extent, perhaps out in the beautiful garden.183   
In such an environment, it is not too surprising that occasionally these contacts 
and friendships and even Atlanticism in general became family affairs.  Birrenbach’s own 
family was involved in this to only a limited exten.  Thanks in part to the less formal 
aspects of some Atlanticist functions or meetings in which they were included, Ida 
                                                
179 KB to Eugene Rostow, 23 March 1979, ACDP K212/1.  This was following Monnet’s death.  In this 
same letter to Rostow, Birrenbach also mourned withrespect to Monnet: “I lost a great friend.” 
180 KB to Alice Acheson, Washington DC, 14 November 1974, ACDP K184/1. 
181 For Birrenbach thanking Müller-Armack for his successful efforts to obtain an honorary doctorate for 
Monnet from the University of Cologne, see KB to Prf. Alfred Müller-Armack, Institut für 
Wirtschaftspolitik at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.    
182 For instance, on the last evening of the Atlantik-Brücke conference in 1959, Birrenbach invited and gave 
a dinner “to” Henry Kissinger, Robert Strausz-Hupé and Gen. André Beaufre (France) in the Hotel 
Petersberg (KB to Kissinger, 28 May 1983, ACDP K146/3).  In this same letter to Kissinger, Birrenbach 
pointed out that the hotel “since more than ten years c nnot be financed by the federal government.” 
183 On the lunch to which George Ball invited Birrenbach on 9 November 1965 and the private discussion 
they had there on the side regarding the previous day’s meeting and so forth, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig 
Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. 
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Birrenbach, along with other wives, became a periphral social element of the network.  
At least sometimes, Ida accompanied her husband on his trips to the United States.184  
Birrenbach’s children were internationally minded, with his daughter, Irene, living for at 
least a time in England (near Marlow) with her husband and children, and his son, 
Thomas, living at times in New York City and Tehran, which he left around the time of 
the Iranian revolution in 1979, and marrying a Persian woman.185  However, Thomas and 
Irene never became part of the German Atlanticist network in any notable, substantive 
way.186  Meanwhile, other families became more involved.  In some instances, 
Atlanticism became a multi-generational affair, as the children of Atlanticists, including 
of Germans such as Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen and Friedrich Carl Freiherr von 
Oppenheim, joined and participated in the Atlanticis  organizations and functions.187   
For Birrenbach, operating within the Atlanticist network also meant interacting 
and dealing with the relatives of his American (and other foreign) contacts.  As an 
example, he occasionally corresponded on a social leve with the spouses of such 
contacts.188  He assisted their children with their ventures in the Federal Republic, 
whether they involved business undertakings (John McCloy Jr.) or academic research 
(Eugene Rostow’s son).  Birrenbach also did his best to help his Atlanticist colleagues 
when they or their family members became ill.  To cite probably the most notable 
example, during the long deterioration of Hajo Holborn’s health, Birrenbach arranged for 
a financial support of DM 20,000 from the federal government for Holborn and his 
                                                
184 This was the case, for instance, in 1974. 
185 KB to Ludwig Erhard, 19 July 1974, ACDP K190/2; KB to Eugene Rostow, 23 March 1979, ACDP 
K212/1.  As indicated, Birrenbach also became a grandfather.  In December 1968, his daughter had her 
second baby (KB to Rodolfo Griesshaber, 10 March 1969, ACDP K048/2). 
186 About the most that can be said is that Birrenbach’s daughter and son-in-law met socially with Bill Bass, 
one of Birrenbach’s contacts and frequent correspondents, in England.   
187 For example, this was true of Falkenhausen’s son, who followed his father into the Atlantik-Brücke.   
188 Including with the wives of Acheson, McCloy, Herter and especially Holborn (also the latter’s sister). 
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family and attempted to facilitate the publication of Holborn’s works in the Federal 
Republic.189  Within the context of his Atlanticist activities, Birrenbach also encountered 
the children of his contacts within the Atlanticist organizations, for instance Christian 
Herter Jr. in the Atlantic Institute in the late 1960s, as well as in other settings, as when 
Holborn’s son, a member of President Kennedy’s White House staff, proved useful on 
Birrenbach’s trips to the United States, for example in setting up meetings, and was 
eventually involved in the Kennedy Memorial Library project (see Chapter 7).  
Having identified the major sources of Birrenbach’s knowledge and expertise, it 
must be noted, however, that for someone considered an expert on the United States, his 
direct experiences with that country were remarkably narrow.  Birrenbach never lived in 
the United States, indeed never visited it until he had reached quite an advanced age.  At 
no point did he vacation in the United States, though, in addition to the Federal Republic, 
he did elsewhere abroad in Europe, including Britain.  During his visits to the United 
States, never lasting more than two weeks at a time, he moved in rarefied circles, 
amongst the elite layers of society, staying at elite hotels, eating at elite establishments, 
and so on.190  Many aspects of his trips, for instance the booking of hotel rooms, were 
arranged by his logistical support in the United States, whether it be the Stahlunion 
representation in New York City or the West German embassy in Washington DC.  In 
other words, it does not seem that Birrenbach had very much to do with typical 
                                                
189 See KB to Hajo Holborn, 21 November 1968, ACDP K098/1; KB to Fred Holborn, Washington DC, 24 
October 1969, ACDP K098/1; KB to Dresdner Bank AG, 10 June 1980, ACDP K158/1; and KB to Karl 
Cornides, Vienna, 1 October 1970, ACDP K158/1.  TheDM 20,000 was paid into a Treuhandkonto.  By all 
appearances, this sum came from the federal government though those responsible wished to remain 
nameless. 
190 While in Washington DC, Birrenbach often stayed at the Shoreham Hotel, the Watergate Hotel, the 
Statler Hilton Hotel, as well as at the Hotel Manger Hay or the Hotel Madison, in New York City for 
instance at the Waldorf-Astoria, the St. Regis or the Pierre Hotel.  On his various trips, Birrenbach ppears 
to have flown commercially, on such airlines as PanAm and Lufthansa.  Birrenbach also stayed in elite 
lodgings and resorts on his vacations to Britain. 
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Americans.  In spite of his own admonitions that to understand the foreign policy of a 
nation one had to take a holistic approach, it alsoppears that his attention and reading 
focused largely and specifically on that contemporary foreign policy, perhaps along with 
contemporary history to a certain extent.  It does not appear, for instance, that he engaged 
with American popular culture or read much in the way of contemporary American 
literature.  Similar observations can be made, sometimes even more emphatically, with 
regard to other regions of the world in which Birrenbach claimed expertise.  These 
included the Middle East, where his knowledge was based on several brief trips, some 
reading and a limited number of contacts, and Latin America and the developing world in 
general, where it was based on his having lived “in countries like that” for “more than ten 
years,” but not on any significant, recent, in-depth, first-hand experience.191   
Furthermore, in addition to being temporally, socially nd intellectually rather 
limited, Birrenbach’s direct experience with the United States was also quite narrowly 
circumscribed geographically.  His visits to the United States focused largely on two 
cities, New York and especially Washington.  His American contacts remained 
concentrated amongst the traditional Northeastern elite.  Like some of the Northeastern 
elites themselves, Birrenbach was alienated from and perhaps a bit contemptuous of that 
rather large part of the United States not located long the Northeastern seaboard.192  
Some sense of this contempt can be gleaned from his remark in the Bundestag Foreign 
Affairs Committee in November 1976 regarding the origins of Jimmy Carter and 
                                                
191 KB to Henry Owen, Deputy Counsellor and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, State Department, 
Washington DC, 31 October 1963, ACDP K157/1. 
192 For the culture shock experienced by some of these elites when they moved outside of the Northeast, see 
for instance Annemarie Holborn to KB, 25 May 1972, ACDP K158/1.  Here, Hajo Holborn’s widow 
explained her troubles adjusting to the “Middle West,” where she found that people “consciously” 
distanced themselves from “the East” and considered it “strange” that she still read the New York Times.  
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Georgia: “That is really Hinterpommern.  Nothing against Pomerania.  I think very highly 
for instance of Fontane.”193  Likewise, this comtempt revealed itself when he compared 
the Midwest unfavorably to the “geistig lebendigen atmosphere” in New Haven (Yale) 
and equated living there with his own life in Argentina, as we have seen not a very 
flattering comparison.194  While such limitations may not be especially surprising given 
the burden of his work and while they may not have be n unusual even amongst foreign 
policy experts, they do raise the question of the ext nt to which Birrenbach truly 
understood, and sought to understand, the nature and “soul” of the United States.   
While Birrenbach’s expertise served as the basis of his influence, his reliance on 
this foundation also evinced some major drawbacks for the expert himself.  Birrenbach 
repeatedly professed a dislike for those who placed career considerations over an interest 
in the cause at stake and for the “politically very ambitious man who is just interested in 
the next higher post.”195  Nevertheless, Birrenbach harbored some quite lofty career 
ambitions of his own, and it was due to his very lack of “party Macht” that the final 
hurdle in this regard remained insurmountable.  This ultimate career prize that remained 
out of reach was the position to which Birrenbach had aspired from practically the very 
start: the post of Foreign Minister.  He seems to have come tantalizingly close to 
achieving this goal on at least two occasions.  Given their later stormy history, it is rather 
amazing that one such occasion was in 1962 with Adenau r still at the helm.  Opposed to 
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder’s Atlanticist outl ok and with a Grand Coalition 
                                                
193 Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 9 November 1976, ACDP K135/3. 
194 KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1. 
195 KB to Eugene Rostow, 11 December 1975, ACDP K211/2.  In this letter to Rostow, Birrenbach 
compared Donald Rumsfeld, the new US Secretary of Defense, unfavorably with his predecessor, the more 
knowledgeable and expert James Schlesinger.  In such contexts, Birrenbach sometimes substituted the 
expression “ambitious politician.” 
 309
seeming to be a real possibility at the time, Adenau r may have been attracted by 
Birrenbach’s relatively good relations to the Social Democrats and his reputation as a 
supporter of a non-partisan foreign policy.  Meanwhile, Birrenbach’s own strong 
Atlanticist views were clearly overlooked or not very well known yet, at least to the 
Chancellor.  Several years later, Chancellor Erhard also considered appointing 
Birrenbach Foreign Minister, indeed Birrenbach believed that on the eve before the 1965 
election it was practically a done deal.  However, those “party people,” various elements 
within the party, opposed to his appointment mustered strong resistance.  In this instance, 
Birrenbach’s lack of party Macht, his lack of contact with the party apparatus, for the 
diverse reasons already described, formed an insuperable obstacle to his ambitions.  Like 
each of his predecessors though perhaps not as seriou ly, Chancellor Kiesinger would 
also consider, but ultimately decide against, naming Birrenbach Foreign Minister.196 
E. The Domestic Framework for Birrenbach’s Political Activities 
While Birrenbach’s expertise formed the basis of his influence, the framework in 
which he sought to exercise that influence evolved considerably over the years.  One such 
element of this framework was the state of his relationships with those in power.  
Particularly significant in this regard were Birrenbach’s relationships with the various 
Chancellors (and the key members of the Bundeskanzleramt).  During the early 1960s, 
Birrenbach’s relationship to Konrad Adenauer seems to have been reasonably solid.  It 
was Adenauer who gave Birrenbach his first “special mission” to the United States in 
1961 and, as we have noted, even considered appointing Birrenbach Foreign Minister.  
Birrenbach enjoyed at least some access to the Chancellor during this period.  Following 
                                                
196 On the Adenauer episode, see Daniel Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987). 
 310
his trips abroad, for instance to Britain in 1960, he had “long and interesting” talks with 
Adenauer about the impressions he had gathered.197  Especially the Adenauer friend and 
advisor Robert Pferdmenges, also to some extent personalities like Kai-Uwe von Hassel 
(CDU Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein), greatly assisted Birrenbach in gaining 
the ear of and establishing a positive relationship with the Chancellor.198  That said, 
Birrenbach’s connection with Adenauer, even during the early 1960s, was not very close, 
and in no real sense did he serve as a regular advisor to the Chancellor. 
However, this period of relative warmth would not last.  The events surrounding 
the Franco-German Treaty of January 1963, an Élysée Treaty that Birrenbach perceived 
as having a disturbingly adverse potential given its apparently single-minded focus on 
continental Western Europe and especially on bilateral Franco-German consultation and 
collaboration, were the proximate occasion for the virtually complete collapse of 
Birrenbach’s relationship with Adenauer, though well b fore then fundamental 
differences over West German foreign policy had, of course, existed between the 
dedicated Atlanticist and the devoted Abendländler.  Birrenbach and Adenauer now 
engaged in intense confrontations in the meetings of the Unionsfraktion, and by the 
meeting of 5 February 1963, Birrenbach was leading an Atlanticist-minded “Fronde”  
within the Fraktion.199  By the time of the meeting at Adenauer’s vacation spot of 
                                                
197 KB to E. Emmet, MP, House of Commons, 11 July 1960, ACDP K076/1. 
198 It was via Pferdmenges that Birrenbach asked Adenau r for a talk [Besprechung] in early 1959, an idea 
with which both Brentano and Erhard as well as Müller-Armack were in agreement (KB to Finance 
Minister Franz Etzel, 4 March 1959, ACDP K001/2).  For Birrenbach and Pferdmenges together with 
Adenauer in Rhöndorf on the past Sunday in early July 1960, see KB to Brentano, 9 July 1960, ACDP 
K076/1 and KB to Erhard, Economics Minister, Vice Chancellor, 9 July 1960, ACDP K076/1.  After their 
London trip in July 1960, Hassel encouraged Adenauer (who had already made an appointment with 
Birrenbach) and Hallstein (President of the EEC Commission) to talk with Birrenbach about his 
impressions from the trip (Hassel to KB, 8 July 1960, ACDP K076/1). 
199 For Birrenbach leading the “Fronde,” see KB to Albrecht Pickert, Chairman of the Vorstand of Hein, 
Lehmann and Co. AG, 11 February 1963, ACDP K011/1 and KB to Strausz-Hupé, 11 February 1963, 
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Cadenabbia (Italy), where the final version of an Atlanticist-oriented preamble was 
agreed upon on 4 April 1963, Birrenbach’s relationship with Adenauer was “beyond 
miserable.”  Birrenbach did not even attend, since, as he put it, “I did not want to 
unnecessarily provoke the Chancellor by my presence.”200  In the wake of the preamble 
episode, Birrenbach would have no communication with Adenauer for several years until 
something of a thaw set in between the two in the twilight of the Altkanzler’s life.201 
Particularly in comparison to the final months of the Adenauer chancellorship, 
Birrenbach enjoyed considerably better relations with the two succeeding heads of 
government, the Chancellors Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg Kiesinger.  In each case, 
Birrenbach functioned as something of an informal advisor on a wide variety of foreign 
policy issues, though whether the respective Chancellors could or even desired always to 
                                                                                                                                      
ACDP K011/1.  The Atlanticists appear to have been cl arly numerically superior within the Fraktion at 
this time.  Nevertheless, Birrenbach initially stood virtually alone in January 1963 as the sharpest critic of 
the Élysée Treaty in its original form in the intra-Union debates, at first finding few open supporters 
(Erhard was also an opponent of the treaty), and he betrayed some bitterness about what he considered the 
timidity of many Fraktion members vis-à-vis Adenauer.  For Birrenbach complaining that “[u]nfortunately, 
civil courage is not writ-large by us,” see again KB to Strausz-Hupé, 11 February 1963, ACDP K011/1.     
200 Günther Patz, Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Außenpolitik: Fallstudien zur politischen Bedeutung des 
Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976).  In part, 
Birrenbach’s decision not to go to Cadenabbia was based on his belief that since the Fraktion was already 
now in favor of the preamble and the text already stood firm, the most essential matters had already been 
dealt with.  Nevertheless, a number of important Union and FDP deputies were present at Cadenabbia, and 
naturally SPD members of the Bundestag, along and largely in cooperation with their Union and FDP 
counterparts, also played a role in the emergence ad triumph of the preamble.  This preamble reaffirmed 
the Federal Republic’s commitment to Atlantic cooperation, thus in some sense neutralizing the treaty, 
soothing the fears of the Americans and the Bundestag and setting narrow limits to de Gaulle’s ambitions.  
The Élysée Treaty was ratified almost unanimously by the Bundestag on 16 May 1963.  Ultimately, the 
CDU Atlanticists around Birrenbach, and also including personalities like Erhard, Brentano and Hermann 
Kopf, successfully asserted their ideas and conceptions and, in the process, also changed the SPD’s mind
regarding its original demand that the Bundestag’s reservations have international legal effectiveness. 
201 For instance, on 7 February 1967, Birrenbach got a “surprising” call from Adenauer, who had heard 
that Birrenbach was responsible in the Fraktion for the “problems” of the NPT.  At Adenauer’s invitation, 
the two met the following day in Adenauer’s office in the Bundeshaus o that Birrenbach, in a one-and-a- 
half hour talk, could present Adenauer with the difficulties and objectionable elements of the treaty (the
Federal President had also spoken to Adenauer aboutsuch themes).  While according to Birrenbach the 
former Chancellor “fully” agreed with him, Adenauer also hoped for support from the French side, which 
Birrenbach explained he himself did not expect (KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2). 
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translate his advice into action was another question altogether.202  As already noted, 
Birrenbach undertook two “special missions” for and with the support of Erhard, one to 
Israel in March-April 1965 and the other to the United States in November 1965 
(regarding the MLF and nuclear control), the latter in advance of and aiming to lay the 
groundwork for Erhard’s own trip in December.203  While Birrenbach offered advice to 
Kiesinger on a broad range of foreign policy matters, the most distinctive element of this 
period was his prominent role with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.204  With the 
Chancellor’s approval, Birrenbach advised and closely consulted with Kiesinger on the 
NPT, passed on information to the Chancellor with respect to the treaty and suggested 
possible courses of action to mold the treaty to suit the interests of the Federal Republic 
as he understood them.205   
Other relationships that shaped Birrenbach’s influence and the framework in 
which he operated also experienced significant change over time.  With regard to his 
valuable links to the government bureaucracy, the most important shift occurred in 1966.  
For Birrenbach, a Grand Coalition, which he had for s me time considered “unavoidable” 
and, as earlier noted, had openly supported, came at an “enormous” price, including a 
turnover of personnel in the government bureaucracy that stretched well beyond the 
                                                
202 For an example of Chancellor Kiesinger rejecting Birrenbach’s advice, here Birrenbach’s efforts (at 
McCloy’s request) and failure to convince Kiesinger to come to a “unified statement” with respect to 
community options (in the context of the NPT), see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2. 
203 Birrenbach’s Sondermission of November 1965 emerged from Chancellor Erhard contacting the US 
ambassador, George McGhee, with the request regardin  Birrenbach’s desire for a meeting with the 
American administration and government departments regarding the MLF, a request then passed on by 
McGhee.   
204 On Birrenbach also advising Kiesinger about the harmonization of détente policy, in particular of arms 
control and disarmament policy, see KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 May 1967, ACDP K139/2. 
205 For instance, KB, MdB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 
1969, NPT, ACDP K023/1.  For Birrenbach’s advising of and for one of Birrenbach’s discussions with 
Kiesinger regarding the NPT, which in this case lasted fifty minutes during a walk in the park of the Palais 
Schaumburg, see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2. 
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cabinet level.206  With the installation of the Grand Coalition imminent, Birrenbach 
accurately predicted that the Auswärtige Amt, to take one pivotal example, would 
undergo a “profound change.”  Personalities like State Secretary Karl Carstens, whom 
Birrenbach especially liked and valued, would have to depart: “I think with horror of the 
people who will replace figures of his rank.”  While Birrenbach acknowledged that the 
Union was in a sorry condition and that he himself had endorsed the idea of a Grand 
Coalition, he also complained that “the situation des not justify, in my opinion, giving 
the SPD the entire foreign, Deutschland, European and development policy.”207  The 
impact of such developments within the ministries on Birrenbach’s activities should not 
be exaggerated.  Regarding the NPT, for instance, Birrenbach maintained contact during 
the Grand Coalition not just with Kiesinger but also with Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, 
Defense Minister Gerhard Schröder and Research Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, passing 
on information, pointing out problems, and offering advice and suggestions.  
Nevertheless, aside from the reassuring presence of Kiesinger as Chancellor, Birrenbach 
was essentially accurate in his assessment that he henceforth found himself with no true 
Gesprächspartnern in the government, a new and “painful” situation after years of 
intensive cooperation with particular individuals in the various ministries.208   
                                                
206 KB to Edith Willick, c/o West German Embassy, Preto ia, South African Republic, 12 December 1966, 
ACDP K047/3.   
207 KB to Hajo Holborn, 2 December 1966, ACDP K098/1. 
208 KB to Edith Willick, c/o West German Embassy, Preto ia, South African Republic, 12 December 1966, 
ACDP K047/3.  Regarding Birrenbach’s talks with Foreign Minister Brandt and Wissenschaftsminister 
Stoltenberg, to whom he presented problems regarding the NPT (with Stoltenberg demonstrating his 
understanding), see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2.  On the essential coincidence of 
Birrenbach’s views with those of Minister Stoltenberg with respect to the “peaceful use of nuclear energy” 
(NPT) but also for Birrenbach’s criticisms of the “not acceptable” cabinet submission [Vorlage] of Foreign 
Minister Brandt regarding the NPT, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP 
K023/1.  On Birrenbach’s disappointment at Foreign Mi ister Brandt’s failure to press hard enough for 
improvements to the NPT, something that he believed undermined the German position, see KB to Prof. 
Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, hiladelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP 
K021/2.  For Birrenbach being in contact with the responsible Referat in the AA with respect to American 
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On top of this, the accession to power of the Social-Liberal government coalition 
under Willy Brandt in 1969 radically altered Birrenbach’s relationship to the Chancellery 
and, consequently, the framework of his activities.  Despite the fact that Brandt was a 
fellow Atlanticist, as was his successor Helmut Schmidt, Birrenbach’s advice would 
never again be as welcome in the Chancellery as it had been under Erhard and 
Kiesinger.209  Unlike his idol John McCloy, Birrenbach never truly succeeded in 
becoming a “Wise Man” whose counsel was valued through ut the political spectrum.  
Largely due to this change in governing coalition, Birrenbach’s political influence within 
the executive declined precipitously from the late 1960s onward.  Birrenbach found 
himself invited less and less to the state receptions f r heads of government and other 
prominent foreign figures, a fact not merely symbolic but also substantive and about 
which he complained as hindering his ability to obtain an accurate impression of such 
visitors.210  Beyond Birrenbach’s weak personal relations with the SPD Chancelleries, the 
Union’s overall loss of power in 1969 dealt a significant blow to his influence and left 
him with a new sense of impotence.  Birrenbach seethed as the government, presenting 
                                                                                                                                      
foreign policy prior to his trip to Washington, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, 
to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP 
K026/1.  On Birrenbach receiving insight in December 1965 from Richard Balken (AA), thanks to Foreign 
Minister Schroeder, into the memo that the Auswärtige Amt had prepared on the control of nuclear weapons 
for the Chancellor’s upcoming visit to Washington in that month (Birrenbach read the paper in Balkan’s 
presence) and offering advice on that memo, see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 
December 1965, ACDP K117/1.  For Birrenbach giving advice, based on the experiences of his last trip to 
the United States in this context, to Carstens regarding the content of the aide-mémoire prepared by the AA 
for Erhard’s visit of December 1965 for the American President (MLF), see again KB to State Secretary 
Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/ .  
209 For Birrenbach’s earlier assessment of Brandt as one of the members of the moderate wing of the SPD, 
see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.   
210 On Birrenbach having been invited at times to Chancellor Adenauer’s functions, which often enabled 
him to meet with foreign visitors, for instance an American delegation at an Adenauer meal in June 1962, 
see KB to Erich Straetling, West German Embassy, Washington DC, 22 June 1962, ACDP K157/1.  
Likewise, with Kiesinger in power, Birrenbach was al o invited to important functions, for instance to an 
intimate dinner given for President Nixon (on a trip to the Federal Republic, including Bonn and Berlin) in 
Bonn in the Bundeskanzleramt in February 1969 in which only ten German and eight American 
personalities took part (KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, 
confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2).   
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itself as the monolithic voice of a secure majority in the Federal Republic (particularly 
with respect to the Ostverträge), prematurely signed and ratified unsatisfactory treaties 
(Ostverträge and NPT) while ignoring his and his party’s efforts to improve them by 
clearing up open points and securing reasonable interpretations.  As Birrenbach put it to 
some of his American contacts, “since we are only the opposition and in a minority, we 
cannot force the government to do what they do not want to do.”211  Therefore, 1969 
marked a key date in Birrenbach’s political career, with the election defeat of 1972 only 
confirming this particular aspect of his declining fluence that had first emerged three 
years earlier. 
However, Birrenbach’s declining influence can be traced not only to shifts in his 
relationship with the country’s executive or to hisparty’s exile from power but also to an 
important change in another element of the framework in which he operated: his relations 
with his own party and Fraktion.  The straining of Birrenbach’s relationships with the 
                                                
211 For this quote, expressed specifically with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see KB to Robert 
Bowie, 10 December 1973, ACDP K160/2.  On all this, including Birrenbach’s outsider criticism of the 
Brandt government with respect to its treatment of the NPT and the Ostpolitik, see KB to Prof. Eugene 
Rostow, Vice Chairman, The Atlantic Council of the United States of America, Washington DC, 14 
September 1973, ACDP K211/2.  For Birrenbach depicting his concerns to Brandt in November 1969 
regarding the NPT, see KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1.  On the 
Brandt government’s success in having “shammed” [vorgespiegelt] the world into believing it had a secure 
domestic majority with regard to its Ostpolitik, see KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 10 April 1972, ACDP K068/1.  
On Birrenbach’s frustration regarding the government’s failure to inform or consult the opposition about 
the details and the government’s actions with respect to the ongoing negotiations about a Berlin 
Agreement, see KB Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2 and 
KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 
1972, ACDP K026/1.  For Birrenbach’s efforts to explain in his September 1972 talk with Chayes the 
Ostpolitik of a future CDU government, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman 
of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1.  On Birrenbach’s efforts to call the attention 
of “Mr. K.” and “Mr. S.” in the White House (probably Kissinger and James Sutterlin) and several officials 
in the State Department to the fact that the federal government since the spring of 1972 disposed of no 
majority in the Bundestag and, following the dissolution of the Bundestag, was merely a 
“geschäftsführende government” and to the undemocratic way (“contradicting all democratic principles”) 
in which an incoming government would be prejudiced by the current government’s “completely 
irresponsible” conclusion of international treaties, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, 
Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 
1972, ACDP K026/1.   
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leaders of the party and Fraktion and the concomitant rapid decline of his influence 
within the party became most noticeable in the wake of the debates surrounding the 
Ostpolitik in the spring of 1972.  Indeed his central role in the ultimately successful 
efforts during these debates to bring the party to abstain from voting on, rather than 
approving, the Ostverträge proved to be pivotal in hastening this process and determining 
his fate within the party.  Fearing an irreversible split of the party into two parts, a 
disaster that would render it impotent as a political force in the future, Birrenbach, 
working together with Walter Hallstein and Werner Marx, saw to it at the crucial moment 
that the party largely abstained.  As he proudly put it, “I am one of the three fathers of 
this idea.”212 
Whatever Birrenbach’s satisfaction in achieving this end, his relationship with the 
leaders in the Unionsfraktion took a turn for the worse in the wake of these events.  Prior 
to this, Rainer Barzel, chairman of the Fraktion, had asked Birrenbach for his opinions on 
various matters, though Birrenbach also complained that he had not usually acted on 
them.213  Now, Birrenbach’s relations with Barzel, who had been pushing in spring 1972 
                                                
212 KB to Lord Gladwyn, 20 May 1972, ACDP K068/1.  Birrenbach based his assessment on the situation 
within the Union, including its party Gremien and the parliamentary group.  Birrenbach’s own rejection of 
the Ostverträge was based on his assessment that certain elements within the party were overestimating the 
value of the resolution proposed by the SPD-FDP government (including the Union’s top party committee, 
the Bundesvorstand, which voted “yes” to the treaties).  Birrenbach had a distinct tendency to detect, 
perhaps to overestimate, the likelihood of party divisions.  For Birrenbach’s concern on an earlier occasion 
about the party’s unity, this time with respect to European issues such as integration, see KB to 
Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.   
213 For instance, earlier on, Birrenbach had provided Barzel with his judgment of successive NPT drafts 
(including those of 24 August 1967 and 18 January 1968), noting improvements but also continuing to 
harbor serious objections and seeking further improvements through changes to the draft itself or through 
supplementary measures, regulations and interpretations.  Birrenbach’s continuing to wield some measure 
of influence within the party during the early 1970s is evidenced, for instance, by his “special mission ” 
abroad in 1971-72, his regular participation in the Ostkommision and his prominent role in the debates 
regarding the Ostpolitik and the NPT.  On Barzel specifically asking Birrenbach for his opinion at times on 
certain matters, including in connection with speeches, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer 
Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Bonn, 15 October 1971, ACDP K024/1.  For Barzel’s request that 
Birrenbach dictate several sentences for a press conference intended for the Western allies, see KB, dictated 
by phone, Hotel Weidmannsruh, Braunlage/Harz, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU and 
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with apparently considerable success for the party to approve the Ostverträge, lay in 
ruins.214  As one of the architects of the policy of abstention and always bereft of a party 
Macht, Birrenbach’s influence declined even further than itherto as the Union’s election 
defeat later in November 1972 was blamed by many on the party’s failure to take a stand, 
for or against, on the Ostverträge.  Although Barzel soon departed, Birrenbach found that
his successors Karl Carstens (Chairman of the Fraktion) and Helmut Kohl (Chairman of 
the CDU) barely had any time for him and were not par icularly interested in his opinions 
on the issues of the day, whether foreign policy or matters like Mitbestimmung.215  With 
respect to the latter issue, Birrenbach, who given his role in the Wirtschaft considered 
himself the most experienced person in this regard in the Fraktion, felt particularly 
slighted that he was not placed on any of the relevant commissions addressing that issue 
at the time.216  During this period and beyond, Birrenbach, feeling increasingly 
powerless, stooped to painfully undignified depths to explicitly remind others of his still 
extant connections in the United States, while uninte tionally serving primarily to reveal 
                                                                                                                                      
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 22 March 1972, ACDP K026/1.  Finally, for Barzel sti l asking 
Birrenbach for his assessment of a paper by Heinrich Böx (CDU) about the relationship of the CDU to the
political groupings in France, see KB, MdB, dictated by phone from Oberstdorf, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, 
Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 22 August 1972, ACDP K026/1.    
214 In spring 1972, prior to the intervention of Birrenbach, Marx and Hallstein and with the final vote fast 
approaching, Barzel had even achieved that the Union’s t p party committee, the Bundesvorstand, voted to 
approve the treaties thanks to the resolution proposed by the government.   
215 Birrenbach welcomed the change in the party leadership, for although Carstens was “harder” than 
Barzel, “a more constructive rethinking [Neuüberdenkung] of our position” in the changed situation would 
be possible while avoiding the “progressivism [Progressivität] of certain people” like Walther Leisler Kiep 
(KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP 
K028/1).  
216 For Birrenbach’s earlier complaints that the circle within the CDU dealing with Mitbestimmung had not 
been hitherto large enough, all the more galling to him as he had long (“concrete”, “not theoretical”) 
experiences, “stretching over almost two decades,” in mitbestimmten firms, see KB, MdB, Düsseldorf, 
Berliner Allee 33, to Thomas Ruf, MdB, Chairman of the Program Commission of the CDU on the 
Mitbestimmung Question, 8 October 1970, ACDP K025/1.   
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his despair about his current plight.217  While Birrenbach remained in the Bundestag until 
1976, his role on the West German political stage was not a major one after 1972.   
F. Distinctive Elements of Birrenbach’s Political Activity 
Birrenbach’s busy everyday existence was largely occupied with fulfilling his 
duties in his various professions.  At the Thyssen firm and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, his 
activity consisted primarily of intermittent meetings and the necessary, often intense, 
preparation for them.218  In addition to his house and his business office, both located in 
Düsseldorf, Birrenbach maintained a political office n the Bundeshaus in Bonn, where he 
generally dealt with his political affairs.  Birrenbach traveled between the two cities by 
car, a journey eased somewhat by the services of a driver.  In the Bundestag, Birrenbach 
participated in many of the standard elements of parliamentary life: committee and 
plenary meetings, reports and speeches, discussions and debates, question periods, 
resolutions, votes and the like.219  However, aside from these typical affairs, Birrenbach 
also engaged in a number of distinctive political activities that ultimately formed key 
elements of and lent a particular character to his political existence.  One such activity 
was his regular communication with his contacts both at home and abroad.  Especially 
noteworthy in this regard was his prolific writing of letters, each of which was dispatched 
                                                
217 For Birrenbach reminding others of the alleged state of his contacts in the US, see for instance KB to Dr. 
Dieter Spethmann, Chairman of the Vorstand of the ATH AG, Düsseldorf, August Thyssen Straße 1, 
personal-confidential, 1 July 1974, ACDP K184/1.  For Birrenbach passing on to German personalities 
simple “thank you” letters and letters expressing a desire to see him from his American contacts, see for 
example Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, to Kurt, 28 July 1975, KB cc Carstens, Marx and Trebesch, 
ACDP K155/1. 
218 On Birrenbach’s professional burdens and on November as a particularly difficult month due to 
Aufsichtsrat meetings and member assemblies at home and abroad, see KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 
1977, ACDP K185/2.   
219 Birrenbach’s key Bundestag speeches included those of 12 November 1969 (in the ame of the 
CDU/CSU-Fraktion in the NPT debate) and of 29 January 1971 (on the attitude of the West towards the 
Ostpolitik).  For an example of interpellations [Anfragen] composed by Birrenbach, here about the 
Ostpolitik, see KB to West German Ambassador Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, 
ACDP K025/1. 
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to one or more contacts.  Usually dictated by Birrenbach and typed up by a secretary, 
these missives, aside from a few polite niceties, gnerally avoided “fluff,” instead coming 
to the point and, often rather dryly, addressing the major issues at hand.220  In this 
correspondence, Birrenbach aimed to strike a balance between frankness and sincerity, 
while remaining tactful and not offending the national feelings of others.221 
Birrenbach’s trips abroad, particularly to the United States, represented another 
extraordinary element of his political activity.  These trips included the five 
Sondermissionen that he carried out from 1961 to 1972, primarily to the United States 
(October 1961, November 1965, September 1968, Fall 1971-Spring 1972) but also to 
Israel (three separate trips, March-April 1965) andin Western Europe (Fall 1971-Spring 
1972).222  These missions were undertaken, at least ostensibly, at the behest of the 
                                                
220 It appears these letters were dictated by Birrenbach in German, and, if necessary, translated by an 
assistant into the necessary foreign language, usually English, sometimes French.  In general this process 
seems to have worked quite well, although there were consistent, sometimes substantive, errors in 
translation, for instance the repeated rendering of the German “sensibel” into the English “sensible,” rather 
than its proper translation as “sensitive,” as well as the use of “interfere” instead of “intervene.”   
221 However, Birrenbach could indeed be blunt and tactless at times in his letters.  See, for instance, KB to 
Frau Prof. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1.  On Birrenbach’s 
efforts to demonstrate understanding for American policies, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, 
University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  For 
Birrenbach’s professed, though certainly not always practiced, belief that, as a foreigner, he did not have 
the right to pass judgement on personalities and events in the United States, see KB to John McCloy, 29 
June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  For Birrenbach’s stress on the need to express criticism or objections in “polite 
form” when dealing with talk partners so as to maintain good links (here on his September 1972 talk with
the American Chayes), see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-
Fraktion, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1. 
222 Birrenbach’s Ostpolitik mission of 1971-72 involved visits to no less than eight Western capitals.  His 
earlier mission to Israel encompassed meetings in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv and involved negotiations with 
the Israeli government, including Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Foreign Minister Golda Meir.  After the 
carrying out of this Israel mission, Birrenbach maint ned contacts with leading Israeli personalities, 
according to him at least up to, but seemingly beyond, the middle of the 1970s (KB to Mayor of Jerusalem 
Teddy Kollek, 25 November 1985, ACDP K094/1).  Following his Israel mission, Birrenbach also served 
at times as an advisor for the BDI (Cologne) on Israel.  For example, in 1971, Birrenbach produced a report 
for the BDI on foreign investment in Israel, in whic  he concluded that Israel enjoyed the suitable 
preconditions for foreign investment and that, on the basis of the advantages offered by that country, the 
West German side should find ways and means to promote Israeli exports (KB Report, “Zur Förderung 
ausländischer Investionen in Israel,” 1 July 1971, ACDP K096/1).  In March 1976, Birrenbach 
accompanied a delegation of the BDI led by its president (and Thyssen giant), Hans-Günther Sohl, on a 
one-week stay in Israel at the invitation of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and with the support of the West 
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government and with the approval of the respective Chancellors, with the exception of 
the mission of 1971-72, which was embarked upon in the name of Birrenbach’s party and 
with Barzel’s approval.223  On these Sondermissionen, Birrenbach met principally with 
key personalities in government, the governmental bureaucracy and the major political 
parties in the particular countries.224  Contrary to some misconceptions, these missions 
usually did not entail negotiations per se rather were intended to ascertain foreign views 
                                                                                                                                      
German government (the first visit of an expert group f the BDI had occurred in 1966).  This trip took 
place against the backdrop of closer Israeli ties to the EEC, including the conclusion of an EEC-Israeli fr e 
trade agreement.  The delegation met with personalities of the Israeli government and “Wirtschaft” on 
themes such as the current situation and development of the Israeli economy, Israeli proposals for future 
cooperation, the Israeli desire for a contribution of West German industry to the restructuring of the 
country’s economy, and the Israeli interest in increased direct investment in industry and tourism on the 
part of the German Wirtschaft.  The delegation conducted its talks in close coordination with the West 
German embassy.  Talk partners of the delegation primarily included Prime Minister Rabin and a number 
of other relevant government ministers and officials; the presidents of the major Israeli economic 
organizations; individuals from the chemical, aircraft and “Gewerkschaftsunternehmen”  branches; and the 
president of the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot.  Aside from the plenary meetings, some 
individual members of the delegation also held separate meetings on the branch or firm level.  Not least due 
to the customs preferences granted to Israel for the American market and the free trade agreement with the 
EEC, both sides claimed to see the future possibility for expanded German-Israeli trade and for production 
within Israel (Report of the Israel Delegation of the BDI, March 1976, ACDP K096/2).     
223 While Birrenbach accurately stressed that these mission  were undertaken at the behest of (or, 
alternatively, were for or ultimately given by; “im Auftrag von”) the respective Chancellors (Adenauer, 
Erhard and Kiesinger) or party leaders (Barzel in the case of the Ostpolitik mission of 1971-2), in fact it 
was often Birrenbach himself who provided the initiat ve, who first suggested and promoted the utility of 
such undertakings, for instance to Foreign Minister Brentano in 1961, and occasionally even prodded thse 
leaders, particularly Barzel in 1971-72, into giving him their blessing for such endeavors.   
224 The reference here to the governmental bureaucracy includes, for instance, the US State Department.  
Birrenbach’s November 1965 and September 1968 mission  were to Washington DC.  On his mission to 
the United States of November 1965, Birrenbach had talks (the key one on Monday, 8 November) with 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, National Security Advisor 
McGeorge Bundy, Under Secretary of State George Ball, and Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs John Leddy (the leader of the European Section in the State Department).  During this mission, he 
also saw Paul Nitze (Secretary of the Navy) and John McNaughton (Nitze’s successor as Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) as well as his most important colleagues.  On 
Birrenbach’s September 1968 mission to the United States, he spoke with Secretary of State Rusk, 
Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Ambassador to the UN George Ball, the heads of the State 
Department, even with President Johnson.  Later, on his visit to Paris as part of his extended Ostpolitik 
mission of 1971-72, Birrenbach conducted talks with s gnificant personalities from a variety of French 
political groupings: Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann (UDR); Jean Lecanuet (President of the CD and 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee) and his key colleagues (including some in the 
parliament), with some of whom Birrenbach was in correspondence; General Secretary Jean Poudevigne 
(PDM); General Secretary Michel Poniatowski (RI) (Birrenbach had an invitation to see Giscard d’Estaing 
but could not accept since he had to leave Paris, the talk with Poniatowski serving as something of a 
substitute); and General Secretary René Tomasini (UDR).  Birrenbach found the UDR, the group of the 
Rue de Lille, “difficult.”   
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on particularly urgent international issues and situat ons while expressing German views 
and concerns on the same.  The central matters addressed included: the Berlin Wall 
(October 1961); nuclear issues and control, primarily in the context of the MLF 
(November 1965); the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (September 
1968); and the Brandt Ostpolitik (Spring 1971-Fall 1972).225  Again, the lone exception to 
this characterization was Birrenbach’s mission to Israel, in which he actually negotiated, 
within strict limits imposed on him by the government, and thus helped pave the way for 
the establishment of West German-Israeli diplomatic relations and the simultaneous 
replacement of German weapons supplies by other forms f aid.226  While not always 
                                                
225 The occasional misconceptions regarding the nature of these missions among some observers in the 
Anglo-Saxon world was perhaps due to the ambiguity of the German word Verhandlungen when translated 
into English.  On his mission of November 1965, Birrenbach consulted with members of the American 
administration and State Department to sound out the remaining solutions with respect to nuclear question  
(Birrenbach arguing, for instance, in favor of the Federal Republic’s participation in all phases of the
nuclear decision making process) and thus to lay the groundwork for progress in this area in advance of 
Chancellor Erhard’s trip in December.  For Birrenbach himself actually focusing during his stay in 
Washington DC in November 1965 not on the MLF nor the ANF but rather on “a different type of weapon 
system that already existed,” see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  
Birrenbach’s September 1968 mission stemmed from the Warsaw Pact intervention in Prague and aimed at 
a discussion with “the responsible American statesmen” about a number of “widespread” fears.  In 
particular, there was concern that the Warsaw Pact could again carry out a similar operation from a 
standstill in a conflict over Berlin or in order to s lve domestic political tensions within the East Bloc 
through a “blitz attack” on the northern flank of NATO and the Federal Republic.  Also, there were 
concerns that the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia might elsewhere trigger “an explosive 
development à la Hungary,” for instance in Poland, which could lead to a situation that was “unpredictable 
[unübersehbar]” (KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2).  Repeatedly, Birrenbach used 
these special missions to prod the Americans towards firm action and an increased engagement in Europe, 
especially on behalf of the Federal Republic, and to facilitate what he considered progress in German-
American relations.  On the issue of nuclear control, see Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the 
Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975) and Helga Haftendorn, NATO 
and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966-67 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).   
226 On Birrenbach having received instructions regarding the Israel negotiations from the AA in Bonn 
(State Secretary Rolf Lahr) and having also telegraphed detailed reports (with the accompanying Rolf Pauls 
of the AA) back to Bonn, see KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, 24 
March 1966, regarding German-Israeli negotiations about economic aid, ACDP K017/1 and KB, 
Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to State Secretary RolfLahr, AA, Bonn, confidential (cc: Amb. Pauls), 7 
March 1966, ACDP K017/1.  For an example of Birrenbach’s inability to make personal commitments in 
the context of his Israel negotiations and his need th refore to interrupt the negotiations to return to the 
Federal Republic, see KB to Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, 25 November 1985, ACDP K094/1.  Even 
prior to his Israel mission, Birrenbach believed that the Federal Republic should carry out an equal policy, 
namely not to supply weapons or similar aid at all, with respect to the entire area in the Middle East tha  
found itself at war, including Israel (KB to Prof D. Helmut Gollwitzer, DD, Berlin, 14 December 1964, 
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pleased with his findings or the ultimate outcomes, Birrenbach was undeniably effective 
in these Sondermissionen.227  Of all his activities, these episodes garnered him t e most 
public attention during his career, and their centrality in his own mind is reflected in that 
his detailed accounts of them formed the core of his later memoirs.228  
More frequent, though less celebrated, were Birrenbach’s regular trips to the 
United States, another key element of his political activity.  Birrenbach undertook his 
                                                                                                                                      
ACDP K014/2).  On German-Jewish relations, see Michael Wolffsohn, Eternal Guilt?  Forty Years of 
German-Jewish-Israeli Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Inge D utschkron, Bonn 
and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition (Philadelphia: Chilton, 1970); and Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: 
The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).   
227 For instance, Birrenbach was ultimately disappointed with the results of Chancellor Erhard’s visit to 
President Johnson in December 1965.  Ignoring his advice, the German government had insisted on a pure 
“Eigentum solution,” something that appeared unrealistic to Birrenbach.  At least in part an effort to satisfy 
the Federal Republic after the failure of an MLF, the Nuclear Planning Group, while “significant 
[beachtlich] and interesting,” was less than that for which Birrenbach had hoped (KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, 
Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACP K184/1).  Birrenbach was also dismayed, 
though not surprised, with his findings in Fall 197-Spring 1972 regarding the attitudes of the Western 
nations towards the Ostpolitik.  For Birrenbach already in December 1970 having expressed “our deep 
disappointment at the attitude of the West, particularly in Europe, vis-à-vis the policy [Ostpolitik] of the 
Federal Republic,” see KB to Dean Acheson, 17 February 1971, ACDP K155/3.  In the wake of 
Birrenbach’s negotiations in Israel, discrepancies emerged between the Israeli and Birrenbach accounts f 
what exactly had been agreed upon in certain instances, particularly what aid Birrenbach had or had not 
promised Israel.  These discrepancies, which created some confusion in the Auswärtigen Amt, revolved 
around the disputed authenticity of protocols presented by the Israelis which they, including Amb. Asher 
Ben-Natan, insisted were accurate but which Birrenbach had hitherto neither seen nor initialled and claimed 
gave a false or inaccurate account of his statements.  According to Birrenbach, his account had been 
confirmed over the phone by Amb. Rolf Pauls, who had accompanied him on his mission (KB, Düsseldorf, 
Königsallee 74, to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, 24 March 1966, regarding German-Israeli 
negotiations about economic aid, ACDP K017/1 and KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to State Secretary 
Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, confidential, (cc Amb. Pauls), 7 March 1966, ACDP K017/1).  On Birrenbach’s 
assessment of his Israel mission as a success, citing in particular the treaty between the Federal Republic 
and Israel later in 1965 that contained his proposal t  the Israelis during his mission of a replacement of 
weapon supplies by economic aid and the assumption by the American government, two months after the 
conclusion of his negotiations, of the weapons supplies to Israel (without Birrenbach’s name being 
mentioned), see KB to Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, 25 November 1985, ACDP K094/1.  When 
Birrenbach had first arrived in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Foreign Minister Golda Meir 
had insisted on the carrying out of the weapons payments by the Federal Republic.  However, in the end,
Eshkol and Meir thanked Birrenbach for his conduct of the negotiations by giving him a clay jug from the 
Valley of the Kings dating from the 6th century B.C.  For private positive assessments of Birrenbach’s key 
meeting (8 November 1965) and of Birrenbach’s effectiv  performance in presenting the West German 
standpoint in that meeting on his Sondermission of November 1965 from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and 
Undersecretary of State George Ball, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  
On Birrenbach’s satisfaction with his contribution t  developments through his Sondermission of 
September 1968, see KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2.     
228 Kurt Birrenbach, Meine Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik 
(Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1984). 
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first such trip in 1959, and throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s these visits, each 
lasting usually one to two weeks, were scheduled for once or twice a year.  Given the 
difficulty of squeezing such a stay into his crowded schedule, Birrenbach often combined 
them with his participation in various Atlanticist functions, for instance undertaking his 
initial 1959 trip in conjunction with his attendance at that year’s NATO Parliamentarians 
Conference in Washington.229  While on these trips, Birrenbach met for talks with crucial 
high-level American personalities influential in the pressing issues of European-
American relations: figures in the White House (including the President on several 
occasions); cabinet; government bureaucracy; Congress; non-governmental foreign 
policy institutions (e.g. Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institution); press; and a 
number of “independent” personalities.230  Birrenbach also met with West German 
representatives located in the United States, including the personnel at the German 
                                                
229 On the difficulty of fitting such a trip into his schedule, see KB to Erich Straetling, Washington DC, 8 
May 1962, ACDP K157/1.  Other  examples of Birrenbach combining attendance at Atlanticist functions 
with his America trips and political talks include his attendance at the Bilderberg Conference in 
Williamsburg in 1964; his participation in the German-American Conference in the United States in Spring 
1967; and his “Blitzreise” of several days (planned for a total of three days) to the United States in 
connection with the Trilateral Commission ExComm meeting of December 1974 in Washington DC. 
230 As an example of talks with the US President, Birrenbach had a meeting with Nixon on his Blitzreise to 
Washington in the first week of February 1969.  This trip, with which Birrenbach pronounced himself 
“very satisfied,” came about as a result of a rather lengthy memo he had sent to soon-to-be National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in the middle of December 1968 (KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, 
University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2).  Within the 
government bureaucracy, Birrenbach especially took up contact with personalities in the State Departmen .  
Birrenbach’s trip to the United States of Spring 1967 provides a list of conversation partners (among 
others) typical for Birrenbach on such visits: Secreta y of State Dean Rusk; Undersecretary of State Eugene 
Rostow; National Security Advisor Walt Rostow; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John 
Leddy; Deputy Director of the US ACDA Adrian Fischer (representing the absent director, William 
Foster); Samuel De Palma (Foster’s closest colleagu in the ACDA); Prof. Robert Bowie (serving as a 
consultant at the time in the State Department); Alfred Puhan (Director of the State Department’s Office of 
German Affairs); Henry Owen (Chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council); Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara; John McNaughton (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs); and Francis Bator (Deputy National Security Advisor, “White House Europe-Referent”).  For 
Birrenbach discussing current American foreign policy in Washington with National Security Advisor 
Henry Kissinger; Assistant Secretary of State for Eu opean Affairs Walter Stoessel (Martin Hillenbrand’s 
successor); and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Russell Fessenden, see KB, 
dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of 
CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.   
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embassy (Washington) and consulate (New York, UN), as well as with those Germans 
representing international organizations, such as the deputy chief of the delegation of the 
Commission of the European Communities in Washingto, Curt Heidenreich.231  Many 
of the Americans and Germans that Birrenbach held talks with were already regular 
contacts, which naturally facilitated the entire process.  As already noted, these trips 
centered on Washington and New York City.  Symbolic f the private element in 
German-American relations, the latter was a valuable destination not only because of the 
location of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Council on Germany and the 
West German consulate but also the presence of so many “inners and outers” currently 
working in the private sector.232   
To carry out these regular trips to the United States, Birrenbach usually relied on 
considerable organizational and logistical assistance.  To some extent, this support was 
provided by private sources.  In particular, presidnt Günther Drechsler and the other 
personnel of the Thyssen/Stahlunion office, located in the Empire State Building, 
considerably aided Birrenbach, particularly with resp ct to his time in New York City.233  
However, Birrenbach also received significant organiz tional and logistical assistance 
from a number of governmental sources.  These included the personnel of the West 
German embassy in Washington DC and the West German government in Bonn, among 
them important figures in the Auswärtigen Amt and other relevant ministries.234  In 
                                                
231 The West German representatives he met with included the Ambassador and the G sandten for 
particular questions at the United Nations. 
232 Even when technically out of government, figures like John McCloy remained in contact with and 
influential in Washington.   
233 See, for instance, KB to LR Erich Straetling, West German Embassy, Washington DC, 22 October 1963, 
ACDP K157/1.  Thyssen Inc. in New York City was thesubsidiary [Tochtergesellschaft] of the August-
Thyssen-Hütte AG. 
234 Birrenbach also received organizational and logistical assistance from the West German embassy in 
London with respect to his trips to Britain, though he of course made significantly less intense use of that 
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addition to these German sources, a number of American sources provided Birrenbach 
with valuable logistical and organizational support, including the State Department in 
Washington DC and the American embassy in Bonn.  Thanks to this organizational 
network, both German and American, private and public, Birrenbach received essential 
assistance and advice in regards to his trips, his typ cally intensive preparation for them, 
determining the most auspicious timing for such ventures, briefings about the current 
situation, selecting and booking lodgings, identifying suitable and available talk partners 
in the variety of relevant governmental and non-governmental fields, actually arranging 
appointments with key personalities, carrying out necessary communications (for 
instance via telex), and the payment of debts and expenses incurred.235  Without such 
logistical support, Birrenbach’s trips to the United States would have been considerably 
                                                                                                                                      
embassy in this regard than the American one.  Birrenbach notified the German embassies about his trips 
and informed them about the talks he carried out on them.  This was, for instance, the case with regard to 
Ambassador von Herwarth and Birrenbach’s trip to London in November 1958, during which he talked 
with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Defence Minister Duncan Sandys and Paymaster General 
Reginald Maudling (KB, Düsseldorf, to Economics Minister Erhard, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP 
K001/2 and KB, Düsseldorf, to Foreign Minister Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2). 
235 For Legationsrat Erich Straetling among the embassy personnel in Washington DC that worked in 
conjunction with Birrenbach to prepare his trips, see KB to Straetling, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1.  On 
Birrenbach postponing his trip to the start of 1965, in part so that he could get an overview of how the new 
administration would look, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International 
Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.  For Birrenbach being received on 8 November 1965 in the 
presence of Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein by Secretary of State Dean Rusk for a joint talk with the 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, in which on the 
American side Under Secretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
John Leddy also took part, see Telegram of the German Embassy in Washington DC (sent by Knappstein 
and Birrenbach) of 9 November 1965 to the Foreign Mi ister (with the request it be presented also to the 
Chancellor and Defense Minister von Hassel), ACDP K090/1.  On the energetic support Birrenbach 
received with respect to his Sondermission to the United States of November 1965, especially in his 
preparation for the visit, from Ambassador Knappstein and Botschaftsrat von Staden and on their 
accompanying him to his key talk of 8 November 1965, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, 
ACDP K090/1.  For Birrenbach sending his reports (both dated 9 November 1965) of the content of his key 
talk (on Monday, 8 November) during his November 1965 Sondermission via the German embassy in 
Washington to Chancellor Erhard, see again KB to Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  The 
German embassy also made a secret report regarding Birrenbach’s special mission in Washington DC in 
November 1965.  For an example of the State Department helping to arrange appointments, see KB to Scott 
George, Director, Office of Central European Affairs, Washington DC, 22 February 1974, ACDP K184/1.  
With respect to assistance from the London embassy regarding trips to Britain, see KB to West German 
Ambassador Karl-Günther von Hase, London, 2 March 1972, ACDP K068/1.    
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more difficult, perhaps even impossible, to orchestrate in the form in which they were 
actually undertaken.   
A number of other factors enabled Birrenbach to carry out his Atlanticist political 
activities in the manner he did.  One of these was the rapid advance in technology, 
particularly in the realms of transportation and communication.  With regard to the 
former, especially the progress achieved in air transport rendered it increasingly possible 
for somebody like Birrenbach to travel rapidly, safely and relatively cheaply back and 
forth across the Atlantic, as well as within Europe.  With respect to communications, the 
telephone enabled him to stay in close touch with his various contacts, particularly those 
currently in Europe, but also those in the United States when he was himself there on a 
visit.  On some particularly urgent occasions, Birrenbach made trans-Atlantic phone calls 
to his contacts in the United States.236  For the transmission of vital information and 
requests in either direction across the Atlantic, the telex machine (telegraph/cable) was 
also extremely useful.  As we have already noted, ra io and television provided 
Birrenbach with access to speeches and news from arund the globe almost 
                                                
236 For trans-Atlantic phone calls both ways between Birrenbach and McCloy, the latter in Connecticut, 
regarding urgent NPT matters, see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2.  Likewise, 
Birrenbach also called McCloy in New York City in 1966 with respect to the NPT.  On Birrenbach calling 
the White House in the first week of May 1972 at Barzel’s request to inform Kissinger of the West German 
opposition’s efforts, together with the government, to find a solution to the Ostpolitik issue “in view of the 
existing stalemate” and “our” intention of rejecting the treaties if the USSR would not agree to a binding 
treaty interpretation in the desired sense (the message was passed on to Kissinger since he was in meetings 
of the Security Council about the “Vietnam crisis”), see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer 
Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 
1972, ACDP K026/1.  For an example of Birrenbach speaking with “people” in the United States via phone 
during a “crisis” situation, see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2.  With respect to 
phone conversations within the United States, Birrenbach might, and did, for instance call at times from 
New York to Robert Strausz-Hupé in Philadelphia.  Within Europe, Birrenbach spoke by phone with his 
West German contacts and with Europeans like Monnet as well as with American contacts currently 
visiting or located in Europe.  For an example of such intra-European communication, see KB Phone 
Conversation with Wilhelm Haferkamp (Brussels), 29 April 1974, ACDP K184/1.   
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instantaneously.237  Even a seemingly prosaic development like the increase in the speed 
and reliability of the postal service proved of great importance to Birrenbach.  Without 
the rapid pace of “technological progress,” Birrenbach’s political activities would have 
been impossible in the form they actually assumed. 
However, beyond such external factors as logistical support and technology, a 
number of Birrenbach’s own internal characteristics also facilitated his political activities.  
For example, his proficiency with foreign languages, especially English but also French, 
proved to be of central importance to the construction of and interaction with his 
international network of contacts.  This was particularly the case given the astonishing 
lack of language skills exhibited by many of the inter ationally minded 
Americans/Anglo-Saxons, including with respect to the German language.238  
Birrenbach’s English was not perfect, and he admitted he could better articulate himself 
in German.239  Furthermore, he was not the only German with some aptitude for English.  
Indeed, if the members of the Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik and the 
Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft (see Chapter 7) are any indication, most Germans 
seriously interested in foreign affairs could at least understand and even speak the 
language to some extent.240  However, the lack of real English language proficien y 
remained a major factor in limiting the pool of Germans, at least in the Bundestag, who 
could effectively engage in Atlanticist activities and serve as contacts with the Anglo-
Saxons.  Birrenbach’s foreign language proficiency and fluency in English was clearly at 
                                                
237 For an example of Birrenbach hearing parts of a de Gaulle press conference over the Paris radio, see 
KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.    
238 This was true even of those who dealt with Germany to a significant extent, such as Christian Herter, 
Eugene Rostow, John McCloy, Robert Bowie, Henry Owen and George Ball. 
239 KB to John Eidenow, Producer, Further Education, BBC, London, 30 May 1974, ACDP K068/1.   
240 KB to Eugene Rostow, 11 September 1974, ACDP K211/2. 
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a level that distinguished him from even many Germans interested in international 
relations and represented a valuable asset in his political efforts.  In fact, it was among 
those qualities that led others to consider him particularly desirable as an interlocutor 
with the Anglo-Saxons, for instance with American visitors to the Federal Republic.  
Beyond his mechanical aptitude with the English language and based on his long 
experience, Birrenbach also believed he possessed a particular faculty for expressing 
himself in a manner understood and appreciated by foreigners, particularly Americans, 
one that eschewed generalities in favor of concrete, sachlichen, knowledgeable 
discussion and criticism about particular problems and issues.241   
Another significant asset in Birrenbach’s efforts to construct and utilize his 
international network of contacts, a virtue he repeatedly and explicitly stressed, was his 
vaunted discretion.  These contacts, American and otherwise, could be confident that the 
information and opinions they provided him would be treated and utilized, in whatever 
form, in a proper and effective manner.  This entailed a number of standard practices on 
Birrenbach’s part.  For instance, he passed on the information from his contacts in only 
limited quantities and dealt very circumspectly with direct quotations from these sources, 
in fact rarely quoting them at all.  If he did quote a contact, he either did not cite the 
specific source, or, if explicitly authorized, did so in the most restrictive fashion possible.  
Birrenbach’s treatment of his confidential reports about his Amerikareisen was marked 
by the same discretion.  As we shall see, these reports, like his letters, received only 
                                                
241 As Birrenbach put it, “[y]ou don’t get anywhere speaking with the Americans or French about 
‘generalities.’  However, if you speak about particular problems and understand something about them, 
then you immediately awaken interest…  I know the Americans now for thirty years and believe to be able 
to handle them” (KB to State Secretary a.D. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2).  
On the United States’ ability to bear and indeed its demand for a “sachliche Kritik,” see KB to Karl 
Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 Decembr 1963, ACDP K014/2.   
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limited distribution.242  Sensitive information was often omitted, even more so in the 
versions presented for discussion to the Fraktion, the AKV and other party institutions.243  
As some compensation, Birrenbach supplemented his reports with oral commentaries to 
an even smaller circle of select individuals, in part to convey the information he deemed 
too sensitive for a broader audience or even for print.244  Birrenbach’s emphasis on 
discretion extended to a broader effort to ensure that confidential matters of which he had 
particular knowledge, such as details of his Israel mission, remained secret.245  This 
emphasis on discretion might have annoyed some, probably mitigated at times the impact 
of the information he offered and certainly made him a less fruitful source for journalists 
and others inquiring about his endeavors, recent or long ago, but in the overall context of 
his activities, it had definite benefits, marking him out to his contacts as a man who could 
                                                
242 Birrenbach also openly insisted that certain of his letters or particular information contained in them be 
treated confidentially by their recipients, on some occasions even that especially frank letters be destroyed.  
On Birrenbach’s unwillingness to put down on paper th  content of a secret message, regarding the future 
English attitude on nuclear questions, given to himin a private talk by Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
intended for Chancellor Erhard “because of its great confidentiality,” see KB to Erhard, 16 November 
1965, ACDP K090/1.   
243 For Birrenbach drawing up a detailed report, including at the behest of Foreign Minister Gerhard 
Schröder, on German-American relations following a trip to the United States and to be discussed “in our 
parliamentary group and other party institutions,” see KB to Jacob Javits, 7 October 1963, ACDP K157/1. 
244 Similarly, Birrenbach also supplemented some of his letters with oral commentaries to convey sensitive 
information to the recipients.  For Birrenbach even preferring to call Bowie in Boston in the fall, when he 
hoped to visit the US, rather than commit delicate information and thoughts to a letter, see KB to Robert 
Bowie, 29 July 1970, ACDP K160/2.   
245 Long after the fact, Birrenbach refused to divulge information pertaining to the issue of weapons 
supplies to Israel or the crucial connection between his Israel mission and his immediately preceding trip to 
the United States (KB to Berend von Nottbeck, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 17 November 1970, 
ACDP K096/2; KB to Amb. Felix Elieser Shinnar, Tel-Ganim, 20 November 1970, ACDP K096/2; 
Shinnar to KB, 30 November 1970, ACDP K096/2; and KB to Inge Deutschkron, Maariv-Zeitung, Tel-
Aviv, 4 June 1975, ACDP K096/2.  For Birrenbach declining to relay in detail in a written report the 
information of a “secret nature” that he had gathered f om having the protocols of the Ostverträge- 
negotiations read aloud to him in May 1972, see KB Report, 19 May 1972, ACDP K133/1.   
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be trusted.246  This perception of Birrenbach contributed enormously to the construction 
and functioning of his international Atlanticist network of political contacts.247   
G. New Channels of Communication 
Birrenbach’s network of international political contacts represented new and 
significant channels of communication.  While face-to-face meetings and telephone 
conversations played a vital role in this, Birrenbach lso stood with many of his contacts 
in an extensive correspondence consisting of a steady stream of letters as well as 
speeches, studies, publications and other materials.248  The upshot was a constant 
                                                
246 For a journalist’s frustration, see KB to Inge Deutschkron, Maariv-Zeitung, Tel-Aviv, 4 June 1975, 
ACDP K096/2 and KB to Amb. Felix Elieser Shinnar, Tel-Ganim, 20 November 1970, ACDP K096/2. 
247 For an example of Birrenbach’s much lauded discretion, see his important Bundestag speech of 29 
January 1971 on the attitude of the West towards the Ostpolitik.  This speech included uncited critical 
quotations from prominent political personalities in the United States (including John McCloy and Dean 
Acheson), France, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Ntherlands.   
248 The materials comprising this correspondence consisted of not only often detailed letters, but also 
exposés, memos, speeches, diverse publications (e.g. books, newspaper and journal articles), studies, 
reports, papers, and key (at times confidential) documents, in many cases actually written by the 
corresponding personalities themselves.  Those materials that Birrenbach thus acquired and pored over also
included the products generated by individuals based t or published by think tanks like the Hudson 
Institute, FPRI or the Brookings Institution, thanks in part to his American contacts like Walter Hahn nd 
Henry Owen who provided them.  Also while at the State Department (until the late 1960s), Owen was 
among those passing on information and material to Birrenbach such as relevant articles and speeches.  For 
Birrenbach receiving from Rep. Chet Holifield the record of the hearings about “The Agreement for 
Cooperation with NATO for Mutual Defense Purposes,” which Birrenbach “studied with great interest,” 
see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of 
Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1.  On Birrenbach’s reference to the proceedings of “the 
Achtzehner-Konferenz” (the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament) in Geneva based on the US 
ACDA document “International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 
see KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1.  Meanwhile, Birrenbach 
also received copies of speeches by prominent American personalities via the publications of the United 
States Information Service and the US embassy like the “Wireless Bulletin from Washington” and the 
“Amerika-Dienst,” for instance a speech of 19 November 1962 of J. William Fulbright (Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee) on “The Atlantic Partnership and its Responsibility in the World” 
(Amerika-Dienst, 23 November 1962, ACDP K011/1).  For Birrenbach receiving a newspaper article from 
the American Curtis Hoxter, see the undated and otherwise unidentified “German Gaullists Flexing 
Muscles,” by Seymour Freiden, marked “Curtis Hoxter Inc.,” ACDP K014/2.  Curtis Hoxter Inc., located in 
New York City, also sent Birrenbach weekly “confidential reports” on international economic and financi l 
developments.  Naturally, given the already cited language barriers confronting the Anglo-Saxon side, 
Birrenbach preferred to send his materials already translated into English.   
Face-to-face meetings of Birrenbach with his American and other contacts occurred in a variety of 
frameworks, whether during his trips to and meetings i  the United States or in diverse settings in the 
Federal Republic and elsewhere in Europe (e.g. Brussels, Paris), including in the context of the various 
Atlanticist functions.  In addition to promoting actual network expansion, the Atlanticist institutions also 
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exchange of valuable (often “inside”) information, views, opinions, predictions, concerns, 
criticisms, complaints, objections, warnings, questions, answers, ideas, explanations, 
descriptions, proposals, advice (including with respect to potential West German actions 
as well as Birrenbach’s own efforts at home and abro d) and requests for assistance, 
action and the exercise of influence, all on a wide range of themes and issue areas and 
broadly in support of the Atlanticist cause.249  To lend them added weight, Birrenbach 
                                                                                                                                      
formed an essential basis of these ready channels of communication, through which flowed such valuable 
information, simply by their facilitating such face-to-face meetings.  For instance, Birrenbach’s concer s 
regarding the British Labour Party under Harold Wilson (in 1963 after the rejection of a British entrace, 
Birrenbach worried Wilson might steer a course thatwould reduce the enthusiasm in Germany for bringing 
Britain into the EEC) were due in part to his “enorm us difficulties” with a series of Labour deputies n the 
committee “Common Market and Atlantic Affairs” in the Königswinter Conference (KB to Amb. Hasso 
von Etzdorf, London, 28 April 1963, ACDP K181/1).  For Birrenbach’s discussions at the Bilderberg 
Conference of 25-27 March 1966 in Wiesbaden with a number of important personalities (among others the 
Americans John McCloy, George Ball, Robert Bowie and Arthur Dean, as well as the NATO Secretary 
General Manlio Brosio) on the question of the Federal Republic’s nuclear Mitspracherecht in NATO, see 
KB to Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, 4 April 1966, ACDP K117/1.  Likewise, in Spring 1967, 
Birrenbach saw Eugene Rostow at the Bilderberg Confere ce in Cambridge (UK).  On Birrenbach’s 
discussions about burning issues with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns in Paris at a meeting of the 
Atlantic Institute Board of Governors and a following meal given for Luns and the OECD Secretary 
General, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 
July 1972, ACDP K026/1.  For Birrenbach on David Packard’s declarations at the European-American 
Conference of March 1973 in Amsterdam on “the use of nuclear weapons in extremis,” see KB to John 
McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On Birrenbach’s astonishment that at the last German-American 
Conference (in Bonn, 17-19 November), some American experts, particularly Marshall Shulman, had 
claimed that economic cooperation would be a significant lever to influence the Soviet Union, a view 
Birrenbach disagreed with, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP 
K184/1.  For the role of the American embassy in informing Birrenbach when it was possible to meet 
American visitors (e.g. William Tyler), see KB to Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, 
Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.   
Birrenbach also met French contacts at the annual German-French Conferences.  For Birrenbach’s 
interaction, including in private meetings, with French personalities, such as members of the UNR (the 
largest government party as of March 1959) and the “Independents,” including a number of Gaullist 
deputies, Christian de La Malène (a colleague of Michel Debré), and Henri Rocherau (Chairman of the 
European Parliament’s “Trade-Political [Handelspolitischen] Committee”), as well as Ambassador 
François Seydoux and the Gesandte Leduc along with prominent personalities of the Fourth Republic (e.g. 
René Pleven and Maurice Faure) in the framework of these German-French Conferences (here, 1959 in 
Bad Godesberg) and on the periphery of the committee m etings of the European Parliament, see KB to 
Finance Minister Franz Etzel, 4 March 1959, ACDP K001/2.  
249 Among other things, such exchanges enabled the partici nts to clarify, for instance, the undertakings 
(and sometimes admit the mistakes) of their own governments and, for Birrenbach, to depict and explain 
the internal and external situation of the Federal Republic, current events within West Germany, as well as 
the West German attitude, difficulties and problems in general and with respect to particular matters.  
While there was plenty of accord in these interactions, occasional arguments and disagreements also 
existed among the Atlanticists on certain issues, sometimes leading to efforts to “correct” one another’s 
views.  On the need to exert influence on the United States early on, well before the “final” decisions were 
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often presented his perspectives, even when strictly personal, as not merely his own but 
as those of his party or, even more encompassing, as “the German view.”250  Given the 
quality of his contacts, Birrenbach could be reasonbly confident that his views would get 
a proper hearing in the American government’s key dcision-making centers, whether 
directly through the arranging of meetings for him or indirectly through the relaying of 
                                                                                                                                      
made, since “[o]nce a consensus has been established among the different departments” it was difficult if 
not impossible to have one’s arguments considered and to change such a decision “from outside,” see KB 
to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 
10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1 and KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  For 
Birrenbach’s proposals on how best to respond to the Élysée Treaty and the events of January 1963, see 
Edmund Kellogg, US General Consul, to KB, 14 March 1963, ACDP K157/1; KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 
16 March 1963, ACDP K051/1; and Birrenbach, Meine Sondermissionen, pp. 170-72.  On Birrenbach’s 
belief that as important as the German position in the United States was, “I have no illusions that, seen in 
the long view, it will equal that of France,” see KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, 
Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  For McCloy’s tactical advice on Birrenbach’s presentation of 
German aims with respect to a physical participation in an integrated nuclear weapon system (hardware 
solution), advice Birrenbach followed on his November 1965 Sondermission in Washington and passed on 
to the Auswärtigen Amt, see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP 
K117/1.  For Birrenbach on the Federal Republic’s es ential powerlessness to resist and its need to take 
part in even faulty policies like a dubious détente and a universal NPT when especially promoted by the 
United States (as well as other Western powers), see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP 
K117/2; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; and KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 
1968, ACDP K109/2.  For Birrenbach’s “American talk partners” especially entrusting to him during 
Kiesinger’s chancellorship the exploration of the possibilities of “a European Caucus” within NATO and 
for Birrenbach having discussed this question in Brussels and in London with Denis Healy (the “English 
Defense Minister”) and Lord Chalfont (the “Europa-Minister”) (Birrenbach could not keep the 
appointment proposed by the British Foreign Minister and planned to make this up at the start of February), 
see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 19 December 1968, ACDP 
K021/1.  On Birrenbach’s apologies for the “deplorable” European attitude in the Near East conflict, about 
which he felt “ashamed,” and for the reaction of the federal government in the “affair of Bremerhaven,” 
which would have been “unthinkable a few years ago,” see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, 
ACDP K184/2.  On the occasionally useful role of embassies, both German and American, in seeing that 
Birrenbach’s letters reached his contacts “directly,” see Walther Stützle, Persönlicher Referent, Federal 
Minister of Defense and Leader of the Minister’s Office, to Flotillenadmiral Kurt Seizinger, the Defense 
Attaché at the West German Embassy, Washington DC, 17 December 1975, ACDP K155/1.     
250 For Birrenbach presenting “the German standpoint” in his key Sondermission talk of 8 November 1965, 
see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  On Birrenbach’s view being “on the 
whole also the opinion of my country,” see KB to Prof. Guido Goldman, Executive Director, Harvard 
University, West European Studies, 19 March 1974, ACDP K184/1.  For effectively similar formulations, 
see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1.  On another Birrenbach effort to 
buttress his views by pointing to the larger support they enjoyed, in this case in Europe, see KB to Prof. 
Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.  For Birrenbach’s efforts to make 
clear “the attitude of my political friends,” see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, 
ACDP K018/2.  On the other hand, for an instance of Birrenbach claiming to be able to speak only for 
himself (expressing personal opinions), not in the name of his party, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, 
to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 1972, 
ACDP K026/1 and KB Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.   
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these views, sometimes of his actual correspondence.251  Meanwhile, this process 
contributed crucially to his understanding and knowledge of foreign countries (especially 
the United States), personalities, policies, attitudes, events, trends and trans-Atlantic 
relations in general.252  An actual penetration of foreign perspectives into the Federal 
                                                
251 Birrenbach’s contacts abroad existed at or near the highest levels of power and inhabited each issue area
in which he dealt.  Naturally, he attempted to make full use of these transnational connections.  For 
instance, individuals like John McCloy and Chris Emmet (American Council on Germany) were very 
helpful in passing on Birrenbach’s views, letters and reports to the relevant personalities in the key 
decision-making centers.  For Birrenbach, such key centers included the executive branch (especially, of 
course, the President) and the legislative branch (Congress) of government.  In some instances, one ca 
even detect the emergence of a transnational network specifically with respect to particular issues, for 
instance of Americans (with important roles played by Emmet and McCloy) and Germans (like Birrenbach) 
to oppose the NPT or at least to secure modifications.  With regard to Birrenbach’s concerns about the NPT 
drafts (and his own), McCloy spoke at various times with, for example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and 
US ACDA Director William Foster.  For McCloy’s advice to Birrenbach (and thus to the West German 
government) and efforts to ensure that German views and, especially, objections regarding the NPT 
received a hearing from the American government, see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP 
K117/2.  For McCloy urging, in his words, “our people” not to pressure the Federal Republic to sign the 
NPT, see McCloy to KB, 8 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.  On Birrenbach’s expression of desires regarding 
the NPT, see KB to McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.  With respect to arranging meetings, 
Birrenbach’s American contacts helped him secure the agreement of the American administration and the 
relevant government departments to the MLF Sondermission meeting of November 1965.  This was 
likewise the case when Kissinger promised to bring Birrenbach and McGeorge Bundy together on his May 
1962 trip to the United States (KB to Erich Straetling, Washington DC, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1).  On 
the impact of the advice of personalities like Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and George 
Ball with respect to the decision of President Johns n, the crucial decision-making element, regarding the 
American position on the issue of nuclear control, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP 
K090/1.  On one occasion, during Birrenbach’s trip to Washington of February 1969, after he had depictd 
the “German standpoint” regarding the NPT, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger even called for the 
Soviet Ambassador and then presented and supported this standpoint (KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, 
Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1).  For Birrenbach on the “extremely difficult” task of exercising 
influence on the decision-making process of another world power, in this case with respect to the Soviet 
Union and his opposition towards a policy aimed at ividing the Politburo, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, 
Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.   
252 Indispensable to his Atlanticist political activites, Birrenbach’s constant interaction with his contacts 
abroad and the flow of information it facilitated significantly shaped his perspective on the personalities, 
thoughts and views, present and future policies and plans (for instance regarding changes to the American 
NPT draft), mood and tenor, problems and overall situation, political and otherwise, existing especially in 
the United States (though also in other foreign countries), not just with respect to international butalso 
domestic affairs, and helped him to assess potential implications for trans-Atlantic and German-American 
relations and to identify the most advisable West German and personal courses forward.  Thus, with respect 
to his November 1965 Sondermission, Birrenbach’s numerous preliminary conversations with contacts in 
New York and Washington enabled him to “survey the terrain” and to garner some preliminary reactions to 
and suggestions regarding his upcoming proposals.  For instance, Birrenbach first attempted in lengthy 
talks with Dean Acheson, John McCloy, Lauris Norstad and Robert Bowie to ascertain the current 
constellation in American politics with respect to the questions he wished to address.  For Birrenbach’s 
American contacts, such as George Ball and Dean Acheson, offering him insights into the attitudes, 
arguments and probable actions of key American personalities, including Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  For Birrenbach on the 
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Republic is testified to by Birrenbach’s embrace of a number of American concepts, most 
significantly those of Atlantic Community and Atlantic Partnership.253  Finally, 
                                                                                                                                      
views with regard to this November 1965 Sondermission of American figures like John McCloy, Dean 
Acheson, George Ball, J. Robert Schaetzel, Robert Bowie, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge 
Bundy, John Leddy (successor of William Tyler as Asistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), Walt 
Rostow (Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff), John McNaughton (successor of Nitze as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), William Foster (Director of the ACDA), 
Arthur Goldberg (US Ambassador to the UN), Paul Nitze (Secretary of the Navy), and Senators Robert 
Kennedy and Jacob Javits, see again KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  For 
Birrenbach keeping well “up-to-date” about the United States through “a very interesting correspondence 
about all questions” with figures like John McCloy, Dean Acheson, James Conant, Christian Herter, 
William Tyler and Henry Kissinger, see KB to Legationsrat Erich Straetling, 4 April 1963, ACDP K157/1.  
For Birrenbach’s information “from the mouth of one of the highest officials in the State Department,” that 
the ACDA was considering a unilateral, asymmetrical withdrawal of a certain part of the American troops 
stationed on the continent, despite denials to Birrenbach by other American officials (McNaughton), see
KB to Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1.  For advice from American 
contacts regarding German actions, see KB to State ecretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 
1965, ACDP K117/1.  Among the information and materi ls pertaining to international affairs that 
Birrenbach received directly from the embassies of the Western nations in Bonn were the proceedings of 
the US Senate, provided by the American embassy, another aspect of his efforts to keep an eye on 
developments in the Congress and its various committees, including through sources like the Congressional 
Record, especially on particular issues.    
253 Those American elements forming a part of or with access to the transnational Atlanticist political 
network could consistently ensure a hearing for their vi ws.  It was not least in this sense that the Federal 
Republic represented what some political scientists have called a “penetrated system.”  Ambitious designs 
of Atlantic Community and Atlantic Partnership, conepts which came to play a central role in 
Birrenbach’s thought, were essentially foreign imports, having originated particularly in the United States 
and perhaps to some lesser extent with a personality like Monnet.  The notion of Atlantic Community had 
especially been taken up and given credence by the Eisenhower administration, including by individuals 
like Birrenbach’s close contact Secretary of State Christian Herter.  The somewhat more concrete idea of 
Atlantic Partnership was presented by National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy in a speech in Chicago 
in December 1961 and later proposed by President Kenedy in Philadelphia on 4 July 1962, thus making it 
the official policy of the United States.  For Sen. William Fulbright’s address on “The Atlantic Partnership 
and its Responsibility in the World” of 19 November 1962 in the assembly hall of the University of Bonn, 
including a reference to Kennedy’s desire for an “Atlantic Declaration of Interdependence,” see that speech 
of William Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Political Committee of the US Senate, given on 19 
November 1962, in the Amerika Dienst of 23 November 1962, ACDP K011/1.  According to Birrenbach’s 
memo of 19 July 1962, the idea of partnership had also been suggested in the President’s name by 
government officials like George Ball, McGeorge Bundy and Paul Nitze (ACDP K051/1).  On the “offer of 
partnership” between the United States and Europe, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge 
of European Affairs, Department of State, Washingto DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.  For 
Birrenbach’s reference to President Kennedy’s speech in Frankfurt in which he offered a partnership in 
which a united Europe would form a second pillar to that of the United States, see KB to Robert Strausz-
Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.  On the view of the Nixon administration that American-
European relations should develop on the basis of Partnership (the administration’s motto) and the 
American interest in a related European unification ( ncluding Britain and political unity) that would secure 
its strategic “Vorfeld,” see KB Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  On the stress of the Nixon 
administration on the exclusively European matter of the organization of European unity, in contrast to he 
practice of the Kennedy administration, see again KB Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  For 
the United States again offering an Atlantic Partnership to the European states, just as at first in the 1960s, 
in Kissinger’s speech of 23 April 1973, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On the role
of Birrenbach’s American contacts in confirming hisconviction in his “fundamental conception,” see KB
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Birrenbach’s conversance with the attitudes of prominent Americans, and those of other 
foreigners, enhanced his influence and was especially relevant in the Federal Republic, 
where such attitudes were considered of vital importance and at times even became the 
subject of dispute.254   
                                                                                                                                      
to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1.  For Birrenbach’s reference to the “vital importance” in 
the long view of the Monnet line with respect to the development of a European Community that could 
negotiate [“verhandeln”] with the United States on the basis of equality, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, 
Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  Birrenbach also embraced other American ideas like the MLF, 
which he saw as “the only constructive solution of the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe.”  On Georg  
Ball, J. Robert Schaetzel and Robert Bowie as supporters of the Kennedy “Grand Design,” of the MLF 
project and also as supporters of a West German Mitspracherecht in the framework of a nuclear 
organization for reasons of the strengthening of the alliance in general and of the connection of the United 
States to Europe in particular, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. 
254 A knowledge of the attitudes of prominent foreign, especially American, personalities was an especially 
effective political tool for Birrenbach and others in the Federal Republic in foreign policy debates with 
respect to issues such as the Neue Ostpolitik.  For the Brandt government’s method of repeatedly presenting 
foreign declarations, including those of the Western allies, to the German electorate as evidence of their
approval of the content and form of the Ostpolitik, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, 
Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 
1972, ACDP K026/1.  On the “consent” given to the Brandt Ostpolitik by the various Western countries, 
“for different motives,” as one of the reasons for the SPD electoral victory in 1972 and the Union’s lo s of 
its status as the largest party, see KB to William Bass, 20 November 1972, ACDP K068/1.  For Chancellor 
Brandt’s desire to have John McCloy on the same podium when he spoke at the American Council on 
Germany meeting in June 1971 on Unity Day as a means to encourage the idea that McCloy supported the 
Chancellor’s policies, including the new Ostpolitik, see McCloy to KB, 17 May 1971, ACDP K210/1.  
Citing eminent figures such as Dean Acheson, John McCloy and Henry Kissinger, Birrenbach repeatedly 
attempted in the context of the debates over the Neue Ostpolitik to dispel the notion that the Americans 
wholeheartedly approved the Brandt Ostpolitik and that a rejection of this policy would have dire 
consequences for German-American relations.  For Birrenbach’s insistence, based on his talks with 
prominent representatives of the Republican administrat on, including Henry Kissinger in November 1971, 
that despite some assertions to the contrary (e.g. Amb. Rolf Pauls’ “alarming” letter to Birrenbach of1 
February 1972) the American government remained “neutral” with respect to the ratification of the 
Ostverträge and that a non-ratification of the treaties would not fundamentally harm German-American 
relations, which rested on “deeper foundations” that could not be shaken by “a difference over such a 
question,” see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman 
of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1.  On Birrenbach’s efforts to 
inject Acheson’s attitudes towards the Brandt Os politik into the debate, see KB to Dean Acheson, 17 
February 1971, ACDP K155/3.  For Birrenbach’s swift, direct, and, at least to him, successful contradiction 
of Brandt’s claims in the Foreign Affairs Committee in June 1971 that McCloy and President Nixon 
supported his Ostpolitik (Brandt cited private conversations among other things) in which Birrenbach could 
refer not only to Nixon’s World Message of 28 February but also, in the case of McCloy, to remarks made 
in their meeting that same month and, with McCloy’s explicit authorization, remarks made in a phone 
conversation two days earlier (Birrenbach had contacted McCloy in part with the intent of refuting Brandt’s 
repeated claims) and a letter of 2 March from McCloy to Brandt, see McCloy to KB, 17 May 1971, ACDP 
K210/1 and KB to McCloy, 28 June 1971, ACDP K210/1.  While Brandt disagreed, his refraining in at 
least the immediate future from mentioning Nixon or McCloy in this context led Birrenbach to conclude 
that “my remarks have had a positive result” (KB to McCloy, 28 June 1971, ACDP K210/1).   
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Birrenbach worked actively to facilitate this process of penetration among his 
compatriots and thus to accelerate the diffusion of his own impressions from abroad as 
well as of especially American, and other foreign, concepts and ideas.  Birrenbach’s 
efforts in this regard never really flagged, but they were especially intense upon his return 
from trips to the United States.255  Following such visits, Birrenbach laid out his 
experiences in extensive, printed, confidential repo ts and supplementary oral 
commentaries.256  Efforts to inform and influence his German contacts, as well as a larger 
audience, also occurred within the framework of private meetings and conversations, 
letters, conferences, speeches, parliamentary reports and, as we shall see in Chapter 7, 
articles and interviews.257  Thus, Birrenbach strove diligently over the years and with 
                                                
255 This was also true to some extent, like much of what we say here about his trips to the United States,  
upon his return from other destinations abroad, for instance Britain (e.g. in 1960 and as part of his Fall
1971-Spring 1972 Ostpolitik special mission).   
256 For a sample, see ACDP K090/2.  Birrenbach dictated th se reports, which were not intended for the 
general public but which received a limited distribut on to a multi-/non-partisan circle of prominent eli e 
contacts and friends (not limited to members of or sympathizers with the Union), supplemented by the even 
more exclusive aforementioned oral commentary.  Therefore, recipients of Birrenbach’s multiple US 
reports included not only Union personalities, such as Chancellor Kiesinger, Rainer Barzel (as Chairman of 
the CDU and of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion) and Gerhard Schröder (as Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign 
Affairs Committee), but also SPD and SPD-inclined prsonalities like Botschaftsrat I. Kl. Berndt von 
Staden.  Among Union recipients of Birrenbach’s US reports in some form or other were also Gaullist-
minded figures like Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenb rg (unclear whether he received the written version 
or perhaps an oral version in the Foreign Affairs Committee) (KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee, to Guttenberg, 
MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2).  At times, such reports were even drawn up at the explicit 
request of a superior, for instance the Foreign Minister.  For requests for Birrenbach’s views on the 
situation in the United States based on his Amerikareisen and his extensive response, see KB to 
Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.  
Birrenbach also produced similar reports about certain other major trips abroad, for instance Britain in 1960 
and his Ostpolitik special mission of 1971-72.  In his reports about this Sondermission, comprising separate 
trips to the US and the major Western European capitals (France, Netherlands, Italy, Britain, Belgium and 
Luxembourg) during the time from November 1971-April 1972, as well as in his letters of this period (e.g. 
KB to Barzel, 1 May 1972, ACDP K026/1), Birrenbach described the attitude of the Western world with 
respect to the Ostverträge (these Ostpolitik reports are contained in ACDP K172/1).  In all such reports, 
Birrenbach aspired to depict the situation of the country in question as he saw it in depth.   
257 For Birrenbach employing the advice and information he received from his American contacts in formal 
debates, here in the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, see KB to Robert Bowie, 4 October 1973, 
ACDP K160/2.  Also among those items Birrenbach passed around, including to German contacts, were the 
studies of the various Atlanticist institutions.  On Birrenbach encountering some of his German contacts in 
the course of his normal parliamentary and party acivities, here speaking with Foreign Minister Brenta o 
in the Foreign Affairs Committee, see KB to Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2. 
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respect to a wide range of themes to keep his German contacts apprised about the content 
of his contacts with Americans, to analyze the internal and external situation and 
difficulties of the United States, and to make American policy intelligible.  In the process, 
Birrenbach naturally injected his own ideas, perspectiv s, views, analysis, warnings, 
predictions, proposals and advice, including with respect to the best courses of action for 
the Federal Republic.  The general tenor of Birrenbach’s discourse here was marked by 
understanding and sympathy for the United States, its policies and goals.  He constantly 
stressed the desirability of close trans-Atlantic relations, the need to actively support the 
United States and promptly address its concerns, if ecessary by major sacrifices, and 
encouraged a fundamental trust in the American engagement in Europe.258  Birrenbach’s 
audience in this respect included a dizzying and multi-partisan (or non-partisan) array of 
influential figures especially in politics and government but also in the Wirtschaft, the 
                                                
258 Birrenbach’s stress on closer trans-Atlantic links aturally comprised the notion of partnership and the 
necessity in this context for European unification.  On the interests of the United States in a political 
consolidation of Western Europe and the need for the Federal Republic, in its own interest, to take such 
considerations into account, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 
Bonn, Palais Schaumburg, 11 December 1967, ACDP K019/1.  One example of Birrenbach’s push for 
greater German efforts and sacrifices to help bring about healthier European-American relations was his 
emphasis on the achievement of a proper offset agreement and burden-sharing as a means of encouraging 
the maintenance of the currently substantial levels of American troops in Europe and Germany.  On the 
important role of the Federal Republic’s policy in influencing whether and to what extent the certain 
reduction in the American engagement in the world would impact on Europe and thus detrimentally impact 
on the Federal Republic, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berlin Allee 33, to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 
18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1.  For Birrenbach’s assesment that “the physical contact [Tuchfühlung] with 
the United States cannot be close enough in this crit cal time” (a time when the United States was 
undergoing an “agonizing reappraisal” of its policy that would lead to a reduction of its role in the world), 
see again KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1.  On Birrenbach encouraging his 
German contacts to take into account American concerns regarding obstacles to trade in Europe and to 
explore American proposals (for instance in the next GATT round) to avoid negative reactions on the part
of the Americans, see KB Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.  For Birrenbach’s efforts in the 
wake of his November 1965 Sondermission to convince his German contacts of the need for the German 
delegation to the United States (December 1965) to be as clear as had been proposed by Bowie, see KB to
Robert Bowie, 16 November 1965, ACDP K160/2.   
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media, the judiciary, the military, academia, the Atlanticist organizations, as well as other 
leading personalities in public life.259   
Aside from the often subtle influx of American ideas nd perspectives into the 
West German policy-making process, the valuable information Birrenbach received from 
his foreign contacts, information not otherwise readily available even to a German 
parliamentarian, is crucial in explaining the triggering and the course of a variety of his 
striking initiatives.  For instance, indications from his contacts abroad, as well as at home, 
that the Brussels negotiations were on the verge of failure, contrary to optimistic press 
reports, alarmed Birrenbach in December 1962 and spurred on his ultimately futile efforts 
to encourage the crucial political figures, including Adenauer, to promote a British 
entrance into the EEC and to warn them of the consequences of breaking off the 
                                                
259 Birrenbach’s audience in this respect included in Government and Politics: the successive Chancellors 
(Adenauer, Erhard, Kiesinger) and Federal Presidents (Lübke); the relevant cabinet ministers (e.g. Foreign 
Ministers Brentano, Schröder, Brandt and Scheel and Defense Minister Schröder; Bundesminister Krone; 
Economics Minister Erhard; Finance Minister Etzel; Agriculture Minister Ertl (at least in 1973)); the 
governmental bureaucracy (Ministerial Directors andState Secretaries, e.g. Westrick (BKA under Erhard); 
Kneiper (BKA under Kiesinger); Carstens (AA)); Ambass dors and General Consuls in the United States 
and Britain and their subordinates (e.g. Ambassadors Grewe, Pauls; Legationsrat I.Kl. Borchardt); 
competent German personalities at the international rganizations, such as NATO and the EEC/European 
Commission (Hallstein); prominent officers and figures in the political parties, especially the Union 
(including Barzel (Chairman of the Fraktion and also, later on, Chairman of the CDU) and Kohl) but, at 
least sometimes, also the opposition (Erler, the parliamentary leader of the SPD); interested and influential 
members of the Bundestag, including within his own Fraktion (Friedensburg), the AKV, other party 
institutions, and the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee (Schröder, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee); and interested Minister-Presidents and MdL’s in the Ländern.  Wirtschaft: Within the Thyssen 
firm, Birrenbach had co-workers with ties to the United States and to prominent Americans, including E.W. 
Mommsen (brother of Theodor).  Also significant as we have and shall continue to see were Birrenbach’s 
ties to the BDI.  For instance, Birrenbach critiqued and made new proposals for a Vermerk of the BDI on 
the NPT sent to him by Wagner and which the BDI planned to present to the BKA (KB to President Fritz 
Berg, BDI, Cologne, 8 July 1968, ACDP K020/1).  At least once, Birrenbach received assistance in 
distributing his US trip report from Wagner (BDI Hauptgeschäftsführer) (Helmuth Wagner to KB, 21 
October 1963, ACDP K157/1).  Media: particularly members located or interested in the United States (e.g. 
Dr. Jan G. Reiffenberg (FAZ), Bethesda, MD).  Atlanicist Organizations: for example the DGAP.  
Birrenbach’s audience also included (dizzying, as said) prominent foreign contacts and, as explained i the 
next chapter, a wider public opinion.  For a contemporary work on the BDI, see Gerard Braunthal, The 
Federation of German Industry in Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1965). 
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negotiations.260  With respect to the Israel Sondermission of March-April 1965, 
Birrenbach’s preferred “middle solution” and his confidence in its efficacy was based not 
least on his experiences on his preceding trip to the United States, where George Ball and 
other representatives of the American government had also indicated to him that the 
United States would, as Birrenbach suggested, be willing to replace the weapons shortfall 
that might come about.261  Birrenbach’s Sondermission in November 1965 to the United 
States was based on his discussions that summer with several contacts, including Lauris 
Norstad, Dirk Stikker and Robert Bowie, who expressed doubts regarding the feasibility 
of an MLF, in light of increasing international resistance and consequently increasing 
objections in the United States, and called for a re-thinking of nuclear deterrence and of 
                                                
260 Birrenbach’s impressions included what he had gathered in Paris while attending the meetings of the 
Monnet Committee that month (December 1962).  Sometimes with his encouragement, Birrenbach’s 
contacts in the Federal Republic, elsewhere in Western Europe (including Jean Monnet) and the United 
States (including Dean Acheson and John McCloy) also took part in these efforts.  The figures addressed 
included key members of the West German government (including Chancellor Adenauer), the party, the 
Fraktion, and the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee.  This activity occurred not only in the months 
prior to but also in the period after de Gaulle’s rejection of the British entrance in January 1963.  These 
efforts ultimately proved to be in vain insofar as Adenauer, the key figure, remained unmoved.  On the 
other hand, Birrenbach and his friends could claim so e credit for the fact that the majority of the Fraktion 
opposed Adenauer on this question and, at least Birrenbach believed, that a clear majority existed in his 
party for the original European concept and the idea of Atlantic Partnership.   
261 As already indicated, the United States did indeed st p in to replace the resulting weapons shortfall at 
the end of April 1965.  As Birrenbach remarked in the midst of the negotiating process: “Without my visit 
in America, my mission would have been hopeless” (KB to Erich Straetling, Botschaftsrat, 12 March 1965, 
ACDP K187/1).  A bit later, Birrenbach remarked with respect to his Israel mission, “Mr. Ball’s promise to 
help us has been my trump card in these negotiations” (KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State, 
31 March 1965, ACDP K187/1).  With respect to the significant influence of Birrenbach’s contacts in the 
United States on his Israel mission, one can point as well to the fact that Chancellor Erhard’s choice of 
Birrenbach on 23 February 1965 to represent the Fedral Republic, a rare occasion when the government 
appointed somebody other than a career diplomat to neg tiate in its name, rested in no small part on the 
latter’s access to such American contacts.  However, Birrenbach’s trip to the United States prior to 
embarking on his Israel mission was (according to Birrenbach) decided upon “exclusively” by himself, 
“without informing the German government of it,” with the intention of speaking “privately” with the 
American government about the key question of weapon supplies to Israel and to bring the American 
government to “discretely assume these payments” (KB to Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, 25 
November 1985, ACDP K094/1).  Also, with respect to he emergence of Birrenbach’s own preferred 
“middle solution,” the Americans had stressed to him not only the need for German-Israeli reconciliation 
but also for the maintenance of German influence in the Near East, since the Federal Republic was the only 
Western power that could still exercise influence in the region.  At the beginning of 1965, Chancellor 
Erhard had indicated that negotiations with Israel could only be conducted if Israel recognized that te 
Federal Republic would not continue to supply weapons into “areas of tension” since otherwise the Arab 
governments might break off their relations with the Federal Republic and recognize the DDR.   
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the participation of the European states in the nuclear process in some form.262  Later, the 
information Birrenbach received from American contacts regarding the NPT and 
Ostpolitik negotiations proved essential for his efforts in these areas as well.263   
Furthermore, Birrenbach represented a channel for the application of foreign 
pressure within the Federal Republic and its politics.  Naturally, given the existing power 
imbalance especially with respect to the United States, such pressure was omnipresent, 
but certain examples are particularly striking.  For instance, despite his continued 
reservations, Birrenbach ultimately counseled acceptance of the NPT in part because his 
conversations with contacts in the United States, as well as Britain and France, had 
convinced him that the treaty’s rejection would entail serious international consequences 
for the Federal Republic.  To take an earlier case, American pressure and urging was also 
a significant reason that by 1963 Birrenbach, along with other Germans, considered 
                                                
262 In Summer 1965, Birrenbach had spoken in Paris with Stikker (former Secretary General of NATO) 
and Norstad (former SACEUR, essentially NATO high commander) (like Birrenbach, both Norstad and 
Stikker were members of the AI Policy Committee) and in Düsseldorf with Bowie (current “Beauftragter”  
of the State Department for NATO questions; professor at Harvard University; former Director of the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff).  All three of these foreign contacts were prominent supporters of a 
multilateral nuclear solution but expressed to Birrenbach their doubts regarding the feasibility of the MLF 
for the reasons cited above.  Birrenbach described th se talks as the “starting point” and “the occasion” for 
his November 1965 Sondermission (KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1 and KB 
to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2).  For Birrenbach acquiring inside information from 
one of his contacts (from Washington by phone to the Federal Republic) on the course of American 
discussions regarding nuclear control issues, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP 
K090/1.  On Birrenbach’s recognition even prior to his November 1965 special mission, in contrast to a 
part of the German government, that the MLF was dead, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 
1966, ACDP K117/1.   
263 Thanks to these contacts, Birrenbach received vital information about the NPT, including the current 
state of the negotiations, relevant American tendencies, confidential American drafts and other pertinnt 
documents as well as behind-the-scenes American proposals and interpretations and was, furthermore, abl  
to pass on his objections to various American NPT draft proposals.  For Birrenbach receiving information 
from McCloy about the possibilities, in this case th lack of possibilities, of substantial changes to the text 
of the NPT draft treaty, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.  On Birrenbach 
requesting information and analysis from Bowie regading the impact of the NPT on prospects for 
European political unification and a possible future European nuclear force (the “European option”), see 
KB to Robert Bowie, 4 October 1973, ACDP K160/2.  On the other hand, for Birrenbach’s dismay during 
the preceding currency “crisis” that the Americans with whom he spoke over the phone had “no solution” 
and upon hearing from members of the European Commission that the Americans had also not proposed a 
solution in Brussels in the meeting of the Club of Ten, see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, 
ACDP K140/2.   
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action for the solution of the chancellor-succession problem “extraordinarily 
important.”264  However, the most celebrated example of this phenomenon was probably 
the preamble episode which transpired that same year.265  Birrenbach’s intense initial 
opposition to the Élysée Treaty, even prior to its actual coming into being, and then his 
insistence on and key role in the inception and success of a preamble to place the 
agreement within an Atlanticist framework is largely xplicable in terms of Western, 
particularly American, pressure transmitted via his contacts abroad.  Not only was he thus 
suitably warned about the treaty’s potential impact on he Atlanticist project, but 
personalities like McCloy, Acheson, Herter and Conant even proposed specific 
amelioratory measures such as postponing the treaty’s r tification or attaching to it 
Atlanticist-minded amendments or resolutions.266  It was largely in response to such 
                                                
264 In a letter to Shepard Stone, Birrenbach, with allusion to an alarmed “attitude in the States” that 
appeared “meanwhile to have calmed down a bit,” remarked “[t]hat the problems still are unsolved, I know 
of course.  My friends and I are absolutely [durchaus] conscious of the seriousness of the situation.  You
can be reassured in this regard.  Therefore, we consider also the solution of the successor-problem 
extraordinarily important” (KB to Shepard Stone, 15 March 1963, ACDP K186/2).  On the succession 
question, see Daniel Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1987). 
265 For “fundamental differences” on key political issue  with the current French government as the root of 
Birrenbach’s criticism of especially the timing and lack of functioning of the Franco-German Treaty of 
1963 as well as the heart of his rejection of any closer “excessive” institutionalization and formaliztion of 
the Franco-German relationship and of de Gaulle’s stres  on the notion of such an institutionalized Zweier-
Union as an alternative to the European idea, see KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, 
Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford 
University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; and KB to Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben Heinrich 
Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On Birrenbach’s pertinent maxim that the 
relations between people and nations should not be “excessively” formalized and institutionalized “as long 
as fundamental political differences still exist” between them, see KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von 
Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.  For Birrenbach on “a certain interested side” in the 
Federal Republic that repeatedly declared the Zw ier-Union “the path to Europe” as striving “not at all for 
Europe but rather for the Zweier-Bund”  itself and a number of German personalities (“you know whom I 
mean”) whose fundamental motivation was not that of Birrenbach (or Brentano), see again KB to 
Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.   
266 McCloy and Conant both suggested it would be best if the ratification of the treaty were postponed, 
while Acheson and Herter proposed amendments, reservations or resolutions that would stress Atlanticis 
goals (John McCloy to KB, 8 February 1963, ACDP K186/2; James Conant to KB, 6 February 1963, 
ACDP K186/2; Dean Acheson to KB, 19 February 1963, ACDP K186/2; Christian Herter to KB, 19 March 
1963, ACDP K186/2).  At the very least, Birrenbach’s connections abroad, including also those with Jean 
Monnet, decisively reinforced his concerns regarding the potential impact of the Élysée Treaty on the 
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warnings and proposals that Birrenbach insisted, including vis-à-vis Brentano (Chairman 
of the Fraktion), on the need to somehow address the misgivings of the United States, 
Britain and the EEC member states.  Years later, Bir enbach acknowledged the “pressure 
of our Western friends” in explaining the efforts to dispel the concerns surrounding the 
Élysée Treaty.267   
Essential to fully understanding the significance of Birrenbach’s political 
activities is the recognition that he was not alone.  Other German Atlanticists were also 
attending conferences and other functions, corresponding with American contacts and 
embarking on trips to the United States.268  Indeed, the Amerikareise became a fruitful 
                                                                                                                                      
European Community and the Atlantic Alliance and possibly even alerted him altogether.  On Siegmund 
Warburg referring to “a strong impression of German two-facedness [Doppelzüngigkeit]” that had “spread 
in the Western world,” see Siegmund Warburg to KB, 15 February 1963, ACDP K064/2.  For Birrenbach 
proposing a number of steps to William Tyler in a letter of 16 February 1963 which seemed indispensable 
to clarify “our” position, including the attachment of a preamble to neutralize the Élysée Treaty, see KB to 
William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 
16 February 1963, ACDP K186/2 and KB to Tyler, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.   
267 For a political science account of the preamble episode, see Günther Patz, Parlamentarische Kontrolle 
der Außenpolitik: Fallstudien zur politischen Bedeutung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Deutschen 
Bundestages (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976).  For a more recent, historical account, see Matthias 
Schulz, “Die Politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet-Kurt Birrenbach, Die Einheit des Westens und die 
‘Präambel’ zum Elysée-Vertrag von 1963,” in Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische 
Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Andreas Wilkens, ed. (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999).  The strong 
reaction to the Franco-German Treaty, encompassing mounting criticism from abroad but also an American 
government offering carrots in the form of an MLF, must also be seen in the light of the French veto, issued 
by de Gaulle in a Paris press conference on 14 January 1963, of the British application to join the EEC and 
the consequent indefinite adjournment of the entrance negotiations in Brussels on 28 January 1963.    
268 On Birrenbach wanting to hear what impressions Friedensburg brought back from the United States, see 
KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.  For Brentano’s trip to 
the United States in March 1963 where he became moraware about American consternation regarding the 
Élysée Treaty, see Patz, Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Außenpolitik (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976).  
For Birrenbach’s discussions with Kai-Uwe von Hassel and Heinrich Krone, regarding steps for the 
clarification of the West German position after theFranco-German Treaty, following their return from the 
United States, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.  For Chancellor Brandt’s speech before the DGAP in 
June 1971 on his experiences during his trip to the United States, see KB to John McCloy, 28 June 1971, 
ACDP K210/1.  On Barzel’s trip to the United States, including Washington DC, where he learned about 
the potential impact, or lack of impact, of a non-ratification of the Ostverträge on German-American 
relations, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman 
of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1.  For Birrenbach’s suggestion 
that Barzel write to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer 
Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 
October 1972, ACDP K026/1.  For examples of the correspondence between Casimir Prinz Wittgenstein 
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activity of a considerable number of prominent Germans with an interest in the United 
States, among them politicians, civil servants and businessmen, with the stream of 
visitors particularly pronounced during international conferences and other functions in 
North America.269  While such flows presented Birrenbach with difficulties in scheduling 
his own trips and appointments, he also played a role in helping others prepare for such 
undertakings.270  Many, probably most, of these trips could not match the level of those 
                                                                                                                                      
(Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt; Chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke) and John McCloy, see KB to McCloy, 
New York City, 27 February 1973, ACDP K183/2.  After ravelling to Britain in 1960 with Birrenbach, 
Kai-Uwe von Hassel, like Birrenbach, returned to convey his impressions of the trip, including to the CDU-
Bundesvorstand (Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein, to KB, 8 July 1960, 
ACDP K076/1 and, for purposes of comparison, KB to E. Emmet, MP, House of Commons, 11 July 1960, 
ACDP K076/1).  For Barzel about to take a trip to Brussels and London, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner 
Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 July 
1972, ACDP K026/1.   
269 The politicians mentioned here included chancellors, ministers, parliamentarians and party luminaries.  
For the report of Otto Graf Lambsdorff (FDP) about his stay in Washington and New York from 17-23 
May 1970, during which time he took part in the 1970 Washington Investment Seminar staged by the 
Council of the United States Investment Community Inc. (Washington DC), which included eighty-five 
guests from overseas (among them representatives of alm st all the leading private German banks, but no 
American guests), and also visited a number of firms, see Lambsdorff’s Aktennotiz, 29 May 1970, ACDP 
K037/1.  For the talk of Alois Mertes with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (whom he had 
known well since his year at Harvard in 1968-69 andwith whom he stood in personal contact) on foreign 
policy issues (also on Barzel’s trip to Moscow), which occurred in a Washington DC club in the context of 
a small meal hosted by David Rockefeller (Chase Manhattan Bank, NY) (including, among others, Antoine 
Pinay, former French Prime, Foreign and Finance Minister; a former Lebanese Finance Minister; and the 
Chairman of the Christian Democratic Fraktion in the Swiss National Council and Ständerat), see Alois 
Mertes, Personal Vermerk (which he distributed), 3 December 1971, ACDP K025/1.  On the Amerikareise 
of Prof. Karl Carstens (CDU MdB) of 7-14 April 1973, during which he stayed three days in Washington 
DC and two days in New York City, gathered general impressions and conducted numerous talks, including 
on a variety of trans-Atlantic and other foreign affairs issues, with members of the government and 
administration (Secretary of Defense Richardson; Deputy Secretary of State Rush; National Security 
Advisor Kissinger; Sonnenfeldt; Stoessel; Tarr; Sutterlin; as well as nine further members of the State 
Department’s European Department), members of Congress (u.a. Sen. Fulbright), a representative of the 
trade unions (Mr. Lovestone); the German Geschäftsträger in Washington (Herr Noebel) and further 
members of the embassy; several German correspondents; the German UN Mission (Amb. Gehloff); two 
under-general secretaries of the UN (Morese and Guyer); and five ambassadors accredited by the UN, 
including the future president of the General Assembly from Ecuador, see Carstens, confidential report on 
USA trip, 7-14 April 1973, dated 15 April 1973, ACDP K028/2.  On his January-February 1974 trip to the 
United States, Bundesminister Egon Bahr had lunch with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and conducted 
talks in Washington about US policy in which he presented official Bonn views.   
270 For instance, Chancellor Schmidt’s trip to the US in December 1974, shortly before Birrenbach’s own 
Blitzreise, led Birrenbach to decide against requesting a meeting at about the same time with the Secretary 
of Defense.  The West German embassy (in coordinatio  w th the US State Department and the Bonn AA), 
responsible for looking after visitors at least in Washington, attempted to coordinate such trips for 
Birrenbach and other visitors (Staden fs to KB (from Washington DC to Bonn AA), 18 March 1974, ACDP 
K184/1 and Staden fs (Washington DC) to Bonn AA, 23 April 1975, ACDP K155/1).  For the 
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conducted by Birrenbach with respect to temporal length, thematic breadth and quality 
and sheer quantity of talk partners, yet the phenomenon testifies to the fact that, like 
Birrenbach, other prominent Germans were seeking to gain first-hand impressions and 
experiences in the United States, meeting with key American political personalities and 
giving talks in venues like the Council on Foreign Relations.271  The preamble episode of 
1963 highlights the breadth and complexity of the existing web, with MdB Herbert 
Wehner (SPD), along with Birrenbach, functioning as a central figure in the preamble’s 
inception and parliamentary history and with foreign influence being exercised not only 
on Birrenbach but also on figures such as Majonica, Erhard, Carstens, Erler and 
Falkenhausen.  What had emerged was an effective transnational political network, 
                                                                                                                                      
“uninterrupted stream of visitors” from the Federal Republic at the moment in Washington DC, “not least 
as a result of the NATO conference in Ottawa,” thate German embassy had to “look after [betreuen],” 
see Robert Borchardt, West German Embassy (Washington DC), to KB, 12 June 1963, ACDP K157/1.  For 
the efforts of the West German embassy in Washington DC to schedule and prepare Birrenbach’s visit 
(already postponed once) and appointments against the backdrop of upcoming visits by Minister Ehmke 
(with a delegation), Minister-President Kohl and MdB Leisler-Kiep and the expectation that “also the 
following weeks and months would be similarly booked [besetzt],” see Amb. Berndt von Staden to KB, 24 
January 1974, ACDP K184/1.  Although he made significantly less use of it than the Washington DC 
embassy, the West German embassy in London also helped Birrenbach with the logistics of trips to Britain, 
including advice on timing, setting up appointments and coordinating such trips with those of other 
prominent German visitors, such as that of Gerhard Schröder (CDU) in 1972 (KB to West German 
Ambassador Hase, London, 2 March 1972, ACDP K068/1).  For Birrenbach providing Leussink, the 
Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft (in response to a request and following a talk Birrenbach had 
a few days earlier in that ministry), the names of personalities in the United States whom he advised 
Leussink to see in Washington besides the official contacts he would have anyway in his capacity as 
minister (Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Edward David, the President’s 
Scientific Advisor; and John Forster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Pentagon) and 
Birrenbach’s offering to answer any further questions prior to Leussink’s trip to the United States, see KB, 
Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 
February 1971, ACDP K025/1. 
271 In certain instances, these other West German visitors met with some of the same American figures as 
Birrenbach on such trips, with for instance those op rating in the political realm arranging talks with many 
of the most prominent personalities in this field, whether Vice Presidents (e.g. Gerald Ford), Secretaries of 
State (e.g. Henry Kissinger), Secretaries of Defense or key Senators (e.g. Symington, Nunn, Kennedy).  
Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU, gave a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations in 1974.  On his trip
to the United States in April 1973, Karl Carstens (CDU MdB) gave addresses in Washington DC at the 
Mid-Atlantic Club (see Chapter 8) and the Washingto Institute for Foreign Affairs and took part in three 
functions of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Georgetown University) as well as a 
function of the American Council on Germany in New York City (Carstens, confidential report on his USA 
trip, 7-14 April 1973, dated 15 April 1973, ACDP K028/2).  
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including and maintained by Birrenbach and a signifcant number of other German 
Atlanticists, working to implement broadly Atlanticist goals, even if they occasionally 
differed on details.272  A sense of the importance of this Atlanticist political network is 
vital to understanding political life and development in the Federal Republic.273   
                                                
272 Birrenbach, Wehner, Jean Monnet and Max Kohnstamm, the four central figures in the preamble’s 
inception, were the participants in the key meeting o  26-27 February 1963 at the Hotel Königshof in 
Bonn.  For Birrenbach, this meeting was the “crucial hour,” when he and Wehner (likewise a member of 
the Monnet Committee), in agreement with Monnet and Kohnstamm, had “given birth to this idea” of the 
preamble (KB to Jürgen Bellers, Munich, 26 July 1978, ACDP K185/2 and KB to Wehner, MdB, Chairman 
of the SPD, 10 July 1978, ACDP K185/2).  On Birrenbach as “one of the two German authors at that time 
of this preamble,” see KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2.  Ultimately, it was Birrenbach 
and Wehner who introduced the initiative for the pramble into their Union and SPD Fraktionen, 
respectively.  Henceforth, they also took part in the crucial parliamentary work and negotiations 
(admittedly not our central interest here and not them alone) to secure the preamble’s attachment by the 
Bundestag to the Élysée Treaty.  For Guttenberg’s later remark that “without Birrenbach there probably 
would not have been a preamble at all,” see Patz, Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Außenpolitik 
(Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976).  However, at least as significant from the historical standpoint as 
exactly identifying Birrenbach’s (and particular others’) central role as one of the authors and key figures in 
the preamble episode is the extent to which this preamble emerged and triumphed in the context and 
through the efforts of a larger, thickly interwoven, transnational Atlanticist coalition, located both within 
and outside of the Federal Republic and characterized by constant consultations and a variety of ideas and 
proposals (here including, for instance, the general concept of interpretive parliamentary declarations) 
transferred around through its multiplicity of channels.  For Shepard Stone having had “long talks” in New 
York with Brentano, Krone, Erler, Freiherr von Falkenhausen, “and others,” his belief that “all of us are
gradually coming to a common point of view,” and his desire to see Birrenbach on an upcoming trip to the 
Federal Republic (Bonn and Berlin), see Stone to KB, 10 May 1963, ACDP K157/1.  For foreign pressure 
and influence, beyond mere public expressions of displeasure, being exercised broadly by their contacts, 
especially from the United States, among them from the Kennedy administration, and also the other 
Western allies, with respect to the Élysée Treaty and the preamble not only on Birrenbach but further on 
German politicians and figures also including Majonica, Erhard and Carstens, see Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, 
Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, 1945-1966 (Düsseldorf, Droste, 
1983).  The preamble episode also highlights the value of Birrenbach’s excellent relations with leading 
like-minded Social Democrats, here Wehner but especially personalities like Fritz Erler, that helped secure 
widespread agreement to the preamble.  Broadly speaking, the episode reflected inter-party cooperation 
between Union, SPD and FDP members of the Bundestag, especially within the Foreign Affairs 
Committee.  However, differences on other particular issues with fellow SPD Atlanticists did exist.  For 
Birrenbach’s openly expressed differences with Helmut Schmidt regarding the solution of the problem of 
the non-nuclear powers in NATO, see KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to Bundesminister Heinrich Krone, 
Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1.  For Erler’s opinions n the MLF that deviated slightly from 
Birrenbach’s, see KB to Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, 4 April 1966, ACDP K117/1.   
273 Among the prominent Atlanticist-minded German political personalities with whom Birrenbach 
interacted, and in some cases had excellent relations, n the CDU were Ludwig Erhard (Chancellor and 
Economics Minister), Gerhard Schröder (Foreign and Defense Minister and, from 1969, Chairman of the 
Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee), Kai-Uwe von Hassel (Defence Minister, 1963-66), Heinrich von 
Brentano (Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 1961-64; former member of the Monnet 
Committee; yet probably somewhat ambivalent), Hermann Kopf (Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign 
Affairs Committee, 1960-69), Ernst Majonica (Chairman of the AKV, 1960-69); in the SPD Fritz Erler, 
Herbert Wehner and Helmut Schmidt.  As demonstrated with regard to Birrenbach himself, the existence of 
the myriad channels provided by the Atlanticist network and the political activities of other German 
 346
In particular, German Atlanticism and the Atlanticist political network played an 
important role in undermining the system of Kanzlerdemokratie dominant in the Federal 
Republic, particularly under Adenauer.  This Kanzlerdemokratie was characterized most 
obviously by the authoritarian and secretive governing style of “dem Alten.”  Especially 
with regard to foreign policy, the decision-making process centered on Adenauer and his 
small inner circle based in the Chancellery.274  Not only the opposition, but also coalition 
partners, party colleagues in cabinet and Bundestag and, at times, even the foreign policy 
bureaucracy were largely excluded.275  Adenauer harbored a deep pessimism about both 
the human condition in general and the political immaturity of the German people in 
particular, potentially devastating for the vulnerable and mistrusted Federal Republic.  
Therefore, he considered it necessary to skirt democratic niceties, to ignore various 
practical, constitutional and legislative objections and to manipulate his colleagues and 
the structures of the infant Federal Republic to shape effective policy.  The 
Kanzlerdemokratie njoyed a number of vital personal, institutional, structural and 
historical foundations: Adenauer’s prestige and the notion of his infallible success at 
                                                                                                                                      
Atlanticists facilitated the penetration of especially American, but also other foreign, outlooks and ideas on 
foreign policy into the West German political system.  For the immediate impact of trips to the United 
States on West German travelers with respect to their perceptions and ideas on the US and foreign policy, 
in this case that Brentano belatedly realized, “in particular on the basis of his America trip,” that “the 14 
January [de Gaulle press conference] has been a fatal blow for us all,” but “many others still not,” see KB 
to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1.  Such relatively uninterrupted flows of political 
personalities and communication represented one of the most salient, and probably salubrious, elements in 
German-American relations since World War II.  As with Birrenbach, these elite-level contacts and 
activities of certain other West Germans with and with regard to Americans and the United States further 
contributed in the Federal Republic to a better understanding of American perspectives and the general 
situation of and in the United States.  On transnatio l relations, in addition to those works cited in Chapter 
1 (page 4, note 7), see Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso, 1984).    
274 For instance, Hans Globke and Heinrich Krone, as well as Walter Hallstein and Josef Jansen.   
275 With respect to the Bundestag, this also applied to members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.  Foreign 
policy bureaucracy is here to be understood as the Auswärtige Amt and the embassies abroad.  For instance, 
the AA (under Schröder) was barely initiated into the negotiations regarding the Élysée Treaty and itself
depicted the treaty as a type of “Romanze” between two old men.  On this situation, see for instance Ronald 
Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966 (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2003).    
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home and abroad; the Chancellor’s independence and broa  powers, ascribed to him in 
the Grundgesetz, to determine policy vis-à-vis cabinet and Bundestag; continuities in 
tradition and mentality, especially those noted in Chapter 3 with respect to Abendland, as 
well as the political socialization of most Germans u der authoritarian forms of rule and 
politics; and the typical dominance of the executive in foreign policy-making, a 
dominance reinforced by the early history of the Federal Republic.276  The decline of this 
authoritarian-democratic form of government in foreign policy, signs of which were 
discernable at the latest by the end of the 1950s, can be traced to a number of electoral, 
institutional and generational developments.277   
However, in addition to such developments, the phenomenon of German 
Atlanticism also helped undermine the foundations of the Kanzlerdemokratie and 
significantly contributed to its decline.  The preamble episode of 1963, in which 
Birrenbach and the Atlanticist network played such a crucial role, represented a milestone 
in this process.  A key factor here was the access to and control of knowledge and 
information.  With its new channels of communication, especially provided by contacts 
abroad, and its extensive knowledge-creating and -dispensing infrastructure, the 
Atlanticist network helped break down the ability of Adenauer and future Chancellors to 
                                                
276 Initially, the Chancellery had handled all foreign relations (through the High Commission).  
Furthermore, Adenauer had become the first Foreign Minister upon the reestablishment of a Foreign 
Ministry in 1951.  Of course, the general air of secrecy surrounding foreign policy-making also lends itself 
well to executive management. 
277 The decline was identifiable at the latest by the “presidential crisis” in 1959.  Contributing 
developments included: Adenauer’s reduced effectiveness as an electoral motor (evident with the outcome 
of the September 1961 elections); the creation and fortifying during the 1950s by the respective 
Bundestagsfraktionen of their own Arbeitskreise (e.g. the Union’s AKV established in 1953) to facilitate 
debate, including on foreign policy and security affairs; and, finally, the generational shift in German 
politics which saw the rise within the Union of a younger (born in the 20th century) and more independent 
leadership cadre during the 1950s.   
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maintain a far-reaching secrecy beyond the Chancellery with respect to foreign affairs.278  
Birrenbach himself explicitly argued that far-reaching foreign policy decisions, 
specifically those impacting Atlanticist affairs, could not be taken by tiny circles without 
input from the Bundestagsfraktion.  His efforts do not seem to have been motivated by 
opposition to authoritarian principles per se, rather they stemmed at this time almost 
entirely from his opposition to Adenauer’s particular policies.279  Thanks in no small part 
                                                
278 The ability of the German Atlanticists to challeng some of the most fundamental bases of the 
Kanzlerdemokratie was founded to a great extent on their being part of something larger, namely on their 
links with the broader Atlanticist network that made it increasingly possible for Birrenbach and others to 
follow, for instance, international negotiations or t  register the decline in Chancellor Adenauer’s 
international prestige and the consternation his policies were sowing abroad, including among the 
Americans and British.  The Anglo-Saxon desire to have Adenauer replaced by a suitable successor, for 
example by Erhard, was also transmitted through this network.  Later on, the state of the Soviet-American 
negotiations with respect to the NPT was a regular subject of Birrenbach’s talks with his American 
contacts.  For John McCloy (ACDA) informing Birrenbach that the American government was not pressing 
Bonn to sign the NPT, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 
November 1969, ACDP K022/1.  On Birrenbach learning “from the American side” that the Italian 
ambassador had presented a standpoint on “the European option” (NPT) a few days ago in the State 
Department equivalent to “the German view,” see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 May 1967, 
ACDP K139/2.  For Birrenbach learning in Washington DC, “and not from the German side,” that the 
American administration had been told that the Grundvertrag (Ostpolitik) would be initialed and perhaps 
signed very soon (i.e. still before the approaching elections) as well as more information on this theme and 
for Birrenbach learning in the United States of the Berlin Senate’s efforts in Washington to secure an 
unlimited right to vote for all Berlin Abgeordnete, see KB to Gerhard Schröder, Chairman of the 
[Bundestag] Foreign Affairs Committee, Bundesminister a.D., Bonn, 11 October 1972, ACDP K027/1 and 
KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.   
279 Birrenbach’s political activities themselves, undertaken not from an executive position but from that of a 
member of the Bundestag, heralded and offer an overview of some of the efforts towards the increasing 
autonomy of the Unionsfraktion, part and parcel of the decline of the Kanzlerdemokratie.  Thanks in part to 
the Atlanticist network, the Bundestag as a body became a more active participant in interna ional affairs 
during this period.  This can be seen, for instance, in the preamble episode surrounding the Élysée Treaty.  
Even in the lead-up to the conclusion of that treaty, Birrenbach, along with other members of the 
Unionsfraktion, were endorsing the accession of Britain into the EEC as well as insisting on a government 
declaration before the Bundestag and a plenary debate to address the speculation surrounding the 
government’s foreign policy, the role of Britain in Europe and the Franco-German Treaty.  Ultimately, as 
described, Adenauer was effectively compelled by the Bundestag, including members from the SPD, FDP 
and many within the Union and especially from within the Foreign Affairs Committee, to accept the 
preamble before that entity would ratify the treaty.  In general, Birrenbach did consistently push to expand 
the circle of foreign policy decision-makers.  In explaining the “sharpness” with which he had intervened 
against Adenauer in the meeting of the Fraktion of 5 February 1963, Birrenbach criticized Adenauer’s 
“irresponsible” account of [“does not correspond to the facts”] and the Chancellor’s “own, not low, share” 
in the “crisis.”  As he put it, “I am of the opinion that this type of depiction does not correspond to the 
importance of the Fraktion” (KB to Brentano, 7 February 1963, ACDP K010/1).  As of July 1964, an 
“extremely concerned [beunruhigt]” Birrenbach pushed, even against former Chancellor Adenauer and the 
CSU’s Franz Josef Strauss, for the expansion of foreign policy discussions, arguing that major foreign 
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to the activities and institutions of the German Atlan icists and the larger Atlanticist 
network, there appeared in the society of the Federal Republic a group of individuals, 
including but not limited to parliamentarians, that was not only opposed to notions of 
Abendland and relatively trusting of their Western, particularly Anglo-Saxon, allies but 
also increasingly better informed about, experienced and confident in foreign affairs and, 
consequently, more willing to challenge Adenauer and other authority figures in this 
field.  Looking beyond the domain of foreign policy-making, one can even argue that, in 
the process, the Atlanticist network played a signif cant role in transforming the CDU 
away from a subordinate party dominated by strong executive leadership and in 
strengthening West German democracy as a whole.280   
H. Conclusion 
During the 1960s and well into the 1970s, Kurt Birrenbach actively engaged in an 
intensive Atlanticist political activity, consisting not only of strictly parliamentary work 
but also of regular exploratory trips and special missions abroad and the maintenance of 
                                                                                                                                      
policy proposals and decisions that would influence “th  fate of the European idea, the entire German 
foreign policy, our relationship to the United States as well as… the unity and future of the party” could not 
be taken by the party presidium or the Fraktionsvorstand alone.  Rather the Fraktion, “on the basis of a 
clear and comprehensive declaration of the Chancellor and Foreign Minister,” had to be heard and “faits 
accomplis” prevented, with such a gathering preceded by “meetings in small circles of those who can make 
a contribution to the matter from knowledge and experience” (KB to Barzel, 10 July 1964, ACDP K013/1).  
For Birrenbach on the rapidly approaching need for the Fraktion, at first in the smallest of circles, to 
discuss and decide what position to take on the NPT, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer 
Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1 and KB, Düsseldorf, 
Berliner Allee 33, to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, 
ACDP K020/1).     
280 This was true, for instance, insofar as some saw the weight of the office of Chancellor as a weakness in 
the young democracy.  It should also be noted that in the struggle over Adenauer’s successor, the members 
of the Chancellor’s own party frequently disobeyed his wishes.  Ultimately, the Atlanticist network played 
a significant role in this overall waning of Adenauer’s power and authority, including within the Unio, and 
the strengthened opposition he faced, also internally, in the later years.  On the history of the Union, see 
Arnold Heidenheimer, Adenauer and the CDU: The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960); Geoffrey Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The 
CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945-1976 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977); Hans-Otto 
Kleinmann, Geschichte der CDU, 1945-1982 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1993); and Jürgen 
Domes, Mehrheitsfraktion und Bundesregierung: Aspekte des Verhältnisses der Fraktion der CDU/CSU im 
2. and 3. Deutschen Bundestag zum Kabinett Adenauer (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964).   
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an extensive international political network of prominent contacts.  While encompassing 
much of the Western world, such activities focused primarily on the United States.  
Birrenbach’s efforts were carried out within and significantly impacted by an evolving 
domestic political framework, determined by a number of factors including the changing 
governmental coalitions.  However, as already pointed out, Birrenbach, while interesting 
in his own right, primarily serves us, given his key role, as a window into the larger 
German Atlanticist world, here its specifically political activities.  In particular, 
Birrenbach’s activities highlight the extent to whic  a trans-Atlantic, transnational 
political network, the construction and maintenance of which was facilitated by 
technological advances and the Atlanticist infrastructure, had emerged in the post-1945 
period.  In its promotion of Atlanticist goals, this network functioned primarily to open 
up new channels of communication between nations, in this case particularly the United 
States and the Federal Republic, through which knowledge, information, encouragement 
and support flowed, influence and pressure were exercised and a process of mutual 
“penetration” occurred.  Major effects within the Fderal Republic included not only the 
strengthening of the German Atlanticism and the weakening of Abendland perspectives 
but also the related undermining of the executive authority, especially Adenauer’s 
Kanzlerdemokratie, and an expanding of the role of non-executive actors in the policy-
making process.  Finally, Birrenbach presents us with an image of the German Atlanticist 
politician as one engaging in extensive foreign travel, enjoying wide-ranging foreign 
contacts and relying on the scholarly output of the Atlanticist infrastructure, all of which 
enabled him, even if not occupying the highest state offices or regularly appearing at the 
center of high-level political events, to become a factor in West German politics.
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Chapter 7: Reaching a Broader Audience - Atlanticist Publications and Public  
      Relations Actions 
 
A. Introduction 
Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists faced a difficult task in their battle with 
Occidentalism in the key area of publications and public relations.  In Chapter Two, we 
briefly touched on the considerable efforts of the Abendland proponents to propagate 
their worldview.  In Chapter 4, we pointed out the essentially elite nature of the 
Atlanticist infrastructure and its related network.  However, to operate effectively in the 
Western world of the post-World War II era, German Atlanticism simply could not 
confine its focus to a relatively small, avid Atlanticist elite at home and abroad.  To 
influence policies within and relations between modern democracies, constant 
propaganda efforts had to be aimed at a more widespread audience, encompassing at 
least, and perhaps especially, educated opinion and, at times, to look even beyond that 
stratum to include genuinely mass opinion.  The audience of the German Atlanticists in 
this sense stretched well beyond the borders of the Fed ral Republic to encompass 
nations on both sides of the Atlantic, in both Europe and North America, and included 
especially the population of the United States.  In this context, the Atlanticists 
consciously functioned within a framework consisting of relatively open societies, with 
their at least ostensibly great freedoms (“the Free World”) and lack of overt government 
intervention, thus facilitating propaganda work and the unhindered circulation of 
information while also serving as the precondition f r a critical “battle of the minds.”  
Activities related to public relations became an important element of German 
Atlanticist endeavours and part of a larger effort being undertaken simultaneously by 
their fellow Atlanticists in other Western countries.  In some ways, the emphasis on 
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sound public relations and the crucial political force of public opinion was larger than 
simply the cause of Atlanticism.  As with many of their other activities, the German 
Atlanticists saw their public relations actions as a vital support for the Federal Republic, 
for they were convinced that democracies required a solid foundation of a well-informed 
(and supportive) public opinion.  On the whole, however, whatever their pretensions to 
simply presenting and contributing to necessary, objective knowledge and enlightenment, 
the German Atlanticists worked assiduously to ensure that it was their own cause, its 
worldview, conceptions, tenets, interests and goals, r ther than some “balanced” 
assessment, that was effectively and convincingly propagated and promoted in the 
consciousness among the general public at home and abroad via the full range of modern 
media, including speeches, television, radio and print.  As usual, Birrenbach’s own 
extensive activities, not surprising given his earli r journalistic endeavors, offer a pretty 
good idea of what the important German Atlanticist undertakings in this field entailed. 
B. Influencing the Educated West German Public 
One way to promulgate the Atlanticist worldview amongst an interested and 
educated public was through the staging of relatively small functions, including 
conferences, colloquia, seminars, and Vorträge, specifically designed for that purpose.  
Such functions could influence a broader audience than would otherwise have been 
involved in the Atlanticist world, whether as members of Atlanticist organizations or 
participants in the various Atlanticist activities described in previous chapters.  As one 
example of this, we can point to the numerous Vorträge staged by the Deutschen 
Atlantischen Gesellschaft (e.V.), usually in the larger German cities, intend d to support 
that organization’s main purpose, the promoting of the NATO idea.  Likewise, the 
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Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft carried out a program of regular Vorträge by prominent 
British and German experts, including politicians, Wirtschaftler, journalists and 
academics (among them historians and sociologists).  These speakers dealt with issues of 
political, economic, scientific and cultural interest in talks explicitly designed to make a 
broader West German public aware of British issues and problems.  In both cases, the 
DAtG and the DEG were aided by their somewhat decentralized structure in that their 
local branches played a significant role in staging these functions.  Moreover, the series 
of evening speech functions at the D utschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik offered 
prominent invited personalities, both German and foreign (including many Anglo-
Saxons), the chance to address openly on an acutely important theme of their choice an 
assembly of the members and guests of the DGAP in Bonn, therefore a German audience 
particularly interested in foreign policy, and to answer questions in the following 
discussion.1   
                                                
1 American speakers before the DGAP included: George Ball (April 1962 as Under Secretary of State on 
“The Developing Atlantic Partnership” and February 1973 on “An American View of Europe”); SACEUR 
Andrew Goodpaster (October 1970 on “The Defense of Western Europe in the 70s”); SACEUR Gen. 
Alexander Haig (October 1975); Amb. Martin Hillenbrand (US Ambassador in Bonn); Sen. Edward 
Kennedy; US Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy (“The New Frontier and the New Europe”); Gen. Lauris 
Norstad (October 1973 on “The New Strategic Conception for the Defense of the Free World”); and 
Eugene Rostow.  British speakers before the DGAP included Alistair Buchan; Roy Jenkins (including as 
President of the EC Commission in December 1977 on “The Integration of the Community in the Face of 
Enlargement”); Reginald Maudling; Lord Soames; Wyndham White; and Kenneth Younger.  German 
speakers before the DGAP included Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf (January 1977 on “The British Question: 
Transitional Problems or Dauerkrise?”, in the Hotel Königshof, Bonn); Prof. Wilhelm Grewe (Ambassador 
to NATO, January 1967 on “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons on the Politik”); Wilhelm Haferkamp 
(Vice President of the EC Commission, February 1978 on “The Role of the EC in International Relations”); 
Ulf Lantzke (Executive Director of the International Energy Agency in the framework of the OECD in 
Paris); Major General Ulrich de Maizière (“The Federal Republic in the Strategic World Situation”); Gen. 
Gerd Schmückle (Director of the International Military Staff (NATO, Brussels), November 1977 on 
“Rüstungsdynamik and Arms Control”); and Dr. Immo Stabreit (Member of the International Energy 
Agency in Paris, March 1978 on “Securing of the Energy Supply: International Cooperation or Distribution 
Struggle?”).  Other personalities speaking before the DGAP included: Giovanni Agnelli (President of 
FIAT, May 1977 on “Europe as Task and Challenge for Italy”); Manlio Brosio; Amb. Valentin Falin 
(USSR Ambassador to the Federal Republic, October 1977 on “Economic and Political Aspects of the 
Entspannungspolitik in the Relations between the Soviet Union and Federal Republic of Germany”); Per 
Federspiel (President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “The Influence of the 
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Meanwhile, in 1964, the DGAP Research Institute began staging conferences, 
colloquia and seminars specifically designed to spread to a broader public the results of 
the study groups and related activities.  Here, members of the study groups as well as 
other prominent experts and Wissenschaftler, German and foreign, made presentations to 
gatherings of German civil servants, military officers, Wissenschaftlern and journalists.2  
Birrenbach himself spoke at various relatively small functions in places like Bonn, 
Cologne, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Munich and Münster, including in a diversity of venues 
such as the Übersee-Tag (Hamburg), the Amerika-Häuser, as well as university and 
business settings, on a diversity of foreign policy themes, always attempting to spread the 
Atlanticist message and ideas.3   
                                                                                                                                      
European Parliamentary Assemblies on the Political Development in Europe”); Nahum Goldman (“Israel 
and the Near East”); Spanish Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Prof. Fraga Iribarne (March 
1976 on “Spain at the Crossroads”); Petrus Lardinois (Member of the European Commission in Brussels 
for questions of agricultural policy, December 1975); OECD Secretary General Jonkheer Emile van 
Lennep; Joseph Luns (Netherlands); Giovanni Malagodi (leader of the Italian Liberal Party and former 
Italian Minister of Finance); Amb. Pietro Quaroni (Italy); Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel 
(February 1976 on “Dutch Foreign Policy: Positive Partnership”); Amb. Byron Theodoropoulos (General 
Secretary in the Greek Foreign Ministry, April 1978 on “Current Problems of Greek Foreign Policy”); 
Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans (May 1976 on “Europe after the Summit Meeting in Luxemburg”); 
and French Amb. Olivier Wormser (March 1975 on “The Change in World Economic Relations in the Past 
Twenty-Five Years”).  For the Tindemans speech, the ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of the 
EC member states were invited to and took part in the function.  The speeches of Haferkamp and Amb. 
Theodoropoulos were staged together with the Press and Information Office of the Commission of the 
European Communities in Bonn.  For Vorträge, with themes intended to be of particular “Aktualität” and 
including those of a political or economic-political nature, as an important field of activity for the DGAP, 
see Günter Henle, DGAP e.V., President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal 
information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1.  Members of the DGAP received invitations to its Vorträge-
functions and later, as far as possible, the texts of the Vorträge themselves so that those members not 
present could also familiarize themselves with the content.    
2 About forty individuals were invited to each of these DGAP functions.   
3 Some examples: On 7 May 1963 (a Tuesday), Birrenbach g ve a speech about “Ideas on the Overcoming 
of the Brussels Crisis” in the Hamburg Rathaus at the annual Übersee-Tag of the Übersee-Club 
(Hamburg).  This and the other speeches from that occasion were reprinted in a booklet (Reden am 
Übersee-Tag 1963, ACDP K077/2).  On 11 October 1965, Birrenbach gave the Festvortrag for Columbus 
Day on “The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States: Unsolved Problems of an Alliance” in 
the Amerika-Haus in Munich on the occasion of his receiving the Columbus Medal.  On 15 February 1966, 
Birrenbach spoke at the University of Bonn on “The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic in the Changed 
World” at a function staged by the Europäisch-Föderalistischen Studentenverband.  In May 1966, 
Birrenbach spoke in the “Mittwochgespräch,” giving a talk in the auditorium of the Stephanienschule in 
Düsseldorf on, again, “German Foreign Policy in a Changed World.”  Also in May 1966, this time on a 
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As was the case with their counterparts abroad, the German Atlanticists and the 
overarching milieu of their infrastructure generated an impressive quantity and variety of 
publications.  Comprising one key segment of these products were the high-quality, 
scholarly works, including books, pamphlets and journal articles.  These were primarily 
targeted at a specialized audience including scholars, practitioners and a relatively narrow 
public with a keen interest in international, especially trans-Atlantic, relations.  
Birrenbach, while not a scholar himself, contributed as an author to this high-quality 
literature of the Atlanticist movement, in large part through his copious articles on 
questions of international politics that appeared in the Federal Republic especially in the 
journals Europa-Archiv and Außenpolitik.4  Founded in the postwar period, in 1950, the 
latter was a very respected quarterly journal marked by a distinctly Atlanticist bent.  In 
October 1965, Birrenbach accepted an invitation to become an advisory editor 
(Mitherausgeber) of Außenpolitik, thus supporting the journal “mit Rat und Tat” and  
especially taking part in annual meetings with fellow Herausgebern and the managing 
editor, Prof. Heinrich Bechtoldt (a political scientist), to examine the journal’s general 
conception and to offer new reflections.  However, it was the former that was the most 
significant high-quality journal to emerge after 1945 from the world of German 
Atlanticism.  A prestigious, internationally respected journal of foreign affairs, the 
                                                                                                                                      
Saturday afternoon, Birrenbach gave a Referat, once more on the theme “The Federal Republic and the 
United States: Problems of an Alliance,” at a discus ion led by the president of the D utsch-
Amerikanischen Gesellschaft (Cologne), Alfred Neven DuMont, in the Amerika-Haus in Cologne in the 
presence of the mayor and the American consul.  In February 1967, Birrenbach gave a Vortrag in Münster 
about the theme “Europe and the German Question.”  O  10 July 1967, Birrenbach delivered a talk before 
about 130 listeners of the CDU-Wirtschaftsrat in the Great Hall at the Industrie-Club in Düsseldorf on 
“The Near East Crisis in World-Political View.”  Finally, Birrenbach was also invited by the Vorstand of 
the Deutschen Bank AG Düsseldorf and scheduled to attend a Kundenfrühstück on 2 June 1975 where he 
would speak “before a circle of befriended Herren” on the foreign political situation, specifically on his 
own chosen theme “The Change of the World Constellation.”  Likewise, as of May 1982, Karl Carstens 
had given a speech recently at the Übersee-Tag in Hamburg on “The Importance of Common Values and
Interests with America.”   
4 For a not entirely complete but still extensive list of Birrenbach’s publications, see file ACDP K205/8.   
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Europa-Archiv was founded in 1946 (initially in Frankfurt) by Wilhelm Cornides and 
was published as a Halbmonatsschrift (twice a month) by the Deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Auswärtige Politik as its own organ.  In addition to myriad essays like those produced by 
Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists, this publication also contained reprints of 
speeches, copies of important documents and a timeline of significant events in 
contemporary international affairs.5  
                                                
5 Birrenbach’s articles published in the Europa-Archiv included: “Großbritannien und die Montanunion” 
(3/1963, on the question of Britain’s entrance into the Montanunion); “Die Erhaltung der Dynamik der 
EEC: Deutsche Gedanken zur Überwindung der Brüsseler Krise” (11/1963); “Partnerschaft und 
Konsultation in der NATO: Grundsatzfragen und aktuelle Probleme der amerikanisch-europäischen 
Partnerschaft” (23/1963); “Aktuelle Fragen der Deutschland-Politik” (8/1967, on the problem of Europe 
and the German Question); “Partner oder Rivalen? Das Verhältnis zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und 
Westeuropa” (3/1973); and “Der europäisch-amerikanische Dialog” (20/1973).  A version of 
“Großbritannien und die Montanunion” was also published under the title “Nach der Debatte” on 11 
February 1963 in the Europa-Union Dienst (Bonn, Press Information and Commentary, published by the 
Europa-Union Deutschland, ACDP K077/2) and as “Nach der Bündnis-Debatte im Bundestag” in the 
Argentinian Freien Presse of 19 February 1963 (Buenos Aires, Verlagsleitung: Walter Linne).  “Aktuelle 
Fragen der Deutschland-Politik” later appeared in The German Tribune (Hamburg) as “Current Aspects of 
the German Question” (9 September 1967).  Other authors of articles published in the Europa-Archiv 
(foreign scholars among them), included, for instance, Karl Birnbaum (“Eine Politik der Bündnisfreiheit”); 
François Bondy (Zurich, 1977), Dieter Braun (SWP, 1974); Heinrich von Brentano (“Kontinuität und 
Dissonanzen der deutschen Politik”); Richard Butwell (“Wandlungen und Kontinuität im sozialistischen 
Birma”); Wilhelm Cornides (“Die vermauerte Wilhelmstraße”); Fritz Erler (“Die deutsche Außenpolitik 
nach dem Abkommen von Nassau”); Dr. Yair Evron (Hebrew University Jerusalem (subject area 
International Relations), 1975 on Israeli foreign policy after the Yom Kippur War); Dr. Hubert Feigl (SWP, 
1973), Karl Kaiser, Klaus Ritter (SWP, 1970, “European Peace Order as a Development Problem of World-
Political Infrastructure”), Ulrich Scheuner (numerous), Helmut Schmidt (1985), Marshall Shulman (1969, 
“Soviet Proposals for a European Security Conference (1966-69)”); Hans-Peter Schwarz (University of 
Hamburg, 1972, “Security Conference and Western Security Community”), Ian Smart (1975), and 
Wolfgang Wagner (1968).  Though not a government publication, the EA did publish articles by 
personalities in the governmental bureaucracy, including Ministerialdirektor Klaus Blech (leader of the 
West German delegation during the Geneva negotiations phase of the CSCE, 1975) and Ministerialdirektor 
Günther van Well (head of the AA’s political section as well as representative of the federal government in 
the EC Political Committee, 1976 on “The Development of a Common Near East Policy of the Nine”).  
Authors of contributions and reports to the Europa-Archiv, as well as translators for the EA and Dokumente 
zur Auswärtigen Politik, received Honorare, with especially qualified authors receiving larger sums.  On 
the rise in personnel costs and technical production costs leading to an expected increase in the overall 
production costs of the Europa-Archiv for 1965, see Draft Wirtschaftsplan 1965 for the Europa- Archiv, 24 
November 1964, ACDP K014/2.  On the subscription price of the Europa-Archiv rising, beginning on 1 
January 1963, from the hitherto DM 56 to DM 65, seeEconomic Plan 1963 of the Department Europa-
Archiv in the Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am Main GmbH, ACDP K010/2.  However, members of 
the DGAP regularly received the Europa-Archiv free through the mail.  The full title of the EA was 
Europa-Archiv: Zeitschrift fur Internationale Politik.  For this subtitle of the Europa-Archiv underscoring a 
widened theme circle, an element of the journal’s continued expansion [“Ausbau”] (including, from 1961 to 
1962, more pages of text and a greater number of contributions while reducing the number of pages 
devoted to documentation), see Report about the Europa-Archiv and the Jahrbücher für Internationale 
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The Atlanticist organizations, particularly the research institutes, in which 
Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists participated also generated a considerable 
number of high-quality books and pamphlets.  One sub-genre here comprised those 
publications that essentially represented verbatim reports and records of the Atlanticist 
activities and functions.  For instance, a substantial amount of the high-quality 
publications originating with the German Atlanticists, whether in the form of books or 
journal contributions, consisted of collections of reports, papers and speeches from the 
public sessions and the panels of the various regular and one-time Atlanticist 
conferences, symposiums and seminars we have touched on in Chapter 4.  As an 
example, the public proceedings of the German-American, Königswinter and NATO 
Parliamentarians Conferences were all regularly published in book form in the wake of 
                                                                                                                                      
Politik, on Point 1 of the Präsidialsitzung, undated but apparently from mid-1963, ACDP K014/2.  For the 
importance of the Europa-Archiv among the activities of the DGAP, see Günter Henle, DGAP e.V., 
President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, 
ACDP K007/1.  
Birrenbach’s articles published in Außenpolitik included: “Deutschland-Amerika: Probleme einer 
Allianz” (2/1966); “Deutscher Erdgas-Röhren-Kontrakt mit Moskau” (written under the pseudonym Karl 
Wangemann, 5/1970); and “Europas Sicherheit in der veränderten Welt” (3/73).  Other pieces published in 
Außenpolitik included Ernst Schneider’s “Kennedy-Runde und Welthandelskonferenz” (1964); Georg 
Ferdinand Duckwitz’s “Ohne England kein Großmarkt Europa” (1967); and Gerhard Wettig’s “Funktionen 
eines Sperrvertrages in der sowjetischen Politik” (1968).  Außenpolitik was subtitled a Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Fragen.  For Birrenbach’s assessment of Außenpolitik as “an outstanding journal,” see KB 
to Zbigniew Rapacki, 19 December 1975, ACDP K070/1.  
Although not regular outlets, Birrenbach published an article entitled “Die NATO und die 
Sicherheit Europas” in Wehrkunde (2/1970, Munich, founded in 1952) as well as one etitl d “Mit der 
Nixon-Doktrin leben-aber wie?” in Europa Union (December 1970).  Wehrkunde was the organ of the 
Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde and billed itself as a “Zeitschrift für alle Wehrfragen.”  Other articles and 
essays by Birrenbach were published as parts of larger books, including “Kulturpolitik im Rahmen der 
deutschen Außenpolitik” (Jahrbuch der ausländischen Kulturbeziehungen, 4/1967); “NATO-Politik der 
Ära Nixon” (in Außenpolitik nach der Wahl des 6. Bundestages, L ke-Verlag, October 1969); and “Politik 
und Modell” (forward to Europas Zukunft-Europas Alternativen, Leske-Verlag, 1969).  Außenpolitik nach 
der Wahl des 6. Bundestages included contributions from eight prominent politicians, Wissenschaftler, 
Wirtschaftler and publicists (besides Birrenbach, also Albrecht Düren, Otmar Emminger, Hartmut Jäckel, 
Ulrich Scheuner, Klaus Schütz, Theo Sommer and Gilbert Ziebura) analyzing the problems that would 
confront West German foreign policy in the 1970s, including the future of Europe, NATO, the Ostpolitik, 
the inner-German relations and the role of the German ark in the international currency system.   
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the conferences themselves.6  Certain one-time functions received similar treatment.  In 
this regard, we can point for instance to the book containing the presentations made at the 
November 1963 conference devoted to the theme “Europe and America in the World of 
Tomorrow,” which Birrenbach had both organized and taken part in.7  Besides such 
verbatim reports, the Atlantic Institute, the DGAP Research Institute and even the more 
secretive Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik issued a number of sophisticated scholarly 
works, at least sometimes grouped into thematic seres, for instance the DGAP series 
pertaining to issues of security policy.8  Along the same lines, in 1958, the DGAP 
Research Institute began issuing its series of Jahrbücher, edited by Arnold Bergstraesser 
                                                
6 See, for instance, the published book based on the third German-American Conference of November 1962 
in Bad Godesberg and Berlin, including a Birrenbach speech, East-West Tensions III: The US and Germany 
in the Atlantic Alliance (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1963). 
7 Birrenbach also wrote the afterword, which naturally expressed his concerns, for this published collection 
of speeches that appeared in 1964.    
8 As part of its efforts in the field of arms control and international security, of which the creation of the 
related study group was a part, the DGAP Research Institute produced a series of publications, at firs
principally in the form of translations and documentations.  These included the document volume Die 
Genfer Abrüstungskonferenz (1961) and the volume Strategie der Abrüstung (1962), the latter an expanded 
German edition (co-edited by the DGAP Research Institute) of a special 1960 edition of Daedalus 
comprising a collection of problem analyses by eminent American experts in this area, among them a 
considerable number of advisors from the staff of President Kennedy.  For the hope that the activities of the 
DGAP Research Institute, including these publications as well as the relevant study group, would 
ultimately contribute to the development of a German position, derived from the Federal Republic’s 
“specific conditions and needs,” on this “important question complex,” see Günter Henle, DGAP e.V., 
President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, 
ACDP K007/1.  As of this point, it was planned that still more foreign-political monographs and document 
volumes from the DGAP Research Institute would be published in 1962, including Per Fischer, Europarat 
und parlamentarische Außenpolitik; Rudolf Schuster, Die Staatlichkeit Deutschlands; Boris Meissner, 
Russland zwischen Utopie und Wirklichkeit; Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Weltpolitische Aspekte des 
chinesischen Bürgerkrieges; Europa-Dokumente zur Frage der europäischen Einigung (in three volumes); 
and  Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage (2nd expanded and revised edition).  Members of the DGAP could 
purchase DGAP publications (such as books) at a reduced price through the offices of the DGAP.  For the 
work of the Research Institute, along with the foreign-political book publications and documentations that 
emerged from it, as an important “activity field” and “the wissenschaftliche heart” of the DGAP, though 
less well known to its members than the Vorträge-functions and the publishing [Herausgabe] of the 
Europa-Archiv, see again Günter Henle, DGAP e.V., President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” 
intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1.  Among the Atlantic Institute studies 
published as books during the mid- to late-1960s were A Monetary Policy for Latin America (Pierre Uri) 
and Trans-Atlantic Investments (Christopher Layton, London), while the 1970s saw, for instance the 
publication of Organizing the World’s Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations 
(Prof. Benjamin Cohen, advisor to OECD Secretary General Emiel van Lennep addressing such problems 
of reform, 1977).   
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and Wilhelm Cornides.9  The Atlantic Institute also was responsible for a long-running 
series of shorter studies released, beginning in 1965, under the rubric of the “Atlantic 
                                                
9 The DGAP Research Institute’s series of Jahrbücher went under the overarching title Die Internationale 
Politik.  The first such yearbook, Die Internationale Politik, 1955: Eine Einführung in das Geschehen der 
Gegenwart, appeared in 1958; the second, Die Internationale Politik, 1956-57: Die Begegnung mit dem 
Atomzeitalter, appeared in 1961.  In contrast to the first three, l ngthy, “Grundlagenbänden” covering the 
period 1955-60 (more than a thousand pages each, includ g extensive source references), the yearbook 
covering 1961 was the first of the henceforth normal “annual volumes,” considerably shorter at about five
hundred pages with a much simplified scholarly apparatus.  The DGAP Research Institute yearbooks 
aspired to be more than simply a chronicle of events, rather each stressed certain themes, with the first two 
providing comprehensive accounts, analysis and insight into the “world-political events” and situation f 
the years covered as well as the present, while the third traced “the development of the Weltpolitik,” with 
particular attention to “the entrance of the now independent developing countries into the modern world 
and the reactions of the great powers to these events” (Die Internationale Politik: Jahrbücher des 
Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, ACDP K007/1).  For the first 
yearbook exploring “world politics” and, notably, expressing its trust openly in “the still not exhausted 
formative abilities of man,” see the announcement in ACDP K118/1.  The multiple chapters comprising the
DGAP Research Institute yearbooks were the product of numerous authors and contributors.  The first 
volume was edited by Arnold Bergstraesser (Director of the DGAP Research Institute and Professor at the 
University of Freiburg) and Wilhelm Cornides (Editor of the Europa-Archiv, Frankfurt) with the assistance 
of Walther Hofer (Leader of the Department Außenpolitik at the Deutschen Hochschule für Politik in 
Berlin) and Hans Rothfels.  The editor of the second such yearbook was Wilhelm Cornides, with the 
assistance of Bergstraesser, Hofer and Rothfels.  The teams of Wissenschaftlern collaborating on the first 
three yearbooks included: Dagmar Gräfin Bernstorff, Hans-Christoph Bömers, Dr. Curt Gasteyger, Prof. 
Herzfeld, Konrad Huber, Prof. Miguel Jorrin (Director of the School of Inter-American Affairs, 
Albuquerque, New Mexico), Dr. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Hans Wolfgang Kuhn, Dr. Walter Lipgens, 
Prof. Loewenthal, Hermann Meyer-Lindenberg, Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Oxford), Prof. Dr. Emanuel 
Sarkisyanz, Dr. Willy Schulz-Weidner, Fritz Steppat, Joachim Willmann (Frankfurt), Dr. Wülker, and Prof. 
Ziebura.  Many of these were Referente in the DGAP Research Institute (e.g. Gasteyger, Huber, 
Kindermann, Kuhn, Lipgens, Sarkisyanz, Schulz-Weidnr).  Along with his teaching activity in the United 
States, Prof. Sarkisyanz worked as a guest professor in the Federal Republic, for instance at the universities 
of Freiburg (im Breisgau) and Kiel.  For the third yearbook being worked on by a team of twenty-five 
Wissenschaftlern, see the Report about the Europa-Archiv and the Jahrbücher für Internationale Politik, on 
Point 1 of the Präsidialsitzung, undated but apparently from mid-1963, ACDP K014/2.  On the yearbooks 
as the result of extensive preliminary work and studies of the DGAP Research Institute and its German and 
foreign Mitarbeiter, see Die Internationale Politik: Jahrbücher des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen 
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, ACDP K007/1.  From the start, the DGAP Research Institute 
yearbooks were widely available in bookstores, with the cloth versions of the first two costing DM 64 and 
DM 96, respectively.  However, DGAP members received a substantial discount on the Jahrbücher when 
they ordered through the DGAP Geschäftsstelle.  On the Präsidium, from the DGAP’s very founding, 
having given the series of yearbooks priority in the Research Institute’s publication program, see Günter 
Henle, DGAP e.V., President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal information, 
26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1.  The DGAP Research Institute yearbooks were promoted as useful to the 
politician, the historian and to all who desired an analysis of current political events and an understanding 
of the political “Kräfte.”  On the yearbooks together with the respective bound volumes of the Europa-
Archiv and the latter’s contributions, overviews and documents forming “a mutually complementary work 
for the foreign political instruction [Unterrichtung] lacking to now in the German literature,” and on the
desire of the DGAP Präsidium that the Research Institute’s Jahrbücher be suitable to “transcend 
[sprengen] the circle of the experts [Fachleute],” thus bestowing “a higher degree of level-headedness 
[Besonnenheit] and steadiness [Stetigkeit]” on “the political thought and political reacting [reagieren] in the 
Federal Republic” in the face of current events, see again Henle, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” 26 
March 1962, ACDP K007/1. 
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Papers.”10  Naturally, such publications were preceded and supported by intensive 
scholarly research and analysis, as organizations lke the AI, SWP and DGAP at times 
simply transformed their earlier work in this regard, the ideas generated in projects, 
studies, papers, conferences, discussions, working groups and workshops, into 
significant, though condensed, pamphlets and impact st tements as well as more 
expansive and deeper books. 
While we have already mentioned the various articles Birrenbach wrote for the 
Atlanticist-minded journals, his most noteworthy contribution to the high-quality 
Atlanticist output was probably his short book Die Zukunft der Atlantischen 
Gemeinschaft: Europäisch-Amerikanische Partnerschaft, which both was completed and 
made its appearance in the Federal Republic in the spring of 1962.  Birrenbach’s work 
was just one of many to appear during this period treating the “hot” themes of European 
unification and Atlantic Community.11  This book was based on an important memo he 
                                                
10 Atlantic Papers issued and published by the Atlantic I stitute, typically six a year, included, for instance, 
Walter Schütze, “European Defense Cooperation and NATO” (1969); Alastair Buchan, “Europe and 
America: From Alliance to Coalition” (1973); Lothar Rühl, “The Nine and NATO” (1974); Fabio Basagni, 
“Employee Participation and Company Reform” (1976); and Dr. Gardiner Tucker (just retired as NATO 
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support), “Towards Rationalization of Alliance Weapons 
Production” (1976).  Curt Gasteyger (Switzerland, previously of the DGAP Research Institute and the 
London IISS) edited the Atlantic Papers while he was at the AI in the late 1960s and first half of the1970s 
and remained editor for some time even after leaving a d functioning merely as a consultant to the institute.  
Though he did not contribute any Atlantic Papers, Birrenbach penned the forward, as he did for certain 
Atlanticist books, to Amb. John Tuthill’s work “The Decisive Years Ahead” (The Atlantic Papers 4, 1972).     
11 Robert Borchardt, West German Embassy, Washington DC, to KB, 12 June 1963, ACDP K157/1.  Other 
books appearing around the same time as Birrenbach’s nd dealing with similar themes, among them 
European unity and the future of the Western world, included: Charles Cerami’s Alliance Born of Danger: 
America, the Common Market, and the Atlantic Partnership (Harcourt, Brace & World); Christian Herter’s 
Toward an Atlantic Community (Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 107 pages), in which 
Herter took up the subject from a very similar viewpoint to that of Birrenbach and explicitly promoted the 
declaration and resolutions of the Atlantic Convention of January 1962 in Paris; Prof. Neil Chamberlain’s 
more provocative and unconventional The West in a World without War (McGraw Hill, 85 pages); Hans A. 
Schmitt’s The Path to European Union (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge); Don Humphrey’s 
The United States and the Common Market, (Praeger); and Walter Hallstein’s United Europe, Challenge 
and Opportunity (the William L. Clayton Lectures at the Fletcher School, Harvard University Press), in 
which Hallstein also explored the economic and political implications of the emerging Europe for the rest 
of the world, particularly for the United States and the Atlantic Partnership.  On these books, see The Wall 
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had presented to the Atlantic Institute staff and Policy Committee in April 1961 as part of 
that institute’s very first study, also focusing on “The Future of the Atlantic Community.”  
As such, it represented another example of the synerg  that existed between the activities 
of the Atlanticist infrastructure and the publications to emerge from the world of German 
Atlanticism.12  It should come as no surprise that Birrenbach’s book, which presented a 
fundamental account and overview of his thinking, analysis and proposals on trans-
Atlantic relations and depicted what he considered th  best long-run solution and one 
superior to the alternative offered by de Gaulle, would not be entirely welcomed by the 
members of the Adenauer cabinet, nor that he should receive, as he put it, “very positive 
commentaries from a whole series of first-class people” in the United States upon the 
publication of his work there.13  However, the book also garnered at least solid, an  often 
positive, reviews from a series of respected German and American sources: among 
others, the Foreign Service Journal, the Saturday Review, Freedom & Union, the Wall 
Street Journal, Das Parlament, and the Zeitschrift für Politik.  Excerpts, essentially 
articles culled from his book, also appeared in Orbis and the Atlantic Community 
Quarterly.14 
                                                                                                                                      
Street Journal, 1 May 1963, ACDP K181/1 and “Toward an Atlantic Community,” Foreign Service 
Journal, September 1963, The Bookshelf, ACDP K181/1. 
12 Birrenbach’s AI memo was dated 15 April 1961.  As we have pointed out in other contexts, this synergy 
was a relatively common phenomenon as the various activities of the Atlanticist infrastructure regularly 
stimulated and fed into the production of a body of high-quality literature.  To cite another example, the 
experiences in the Atlantic Institute’s diverse inter ational conferences, meetings and round table 
discussions with prominent experts exercised significant influence on that organization’s scholarly 
publications.  Likewise, the activities of the DGAP Study Groups played a key role in the studies and 
publications of the DGAP Research Institute.   
13 KB to LR Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 4 April 1963, ACDP K157/1.  For Birrenbach having 
received a number of “very beautiful letters” upon the publication of his book in the US, see KB to Erich 
Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1.  See also KB to LR I. Kl. Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 
25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1.  Birrenbach’s Die Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft had an appendix in 
which was printed the Paris Declaration of the Atlantic Convention of the NATO States of January 1962.   
14 See, for instance, KB to Erich Straetling, 12 July 1963, ACDP K157/1.  For a positive review of Der 
Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft, including praise of Birrenbach’s realism with resp ct to the 
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Actually getting a study manuscript published was often an arduous task for 
Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists.  In the course of his activities within the 
Atlanticist-minded organizations, particularly as a member of the Atlantic Institute and 
Atlantica (but also as part of the DGAP and FTS), Birrenbach, along with personalities 
like Oppenheim and Stahl, was quite involved in many spects of the publication process 
of works of the AI in the Federal Republic as well as in that of other works he deemed of 
considerable importance.  Such trying issues in this process for Birrenbach were matters 
of translation, locating a suitable publisher and negotiating the final terms of publication.  
This latter aspect, involving contract agreements, contributions to the publisher, profit 
margins and costs of production, was particularly tricky given that, in spite of their rather 
impressive quality, blockbuster sales and commercial success generally eluded such 
Atlanticist publications.15  One common practice, and a typical subject and facilitator of 
                                                                                                                                      
analysis in his book (“in contrast to some other conceptions of this type,” including those that saw Europe 
as a “Third Force”), see Helmut Klocke (Munich), Zeitschrift für Politik, Cologne, 2/1963, ACDP K181/1.  
Klocke saw Birrenbach’s book offering the reader a general yet concentrated “programmatic foundation for 
discussion.”  Klocke also stressed the need for further studies about the Western defense conception, about 
the coordination of economic policy (“above all agrrian policy”), about the possibility of a balancing 
[“ Ausgleich”]  of the various national conceptions of policy towards the developing countries, about 
disarmament policy and about policy vis-à-vis the East, which not only contributed to “opinion formation” 
but also to the “active shaping [Mitgestaltung] of the overall political conception [Gesamtkonzeption].”   
Klocke acknowledged that “such works are currently underway in international institutes” (as emerged 
from the “informative” overview “Research Reports on the Theme: EEC, NATO, Atlantic Community” in 
the Offenen Welt, Nr 79, March 1963).  For a very positive review of ZAG, including acclaim for 
Birrenbach’s drafting of “a fascinating picture” of a future Atlantic Community that would “enthuse” 
readers and “fill them with confidence,” see Werner Bögl, Schriftenreihe “Politik”, Das Parlament, Nr 31, 
1 August 1962, ACDP K181/1.  For a very positive review of Birrenbach’s Future of the Atlantic 
Community: Toward European-American Partnership (“[a]n excellent and persuasive plea for European 
and American partnership in an Atlantic Community”), see “Toward an Atlantic Community,” Foreign 
Service Journal, September 1963, The Bookshelf, ACDP K181/1.  For another positive review of 
Birrenbach’s FAC, see The Wall Street Journal, 1 May 1963, ACDP K181/1.  The WSJ believed that 
Birrenbach’s work was “reasonably up-to-date and filled with instructive general ideas on the relationship 
between the US and Europe”, “well versed in internatio l relations”, and presented “the complex 
underlying issues” of its subject “in terms that are understandable to the lay reader.”  On the “hundreds of 
speeches and magazine articles on both sides of theAtlantic every year” that expressed ideas similar to 
Birrenbach’s, see again The Wall Street Journal, 1 May 1963, ACDP K181/1.   
15 For Birrenbach on the German market for “books of this kind” being “smaller than one thinks,” see KB 
to Lord Gladwyn, 27 January 1966, ACDP K064/2.  While earning some income from the sale of their 
publications, the later experiences of the Atlanticis  Institute suggest that Atlanticist organizations 
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negotiations with potential publishers, was the securing of a guaranteed purchase of a 
large number of copies at a suitable, ideally reduc, price (otherwise potentially too 
expensive), for instance by the Atlanticist organiztions themselves, usually to distribute 
to members and friends of those organizations.16  This practice assured at least a certain 
amount of sales, while the Atlanticist institutions and their members also represented a 
ready-made market, ideally at special rates, for such works.  Despite these efforts by 
Birrenbach and others, some glaring weaknesses in the Atlanticist publication program 
persisted.  For instance, although the Atlantic Institute sought to release its publications 
in several languages, its Atlantic Papers appeared in English and French, but not in 
German until 1975.  Not until that year did the Atlantica, the Europa-Union Verlag, the 
Institut für Europäische Politik and the DAtG inaugurate a series that annually published 
four of the Atlantic Papers of interest to German readers. 
Whatever difficulties they may have encountered, Birrenbach and the German 
Atlanticists could at least rest assured that there existed a certain number of publishers 
who were typically willing to publish Atlanticist works and whose interest in such 
products seemed to transcend simple business calculations of financial success and 
                                                                                                                                      
essentially lost money on them overall as a result of the costs of production and distribution.  Thus, for 
1977, the AI expected FF 295,000 in expenditures for its publications and only FF 40,000 in resources from 
their sale.  A bit earlier, one projection for 1976 claimed that an elimination of the French-language edition 
of the publications (apparently referring to the Atlan ic Papers) would save FF 145,000.  Another projection 
for 1976 estimated that the direct additional cost of a French-language edition of the Atlantic Papers would 
be FF 135,000 less the probable subscription, meaning a total direct additional cost of FF 125,000 (Budget-
1976, ACDP K058).  Among the expenses for the Atlantic Papers were honoraria to the writers.  Likewise, 
during the first half of the 1960s, a period when the expenditures and income with respect to the Europa-
Archiv appear to have been essentially stable, the DGAP had to subsidize the Verlagshaus in question for 
the costs of the Europa-Archiv, for instance to the tune of an estimated DM 101,10 for the upcoming year 
1965 (Draft Economic Plan 1965 for the Europa-Archiv, 24 November 1964, ACDP K014/2).   
16 This was the case, for instance, when Birrenbach significantly helped bring about the publication by the 
Econ Verlag (Düsseldorf) in 1969 of Der Krise um den Beitritt Englands, edited by Heinz Kuby, by 
arranging for the Atlantica to acquire two hundred an  fifty copies for its members and friends (and also to 
distribute, for example, to relevant newspapers, journals and research and university institutes) (Walter 
Stahl to the Members of Atlantica, 15 July 1969, ACDP K106/1. 
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turning a profit.  For starters, a number of Atlanticis -minded organizations maintained 
their own in-house publishing operations, such as tho e of the Atlantic Institute and the 
Europa-Union Verlag.17  However, there were also those publishing houses that, while 
institutionally independent, maintained close ties o the Atlanticists.  In this respect, 
Birrenbach enjoyed a particularly close relationship w th the Verlag Rombach, based in 
Freiburg and associated with the prominent Atlanticist Prof. Arnold Bergstraesser.  This 
was the house that, at the arrangement of Walter Stahl and the Atlantica, published 
Birrenbach’s work Die Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft (1962), as well as a 
summary of the conference he had organized on “Europe and America in the World of 
Tomorrow” (1964).18  Another such Atlanticist-minded Verlag was that of Kiepenheuer 
& Witsch, based in Cologne.  This house cooperated particularly closely with the Atlantic 
Institute and Atlantica, a relationship solidified by the membership of Dr. Joseph Witsch 
                                                
17 At least in the first half of the 1960s, during his period as Vice-President of the Europa-Union 
Deutschland (1957-65), Birrenbach served on the B irat (chaired by Friedrich Carl Freiherr von 
Oppenheim) of the Europa-Union Verlag GmbH (Bonn).  Katharina Focke and Gerhard Eickhorn were 
central figures over the years in the active management of this Verlag, which published, among other 
things, EUD documents and reports as well as the EUD’s Europäische Zeitung (run in cooperation with 
Europa (Bern), New Europe (London), Europa in Beweging (The Hague), and Unita Europa (Milan)).   
18 At Birrenbach’s request, Bergstraesser wrote a brief introduction for Die Zukunft der Atlantischen 
Gemeinschaft: Europäisch-Amerikanische Partnerschaft (Verlag Rombach, Freiburg, 1962, 95 pages, DM 
7,80), possibly based on a draft provided by Birrenbach.  This work then appeared as part of the Verlag 
Rombach’s new Schriftenreihe “Politik,” edited by Bergstraesser and devoted to both “fundamental and 
contemporary” political questions and explicitly seeking to promote the cooperation of Politik and 
Wissenschaft.  This series was also an expression of Bergstraesser’s prominent efforts for a broader and 
deeper political and civic Bildung.  Here, Bergstraesser aimed at diverse analyses and interpretations that 
brought together the study of political reality with fundamental questions while stimulating discussion 
through the originality and personal coloring of the accounts.  Earlier volumes in the series “Politik” 
included “Das Atlantische Bündnis” (1960), based on the International Seminar that had been staged in 
April of that year at the University of Freiburg; Führung in der modernen Welt, by Arnold Bergstraesser 
(1961, 56 pages), dealing with issues of leadership and elite formation; Der Christ in der politischen 
Verantwortung, by Hans Asmussen (1961, 61 pages); and Die Geistigen und Sozialen Wandlungen im 
Nahen Osten, by Muhsin Mahdi (1961, 103 pages).  Other volumes appearing in the Rombach Verlag 
included Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung (1961), a collection of Bergstraesser writings and speeches.  
A contribution from this work entitled “Erwachsenenbildung als politische Aufgabe” was also reprinted as 
a supplement of Dem Parlament (Nr 44/1961).  Taking over in January 1966 from the Deutschen Verlags-
Anstalt (Stuttgart), the Verlag Rombach published the journal Außenpolitik for a time during the second 
half of the 1960s until the Übersee-Verlag GmbH (Hamburg; publisher: Harald Boeckmann) assumed this 
role.  By August 1962, Birrenbach’s Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft was easily accessible as a 
paperback book.   
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in the latter organization.  Although their political inclinations might not have been quite 
so clear, a number of other publishing houses also served as important outlets for the 
works of German Atlanticism.  For instance, the DGAP Research Institute maintained a 
long-term relationship with the venerable Oldenbourg Verlag (Munich), the publisher 
from the start of its Jahrbüchern.  It was probably no coincidence that Dr. Thomas 
Cornides, brother of the DGAP’s Wilhelm and therefo ne of Birrenbach’s contacts in 
the publishing world, played a prominent role in, ultimately as leader of, this Verlag.19 
Finally, in addition to their participation in various aspects of the publication 
process, Birrenbach, other German Atlanticists and at least some of their institutions were 
involved in the targeted distribution to an intended audience, not just to the general 
public, of their high-quality literature in an effort to enhance its effectiveness.  As far as 
Birrenbach was concerned, this was especially, thoug  not exclusively, the case with 
regard to the Atlantic Institute, thus keeping in line with its aspirations of functioning as 
something of an Atlantic Monnet Committee.20  Birrenbach often carried out such 
undertakings with respect to works he deemed especially important through the Atlantica, 
                                                
19 Other works of the DGAP Research Institute published by the Oldenbourg Verlag included, for example, 
Südostasien seit 1945 by Emanuel Sarkisyanz (1961).  Thomas Cornides and the Oldenbourg Verlag were 
also involved in printing Fritz Thyssen Stiftung volumes, for instance from the series “Nineteenth Century.”  
Other houses that published Atlanticist works included the Alfred Metzner Verlag (Frankfurt-Berlin), the C. 
Bertelsmann Verlag (Gütersloh) and the C.W. Leske Verlag (Opladen) (all three of which published works 
of the DGAP Research Institute) as well as the Econ-Verlag (Düsseldorf).  At least during the first half of 
the 1960s, the DGAP dealt with the Abteilung Europa-Archiv in the Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am 
Main GmbH (Frankfurt) with regard to publishing, selling and distributing the Europa-Archiv.    
20 Naturally, Birrenbach was not the only figure involved in such efforts at the AI, rather other members of 
its board also took part.  These practices were also evident, for example, at the Atlantik-Brücke.  For 
Birrenbach’s belief that “on the basis of sound research,” the Atlantic Institute should “make practical 
recommendations for action by governments, by the OECD and NATO” and his hope that “the Atlantic 
Institute might do work somewhat similar to that of the Monnet Committee, within an Atlantic framework,” 
see the Confidential Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Atlantic Institute, Paris, 6 
May 1961, 3 PM, Château de la Muette, ACDP K105/2.  On at least the possibility of conceiving of the 
Atlantic Institute as “a Monnet Committee of Action in the Atlantic realm,” the need to convert the results 
of AI activities into “political action,” and the necessity of thinking in terms of a cost-benefit (“cost 
effectiveness”) analysis, see KB to John McCloy, 8 July 1968, ACDP K210/1.  For Birrenbach placing the 
Atlantic Institute alongside the “European Action Committee of Jean Monnet” as “an independent 
international committee,” see Protocol of the Atlantica Member Assembly, 16 June 1969, ACDP K106/1. 
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particularly Stahl, in cooperation with the various publishing houses in question, himself 
determining the most appropriate recipients, chiefly but not only in the political world.  
Indeed, potential recipients of high-quality Atlanticist literature via this method of 
targeted distribution included prominent figures in a broad range of fields: government 
and politics, including cabinet ministers, chairmen of the Fraktionen and other 
parliamentarians, as well as the relevant ministerial bureaucracy (e.g. state secretaries, 
ambassadors); international organizations, including personalities based in Brussels at 
institutions like the European Communities (e.g. Walter Hallstein); the Wirtschaft and 
banking, including the Bundesbank; the Wissenschaft, among them individuals in 
academia, the universities and the research institutes; the media and other opinion 
makers, including newspapers and specialized journals; as well as members, participants 
and friends of the private Atlanticist infrastructure itself.21  Birrenbach also contributed to 
the distribution of his own Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft simply by giving 
copies, via the Rombach Verlag, as gifts.22 
                                                
21 On every Atlantic Institute project being “concluded by recommendations that are communicated to 
governments, international organizations and leaders in the political, economic and social fields,” see AI 
Brochure, January 1972, ACDP K057/2.  For Birrenbach’s assessment that the significance of the Atlantic 
Institute existed in part in its investigation of international problems and the development of pertinn  
“solution proposals and initiatives” and thus its ability “to provide decision aid” for Western governments, 
see Protocol of the Atlantica Member Assembly, 16 June 1969, ACDP K106/1.  Among those 
recommended to receive Atlantic Institute reports were, for instance, members of the AI Board of 
Governors; the general secretariat of NATO, which would itself determine distribution within NATO; the 
ambassadors of the national delegations to NATO; the ministers of foreign affairs of the NATO members; 
within the OECD, the secretary general and the heads of the national delegations; the president of the 
NATO Parliamentarians Conference; the secretary general of the Atlantic Treaty Association; as well as 
other personalities indicated by the AI Policy Committee or AI Director-General as vital recipients by 
reason of their position in the Atlantic Community (G.L. Bassani to KB, 7 March 1961, ACDP K128/1).   
22 For instance, in addition to particular individuals, also to the always financially strapped Jungen 
Europäischen Föderalisten Deutschland (Bonn), a sub-organization of the Europa-Union Deutschland.  
Furthermore, Birrenbach (and the Rombach Verlag) sent copies to members of the press.  Meanwhile, 
copies of Birrenbach’s book were ordered and paid for by the Atlantica (Hamburg), the Europa-Union 
Deutschland (Bonn) and the Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft (Bonn), arranged largely through Stahl, 
who played a major role in the distribution.  The Bundestag (at least the Unionsfraktion) and the 
Bundesbank also acquired several hundred copies total (the latt r pparently due to Vice President Heinrich 
Troeger).  The books were then passed on throughout t ese organizations.  On all this, see ACDP K151/1.    
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C. Influencing the Broader West German Masses 
 These aforementioned publications and functions helped spread the Atlanticist 
worldview to a specialized, sophisticated and interested public and may eventually have 
even filtered down to a much larger audience.  However, the German Atlanticists 
ultimately strived to extend their worldview not only indirectly but also directly to the 
broader West German public.  Although not actually determined by the Atlanticists 
themselves, the extraordinary visits to the Federal Republic by prominent foreign leaders 
from the Anglo-Saxon world played an important role in this process.  Trips by President 
Kennedy (1963) and Queen Elizabeth II (1965) were spectacles that dazzled the public, 
including the media, and gave courage and impetus to the German Atlanticists.  
Birrenbach was perfectly well aware of the significan e of a trip like Kennedy’s, noting 
with satisfaction that “the echo was far greater than that of the September [1962] trip of 
the General [de Gaulle] to Germany….  I believe that is immunizing injection came at 
the right time.”23  However, Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticis s could not rely 
solely on such rare and fortuitous occasions bestowed on them by foreign dignitaries.  It 
                                                
23 KB to Henry Kissinger, 8 July 1963, ACDP K146/3.  For Birrenbach being “very happy about the echo 
in Germany to the visit of the American President Kennedy,” see KB to Jean Monnet, 4 July 1963, ACDP 
K050/2.  For Birrenbach’s participation in the events related to Kennedy’s “great visit,” including the 
Chancellor’s evening function, the evening “by” theAmerican ambassador, the F ier in the Paulskirche in 
Frankfurt, and the function in Wiesbaden, see KB to LR I. Kl. Robert Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 
25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1.  As of June 1965, Birrenbach was informing his British contacts that the 
queen’s visit had been an “outstanding success” and hoped for a noticeable impact on Anglo-German 
relations, KB to Baroness Emmet of Amberley, House of Lords, London, 9 June 1965, ACDP K064/2.  
Though it had a much different character, the earlir visit of US Vice President Lyndon Johnson to West 
Berlin in August 1961, along with the arrival of 1,500 American soldiers, was also enthusiastically 
welcomed and the continuation of such gestures was con idered important.  On de Gaulle’s trip “through” 
the Federal Republic in the “fall” of 1962; his apprently successful efforts on that visit to influenc  the 
West German population as a whole in a Gaullist direction through his speeches in German as well as to
court particular segments of that population, including the youth (speech in Ludwigsburg), the 
Arbeiterschaft (speech in the August-Thyssen-Hütte) and the industriali ts (the Rheinfahrt from Düsseldorf 
to Duisburg); his plans for his next visit next summer, combined with an even stronger continuation of such 
efforts; the astonishingly favorable attitude towards de Gaulle of many Germans occupying high positions 
in their professions; and fears of de Gaulle’s influence on the German youth, see “De Gaulle, We and the 
Western World: Short Overview about the Foreign Political Situation on the Basis of the Double ‘No’ in 
the Well-Known Speech of de Gaulle,” 26 February 1963, unknown author (not by KB), ACDP K011/1.  
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was also necessary for them to undertake their own efforts.  Among the instruments they 
employed from time to time for reaching a larger audience was the mass pro-American 
rally.  Probably the most salient example of this in B rrenbach’s career occurred in the 
wake of the assassination of President Kennedy, when Birrenbach, along with the 
members of the Steuben-Schurz-Gesellschaft in Düsseldorf (of which Birrenbach was 
chairman), took part in arranging a Gedenkfeier of “our Amerika Gesellschaften” for 
Kennedy in Düsseldorf’s Robert Schumann Hall.  According to Birrenbach, more than 
two thousand people attended this assembly on 1 December 1963, with “hundreds outside 
the doors,” to hear the speeches from Birrenbach and others, a rather impressive showing 
considering the somewhat “improvised” nature of the ev nt.24 
Perhaps even more effective, and certainly more constant and capable of reaching 
a broad mass audience were the channels provided by the modern mass media.  
Birrenbach, a man acutely aware of the power of this mass media in politics and public 
life, offers an example of how one particular German Atlanticist attempted to take 
advantage of the opportunities it presented.25  For one thing, Birrenbach appeared from 
                                                
24 KB to AW Schmidt, Pittsburgh PA (USA), 16 December 1963, ACDP K157/1.  On “our Amerika 
Gesellschaften,” see KB to Hans Bolewski, 10 December 1963, ACDP K015.  This Gedenkfeier for 
Kennedy was jointly staged by the Steuben-Schurz-Gesellscahft e.V. (Düsseldorf) along with, at least 
ostensibly, the Deutsch-Amerikanischen Gesellschaft e.V. (Frankfurt) and the Atlantik-Brücke e.V. 
(Hamburg) and occurred without the benefit of advertising on the radio or even posters.  For Birrenbach’s 
speech on this occasion, see ACDP K077/2.  Other speakers included US ambassador George McGhee.       
25 Thus, Birrenbach attributed the ability of the Brandt government to “sell” its Ostpolitik to the West 
German population to what he considered its almost total control over this mass media.  On the major role
of the “mass media,” its pro-government presentation of issues like the Grundvertrag (which also fell just 
prior to the election), the European summit conference and the Olympic Games and the consequent 
deception of “the German public,” in the “negative el ction result” (coalition victory) in November 1972; 
on the role in the coalition’s election success of the unprecedented speaking of ministers “in the most 
important large Betrieben”  in helping generate a “total mobilization of the B triebe”; and on the general 
power of a “government apparatus” in generating an “overwhelming” publicity in favor of incumbents (in 
the Federal Republic but also in the United States, where the sitting American President “as good as never” 
lost the election) that was virtually impossible for an opposition to counter, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 
23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  Though acknowledging that the election result was not alone Barzel’s 
fault (rather there were “deeper reasons”), Birrenbach also pointed out here to Thomas the more favorable 
 369
time to time on television, for instance on the various interview programs or on programs 
dealing with contemporary history.26  At times, his numerous speeches were occasionally 
reprinted, either in whole or in part, in the mass press.  Perhaps the most striking example 
of this was his Bundestag speech of 29 January 1971, dealing with the attitudes of the 
West and the German Ostpolitik, which appeared in its entirety in Der Welt.27  Beyond 
this, Birrenbach also wrote a considerable number of a ticles for the prominent organs of 
the mass quality press in the Federal Republic overthe years, including a variety of 
leading dailies and weeklies: the D utsche Zeitung/Christ und Welt, Handelsblatt, 
Industriekurier, the Rheinische Merkur, the Rheinische Post, he Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Die Welt and Die Zeit.28  Meanwhile, his articles also appeared 
                                                                                                                                      
public image of Brandt vis-à-vis that of Barzel, esp cially vital in a “personalbezogenen”  election as 
“shrewdly” orchestrated by the SPD in 1972. 
26 For instance, as part of his efforts to combat anti-Americanism in the Federal Republic during the lat
1960s, Birrenbach appeared and expressed his opinions, along with the historian Günter Moltmann and the 
journalist Theo Sommer, on an NDR documentary program by Wolfgang Rieger of 1 March 1969 (“Ami 
go home, Spielarten und Wandlungen des Anti-Amerikanismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”).  For 
Birrenbach presenting his views on television, here explaining the United States “perspective” on 
European-American relations, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. 
27 This turned out to be the only speech from this particular Bundestag debate, aside from the state of the 
union speech, that was reprinted in its entirety in one of the major national West German newspapers.  
Birrenbach’s speech of 29 January 1971 also appeared as an enclosure with the DAtG eV Information 
Letter of 26 February 1971 (Nr. 54, Bonn).   
28 Birrenbach’s articles in the Industriekurier included: “US-Zahlungsbilanz und atlantische Partnerschaft” 
(5 June 1962).  In the Rheinischen Merkur: “Amerika wird in Europa bleiben” (8 March 1974).  In Dem 
Spiegel: “Für Europa ein Primus?” (18 August 1965), which was a favorable review of the work of 
Birrenbach’s fellow Atlanticist Ernst Majonica, whic  Birrenbach undertook on the advice of the American 
embassy.  In Handelsblatt: “Die Freihandelskrise birgt ernste Gefahren” (22 April 1959, on the “crisis” 
surrounding the free-trade zone); “Der Weg zu einem größeren Europa” (June 1961); and “Atlantische 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft-eine Illusion?” (23-24 February 1962).  In the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 
“Die deutsch-englische Verstimmung” (18 April 1959).  In Der Welt: “Integration und 
Wiedervereinigung?” (11 August 1962); “Der Kanal ist keine Grenze” (WamS, “Man schreibt uns,” 27 
January 1963, a comment on the Franco-German Treaty and Atlantic Partnership); “Was die Verbündeten 
wirklich denken...” (5 February 1971); “Die USA und Westeuropa: Partner oder Rivalen?” (17 February 
1973, excerpted from an Europa-Archiv article); “Amerika-fühlt es sich alleingelassen?” (14 June 1975, on 
the US-European relationship and US attitude towards its NATO allies after the collapse of South 
Vietnam); “Carter zwischen Ideal und harter Realität” (30 December 1976); and “Der neue Mann setzt auf 
Kontinuität” (31 December 1976), the last two a two-part article on Carter’s future foreign policy at the 
invitation of Der Welt).  In the Deutschen Zeitung/Christ und Welt: “Partnerschaft bleibt das Ziel” (31 
December 1963; “Die Wirtschaft an der Jahreswende”); “Moskauer Vertrag-Fragen an Willy Brandts 
Regierung” (4 September 1970, questions for the forign minister on the interpretation of the Moscow 
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from time to time in party-oriented journals, such as Die Politische Meinung and the 
Politische-Soziale Korrespondenz.29  The possibilities for such mass propaganda were 
enhanced by the fact that the Atlanticists enjoyed powerful allies among newspaper 
publishers like Gerd Bucerius and Marion Gräfin Dönhoff (both Die Zeit) and Axel 
Springer (Die Welt). 
In a larger sense, Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists cultivated the 
members of the mass media, and well beyond just thee major publishing figures, as a 
valuable outlet to a mass audience.  Influential German media figures were invited to 
become members of the Atlanticist organizations and to attend various Atlanticist 
functions, either in their capacity as members, active participants or guests and were, 
furthermore, encouraged to report to the public via their respective media on their 
experiences.30  International conferences specifically among journalists were staged, 
including a German-American journalists meeting in Ju e 1971 in Gummersbach on the 
                                                                                                                                      
Treaty); “Ist Bonn skeptischer geworden?  Ein Gespräch mit dem CDU-Abgeordneten Kurt Birrenbach 
nach seiner Rückkehr aus Washington” (2 July 1971, “Deutschlandpolitik”); “Die Schatten der 
Vergangenheit: Der Staat der Juden besteht 25 Jahre” (4 May 1973); and “Kann Amerika die Sowjets noch 
bremsen?” (18 April 1975).  In Der Zeit: “Lockt der rote Handel?” (27 November 1964); and 
“Wiedervereinigung-reicht unser Atem?” (28 April 1967, about Europe and the German question, a 
shortened version of an Europa-Archiv article).  For Birrenbach as the only MdB in the public discussion 
working for an improvement in German-British relations and for a rapid solution of the free-trade zone 
question (with reference to Birrenbach’s April 1959 articles in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the 
Handelsblatt), see H. Cammann, ECSC, Delegation of the High Authority in the United Kingdom, London, 
to KB, Düsseldorf, 27 April 1959, ACDP K001/2.   
29 Essays Birrenbach wrote and then published in Der Politischen Meinung (Zweimonatshefte für Fragen 
der Zeit) included: “Der dritte Partner: Wann kommt die deutsch-englische Verständigung?” (November 
1959); “Was will Kennedy?  Der amerikanisch-sowjetische Dialog” (November 1963); “Kennedy und 
Johnson: Kontinuität in der Demokratie” (December 1963, “Zeitkritik”); “Westliche Allianz” (March 1964, 
“Briefe an die Redaktion,” dated 6 February 1964, Düsseldorf); “Deutsche Aufgaben heute: Die 
außenpolitische Lage nach dem 21. August” (Heft 126, 9 9); “Die Zukunft unserer Sicherheit: Risiken 
und Notwendigkeiten einer Konferenz” (Heft 130, 1970); “Kritik aus dem Westen” (“Acht Einwände von 
draußen”; Heft 135, 1971, based on his 29 January Bundestag speech); and “Grenzen der 
Entspannungspolitik: Die Vereinigten Staaten und Europa” (November/December 1973).  Birrenbach’s 
articles in the Politisch-Sozialen Korrespondenz included “Die amerikanische Berlin-Politik” (Spring 
1961).   
30 For instance, it was not least for this reason that members of the media, like the WDR’s Klaus von 
Bismarck, were included in the German Kuratorium for the Kennedy Memorial Library (see later in this 
chapter), which helped in securing press coverage. 
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rather generic overall topic “Germany and the United States in 1971.”31  By 1969-70, the 
Atlantic Institute was holding press seminars in Paris that brought together prominent 
experts with interested journalists from respected publications to assess, debate and 
discuss particular crucial international relations themes and mutual problems currently 
facing the nations of the Atlantic world.32  By December 1976, the AI had created an 
                                                
31 On this German-American journalists meeting in June 1971 as well as an American-French journalists 
meeting in Bellaggio in May 1970, see the Report of the German General Consulate in New York, 5 
October 1972, ACDP K183/2.  According to this report, Robert Kleiman of the New York Times had been 
impressed by what he considered the success of these gatherings and was convinced it would be useful to 
stage a European-American journalists conference in New York in 1973.  In this proposed undertaking, 
Kleiman enjoyed a warm offer of support from the head of the German Information Center (Hoffmann).  
Kleiman was significantly motivated by his belief in the not inconsiderable role played by the leading 
European and American journalists in identifying, thinking through and tackling the problems of European-
American relations.  With respect to his proposed conference, Kleiman stressed his desire to attain 
“independence” by obtaining funding from foundations and other “independent institutions,” rather than 
relying on “staatliche Gelder.”  
32 The first such press seminars were held jointly with the International Press Institute (Zurich), with the 
first one (March 1969) being staged, exceptionally, in Brussels.  As of 1976 and 1977, there were about six 
AI Press Seminars per year.  Themes included: “The Atlantic Alliance and the Seventies” (March 1969); 
“Economic Problems of the Atlantic Community” (Janury 1970); “The Future of the Dollar” (28 February 
1978); “The Economic and Political Problems Faced by Advanced Countries in Developing Nuclear 
Energy” (3 April 1978); “The European Parliament: Symbol or Substance?” (14 February 1979); “Can the 
Industrial Powers Cope with the Oil Predicament?” (5 July 1979); and “Collapse of a Planned Economy: 
Consequences of the Polish Crisis for East and West” (11 February 1982).  Planned AI Press Seminars also 
included those on “Managing the Float” (end of March 1976); nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation (16 
December 1976); Eastern European borrowing in international financial markets (January or February 
1977); and “The Future of the World Trade System” (24 June 1982).  Such meetings involved opening 
remarks from the AI Director-General (who chaired the press seminars), statements and presentations by 
the expert panelists, questions from the journalists and, of course, discussion.  Journalists, including 
Americans, present at the press seminars hailed from important German, American, British, French, Italian, 
Swiss, Dutch and Spanish publications including Die Zeit; Die Welt; the New York Times; Time Magazine; 
The Los Angeles Times; The Wall Street Journal; Business Week; The Observer (London); the Financial 
Times; the French Press Agency; Le Monde; Les Échos (Mr. Tristan Doelnitz); France Culture; the Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung; Financieele Dagblad (Amsterdam); N.R.C. Handelsblad (Rotterdam); and La Vanguardia 
(Barcelona).  The first two press seminars (March 1969 and January 1970) were attended by about forty 
journalists each.  Sixteen journalists were present at the conference of 3 April 1978 (on nuclear energy), 
among them several well-known scientific editors, some economics editors, and chief Paris correspondents 
of such publications.  German journalists taking part in AI Press Seminars included Marion Gräfin Dönhoff 
(Die Zeit) and August Graf von Kageneck (Die Welt).  Expert panelists participating in the meetings 
included Germans like Dr. Ulf Lantzke (Executive Director of the International Energy Agency); Dr. 
Hanns Maull (former European Secretary of the Trilater l Commission and author of the report on energy 
published by that body); and Jochen van Aerssen (CDU MdB and MdEP, Vice-President of the Europa-
Union); as well as non-German figures like Prof. Charles Kindleberger (Prof. Emeritus of Economics, 
MIT); Dr. Octave du Temple (Executive Director of the American Nuclear Society); Ian Smart (an 
independent energy consultant and former Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs); Alan Lee Williams (Labour Member of the British Parliament, Former Parliamentary Secretary to 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Treasurer of the Labour Committee for European Affairs, 
Deputy Director of the European Movement); Dr. Norman Lawrence Franklin (a nuclear industrialist who 
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editorial advisory committee of distinguished editors from the United States and Europe, 
which met twice a year to provide guidance to this program (for example, 
recommendations on topics and participation), with Gräfin Dönhoff as one of this group’s 
key members.  Seeking to reach a larger audience, the German members of the Atlanticist 
organizations staged press conferences, for instance to present recent resolutions or 
publications emerging from their institutions.33   
Birrenbach played a role in all of this and, moreovr, utilized his numerous close 
contacts with influential German (and American) journalists and media figures to ensure 
that important Atlanticist resolutions, declarations, meetings, activities, speeches and 
other news relating to organizations like the Monnet Committee or the DGAP received 
due publicity in the Federal Republic.34  Birrenbach nurtured and enjoyed prominent 
                                                                                                                                      
was Chairman and Managing Director of the Nuclear Power Company, England); Amb. Olivier Wormser 
(former governor of the Banque de France and former ambassador to the Federal Republic); Chafic Akhras 
(President of the Al Saudi Bank in Paris); Jean Saint-Geours (President-Director General, SEMA; member 
of the Club of Rome; member of the Commission de l’Énergie au Plan; and President of the Groupe pour la 
Croissance Économe de l’Énergie (EEC)); François Bujon de l’Estang (Director for International Relations 
of the French Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique); Jan-Pierre Cot (Member of the French National 
Assembly and of the European Parliament, Member of the Executive Office of the Socialist Party, National 
Delegate for European Questions); Michel Habib-Deloncle (former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
former Vice-President of the European Parliament); Dr. Marcello Colitti (Director of Planning, Ente 
Nazionale Idrocarburi); Hon. Altiero Spinelli (Indep ndent Member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and 
of the European Parliament, Former Commissioner of the European Community for Industrial Policy and 
Technology); Manlio Brosio (Secretary General of NATO); Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer (SACEUR); and Prof. 
Alexandre Lamfalussy (Head of the Monetary and Economic Department, Bank of International 
Settlements).  For example, the panel at the seminar of 14 February 1979 was composed of four 
parliamentarians and one former minister.  Special lunch guests at such press seminars included: Mr. Lisle
Wideman (Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary Affairs of the United States Treasury), 
who gave a detailed account of the American governmnt’s present thinking during the luncheon; and 
Amb. Herbert Salzman (United States Representative to the OECD).  It appears Birrenbach was never 
invited to take part in AI Press Seminars.  For summaries, see Press Seminar on “The Future of the Dollar,” 
Paris, 28 February 1978, ACDP K058; Report on AIIA Press Seminar, 3 April 1978, ACDP K129/1; and 
AI Press Seminar on “The European Parliament,” 14 February 1979, ACDP K104/2.  Personalities at the 
AI managing the series of press seminars included Dr. Gregory Flynn (US) and, then, beginning in January 
1977 Mlle Françoise Gondrée.   
33 More broadly, the Atlantic Institute, for example, held press conferences to announce the release of its 
publications, including Atlantic Papers. 
34 For example, Birrenbach endeavored so that speeches giv n at the DGAP received press coverage and 
publicity, even if this entailed their burdensome translation from English into German (see, for instace, 
KB to Sen. Edward Kennedy, 19 April 1974, ACDP K184/1).  For a press release of 17 July 1961 from the 
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Atlanticist-minded contacts and allies, in some cases of international rank, in the West 
German media and press landscape, whom he also kept informed of his own activities, 
with whom he engaged in extensive idea exchanges, and to whom he distributed his own 
articles, speeches and “America-reports,” not least in an effort to exert some measure of 
influence or even to encourage their publication, thus further enhancing their spread.  
Such contacts and allies included figures like Marion Gräfin Dönhoff (Die Zeit), Theo 
Sommer (Die Zeit), Jürgen Tern (FAZ), Günther Gillessen (FAZ), Jan G. Reifenberg 
(FAZ), Alfred Rapp (FAZ), Axel Springer (Die Welt), Ernst Cramer (Die Welt), Herbert 
Kremp (Rheinische Post/Die Welt), Georg Schröder (Die Welt), Hans Hellwig (Deutsche 
Zeitung), Anton Böhm (Rheinischer Merkur), and Klaus von Bismarck (Westdeutscher 
Rundfunk).35  It seems that these efforts, along with those of his ellow Atlanticists, were 
                                                                                                                                      
Deutschen Rat der Europäischen Bewegung, the Europa-Union Deutschland and the Jungen Europäischen 
Föderalisten Deutschland (Bonn) and related attachments (the European Parliament’s “Resolution about 
the Political Cooperation between the Member States of the European Communities” of 29 June 1961 and 
the “Political Resolution accepted by the Congress of the European Movement” on 17 June 1961), see 
ACDP K007/1.  From 1960-62, Hans Furler was President of the European Parliament in Strasbourg.   
35 These personalities comprised a wide array of publishers, editors-in-chief, editors, Intendanten and 
correspondents.  With respect to Die Zeit, personalities like Dönhoff, Sommer and Gerd Bucerius, among 
certain other prominent figures of the West German press, were all active members of and participants in 
the German Atlanticist organizations.  Also, in 1983, Helmut Schmidt would become a co-publisher of Der
Zeit.  Birrenbach was in contact with the FAZ’s Reifenbrg especially during the latter’s stints as a 
correspondent in Washington DC, to a lesser extent while the latter was in Paris.  Die Welt and Die Zeit (as 
well as Der Spiegel) were based in Hamburg, while the WDR was based in Cologne.  Die Welt was part of 
the Springer publishing concern, which in 1966 erected its own main headquarters in West Berlin near the 
Wall.  On the other hand, it is noteworthy that, among the major West German newspapers, Birrenbach 
really had no substantial contact with the Süddeutschen Zeitung, situated in Munich.  Beginning from the 
group’s inception in 1964 and well into the 1970s (still as of 1975), Birrenbach, having been initially 
approached by Gustav Stein (BDI, Cologne), was at least a nominal member of a small Handelsblatt 
advisory circle, though he appears to have rarely, if ever, been able to actually accept the invitations to 
attend the meetings held once or twice a year.  Such sessions, including dinners together afterwards, aimed 
at an open discussion and exchange of opinions on pressing contemporary economic themes and problems 
between, on the one hand, the publishers and leading e itors at the Handelsblatt (Düsseldorf), among them 
Friedrich Vogel (publisher) and Klaus Bernhardt and Karl Heinrich Herchenröder (editors-in-chief), and, 
on the other hand, some of the most important personalities of the West German Wirtschaft (including in 
the fields of industry, banking and insurance).  Most significantly, they provided the figures of the 
Wirtschaft the opportunity to express their opinions, viewpoints, criticisms, wishes and experiences to the 
journalists, in the expectation they would be reflected in the content of the prominent West German 
business newspaper.  Even with Birrenbach typically absent, Thyssen was well represented over the years
among the participants (who were necessarily approved by the other members), including by Ernst Wolf 
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well rewarded in that the key West German (and international) media, press and 
journalistic elite reported quite extensively on Atlanticist undertakings and appears to 
have been generally pro-Atlanticist in its broader articles and overall reporting in these 
principal media outlets.36 
                                                                                                                                      
Mommsen (Thyssen Röhrenwerke AG); Dieter Spethmann (August-Thyssen-Hütte AG); and Egon 
Overbeck (Mannesmann AG).  Meetings were often heldat the Industrie-Club in Düsseldorf but also in 
major cities throughout the Federal Republic, as well as at the headquarters of these Thyssen figures, such 
as the Thyssen Hochhaus in Düsseldorf.    
36 The Atlanticist institutions, functions and declarations received extensive coverage in the West German 
and broader international press (including the printing of entire texts).  Monnet’s Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe enjoyed particular notice for its meetings and resolutions, with newspapers, 
including West German ones, regularly reporting on its gatherings.  For the Monnet Committee meetings 
receiving “attention” in the six countries of the European Community, Britain and the USA, see Jacques 
Van Helmont to KB, 26 May 1965, ACDP K050/2.  Such later examples include newspaper articles in the 
FAZ of 13 March 1969 (“Monnet Committee Deploys Itself for EEC-Entrance of England”); The Times 
(London) of 12 March 1969 (“Five Experts Plot Europe’s Course”); The Guardian of 12 March 1969; Le 
Monde of 13 March 1969; and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 8 March 1969.  Indeed, the FAZ typically 
printed the full texts of the Monnet Committee declarations on its “documentation” page.  Likewise, in 
December 1962, the resolutions of the Monnet Committee were reprinted in The Times.  As of 27 June 
1962, the Deutsche Zeitung had printed a full page about the Monnet Committee, which had just released a 
joint declaration the previous day (Hellwig, DZ editor-in-chief, telex to KB, 27 June 1962, ACDP K051/1).  
Also, for the Declaration of Atlantic Unity being covered in November 1962 by the Nachrichtenspiegel, see 
the attachment to the Nachrichtenspiegel I of 13 November 1962, ACDP K152/2.  On the NATO 
Parliamentarians Conference of November 1962, including speeches of prominent personalities, receiving 
coverage in the New York Times and Combat (France), see the main news items in the NATO Press 
Service, 13 November 1962, ACDP K152/2.  Hosting such well-known speakers certainly helped attract 
attention to Atlanticist gatherings, as further evidenced by the noteworthy reporting in the newspapers 
about Birrenbach’s own Übersee-Tag speech in May 1963.  For the foreign press also dev ting extensive 
attention to Atlanticist undertakings, here especially the wide coverage of the principal speeches given at 
the opening session of the NPC in November 1963 in the British, American and French press, see Press 
Review, NATO Press Service, 5 November 1963, ACDP K154/1.  As of November 1964, the New York 
Times, the Washington Post and the Evening Star had all run editorials on the NPC-related ADELA 
(development projects for Latin America, see Chapter 8).  For the German press, here the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, reporting on proposals made by German participants t he annual conference of the North 
Atlantic Assembly, see “NATO soll Mitgliedsstaaten helfen: NAA fordert ‘Marshall Plan’ für Südeuropa,” 
SDZ (Munich), 18 November 1974, Bundestag Press Documentation, London (dpa), ACDP K213/2.  For
an apparently Atlanticist-minded FAZ allocating front-page space to describe the nature of the Atlantik-
Brücke and its activities, here in a by and large positive assessment of the AB and the American Council on 
Germany, particularly of the 1977 German-American Co ference, and more broadly of the meetings and 
other endeavors of such private organizations in general, see “Transatlantische Eilsache,” by Robert Hld, 
FAZ, 16 March 1977, p. 1, ACDP K134/2.  On Birrenbach’s pleasure about the German press (including 
the FAZ and Die Welt) publishing articles on 5 May 1980 reporting on the ceremony in Karlsruhe in which 
John McCloy had been awarded the Lucius D. Clay Medal, see KB to John McCloy, 5 May 1980, ACDP 
K178/2.  Such press outlets also covered other Atlanticist functions like the Königswinter Conferences.  Of 
course, the Atlanticists were not alone in employing media to their advantage, as strikingly demonstrated 
by de Gaulle’s famous press conferences.  On the efforts of the Bundeskorrespondenz- und Verlag GmbH 
(Frankfurt), closely aligned with the federal government, to spread doubts about British firmness vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union (highlighting an alleged tendency to compromise) and therefore about the desirability of a 
British entrance into the EEC that might bring unwated consequences, as well as a defense of the attitudes 
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 At the same time, it was believed that secrecy retain d its virtues in certain 
instances, where publicity could be a double-edged sword and, on balance, more could be 
accomplished if the press were kept at a distance.  Such a circumstance could simply be 
the result of the peculiar function of a particular organization.  Most obvious in this 
regard was the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, whose studies were generally 
confidential and not intended for public consumption.  In other instances, a measure of 
secrecy facilitated the carrying out of certain functions and enhanced the value of 
particular activities.  For instance, the confidentiality imposed on the proceedings of the 
meetings of the Monnet Committee, the functions and stu y groups of the DGAP, certain 
elements of the NPC sessions (e.g. committee meetings), and the panel sessions of the 
AB’s German-American Conferences encouraged participants to speak frankly, without 
the fear, for instance, that their remarks might be exploited by their political opposition.37  
In another sense, Birrenbach preserved secrecy in expressing his ideas, views and 
judgments in various public forums and public relations actions not only by avoiding the 
revelation of secret information in his possession but also by rather impressionistically 
making points in a “discrete,” “decent” and “cautios” manner.  In part, this entailed 
scaling back, for instance, his criticisms of the United States, whether of its Presidents 
                                                                                                                                      
of Adenauer and de Gaulle in this question, for insta ce in a lead article “British Escapades,” by Martin 
Vogel (currently in London), circulated through its Sonderdienst, see “Copy” of 12 February 1963, ACDP 
K011/1.   
37  However, this secrecy could be a fragile thing.  Such was particularly the case when journalists were 
present in an Atlanticist context, whether as members or participants.  In these instances, they could be, and 
at least sometimes were, pressured by their editors or other superiors to report about “off-limits” details of 
specific functions, an act that patently threatened to cast doubt on the so vital confidentiality.  See, for 
instance, the examples with respect to DGAP functios provided in Daniel Eisermann, Außenpolitik und 
Strategiediskussion: Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1955 bis 1972 (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999).  While Birrenbach obviously understood the value of publicity in some 
respects, he also recognized the worth of subtle and private diplomacy.  For Birrenbach’s insistence in his 
key Sondermission meeting with the Americans (Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, and Leddy) of 8 
November 1965 in the State Department that an American proposal regarding nuclear issues, here those of 
an MLF and nuclear control, must be presented by the US President “to the most important powers” and “i  
a small circle without publicity,” see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. 
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and administrations, its foreign policy, or of particular experiences there, and his 
depictions at times of what he considered an abhorrent mood in Europe.  Thus, relative to 
his private correspondence and interactions, Birrenbach publicly adopted a more abstract, 
milder, “insinuating” approach, sometimes omitting “certain doubts,” suppressing less 
flattering thoughts and often revealing “only the tip of the iceberg.”  Moreover, regarding 
secrecy, he made it a point to protect the identity of his (typically American) “friends” 
who provided him with information and opinions on diverse and delicate matters, even if 
this occasionally led to a lack of expressed precision and clarity regarding the ascertained 
“American attitude,” all in the interests of averting any “Vertrauensbruch.”38        
Birrenbach was also constantly on the look-out for and enthusiastically sought to 
have abundant honors bestowed upon his foreign conta ts, particularly Monnet, for their 
achievements but well aware, too, of the resultant attention and public relations 
benefits.39  Birrenbach’s greatest failure in this regard was undoubtedly the drive he 
spearheaded in early 1971 (January-February) to propose Monnet for and hopefully 
secure him the Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution to “peace and understanding among 
the peoples,” an undertaking that received further impetus from his desire to deny the 
honor to Chancellor Willy Brandt.40  Birrenbach played a central role in this endeavor 
through his initiative in hatching the idea, in securing the support of the German 
members of the Monnet Committee and then, with their lp, the approval of the 
members from other countries, and finally in putting together, along with Katharina 
                                                
38 For Birrenbach’s newspaper articles, here in the Federal Republic, revealing “only the tip of the iceberg,” 
see for instance KB to Hermann J. Abs, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 21 October 1977, ACDP K151/2.   
39 In 1959, the West German President had already granted Monnet the highest relevant German 
Ordensstufe (the Großkreuz).  Otherwise, it seems certain that Birrenbach would have pushed for that 
award in June 1968 as Monnet approached his 80th birthday.   
40 On Monnet’s “extraordinarily important contribution” to “peace and understanding among the peoples,” 
see KB telex to Rainer Barzel, 12 January 1971, ACDP K140/2.   
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Focke (SPD) and based on a draft of Francois Deshormes, the definitive proposal in the 
name of the members of the action committee to the Nobel Prize Committee in Oslo.41  
Writing to Monnet in October 1971 after learning of the “regrettable” decision of the 
Storting’s Nobel Committee to grant Brandt the prize, Birrenbach remarked:  
This is without any doubt a party decision since the majority of the Storting is 
social-democratic or socialist….  If the Storting would have granted the Nobel 
Prize to you [Monnet] this would have given a new lift to the European idea in a 
moment when Europe and the world need this lift more than ever.  This would 
have made historical sense.  On the other side, granting the Prize to Brandt now is 
equivalent to an interference in the process of forming a definite public opinion in 
Germany.  Nobody has ever had the idea to grant the Nob l Prize to Adenauer.  
But after two years of unfinished work a social-democratic influenced Committee 
grants it to Brandt.  I can only say in this painful moment that I regret this 
decision deeply for you and our common cause.  It will help the Russians.  Will it 
contribute to peace?  I do not know.42 
 
Birrenbach had greater success in some other similar efforts, having arranged that 
Monnet be granted an honorary doctorate from the University of Cologne, definitively 
decided on in October 1968, and that Hajo Holborn be granted the first Inter Nationes 
Prize at a ceremony in Bonn-Bad Godesberg on 19 June 1969 (in which Birrenbach gave 
the Laudatio), in recognition of his work for German-American uderstanding and of his 
“gegenwartsbezogenen” i terpretation of German history.43 
                                                
41 The proposal was signed by the Monnet Committee members of the parliaments and governments (only 
they were qualified to make such a proposal) of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, 
Britain, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  The German signers were Walter Arendt, Rainer Barzel, 
Birrenbach, Brandt, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Helmut Schmidt and Herbert Wehner.  Walter Scheel did not 
sign, doubting that it was a good idea that an organization nominated its own president, something that 
“could lead to misunderstandings” that did not do justice to the matter at hand nor to the personalities 
involved.  Therefore, he opposed at least this procedure (Scheel telex to KB, 13 January 1971, ACDP 
K140/2).  At the time, MdB Focke, daughter of Ernst Friedlaender, was actually the Parliamentary State 
Secretary in Willy Brandt’s Bundeskanzleramt. 
42 KB to Jean Monnet, 20 October 1971, ACDP K140/2. 
43 Regarding Monnet’s honorary doctorate, Birrenbach ppears to have been in contact at the University of 
Cologne with both Prof. Theodor Wessels (Institut für Energiewirtschaft), in whose faculty the degree was 
granted and who seems to have been particularly instrumental in securing the honor, and State Secretary 
a.D. Prof. Dr. Alfred Müller-Armack (Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik).  As of June 1969, there had still been 
no related ceremony at the University of Cologne, apparently due to Monnet’s repeated postponements, nor 
any other official presentation of the honor, and it is not clear when or even if the honorary doctorate was 
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D. Influencing the American Public 
However, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists were not solely interested in 
molding public opinion in the Federal Republic, rather they also devoted considerable 
energy to influencing such opinion abroad, particularly in the United States.  As already 
alluded to, Gaullists in the Federal Republic regularly attacked Atlanticist policies and 
personalities in books, the mainstream and Gaullist press and via other publications and 
public relations actions, while de Gaulle’s own press conferences and foreign trips 
resonated extraordinarily abroad.44  Among the further complicating factors these 
                                                                                                                                      
ever physically transferred to Monnet.  Birrenbach’s earlier efforts (June-July 1968) to secure an honorary 
doctorate for Monnet from the University of Bonn via Prof. Ulrich Scheuner (Institut für Völkerrecht) 
failed due to a lack of unified opinion, especially the opposition of a key faculty member (an economist) 
who was a proponent of the Erhard course and had clashed repeatedly with Monnet in the first years of the 
Montanunion.  Holborn was given the Inter Nationes Prize, only a few hours before his death, by State 
Secretary Günter Diehl (Chairman of the V rwaltungsrat of Inter Nationes eV), in the quarters of that 
organization.  An Inter Nationes Festschrift devoted to Holborn also emerged in both German and English 
in 1969, containing essays by Holborn on contemporary history, the commemorative speeches 
(Gedenkreden) of the US Gesandten Russell Fessenden, AA State Secretary Georg Ferdinan  Duckwitz 
and Prof. Max Braubach (representing the Wissenschaft), as well as Birrenbach’s Laudatio, which focused 
on Holborn’s political activity.  For Birrenbach’s claim that this Laudatio had “often been quoted,” see KB 
to Hanna Holborn Gray, c/o Prof. Eugene Rostow, Yale Law School, 21 December 1979, ACDP K158/1.  
However, Birrenbach also suffered further disappointments along these lines.  As of December 1969, his 
efforts vis-à-vis a sympathetic Mayor Hermann Heusch (CDU) to have the Monnet Committee awarded the 
International Charlemagne Prize of the City of Aachen (Karlspreis) had failed since Monnet himself had 
already won the prize in 1953.  Likewise, Birrenbach’s efforts in September 1972 to have the Stiftung FVS 
in Hamburg, through a similarly understanding Alfred Toepfer (Vorstand of the Stiftung), grant Monnet an 
award came to naught due to the foundation’s statutes, which stipulated that the granting of such a prize 
was only possible for historical achievements within t e previous two years, and due to the fact that 
Monnet had already been granted the foundation’s first Robert-Schuman-Preis n 1966, bestowed on 
personalities promoting European unity in exemplary f shion.  At Monnet’s wish, Birrenbach had been 
invited to the celebration at the Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Bonn upon the granting of 
this first Schuman Prize.  Finally, Birrenbach’s effort initiated in June 1972 vis-à-vis a sympathetic federal 
government, particularly Foreign Minister Scheel, to have former Israeli Ambassador Felix Elieser Shinnar 
granted a high German decoration (presumably an award of the Verdienstorden from the Federal President) 
for his contribution to German-Israeli relations, an effort aiming to draw attention to the 20th anniversary of 
the September 1952 restitution agreement in whose negotiation Shinnar had played an important role, 
ultimately floundered on the Israeli government’s refusal to allow Shinnar to receive such a medal, perhaps 
the result of the rules regarding Beamte, and his subsequent rejection of such an honor (KB to Scheel, 28 
June 1972, ACDP K096/1).   
44 For Gladwyn’s complaint regarding “to what lengths Gaullist propagandists will go in their efforts,” here 
with respect to the treatment by the West German mothly Dem Profil (Munich) of his article “Britain in 
Europe,” which appeared only in crucially truncated form and countered by “A Gaullist Answer to Great 
Britain,” by the French journalist Georges Broussine, see Lord Gladwyn to Dr. Hans Werner Gille, Editor-
in-Chief, Das Profil, Munich, 10 April 1968, ACDP K066/1.  Though in many aspects admiring of the 
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concerned Atlanticists generally confronted in thisrealm was the incessant and massive 
communist propaganda emanating from the USSR and the East Bloc states, among them 
the GDR.  This propaganda was aimed in part at the Western publics, namely American, 
West German and West European (including British) opini n, but also at other foreign 
populations all over the world, such as those of friendly Pacific countries like Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand as well as the developing Third World.  A rather crude form 
of ideological warfare, this often blatantly false and misleading, yet difficult to ignore, 
disinformation assailed the West, sought to conjure up fears of war, linked to an 
escalating arms race, and functioned overall to potentially undermine Atlanticist goals.  
Such propaganda from the East was even explicitly directed at times at the Atlanticists 
themselves, their institutions, activities and networks.45  While among individual 
countries the US bore much of the brunt, this propaganda also demonstrated a distinctly 
anti-West German character and strove to incite anti-German feelings.  The Federal 
Republic was distorted and defamed as a country of a revived National Socialism, neo-
Fascism, anti-Semitism, militarism, aggression and revanchism.  Thrust into the role of 
Schreckgespenst and Störenfried, the Federal Republic was lambasted not only for its 
Nazi past and its supposed failure to prosecute war criminals but also for central elements 
                                                                                                                                      
American Way, the Frenchman Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s international best-selling book The 
American Challenge (1967), with its startling title and notion of a (peaceful) European-American 
“confrontation of civilizations,” not only astounde the European scene but also fed into certain Gaullist or 
other anti-Atlanticist tendencies. 
45 For example, on 15 March 1961, Pravda ran an article on the KWC entitled (here in German) “Die 
deutsch-englischen Gespräche in Königswinter - bittere Pillen für viele Bonner Politiker” (contained in the 
BPA Ostinformation, ACDP K076/1).  Meanwhile, Neues Deutschland and Radio Ostberlin also reported 
propagandistically on the 1961 KWC (the latter recoded in the Nachrichtenspiegel/Ostteil of the Federal 
Government’s Press and Information Office, 14 March 1961, ACDP K076/1).   
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of its foreign policy, most notably its stress on reunification as well as its hesitation in 
signing and ratifying the NPT, that allegedly precluded an international détente.46 
In their own efforts abroad, the German Atlanticists were confronted with some 
particularly thorny, even unique problems.  Germany’s terrible recent history, including 
its role in two world wars (i.e. also encompassing the figure of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the 
imposition of occupations) but especially Hitler and the crimes of National Socialism (i.e. 
also genocide), cast a dark shadow on its image in foreign popular opinion.  Moreover, 
this horrific past repeatedly came to the forefront in this period.  During the 1950s and 
60s, evidence emerged at times of certain radical right-wing tendencies in the Federal 
Republic: the ominous electoral successes of extremist parties in the 1950s but especially 
later on in the mid- and late-1960s with the rise of the neo-Nazi NPD; the content and 
rising circulation of publications like the National- und Soldatenzeitung; and a number of 
anti-Semitic incidents, including the defacing of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries.47  
Historical works, whether the widely viewed broadcast of the play Judgment at 
Nuremberg (1959, Playhouse 90 in the US); the American journalist William Shirer’s 
popular book The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960); or the influential studies of 
specific German and foreign professional historians, including AJP Taylor and Fritz 
Fischer, depicting the Germans in an unflattering lght, revived and perpetuated harsh 
                                                
46 For instance, the Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag (Cologne), financed by the GDR, published a multitude of 
polemical works, including its ongoing Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik as well as books like 
Eberhard Czichon’s Der Bankier und die Macht (1970).  This work, part of the long-term campaign against 
the West German Wirtschaft, took Hermann Josef Abs and the D utsche Bank to task for their at least 
controversial activities and relationship to the regime during the Third Reich and not only brought the
Verlag and Czichon further attention but also a trial in Stuttgart ultimately won by Abs and the Deutschen 
Bank.  For a Druckerei Wetzel near Baden-Baden that was said to have itself beenfunded with money from 
the DDR and which produced many of the titles of the Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, see Rolf Vogel to KB, 14 
October 1975, ACDP K096/2. 
47 On the wave of anti-Semitic and Nazi-themed incidents in the Federal Republic (including Cologne) in 
1959-60 which abroad received extensive coverage and attention in press and public, see the AA Report to 
All Diplomatic and Professional Consular Representations Abroad, 10 March 1960, ACDP K126/2.   
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memories.48  Extraordinary events like Adolf Eichmann’s abduction in Buenos Aires 
(1960) and subsequent trial in Jerusalem (beginning i  1961) and even the Spiegel Affair 
(1962) stirred reflection abroad on the German past, and future.  Finally, the emergence 
of issues such as the Verjährung of war crimes and the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons also played a noteworthy role.49  The latent burdens, resentments and mistrust 
thus generated and sustained in much of the world, including the United States, Britain 
and elsewhere in the West, was both reflected in and stoked by, for instance, the Anglo-
Saxon and wider foreign press and media.50   
Such phenomena and events not only fuelled fears abroad of a revival of National 
Socialism and of nationalism in general in the new Germany but also, in turn, fed into 
perceptions, sometimes resentful, in the Federal Republic of an hysterical anti-German 
wave in American public opinion.  The reputation of c ntemporary West Germany and of 
the Germans themselves in the United States appeared to be tarnished by the persistence 
of deep-rooted yet obsolete clichés and misconceptions; the often distorted and 
exaggerated reporting of the American news media on German affairs; as well as a 
plethora of frankly unambitious but nevertheless (and therefore?) popular “anti-German” 
                                                
48 Shirer’s book presented the Germans and their history as leading logically to Hitler and National 
Socialism, with all the implicit connotations for the future.  In contrast to even British historians like Alan 
Bullock and Correlli Barnett, Fischer suggested that Germany deserved sole responsibility for the outbreak 
of World War I.  For Birrenbach not knowing Fischer’s work personally, but nevertheless claiming that is 
Krieg der Illusionen (1969), the recent English translation of which had just been approvingly reviewed in 
The Spectator (27 June 1975) under the headline “German Guilt,” was “awful [schrecklich],” see KB to 
Herbert Sulzbach, West German Embassy, London, 25 July 1975, ACDP K068/2.   
49 Hence Birrenbach’s stress to his American contacts on the “peaceful use of nuclear energy.” 
50 On the recent anti-German attacks in books, newspaper articles, letters to the editor and public statements 
in the United States, characterized by “emotionalism,” “sweeping generalizations” and “wholesale 
condemnations,” complete with charges of a re-Nazification of the Federal Republic as manifested, for 
example, in the occupation of “almost all leading positions” in public life (e.g. administration, bureaucracy) 
and business by “ex-Nazis,” see The Bridge, published by the Atlantik-Brücke, Hamburg, Vol. 6, No. 3, 
March 1962, ACDP K007/1.  On the role in Britain of “some newspapers and a flood of ‘war movies’ and 
books” in fostering “the average man’s ingrained suspicion and dislike of Germans,” see again The Bridge, 
Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1962, ACDP K007/1.   
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films and television broadcasts/series produced by the American mass entertainment 
industry dealing with the National Socialist and World War II period.  Within such 
frameworks, virtually all Germans seemed to be presented as stereotypical “bad guys.”  
Dismayingly, this all appeared to be the case even with the considerable passage of time 
and its anticipated positive effects on both American attitudes towards the Germans and 
the desire for a greater measure of historical truth; the presence and enduring influence in 
the United States of the German immigrants of the 19th and early 20th centuries; as well as 
what was considered by most Germans to be the rather exemplary behavior of the Federal 
Republic after the Second World War, including the provision of generous reparations 
and restitution, genuine efforts to pursue National Socialist crimes and perpetrators and a 
peaceful and stable posture within the context of the Atlantic alliance that was also 
loyally supportive of the American foreign policy approach.  True, some German voices 
at times painted a different picture of reality, one of at least a heterogeneous, even 
friendly, American perspective on West Germany and the Germans.51   
However, despite such alternative assessments, Birrenbach and the German 
Atlanticists, taken as a whole, were not only acutely interested in but even quite sensitive 
and rather excitable regarding potentially negative eff cts on the Deutschlandbild in the 
                                                
51 For such a relatively optimistic assessment, see “Das Deutschlandbild der amerikanischen 
Öffentlichkeit,” Referat of the Washington DC Embassy Pressereferenten, an Excerpt from the Protocol of 
the Consular Conference in Washington DC from 1-3 April 1968, ACDP K131/2.  Here, it was argued that, 
at least as of 1968, the “extent and quality” of the reporting about contemporary Germany in the “American 
mass media” was generally acceptable.  A “controversial and biased” CBS report on “The Germans” served 
as an exception, but even this had evoked a “negative” response among both the American public and the 
CBS producership, leading to the recall of the respon ible CBS Germany correspondent (Hughes Rudd).  
Indeed, the demand for and “extensive output of scholarly and popular-scholarly literature” about Germany 
and the Germans as well as the panel discussions, interviews, commentary and documentary broadcasts on 
American radio and television (e.g. National Educational Television), including relatively “objective” 
documentaries about the Germany of the 1930s and 40s, indicated the fascination of the “intellectual elite” 
and “educated [gebildeten]” Americans with “Germany and its social and political development.”  
Moreover, this Referat argued that there was no single, homogenous, “demoskopisch” ascertainable 
American Deutschlandbild, rather a variety of simultaneously existing “group pictures [Gruppenbilder]” of 
the German people conditioned by numerous regional, ethnic, professional, educational and social factors.  
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United States.  Among those experiences permanently stamping Birrenbach’s outlook 
with respect to the existence of “deutschfeindlichen” sentiments in the US and the need 
for a proper, calm and “maßvolle” response to them, were his, at least by his own 
account, triumphant exchanges with the “clearly anti-German” John Kenneth Galbraith at 
a dinner organized for Birrenbach in New York, while on his Sondermission in Fall 1961 
during the Berlin crisis, by the American corporate l wyer George Baker, one of the 
leading representatives of the Democratic Party in New York.  This meeting was intended 
to allow Birrenbach to describe and initiate a discussion about the Berlin situation and the 
consequences of the construction of the Wall in this American circle of approximately 
twenty to thirty invited guests that also included Theodore White (author of the recent 
Kennedy book The Making of the President) and Charles Collingwood (responsible for 
the foreign political broadcasts of CBS).52  The German Atlanticist concern with public 
relations in the United States manifested itself, for instance, in the regular inclusion of 
American media figures in Atlanticist conferences and the like, as well as in the various 
personalities with whom Birrenbach himself was connected abroad, among them molders 
of American opinion, links that were established also through meetings like the just 
                                                
52 Galbraith was a Harvard professor of economics and, t the time, American ambassador to India.  As of 
April 1985, Birrenbach still remembered this occasion in which Galbraith had asserted that the Germans 
intended to “drag” the US into a nuclear war against the Soviet Union as well as his own effective rebuttal 
of Galbraith’s arguments, all of which led Baker to tell Galbraith that “I must say to you, Kenneth, eith r 
you shut up or you get out.”  In Birrenbach’s account, that was also the general reaction prevailing in the 
meeting, and Galbraith left silently (KB to Helmut Schmidt, 30 April 1985, ACDP K033/3).  For Galbraith 
expressing himself in a “tone of distanced arrogance which one finds here and there in the American 
universities of the Ivory League [sic] on the East Cost, however which I had still never encountered in such 
penetrating form,” see Birrenbach’s report about his discussions in Washington DC and New York during 
his trip to the United States from 18 October-1 November 1961, dated 3 November 1961, ACDP K159/1.  
Here, Birrenbach remained unclear to what extent Galbraith’s views were characteristic of “part of the 
Intellectual Community of the East Coast” but “[a]t ny rate the attitude of such a man, who is certainly not 
isolated, is symptomatic that also in the United States memories of the prewar time [prewar?] are still alive 
[wach geblieben].”  For Birrenbach’s somewhat watered-down account of this episode, see Meine 
Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 
1984), pp. 60-63.        
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described October 1961 gathering and, more generally, during trips to the US.53  Within 
the unique environment of the United States, the German Atlanticists sought to improve 
the Deutschlandbild there and to fortify the trust and respect of the American public.  
Despite the singular context of the United States, there existed considerable 
similarities between the German Atlanticists’ publicat on and public relations efforts 
directed principally towards their compatriots and those directed primarily towards 
Americans (and other foreigners).  These similarities extended to the forms employed and 
the general nature of the intended audiences.  Indeed, in certain instances, it is difficult to 
even draw such stark distinctions since some of those activities primarily directed at 
either a German or American audience were simultaneously aimed, at least to some 
extent, at the other nation’s public as well.  Once again, now with respect to an American 
audience, we can see a distinct effort on the part of the German Atlanticists to influence 
the opinion of a relatively specialized public.  As part of his larger international 
engagement, Birrenbach often gave speeches in the Unit d States, for instance at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, but also including the undertaking of an extensive lecture 
tour in the fall of 1962 that included talks at many colleges and universities at which he 
had contacts (e.g. in Stanford).54  Furthermore, Birrenbach, for one, saw to it that at least 
                                                
53 Among foreign journalists outside of the United States, as we have already noted, Birrenbach was a long-
term contact and great admirer of the Frenchman Raymond Aron, whose articles he read in Le Figaro and, 
later, L’Express and with whose ideas he generally found himself in agreement.  For Birrenbach, as of June 
1981, having had contacts with Aron for twenty years [one of Birrenbach’s standard long-term estimations 
around this time, rather than a necessarily precise dating of the inception of their relationship], see KB to 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 9 June 1981, ACDP K092/3.  Aron’s books, including The Century of Total 
War (1954), appeared in English translation in the United States.  Among Aron’s other works were Paix et 
guerre entre les nations (1962) and Le Grand Débat: Initiation à la stratégie atomique (1963), the latter  
exploring and assessing for non-American audiences the work of the leading American nuclear strategists 
in the immediately preceding years.      
54 To cite a later example, Birrenbach gave such a Vortrag before the CFR in May 1975.  Aside from the 
US, Birrenbach also embarked ontrips, at least in part, to give speeches within Europe (including Britain) 
and in Canada.  Thus, on 4 February 1960, Birrenbach g ve a talk before Chatham House in London, which 
dealt at least to a significant extent with the theme “Europe and Great Britain” (EEC/EFTA).  Likewise, on 
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some of his articles and writings, though certainly to a lesser extent than in the Federal 
Republic, appeared in a number of foreign affairs journals abroad.  Thus, his pieces could 
be found in outlets like the Canadian-based International Journal (Toronto); the Italian 
journal Affari Esteri (Rome), the latter published by the former ambassador to the Federal 
Republic Pietro Quaroni; and even once again the Argentinian newspaper the Freien 
Presse.55   
Nevertheless, the focus of Birrenbach’s attention in th s regard was clearly on the 
United States.  Here, Birrenbach’s work appeared in Atlanticist-minded journals such as 
the Atlantic Community Quarterly, founded in 1963 as the organ of the Atlantic Council 
of the United States, and Freedom & Union, the Washington-based magazine of Clarence 
Streit’s Federal Union Inc. and International Movement for Atlantic Union.56  Just as 
important as Atlanticist-minded forums for the publication of his works, at least 
measured by the sheer quantity of his articles, were the English-language version of 
Außenpolitik, which first appeared in 1970 and for the establishment of which Birrenbach 
himself had worked, and the quarterly journal Orbis, produced since 1957 by the Foreign 
                                                                                                                                      
22 February 1963, Birrenbach gave a Vortrag on “The Federal Republic after the Brussels Decision” at an 
anniversary rally of the European Movement in the Ridderzaal (Binnenhof) in The Hague.  As with so 
many of his other activities, Birrenbach was especially ntensive but not entirely unique in this respct, for 
example insofar as some other German Atlanticists al o embarked on lecture tours in the US.   
55 These included Birrenbach’s articles “Europe, the European Economic Community and the Outer Seven” 
(International Journal, Winter 1959/60); “Europäisch-amerikanische Beziehungen, ihre Problematik und 
ihre Zukunft” (Affari Esteri, Nr. 4, October 1969), an article that also existed in the German language as a 
Sonderdruck; and “Nach der Bündnis-Debatte im Bundestag” (Freie Presse, 19 February 1963, Buenos 
Aires, Verlagsleitung: Walter Linne), as already noted a version of a recent Europa-Archiv article.      
56 Birrenbach’s articles in Freedom & Union included “Atlantic Union and Germany” (November 1960, 
dealing with “the problem” of the relationship betwen the Federal Republic and the other nations of the 
Atlantic Community) and “Pulling Atlantica Together: A German Survey” (October 1961, heavily based on 
his April 1961 Atlantic Institute memo on “The Future of the Atlantic Community”).  Birrenbach’s articles 
in The Atlantic Community Quarterly included “Europe and America: Partners in Atlantic Community” 
(Summer 1963, Vol. 1, No. 2, reprinted from his book the Future of the Atlantic Community); “Partnership 
and Consultation in NATO” (Spring 1964); and “The West and German Ostpolitik: The German 
Opposition View” (Summer 1971, Vol. 9, No. 2).  Though not a regular outlet, Birrenbach also published 
in May 1968 “Germany Re-enters the Arena” in The Reporter (“The Magazine of Facts and Ideas,” Vol. 
38, No. 10, 16 May 1968), the influential but soon-t -be defunct Cold War Liberal biweekly edited and 
published out of New York City by Max Ascoli.   
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Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia (an institute to which Birrenbach was 
particularly close).57  On at least some occasions, Birrenbach’s articles and papers also 
appeared as a part of larger collections, for instance the working paper he had prepared 
                                                
57 Birrenbach’s articles published in Orbis (“A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs”) included “The 
Reorganization of NATO” (Summer 1962, Vol. 6, No. 2); “The United States and Western Europe: 
Partners or Rivals?” (Summer 1973, Vol. 17, No. 2, previously published in the Europa-Archiv); and 
“European Security: NATO, SALT and Equilibrium” (Summer 1978, “The Many Faces of Nuclear 
Policy,” Vol. 22, No. 2).  Birrenbach’s articles appearing in the English-language edition of Außenpolitik 
included his 1970 “Erdgas” piece, written under the ps udonym Karl Wangemann, as well as “Europe’s 
Security in the Changed World” (Vol. 24, 3rd Quarter, 1973).  For Birrenbach’s efforts in support of an 
English-language edition of Außenpolitik, see Bechtoldt, Außenpolitik, to KB, 26 January 1970, ACDP 
K022/1.   
 Although never publishing in it, Birrenbach did sub cribe to the short-lived journal Western World 
(1957-60).  Seeking a scale encompassing the whole of the Western world, this innovative “Western” 
monthly was launched simultaneously in all the principal countries of that “world” in identical English- and 
French-language editions (the latter more ambiguously entitled Occident) and aspired to promote a “free 
discussion among the Atlantic nations” of the American and European continents; a better understanding of 
the Atlantic Community, in part by providing information regarding its political and economic problems; 
the overcoming of differences of opinion within the Atlantic Community; and the development of a united 
Atlantic Community into an “increasingly alive reality.”  The journal’s sponsor was a charitable 
organization, whose board of directors was headed by the Dutchman Paul Rykens (former chairman of the 
board of Unilever Ltd.) and whose managing director was the Belgian parliamentarian Lucien Radoux.  
The journal’s officers and contributors came from many nations, among them the United States, Canada, 
Britain, the Federal Republic and the rest of Western Europe (including Switzerland and Denmark).  The 
journal’s Executive Board consisted of Jacques de Bourbon-Busset (former director of cultural relations for 
the French foreign office); René Dabernat (Paris-Presse l’Intransigeant); Edgar Ansel Mowrer (American 
political columnist); and Lucien Radoux (identified here as the “Director of the European center in Brussels 
for International Relations”).  Though no Germans were among the editors, the International Editorial 
Advisory Board, comprising personalities from the field of newspapers and journalism, included Ernst 
Friedlaender (“German ‘Columnist’”) and Friedrich Wesemann (“Hannover Press”).  Those West Germans 
signing an inaugural declaration supporting Western World were Hermann Josef Abs; Otto Wolff von 
Amerongen; Fritz Berg (President of the BDI); Heinrich von Brentano (Foreign Minister); Walter Freitag 
(presumably the trade unionist but identified here as the “President of German Industrial Association”); Dr. 
Jost Henkel; and Helmut Wohlthat.  The head office of Western World was located in Brussels, with 
editorial offices elsewhere in Europe (Paris) and in the United States (Washington DC).  For more on all 
this, see the undated information letter from the editors of Western World, ACDP K078/2.  On the efforts of 
Western World, which already enjoyed the “support [Förderung]”  of “the Wirtschaft”  in “most West 
European countries” and with the assistance of the BDI, to gain the support of the West German Wirtschaft 
through speech-meal functions, including at the Ritz Hotel for the representatives of the German Wirtschaft 
at the Atlantic Congress in London in June 1959 and at the Hotel Breidenbacher Hof (Düsseldorf) for 
representatives of German industry in October 1959, see the invitation letter from Dr. Beutler, BDI, as 
Geschäftsführende Präsidialmitglied, Cologne, 26 September 1959, ACDP K002/2.  For the BDI looking 
positively on Western World as a “promising” endeavor to foster “the idea of an Atlantic 
Völkergemeinschaft” and for the involvement of the BDI already several times at the wish of Western 
World in the treatment of contemporary economic-political questions, see again Beutler, 26 September 
1959, ACDP K002/2.  Finally, on the “very strong echo in the press” enjoyed by the occasional discussion 
functions staged by the organization “ standing behind” Western World, so far in Paris, Rome and London, 
at which “leading European and American personalities” were present, see yet again Beutler, 26 September 
1959, ACDP K002/2.  Ultimately, Western World turned out to be commercially unviable, by its own 
account not least due to a “rather severe lay out and limited circulation” that “did not prove sufficiently 
attractive to advertisers” (Notice of May 1960, ACDP K004/2).   
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on “Political Sovereignty, Leadership and Cooperation” for a May 1964 conference on 
NATO reform and reorganization staged by Georgetown University’s Center for 
Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC (which he had planned to but 
ultimately was unable to attend) would appear as a contribution, along with ten to twelve 
other such works, in Fall 1964 in a volume, NATO: Problems and Prospects, published 
by the CSIS in the United States.  Over the years, the publication of Birrenbach’s pieces 
in journals like Europa-Archiv and ORBIS, as well as his recommendations in favor of 
specific articles submitted by others (including his foreign contacts), were facilitated by 
his tight, friendly relations with some of the crucial figures engaged in the publishing and 
editing of such Atlanticist-oriented organs, personalities like Wilhelm Cornides, 
Wolfgang Wagner, Hermann Volle, and Robert Strausz-Hupé.58   
Likewise, the publication of English-language transl tions of books originally 
appearing in German also played a role in the German Atl nticist effort to influence a 
specialized foreign audience.  For instance, Birrenbach’s The Future of the Atlantic 
Community: Toward European-American Partnership, complete with a glowing 
introduction by former Secretary of State Christian Herter, appeared in the United States 
in the spring of 1963 and was available in Britain that same year.59  Regarding the latter, 
                                                
58 Successive editors of Orbis included Robert Strausz-Hupé (1957-69), William Kintner (1969-73) and 
Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. (1973-76).  As of the Winter 1974 edition, the Associate Editor was James 
Dougherty.  Over the years, the Editorial Board included personalities like Walter Hahn and Don 
Humphrey.  For Birrenbach’s inquiry regarding news about Strausz-Hupé’s planned publication of a part of 
Birrenbach’s “report” about the Atlantic Community, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, Hotel Europäischer 
Hof, Heidelberg, 12 September 1961, ACDP K008/1.  Strausz-Hupé continued to be pivotal in helping 
Birrenbach get his articles published in ORBIS even after he had officially departed as editor.  Wilhelm 
Cornides, founder of the Europa-Archiv, remained its publisher until his death in 1966.  He was succeeded 
in this role until 1994 by the journalist Wolfgang Wagner.  Meanwhile, Hermann Volle remained editor-in-
chief of the EA essentially throughout until 1986.         
59 The appearance of Birrenbach’s book in the United States was delayed more than three months by a 
printers strike in New York.  Birrenbach considered Herter’s forward “a great honor” and was very grateful 
to him (KB to Herter, 6 September 1962, ACDP K151/1).  Chris Emmet appears to have been among those 
instrumental in arranging for Herter to undertake this.     
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the Atlantica subsidized advertisements for the book, themselves public relations actions 
of a sort, in prominent British journals such as The New Statesman.60  With the assistance 
of the West German embassies in Washington and London, Birrenbach saw to it that a 
significant number of copies were distributed in each country to key figures and 
institutions in government and politics, the Wirtschaft, the Wissenschaft and the media.61  
Birrenbach and other German Atlanticist authors were aided by the fact that, just as in the 
Federal Republic, various pro-Atlanticist publishers also existed abroad.  For instance, 
The Future of the Atlantic Community was published and sold in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries by two such houses, Pall Mall (London) in Britain and Frederick Praeger Inc. 
(New York) in the United States, the latter being the German Atlanticists’ most important 
such ally in the Anglo-Saxon world.62  Birrenbach applauded and wished success on 
                                                
60 This was carried out by Walter Stahl, the G schäftsführer of the Atlantica and underscores the 
Atlanticists’ aspiration to ensure an effective advertising of their publications in the press, including abroad 
and in this case in the Anglo-Saxon countries.   
61 Within government, this also included the governmental bureaucracy.  Among the parliamentarians were 
the members of the Anglo-German parliamentary group.  Beyond this, Birrenbach believed that the 
participants in the Königswinter meetings, the universities, members of the media, the German embassies 
and consulates, trade organizations and other associ tions might also be interested.  For Birrenbach 
planning to send Erich Straetling, based at the West G rman embassy in Washington DC, a copy, see KB to 
Straetling, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1.  For the English-language edition of Birrenbach’s book having 
been recently sent to William Tyler at the State Department, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secreta y 
in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. 
62 Indeed, at least around this time, Praeger was the larg st English-language publisher of books on world 
affairs, international relations and contemporary history.  The head of the firm, Frederick Praeger, was an 
immigrant from Austria (after the Anschluss) who participated in a number of Atlanticist functions 
including the aforementioned NATO conference held by the CSIS in Washington DC in May 1964 and, as 
of February 1968, a Council on Foreign Relations discussion group on “Germany as a Focus for East-West 
Relations.”  The Praeger edition of Birrenbach’s The Future of the Atlantic Community: Toward European-
American Partnership was 94 pages long and cost $3.50 (“Toward an Atlantic Community,” Foreign 
Service Journal, September 1963, “The Bookshelf,” ACDP K181/1).  Frederick A. Praeger published a 
number of works emerging from the Atlantic Institute and the Atlantik-Brücke, for instance the former’s 
Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries (1965) and A Monetary Policy for Latin America 
(1968) as well as the latter’s Education for Democracy in West Germany: Achievements-Shortcomings-
Prospects (1961) and The Politics of Postwar Germany (1963).  In 1977, Praeger also published (in 
cooperation with the European Community Institute for University Studies) the English-language edition of 
Decision Making in the European Community, which had been financed by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and 
edited by Max Kohnstamm.  The Pall Mall Press had been founded by John MacCallum Scott, a staunch 
promoter of European integration.  In 1970, Pall Mal also published German Constitutional Documents 
since 1871.   
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Frederick Praeger’s attempt, via his firm’s offerings, “to carry out a political action in a 
definite [bestimmten] direction.”63  Praeger’s efforts to implement its own “Atlanticist” 
policy manifested themselves not just in its publication program, but also in its business 
policies.64  Birrenbach’s close connections with the firm, including with Frederick 
Praeger himself, served not only his own publication efforts but also those of his fellow 
Atlanticists, playing for instance a key role in securing publication of Ernst Majonica’s 
work (East-West Relations: A German View) in the US in 1969 by this house.65 
Aside from such high-quality publications, “information trips” to the Federal 
Republic could also prove useful in influencing a foreign public, even well beyond the 
strictly limited number of foreign elites that directly participated in such undertakings.  
These trips were carried out by a number of German Atlanticist organizations, including 
the Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft nd the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft (the latter 
                                                
63 KB to Frederick Praeger, New York, 29 October 1962, ACDP K151/1.   
64 Here, it actively sought to cooperate with and to acquire other publishers in Europe, with the explicit 
aim, in part, of increasing “communication” and theinternational “exchange of information and ideas” 
among the “scholarly, governmental and library communities.”  It was this policy that led to Praeger’s 
acquisition in 1963 of a controlling interest in Pall Mall, a move facilitated by the “similarity of viewpoint” 
in the publishing programs of the two firms in the fields of politics and world affairs.  On all this, ee the 
Frederick A. Praeger News Release, New York, 1 August 1963, ACDP K151/1.   
65 This was the English-language version of Majonica’s Deutsche Außenpolitik: Probleme und 
Entscheidungen (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965), which had appeared in a second edition in 1966.   
Likewise, for Rainer Barzel thanking Birrenbach forhis “letter to Herr Praeger in New York,” see Barzel to 
KB, 1 July 1968, ACDP K052/2.  Frederick Praeger also sent Birrenbach published volumes that might be 
of interest to Birrenbach as well as publication programs whose works Birrenbach found “well-rounded 
[vielseitig]” and “interesting” (KB to Frederick A. Praeger, 1 October 1971, ACDP K038/2).  As of 
October 1971, Frederick Praeger was involved with a new Verlag, the Edition Praeger GmbH (Munich), 
which had just published its first volume.  His publishing house having been taken over by another firm, 
Praeger nevertheless appears to have remained engaged for some time thereafter with his former Verlag but 
also founded Westview Press in 1975 in Boulder (Colorado).  Then as well, Frederick Praeger continued to 
be interested in, actively pursue and apply for the publishing of Atlanticist works, which created at least 
further possibilities for Birrenbach during this period regarding the appearance of such works in the US, for 
instance with respect to his Festschrift (see Chapter 9).  In 1985, the Westview Press would p blish the 
European Security Study Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1985).  The American publisher DC Heath (Lexington, MA) played a significant role in 
the publishing of Atlantic Institute works during at least the early and mid-1970s, including the Atlantic 
Papers.  For AI payments to DC Heath for the Atlantic Papers (including back-payment of FF 140,000 for 
Atlantic Papers of the period 1972-74), see AI Expenditures 1975, 12 February 1976, ACDP K058 and 
expenditure details attached to the AI Budget 1976, ACDP K058.  In 1973, DC Heath also published Dr. 
Gerhard Mally’s The European Community in Perspective for the Atlantic Council of the United States.   
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for British guests), particularly by their local branches.66  Such visits enabled foreign 
guests to meet and interact with prominent West German personalities from the worlds of 
politics, Wirtschaft, press and culture.  In addition to maintaining its own visitor service, 
the Atlantik-Brücke also occasionally organized rather elaborate information visits for 
Americans.  One such endeavor in which Birrenbach played some role was a two-week 
trip through the Federal Republic in January-February 1967 for a number of important 
American publicists and writers, some of whom had evinced quite negative opinions of 
Germany and who were deemed especially influential in shaping educated public opinion 
in the United States.67  During this trip, organized in conjunction with te Ford 
Foundation, the Americans were familiarized with contemporary Germany, experiencing 
especially its cultural achievements and meeting “creative personalities” in politics, 
academia and the arts and sciences, including throug  gatherings in private houses as 
well as smaller official receptions.68  Birrenbach not only took part in the discussion and
approval of this particular trip program in the AB Vorstand but also served as one of the 
Atlantik-Brücke members who met with the visitors during their stay in Bonn.69 
                                                
66 The DAtG trips were also intended and carried out f r West German participants (“inländische guests”). 
67 Participants included George Elliott (critic and novelist); Stanley Kauffmann (co-editor, New Republic); 
Irving Kristol (vice president of Basic Books Inc., former editor of Encounter); Dwight MacDonald (writer, 
The New Yorker); Robert Manning (editor, The Atlantic Monthly); Danial Moynihan (Director of the Joint 
Center for Urban Studies at MIT and Harvard University); Norman Podhoretz (editor, Commentary 
magazine); Richard Rovere (writer, The New Yorker); Harvey Swados (novelist); Lionel Trilling (critic and 
professor of English literature, Columbia University); and Diana Trilling.  The trip consisted of longer stays 
in three of the most important centers of the Federal Republic (Hamburg, Berlin and Munich), a visit to the 
capital and a side trip to the Ruhr. 
68 In preparing and carrying out this program, the Atlantik-Brücke was aided by leading experts in these 
fields, among them representatives and responsible authorities of the various cities in question. 
69 Including, among others, Economics Minister Karl Schiller (SPD).  The inviting of foreign personalities 
of the Publizistik to the Federal Republic was considered particularly effective since such guests functioned 
as Multiplikatoren upon their return to their homelands.  Likewise, on 18 September 1962, Birrenbach gave 
a talk to and answered the questions of a party of ab ut twenty, primarily students, from Britain’s Imperial 
Defense College, visiting the Federal Republic for five days, in the Bundeshaus.  On Berlin as the 
highpoint for most foreigners invited by the government to the Federal Republic and consequently the 
establishment of a visitor office there, see the Report presented by Ministerialdirigent Krueger of the Press 
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Of course, not all American or Anglo-Saxon elites could be brought over to the 
Federal Republic for these sorts of information visits.  Therefore, to keep such a, often 
specialist, audience accurately informed about events a d trends in contemporary West 
Germany, the Atlanticist organizations, especially the Atlantik-Brücke, produced a 
number of relevant publications.  In particular, as of 1962, the AB was issuing a monthly 
Newsletter circulated among a select group of Americans in leading positions in 
government, education and information media.  By Jul 1973, Report from Germany, a 
brief newsletter published by the Brücke at irregular intervals, but approximately 
quarterly, was being sent to a particularly interested circle of Americans and other 
English-speaking foreigners occupying “key positions” (including outside the public 
sector, for instance in the business world), as of the mid-1970s numbering about 450.  
This report offered analysis and an “inside view” of the current situation, developments, 
issues and problems in West German foreign and domestic affairs (including political 
affairs and German positions and policies on central questions) and sought to further 
awaken interest in and promote an understanding of the Federal Republic.70 
Through their publications, the German Atlanticist organizations also attempted to 
reach a larger foreign audience, not necessarily located amongst the societal elites, but 
one nevertheless especially interested in the Federal R public.  This audience could 
include businesspeople, students, vacationers, or simply curious individuals, not 
inevitably specialists on the Federal Republic but still in need of a solid overview.  For 
                                                                                                                                      
and Information Office of the Federal Government before the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs on 
21 January 1960 about “Politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit im Ausland,” ACDP K004/2.    
70 On the monthly Newsletter as well as a sample article by Walter Stahl, see The Bridge, Vol. 6, No. 3, 
March 1962, ACDP K007/1.  This newsletter appears to have also been distributed to the AB’s own 
members.  On the Report from Germany, see the write-up on “Atlantik-Brücke Publications” in ACDP 
K104/2.  As of the early 1980s, the Report from Germany was being sent several times a year to about 
seven hundred Americans in such “key positions” (AB Arbeitsplan 1982/83, ACDP K144/1).   
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example, the Atlantik-Brücke published the booklet These Strange German Ways, which 
first appeared in 1963 and was intended to familiarize English-speaking foreigners with 
German customs and manners and in general to provide an introduction to the German 
way of life.  As of the early 1970s, this publication was being increasingly used in foreign 
schools and colleges in the context of German instruction.  Another Atlantik-Brücke 
publication intended for a similarly somewhat broader audience was the bi-annual Meet 
Germany, which first appeared in 1953.  This publication cvered the most significant 
political, economic, cultural and social issues pertaining to the Federal Republic.  Each of 
these publications went through multiple updated editions, thus vitally enabling them to 
take recent developments into account.71     
E. Influencing the American Masses 
Seeking to move beyond this still small group to influence an even broader, 
though still educated, public opinion, the German Atlanticists also relied to a certain 
                                                
71 By 1982-83, These Strange German Ways had gone through fourteen editions with a total circulation of 
368,600 copies.  By 1982, Meet Germany had appeared in eighteen editions, with this 18th edition 
consisting of a total of 47,070 copies and the entir  circulation since 1953 consisting of over 600,00 
copies.  This new edition had been enabled by a large o der of the Bundespresseamt of 40,000 copies, of 
which 38,800 were sent to German foreign representatio s, including 18,300 to the German Information 
Center in New York City.  Later similar publications from the Atlantik-Brücke included German Holidays 
and Folk Customs (which first appeared in 1972 and by 1982 had gone through six editions with a total 
circulation of 41,500 copies); Meeting German Business (first appeared in 1973 and by 1982 had gone 
through three editions with a total circulation of 26,000); A Short History of German Place Names (first 
appeared in 1974 and by 1982 had gone through threeeditions with a total circulation of 17,700); and Civil 
Liberties and the Defense of Democracy against Extremists and Terrorists (first appeared in 1980 in a first 
edition with a total circulation of 3,000 by 1982).  Thanks to sizeable orders of the Bundespresseamt for the 
German foreign representations, it was possible to have, especially for Meet Germany and These Strange 
German Ways, a large number of copies at cost, a favorable situation.  The books of the Atlantik-Brücke 
also went regularly to American and German book dealers, universities, and firms, as well as to many 
individuals.  On all of this, see the AB Arbeitsplan 1982/83, ACDP K144/1 and Walter Stahl to Members 
of the AB, 30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1.  As of 1972-73, the Bundespresseamt and Inter Nationes in 
Bonn were the largest purchasers of the Atlantik-Brücke publications.  Inter Nationes operated in the 
cultural-political field and itself received funding from the BPA.  For the suggestion of Dr. Schmidt-
Schlegel (German General Consulate in New York) that Robert Kleiman’s trip to the Federal Republic in 
connection with his possible carrying out of the American Council on Germany’s proposed research study 
on “the situation at the German universities and the possible consequences for the domestic political 
development of the Federal Republic” could be “techni ally [technisch]” prepared by Inter Nationes, a 
suggestion in which Kleiman was very interested, see th  Report of the German General Consulate in New
York, 5 October 1972, ACDP K183/2.   
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extent on the reach of the American mass media.  The upshot, in Birrenbach’s case, was a 
series of extraordinary one-time initiatives during the 1960s.  One such effort was the 
Atlanticist “open letter” published in several American and other foreign press outlets in 
March 1963.  This letter represented a response to events earlier that year, namely the 
Franco-German Treaty and de Gaulle’s veto of a British entrance into the EEC, and 
sought to clarify the West German attitude, especially to counteract the impression of 
many Americans that the Germans endorsed the Gaullist concept of an inward-looking 
Europe.  As Birrenbach put it, “[t]he roundabout [gewundenen] declarations of certain 
personalities in Germany… have awakened the impression of a certain ambiguity.”72  
Therefore, the letter endorsed the idea of a growing Atlantic Community and Partnership, 
expressed German appreciation for past and present American assistance, and reaffirmed 
the centrality of the alliance and connection with the United States for the Federal 
Republic and its citizens.73  This effort was undertaken at the initiative of and sponsored 
by the Atlantik-Brücke, in whose Vorstand the idea had been hatched, and ultimately 
came to fruition thanks especially to the work of theVorstand members Birrenbach, 
Marion Gräfin Dönhoff and Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen.74  Birrenbach was 
particularly valuable in the preparation and execution in drawing up a well-rounded list 
of potential signers and ultimately securing the signatures of eighteen prominent 
Germans, each with considerable name recognition in the US and encompassing a wide 
spectrum from the worlds of politics, Wirtschaft, trade unions, and Wissenschaft.75  The 
                                                
72 KB to Siegfried Balke, 5 March 1963, ACDP K186/2.   
73 In this context, the notion of British entrance into the EEC was also explicitly endorsed in this letter.   
74 The idea was also approved, more widely, by the AB annual assembly on 20 February 1963 in Bonn 
(Short Protocol, ACDP K010/1).   
75 For Birrenbach’s successful efforts, see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 16 March 1963, ACDP K051/1.  The 
signers included leaders in parliament of all four German political parties present there; the mayor of West 
Berlin, Willy Brandt; the former federal president Theodor Heuss; the chairman of the DGB, Ludwig 
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declaration appeared in the Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Post and the 
European edition of the New York Herald Tribune on 20-21 March 1963.76  Thanks to 
Birrenbach’s contacts in the German press, it also ppeared, at least in excerpt, in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Welt, and the Deutschen Zeitung.77 
Another example of an effort involving Birrenbach to place a piece in the 
American media occurred in 1964 during the lead-up to the Kennedy Round of the GATT 
talks.  Seeking to promote a successful outcome to these approaching negotiations, 
Birrenbach, supported by Fritz Berg (President of the BDI) and the economic Verbänden, 
became something of a driving force in encouraging Chancellor Erhard to do an 
exclusive interview in Bonn with the editors of the American newsweekly US News & 
World Report.  In choosing such an outlet for publication of the interview, Birrenbach 
and the other Atlanticist-minded participants in this initiative (along with Robert 
Borchardt in the AA), primarily took into account the need to inform not just the 
American public in general, but especially to reach broadly those sectors of American 
society that shaped opinion and those circles exercising influence on the upcoming 
Senate hearings about the trade talks, including the leading figures of the American 
Wirtschaft.78  Birrenbach’s ultimately successful efforts with respect to the Erhard 
interview were part of and consciously coordinated with a larger publicity effort 
                                                                                                                                      
Rosenberg; the president of the BDI, Fritz Berg; leaders of the banking/finance community; and eminent 
educators and scientists. 
76 Christian Science Monitor (20 March), the Washington Post (21 March), and the European edition of the 
New York Herald Tribune (21 March).  See, for instance, “German Views Expressed,” Christian Science 
Monitor, 20 March 1963, ACDP K186/2.  Publication was delay d by a strike that crippled the major New 
York newspapers and then plagued and, ultimately, limited by mix-ups and snafus on the American end. 
77 Dönhoff also notified the dpa with similar results. 
78 On this endeavor, see Dr. Joseph J. Thomas, Director of he German Information Center, to KB, 15 
October 1963, ACDP K187/1; LR I Robert Borchardt, AA, to KB, 21 October 1963, ACDP K157/1; Hans 
Dichgans to KB (and Sohl, Wagner, Köhler and Vosen), regarding Aufklärungsarbeit in the USA, 5 
February 1964, ACDP K187/1; KB to Erhard, 24 February 1964, ACDP K187/1; and Berg to Erhard, 27 
February 1964, ACDP K187/1.   
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undertaken by the German economic organizations, including the German-American 
Chamber of Commerce, the BDI (Berg and Hellmuth Wagner) and the WVES (Hans 
Dichgans), comprising speeches as well as ads in other major American publications, 
such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the New York Herald Tribune and 
Business Week.79 
On other occasions, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists placed less reliance 
on the insertion of specific pieces into the American mass media and more on general 
initiatives that it was hoped would generate their own media attention.  One example of 
this was the effort undertaken by the German Kuratorium for the John F. Kennedy 
Memorial Library, to be located at Harvard University.  In 1964, Birrenbach was asked 
by the Kennedy family, through George McGhee (the American ambassador to the 
Federal Republic), to constitute and chair this Kuratorium, which was to raise money, 
technically collected by the Atlantica, for the KML.  Under Birrenbach’s guidance, this 
Kuratorium ultimately came to include about sixty figures from politics, Wirtschaft, 
Wissenschaft, the churches, Bundeswehr and the press.  With particular assistance from 
Hellmuth Wagner (BDI) as treasurer and Walter Stahl (Atlantica, Atlantik-Brücke) as 
Geschäftsführer of the Kuratorium, the fundraising campaign for the library went on 
from late 1964 until early June 1965 and ended up collecting approximately DM 3.2 
million, including DM 1.2 million from the private sector and the other DM 2 million 
                                                
79 For the Erhard interview, see the US News & World Report of 8 June 1964.  For Birrenbach’s later 
calling of attention to and concerns regarding the “misinterpretation” of Kiesinger’s reference to “a North-
Atlantic Imperium” in the Chancellor’s “state of the nation” report of 11 March 1968 and his suggestion 
that Kiesinger, at the appropriate time, in an interview with the New York Times clear up the 
“misunderstandings” and characterize the relationship of the Federal Republic to the United States in a way 
that “accommodates the current American psychological attitude [Einstellung],” see KB, Düsseldorf, 
Berliner Allee 33, to Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. 
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from the federal government.80  Birrenbach presented the check for the private 
contribution to McGhee on 7 July 1965 and the government contribution to Robert 
Kennedy in October 1965.  The fundraising campaign itself, the presentation of these 
contributions and the large KML assembly in Boston, in which the Atlantica cooperated, 
all generated a certain amount of publicity for these German Atlanticist efforts in the 
American as well as the West German press.81 
                                                
80 The private contributions came from public collections (DM 400,000, the lion’s share from Berlin), 
donations from the cities of Bonn, Frankfurt and Cologne (DM 65,000), industry and banks (DM 473,000), 
and the DGB and its connected unions (DM 300,000).  The federal government’s contribution to the 
Kuratorium was one of two contributions it made around this time to Kennedy projects, the other one being 
to the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington DC. 
81 The German efforts for the Kennedy Memorial Library were not solely a public relations endeavor, and 
Birrenbach’s involvement with the KML did not end there.  Thanks to Birrenbach (and in light of “the will
of the donors [Stifter]”), it was arranged that the majority of the German money, especially the private 
portion, went to the funding of fellowships to enable Germans to study at Harvard and its various 
specialized institutes (Kennedy School of Government, Institute of Politics, Center for International 
Affairs, Institute for West European Studies, and eventually the KML itself).  In September 1967, 
Birrenbach met in Bonn with Prof. Adam Yarmolinksy, chairman of the Harvard Committee for German 
Kennedy Memorial Fellowships, and together they agreed that not less than 70% of the fellowship 
allocations, therefore “the overwhelming part,” be reserved for “long-term scholars” (“post-docs”) working 
in areas related to the study of politics and public policy and the rest for intense, short-term visits at the 
invitation of Harvard University of practitioners or bservers of politics and public policy “of outstanding 
ability and promise” (primarily politicians, political office holders, public servants, journalists and 
Wissenschaftler, with a stress placed on “professional, political, and geographic diversity”).  Thus, the 
concept of “student” was applied here in the wider American sense.  This program was administered in the 
following years by the Harvard Committee on German Ke nedy Memorial Fellowships, which as of 1975 
consisted of the Wissenschaftlern Prof. Karl Deutsch, Prof. Franklin Ford, Dean Richard Hunt, Prof. 
Reginald Phelps and Dr. Guido Goldman.  This committee was assisted in the Federal Republic, for 
instance in administration and locating and screening potential candidates, by both the DAAD and by an 
informal network of individuals prominent in the relevant fields, many of them pronounced Atlanticists (a  
of 1967 this network consisted of seven “talent scouts” (Professors and/or Doctors): Klaus Ritter, Theo 
Sommer, Wolfgang Wagner, Waldemar Besson, Horst Ehmke, Richard Löwenthal, and Ulrich Scheuner) 
(Adam Yarmolinsky, Professor of Law, Chairman, Harvard Committee, German Kennedy Memorial 
Fellowships, to KB, 28 November 1967, ACDP K150/1 and Franz Eschbach, DAAD, Stipendienabteilung, 
to KB, 9 October 1975, ACDP K150/1).  On the Kennedy Fellows being enrolled at the Kennedy School of 
Government, with the Institute for West European Studies serving as the host institution, and on the pre-
selection committee in the Federal Republic consisti g of Prof. Karl Kaiser (University of Cologne, 
DGAP); Dr. Ulrich Littmann (General Secretary of the Fulbright Commission); Dr. Heinrich Pfeiffer 
(General Secretary of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung); and Dr. Hans-Jürgen Puhle (Historisches 
Institut, University of Münster, former Kennedy Fellow), see Eschbach to KB, 9 October 1975, ACDP 
K150/1.  However, no German authority [“Stelle”] took part in the nomination or selection for the short-
term “invite program.”  Harvard University brought t e German donation [“Stiftung”] into the Harvard 
Trust Company and used the interest thus accrued for the JFK Memorial Fellowship Program.  As of 
October 1975, Goldman claimed that about $40,000 was av ilable per year, which could provide for up to 
three Kennedy-Jahresstipendien (Eschbach to KB, 9 October 1975, ACDP K150/1).  Onthe mutual value 
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Finally, the activity of Birrenbach’s Twenty Years Marshall Plan Kuratorium, a 
“national” West German committee, was yet another one-time Atlanticist initiative 
largely intended to generate positive publicity and goodwill among a mass American 
public, here by demonstrating the FRG’s appreciation of the US and the Marshall Plan.  
This body was already in existence when Birrenbach assumed its chairmanship in 1966, 
however his stewardship, especially with respect to the composition and activities of the 
Kuratorium, lent the initially floundering project much-needed prestige and credibility 
and contributed significantly to its achievements.82  Essentially, the Kuratorium and its 
members worked to stimulate and assist in the various c mmemorations of the twentieth 
anniversary of the Marshall Plan in the Federal Republic.  In these endeavors, it 
cooperated particularly closely with the Deutschen Rat der Europäischen Bewegung, of 
                                                                                                                                      
of the exposure of German Kennedy Memorial Fellows to Harvard University and to the “Cambridge 
intellectual community,” and vice-versa, see Yarmolinsky to KB, 28 November 1967, ACDP K150/1.   
While the ultimate effect of the activities of the German Kuratorium for the Kennedy Memorial 
Library was intended to be on an American public, there also existed an element of public relations directed 
at the German public as well.  Appeals were made on the federal and regional levels to the Chancellor and
to the Ländern (to secure the generous participation of Bund and Ländern), to the Wirtschaft, and via 
television, radio and press also to the German public to secure small donations at a broad level.  In 
November 1964, a related traveling exhibit made stops in several German cities, including Frankfurt, Bonn 
and Berlin, in coordination with and with the assistance of the Amerika-Häusern and State Secretary Karl-
Günther von Hase of the Federal Government’s Press and Information Office.  Birrenbach himself 
proposed during the fundraising campaign a Kennedy-Feierstunde in Bonn, in which President Heinrich 
Lübke, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, State Secretary Ludger Westrick (BKA), Prof. Carlo Schmid (SPD) and 
State Secretary Hase (BPA), among others, took part in December 1964.  The German youth 
Spitzenverbände also held functions connected with collections, particularly at the universities, climaxing 
on the approximate anniversary of President Kennedy’s death with a meeting staged by the D utschen 
Bundesjugendring in Cologne on 27 November 1964 (including a Birrenbach speech in remembrance of 
Kennedy), under the honorary chairmanship of President Lübke.  As already pointed out in Chapter 5, the 
fundraising process for the KML vividly demonstrates hat, at least for Birrenbach and probably for other 
Atlanticists as well, public relations actions, also and perhaps especially those vis-à-vis the United S ates, 
often exhibited a competitive aspect between the Federal Republic and other European countries involved.   
82 The project had originally been under the leadership of Dr. Rudolf Binapfl (a Frankfurt-based industrial 
consultant and member of the DREB).  For Binapfl’s earlier, rather overambitious plans, see the pertinen  
documents in ACDP K148/2.  Under and largely thanks to Birrenbach, the composition of the TYMP 
Kuratorium was dramatically improved and came to encompass an impressive list of eminent personalities, 
broadly representative of virtually all walks of German life, including all the political parties in the 
Bundestag.  For instance, Hermann Josef Abs (Deutsche Bank AG), who had previously declined to join, 
now entered the Kuratorium, while President Lübke and US Amb. McGhee assumed honorary positions, 
the former the Schirmherrschaft.   
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which Birrenbach was a member of the Vorstand and which functioned as the 
Geschäftsführung of the Kuratorium, as well as with the responsible federal authorities, 
especially the Treasury Ministry and the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.83  The 
efforts assumed diverse forms: articles and inserts t e sing the Marshall Plan’s past and 
current significance were produced and appeared in newspapers84; political, economic 
and educational organizations were contacted and encouraged, with considerable success, 
to explicitly commemorate the anniversary85; information materials regarding the plan 
were supplied, including to the Atlantic and European organizations (with which the 
Kuratorium stood in contact), to aid in commemorative speeches, d clarations and 
articles.  Abroad, the European institutions as well as organizations and individuals in 
other European countries were likewise encouraged to openly commemorate the 
anniversary.  On 2 June 1967, the climax was reached as the federal government staged a 
Festfunktion in Bonn’s Beethovenhalle on approximately the 20th anniversary of the 
plan’s announcement, attended by about eight hundred invited guests, at which 
Birrenbach was among the speakers in his capacity as ch irman of the Kuratorium.86   
                                                
83 Given the temporary nature of the Kuratorium and of the entire initiative, it was decided to take this 
course rather than to create an entirely separate oganization to carry out the Geschäftsführung.   
84 These included an illustrated insert for Lesemappen, an installment of the Zeitbild for use in schools, an 
insert for the newspaper Das Parlament, an installment of the Europa-Bildzeitung, and the making 
available of a Maternseite for daily newspapers.  See, for instance, the “Textb ilage zur 
Europabildzeitung,” Folge 162, ACDP K148/2.  Such commemorations of the Marsh ll Plan stressed the 
plan’s effect on West German (and European) economic recovery and on European unification as well as 
its continued relevance for foreign aid, for instance to the developing countries. 
85 Organizations thus contacted included the major German economic organizations (among them the BDI, 
BDA, DIHT, DGB and DAG), a plethora of smaller such Verbänden, the political parties and educational 
(Bildungs-) institutions.  The commemoration of the anniversary by such bodies comprised, for example, 
pertinent references in their publications or in other forums. 
86 In his speech of 2 June 1967, Birrenbach stressed the economic impact of the Marshall Plan on Germany 
and Europe and its continued significance, with its principles of aid and self-help, as the “starting point” for 
all major economic assistance efforts aimed at building up the economies in the less developed (but 
developing) countries.  As Birrenbach put it, the Marshall Plan also enjoyed historical significance as the 
“beginning of the construction of a united Europe.”  Here, Birrenbach also praised the “genius” of Jean 
Monnet and the “staatsmännische Weitsicht” of Robert Schuman.  Birrenbach further expressed thanks on 
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The efforts of Birrenbach and the German Atlanticiss to present a positive image 
of the Federal Republic to the world, especially to the United States, also included 
attempts to exert influence on what appeared in West G rman media and publications.  
For example, during the early 1970s, a period when t  Atlantik-Brücke, with the aid of 
its influential members, was striving to counter considerable anti-American sentiment in 
the Federal Republic, including in the media, its chairman, Gotthard Freiherr von 
Falkenhausen, wrote to the executive vice president of the NDR in Hamburg with respect 
to a report of the well-known “left-wing” commentator Peter Merseburger regarding an 
Allied parade in West Berlin in June 1970, an apparently successful intervention that 
seemed to temper Merseburger’s subsequent reporting.87  In 1965-66, Birrenbach and 
Dönhoff collaborated in vain to prevent the publication of the French writer Roger 
Peyrefitte’s Les Juifs in German translation in the Federal Republic by the Stahlberg 
Verlag (Karlsruhe), fearing the uproar and its potential consequences that would surround 
what they deemed this anti-Semitic work, but did succeed, mainly via Birrenbach’s 
contact with and the consequent intervention vis-à-vis the publisher by the Karlsruhe 
MdB Max Güde, in securing desired modifications.88 
Already in Chapter Four, we touched on the public relations elements contained 
in the mere forms of the Atlanticist institutions and activities, and it should come as no 
                                                                                                                                      
behalf of the “Gemeinschaftsausschusses der deutschen Wirtschaft,” which comprised all the 
industrial/commercial Spitzenverbände and which had asked him to speak in its name.  Birrenbach’s “Die 
historische Bedeutung des Marshall-Plans” was then published in the Bulletin (Nr. 61, 13 June 1967, p. 
520, ACDP K114/1).  The other speakers at this functio  were Paul Hoffman (the first administrator of the 
Marshall Plan), Chancellor Kiesinger, Bundesschatzminister Kurt Schmücker (CDU), and Bundesminister 
für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski (SPD; representing the 
Wirtschaftsminister).  Marshall had announced the plan that would become associated with his name in a 
speech at Harvard on 5 June 1947.    
87 Walter Stahl to Chris Emmet, American Council on Germany, confidential, 13 July 1970, ACDP K112/1. 
88 For Birrenbach’s satisfaction that “I believe we have done well to halt the wheel of fate [dem Schicksal in 
die Speichen zu greifen],” see KB to Güde, 7 March 1966, ACDP K016/2. 
 400
surprise that the forms assumed by the specifically public relations actions discussed in 
this chapter, particularly those directed primarily at an American audience, in many cases 
also contained in and of themselves an element of public relations.  In numerous 
instances, there was a conscious effort to demonstrate to such an audience that a broad 
Atlanticist, generally pro-American consensus indeed xisted within virtually all 
significant branches of German society and amongst the German people as a whole.  
Similar to what we have observed with respect to the Atlanticist institutions, such efforts 
manifested themselves, for instance, in the wide-ranging composition of bodies such as 
the German Kuratorien for the Kennedy Memorial Library and the Twenty Years 
Marshall Plan as well as the group that signed the Atlantik-Brücke’s open letter of March 
1963.  Given his extraordinary contacts, Birrenbach was instrumental in each of these 
cases in putting together such groups consisting of “first-class” personalities 
representative of effectively all sectors of German life.  Likewise, the private character of 
these undertakings was particularly significant insofar as it allegedly demonstrated that 
such Atlanticist perspectives were dominant throught the population, rather than being 
limited to, say, members of the federal government or to other German authorities.89  As 
Birrenbach put it with respect to the Twenty Years Marshall Plan project, such private 
initiatives were especially important since “it has a far greater impact in the United States 
                                                
89 For instance, the goal of the German Kuratorium of the Twenty Years Marshall Plan was to demonstrate 
to the German and American publics that the German government, parliament, Wirtschaft (including 
finance), Wissenschaft and broad public opinion as a whole were conscious and appreciative of the 
statesmanlike act that was the Marshall Plan.  To this end, the Kuratorium, under the Schirmherrschaft of 
the Federal President, comprised prominent representatives of all areas of public life in the Federal 
Republic and of all the parties in the Bundestag.   
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if the Gesellschaft as such expresses its thanks of its own free will to the American nation 
than if the state does this ex officio.”90 
F. Unique Elements of German Atlanticist Efforts to Influence the American Public 
Whatever the similarities and overlap, the efforts f Birrenbach and other German 
Atlanticists to influence their own compatriots exhibited some significant differences 
from those efforts aimed at a foreign, principally American, public.  We have already 
mentioned the burden of recent German history and the challenges it presented abroad.  
Another important difference lay in the identity of some of those particular groups 
targeted with propaganda.  For instance, the German Atl ticists, especially through the 
activities of their organizations, undertook an extensive public relations effort 
consciously aimed at the American troops, families and support personnel temporarily 
based in the Federal Republic.91  In this sense, whatever frictions existed between th  
German population and US military personnel, such Americans who would eventually 
return home represented not just protectors but also a potentially invaluable conduit 
through which to influence American public opinion positively towards the Federal 
Republic.92  One significant aspect of this campaign was the publication and distribution 
of books and periodicals intended to inform such Americans about the Federal Republic.  
The Atlantica and Atlantik-Brücke both carried out such activities, with the latter, fo  
                                                
90 KB to Bundesschatzminister Kurt Schmücker, 3 May 1967, cc to Koppe and State Secretary Langer, 
ACDP K148/2.  At least in this instance, the Auswärtige Amt thought along the same lines. 
91 Over the years, millions of US soldiers were stationed at one time or another on West German soil,  
including West Berlin, as well as smaller numbers of other foreign allied troops (e.g. British and Belgian).  
As of the early 1980s, the American citizens in the Federal Republic, essentially members of the armed 
forces and their family members, amounted to about 8-900,000 and were viewed by the Atlanticists as “a 
great reservoir of potential ‘ambassadors of good will’” for the Federal Republic provided they could be 
brought out of their “isolation” with German help (something of a parallel process to what was occurring 
on the level of “high politics”) (AB Arbeitsplan 1982/83, ACDP K144/1).   
92 Regarding frictions, at least certain Atlanticists were concerned that, in their view, many Germans 
confused the sorry conduct of some US military personnel with the “American way of life” in general.   
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instance, publishing The Bridge, a short illustrated monthly intended for Americans 
living in West Germany.93  Another prominent aspect of these endeavors was the taging 
of educational seminars.  For example, the Brücke, in cooperation over the years with 
Haus Rissen (Hamburg), the Akademie für Politische Bildung (Tutzing) and the 
Europäischen Akademie Bayern (Munich), annually conducted several multi-day 
information seminars on Germany for American officers as well as separate seminars for 
American, and a lesser number of Canadian, teachers based in the Federal Republic.94  At 
                                                
93 As of December 1965, The Bridge enjoyed a circulation of about 76,000 (Walter Stahl o Dr. Hans 
Schmidt, Chairman of the Vorstand of the Handelsunion AG, 1 December 1965, ACDP K112/ ).  For a 
sample issue of The Bridge, including what was billed as a timely and important rticle on “The Young 
Germans and the Old Nazis” written by Walter Stahl (reprinted from the current monthly Newsletter) and 
arguing that “powerful trends in the modern world” (among them “internationalizing, Europeanizing and 
Americanizing” ones), particularly but not only impacting on the youth (therefore also encompassing 
generational change), as well as educational efforts were encouraging in the Federal Republic a 
“democratic development” and a tendency in favor of “integration in the Western World” while 
undermining nationalism, right-wing radicalism, extr mism and “dreams of omnipotence” (including 
National Socialism), see The Bridge, Hamburg, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1962, ACDP K007/1.  This issue of 
The Bridge also contained notices of upcoming events (exhibits, music, theater, folk festivals, social events, 
sports); a thanks to “our American friends” in the US armed forces for their hurricane and flood relief 
(British armed forces had also helped) and for the assistance at the Saarland mine disaster in February 1962 
and “in any number of disasters in the past,” all of which had “won the Americans many friends in 
Germany”; a “Trip Tip”; a “These Strange German Ways” section on “The Ins and Outs of Telling Time”; 
and an article from Introducing Germany by Michael Winch (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London) on Bamberg.  
Naturally, These Strange German Ways, a  an introduction into the “German way of life,” also functioned 
as part of the Brücke’s efforts to “tend to” the American soldiers stationed in the Federal Republic.  Indeed, 
as of the early 1980s, the main outlets for These Strange German Ways, German Holidays and Folk 
Customs and A Short History of German Place Names were the Stars & Stripes bookstores in the American 
garrisons in the Federal Republic (AB rbeitsplan 1982/83, ACDP K144/1).     
94 As of December 1965, the American presence and audience in the Federal Republic included the 
approximately one hundred and fifty schools with over three thousand teachers maintained by the 
American forces (Walter Stahl to Dr. Hans Schmidt, Chairman of the Vorstand of the Handelsunion AG, 1 
December 1965, ACDP K112/1).  On the role of American teachers in American schools in West Germany, 
often arriving with little preparation at their posts and “minimal” knowledge of the Federal Republic, as 
among the most important “Multiplikatoren” in the ralm of German-American cultural relations with their 
impact not only on the millions of American children they ultimately instructed over the years (children 
who were themselves a potential audience to be brought into a “genuine contact with Germany” and for the
transmission of “well-founded knowledge” about the Federal Republic that would eventually be taken with 
them) but also indirectly on the families of those children (thus, children as a channel), see AB Arbeitsplan 
1982/83, ACDP K144/1.  As of the early 1980s, five-day seminars were being held for American officers 
(including generals) six times a year with about for y fficers taking part in each seminar.  The main share 
of the costs for these officer seminars was borne by the United States armed forces, with the annual rel ted 
expenses of the Atlantik-Brücke amounting to about DM 20,000 at that time.  Meanwhile, five-day 
seminars for teachers were being held three times a y ar, with approximately thirty American and five 
Canadian teachers taking part in each case.  The expenses of the Atlantik-Brücke for the teachers seminars 
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times, further efforts were undertaken by the German Atlanticists and their organizations, 
again especially the Atlantik-Brücke, to “look after” the US soldiers and to enhance their 
impressions and experiences in the Federal Republic, for instance to reduce the 
discrimination endured by troops, particularly blacks and Latinos, in matters such as 
housing.95  Given the relative youth of the target audience, amely the American troops 
in Germany and their support personnel and dependents, such public relations actions 
promised long-term benefits to German-American relations and the Atlanticist cause.96 
Another key foreign group for the German Atlanticists in their public relations 
actions was the Jewish community, particularly thatin the United States.  Here, the 
Atlanticists faced the daunting task of securing the reconciliation of these Jews with the 
Federal Republic in spite of the horrific events of the recent past.  Whatever elements of 
genuine moral concern may have played a role in motivating these efforts, there was also 
quite a bit of hard-headed self-interest involved.  German Atlanticists were fully aware of 
and explicitly acted on the fact that, particularly given the relatively small numerical size 
of their population, the Jews were a remarkably influential group in the United States and 
played an important role in virtually all significant fields of endeavor, including the 
making of foreign policy.  True, certain experiences somewhat improved the 
                                                                                                                                      
amounted at this time only to about DM 10,000 annually.  On all of this, see especially the AB Arbeitsplan 
1982/83, ACDP K144/1 as well as the AB Activity Report, 16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1. 
95 Especially Walter Stahl (AB) to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K132/1 as well as Stahl to the AB Vorstand 
Members (regarding discrimination against black American soldiers in the Federal Republic), 10 January 
1972, ACDP K132/1.  For the Atlantik-Brücke letter action “Schwarze Amerikaner” directed at the 
“editors-in-chief of the most important German daily newspapers, journals, and broadcasters,” here 
referring to the many blacks among the approximately 400,000 American citizens currently living in the 
Federal Republic and promoting the use of the expression “black Americans” in the German mass media 
rather than “farbig” or “Neger” so as to introduce it into everyday German language, see Stahl to AB 
Members, 15 October 1975, ACDP K132/1 and Stahl to Dietrich Schwarzkopf, Stellvertretender Intendant, 
Norddeutscher Rundfunk, Hamburg, 28 October 1975, ACDP K132/1.   
96 In addition to these specific efforts, there also exist d generally friendly relations between Atlanticist 
organizations like the Atlantica and Atlantik-Brücke, on the one hand, and these Americans based in the
Federal Republic, on the other, with the Atlantik-Brücke, for one, tracing its own such cooperative contacts 
all the way back to the mid-1950s. 
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Deutschlandbild of Jewish-Americans, including the German-Israeli rparations 
agreement of September 1952, the taking up of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1965 
and the apparently pro-Israel attitude of a large part of the German public during the 1967 
Near East conflict.  However, the public relations efforts of the German Atlanticists in 
regard to American Jews took on an added urgency in light of the aforementioned right-
wing and anti-Semitic phenomena of the 1950s and 60s in West Germany, as well as in 
light of, for example, the ending of the weapons agreement with Israel in 1965 and the 
events at the Olympics in Munich in 1972, in which memories of the Holocaust and 
overt, strong anti-German sentiments, concerns and emotions were intensified or revived, 
with negative impact also on the Israeli public and o  German-Israeli relations.  
Nevertheless, the critical but intensive interest in Germany of Jewish-Americans, many 
of whom themselves were emigrants from Germany, also r i ed the possibility of a better 
informing about and understanding of the Federal Republic than their compatriots.  We 
have already touched on some of the ways in which Brrenbach and the other German 
Atlanticists sought to improve German-Jewish relations, for instance through the 
grantmaking practices of foundations like the Thyssen Stiftung.  Extensive political 
consultations with Jewish leaders in the US were also t the core of such efforts.97    
However, another significant element of the public relations efforts of the German 
Atlanticists vis-à-vis American Jews that we have not yet pointed out were the attempts 
to inform them, and especially their leaders and elites, about the true state of the new, 
democratic Federal Republic.  While the large American-Jewish organizations had, by 
the early 1960s, adopted generous attitudes toward the Federal Republic, the rank-and-
                                                
97 It was precisely to help arrange meetings with American Jewish personalities that Dr. Josef Cohn, the 
European representative of the Weizmann Institute (Jerusalem), accompanied Birrenbach, at Chancellor 
Adenauer’s behest, on his “Berlin Wall”-Sondermission to the United States in Fall 1961.  
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file of these groups seemed less well-informed thanits leaders and, therefore, more 
suspicious about and hostile towards the postwar German democracy.  To confront this 
situation, the German Atlanticists considered it essential to equip Jewish leaders with the 
latest and most responsible information.  Most striking in this regard were the efforts of 
the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany within the framework of their 
German-American Conferences.  With respect to these gatherings, there existed an 
unwritten policy of inviting Jewish leaders to attend, especially those whose 
organizations were deemed most in need, with an eye towards providing them with the 
necessary factual information.98  As a concomitant to these efforts, certain participants on 
the German side were explicitly included in these conferences based largely on their 
distinct suitability for enlightening Jewish leaders.99  At times, experiments were 
undertaken with the structure of the German-American Conferences with such 
considerations in mind.  For instance, in 1962, the conference added to the standard 
political and economic committees a third, “cultural,” committee.  This body focused on 
the development of German democratic institutions and was seen to be of particular 
importance and interest for the Jewish delegates.100  Though not explicitly presented as 
                                                
98 In 1962, for instance, the American Jewish Congress, an organization affiliated with the World Jewish 
Congress, was considered in particular need, and therefore its president, Rabbi Dr. Joachim Prinz (himself 
an emigrant from Nazi Germany), was invited to the Atlantik-Brücke conference.  For Birrenbach 
explaining to Sen. Jacob Javits (NY) the efforts of the Federal Republic to make an acceptable restitution 
for the victims of National Socialism, see KB to Javits, 14 March 1966, ACDP K090/1. 
99 Thus, personalities like the Director of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich), Helmut Krausnick. 
100 While this experiment was dropped at the request of the ACG from the fourth conference, held in Berlin 
in November 1964, the overall thrust remains clear.  Indeed, much of the impetus for such efforts can be 
traced back to the ACG and especially Chris Emmet, a Catholic who had been involved with pro-Jewish 
Christian organizations, including the Volunteer Christian Committee to Boycott Nazi Germany, during the
1930s.   
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such, the already mentioned publicist trip staged by the Atlantik-Brücke in 1967 was also 
largely directed at prominent Jewish figures in the world of American journalism.101 
German Atlanticist propaganda efforts undertaken abroad were also distinguished 
from those carried out in the Federal Republic by the uncertainties and unknowns of such 
an endeavor, whether a concerted public relations campaign or even a one-time initiative, 
in a relatively unfamiliar foreign nation like the United States.  Fortunately for 
Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists, they and their institutions were able to 
rely on a number of valuable partners and advisors, Germans as well as non-Germans, to 
assist them in such undertakings.  As for the Germans, these included the West German 
embassies and consulates abroad, particularly in the United States and Britain102; the 
German Information Center in New York City, which was subordinate to the embassy in 
Washington and responsible for “political publicity work” in the United States; Günther 
Drechsler and the Stahlunion Office in New York City; and the governmental 
bureaucracy located in the Federal Republic, including the Bundespresseamt (the federal 
government’s Press and Information Office) and the Auswärtige Amt.103  As for the 
Americans, such assistants and advisors included the American embassy in Bonn and the 
American consulates104; the American Council on Germany (New York City)105; various 
other pro-Atlanticist organizations, such as the FPRI/ORBIS and the Council on Foreign 
                                                
101 Moreover, on the great support enjoyed by Israel in American public opinion, see KB Memorandum, 9 
March 1970, ACDP K139/3. 
102 This personnel included Joseph Thomas, Erich Straetling, and Robert Borchardt (the latter as press 
attaché) at the embassy in Washington DC as well as Amb. Hasso von Etzdorf, Amb. Herbert Blankenhorn, 
and Herbert Sulzbach at the embassy in London. 
103 Of particular importance in the Bundespresseamt was the Abteilung Ausland, including its leader 
Ministerialdirektor Dr. Joseph Thomas (also previously as head of the German Information Center) as well 
as Reinhard Schlagintweit.  Helpful in this regard t the AA was the Informationsreferat Ausland, including 
its leader LR Robert Borchardt.   
104 Among them the American consulate in Hamburg, conveniently the home as well of the Atlantik-Brücke 
and the Atlantica. 
105 Especially figures like Chris Emmet and Joseph Kaskell. 
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Relations106; Atlanticist-minded publishers, such as Frederick Praeger; and a bevy of 
public relations experts.107  These partners and advisors, both German and American, 
constituted a valuable support sub-network for Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists 
and were, at least at times, even in contact and cooperating with one another. 
Taken as a whole, the elements of this sub-network provided crucial assistance in 
a variety of ways to Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists in their foreign public 
relations endeavors.  On one level, this assistance came in the form of advice and 
information to the German Atlanticists.  Such might call attention to disturbing releases 
and phenomena (along with, for instance, the passing on of an egregious article) or 
pertain to the current tenor of American public opinion, the nature of particular American 
media outlets, their own prior experiences with respect to propaganda actions, the 
prospects and likely effects of propaganda initiatives proposed by the German 
Atlanticists, or the impact of those initiatives actually undertaken.108  Occasionally, 
elements of this sub-network even suggested and stimulated particular public relations 
initiatives on the part of the German Atlanticists.109  As a whole, such advice and 
information was precious for determining the best approaches and occasions for carrying 
out publicity and publishing actions in and/or regarding the United States.  Furthermore, 
the elements of this sub-network actually assisted in arranging and carrying out the 
propaganda activities of the German Atlanticists, at times even lending their own prestige 
                                                
106 And, of course, the individuals associated with them, such as William Diebold (CFR). 
107 Chris Emmet of the ACG was himself one of these experts in the field of public relations and had 
received the Federal Republic’s Grand Cross of Merit as part of the government’s efforts to encourage pro-
German voices in the United States.   
108 For instance, advice with respect to the size and characteristics of the likely audience or readership as 
well as the nature, attitudes and pliability of key media figures, bodies (e.g. editorial boards) and outlets.  
For such analysis regarding US News & World Report ( he potential Erhard interview), see LR I Robert 
Borchardt (AA) to KB, 21 October 1963, ACDP K157/1. 
109 Thus, it was Chris Emmet (ACG) who urged the Germans to dispel American concerns through clear, 
pro-Atlantic statements and, so, greatly helped trigger the AB press release (“open letter”) of March 1963. 
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and name recognition among American audiences to the effort.  Such aid included 
translating materials into English; facilitating contacts with important American 
journalists; stimulating publicity in the American press for German Atlanticist causes; 
identifying suitable recipients for particular Atlanticist materials and assisting in their 
targeted circulation; and supporting the publication, sale and distribution of German 
Atlanticist works (and in some cases their own) in influential outlets in the United States 
(and Britain).110  In spite of such assistants and advisors, and sometimes because of them, 
the public relations and publication activities of the German Atlanticists did not always 
run smoothly.111  However, as a whole, it can be said that thanks to this sub-network 
                                                
110 Of course, aside from other German Atlanticists and their works, all this often benefited Birrenbach with 
respect to his own book (The Future of the Atlantic Community) and multiple articles, the public 
declarations with which he was involved, as well as his contacts with significant American journalists.  For 
instance, the American Council on Germany was quite helpful with regard to the Atlantik-Brücke press 
release of March 1963, with Chris Emmet making the necessary arrangements in the United States and the 
declaration being released to the American press by Gen. Lucius Clay (honorary president of the ACG) 
along with his own introduction so as to further increase the publicity garnered.  Emmet also sent two 
hundred copies of this “open letter” directly to various influential and interested American personalities.  
Likewise, Emmet negotiated with publishers on behalf of Birrenbach with respect to the American edition 
of The Future of the Atlantic Community and also promoted its sale to diverse organizations, in part to 
reduce the price of the publisher, Frederick Praeger.  Furthermore, Emmet and the ACG took on over 1,200 
copies of Birrenbach’s book for further sale or distribution, apparently far too many since as of lateJuly 
1963, only 500 had been so disposed [“abgesetzt”] and Emmet was still sitting rather hopelessly on 700 of 
them (available for free as of August 1963).  On this, see KB to LR I. Kl. Robert Borchardt, Washington 
DC Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1 and KB to LR Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 12 August 
1963, ACDP K157/1.  Regarding the distribution of the English-language (American) edition of 
Birrenbach’s The Future of the Atlantic Community, see again KB to LR Borchardt, Washington DC 
Embassy, 12 August 1963, ACDP K157/1.  On Birrenbach’s book receiving energetic support from this 
sub-network (here the Washington embassy), including with respect to “publication,” see for instance KB
to LR Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 4 April 1963, ACDP K157/1 and KB to Borchardt and 
Straetling, Washington DC Embassy, 22 March 1963, ACDP K157/1.  For analysis, including with regard 
to the possible Erhard interview, but also potential related assistance with respect to contacts and 
arrangements, see Dr. Joseph Thomas, Director of the German Information Center, to KB, 15 October 
1963, ACDP K187/1.  Finally, the fundraising campaign of the German Kuratorium for the Kennedy 
Memorial Library enjoyed support in both the German and American press from American Ambassador 
George McGhee and the US embassy in Bonn.   
111 Any number of such snafus over the years pertained, for instance, to the processes of translation and 
publication.  For example, Chris Emmet (ACG) fumbled the coordination of the publication of the Atlantik-
Brücke press release of March 1963, resulting in the refusal of many newspapers to publish it after it had 
already appeared in some others and was therefore no longer considered “real news” (KB to LR I. Kl. 
Robert Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1).  Perhaps a more systematic 
problem with this approach was that the stress placed by the German Atlanticists (as well as by other 
branches of West German society, such as industry and government) on the salience of public relations a d
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Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists received invaluable, even essential, 
assistance in their public relations endeavors abroad, particularly in the United States.  
G. Motives and Assumptions 
As with virtually all of their efforts, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists saw 
publication and public relations actions as potentially exercising a considerable and 
salutary influence on the achievement of their overarching Atlanticist goals and on the 
Federal Republic’s bilateral relations with the Anglo-Saxon nations, especially the United 
States.112  Birrenbach may have seemed in some ways an unlikely candidate for such 
activities.  In general, he consistently emphasized th  need for a delicate, quiet, discrete 
even rather secretive diplomacy that involved only a small number of actors and that 
eschewed publicity.  Though Birrenbach seems to have considered himself a skilled 
persuader and sought to express himself in terms interesting and comprehensible to the 
general public, he was also given to a quite sober, technical, analytical and detailed 
manner of speaking and writing and often struggled to limit the extent of his effusions.  
Moreover, as mentioned, Birrenbach felt himself constrained with respect to content in 
his public expressions and taking of positions on the complex problems of the hour.  In 
later questioning President Jimmy Carter’s “open” foreign policy, Birrenbach stressed, 
                                                                                                                                      
American public opinion left them potentially vulnerable to the self-interested schemes of certain American 
public relations experts to shamelessly drum up busines  for themselves by constantly exaggerating the 
allegedly anti-German mood in the United States.  Regarding such “experts” in contact with Birrenbach 
and other German Atlanticists, this was unfortunately the case with characters like Curtis Hoxter (New 
York City) and, probably even more blatantly, Gen. Julius Klein (Chicago), “the busy Public Relations 
General” (Amb. Rolf Pauls to KB, 24 April 1969, ACDP K169/2).  To Birrenbach’s credit, he seems to 
have been quite wary about closer ties to Klein, who also warned about the image of the CDU in the United 
States and the consequent need to undertake public relations actions there.  For an example of these 
unscrupulous but not atypical tactics, see Curtis Hoxter to KB, 18 September 1963, ACDP K157/1.      
112 Such propaganda undertakings offered the prospects of helping create the necessary mutual 
understanding between nations.  For instance, regarding the publication in Britain of Birrenbach’s The 
Future of the Atlantic Community, Walter Stahl wrote Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim on 7 March 
1963, “I believe that the publication of this writing in England, just at the current point in time, will be a 
valuable contribution to German-English understanding in the framework of the common Atlantic goals 
[Zielsetzung]” (ACDP K108/2).    
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“[t]he great statesmen in the past knew why they prefer ed to keep silence about their 
final intentions in a diplomatic operation until they put all their cards in the right moment 
on the conference table.”113  At the same time, Birrenbach was often critical of the 
German and foreign mass media (including the press), it  presence so incessant in the 
Atlantic world, seeing it riddled with errors, falsehoods, distortions, inaccuracies and 
broadly characterized by superficiality, sensationalism and a lack of objectivity, not least 
with respect to its reports and information on his own activities.  Furthermore, the 
contemporary prerequisite “to have a special appeal in television and radio 
performances” brought forth a downright harmful “type of leader.”114  Indeed, the mass 
media was a major factor contributing to the daunting problems constituting the 
“dangerous situation” in which they found themselves.115   
On the other hand, certain factors render Birrenbach’s intense interest in 
publication and public relations actions considerably less surprising.  For one, he 
emerged from and always retained one foot in a busines  world where considerations like 
image and publicity were naturally of central concer  to firms like Thyssen.  As we have 
seen, Birrenbach exhibited, already from youth, certain publizistische elements in his 
background.  Such endeavors also meshed well with the A lanticist stress on private and 
                                                
113 KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, Washington DC, 17 August 1977, ACDP 
K115/2.  On Birrenbach criticizing the Jackson Amendment “with all its publicity” and the publication of
the letters that followed the internal arrangements between the US administration and the Soviet embassy, 
see KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Trilateral Commission, New York City, 8 March 1976, 
ACDP K146/1.  For Birrenbach’s reference to the “scandalous” publication by the Washington Post about 
the financial support to King Hussein, see KB to William R. Tyler, Director, Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for 
Harvard University, Washington DC, 24 February 1977, ACDP K100/1. 
114 KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Trilateral Commission, New York City, 7 February 1975, 
ACDP K146/1.  Though not depicted in such terms, Birrenbach appears to have been implicitly referring to 
the shift in the Atlantic countries from the dominance of sequential, logical media towards a more sensory 
media, in part a modern technological revolution transforming thought, perceptions and ways of life.     
115 On this “dangerous situation,” with particular stress on the conditions within the West European 
democracies and somewhat less on those within the Unit d States, see KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Director, Trilateral Commission, New York City, 7 February 1975, ACDP K146/1. 
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non-governmental undertakings.  Moreover, like his fellow Atlanticists in general, 
Birrenbach was simply a strong believer in the practic l efficacy and influence of 
speeches, appeals, publications and the like, indeed of the whole range of Atlanticist 
public relations efforts so far discussed, seeing in them a particular type of constructive 
“political action.”116  Perhaps the primary basis of this outlook was his appreciation of 
what he called the, admittedly difficult to calculate, “psychological aspect” and “moral 
effects” of international relations and policies, particularly in the German/European-
American relationship.117  As with so many of the other undertakings we have alr ady 
described in Chapter 4, a significant manifestation of Birrenbach’s ambitious goals for 
Atlanticist publications and public relations actions, even with respect to rather esoteric 
projects such as his own book, was his sensitivity to the overall context in which they 
were carried out.  Birrenbach’s role in such endeavors was marked by close attention not 
only to public opinion itself but also to the broader situation and most recent events, 
particularly in the political realm, as well as by a zeal with regard to speed and timeliness, 
all of which was directed at ensuring the current, topical nature of and attaining the  
maximum impact and interest for these Atlanticist efforts.118    
                                                
116 On such forms of “political action,” see KB to Amb. Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Grewe, Representation of the 
Federal Republic to NATO, 20 February 1967, ACDP K125/2.   
117 For the continued importance of “psychological factors,” even in “the nuclear age,” see KB to William 
Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, State Department, Washington DC, 21 May 
1963, ACDP K186/2.  On the treatment of France as an “extraordinarily complex” psychological problem 
for German foreign policy, see KB to Bundesminister aD Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 
1964, ACDP K013/1.  Birrenbach was also very aware of the psychological element present as well in 
broader political life.  On the “deeper,” “psychological foundation” of the SPD-FDP election victory of 
1972, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.   
118 Through his correspondence, one can sense the frustration, even anguish and torment, endured by 
Birrenbach at delays in the publishing process (e.g. due to translation, printer strikes, publishers’ lockouts, 
changes in the Redaktion as well as sheer confusion, mistakes and oversights of the Redaktion) that plagued 
actions such as the publication of his book and the “open letter” of March 1963.  This concern with 
Aktualität led Birrenbach to sometimes opt for an article in a daily newspaper rather than in a periodical.  
Birrenbach worked diligently to ensure that his publications were brought up-to-date upon release, 
including numerous versions and last-minute additions, all seeking to account for the latest events and other 
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Naturally, the precise goals of the diverse German Atlanticist propaganda 
endeavors might differ from case to case, depending on the circumstances.  Such 
initiatives directed towards their German compatriots evinced a number of possible 
motives of varying degrees of generality and specificity.  On at least a certain level, the 
German Atlanticist infrastructure sought to keep an audience apprised of its own 
                                                                                                                                      
changes as well as to avoid repeating what others had said in the meantime.  Along these same lines, 
Birrenbach also urged, even pressured, editors to publish his pieces as soon as possible.  Thus, Birrenbach 
wrote an afterword for the English-language edition of The Future of the Atlantic Community so as to 
update the book.  On the “reasonably up-to-date” yet “slightly dated” nature of Birrenbach’s Future of the 
Atlantic Community since it was composed before de Gaulle “slammed shut the European Economic 
Community door” on Britain, see The Wall Street Journal, 1 May 1963, ACDP K181/1.  For Birrenbach’s 
acknowledgement as of May 1963 that the “friendly trea ment” of the French President had somewhat 
diminished the “currency” of his book but also his belief as of April 1963 that the book was still of 
“interest,” see KB to Sir Frank Roberts, Ambassador of the UK, 9 May 1963, ACDP K064/2 and KB to 
Mr. John Midgley, The Economist, London, 26 April 1963, ACDP K064/2.  On the appearance of 
Kissinger’s The Troubled Partnership (1965) at “the right moment,” given the recent events at the Geneva 
conference, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 
August 1965, ACDP K017/1.  For a later example of aBirrenbach decision to undertake a propaganda 
action directly in light of the larger context, see KB to Harry Bergold Jr, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for European and NATO Affairs, Department of Defence, Washington DC, 24 June 1975, ACDP 
K155/1.  In this case, in view of the “feeling of uncertainty” that Birrenbach “found in some places” in 
1975, he decided, in contrast to his “attitude in the past,” to publish a summary of his Amerika-report in the 
press (14 June 1975 in Der Welt), albeit in a “much shorter” and “less differentiated” form.   
Birrenbach’s convictions regarding the effectiveness of propaganda were reflected in his constant 
fears about such Soviet efforts.  On the role of the Soviet Union in stirring unfounded fears that the 
European “non-nuclear powers” sought “to get the finger on the trigger” of a strategic weapon system, see 
KB to Chet Holifield, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of 
Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1.  For Birenbach’s anxiety that the Federal Republic’s 
“moral position [moralische Position]” might be undermined by Soviet and East Bloc propaganda 
portraying it as a “disturber of the peace [Störenfried],” see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 19 
January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  On the need for “nuclear weapon states” to agree on a 
“Wohlverhaltensregelung,” most appropriately in the framework of the NPT, which would protect “non-
nuclear powers” who had signed the treaty against being “defamed,” see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, 
to Dr. Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1.  For 
relentless Soviet propaganda against any kind of German “access” to nuclear weapons raising problems in 
the long-run of the compatibility of the McNamara Committee with the NPT, see KB to John McCloy, 29 
March 1968, ACDP K109/1.  On Brezhnev’s “charm offensive” in Bonn that had also “not unbedenklich 
gestimmt” some personalities in the leadership group of the West German government (though not the 
“actual leadership” itself), see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD 
(USA), 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1.  For the Soviet Union’s “all-out attempt” to convince “the Western 
world” that she no longer constituted a “danger” to “peace,” including Brezhnev’s visit in Washington a d 
Bonn, see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  However, on Birrenbach’s 
disproportionate concern with Soviet propaganda vis-à-vis the Federal Republic and on the views of the 
Federal Republic’s allies being of greater importance, see McCloy to KB, 8 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.    
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activities and to promote itself.119  Though it does not appear to have played a prominent 
role in Birrenbach’s own thinking, there was on a general level a conscious desire among 
certain Atlanticists, such as Arnold Bergstraesser, to promote through their activities the 
political and staatsbürgerliche Bildung of the German people.  More specifically, and 
more in line with Birrenbach’s own thinking, Atlanticist publications and public relations 
actions were aimed in part at keeping the German public, especially that element 
interested in international affairs and particularly German-American relations, apprised of 
the state of Atlantic affairs and the crucial issues at stake, as well as at promoting 
possible courses of action and solutions to existing or potential problems.  However, 
Birrenbach, and presumably other German Atlanticists, entertained even more ambitious 
goals, whether explicit or left implicit, with respect to at least some of his propaganda 
activities.  Essentially, this was to overcome what he perceived to be the still existing 
widespread misunderstanding of the idea of Atlantic Community in the Federal Republic 
and the sharpening of the consciousness there of such a community.  The effort in this 
                                                
119 Thus, the Atlantic Institute issued updated brochures and a semi-annual Newsletter, all of which 
summarized AI activities and aimed to promote interest in the AI, to encourage authors and others to 
participate in its work as well as, later on, to obtain Participating Members (see Chapter 8).  As of 1975, 
such AI institutional public relations work also included “In Progress,” published in Washington DC.  
Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Assembly published an information bulletin aptly entitled “News of the 
North Atlantic Assembly.”  Broadly speaking, foundations also confronted such challenges.  On the lack of 
press coverage of foundations and their “customers,” the neglect by the “introspective” foundations of their 
“public image” and, therefore, the public’s “ignorance” and incomprehension of the “beneficial work” 
engaged in by foundations as well as the need to improve “external information” (i.e. between foundations 
and public) so as to clarify the “image” of the foundations, see the Report on the Meeting on Foundations 
and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1.  In contrast, “internal 
information” consisted of horizontal information (i.e. between foundations) and vertical information (the 
flow between the foundation and its beneficiaries).  Likewise, on the need to “preserve and improve the 
philanthropic climate,” on a tendency in some quarters o “wrongly” believe that the state will “do it all,” 
and on “those forces” that denied “the real need for philanthropy,” see again the Report on the Meeting o  
Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1.  However, for 
Birrenbach, along with Prof. Ellscheid and Prof. Coing, laying out the central interests and tasks of the 
Fritz Thyssen Stiftung in a press conference of 2 November 1962 on the occasion of the publication of the 
first FTS activity report, see the Expositions by Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the Kuratorium, 
on 2 November 1962, ACDP K077/1.  In addition to such activity reports and press conferences, a volume 
published in 1970 celebrated the 10th anniversary of the taking up of the activity of the Thyssen Stiftung.    
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direction was most clearly visible in Birrenbach’s opes for his book Die Zukunft der 
Atlantischen Gemeinschaft, through which he aspired “to fill with life this concept [the 
Atlantic Community], which has been to now somewhat bloodless [blutleer] for German 
readers.”120 
Those publication and public relations activities directed at an Anglo-Saxon, and 
especially American (but also British and even someti es other foreign), audience also 
exhibited a variety of motives, in some regards differing from or perhaps supplementing 
those characteristic of such initiatives directed principally towards a German audience.  
In Birrenbach’s case, the stress on and motives driving such propaganda endeavors in the 
United States were influenced by his assumptions and perspectives regarding the unique 
and persistent elements of the cherished identity of the United States and the American 
audience and their impact on its foreign affairs and policy, which he believed often went 
unrecognized in Europe.  Birrenbach viewed Americans d American public opinion as 
being characterized by an “extraordinarily wide-spread ignorance” with regard to the 
Federal Republic, the European Economic Community ad the issues concerning them.  
Therefore, like his German compatriots, though in differing respects, they too were in 
                                                
120 KB to Bergstraesser, 28 February 1962, ACDP K151/1.  For the purpose of Birrenbach’s book being “to 
work out the real political content of the concept of he Atlantic Community and especially to free it from 
all utopian interpretations,” see KB to Konrad Adenauer, Bundeskanzleramt, 14 May 1962, ACDP K181/1.  
In this particular work, Birrenbach hoped to explain the concept of an Atlantic Community, including 
America and a united Europe, to which he subscribed and, rather than focusing on “the individual 
difficulties of today,” to present proposals with respect to such a community that could be realized in the 
long or even medium term (about ten years).  For Birrenbach’s remark to Abs that “your talk with the 
Chancellor [Adenauer] will have shown to you how much educational work still needs to be done in this 
direction in Germany,” see KB to Josef Hermann Abs, Chairman of the Vorstand, Deutsche Bank AG, 
Frankfurt, 26 May 1962, ACDP K181/1.  On the secondary importance in “public opinion” of the question 
of the Atlantic Community in comparison to that of European integration and, therefore, the usefulness of 
Birrenbach’s book as a reminder of the Atlantic Community, see Werner Bögl, Schriftenreihe “Politik,” 
Das Parlament, Nr. 31, 1 August 1962, ACDP K181/1.   
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need of enlightenment via Atlanticist initiatives.121  Furthermore, Birrenbach saw 
Americans and their foreign policy as being driven by something other than the dictates 
of the rational balance of power.  Instead, other factors were at work, including 
considerations of morality and demonstrations of friendship, thus rendering propaganda 
actions all the more essential in relations with the United States.  As Birrenbach put it, 
“[t]he United States is no imperial power like England before, which is indifferent to the 
internal attitude [Einstellung] of other countries and which essentially focuses on power 
[im wesentlichen auf Macht setzt].  The United States is, on the contrary, extremely 
sensitive [empfindlich] in regard to approval [Zustimmung] and increased support.”122  
                                                
121 KB to Chancellor Erhard, 24 February 1964, cc Seibt, Hohmann, Dr. Wagner, Dichgans, Borchardt, 
ACDP K187/1.  On the false equation of “Gaullism with Europe” by American “public opinion,” see KB to 
John McCloy, New York City, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.  Admittedly, Birrenbach could at times be 
doubtful of the knowledge of general public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic.  For the ignorance of his 
own compatriots regarding the United States, for insta ce that it was simultaneously “an Atlantic and 
Pacific power,” see KB to Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 
January 1967, ACDP K117/2.  Birrenbach was also typically dubious of the ability of the press to properly 
assess matters.  On the misjudgment of the American press of the relationship of the NPT (which it 
“strongly” supported while being “skeptical” towards an MLF) to the cohesion of NATO, see KB to 
Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.  For the role of “part” of the American press in 
stirring up unfounded fears that the European “non-uclear powers” wanted “to get the finger on the 
trigger” of a strategic weapon system, see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1.  On Birrenbach’s surprise 
about the reaction of the American press to Chancellor Kiesinger’s recent declaration in July 1968, see KB 
to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2 and KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP 
K109/2.  For the faulty assessment by the German press of the situation and problems of the steel industry, 
see KB to Dr. Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1.  
Therefore, on the need for the American government to lead and influence with the proper arguments the 
opinions of the population, rather than to be led by the variations of that opinion, see KB, Düsseldorf, 
Berliner Allee 33, to Dr. Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 
ACDP K026/1 and KB Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.  
As already alluded to, given Germany’s history, it was considered imperative to explain to the Americans, 
especially but not only to American Jews, the true situation in the Federal Republic, namely the reality of a 
stable, democratic, humane and peaceful Germany.  Birrenbach himself was very conscious of the Federal 
Republic’s image in the world, for instance with resp ct to the German past and the fears of a revived 
National Socialism (e.g. neo-Nazism in the form of the NPD), and of the practical importance of such 
perceptions for West Germany.   
122 KB to Bundespräsident Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, ACDP K033/1.  Whatever 
understanding Birrenbach feigned for President Jimmy Carter’s “Wilsonian style” of policy (e.g. human 
rights) was based on his recognition that “the balance of power cannot be alone a goal which in the long
run could motivate the American nation” (KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia University, 
Research Institute on International Change, 8 July 1976, ACDP K146/1).  As of November 1984, 
Birrenbach traced the “faith” of the US in its “moral mission [Sendung]” back to the American Revolution 
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This perception played an essential role in the efforts of Birrenbach and the German 
Atlanticists, through their propaganda initiatives, to convince the Americans especially of 
German loyalty, friendship and appreciation for the United States, its people and its 
policies, both past and present.  Such was a common theme for Birrenbach, whether it be 
with respect to his book, the activities of the Twenty Years Marshall Plan Kuratorium or 
the fund-raising efforts for the Kennedy Memorial Library.123   
Ascertaining the effectiveness of the public relations and publication activities of 
the German Atlanticists with any degree of precision is virtually impossible.  In many 
respects, such endeavors primarily consisted of a one-way communication rather than an 
on-going dialogue.  It is difficult to draw any direct correlations between the endeavours 
outlined in this chapter and the prevailing trends of public opinion or to measure their 
immediate impact on foreign policy and international relations during this period.  No 
doubt helpful in some sense was the existence alongside the Atlanticist publications with 
which Birrenbach was closely involved of other, complementary Atlanticist-minded 
organs, for instance those culturally oriented magazines published since the 1950s under 
the auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (e.g.Der Monat, Encounter, 
Preuves).124  National states and governments along with their leaders in the West, 
                                                                                                                                      
in the 18th century and claimed “I know none of the great nations in the world that is so sensitive in the 
preservation [Wahrung] of its identity as the United States” (KB to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 12 November 
1984, ACDP K029/2).   
123 For instance, Birrenbach’s The Future of the Atlantic Community was explicitly intended, in no small 
part, to encourage and reassure the Americans in their current course and policies, in particular their project 
of European-American partnership and Western unity.  To take another example, the broad construction of 
the Twenty Years Marshall Plan Kuratorium was intended to demonstrate the broad appreciation of the 
West German public for the American assistance provided under that plan.  Indeed, Birrenbach conceived 
of the activities of the Twenty Years Marshall Plan Kuratorium as representing much more than simply a 
commemoration of the Marshall Plan, rather they and other such endeavors served as an expression of the
German people’s affection for the American nation.  Along these lines, see for instance KB to 
Bundesschatzminister Kurt Schmücker, 3 May 1967, ACDP K148/2.   
124 For Birrenbach on how “excellent” Der Monat had been in the past when Lasky was editor; his having 
subscribed for years to Encounter and having always read it “with great interest”; his aving “abandoned” 
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whether in the United States, Britain, the Federal Republic or elsewhere in Western 
Europe (e.g. de Gaulle), as well as international ad intergovernmental organizations (e.g. 
NATO, European Communities, OECD) disposed of enormous resources, instruments 
and powers and enjoyed tremendous access to the potent domestic and foreign mass 
media as means to generate propaganda, control communications and influence the public 
opinion and worldview on a national and international scale.125  While sometimes 
                                                                                                                                      
his Encounter subscription “two or three years ago” (therefore not to  long after the revelations of CIA 
funding) since a lack of time dictated that he could not afford to read more than what he “professionally” 
needed to read; and his now subscribing to Encounter again, for a year, after briefly seeing Lasky at the 
recent Königswinter Conference and then receiving from him in the mail a friendly but slightly desperate 
subscription request, see KB to Melvin J. Lasky, Encounter, London, 4 May 1971, ACDP K066/2.    
125 For Birrenbach pointing to the advantage of the greater “publicity” that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had 
garnered in the US as a result of “his position” in comparison to Franz Josef Strauss on their recent 
respective trips there, see KB to FJ Strauss, Minister President of Bavaria, Munich, confidential, 26 March 
1980, ACDP K034/1.  The public relations and publication products issued by governments and 
international organizations also served as potential sources of information for Birrenbach.  As of 1963, the 
NATO Information Service generated detailed reports that were read and discussed by the NATO 
Parliamentarians Conference’s Information and Cultura  Affairs Committee.  Among American agencies 
active in the propaganda field was the USIA/USIS, with its Amerika-Häusern, among other activities, 
purchasing relevant books to stock their libraries in West Germany.   
On the key role of “political Öffentlichkeitsarbeit”  in a successful contemporary foreign policy 
and, more specifically, on such work abroad of the West German federal government, carried out by the 
Press and Information Office (BPA) and the Auswärtigen Amt (sometimes in cooperation with other 
departments), that aimed “to familiarize the leading bearers [maßgeblichen Träger] of public opinion in the 
entire world with our standpoint,” see the Report presented by Ministerialdirigent Krueger of the Press and 
Information Office of the Federal Government before th  Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs on 21 
January 1960 about “Politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit im Ausland,” ACDP K004/2.  In carrying out these 
activities, the federal government created and relied on an organization and instruments located both at 
home and abroad, including the West German missions (often equipped with press attachés or press 
offices), to win over foreign public opinion.  The government’s political Öffentlichkeitsarbeit directed 
abroad included the areas: 1) Visitors: the invitation o the Federal Republic and “looking after” of f reign 
guests (with the most effective being those from the Publizistik); 2) Film and Television (including 
invitations to television teams from various countries who, with the government’s support, reported from 
the Federal Republic); 3) Radio (including the invitation of radio reporters and the provision of aid by their 
work); 4) Vortragsreisen of German personalities abroad; 5) Press; 6) Printed Materials and Publications 
(including targeted distribution by missions); 7) Exhibitions; and 8) Public Relations Offices.  As of the late 
1950s and early 1960s a total of about DM 16.6 million per year was budgeted to the BPA for such politica  
public relations work abroad (again Krueger’s Report on 21 January 1960, ACDP K004/2).  On the need 
for “German Stellen” to “look after” American citizens in the Federal Republic and to bring them out of 
their “isolation,” especially the Kreise and Kommunen in which American troops were stationed, with 
“corresponding impulses” emerging from Bund and Ländern also desirable, see the AB Arbeitsplan 
1982/83, ACDP K144/1.   
Related to such public relations work were the cultura  efforts of the Federal Republic abroad, 
with the AA housing a cultural department, West German foreign representations outfitted with cultural 
attachés, and the federal government (and Länder) providing financial assistance to the network (“Stellen”) 
of German cultural institutes, sites of cultural encounter [“Begegnung”], cultural associations and schools 
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fostering trans-Atlantic understanding, such entities also acted at times, in Birrenbach’s 
eyes, to hinder such objectives and thus, instead, o deceive their own (and other) 
populations.  In any case, the engagement of these other actors in such propaganda 
activities renders an assessment of the specific impact of the German Atlanticist 
endeavors examined here even more difficult.126   
However, there exists substantial evidence that Birrenbach and the German 
Atlanticists themselves considered their activities in this realm not only crucial but, 
moreover, quite successful.  For one thing, they consistently summoned up the necessary 
wherewithal, determination and energy to engage in and even aspire to the intensifying 
and expansion of these public relations and publication initiatives over an extended 
period of time at a not inconsiderable expense in trms of money, time and effort.  They 
saw their publications, along with other activities, a  being of outstanding quality, a 
judgment reinforced by certain feedback.127  They also appear to have been rather 
                                                                                                                                      
located abroad (including the Goethe Institutes) as well as to cultural exchanges (e.g. guest programs nd 
trips), the UNESCO, and various performances and exhibitions abroad, the totality of which encompassed 
areas like Geistesleben, Wissenschaft, literature, language, theater, music, art and film.      
126 Furthermore, the German Atlanticist publication and public relations efforts took place within the wider 
context of foreign policy-related public relations work being simultaneously undertaken by not only, for 
instance, the West German government but also by other, non-governmental organizations.  On the action 
“Macht das Tor auf!” carried out by the Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland in numerous West German 
cities and consisting of the sale of Brandenburg Gate b dges by young people and “nameless citizens” as 
well as by “the leading personalities” of society, including from fields like politics, administration, 
Wirtschaft, religion, art, education and sports, as a means of providing the endeavor with vital “energy 
[Nachdruck] and attractive power”; on this action being intend d as an expression of “solidarity” with 
Berlin as well as “Central and East Germany” and as a testimony of a “powerful German public opinion” to 
a foreign audience; and on the KUD claim that this operation had thus far enjoyed “a strong echo” and 
“triggered a good staatsbürgerliche effect,” see the Unteilbares Deutschland letter of 5 February 1959, 
ACDP K002/1.  
127 We have already referenced positive German and American reviews of Birrenbach’s Die Zukunft der 
atlantischen Gemeinschaft.  For positive reviews and opinions of Die Internationale Politik, 1955 (the first 
DGAP Research Institute yearbook), including those from Geoffrey Barraclough (in International Affairs 
(London)); Heinrich Benedikt (in the Wiener Zeitung); Politique Étrangère (Paris); Rudolf von Albertini 
(in the Schweizer Monatshefte); and Hans Herzfeld (in the Historischen Zeitschrift (Munich)), see “Die 
Internationale Politik: Jahrbücher des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige 
Politik,” ACDP K007/1.  For positive reviews of the DGAP Research Institute’s Jahrbüchern as a whole, 
including from Ernst Ulrich Fromm in Der Welt, see Günter Henle, DGAP eV, President, Bonn, 
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satisfied with the interest demonstrated in their publications and other activities.128  
Furthermore, the general tenor of the assessments by Birrenbach, other German 
Atlanticists and Birrenbach’s German propaganda contacts regarding the effectiveness of 
such undertakings suggests that they believed theseendeavors were enjoying 
considerable influence at home and abroad.  This generally positive tone is especially 
worth noting in Birrenbach’s case insofar as it strikingly contrasts with so much else in 
                                                                                                                                      
“Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1.  On 
the “all-around [vielseitige]”  approval enjoyed by the Europa-Archiv essay of Dr. Mende on “Die nicht 
bewältigte Vergangenheit des ersten Weltkrieges,” and on the gratifying number of reprints from the 
Europa-Archiv that had appeared in foreign-language Zeitschriften, such as Jeune Afrique (August 1962), 
Ministere des Armees (March 1963), Documents (March 1963), Survival (March 1963), and the  
Informationsschriften of the Svenska Institutet för Kulturellt Utbyte med Utlandet (June 1963), see the 
Report about the Europa-Archiv and the Jahrbücher für Internationale Politik, on point 1 of the 
Präsidialsitzung (apparently from mid-1963), ACDP K014/2.    
128 On the number of Europa-Archiv subscriptions (besides the members of the DGAP) amounting to about 
1,500 in both 1962 and 1963 (in spite of an increase in the sale price for 1963 from DM 56 to DM 65, 
necessary due to increases in production costs and alary rates), which represented a growth of about 22%
in comparison to 1957 (1,171); and on 1,553 Inlandsabonnenten (including 779 members) compared to 
1,029 Auslandsabonnenten (including 97 members) as of June 1963, with the sal s abroad likewise 
remaining constant at about a third of the entire circulation [Gesamtauflage], see the Report about the 
Europa-Archiv and the Jahrbücher für Internationale Politik, on point 1 of the Präsidialsitzung (apparently 
from mid-1963), ACDP K014/2.  For increases in subscriptions for the Europa-Archiv and increases in 
copies for the members of the DGAP, see the Draft Economic Plan 1965 for the Europa-Archiv, 24 
November 1964, ACDP K014/2.  Technical production csts for the EA for 1965 were estimated for 24 
issues at an average of 78 pages in a print run [A flage] of 3,100 copies including the index (Draft 
Economic Plan 1965 for the Europa-Archiv, 24 November 1964, ACDP K014/2).  On plans for a new 
edition of the Grundlagenbänden of the DGAP Research Institute yearbooks, with the first two (covering 
1955 and 1956-57) almost unavailable [“vergriffen”], see the Report about the Europa-Archiv and the 
Jahrbücher für Internationale Politik, on point 1 of the Präsidialsitzung (apparently from mid-1963), 
ACDP K014/2.  On the contractually agreed deliveries (from the Department Europa-Archiv) of the 
Dokumente zur Auswärtigen Politik o the Auswärtigen Amt amounting in 1962 to 1,100 copies at DM 
84.50, for a total return of DM 92,950, see the Economic Plan 1963 of the Department Europa-Archiv, in 
the Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am Main GmbH, ACDP K010/2.  For the contractually arranged 
deliveries of the Dokumente zur Auswärtigen Politik o the Auswärtigen Amt amounting to 1,000 
subscriptions, each with 24 deliveries, at a price of DM 100.50, with returns thus coming to DM 100,500, 
see the Draft Economic Plan 1965 for the Europa- Archiv, “Herstellung und Vertrieb im Druck- und 
Verlagshaus Frankfurt am Main GmbH,” 24 November 1964, ACDP K014/2.  As of 1975-76, a typical run 
of the Atlantic Papers in English consisted of 2,500 copies and, apparently, in French of 1,500 copies.  On 
the growing interest in and strong popularity of the DGAP Vorträgen, including more than six hundred 
members, guests and press representatives attending that of the US Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, 
see Günter Henle, DGAP eV, President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal 
information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1.  As of 1976, a very large audience for a DGAP Vortrag 
numbered almost five hundred people and, as of 1978, all such Vorträge were considered well attended.  
On the remarkably high “demand” (even a press run of 4,000 not enough) for the English-language edition 
of Außenpolitik as “proof of the respect” enjoyed by the journal, see Bechtoldt, Außenpolitik, to KB, 26 
January 1970, ACDP K022/1.  For the English-language edition of Außenpolitik having brought the journal 
“great reach [Reichweite],” see Bechtoldt to KB, 31 October 1974, ACDP K173/2.    
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his outlook, which, as we have seen in Chapter 6, distinctly tended towards the 
pessimistic.  We can also point to the enthusiastic response of Birrenbach’s contacts 
among the American elite regarding the German Atlanticist efforts in the public relations 
field.  For instance, Birrenbach was clearly pleased by the praise heaped by these contacts 
on the American edition of his book The Future of the Atlantic Community, as well as by 
the response emerging from the United States to his university lecture tour in the fall of 
1962.129  Though certainly not conclusive, all of this at least indicates that Birrenbach, the 
German Atlanticists and their institutions enjoyed notable achievements at home and 
abroad in their publication and public relations actions.130   
H. Conclusion 
The upshot of the efforts of Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists in the 
field of publications and public relations to bring about a favorable Atlanticist climate, a 
component of which would be a strong pro-Atlanticis public consensus, was a series of 
ongoing and one-time ventures designed to promulgate the Atlanticist worldview to an 
audience extending far beyond the members of the Atlanticist infrastructure, the direct 
                                                
129 For Birrenbach claiming, with respect to his book, that “I hear again and again that the people [on the 
American side], even after the concept has been temporarily shattered [zerschlagen] by de Gaulle, are 
pleased that a German voice is so near to the American concept”; his having recently received from J. 
Robert Schaetzel in this regard an “especially nice, appreciative letter”; and his satisfaction about the “long, 
very positive” related article that would appear in the July/August edition of Freedom & Union, see KB to 
LR I. Kl. Robert Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1.  On Birrenbach 
having received a number of “very beautiful” letters in response to the publication of his book in the US, 
see KB to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1.  With regard to his lecture tour of Fall 1962, 
Birrenbach already as of April 1963 had new invitations to universities in the United States (again KB to 
Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1).  Such Vorträge abroad were considered particularly 
effective when the names of those German personalities involved were already well known.  Birrenbach 
also deemed the Atlantik-Brücke “open letter” (press release) of March 1963 a success and believed that 
Chris Emmet’s sending of two hundred copies of thatdeclaration to “prominent personalities” in the US
had also contributed to its having had its “effect” (KB to LR I. Kl. Robert Borchardt, Washington DC 
Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1).   
130 For a later assessment citing the “proven” Atlantik-Brücke seminar program for American officers and 
teachers stationed in the Federal Republic, see the AB Activity Report, 16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1.  For 
a reference to the “convincing cost-benefit relationship” of the officer seminars staged by the Atlantik-
Brücke, see the AB Arbeitsplan 1982/83, ACDP K144/1.  
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participants in explicitly Atlanticist activities and even beyond the relatively small elite 
layers located at the peak of the social structure, including within government.  There 
existed a distinct attempt to educate a broader public on the need for Atlantic Partnership 
and to contribute to the feeling and consciousness of belonging to an Atlantic 
Community, not least via symbolic appeals and actions.  These efforts manifested 
themselves in the journals, books, articles, speeches, mass rallies, television interviews, 
fund-raising campaigns and the like that characterized the German Atlanticist movement.  
Such initiatives were intended to impact ultimately not only within the Federal Republic 
but also abroad, especially in the United States, a desire that introduced unique elements 
into such undertakings.  An examination of the German Atlanticist propaganda endeavors 
also highlights an important aspect of the modern rlations between, at the time 
especially Western democratic, nations.131  It sheds light as well on the perceptions 
entertained by Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists of not only the German people but 
also of the unique nature of the United States and the American people and the 
extraordinary imperatives to be derived from these r cognitions in interacting with such 
an entity.  Within this overall context, Birrenbach found ample space in a variety of 
publication and public relations outlets to promote his specific views, analyses and 
proposals and especially his fundamental Atlanticist outlook.   
                                                
131 As previously indicated, the stress on public relations was not unique to the German Atlanticists, rather 
it was a significant and increasingly salient element of the overall German-American (and German-British) 
relationship and, more widely, even of international relations in general.  For instance, see the memo of the 
West German embassy in the United States on the “Information and Public Relations Work of Foreign 
Governments and German Institutions in the USA,” 12 August 1958, ACDP, K040/1 and the memo about 
the “Extension [Ausbau] of the German Information Work Abroad,” March 1959, ACDP K040/1.  
However, genuinely widespread public relations work was at the time really worthwhile only in countries 
like those of the West that boasted a strong and well-organized public opinion, in contrast to most of the 
developing world where public life consisted merely of a thin upper layer that could realistically be 
targeted by such initiatives.   
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While we have outlined in Chapter 4 the construction and consolidation of an 
overarching Atlanticist infrastructure, in Chapter 5 the creation of a related financing 
infrastructure, and in Chapter 6 the development and fu ctioning of an Atlanticist 
political network, Birrenbach’s experiences suggest tha  we can also speak of the 
emergence in this period of an Atlanticist propaganda i frastructure and network, 
essential to the largely private, non-governmental efforts of the German Atlanticists in 
the realm of publications and public relations.  This propaganda infrastructure and 
network consisted not only of the Atlanticist organizations we have already encountered 
in previous chapters but also certain government departments, a number of Atlanticist-
minded journals and newspapers, West German and foreign publishers and publishing 
houses, as well as prominent journalists and other media figures.  In carrying out their 
propaganda initiatives abroad, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists could also rely for 
assistance on a sub-network of various American and German advisors and experts, both 
official and non-official, on the United States.  Ultimately, as Birrenbach well 
recognized, the Atlanticist publications and public relations actions formed a vital, and 
apparently successful, aspect of the overall Atlanticist effort, not least to confront familiar 
Abendland perspectives as well as later blossoming forms of, what at least they 
considered to be, overt anti-Americanism in the Federal Republic that we shall encounter 
in the coming chapters.  The efforts of the German Atlanticists to spread their ideas to 
and impact on a broader public, both in the Federal Republic and abroad (particularly in 
the United States), and the concomitant emergence of this propaganda infrastructure and 
network represented key developments in the evolution of German Atlanticism in the 
post-World War II era.
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Chapter 8: Thematic and Geographic Development of German Atlanticism - The  
                  Development of the Atlanticist Infrastructure and Network from the 
      Late 1960s Onward 
 
A. Introduction 
Naturally, the Atlanticist infrastructure and network continued to evolve from the 
late 1960s onward.  Many of the institutions described in previous chapters continued to 
function in much the same way as before, conducting conferences, undertaking research, 
generating publications and so on.  However, the changing environment in which the 
infrastructure and the German Atlanticists themselves existed impacted considerably on 
this infrastructure and network and presented novel challenges.  Particularly during the 
first half of the 1970s, new institutions, some of them fleeting, others of a more 
permanent nature, were created in an attempt to overc me these challenges.  Birrenbach 
remained located at the heart of many of these developments throughout the late 1960s 
and 1970s.  Once again, therefore, an examination of his activities during this period 
offers illuminating insights into the evolution of the German Atlanticism of the time.  As 
we shall see, with respect to infrastructure, Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists 
were ultimately engaged in two overarching projects during the late 1960s and early 
1970s.  The first was essentially a continuation of the direct effort to reinforce the trans-
Atlantic relationship both by strengthening existing stitutions as well as by founding 
new ones.  The second major project was the attempt to fortify the trans-Atlantic 
connection by enlarging the very thematic and geographic scope of Atlanticism, and 
especially to establish an organization designed in large part to expand their already 
extensive private, non-governmental infrastructure and network, however now beyond 
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the Atlantic world itself.  Related to all of this, ignificant innovations were also 
occurring in the Atlanticist sphere at the same time n the field of financing.    
B. Framework Conditions: Economic Downturn and the Atlanticist Infrastructure 
 Beginning in the mid-1960s, a significant decline i economic growth, even 
periods of recession, in the Federal Republic formed one of the most important structural 
conditions in which Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists operated their institutions.  
True, these Atlanticists had experienced relatively brief “dry spells” in raising funds for 
their infrastructure in the past.  For instance, elction years tended to be particularly 
difficult times as potential contributors, among them business firms and political parties, 
directed their limited available funds elsewhere.1  However, never before in their 
endeavors had the German Atlanticists confronted anything of this magnitude over such a 
prolonged period.  Interwoven as the Atlanticist infrastructure and network was with such 
broader economic developments, this larger slowdown could not but have a significant 
impact.  Just as the economic boom times hitherto had contributed to their ability to 
finance their infrastructure and activities, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists now 
found themselves facing considerable obstacles in this regard.  While the West German 
economy would not find itself mired in permanent recession, it would never again 
experience anything like the continuously high growth rates characteristic of the 
Wirtschaftswunder and, from the mid-1960s onward, economic troubles, including those 
                                                
1 Indeed, during the 1957 election campaign for insta ce, Birrenbach himself, in consultation with Robert 
Pferdmenges, had arranged for the transfer of Thyssen money, DM 250,000 from the Thyssen AG für 
Beteiligungen in addition to “considerable sums” from those works connected to it, into CDU coffers via 
the Staatsbürgerliche Vereinigung 1954 eV(KB to Fritz Berg, BDI President, 2 May 1957, ACDP K001/1).    
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in the steel industry, were common enough that Birrenbach regularly alluded to them in 
bemoaning the difficulty of raising funds in the Federal Republic.2    
Simply put, the German sources of financing for the Atlanticist infrastructure and 
activities were not as able nor as willing to part with money during tough economic times 
as they were during periods of general prosperity.  The federal government certainly felt 
the pinch and adjusted its funding practices to suit the financial situation of the Bund.  
The components of the Wirtschaft also took account of the new economic realities.  In 
many cases, the Stiftungen found themselves considerably more restricted in their 
financing of Atlanticist projects.  The situation of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung is instructive 
in this regard.  Due to the very nature of its means, the Stiftung found its ability to finance 
projects seriously hampered during times of economic difficulty for the Thyssen firm.  
By June 1967, the foundation’s income had declined by more than 30% in the past year 
                                                
2 For such complaints from Birrenbach, see for example KB to Karl Hohmann, 4 November 1976, ACDP 
K190/2.  Henceforth, Birrenbach offered warnings and concerned accounts of the “severe” difficulties 
within the national and international framework, unknown in earlier years, at least threatening to undermine 
the prosperity and successful development of the West G rman Wirtschaft as a whole, including the 
weakening of and uncertainty surrounding the domestic Konjunktur and economic growth; an ongoing 
collapse of profits due to both rising costs and declining revenues; and a waning readiness among the 
Unternehmen to sustain the rates of investment necessary for increased productivity.  According to 
Birrenbach, this state of affairs had resulted in a decline in the growth of steel consumption in the Federal 
Republic and led to the serious situation of a struggling, “extraordinarily crisis-prone” German steel 
industry (enduring a multi-year crisis, including in 1967-68) that was, furthermore, debt ridden and capital 
poor; at the mercy of high and rising expenses (e.g. wa es, social expenditures, energy/coal costs), low 
prices (relative to rising costs of living), short working hours, as well as declining returns and low or even 
non-existent profits; plagued by labor conflict (including wild strikes and violence); burdened with 
distorted tax disadvantages; and pummeled with unjustified criticism, to boot, at the hands of the press and 
political opposition (e.g. in 1969 by the SPD Bundesminister Georg Leber).  On all of this from the mid-
1960s to the early 1970s, along with the extraordinary problems of “far-reaching importance 
[einschneidender Bedeutung]” specifically confronting the August-Thyssen-Hütte, see the Expositions of 
the Aufsichtsrat-Chairman Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, 12th ordentliche Hauptversammlung of the ATH AG, 15 
April 1966, ACDP K079/2; Expositions of Kurt Birrenbach, 17th ordentliche Hauptversammlung of the 
ATH AG, 27 April 1971, ACDP K065/3; KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to Dr. Rainer Barzel, MdB, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, 24 March 1966, ACDP K016/1; and KB to Dr. Rainer Barzel, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1.  For Birrenbach 
arguing that the steel industry had in no way exceeded its capacity [“überspannt den Bogen”] in its 
dividend payments and that the dividends of the stel industry were among the lowest in the Federal 
Republic, see again KB to Barzel, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1.  
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due to the crisis in the German steel industry, and by 1973, the dividends of the August-
Thyssen-Hütte had been cut in half, which prevented th  Stiftung from doing much more 
than continuing to finance ongoing projects.3  During such a trying time, even the 
influential Birrenbach had to accept rejections from the organs of the Stiftung or at least 
issue cautions to those requesting funds for Atlanticist projects that he and the foundation 
would have supported wholeheartedly in financially healthier times.  The Thyssen 
Stiftung was not alone in this regard.  For instance, other foundations largely reliant on 
the steel industry, such as the Krupp-Stiftung, also suffered as a result of the struggles 
experienced in that sector.4  On the other hand, not all the major German foundations 
suffered equally.  The Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, for example, was significantly less 
affected by the economic climate due to its greater m ans and the fact that the earning 
power (Ertragskraft) of the Volkswagen works, though diminished, remained unbroken.  
That said, the impact of the economic downturn on the German Stiftungen exercised a 
markedly deleterious effect on Atlanticist fundraising efforts in the Federal Republic.   
Firms, themselves, were also less willing to contribute to the Atlanticist cause 
from the mid-1960s onward.  In some cases, this was due not only to the economic 
downturn per se but also in part to the frustration experienced by certain German firms 
with American competition on the German market during this period.  Thyssen offers one 
not atypical example of a firm’s response to the economic difficulties of the time.  Here, 
as a result of the economic troubles confronting the steel industry, the Thyssen Vorstand 
instituted a series of general savings measures, includi g an attitude of strict reserve with 
                                                
3 KB to JE Slater, Ford Foundation, 26 June 1967, ACDP K139/2.  The amount of the dividends for the 
Thyssen Stiftung varied during the 1960s: 1961-63=12%, 1964=10%, 1965 and 1966=11%, 1967 and 
1968=8%, 1969=10% and 1970=12% (Die Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 1960-70, Tübingen: JCB Mohr, 1971, p. 
3). 
4 This was the case in the early 1970s, for example, at the Krupp-Stiftung. 
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respect to donations and memberships.5  Birrenbach was consulted in ticklish cases 
regarding the donations of the August-Thyssen-Hütte to he Atlanticist organizations, and 
he was sometimes able to at least secure delays in the mplementation of the specifically 
proposed savings measures.  However, despite Birrenbach’s presence and, often 
effective, lobbying, even Thyssen was not exempt from slashing its contributions to the 
Atlanticist infrastructure in such economically troubled times.  For instance, during the 
mid- to late-1960s, the firm reduced its Spenden to the Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft, 
the Atlantik-Brücke and the Atlantica.6  It should also be noted that, in some cases, even
when firms did not curtail the nominal value of their contributions, inflationary trends 
gradually reduced their real value over time.   
The reduction in funding from the mid-1960s onward b ought about by the 
economic difficulties in the Federal Republic affected the Atlanticist organizations and 
projects virtually across the board.  Institutions like the Atlantik-Brücke, the Atlantica, the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik and the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft all 
suffered painful losses in member contributions from the Wirtschaft beginning with the 
recession of 1966-67.  Especially after 1969, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik saw its 
anticipated expansion, in the sense of personnel, thematics and infrastructure, seriously 
hampered by the financial shackles imposed by governm nt and Bundestag.  The 
Atlantik-Brücke saw a reduction in the purchase of its publications by the Bund, which it 
considered, for example, the primary cause of its relatively high deficit in 1972-73.  Such 
                                                
5 For references by Birrenbach to the “serious crisis” in the coal and steel industries in NRW, see for 
instance KB to Dean Acheson, Washington DC, 19 August 1966, ACDP K155/3. 
6 Due to the economic situation, the ATH reduced its onations to the DEG during the mid-1960s and cut 
its contribution to the Atlantik-Brücke from 1967-69 to DM 3,000 from the previous DM 5,000.  Thanks to 
Birrenbach’s lobbying of Sohl, the firm increased its contributions to the previous level in 1970 with the 
temporary abating of the steel crisis. 
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financial strictures were especially serious for an organization like the Atlantica at a time 
when the German Atlanticists, along with their European counterparts, were being urged 
by figures like John McCloy and Walter Dowling to increase their support for the 
Atlantic Institute or face the possibility of a sign ficant reduction of the crucial American 
support that constituted more than half the budget of that organization.7 
The response of the German Atlanticists and their institutions to this tighter 
financial situation varied.  On the one hand, such organizations made efforts to reduce or 
limit their expenses and to operate more efficiently.  This was the case, for instance, with 
the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.  From the mid-1970s onward, the Königswinter 
Conferences were staged alternately in Britain and the Federal Republic in order to ease 
the workload and financial burden on the D utsch-Englischen Gesellschaft of staging 
these gatherings.  As his appeals in July 1968 with respect to the Atlantic Institute 
demonstrate, Birrenbach, with his keen awareness of financing issues in general and of 
the acute difficulties thereof in this period in particular, was a firm advocate of efforts to 
analyze the activities and expenditures of the Atlanticist institutions so as to determine 
where money could be saved and spent more effectively.8    
On the other hand, intensified and often creative efforts were also undertaken to 
locate financing necessary for the continued development of the Atlanticist infrastructure.  
                                                
7 On, as of July 1973, the European-North American Committee (EURNAC, see later in this chapter) 
“skating on thin financial ice,” see the Proposal for a New Transatlantic Foundation, Draft No. 1, 24 July 
1973, by James Huntley, ACDP K130/1.  For business corporations, usually American, having been among 
the few sources willing to help EURNAC with funding as of March 1973, see the Summary of Discussions, 
Meeting of Atlantic Organizations, Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Lake Como, Italy, 16-20 March 1973, by 
James R. Huntley, Secretary to the Conference, issued by the Secretary, Guildford, Surrey, England, ACDP 
K068/1.  Jacques Pomonti (France) was convinced that “[w]e’ve got good people and good ideas; our only 
problem is more gas to put in the motor!” (Newsletter of Atlantic Organizations, Nr. 2, July 1973, ACDP 
K068/1).   
8 KB to John McCloy, 8 July 1968, ACDP K210/1.  For a later example, in 1978, the Atlantic Institute 
planned to hold only one meeting of Participating Members (see later in this chapter) (AIIA Budget 1978, 
Expenditures, 16 December 1977, ACDP K058). 
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Birrenbach played an important role in increased efforts to approach firms for donations 
and to recruit new members.  Sometimes, these attempts sought to broaden the base of 
support in the Wirtschaft.  Thus, in the late 1960s, in the wake of the recession, 
Birrenbach took part in the expanded efforts of the Atlantica to attract “mittlere 
Unternehmer.”9  In 1969, the Freunde der deutsch-englischen Gespräche in 
Königswinter e.V. was founded to facilitate the raising of the contributions chiefly from 
the Wirtschaft for the DEG.10  In some cases, new programs were created to tap funding 
sources.  To expand its range of financing and contacts with various sectors of society, 
the AI initiated in November 1970 a Participating Members program, modeled on the 
corporate service of the Council on Foreign Relations and benefiting from the CFR’s 
advice initially.  The AI governors helped in the arduous process, requiring considerable 
travel and contact work, of enrolling firms, trade associations, newspapers and similar 
private organizations, with the August-Thyssen-Hütte among the German PMs.  For an 
annual fee, PM representatives attended semi-annual meetings, often in Paris, that 
enabled the AI to expose them to its relevant especially economic and financial research, 
to clarify in which directions further work needed to be done and to incorporate views 
and information gleaned from PMs into studies underway.11  Other Atlanticist institutions 
                                                
9 Walter Stahl to KB, 3 April 1968, ACDP K106/1.   
10 As of 1969, the member contributions and contributions from the Wirtschaft covered more than two-
thirds of the annual expenses of the DEG.  The remainder was made up through donations and through 
sums from the government (explicitly comprising only a very low share of the DEG budget). 
11 Chairmen of Participating Members meetings included, for example, the Hon. Nathaniel Samuels (US; 
chairman of the Louis Dreyfus Holding Company and chairman of the board of advisory directors of Kuhn, 
Loeb & Co.) on 16 December 1977.  The Participating Members meetings were also addressed by 
prominent guest speakers from the academic world, international organizations, governments and the 
private sector, among them Germans such as Otto Wolff von Amerongen (president of the DIHT, 4 June 
1973), Jürgen Ponto (Dresdner Bank, 11 November 1974), and Dr. Günter Geisseler (former legal director, 
Mannesmann AG, 7 November 1975), as well as figures lik  Manlio Brosio (Secretary-General of NATO), 
William Bundy (President of the Ford Foundation), Bruno Kreisky (Chancellor of Austria), Janez 
Stanovnik (Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva), Samuel Pisar, Yves 
Laulan (Director of Economic Affairs, NATO), Louis Kawan (EEC Commission), H. Exc. Pierre Werner 
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expanded their scope of funding source-types.  For example, beginning in the late 1960s, 
the DGAP, previously focused on financing from industry, sought larger contributions 
                                                                                                                                      
(Prime Minister of Luxembourg), Henry Fowler (former US Treasury Secretary), Jean Rey (former 
president of the EEC), J. Robert Schaetzel (former US ambassador to the EEC), Edward Fried (Brookings 
Institution), François Duchêne (IISS), Emile van Lenn p (OECD Secretary-General), Joseph Luns (NATO 
Secretary-General), Robert Rossa (former United States undersecretary of the Treasury), Prof. BC Roberts 
(London School of Economics), Francois Lagrange (Rapporteur-General of the Sudreau Commission), NH 
Petersen (Chef de Cabinet of Mr. FO Gundelach, European Commissioner), the Rt. Hon. Lord Roll of 
Ipsden (KCMG, CB, chairman of SG Warburg & Co. Ltd., London), M. André de Lattre (Chairman of 
Crédit National, Paris), Baron Edmond de Rothschild (Chairman of Compagnie Financière Holding, Paris), 
and Geoffrey Chandler (CBE, Director, Shell International Petroleum Co., London).  Other participants i  
PM meetings included Germans like Hermann J. Abs, Dr. Walter Damm, Dr. Gerd Tacke, and Marion 
Gräfin Dönhoff, along with Jonkheer John Loudon, Aurelio Peccei, Count René Boël, Sir Richard Powell, 
Robert Belgrave, Amb. Egidio Ortona, IPH Skeet, andAmb. Martin Hillenbrand.  “Respondents” to the 
PM meeting of 7 November 1975 included, among others, Rudolf Vollmer (Labour Attaché, German 
Embassy in London), along with Roy Grantham (General Secretary, Association of Professional, 
Executive, Clerical & Computer Staff (APEX), UK); Mr. Janurus (Labour Attaché, Swedish Embassy in 
London); and Harry Pollak (Labour Attaché, United States Embassy in London) (Labour-Management 
Study, Draft Project Description, 25 February 1976 and related Draft Budget, 15 April 1976, ACDP K058).  
Participating Members meetings covered topics such as “East-West Economic Relations” (4 June 1973); 
“The Upcoming West-West Negotiations” (on forthcoming monetary, trade and defense talks, 13 
November 1973); “Inflation, Deflation and Continuing Monetary Disorder?” (11 November 1974); “The 
Reform of European Company Laws: The Issues for Labour and Management” (7 November 1975); and 
“The Problems Caused in Business by Growing Governmnt Intervention” (16 December 1977).  Though 
many PM meetings occurred in Paris (e.g. 4 June 1973 at the Hotel Méridien; 13 November 1973 at OECD 
headquarters), some were held elsewhere (London, 7 November 1975; Brussels, 3 December 1976).  On 11 
November 1974, the AI Participating Members gathered in Munich, the first PM meeting staged in the 
Federal Republic and one presented as a reflection of the importance of the German cooperation in the AI 
(Protocol of the Atlantica Member Assembly, 17 June 1974, ACDP K104/2).  Initially set at FF 5,000, the 
annual fee for Participating Members was increased in 1974 to FF 6,500 (along with the new possibility of 
signing up for 3-5 years at a rate of FF 6,000) and in 1976 to FF 7,500 (or FF 7,000 for a longer 
commitment).  As of August 1976, recommendations exi t d that Participating Members be asked to pay 
FF 8,500 for 1977 (Memo on finances from John Tuthill, AIIA Director-General, Paris, to all members and 
ex-officio members of the Steering Committee, 26 August 1976, ACDP K058).  In general, the 
Participating Members program was considered well-organized and expanding, with the first list of PMs 
consisting of more than one hundred such members (Report about the Atlantic Institute for International 
Affairs, ACDP K104/2).  In 1973, the AI Board, believ ng increased American participation would be 
“useful,” agreed to begin a “low-key, selective” effort to obtain more major US firms, concentrating on 
those with “substantial trading or financial” interests and operations in Europe and Japan, as Particip ting 
Members.  This campaign, which progressed “well,” was expected to add by the end of 1973 about fifteen 
to twenty more US Participating Members to what hadbeen initially less than a dozen, an increase from 
somewhere less than 12% to about 20% of the total (Report about the Atlantic Institute for International 
Affairs, ACDP K104/2).  In the course of 1973, twenty-four new PMs joined the AI (none German, but one
each from Finland (Finnish Sugar Co. Ltd.) and Sweden (Salenrederierna) along with diverse US and West 
European ones (including several from France and one each from Spain (Banco Hispano Americano) and 
Luxembourg)) (AI Activity Report 1973, ACDP K104/2).  As of 1977, there was a new, hopeful, vigorous 
“drive” for additional AI Participating Members “in various countries” (including the US and Europe) but 
also a cautionary tone since, “in certain cases, even hanging on to what we have got is proving difficult 
enough” (Memorandum from Martin Hillenbrand to members and ex-officio members of the Steering 
Committee regarding the financial report, 12 April 1977, ACDP K058).  Nevertheless, for the director-
general’s assessment of the previous day’s “very successful” PM meeting (10 June 1977), see the Minutes 
of the Meeting of the AI Board of Governors on 11 June 1977, ACDP K058.   
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from the Bund, even as it attempted to maintain its “independence.”  The SWP turned to 
financing outside the public sector for certain projects, including to the Thyssen Stiftung. 
While, as a leading member of these organizations, Birrenbach obviously had a 
hand in such efforts, perhaps his most striking undertaking during this period with respect 
to increasing the financial means for the existing Atlanticist infrastructure were his efforts 
on behalf of the Monnet Committee.  By the mid to late 1960s, this organ found itself in a 
difficult financial situation with an annual income (about FF 125,000) amounting to 
approximately half its annual expenses (about FF 250,000).12  These difficulties could be 
traced to a number of causes but were primarily attribu able to the fact that the committee 
had seen itself compelled to refrain from the considerable financial support it had been 
receiving from American foundations, especially the Ford Foundation, due to “the current 
political situation in France.”13  By the late 1960s, therefore, ideas were floating around 
about how the long-term financing of the Monnet Committee could be placed on a firmer 
basis.  With respect to this issue, Birrenbach functio ed as someone who could expertly 
explore the possibilities of such an undertaking in the Federal Republic.  One such 
possibility entertained by Monnet was that of a European foundation whose raison d’être 
would be the realization of European unity through the promotion of the European idea 
and the support of the organizations acting in this sense, an explicit purpose believed to 
be conspicuously lacking among the few European foudations enjoying significant 
                                                
12 Of this annual income of approximately FF 125,000 in th s period, FF 50,000 came from the political 
parties and FF 75,000 from the trade unions. 
13 Birrenbach Memo, 12 July 1966, ACDP K050/2.  In 1966, while searching for funds for the committee 
from private West German sources (essentially the Wirtschaft), Birrenbach also mentioned the committee’s 
desire, “in the current phase of European unification,… to strengthen [verstärken] its political activity” 
both within the Community as well as beyond it, “esp cially in Great Britain and in the United States” (KB 
Memo, 12 July 1966, ACDP K050/2).  These financial d fficulties of the Monnet Committee were, in part, 
due as well to the “special expenditures” in at least 1969 brought on by “the England entrance” (Max 
Kohnstamm to KB, confidential, 13 March 1969, ACDP K126/1).   
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means.  To this end, Monnet set his sights on the soon to be founded Krupp-Stiftung.14  
Despite Birrenbach’s support of such ideas vis-à-vis Krupp’s Berthold Beitz, Monnet’s 
proposals regarding the purposes of the Krupp-Stiftung were rejected in early October 
1967 since the purposes of this Stiftung had already been set down in the testament of 
Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach.15  Another idea along similar lines, entertained 
especially by the DGB’s Ludwig Rosenberg and Monnet and about whose feasibility and 
potentialities in the Federal Republic Birrenbach was consulted, was the founding of a 
European Foundation whose financial means would be rais d through contributions.16 
The solution ultimately arrived at took a somewhat different approach, one that 
involved the Wirtschaft but not in the form of a Stiftung.  The possibility of securing 
financing for the committee from industry was a topic of discussion during the mid- and 
late-1960s and, having promised Monnet he would make just such an effort, Birrenbach 
played a central role in obtaining the support of the German Wirtschaft for this entity.  In 
his direct contacts with the BDI, Birrenbach repeatedly sang the praises of the Monnet 
Committee, referring to it as “the political conscience of the Europe which we desire,” 
                                                
14 As he put it in September 1967, “I believe that it is a plan that can be very important for Germany and for 
Europe if the object of the future foundation is well chosen.  In my view, the Krupp Foundation could not
have a more useful function than to aid in the construction of Europe” (Monnet to KB, 5 September 1967, 
ACDP K052/2).  An attached memo, apparently written by Monnet assistant Jacques van Helmont, further 
proposed that the “direction” of the Stiftung be composed of German members as well as members of other 
European nationalities, a “significant innovation” since the American foundations that “generously” aided 
foreign activities had a direction composed only of Americans.  Such a step would not o ly benefit 
European unification but also the image of the Krupp firm and of the Federal Republic, thus continuing the 
efforts to prove they were today of a “peaceful” nature (Memorandum, VH/cm, 5 September 1967, ACDP 
K048/2). 
15 Berthold Beitz to KB, 2 October 1967, ACDP K048/2. 
16 Rosenberg apparently responded to Monnet’s inquiries regarding the long-term financing of the 
committee with the proposal of the construction of such a foundation.  Birrenbach was consulted about the 
idea and potential tasks of this foundation and the conditions under which it could be recognized in the
Federal Republic as charitable (Dr. Otto Kunze, DGB Bundesvorstand, to KB, 24 April 1968, ACDP 
K052/2). 
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and attempted to soothe concerns regarding the influe ce of the labor unions in the 
committee and the exclusion of the employers organizations:  
as far as the participation of the unions, these hav , to this point, never attempted 
to cause the committee to propose negative measures in lation to the 
Unternehmern.  The presence of the Christian-social, conservative and liberal 
parties in the committee have provided a sufficient security for it. 17 
 
Birrenbach was also instrumental in encouraging, facilit ting and arranging contacts and 
meetings, in which he himself took part, that brought West German industrialists, 
especially the leading members of the BDI (including Berg and Wagner), into connection 
with the Monnet Committee (Monnet and Kohnstamm) and foreign, especially French 
and Italian, industrialists (e.g. Wilfrid Baumgartner, Giovanni Agnelli, Giuseppe Petrilli, 
also within the context of meetings of the presidents of UNICE) to impart impetus to the 
process and ultimately to plan and coordinate their contributions.  Birrenbach continued 
to prod things along, also approaching industrialists himself, and kept Monnet apprised of 
the situation in the Federal Republic.  Finally, in support of future fund-raising, 
Birrenbach devised and arranged a way, via the Europa-Union and with the agreement of 
its president, Baron von Oppenheim, for firms donating o the Monnet Committee to 
enjoy a tax deduction on that contribution.18  Once again, as we have seen with respect to 
the Atlantica and the Stiftungen, Birrenbach’s skill in matters of taxation, and more 
specifically the evasion thereof, thus proved an important asset in his fund-raising efforts.   
                                                
17 KB to Hellmuth Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1 and KB to Fritz Berg (cc: Wagner), 17 March 
1969, ACDP K126/1.  Despite such criticism at times for the exclusion of the employers organizations, 
Monnet had believed in forming his committee that “[o]nly the political parties and the trade unions had 
both the strength and the element of disinterest that were needed for the building of Europe” [Jean Monnet,   
Memoirs (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), p. 406]. 
18 Oppenheim agreed to have the Europa-Union issue Spendenquittungen provided that the letter of the 
donor made clear that the contribution did not come at the expense of the contributions of these firms to the 
Europa-Union itself (KB to Wagner, 6 June 1969, ACDP K126/1).  The funds were then transferred 
through the Europa-Union to the Monnet Committee’s Swiss bank account.   
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 However, the entire process was a rather slow and prolonged affair with the 
exchanges of letters and the various meetings dragging on for several years following 
Birrenbach’s initial approach to Berg in this matter in July 1966, therefore well into the 
late 1960s.  This was in spite of an initially encouraging response from Berg in a meeting 
in Bonn in 1967 with Monnet, Kohnstamm, Wagner and Birrenbach.  In Birrenbach’s 
mind initially, a contribution from German industry represented something of a catalyst 
for contributions from the industries of other countries in the Common Market.19  
However, by March 1969, with still no contribution from German industry, the Monnet 
Committee was already or soon would be receiving significant sums of money from the 
French (anonymously), the British, the Dutch and the Belgians, as well as from the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.20  The lackluster progress, on the German side at leas , had 
something to do in part with the already mentioned questions being raised among 
industrialists about the influence of the trade unions in the committee and the exclusion 
of the employers organizations.21  Finally, years after the initial approaches, with o er 
countries donating money while “the strongest economic country of Europe, the Federal 
Republic, about which everyone asks, pays nothing,” Birrenbach released his frustrations 
to Wagner in a letter of 2 April 1969 regarding hisinability to elicit a definitive answer 
from the German businessmen: 
Today-almost two years later [after the initially encouraging meeting]- we are still 
not a step further….  I now need an answer from you.  If you say “no,” I would 
respect this answer, even if I consider it wrong, especially as the coming twelve 
                                                
19 KB Memo, 12 July 1966, ACDP K050/2. 
20 For “several personalities” in France paying “under the table,” see KB to Hellmuth Wagner, 2 April 
1969, ACDP K126/1 as well as KB to Wagner, 13 March 1969, ACDP K126/1.  As of 2 April 1969 the 
British sum amounted to 100,000 to 200,000 DM, the Dutch 60,000 DM, and the Belgian 40,000 DM (KB 
to Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1).   
21 In explaining the slow German progress, Birrenbach lluded to unspecified reasons both inside and 
outside of the Federal Republic (KB to Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1).   
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months will be of decisive importance for the European development….  But 
what I cannot do is sit back and watch as nothing happens on the part of the 
Federal Republic in this question.  I would simply not be able to come to terms 
with it [abfinden]….  Give me an answer: yes or no, but do not make me wait any 
longer.  Please, have understanding for my impatience, but two years is a long 
time.22 
 
Spurred on by this plea and aided by Birrenbach’s solution of the taxation issue, Berg and 
Wagner finally seem to have gotten down to the business of securing financial support 
from the Unternehmern for the Monnet Committee.  Meanwhile, the industrialists 
attempted to coordinate their contributions within their own industries.  By 11 July 1969, 
the donations for the first two years to the Monnet Committee amounted to DM 71,500 
and DM 61,000, respectively, sums within the range of Birrenbach’s recent expectations 
and considerably exceeding those of his earlier projecti ns.23  Naturally, Birrenbach was 
also in contact with Sohl and saw to it that the Thyssen group provided a substantial DM 
10,000 contribution for at least each of the first two years, equal to the most of any firm.24   
Of course, the upshot of such financing, including that from the German 
Wirtschaft, was the placing of the Monnet Committee on a firmer financial footing and 
the enhancement of its ability to expand its activities.  The contributions raised from 
European business for the committee served a variety of purposes, depending on the 
source.  The Dutch, Belgian, English and (in part) German contributions went towards 
                                                
22 KB to Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1. 
23 This surpassed Birrenbach’s original suggestion to Berg in July 1966 of an annual sum of DM 50,000 as 
a reasonable target and was within the range of his later suggestion to Berg and Wagner of March 1969 of 
DM 50,000-100,000 for an initial period of two years (KB to Fritz Berg, President of the BDI, 12 July 
1966, ACDP K050/2 and KB to Berg (cc: Wagner), 17 March 1969, ACDP K126/1).  In August 1969, 
Birrenbach expressed his confidence that the contributions for the second year would eventually match 
those for the first (KB to Winrich Behr, 8 August 1969, ACDP K126/1).  In a letter of 9 September 1969, 
Gerhard Eickhorn, the General Secretary of the Europa-Union Deutschland, enclosed a table of the 
promised and the thus far received contributions for the committee of DM 69,000 and DM 66,000, 
respectively (Eickhorn to KB, 9 September 1969, ACDP K126/1).   
24 Eickhorn to KB, 9 September 1969, ACDP K126/1; KB to Kohnstamm, 11 July 1969, ACDP K126/1; 
and Sohl to Berg, 11 June 1969, ACDP K126/1. 
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the committee’s special British program, resolved at its London meeting of 11 March 
1969.  This program aimed to promote British entrance i to the European Economic 
Community by arranging for a group of experts to investigate the problems the French 
government was then depicting as insurmountable and included, among other things, the 
financing of four reports as well as special meetings of the committee on this theme.25  
However, at the agreement of Birrenbach, Monnet and Kohnstamm, the German funds 
also went towards a somewhat broader purpose, financi g ot only the “Britain project” 
but also the committee’s normal expenditures and also compensating Monnet for his own 
personal contributions to the committee’s expenses.26  It is not clear exactly what 
influence the contributions of the industrialists provided them in the committee, though it 
seems and stands to reason that they enjoyed at least some.  Monnet, henceforth, 
expanded his regular contacts with the governments, political parties and labor unions to 
include the BDI and the corresponding employers organizations in the other donor 
countries.  Meanwhile, Birrenbach passed on draft declarations to Berg and Wagner of 
the BDI so that they could make suggestions to Monnet.  However, a formal widening of 
the committee to include explicit representatives of industry was rejected so as to prevent 
an unwieldy swelling that would render the committee’s work impossible.  Therefore, 
added to Birrenbach’s task of acting as the go-betwe n for the committee and the CDU 
                                                
25 The British had entered the Monnet Committee during the late 1960s, therefore even prior to the entrance 
of Britain into the EEC. 
26 For instance, over an eighteen-month period in the late 1960s, Monnet himself gave “new advances” of 
approximately DM 150,000 to the committee (Kohnstamm to KB, confidential, 13 March 1969, ACDP 
K126/1).    
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was that of serving as the liaison between the committee and German industry (also via 
the Europa-Union and the BDI) including with respect to funding issue .27 
C. Framework Conditions: Atlantic Drift 
In addition to the economic difficulties confronting Birrenbach and the German 
Atlanticists, another key element in the framework in which they and their institutions 
operated during the late 1960s and early 1970s was at least the sense that the United 
States and Western Europe, including the Federal Republic, were gradually drifting apart 
from one another.  This typically manifested itself in American-European discord in a 
variety of security, political and economic areas (e.g. détente, trade and monetary issues, 
burden-sharing) and a general deterioration in mutual comprehension and in the belief in 
interdependence.  In fact, the West German Ostpolitik and the disagreements surrounding 
it was among the chief causes in the late 1960s and e rly 1970s of a phenomenon that 
dismayed Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists.  This was, namely, the appearance 
during this period of fissures within the Atlanticist network, in both an international as 
well as an intra-German sense.  Other previous and current disputes about particular 
issues and methods, perhaps most importantly with respect to nuclear affairs (especially 
the MLF) were relatively minor in comparison to the emotions that flared up regarding 
the Ostpolitik.28  As a result, Birrenbach’s relations with foreign personalities like Frank 
                                                
27 Similar to before, whenever funds were lacking from the party or from industry, Birrenbach was 
contacted, usually by Ludwig Rosenberg, and requested to deal with the matter.  For Birrenbach’s sarcasti  
elation (“Wonders never cease [Es geschehen noch Zeichen und Wunder]”) at the belated transfer of the 
CDU contribution via the “Staatsbürgerliche Gesellschaft” (Cologne; probably referring to the 
Staatsbürgerliche Vereinigung 1954 eV), see KB to Barzel, 9 August 1968, ACDP K052/2.   
28 The differences existing even among the Atlanticists themselves during this period are symbolized in the 
difficulties the Atlantic Institute’s Policy Committee, chaired by Birrenbach, experienced in obtaining 
signatures from prominent members of all the democratic parties of the European member states of NATO 
for an Atlantic Declaration to be transmitted to the new US President, Richard Nixon, in 1969.  While 
signatures were secured from parliamentarians of a number of such states, including the Federal Republic, 
those of other nationalities refused to sign or only signed the text in modified form.  Given this mixed 
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Roberts, George Ball, Max Kohnstamm and even Jean Mo net himself were all strained 
to at least some degree during this period, a conditi  aggravated by the exploitation by 
both the West German government and opposition of the views of such foreign 
luminaries in the Ostpolitik debates.29  However, the Neue Ostpolitik of the Brandt 
government and the opposition to that policy also resulted in considerable rifts within the 
ranks of the German Atlanticists themselves.  In Birrenbach’s case, this was especially 
noticeable with respect to his strained relations with many of the Hamburg Atlanticists 
centered around Die Zeit, particularly Theo Sommer and Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, as well 
as with figures like Willy Brandt himself and, eventually, even Rainer Barzel (CDU).30   
In institutional terms, the clashes among the Atlanticists regarding the Ostpolitik 
were probably reflected most intensely in Birrenbach’s experiences within the Monnet 
Committee, a body in which not only were discussion held but resolutions actually 
                                                                                                                                      
response, the Policy Committee at first hesitated but eventually decided that Birrenbach should indeed send 
the declaration in 1969 to Nixon, signed by twenty-three prominent parliamentarians from nine European 
member states of NATO, “as a gesture of goodwill and solidarity towards the government and people of the 
United States” (KB to Henry Kissinger [US National Security Advisor], 20 February 1969, ACDP K146/3).  
On the MLF, see Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1975).  At least in 1964, Monnet had great difficulty in obtaining a consenus 
on his committee’s MLF proposals (which Birrenbach himself supported), due to the German members’ 
espousal of the MLF possibility.  This dissension within the action committee forced Monnet and others to 
seek large majorities, rather than unanimous approval (Monnet to KB, 26 May 1964, ACDP K050/2).   
29 Indeed, Birrenbach professed himself to be “deeply u set” and “astonished” by some of Ball’s views on 
the Ostpolitik, for example when Ball had told Birrenbach in a phone conversation that “this treaty [the 
Moscow Treaty] is not particularly disagreeable for the Federal Republic of Germany” (KB to John 
McCloy, 15 February 1971, ACDP K210/1 and KB to Georg  Ball, 20 October 1972, ACDP K160/3).  By 
the early 1970s, Kohnstamm’s and Birrenbach’s opinins also diverged regarding the Ostpolitik, and 
Monnet was also generally a supporter of Brandt’s policy.  For Birrenbach learning from the German press 
that Herbert Wehner (SPD) had referred to Monnet and his moral authority as the “principal witness 
[Kronzeugen]”  for the Moscow Treaty, see KB to Barzel, 21 Septembr 1970, ACDP K024/1.  A February 
1971 article by Roberts, former British ambassador to the Federal Republic, in the Italian journal Affari 
Esteri was used “quite extensively” by the SPD in support of the Brandt government’s position on the 
Ostpolitik.  On the other hand, John McCloy’s name was meanwhile being “bandied about in anti-Brandt 
circles” (John McCloy to KB, 1 March 1971, ACDP K210/ ).   
30 For example, Birrenbach’s relations with long-time contact and fellow Atlanticist Theo Sommer, who 
had generally agreed with Birrenbach on foreign policy issues but differed significantly with him about the 
Ostpolitik, withered and they barely spoke to one another in p ivate for at least several years, although they 
continued to interact at the various conferences.  By the latest in Spring 1972, Barzel was avoiding 
discussion with Birrenbach and relying more on other colleagues in the Fraktion.   
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approved and then promoted.31  At the latest by 1967, the question of détente and 
Ostpolitik had become a source of divisiveness in that body an a major concern for 
Birrenbach.32  Acting in conjunction at times with other Union members of the committee 
(Barzel and, later on, Kiesinger) and in consultation with Union MdBs and the federal 
government, Birrenbach focused on a primary goal of precluding the appearance of 
objectionable passages in the committee’s resolutions, namely those passages that he 
believed endorsed the present division of Germany.33  In practice, these efforts included 
not only discussions with the other members of the committee in meetings of that body 
but also private talks with Monnet and Kohnstamm (along with Barzel) about the proper 
treatment of sensitive issues.34  In this, Birrenbach and other Union committee members 
confronted not only foreign but also SPD members of the committee.  These 
                                                
31 Monnet made strenuous efforts, usually commencing months prior to a committee meeting, to achieve 
unanimity on the committee’s common declarations.  A  we have seen and shall see with respect to certain 
issues, particularly the Multilateral Force and the German Ostpolitik, this sometimes proved impossible.   
32 The mid-1960s saw the beginnings of rumblings within e committee regarding the German Ostpolitik.  
Ironically, it had been Birrenbach himself who in these mid-1960s had suggested to Monnet that the 
committee “discuss” and “occupy itself” with “[t]he r lations between Europe and the People’s 
Democracies in East Europe” since they were becoming “more and more important” and the subject of “a 
great debate” in the Federal Republic, although he also cautioned that it might still be too soon to trea  such 
“problems” in a resolution since “the differences between the European nations are still too great” (KB to 
Monnet, 21 March 1966, ACDP K050/2).  On the German Ostpolitik, see for instance Christian Hacke, Die 
Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU: Wege und Irrwege der Opposition seit 1969 (Cologne: Verlag 
Wissenschaft und Politik von Nottbeck, 1975); William Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978); Clay Clemens, Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats 
and West German Ostpolitik, 1969-1982 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); and Timothy Garton 
Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993). 
33 See, for instance, KB to Monnet, 2 May 1967, ACDP K052/2.  For Birrenbach undertaking these efforts 
in consultation also with members of the Bundestag, such as Hermann Kopf (CDU), Siegfried Balke (CSU) 
and Richard Stücklen (CSU), as well as the federal government, see for example Kopf to KB, 29 May 
1967, accompanied by a memo on the proposals of the Monnet Committee, dated 10 April 1967, ACDP 
K052/2; and KB to Stücklen, 12 June 1967, accompanied by a Birrenbach memo dated 7 June 1967 (which 
had also been presented by Birrenbach to the Kanzleramt), ACDP K052/2.  
34 According to Birrenbach’s memo of 7 June 1967 (ACDP K052/2), a discussion had occurred between 
Barzel, Monnet, Kohnstamm and Birrenbach a number of weeks ago regarding the draft of a resolution and 
again in the past week between Barzel, Kohnstamm and Birrenbach, with the goal of removing from the 
draft resolution the passages that appeared to be “unacceptable from the standpoint of the federal 
government.”  With respect to this question, Monnet had contacted “the delegations of the other five 
partners,” so it was to be “assumed” that in the next meeting of the committee, in Brussels on 15 June, their 
proposals would “meet the approval of the other delegations.”   
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disagreements placed strains on the Monnet Committee, ncluding on the relationship 
between Monnet and Kohnstamm, on the one hand, and Birrenbach and the members of 
what was by then the German opposition, on the other, with Birrenbach even making 
thinly veiled threats to Monnet about the possible termination of the CDU/CSU 
participation in case the committee’s line on the Ostpolitik was not to these parties’ 
satisfaction.35  On the whole, Birrenbach appears to have been quite s ccessful in these 
efforts to prevent undesirable resolutions from emerging out of the Monnet Committee.36 
However, if the disagreements surrounding the German Ostpolitik, as well as 
other issues, were played out in part within the Atlanticist institutions themselves, such 
discord and its potential impact on German-American and broader trans-Atlantic relations 
                                                
35 As explained in the previous chapter, the entire theme and course of the Ostpolitik was rendered even 
more frustrating for Birrenbach through the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Brandt in October 1971, 
which Birrenbach viewed as a “very regrettable” decision and “an interference” by “a social-democratic 
influenced” Storting committee in the West German Ostpolitik debate.  The final choice, as well as the 
three finalists, were “characteristic for the political composition of the Oslo group” and “the trend of our 
time” (KB to John McCloy, 25 October 1971, ACDP K210/ ).  Of course, this was all the more “painful” 
since it was at Birrenbach’s initiative that the qualified German members of the Monnet Committee had 
nominated Monnet vis-à-vis the Nobel Committee (they w re joined in this by the qualified members of the
committee from the other countries, including Britain).  For Birrenbach, the granting of the Nobel Prize to 
Monnet “would have given a new lift to the European idea in a moment when Europe and the world need 
this lift more than ever” (KB to Monnet, 20 October 1971, ACDP K140/2).  Monnet graciously responded 
to Birrenbach’s letter the following day, assuring him that the Norwegian Nobel Committee of the Storting 
had made “the right decision” (“under the circumstances, a good one”) and enclosing a copy of a 
congratulatory telegram he had sent to Brandt as well as the text of a statement (“special comment”) he had 
made at the prompting of the DPA in Paris that was likewise complimentary to Brandt (Monnet to KB, 21 
October 1971, ACDP K140/2).  Such starkly divergent r actions to this episode suggest quite well the 
disagreements that existed between Monnet and Birrenbach about the Brandt Ostpolitik.  With respect to 
subtle threats, Birrenbach reminded Monnet of the obligation of the three Western powers, assumed in the 
Paris Treaty of 1954, “to recognize the Federal Republic as the only legitimate state of the German natio   
and to support our efforts for reunification in peac  and freedom.  A voiding [Aufhebung] of this obligation, 
which binds both sides, is out of the question.  All the more so, we believe that in order to guarantee th  
close connection of the CDU/CSU party to the Monnet Committee, also in the future, we have to discuss 
this question of such cardinal importance for Germany in the circle of the CDU members of the Monnet 
Committee with you and Herrn Kohnstamm.  Your understanding for the German people and the Federal 
Republic is known to all of us.  From it emerges also the high degree of unanimity that has distinguished 
the cooperation of the CDU/CSU party with the Monnet Committee from the beginning.  In the European 
interest, we should not endanger this and should therefore seek means and ways to remove [beheben] the 
first differences of opinion between our party and you since the formation of the committee” (Draft to 
Monnet, “verbally expressed [mündlich vorgetr.]” on 6 October 1970, ACDP K140/2).   
36 For Birrenbach’s successes in this regard, see for xample KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, 
Parliamentary State Secretary in the Kanzleramt, 22 June 1967, ACDP K052/2.     
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were also among the chief motivations for the German Atlanticists to seek to strengthen 
their private infrastructure.  Particularly with the onset of the Neuen Ostpolitik of the 
Brandt-Scheel government, Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists considered it all 
the more necessary to carry out a further integration of the Federal Republic into the 
West, including on the level of the Atlanticist infrastructure and networks.  For instance, 
in October 1970, Walter Stahl, seeking to gain new members for the Atlantica, argued: 
After our Ostpolitik has come in motion to such an extent, it has becom even 
more important, in our view, to strengthen the firm anchoring of the Federal 
Republic in the Western world wherever it is possible and appears appropriate 
[angezeigt].  This is also, as is known [ja], again and again emphasized by the 
federal government and demanded by the opposition.  Also for this reason, it 
would therefore be very good if the Atlantica could intensify its participation 
[Mitarbeit] in the Atlantic Institute and the latter's support [Förderung].37 
 
In explaining in August 1972 the impetus behind the creation of the Mid-Atlantic Clubs 
(see later in this chapter), the American James Huntley also cited concerns regarding “the 
deterioration (and the potential for further deterioration) of European-American 
relations.”38  At the same time that they faced trying economic cir umstances, the private 
Atlanticist organizations, therefore, seemed to be particularly necessary.   
In seeking to implement, at least in part, institutional remedies to help overcome 
this Atlantic drift, Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists identified and attempted to 
counter disturbing trends in the United States and the Federal Republic that presaged 
serious dangers for the future of the German-American relationship.  One such structural 
transformation that greatly troubled them was the pnomenon of generational change 
occurring in the United States and Europe, of the latt r especially that in the Federal 
                                                
37 Walter Stahl to Will Marx, banker, Frankfurt, 5 October 1970, ACDP K106/1. 
38 Memorandum on the Possibility of Founding a MAC in Rome, by James R. Huntley, Secretary of the 
Network of MACs, 30 August 1972, ACDP K068/1.  In this memo, Huntley also pointed to existing 
“concern… for the state of the EC and of EC-US relations.”   
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Republic.  An Atlanticist interest in and concern with younger generations was not 
unique to the late 1960s, with certain efforts and ctivities being directed towards “youth” 
well before then, not least with an eye towards democratic stability.  Nevertheless, the 
sense that these pools of future leaders on both sides of the Atlantic no longer attached 
the same primary value to the trans-Atlantic connection nor appreciated the vital 
Atlanticist ties that had been forged was particularly strong by the late 1960s and early 
1970s.39  With respect to the United States, the Atlanticists could point to a number of 
symptoms reinforcing such fears at this time, including for instance a lagging interest in 
the German language.40  Meanwhile, in the Federal Republic, the belief that a Liberal age 
of Entideologisierung had dawned proved by the late 1960s to be an illusion.  True, from 
the middle of the 1960s, the Abendland concept disappeared almost entirely from at least 
the public discourse.  However, Marxist interpretations, themselves containing 
characteristics of a secular religion, experienced a revival during the latter half of the 
1960s, lending credence to the notion of a continuity of anti-Liberal thought after 1945 in 
the Federal Republic.41  Such Marxist perspectives, often bearing an anti-American 
stamp, enjoyed considerable currency among significa t parts of the West German 
                                                
39 For still later trepidation in this regard, see Shepard Stone bemoaning that “when I look upon [betrachte] 
the current situation, there are unfortunately no more young Birrenbachs and McCloys” (Stone to KB, 1 
February 1979, ACDP K130/2).   
40 On the “majority” of American participants in the Second German-American Youth Conference (see 
later in this chapter) unable to speak “very good German” (with several exceptions) and on it being 
“unrealistic” to expect them to speak fluent German in the future, see the Atlantik-Brücke Report about the 
Second German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 26-29 August 
1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1.  Therefor, Burmeister stressed the need to “insist” that 
German participants in these youth conferences speak “fluent English,” despite the increased difficulty this 
meant “for us” in finding suitable candidates and the “handicap” imposed on the German side in 
conducting discussions in a foreign language, due to the loss of “verbal precision.”  However, she also 
pointed to the reasonable expectation that young Germans “seriously interested” in international politics or 
in a career in the Wirtschaft would have a “good knowledge of English” (which quite a few did, including 
often as a result of having already stayed in an English-speaking country like the United States).   
41 On Entideologisierung, see the work of Daniel Bell, of course from an American perspective. 
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student movement of the late 1960s.42  Consequently, especially by the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, there seemed to exist a pressing need to encourage and even to  engineer an 
Atlanticist “passing of the torch” from generation to succeeding generation. 
Birrenbach demonstrated a marked sensitivity in general to the question of 
generational change and especially with respect to its potential impact on relations in the 
Atlantic world.  Broadly speaking, the idea of generational succession played a major 
role in Birrenbach’s overall political thought, for instance regarding potential 
developments in the Soviet Union.43  At the latest by the early 1970s, Birrenbach was 
distraught in many respects, as part of his overarching pessimism, about the condition of 
the young generation in the Federal Republic.44  Birrenbach’s great worries here included 
                                                
42 On these themes, see Axel Schildt, Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der 
Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1999).   
43 By the early 1950s, Birrenbach perceived a generation l change underway in Russia comprising the rise,
including into the “key positions” of party and state leadership (as personified by the “functionary,” 
”technocrat,” and ”engineer” Georgy Malenkov), of yunger age groups who dated their “crucial life 
experiences” to after the end of the October Revolution, rather than sharing those of the “professional 
revolutionaries” of the Lenin-Stalin generation, and who were less inclined to a “pure Doktrinarismus,” 
thinking more “empirically” and not exclusively in terms of “the theory and dialectic of Marx and Lenin.”  
True, this “new” generation exhibited more “gradual,” rather than “essential,” differences in thought vis-à 
vis Stalin, yet Birrenbach suggested that such generational succession, along with the “reorganization 
[Umbau]” of Soviet society as characterized by the “formation [Bildung] of new classes,” might gradually 
result over the long-run in a “considerable waning [Nachlassen]” of the Bolshevik “world-revolutionary” 
ideas and tendencies as well as of the “w ltanschaulich doctrinaire fanaticism.”  Indeed, he claimed to 
already detect such a process underway with Stalin’s theory of “socialism in one country,” the 
“development” during the first phase of the “Great P triotic [vaterländischen] War,” and the “visible 
weakening [Abschwächung]” of the “ideological fundamental attitude [Grundeinstellung]” in the period 
preceding “the new change of government.”  On all of this, see “Rußland nach dem Tode Stalins,” by KB,
Düsseldorf, 10 September 1953, ACDP K001/1.   
44 For Birrenbach mourning that in the Federal Republic “[t]he generation gap goes very deep.  It is deeper 
than I ever experienced it in my life,” see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 27 February 1973, ACDP 
K183/2.  In this letter to McCloy, Birrenbach complained that “[a] great part of the young generation” in 
the Federal Republic “does not believe anymore in the values of the fifties and the early sixties,” among 
them the “Christian values” that were “in erosion” and lacked the earlier “importance” they had enjoyed “in 
the times of the founding fathers of the CDU/CSU.”  This West German youth did not exhibit the “loyalt 
to the state” or “feeling for the importance of thenation” characteristic of Birrenbach’s generation; 
harbored “deep doubts” regarding the “liberal market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft)”; demonstrated 
“no understanding for power and power politics”; possessed “a very limited inclination to accept 
authority”; did not recognize “the necessary limits of liberty”; and “articulated” a considerable “anti-
Americanism.”  For Birrenbach’s assessment that it was the “youth” (along with the “Arbeiterschaft” in 
some respects, such as Sozialpolitik) that “wants to hear as little as possible about authority and all the more 
of unlimited freedom” and that was most receptive to a policy characterized, among other things, by 
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the state of the German universities and students, as manifested for instance in his 
membership in the Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft, founded in November 1970 in 
response to the student movement.45  Linked to this was Birrenbach’s concern with 
“Geschichtsbewusstsein,” here particularly the lack of interest in history among the 
German youth, one of the motivating factors in his efforts, described in Chapter 6, to 
promote the publication and spread of Hajo Holborn’s works in the Federal Republic.46  
Even worse, Birrenbach detected such deficiencies in the younger generation finding 
                                                                                                                                      
outlandish “expectations” in the “economic-political, social-political and similar areas,” including “almost 
unlimited wage demands”; “Mitbestimmung in all areas”; reductions in work time; a stress on “better 
quality of life” (his quotation marks here); the decriminalization [“Strafschutz”] of abortion; a reduction in 
the prosecution of crimes [“Strafverfolgung”]; the relaxing [“Lockerung”] of the conditions of the general 
criminal code [“allgemeinen Strafordnungsbestimmungen”]; and the elimination of restrictions 
[“ Freigabe”] on pornography,” see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  On 
parts of the “young generation” rejecting certain ideas that Birrenbach espoused such as the “system” of the 
Marktwirtschaft and the Leistungsprinzip, see KB to Frau Prof. Dr. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil 
Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1.  The Nation l Socialist past contributed to the especially 
pronounced rift between young and old in the Federal Republic.    
45 For Birrenbach citing “the disaster in the German universities” among the “grave problems” facing the
Federal Republic, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.  In this letter to Emmet, 
Birrenbach depicted the student movement, with “Cambodia or Vietnam… only one of the catalyst 
elements,” as being fundamentally “directed against the free society in the Federal Republic,” the  
demonstrations in Berlin serving as “only one of the many pathological symptoms” of that movement in 
this city.  While by November 1972, Birrenbach saw fe er demonstrations at universities like Berlin, 
Heidelberg, Bremen and Münster, he believed that these and other universities were still “practically 
controlled [beherrscht] by radical students” grouped together in the “Spartacus” or the Sozialistischen 
Hochschulbund, with a further “influx [Zuzug] from the third of the Assistenten who show solidarity with 
them” and (unfortunately “as always”) from “progressive” professors who “lack the character to say no.”  
This situation (most explicitly the role of the professors but apparently other elements as well) reminded 
Birrenbach of his “bitter experience in the Hitler-time” under National Socialism and was something that
he now had to endure “with bitter feelings the second time.”  He believed that “sooner or later” such 
“emotional states of consciousness [Bewußtseinslagen] will have terrible consequences [sich… fürchterlich 
rächen].”  On all of this, including “the catastrophe of the universities,” and for Birrenbach’s criticism of 
the manipulation of public institutions, universities and schools, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 
November 1972, ACDP K039/1.  For Birrenbach’s 1974 membership card for the Bund Freiheit der 
Wissenschaft (dated 29 October 1974), see ACDP K206/2.  At this point, Hartmut Hentschel was the 
organization’s Bundesgeschäftsführer.   
46 For Birrenbach’s concerns regarding a West German youth that had “almost no conscience 
[consciousness] of history” and his belief that “[t]he erosion of the values of the last two decades and the 
fact that the experiences of this time are about to be forgotten make it difficult to give…, particularly to the 
young generation, a realistic picture of the world,” see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 27 February 
1973, ACDP K183/2.  Despite Birrenbach’s efforts, as of September 1970, the German edition of Volume I 
of Holborn’s History of Modern Germany (Verlag Kohlhammer) had experienced “catastrophic sales,” with 
the largest part of the edition “already by an antiquarian bookshop [Antiquariat] to be sold off cheaply [zum 
Verramschen]” (Karl Cornides, Oldenbourg Verlag, to KB, 25 Sept mber 1970, ACDP K158/1).  On 
Kohlhammer having “condemned” Holborn’s Deutsche Geschichte to “failure,” see Diest to KB, 3 June 
1971, ACDP K158/1.   
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expression in German politics and foreign policy.47  However, Birrenbach’s concerns 
extended beyond the German youth to encompass to some extent their American 
counterparts as well.48  Therefore, in each of his capacities, including that of a 
parliamentarian, Birrenbach was a strong proponent of youth and academic exchange 
programs, seeing these as an important element in the development of “good” 
international relations, including at the level of the “people,” and more specifically of an 
Atlantic Partnership.49  Meanwhile, Birrenbach also sought personally to “educate” 
newcomers to the field of German-American relations by advising them as well as by 
bringing them into contact with what he considered the appropriate Americans, thus 
functioning yet again in the role of gatekeeper.  One striking example of this was his 
intensive preparation of the “young” Helmut Kohl’s trip to the United States in 1974, for 
which he served as something of a consultant and assist nt.50 
                                                
47 For Birrenbach venting his bitterness that two-thirds of the “youth” had supported the government 
coalition in the November 1972 elections, see KB to Th mas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP 
K039/1.  With respect to the potential impact of generational change on the issue of the recognition of 
Germany’s eastern borders [Ostgrenzen], see for instance KB to Rodolfo Griesshaber, Argentina, 10 March 
1969, ACDP K048/2.   
48 For Birrenbach’s assessment that segments of the Am rican youth were among those “parts of the 
American nation” (another being sections of its “intellectual community”) that were “no longer sure 
[sicher] that America, with its gifts [Gaben], riches [Reichtümern] and its national genius, can master all 
troubles [Übel],” see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft 
Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.  As of July 1972, Birrenbach saw a “youth” 
(not entirely clear whether American, German or both) that he characterized as “immoderate [einer die 
Mitte verloren habenden Jugend],” manifested for instance in its participation in the reproaches (triggered 
in the US at least by the “Vietnam trauma”) “from undiscerning [uneinsichtiger] side” directed at the 
Wissenschaft, which had allegedly “collaborated [zusammengewirkt]” with the arms industry (“Whoever is 
familiar with the feelings of men like Einstein, Fermi, Frank and Oppenheimer can always only shake one’s 
head at such global misrepresentations [Unterstellungen]”) (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 27 
July 1972, ACDP K080/1).   
49 On Birrenbach’s promotion of German-British youth exchange, including both of a public and private 
nature, see the AKI Draft Antrag of the Fraktionen on this theme of 6 May 1969, signed by Birrenbach 
among others, ACDP K103/2. 
50 Born in 1930, Kohl had become party chairman of the CDU the previous year (1973).  To help groom 
Kohl for his visit, Birrenbach drew up a memo dealing with German/European-American “problems.”  He 
saw to it that Americans like Robert Murphy, George Ball, Peter Peterson, William Bundy and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski were invited to attend Kohl’s luncheon at the West German consulate-general in New York and 
also encouraged them to attend.  Finally, Birrenbach suggested Kohl invite the leadership of the American 
Council on Germany, including the new president, Dean Richard Hunt (Harvard); the vice president, John 
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However, as with so much else, the concern of the German Atlanticists with 
respect to generational change found its manifestation not only in the thoughts and 
actions of Birrenbach and other individuals but increasingly in the characteristics and 
activities of their institutions as well.  By the early 1970s, Atlanticist organizations like 
the Atlantik-Brücke, the Atlantic Institute and the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle were 
engaging in efforts to encourage a more youthful memb rship and participation.51  At the 
insistence of the Ford Foundation, the German-American Conferences began in 1969 to 
place a greater emphasis on recruiting younger delegations.52  Such efforts at 
rejuvenation also had implications for the leadership of these organizations, contributing 
largely for example to Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen’s resignation in 1971 as 
chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke.  In line with its general purposes, the grants of the 
Thyssen Stiftung often supported Atlanticist projects carried out by young German and 
foreign Wissenschaftlern.53  In some instances, existing Atlanticist organizations 
                                                                                                                                      
Diebold; and the “very seriously ill” executive vice president, Chris Emmet.  On all this, see for example 
KB to Kohl, 1 February 1974, ACDP K184/1.  Kohl also gave a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations 
during this visit.  Already at a much earlier time, in 1962, Birrenbach had likewise spoken several times 
with Walter Scheel (FDP) about a potential trip to the United States.  On other occasions, Birrenbach was 
similarly able to help Germans he deemed worthy gain access to prominent Americans in the United States.  
Thus, in 1969, Birrenbach could recommend and introduce Dr. Rolf Pauls, the new West German 
ambassador in Washington DC, to his contacts such as John McCloy and Henry Kissinger (KB to McCloy, 
16 January 1969, ACDP K210/1 and KB to Kissinger, 16 January 1969, ACDP K146/3).     
51 Such efforts began around 1970 in the Atlantic Institute and were fully underway by 1971 in the 
Atlantik-Brücke.  As we shall see, the striving for a younger membership represented part of the attempt to 
revitalize the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle in the early 1970s. 
52 For instance, on the Ford Foundation’s desire for “y ung blood,” see Chris Emmet to Walter Stahl, 14 
July 1969, ACDP K138/2.   
53 On the growing possibilities and urgent need, indeed the “genuine socio-political obligation 
[gesellschaftspolitische Verpflichtung],” for the Thyssen Stiftung (and other German Stiftungen), “in the 
midst of the crisis of the German universities,” to make a significant contribution by directing its means 
toward gaps that had appeared in the financing of research as a result of “the kritischen development of our 
days,” see Birrenbach’s speech at the meeting of the FTS on 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2.  For similar 
ideas, see Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, 
ACDP K065/2 and Birrenbach’s Text for the ATH-Werkszeitung, Düsseldorf, 1 December 1970, ACDP 
K065/2.  On the FTS funding a study (now approaching its conclusion) about the “talent and educational 
reserves [Begabungs- und Bildungsreserven]” i  the Federal Republic and financing the Dokumentation of 
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responded by developing related institutions.  Thus, in 1967, the Vorstände of the 
Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft and of its Landesgruppe Berlin established the Deutsch-
Britischen Jugendaustausch e.V. especially to stage “Young Königswinter Conferences” 
and other youth meetings in West Berlin.54  In 1973, the Atlantik-Brücke e.V. and the 
American Council on Germany Inc. began jointly sponsoring and staging German-
American Young Leaders Conferences, which took place every other year alternately in 
the Federal Republic and the United States.55  Already in Spring 1966, the AI had held its 
                                                                                                                                      
the Westdeutschen Rektorenkonferenz about the Hochschulrecht and the Studienreform (characterized as 
“zeitnah”), see again Birrenbach’s Text for the ATH-Werkszeitung, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2.   
54 Patterned on the Königswinter Conferences themselve , the Young Königswinter Conferences, held at 
least at times in the Robert-Tillmanns-Haus, brought together a total of about 50-80 “future leaders” in 
public life for open exchanges about relevant current issues.  Usually between 18-30 years old, the 
participants were for the most part selected at the proposal of KWC participants and DEG-Beirat members.  
In general, the DEG considered the Young Königswinter Conferences a success, with participants highly 
interested and engaged in lively talks.  The post-1967 Young Königswinter Conferences built on the annual 
Deutsch-Englischen Jugendgespräche initiated already in 1962 and staged in West Berlin by the DEG’s 
Landesgruppe Berlin (these earlier gatherings apparently involving only British and Berlin youths).  Also 
beginning in 1967, a Young Königswinter Conference was carried out in London by the Educational 
Interchange Council (London) with the means provided by the British Foreign Office for the support of the 
British-German youth exchange.  At least in 1967, this London-based conference comprised about twenty 
British and thirty West German participants, among them ten Berliners, who had all either taken part in the 
Berlin youth conferences or been recommended by participants in the big Königswinter Conferences.  Of 
course, the hosts compiled a program also giving the German visitors good insight into British political life.        
55 For the idea of a bilateral German-American Youth Conference being originally conceived by ACG vice 
president John Diebold, who proposed it to a meeting of the ACG Board on 5 May 1972, see the Report of 
Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1.  The first such conference occurred, at the 
suggestion of the Atlantik-Brücke, at Haus Rissen in Hamburg from 27-30 June 1973 (Wednesday-
Saturday).  The second was held, at the proposal of the ACG, at Wingspread in Racine, Wisconsin (USA) 
from 26-29 August 1975.  The third was staged at the Schloßhotel Gehrhus in West Berlin-Grunewald on 
14-18 August 1977 (Sunday-Thursday).   
These German-American Young Leaders Conferences usually brought together about 15-25 
“future leaders” each from both countries between the ages of 20-35 (raised from an initial 30 to secur  a 
better circle of participants), encompassing men and women studying, training or already professionally 
active in the fields of politics, government, Wirtschaft, law, trade unions, the military, Wissenschaft and 
media.  The AB and ACG each sought delegations with a broad and balanced diversity of backgrounds and 
interests (e.g. fields of endeavor, political attitudes, age, gender, race, geographic origin).  At first glance, 
the German delegations appear to have represented a wide range of party and political affiliations and 
sympathies (CDU/CSU; SPD, among them center-left R ormsozialisten from Berlin’s Otto Suhr Institute; 
FDP; independent).  However, for Richard Hunt’s complaints about the absence of Jusos at the first 
conference, see again his Report of 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1.  Likewise, for some American 
participants at the sixth conference (August 1982) criticizing the lack of representatives of the Greens and 
the Left, while the young Gewerkschaftler and the SPD MdBs spoke so little English that their arguments 
carried little weight even when they did engage in the discussion, see the Lindemann Report on a USA trip 
of August 1982, dated 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1.  With respect to race, efforts were made to 
attract minority groups, especially some American blacks, though no blacks were present at the second 
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conference.  Women were a distinct minority in the German and American delegations (20% for the 
Germans at the first two conferences, just slightly more numerous among the Americans).  The American 
delegations included a New York State assemblyman (Charles E. Schumer), a West Point cadet, an 
employee of the RAND Corporation, an analyst at FPRI, the current chief speechwriter of President Carter 
and the current planning chief in the Treasury Department.  Though new delegates appear to have been a 
large majority in each case, efforts were made by both sides to ensure a certain continuity of participation 
by also including a fraction of delegates who had already taken part in previous such conferences.   
The German-American Young Leaders Conferences were in many ways modelled on other 
Atlanticist functions, most obviously their “parent” German-American Conferences (e.g. with regard to 
format).  They, too, aimed to enable open discussion and debate; to facilitate a real exchange of information 
and opinions; to deepen the interest in, feeling for and understanding of the bilateral and broader trans-
Atlantic relations; to identify differences and common interests; to promote mutual sympathy for one 
another’s countries; and to establish firm, lasting personal contacts and friendships.  The themes addressed 
at the youth conferences were also similar in many respects to those dealt with at the traditional German-
American Conferences, involving the most important issues and problems currently on the international 
agenda, especially those of relevance to German/European-American relations, with several additional 
topics of special interest to the young generation.  However, beyond all this, the youth conferences  
functioned as well to enable the AB and ACG to identify particularly good delegates; to inform them about 
the work of these institutions; and thus, hopefully, to attract younger members; to gradually build up over 
the years on both sides of the Atlantic a reservoir of future policy-makers and opinion-shapers that would 
remain connected to the AB and the ACG as well as to one another; and, so, to contribute to the 
development of a cohesive trans-Atlantic network among the up-and-coming generation.  Along these lines, 
especially qualified German participants in the German-American Youth Conferences were then invited to 
the main German-American Conferences.  For the AB-Vorstand deciding at its meeting of 22 September 
1982 to co-opt the best German participants in the August 1982 Young Leaders Conference, see the 
Protocol of the AB-Vorstand meeting in Bonn on 22 September 1982, ACDP K144/1.     
The officers of the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany also sought to ensure 
that the participants themselves, especially via Steering Committees consisting of several delegates from
each side, enjoyed some influence in organizing and ru ning the German-American Youth Conferences 
(e.g. format, agenda, themes, procedures, delegate selection).  At the third such conference, National 
Socialism was one of the topics discussed, spontaneously suggested by especially the German participants 
from Berlin and prompted by the echo of Joachim Fest’s film Hitler-Eine Karriere (1977) and numerous 
recent books on Hitler.  The views and preferences of the delegates were also solicited before and after the 
conferences.  For Hunt characterizing this as “group democracy” or “genuinely participatory democracy,” 
see the Report of Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1.  However, whatever such 
consultation existed, all major decisions (including their own side’s delegate selection) appear to have been 
essentially made or strictly circumscribed by the sponsoring organizations, particularly their officers, which 
were assisted in identifying suitable conferees by nominations emerging from, sometimes narrower circles 
of, their own members as well as friendly personalities, contacts and institutions, for the AB including 
bodies in the Federal Republic and the United States lik  the DAAD and the German American Chambers 
of Commerce.  
Outside what was considered the relaxed and warm atmosphere of the formal gathering, these 
German-American Young Leaders Conferences featured he extracurricular activities, arranged by the 
stagers, typical of an Atlanticist function.  In part, these offered participants the chance to personally 
acquaint themselves with other delegates but also promoted among the visitors an understanding of life in 
the host country.  Aside from simple pauses, these included meals (also comprising coffee receptions and 
dinner parties), interaction in the shared accommodati ns (e.g. the very good hotel “Holiday Inn” in 
Racine), and tours and excursions in the host city that highlighted unique attractions (e.g. restaurants).  At 
the first conference, Walter Stahl and Eric Warburg hosted parties for the delegates in their private homes.  
In the US, German delegates stayed as guests of American families, with seven German delegates to the 
second conference, thanks to arrangements made by the Johnson Foundation, spending the following Labor 
Day weekend with families in Racine (usually of leading Angestellten of the Johnson Corporation).  For the 
Germans familiarizing the American delegates with the problem of Berlin and the situation of divided 
Germany, including through a tour of West Berlin and the Wall, as well as a trip to the Axel Springer 
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Verlag that enabled a view from the Axel Springer Haus beyond the Todesstreifen into East Berlin, see the 
Summary AB Report on the Third German-American Youth Conference, Rüdiger Löwe, ACDP K134/2.   
The German-American Youth Conferences also received diverse support from a number of 
prominent outside personalities and organizations, whether functioning as hosts, guest speakers or simply 
meeting and talking with the participants about a wide range of issues.  These included Peter Schulz (Lord 
Mayor of Hamburg), who gave a reception at the Rathaus; John Brogan III (the American consul general in 
Hamburg), who held an evening reception in the courtyard of the Amerika-Haus to which a number of 
Americans living in Hamburg as well as German friends of the Atlantik-Brücke were invited; Dr. Dietrich 
Kebschull (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Hamburg), who spoke to the plenary session on “Partners or 
Rivals: The Economic Relations between the United States and the European Community”; Dr. Gerhard 
Merzyn (Haus Rissen), who spoke to the plenary session on “US-European Relations at the Crossroads,” 
gave a coffee reception at his residence and hosted a dinner party in his private home for the delegats; 
Hans-Viktor Schierwater (Haus Rissen), who served as an observer from the Atlantik-Brücke at the second 
conference; Horst Elfe (President of the B rlin Industrie- und Handelskammer), who gave a dinner in the 
Hotel Gehrhus and spoke on the situation of the Berlin Wirtschaft; Dr. Peter Pechel (Editor-in-Chief of the 
Sender Freies Berlin), who explained the German radio and TV system; the Axel Springer Verlag, which 
invited the participants to a “Berliner Buffet” at which Ernst Cramer (in place of Springer himself) spoke 
briefly and a leading Morgenpost editor was available for discussion; the Berlin Senat  which invited the 
participants on a steamship outing with a cold buffet as well as to a dinner; Gesandter Scott George (head 
of the US Mission in Berlin), who explained the political problems the situation of Berlin posed to the US; 
and Dietrich Stobbe (Regierender Bürgermeister of Berlin), who engaged in an extensive discussion.   
Expenses for the German-American Youth Conferences included airfares, housing, meals and 
meeting rooms.  The sponsoring AB and ACG split the costs for at least the first three conferences, along 
with the Johnson Foundation for the second thanks to the efforts of the ACG and especially the 
recommendation of Prof. Marshall Shulman who was clo ely involved with the foundation.  The Johnson 
Foundation was linked to the Johnson Wax Corporation and was located, along with its conference center, 
at Wingspread.  Total expenses for the first conference amounted to about $13,000.  In part to avoid high 
trans-Atlantic flight costs (also language considerations and an understanding of mentalities), both the AB 
and the ACG sought to identify some suitable delegates lready staying temporarily for study, training or 
professional purposes in the United States or Europe (depending on the conference location), with almost 
half the German participants recruited for the second conference already currently in the US, thanks to 
assistance provided by the DAAD, the Carl Duisberg-Gesellschaft für Nachwuchsförderung (which 
sustained a management trainee program in the US) and the German American Chambers of Commerce in 
New York and Chicago (AB Report about the 2nd German-American Youth Conference in 
Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA), 26-29 August 1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1).   
The German-American Young Leaders Conferences also reflected the Atlanticists’ interest in 
public relations.  On the ACG efforts to select some delegates active in publishing, see the Report of 
Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1.  For a half-hour radio interview with two 
German participants entitled “The New Generation of Germans” (part of a series “Conversations from 
Wingspread”), with the Johnson Foundation sending the tape recording to the Atlantik-Brücke, see the AB 
Report about the 2nd German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 
26-29 August 1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/ .  For coverage (and positive judgments) in 
press and broadcasting [“Rundfunk”], including in Der Welt (“Blitzgescheites Symposium über politische 
Gegenwartsfragen,” 16 August 1977) and Dem Abend (“Hochkarätige ‘Brücke,’” 18 August 1977), see the 
Summary AB Report on the 3rd German-American Youth Conference, Rüdiger Löwe, ACDP K134/2.   
Internal assessments of the German-American Youth Conferences were generally positive.  Thus, 
on the first three, see for instance the Report of Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP 
K132/1; the AB Report about the 2nd German-American Youth Conference, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP 
K132/1; and the Summary AB Report on the 3rd German-American Youth Conference, Rüdiger Löwe, 
ACDP K134/2.  For the 2nd German-American Youth Conference as “extremely concentrated” and “very 
fruitful [ ergiebig]” and being characterized as “especially rewarding a d gratifying” by all the delegates 
and observers, see the AB Activity Report drawn up for the AB MV on 19 February 1976, ACDP K132/1.  
On the “very successful” staging of the Young Leaders Conference in 1977, see the Protocol of the AB MV 
of 9 March 1978 in Bonn, ACDP K134/2.  Elsewhere, it was believed that both German and American 
conferees considered the 3rd Young Leaders Conference an “overwhelming success.”  Discordant tones did 
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first Young Leaders Conference in Villa Serbelloni (Bellagio) and, henceforth, staged 
such gatherings two or more times a year in diverse locations.56  Of course, Birrenbach 
the gatekeeper himself took part in the process of nominating and screening the young 
candidates for such activities.57  In other cases, it was believed that the most effective 
route towards rejuvenation and overcoming the generation gap was instead to found 
entirely new institutions, such as Mid-Atlantic Clubs (see later in this chapter) or the 
                                                                                                                                      
exist.  On it becoming “alarmingly [erschreckend] clear” how few German participants in past Young 
Leaders Conferences had actually risen to become young leaders of the present (though the ACG had been
more successful in this respect), see the Lindemann Report on a USA trip of August 1982, dated 27 
September 1982, ACDP K144/1.  As of September 1982, the ACG had raised the question whether the 
Young Leaders Conferences could really make a constructive contribution to the improvement of German-
American relations that would justify the hefty work and costs entailed (Lindemann Report on USA trip of  
August 1982, 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1).  However, on the realistic expectation that young 
Germans “seriously interested” in international politics or a career in the Wirtschaft had a “familiarity” with 
the American mentality, including quite a few not only from having stayed in the United States but also 
often from having taken part in such German-American Youth Conferences, see the AB Report about the 
2nd German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 26-29 August 
1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1.  For the expressed belief of the AB-Vorstand, with 
Birrenbach at least present, that the German-American Youth Conferences were “at least as important” as 
the large German-American Conferences, see the Protocol of the AB-Vorstand Meeting on 7 November 
1975 in Bonn, ACDP K132/1.  On the Atlantik-Brücke desire to turn the Young Leaders Conferences into 
annual functions being thwarted by the lack of necessary financial means, see the AB rbeitsplan 1982/83, 
ACDP K144/1.   
56 Participants in the AI Young Leaders Conferences wre a “carefully selected group” of around 25-30 
politicians, journalists, businessmen, scholars and trade unionists under 40 years of age (generally lte 20s 
and 30s) from throughout the Atlantic Community.  These meetings of the AI Young Leaders Program 
aimed at promoting genuine debate and new ideas on key issues often closely linked with specific AI study 
projects.  On a part of the Ford Foundation’s DM 2 million grant to the Atlantic Institute in 1965 being 
intended for that organization’s series of Young Lead rs Conferences (“meetings of young men and women 
who will achieve in the coming years leadership positions within the Atlantic world”), see Walter Stahl’s 
circular letter to Atlantica members of 25 June 1965, ACDP K108/2.  For the Gulbenkian Foundation 
contributing $10,000 to the AI in 1969 for the Young Leaders, see Annex III, 1962-1977, Contributions 
from European Foundations, ACDP K058.  For the Rockefeller Brothers Fund financing about half the cost 
of the AI Young Leaders Conferences through a $10,000 annual grant, see the write-up on the Atlantic 
Institute for International Affairs, undated but app rently 1973, ACDP K104/2.  For the invitees to these 
conferences taking part “very actively” in the discu sions, see again this AIIA write-up, ACDP K104/2.     
57 On Birrenbach recommending Löwe for the upcoming AB German-American Young Leaders 
Conference, see KB to Rüdiger Löwe, 3 March 1980, ACDP K034/2.  On Birrenbach providing his opinion 
on a list of proposed German participants for the AI Young Leaders Conferences, see KB to Dr. Jan G. 
Reifenberg, FAZ, 6 May 1966, ACDP K017/2.  For membrs of the AI Policy Committee, including 
Birrenbach, being asked to submit names of candidates from their respective countries for the AI Young 
Leaders Conferences, see the Minutes of the Meeting of the Policy Committee at the Atlantic Institute, 
Paris, on 13 March 1966, ACDP K107/2.  For AI governors, upon request, proposing names from their 
particular countries for the AI Young Leaders Conferences, see the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board at 
the Atlantic Institute on 18 June 1966, ACDP K107/2.   
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European-North American Committee (EURNAC), both of which aspired to bring 
promising younger people into the Atlanticist network.58   
Aside from the relative economic downturn and generational change, the other 
salient structural trend in trans-Atlantic relations that troubled Birrenbach and the 
German Atlanticists during this period was the shift in power, especially political power, 
in the United States away from the Northeast of the country and towards the west and 
south.  Indeed, the discovery of this crucial, new political and demographic process and a 
hint at what it might bode for the future comprised Birrenbach’s key experience, rather 
                                                
58 The American James Huntley was among those Atlanticists particularly concerned with the issue of 
generational change and a strong advocate of creating new institutions and channels of communication, 
rather than solely trying to work through, but also hopefully to stimulate a rejuvenation among, what he 
considered often sclerotic, age-encrusted older structu es (Personal Note for KB from Huntley, 13 February 
1971, ACDP K130/1).  For an outlook that may likewise have implicitly promoted the construction of such 
new organizations, see the pessimistic assessment of the “inadequate” “grassroots” effects of existing 
Atlanticist organizations contained in the remarks of the Czech-British Prof. Otto Pick (and of some others) 
in the Summary of Discussions, Meeting of Atlantic Organizations, 16-20 March 1973, ACDP K068/1.  
While both Huntley and Pick (Director of the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, London) were 
referring to Atlanticist organizations throughout the Western world, rather than solely the more German-
oriented institutions in which Birrenbach was involved, their concerns are still instructive in this context.  
The Paris-based EURNAC, which Huntley served as an informal advisor, consisted of a group of about 100
young “leading” men and women from Western Europe, th  United States and Canada around the average 
age of thirty, with the Frenchman Jacques Pomonti (a  engineering consultant and the former secretary of 
the Club Jean Moulin in Paris) as chairman, the American James Fowler as secretary, and Horst Jobkes and 
Peter Corterier among Fowler’s German collaborators.  EURNAC engaged in meetings (apparently the first
with sixty-five attendees in March 1970 in Grottaferrata, Italy), international task forces, studies, r ports, 
policy proposals and civic action with respect to key trans-Atlantic problems, including social, economic 
and political (also foreign policy) issues.  Though Birrenbach never played a major role in the organiz tion, 
Huntley did hope that he (and Stahl) would look into whether the Atlantica could proffer future support to 
EURNAC and asked Birrenbach to provide advice to Fowler on obtaining support for EURNAC elsewhere 
in the Federal Republic (Huntley to KB, 7 May 1971, ACDP K066/2 and Huntley to KB, 17 February 
1971, ACDP K066/2).   
In general, these and other youth institutions offered the Atlanticists and their organizations the 
potential for fruitful interaction with controlled groups of active young elites, enabling them to disseminate 
substantive studies and reports to youth constituencies as well as to become better informed on the needs, 
views, desires and frequently fresh insights of younger people.  Thus, among the topics discussed at the 
first German-American Youth Conference were Cultura and Political Radicalism (especially in the 
universities) and Academic Reform in Germany and the United States.  Of course, the efforts of the 
German Atlanticists with respect to the generational question took place within a larger youth context.  This 
broader environment included flows, outside the framework of the Atlanticist institutions, amounting 
annually to millions of young people for diverse reasons between the Federal Republic and the Anglo-
Saxon nations, where the Atlanticists hoped they garnered experiences encouraging warm feelings towards 
their destination countries.  Other factors comprised, for instance, the government’s Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung, whose activities encompassed the distribution of relevant books and other materials to 
schools and teachers.  Generational change and the passage of time may also have contributed to reducing 
negative feelings among the young towards one another’s countries due to dark history (e.g. world wars).   
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than any individual speeches or high-level consultations, during his early Fall 1962 
lecture tour that took him for the first time to the midwestern and western United States.  
Especially in California, he had sensed a “conservative” trend:   
My stay on the West Coast, as interesting as it was, virtually stood under the 
depressing impression of the extraordinary spread of this [conservative] element.  
The prominent people virtually apologized to me for the existence of Kennedy 
and his administration.  They saw in him a “New Dealer” of the worst kind, a 
friend of the communists and who knows what else [was weiß ich noch].  I have 
also met representatives of this type in Stanford, which really amazed me.  That is 
also America, and the East Coast is no longer alone.  Pr cisely the latter point 
impressed itself upon me profoundly on my trip of 1962 from coast to coast.59 
 
Over the years, this realization would be reflected in Birrenbach’s activities.  For 
instance, his future endeavors in the realm of public re ations would take into account the 
imperative of reaching a larger geographic section of the United States, beyond “the East 
Coast.”60  Birrenbach took the opportunity as well to speak occasionally before groups of 
Americans visiting the Federal Republic from the West Coast.61  On the level of elites, 
Birrenbach also attempted to expand his contacts with personalities from the West Coast, 
                                                
59 KB to Hajo Holborn, 30 July 1964, ACDP K098/1.  Inaddition to the San Francisco Committee on 
Foreign Relations and its sister institution the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City, the principal 
stops on Birrenbach’s lecture tour to the United States in Fall 1962 were several elite colleges and 
universities, including Stanford, Northwestern, Georgetown, Penn, Haverford, Harvard and Yale, where h 
spoke on topics like “Germany and the Atlantic Community.”  Conducted by plane and train, this tour was 
only made possible through essential organizational assistance from his American contacts, among them 
those based at these “institutions of higher learning.”   
60 The publicity efforts in 1964 surrounding the upcoming Kennedy Round of trade talks (see Chapter 7) 
demonstrated the newfound recognition by Birrenbach and other Atlanticist-minded Germans of the shifts 
in political gravity within the United States.  In i sisting that Erhard conduct an interview with the
American weekly US News & World Report, Birrenbach was motivated not only by the fact thais 
magazine boasted a high circulation and was considered influential among those circles impacting on the 
pertinent Senate hearings, but also by the fact that, in contrast to even the New York Times and other 
undeniably important publications, it reached an audience far beyond the East Coast (KB to Chancellor 
Ludwig Erhard, cc Seibt, Hohmann, Dr. Wagner, Dichgans, Borchardt, 24 February 1964, ACDP K187/1).   
61 For instance, at the encouragement of Weldon Gibson (Executive Vice President, Stanford Research 
Institute) and Edmund Kellogg (US General Consul, Düsseldorf), Birrenbach spoke in July 1963 and July 
1965 at luncheons in the Düsseldorf Industrie Club to American graduate business students (and some 
deans and financial editors of major newspapers) from West Coast schools (including Stanford) who were 
on study trips in Europe as part of “Journey for Pesp ctive” seminars (William J. Bird, President, Journey 
for Perspective Foundation, San Francisco (CA), to KB, 4 March 1966, ACDP K090/1; Kellogg to KB, 6 
July 1965, ACDP K187/1; Kellogg to KB, 14 March 1963, ACDP K157/1; and Gibson to KB, 13 March 
1963, ACDP K157/1).  Birrenbach had seen Gibson earlier at Stanford in Fall 1962 on his lecture tour.   
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not least through organizations in which they enjoyed a large representation, such as the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars founded in 1968.62  Despite some 
sporadic contacts along such lines, for instance at Stanford, these particular efforts came 
to little.63  Birrenbach’s American contacts (and travels) remained concentrated on the 
East Coast, more specifically in the Northeast, the customary stomping grounds of the 
American Atlanticists, and for Birrenbach the pejorative “West Coast” would forever be 
synonymous with those personalities lacking a sufficient knowledge of Europe and thus 
contributing significantly to difficulties in European-American relations.64   
As with respect to generational change, the efforts f he German Atlanticists to 
establish closer contact to and to impact on regions of the United States beyond the 
Northeast exhibited themselves institutionally in a variety of ways, particularly in the 
endeavors of the Atlantik-Brücke during the 1970s and 80s.  One such manifestation was 
the marked desire to stage Atlanticist functions in regions well removed from the East 
Coast.  This was perhaps most evident in the locating of those German-American Young 
Leaders Conferences staged in the United States in places like Racine (1975), Dallas 
                                                
62 KB to Helmut Kohl, 10 November 1981, ACDP K132/2.   
63 For examples of Birrenbach’s intensified contacts wi h advisors of Republican presidential nominee Sen. 
Barry Goldwater (Arizona), see KB to Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 4 August 
1964, ACDP K013/1; KB to Prof. Dr. Edward Teller, University of California, 11 August 1964, ACDP 
K187/1; and KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 6 August 1964, ACDP K015.   
64 In November 1981, Birrenbach wrote Helmut Kohl: “As you know, a great part of the difficulties which 
have developed today in the American-European relationship come from personalities of the West Coast 
who do not sufficiently grasp [übersehen] the European problems” (KB to Kohl, 10 November 198 , 
ACDP K132/2).  Whatever anti-German sentiments may have existed on the East Coast among certain 
business leaders, press outlets and minority groups (i.e. blacks), the Northeastern Establishment, including 
its political and intellectual elite, had traditionally exhibited a pronounced specialization in and experience 
with European affairs and history, as reflected in the postwar focus of American foreign policy on US-
European relations.  The steady, long-term weakening and even displacement of this leadership by a more 
heterogeneous one encompassing also the southern and western regions of the US led to a corresponding 
relative increase in attention to and interest in relations with the Hispanic world and the Pacific sphere.   
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(1978) and San Francisco (1982).65  Beginning in May 1982, the AB, in conjunction with 
the Auswärtigen Amt and the German Information Center (New York City) and with 
funding from the Körber-Stiftung (Hamburg), helped carry out an extensive program of 
Vortragsreisen of up to three weeks duration of prominent Germans to the United States, 
with an emphasis on targeting the most important areas beyond the Northeast and East 
Coast.66  Of course, such geographically ambitious undertakings presented logistical and 
                                                
65 As already noted, the 2nd German-American Youth Conference occurred from 26-29 August 1975 at 
Wingspread, the Johnson Foundation conference center in Racine near Milwaukee (WI).  The 4th German-
American Young Leaders Conference was staged in Dallas (TX) from 15-18 August 1978 so as to avoid 
falling in the same year (1979) as the larger, biennial German-American Conference.  The 6th German-
American Young Leaders Conference was held from 3-7 August 1982 on the Lone Mountain Campus of 
the University of San Francisco.  This August 1982 gathering featured numerous guest speakers, notably 
including some from the Reagan administration.  Meanwhile, German participants were invited to private 
homes and country clubs, thus affording them a taste of what was deemed the “American way of life” and 
the opportunity to meet a number of influential Americans of the West Coast (Walter Stahl to Members of 
the Atlantik-Brücke, 30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1 and the Beate Lindemann Report on a USA-Trip 
of August 1982, 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1).  Lindemann related here that this German Young 
Leaders delegation had also enjoyed two “glorious” vacation days [“Ferientage”] together in California.   
 As with earlier German-American Young Leaders Conferences, assessments of these later youth 
meetings appear to have been quite favorable.  On the “highly qualified” German delegation to be 
dispatched by the Atlantik-Brücke to the 4th such conference, see Walter Stahl, AB, Hamburg, to the AB 
Members (“Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren!”), 15 June 1978, ACDP K134/2.  On the “very successful,” 
“open,” “cooperative,” and “imaginative” 6th conference, see Lindemann’s Report of 27 September 1982, 
ACDP K144/1.  Here, Lindemann pointed to the improved quality of the participants and discussions at the 
conference, offering a positive judgment of the German and American delegations, especially a German 
group whose composition was “more well rounded [vielseitiger] and interesting” than that of its American 
counterpart.  On the “particularly good” German-American Young Leaders Conference of August 1982, 
“especially regarding the quality of the German delegation,” see the Protocol of the AB-Vorstand Meeting 
in Bonn on 22 September 1982, ACDP K144/1.  On the “highly qualified” US and German delegations to 
the 6th conference, see Stahl to the Members of the AB, 30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1.  For the 
“successful” and “lively” 6th German-American Young Leaders Conference, see the AB Activity Report, 
16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1.  On the Young Leaders Conference in August 1982 as “very gratifying 
[erfreulich],” see the Protocol of the AB Member Assembly on 6 June 1983 in Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 
ACDP K144/1.  For Peter Weitz (German Marshall Fund, see later in this chapter) displaying “a positive 
attitude” towards the 6th conference and towards the German-American Young Leaders Conferences in 
general, see again Lindemann’s Report of 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1.   
Incidentally, after the 1st German-American Youth Conference was held at Haus Rissen (Institut 
für Politik und Wirtschaft) in Hamburg from 27-30 June 1973 and the 3rd German-American Young 
Leaders Conference was carried out in West Berlin from 14-17 August 1977, the 5th such meeting was then 
staged at the Akademie für Politische Bildung in Tutzing (Bavaria) in August 1980 and the 7th would be 
held once more at Haus Rissen in Hamburg in 1984 (AB Activity Report, 16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1).  
Such conferences enjoyed the support of the Leitungen of the hosting institute or academy.   
66 At the suggestion of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the Körber-Stiftung (Kurt Körber) had made DM 
200,000 available in Spring 1982 since the Auswärtige Amt, which had initiated and maintained overall 
control of the program, lacked sufficient funds due to cost-cutting measures.  Speakers included politicians, 
scholars, journalists and possibly Wirtschaftler, for instance Peter Corterier (formerly of the AA, now of 
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financial challenges for the Atlantik-Brücke and other Atlanticist institutions.67  
Nevertheless, there existed a further desire among German Atlanticists to ensure that 
Americans from regions outside the northeastern United States took part in specific 
Atlanticist activities.  Thus, during the early 1980s, the Atlantik-Brücke helped organize 
and stage two-week information trips to the Federal Republic, the first in June-July 1983, 
for annually up to fifteen promising, younger American international affairs journalists of 
key newspapers and radio and TV stations, especially those from outside the major media 
outlets of the American Northeast.68  In each of these undertakings, the German 
                                                                                                                                      
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Washington DC); Günter Diehl (President of the DGAP); and Dr. Christoph 
Bertram (Die Zeit).  Such trips occurred during the spring and fall,with for instance seven being organized 
in Fall 1982, five in Spring 1983 and six or seven planned for Fall 1983.  In choosing locations, the desire 
was to cover as much geographic area as possible.  While venues also encompassed larger metropolises like 
Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Atlanta and Miami, particular value was assigned to smaller cities and 
universities like Greensboro (NC), Birmingham (AL), Columbia (MO), Grand Rapids (MI), and Fargo 
(ND), sites that generally featured a much more appreciative [“dankbareres”] audience, were otherwise 
mostly ignored by prominent Germans, and therefore held out the promise of greater effect.  Settings 
spanned a wide gamut from gatherings of the World Affairs Council in San Francisco and the Gulf Coast 
Council on Foreign Affairs in Houston, through divers  seminars and university functions, all the way to 
unusual events like a “Heritage Ball” in Ann Arbor (MI) on the occasion of a “tricentennial” celebration, 
with the number of listeners varying from more than a hundred to as few as approximately a dozen.  
Particular stress was placed on addressing opinion-shaping groups possessed of a “multiplier effect” (S ahl 
to AB Members, 30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1).  Therefore, speakers also met with media in the 
respective locations for interviews and the like.  As of 1983, the resonance surrounding this program led 
State Secretary Berndt von Staden (the AA’s Coordinator for German-American Relations) to encourage 
Körber to continue its financing from 1984 on.  However, while the participation of the Atlantik-Brücke in 
this project went on at least through 1983, it was apparently not expected in 1984 (Oskar Bezold, “Report 
1983” on the Vortragsprogramm USA for the AA/Körber-Stiftung, ACDP K144/1; Stahl to AB Members, 
30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1; and the Protocol of the AB-Vorstand meeting in Bonn on 22 
September 1982, ACDP K144/1).  Bezold, a journalist who had previously worked in an expert capacity 
with the GIC in New York, assisted in the preparation, especially in the United States, of these trips.   
67 For example, in the case of the just discussed Vortragsreisen, the web of West German diplomatic 
representations, including general consulates and ho orary consuls, proved essential for tackling diverse 
tasks, whether securing the talk functions with the various host entities in question, setting up interviews 
with newspapers and radio and television stations or organizing social events, in the enormous expanses of 
the United States (Oskar Bezold, “Report 1983” on the Vortragsprogramm USA, ACDP K144/1).  On the 
ACG proposal of Dallas as the site for the next big German-American Conference being judged too 
expensive and impractical by the AB-Vorstand, as was any site other than New York and Washington DC, 
see the Protocol of the AB-Vorstand meeting on 12 December 1983, ACDP K144/1.     
68 This effort to encourage more intensive as well as more accurate reporting about German affairs was 
directed at American journalists, “the coming Walter Lippmanns and Walter Cronkites,” in the age group 
30-45, the so-called Successor Generation.  Nominations were accepted from a number of American 
sources, among them journalism schools and organizations as well as prominent individuals in the 
journalistic field.  The engagement of a private entity like the Brücke was especially valuable in this 
 456
Atlanticists and, more particularly, their institutons sought to enlighten and influence 
personalities hailing from geographic areas of the United States that seemed to know and 
care less about the Federal Republic than those Americans rooted in the Northeast and 
whose information about and perceptions of West Germany were considered seriously 
distorted, as well as to enhance their own knowledge of these unfamiliar regions.69      
                                                                                                                                      
endeavor since many American editors and publishers in principle would not accept invitations from and 
trips financed by foreign governments.  The Brücke cooperated in this undertaking with the Carl-Duisberg-
Gesellschaft (Cologne/New York, a private organization with a much-esteemed reputation in sponsoring 
exchange programs), the BPA (which had been successfully carrying out, here essentially complementary, 
Germany visits for American journalists), and Inter Nationes.  These trips featured especially time in the 
Bonn-Cologne-Ruhr area, along with Heidelberg-Frankfurt-Mannheim, Munich, of course Berlin (West 
and East) and Hamburg.  On their travels, the Americans met with high-ranking politicians, members of the 
business and banking community, representatives of the mass media, US and German military officers and 
the like, such personal contacts facilitating their gathering of information and forming of impressions.  
Atlantik-Brücke members in the various German cities in question also further participated in this project, 
for instance as contact persons and in general in the “Betreuung” of the visiting journalists.  On all this, see 
the Protocol of the AB Member Assembly on 6 May 1982 in Bonn, ACDP K144/1; the AB Arbeitsplan 
1982/83, ACDP K144/1; the AB Application for a Grant, 21 March 1983, ACDP K144/1; and the AB 
Activity Report, 16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1.  For a decidedly positive initial assessment, see Peter Pechel 
to Dr. Karl Klasen, Bundesbank-Präsident i.R., Deutsche Bank AG, Hamburg, 8 July 1983, ACDP K144/ .     
69 See, for instance, the Protocol of the Atlantik-Brücke Member Assembly on 6 May 1982 in Bonn, ACDP 
K144/1 and the AB Arbeitsplan 1982/83, ACDP K144/1.  On ACG efforts to select American participants 
for the German-American Youth Conferences who contributed to a broad geographical representation and 
that came from universities other than Harvard, Princeton and Yale, see the Report of Richard Hunt, 
President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1.  However, for the American delegation to the 2nd German-
American Young Leaders Conference exhibiting an Übergewicht of Harvard graduates (eight), see the AB 
Report about the 2nd German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 
26-29 August 1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/ .  For the already mentioned half-hour radio 
interview with two German participants in the 2nd German-American Young Leaders Conference entitled 
“The New Generation of Germans” (part of a series “Conversations from Wingspread”) being afterwards 
broadcast in the course of September 1975 by over 85 stations in the entire United States, see again the AB 
Report about the 2nd German-American Youth Conference, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1.   
As of 1982, the Atlantik-Brücke was contemplating, conditional on the securing of the necessary 
means (possibly including public funds), the creation of some discrete German-American institutional 
framework, for instance workshops or seminars comprising at most ten invitees on each side, to properly 
address the “Successor Generation,” the “Kronprinzen-Generation” standing before the “final hurdles on 
the path to leadership positions” but simultaneously a “Zwischengruppe” that from 35 to about 45 years of 
age was no longer engaged by the German-American You g Leaders Conferences (though encompassing 
former Young Leaders) yet still not involved with the big German-American Conferences (AB rbeitsplan 
1982/83, ACDP K144/1).  Especially relevant here was the proposal that in conducting such Successor 
Generation projects the AB should have “a free hand” in the changing selection of partner institutions (i.e. 
not exclusively the ACG).  This would enable the ABto cooperate with large, active, private organizations 
and institutes in all parts of the US (e.g. the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in the Midwest and the 
World Affairs Council of Northern California in San Francisco on the West Coast) and, above all, with 
those close to the respective administrations in Washington DC, thus facilitating the recruitment of 
influential Americans as participants and increasing the likelihood that the discussions staged would impact 
on the Willensbildung and decision-making processes in the US on vital questions of German-American 
relations (Lindemann Report on a USA-Trip of August 1982, 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1).   
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D. Constructing New Institutions 
Especially the first half of the 1970s saw the appearance of new Atlanticist 
institutions, intended to strengthen what was perceived to be the fraying trans-Atlantic 
relationship.  However, before we address this phenomenon and Birrenbach’s role in it, 
we should first point out that this period also saw the elimination of certain institutions 
utilized by the German Atlanticists in pursuit of their aims.  Despite the efforts to 
revitalize it that were carried out from late 1971 onward, the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle 
was disbanded in 1973.70  More significant in the overall scheme of things, and less the 
direct result of Birrenbach’s own decisions, was the disbanding of the Monnet Committee 
in 1975 at the behest of Monnet himself.  At least on he face of it, there does not appear 
to have been a common thread in the separate decisions to close down these two 
                                                                                                                                      
For John Loudon, J. Robert Schaetzel and John Tuthill soon meeting with prospective AI 
Participating Members in Minneapolis and Chicago as p rt of an enhanced effort to raise funds in the US, 
see Tuthill, AIIA, Director-General, Paris, to Baron von Oppenheim, 9 July 1976, ACDP K058.   
Evidence of a wider interest in such geographically expansive approaches includes the November 
1982 European-American “Successor Generation” confere ce in Santa Monica (CA) on the future role of 
NATO in which thirty Europeans (two from each of the fifteen NATO countries) and ten Americans took 
part.  This conference had been originally proposed by the NATO Information Service (Brussels) and also  
involved RAND (but apparently not the AB or ACG), with the further financing sources being the US State 
Department, the Volkswagenstiftung, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
(Lindemann Report on a USA-Trip of August 1982, 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1).   
Furthermore, on Hunt regarding the need for a better geographic representation in the G rman 
delegations to the German-American Youth Conferences, namely his complaint that the group at the first
such meeting lacked participants from South Germany, see the Report of Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 
August 1973, ACDP K132/1.  For the subsequent Atlantik-Brücke efforts to select a German group that 
also displayed as much balance as possible with respect to geographic origin, see the AB Report about the 
2nd German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 26-29 August 
1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1.   
70 Beginning in late 1971, Birrenbach, along with Hans von der Groeben and Hellmuth Wagner, had 
undertaken a number of measures to revive and revitalize their circle.  These included efforts to make th  
circle and its discussions more thematically concentrated, deeper and better prepared; to have the circl  
come to more concrete conclusions to be passed on to the leadership of the party and the Unionsfraktion; to 
better connect the circle with the leadership of the party and Fraktion, for instance by occasionally inviting 
the chairmen to meetings; to improve the group’s per onnel composition, including through a Verjüngung 
of the membership, especially from the Fraktion, and through the inclusion of those political Beamten who 
had been in leading positions in the “Unionskabinetten,” all the while maintaining the group’s professional 
balance.  The new members that were co-opted included Konrad Kraske, the CDU General-Secretary; 
Franz Heubl, the representative of Bavaria by the Bund; Albert Schnez, until recently Inspector General of 
the Army; and Karl-Heinz Narjes, Economics Minister of Schleswig-Holstein.  Despite these efforts, by 
mid-June 1973, less than two years after it had been initiated, the revitalization attempt had clearly failed. 
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institutions.  Indeed, the Monnet Committee disbanded in part due to Monnet’s declining 
health along with his sense that this particular action committee had become, so to speak, 
a victim of its own success, the latter as evidenced by the implementation of many of its 
proposals by the responsible decision-makers, and was therefore of diminishing utility.  
Most significantly in this regard, the meeting of the heads of government of the nine 
European Community countries on 10 December 1974 in Paris had created a dramatically 
new situation, in so far as it established the intergovernmental machinery that had been 
previously proposed by the Monnet Committee and that would enable the continued 
building of Europe.  Given that the resources of the Monnet Committee were considered 
to be of no match compared to those at the disposal of the European governments, the 
effective space of this action committee suddenly seemed to be, thus, greatly reduced.71 
Meanwhile, the difficulties of the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle and the decision to 
disband, undertaken largely at Birrenbach’s advice and impetus with the agreement of the 
other participants, can be traced to a number of different factors.  By November 1972, 
Birrenbach, never one to welcome too diverse or divergent opinions into a group, 
considered the earlier “cohesion” of the circle to have been undermined to an intolerable 
extent, especially since he judged several of its members to be partly responsible 
(“mitschuldig”) for the “development of recent months” (presumably referring to the 
                                                
71 In particular, the heads of government had agreed that there would be frequent Councils of the heads of 
state and government, that unanimity would no longer be required on all questions in the Council, and that
the European Parliament would hold general elections from 1978 onward.  As Monnet put it, “[t]he 
strivings which the parties and unions united in our committee undertake for almost twenty years, in order 
to make a contribution to the realization of European unity, must be adapted henceforth to the new 
conditions” (Jean Monnet to KB, 20 December 1974, ACDP K158/2).  The members of the committee, 
including Birrenbach, agreed at least ostensibly with Monnet’s assessment and with the decision to close 
down the committee but also hoped that the networks con tructed in the course of its existence could be 
maintained.  Birrenbach, for one, remained in contact with Monnet after the dissolution of the committee, 
until the Frenchman’s death in 1979.   
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Ostpolitik and probably the just-occurred federal elections).72  Membership and 
attendance were in steady decline, particularly with regard to figures currently active in 
politics but also those from the economic realm.  Perhaps most important in explaining 
this flagging interest was the fact that, with the initial change in and subsequent 
confirmation of ruling coalition (1969 and 1972, resp ctively) that saw an SPD-FDP 
government firmly in power and the Union relegated to the status of a long-term 
opposition party, there now existed little genuine opportunity for such a partisan circle to 
influence policy, especially a circle that furthermore found itself cut off from its previous 
governmental sources of information.  Of course, politicians and businessmen were 
overburdened already, the latter even more so in light of the increased number of 
meetings within their firms due to the economic troubles characteristic of the time.73  
Finally, during the period of revitalization efforts and perhaps motivated by some of the 
other factors we have already cited, the BDI ceased to finance the group, at least to the 
same extent as hitherto, leaving it to the members themselves to help cover the costs.74  
All of this contributed to the end of the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle.   
However, despite these two cases in which Birrenbach was directly involved, the 
trend during the early 1970s actually appears to have been one of efforts to construct new 
                                                
72 For Birrenbach, cohesion was essential since the group was not intended to be some sort of intellectual 
circle focused on debating dramatically contrary viewpoints.  Therefore, at the “reactivation” meeting of 3 
December 1971, Birrenbach opposed an “engagement” with “Andersdenkenden” from the three parties, 
something which, indeed, did not come about.  However, the lack of cohesion [which had been utterly 
“destroyed”] that Birrenbach recognized by November 1972 confronted him with “extraordinarily serious” 
problems with respect to the circle (KB to Dr. Ernst Schneider, 24 November 1972, ACDP K156/1). 
73 Due to their new offices, figures like Gerhard Stoltenberg (Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein), 
Karl Carstens (Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion), and Ernst Benda (President of the 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts) found themselves unable to take part in the meetings, yet another major blow 
to the circle.  
74 Despite the disbanding of the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle, the desirability of such undertakings in 
principle was not placed in doubt.  Birrenbach, Groeben and Wagner (i.e. the initiators of the circle) all 
recommended that the younger members eventually refound such a circle, albeit with an altered 
composition especially including younger men who were more active in events. 
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institutions.  As with the earlier waves of instituion-building, these were private, non-
governmental bodies, based on the premise that governments alone were incapable of 
surmounting the current crisis in American-European relations, fueled by recent political 
and economic troubles, and constructing a viable Atantic Community.  At least in 
general terms, these institutions were of similar types to what had come before, among 
them action committees, conferences, funding entitis, and publications.  Not all of these 
institutions survived, but the efforts undertaken during this period, including by 
Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists, indicate an unbowed will to strengthen trans-
Atlantic relations.   
E. New Financing Instruments: The German Marshall Fund of the United States 
Given the economically grueling environment in which the German Atlanticists 
functioned during this period, one of the most signif cant Atlanticist-minded institutions 
to appear during the early 1970s was undoubtedly the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States.  The establishment of this fund, a West German initiative, was publicly 
announced by Chancellor Brandt on 5 June 1972 at Harvard University, where twenty-
five years earlier Secretary of State George Marshall had introduced the plan bearing his 
name.  Serving as the representative of his party (Union), Birrenbach flew to Boston with 
the Chancellor to take part, along with other German guests, in this special convocation, 
the fund’s trustees and honorary trustees also among those in attendance.  Conceived of 
as a memorial gift to demonstrate the appreciation of the Federal Republic and the 
German people for the Marshall Plan assistance, the unv iling of the GMF enjoyed a 
positive reception in the United States.75  The GMF was a private, philanthropic 
                                                
75 On this “generosity” being “a very constructive stp” that garnered “a very good press” and that was 
“well received generally,” see Robert Bowie, Harvard University, Director, Center for International Affairs, 
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American foundation based in Washington (DC) whose capital of DM 150 million was 
provided by the West German federal government in fifteen annual installments of DM 
10 million each beginning in June 1972.  These resources were devoted to supporting a 
mutual transnational learning process through the creation and maintenance of working 
relationships leading to a sustained and systematic exchange of practical knowledge, 
approaches and experiences.  Intended to be a perpetual institution and symbol, the GMF 
not only dispersed funds from its capital and income but also accumulated a sizeable 
endowment.76  The GMF was created by the West German government in conjunction 
with an American Planning Group, the main responsibility for the negotiations in 1971-
72 resting with MdB Prof. Dr. Alex Möller and Harvard’s Dr. Guido Goldman and the 
funds approved by unanimous vote in 1972 by all four parties in the Bundestag.77   
Initially, Birrenbach was quite pleased with the founding of the German Marshall 
Fund.  After all, here was an organization acknowledging an increasing international 
“interdependence” and, in this context, placing its h ghest priority on the “trans-Atlantic 
dimension”; promoting an institution-building that f cilitated international coordination 
on multiple levels, not least between the policy-oriented American and West European 
Wissenschaft; advocating private initiatives, public-private cooperation, and a related 
                                                                                                                                      
to KB, 8 June 1972, ACDP K160/2.  For the reputation of the GMF having “really grown” in the US as of 
the mid-1980s and the fund having even found “universal recognition [allgemeine Anerkennung],” as 
expressed for example by Berndt von Staden a bit earl er during his time as the AA’s Coordinator for 
German-American Cooperation, see KB to Hermann J. Abs, Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, 
Frankfurt, 23 February 1984, ACDP K062/3.   
76 To build up assets that would ensure the GMF’s permanent activity beyond fifteen years, a portion of the 
annual installments were set aside and invested.  The fund’s budget authorized the commitment of 30% of 
the second DM 10 million installment during the installment year itself (1 June 1973-31 May 1974); 50% 
of the 1974-75 installment; 75% of the 1975-76 installment; and 100% of all subsequent installments.  The
residual fund was expected to amount to $10-25 million by mid-1988 (GMF Status Report on Fund Theme, 
Programs, Projects and Resource Decisions, 10 May 1974, ACDP K114/1).   
77 Möller, the federal government’s official representative in this matter, was a former finance minister 
(1969-71).  Goldman, chairman of the American Planning Group, was Executive Director of Harvard’s 
Center for European Studies.   
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collaboration between expert scholars and responsible decision-makers; stressing social 
scientific, interdisciplinary and managerial approaches (e.g. with respect to “human 
resources” and family welfare); all in its quest to encourage innovative solutions to 
complex contemporary and emerging problems.78  Moreover, the GMF also demonstrated 
in its practices many similarities with the Atlanticist-minded Stiftungen already discussed 
in Chapter 5.79  Therefore, it was able to integrate itself rather w ll into the existing 
foundation system, funding projects jointly with institutions in the Federal Republic like 
Birrenbach’s Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk; in the United 
States the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation; and the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation among those located elsewhere abroad.80  Finally, in a more personal vein, 
Birrenbach even enjoyed a number of contacts within the GMF’s boards of trustees.81   
                                                
78 All projects funded by the GMF were international in nature and were required to feature at least both
American and European (West or East) elements, whether through the direct participation of appropriate 
persons and institutions or through consideration as thematic subjects.   
79 Thus, seeking to limit costs, the GMF eschewed an el borate administrative structure, maintaining only a 
small staff, and instead relied on the assistance i rtain capacities of friendly but independent consultants, 
among them members of the planning staffs of several foreign ministries, leading young scholars, and other 
outside experts.  These included, for instance, Peter Rothammer (German Institute for Urban Studies, 
Berlin) with respect to a specific project feasibility study.  Already from early on in the planning phase, the 
GMF benefited at least initially from sharing office space and facilities and from close working relations 
with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington (DC).  Cementing this linkage, 
Thomas Hughes, president of the Carnegie Endowment, was among the founding members and charter 
trustees of the GMF, while Milton Katz, chairman of the CEIP’s Board of Trustees, was a GMF honorary 
trustee.  Emphasizing speed and flexibility, the GMF boasted quick administrative processes, including 
with regard to decisions on applications, and constantly re-examined and revised its program goals, areas 
and priorities so as to adjust rapidly to address new issues.  Rather than simply reacting to unsolicited 
submitted proposals, the GMF displayed considerable ss rtiveness in selecting the particular problems to 
be tackled and, therefore, in shaping the development of its overall program, as well as in actively molding 
those projects actually supported.  In choosing its target areas, the GMF sought to ensure that its relativ ly 
modest means produced a significant and lasting impact, focusing on the financing of so-called high-
leverage projects and activities that fulfilled urgent needs and promised to generate multiplier effects, all 
the while identifying gaps in, supplementing, and avoiding duplication of the efforts of various state, 
international and private institutions (e.g. other foundations in the United States and Europe), many of 
which wielded greater resources.     
80 Indeed, the GMF cooperated with a number of other private and public entities through the joint funding 
of projects.  Among the foundations not mentioned above in the text, these included, in the United States, 
the Mellon Foundation (New York City), the Kettering Foundation (Dayton, OH) and the Cleveland 
Foundation (Cleveland, OH) as well as, abroad, the Adriano Olivetti Foundation (Rome) and the Sociedad 
de Estudios y Publicaciones of the Banco Urquijo (Madrid).  Meanwhile, the GMF also co-sponsored 
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However, with the announcement of the GMF’s initial programs and projects by 
the trustees on 11 January 1974, Birrenbach soon found himself disappointed.  In 
particular, he was convinced that the research and activities being supported by the fund 
were hardly conducive to the practical and immediat improvement of European 
(especially German)-American relations, above all with respect to effectively filling a 
certain “communication gap… particularly on the political level,” and to the promotion 
of “a really functioning Atlantic Partnership.”  Inreality, the fund did tend to ignore the 
traditional, allegedly pressing, security and diplomatic concerns that were especially the 
focus of Birrenbach’s attention throughout the 1970s and beyond, instead stressing the 
“Common Problems of Industrial Societies,” namely domestic, comparative and, though 
only to a much lesser extent, international economic, social, cultural and political 
                                                                                                                                      
projects with bodies such as the EC Commission, the UK Home Office, the French Ministry of Justice, the 
West German Bundesjustizministerium, the US Department of Labor, and trade unions like the UAW.   
81 Birrenbach’s contacts among GMF trustees included Richard N. Cooper (Provost and Professor of 
International Economics, Yale University); Guido Goldman (Executive Director of the Center for European 
Studies and Lecturer on Government at Harvard University); and Carl Kaysen (Director, Institute for 
Advanced Study, Princeton NJ; later, Vice Chairman and Director of Research, Sloan Commission on 
Government and Higher Education, Cambridge MA).  Among the honorary trustees, they included John 
McCloy, James Conant and David Rockefeller.  Chaired by C. Douglas Dillon, the Honorary Committee 
advised, initially, the Planning Group and, then, the Board of Trustees.  In administering the GMF, this
Board of Trustees made a variety of personnel and policy decisions, among them setting the budget plan; 
determining goals, guidelines and program (including priority areas); and approving particular projects and 
actions.  During the 1970s, the chairmen of the Board f Trustees included Harvey Brooks (Professor of 
Technology and Public Policy, Harvard University) and, later, William M. Roth (Regent, University of 
California, San Francisco).  In addition to the prominent role of Roth, the growing influence in the US of 
regions outside the Northeast was reflected in the presence within the Board of Trustees of personalities 
like John Seigenthaler (Publisher, The Tennessean, Nashville); Irving Bluestone (Vice President, UAW, 
Detroit); John Kilgore, Jr. (Chairman, Cambridge Royalty Co., Houston); Howard Swearer (President, 
Carleton College, Minnesota); Moon Landrieu (New Orleans); and John Cowles, Jr. (Chairman, 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.).  Likewise, the importance of generational questions was manifested by 
the presence among the GMF honorary trustees of James Perkins (Chairman, International Council for 
Educational Development, New York City).  Other figures of note on the GMF Board of Trustees included 
Thomas Hughes (President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC); Eugene 
Skolnikoff (Director, Center for International Studies, MIT, Cambridge MA); Robert Ellsworth (Treasurer 
from 1972-74); and William Donaldson (Ellsworth’s successor as Treasurer; founder of Donaldson, Lufkin, 
Jenrette, Inc., New York City; Dean, School of Organiz tion and Management, Yale University).   
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issues.82  Indeed, as stipulated in the initial agreements, there was not even any special 
preference for the financing of specifically bilateral American-German projects, rather 
(consciously like the Marshall Plan itself) a stress on multilateral endeavors pertaining to 
several countries.  This frustration led Birrenbach in 1974 to attempt to indirectly 
exercise influence via several similarly dismayed honorary trustees with whom he was in 
contact, most notably John McCloy, but also to intervene directly vis-à-vis GMF 
president Prof. Benjamin Read in an effort to alter th  fund’s focus towards what he 
considered more fruitful avenues.83  This action, ultimately futile it appears, was at the 
very least a violation of the spirit of the fund, which as a gift was explicitly intended to be 
independent and free from all influence of German authorities (including members of the 
                                                
82 Among these issues were, for example, unemployment; inflation; environmental pollution; the work 
sphere (including women); education; transportation; the criminal justice system; the family; local 
government; urban affairs, planning and development ( .g. land use, Raumordnung); trade and monetary 
affairs; as well as resources and resource shortages (e.g. energy, food, seabed minerals, population). 
83 For Birrenbach’s complaints, including his proposal th t the GMF finance, for instance, meetings 
between members of the US Congress and the European parliaments “in order to improve the 
understanding of the legislative branches about the problems which have to be solved,” see KB to Read, 5 
August 1974, ACDP K114/1, as well as KB to Read, 4 March 1974, ACDP K114/1 and KB to Read, 26 
June 1974, ACDP K114/1.  On Birrenbach attributing he “not outstanding” experiences with the GMF in 
part, but not exclusively, to the formulation of the institution’s founding documents, see KB to Amb. 
Berndt von Staden, Washington DC, 22 October 1975, ACDP K150/1.  For Read’s responses, see Read to 
KB, 11 March 1974, ACDP K114/1; Read to KB, 18 July 1974, ACDP K114/1; and Read to KB, 13 
August 1974, ACDP K114/1.  For McCloy sharing Birrenbach’s sentiments, “only more emphatically,” and 
his grousing that the thematic approach of the GMF “really drives me ‘up the wall,’ as today’s jargon has 
it,” see McCloy to KB, 12 March 1974, ACDP K114/1.  On a “shocked” Lucius Clay’s disappointment 
with the GMF’s initial awards, see Clay to KB, 21 March 1974, ACDP K114/1.  For “outstanding 
[hochverdiente] American friends” finding Birrenbach’s letters to Read “good,” see KB to 
Ministerialdirigenten Dr. Joseph Thomas, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 23 July 
1974, ACDP K114/1.  For “a series of prominent American personalities” sharing “fully” Birrenbach’s 
“objections [Bedenken]” in regard to the GMF program, see KB to Amb. Staden, 11 September 1974, 
ACDP K114/1.  On Birrenbach’s belief that many GMF projects, “especially environmental protection 
projects [Umweltschutzprojekte],” were “unworthy [unwürdig]” of the fund, see KB to Hermann J. Abs, 
Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 23 February 1984, ACDP K062/3.  The successive 
presidents of the GMF were Guido Goldman (Acting President, 1972-73); Benjamin Read (1973-77; 
previously Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington DC), 
Smithsonian Institution, 1969-73; and Executive Secretary of Dean Rusk at the State Department, 1963-
69); and Robert Gerald Livingston (starting in November 1977; GMF Vice President, 1974-77; Visiting 
Fellow at the CFR, 1970-71).  These presidents functio ed as the principal executive officers, heading the 
GMF office whose staff included Marianne Santone (Administrative Officer/Executive Assistant; Ford 
Foundation, 1969-72; BA Mainz University, Germany, 1960); Denie Weil (Program Officer); Christina 
Graf (Assistant Program Officer); and Peter Weitz (Research Consultant and Program Coordinator).   
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federal government and the Bundestag), and also serves as a vivid demonstration of 
Birrenbach’s often unappealing pushiness in such matters.84 
That said and despite the fact that Birrenbach played no direct role in its creation 
and functioning, the German Marshall Fund did become a major source of financing for 
Atlanticist projects, including a number of organizat ons and activities in which he was 
involved.  The Atlantik-Brücke would be a particular beneficiary of GMF money, which 
for example helped fund its major German-American Co ferences.85  The GMF also 
provided the Brücke with crucial financing for its short-term program of small Joint 
Working Groups organized with the American Council on Germany during the first half 
of the 1980s.86  Necessary means for the already discussed AB trips to the Federal 
                                                
84 For Birrenbach’s gripe that “the conditions have be n fixed [festgelegt] extremely one-sidedly [einseitig] 
in favor of America,” a fundamental misunderstanding, or perhaps blithe dismissal, of the nature of the 
GMF, see KB to Hermann J. Abs, Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 23 February 1984, 
ACDP K062/3.  A mainstay of this independent status exi ted in that the crucial GMF Board of Trustees 
was exclusively composed of and selected by Americans.  A lone exception to this independent condition 
was the agreement of the GMF Planning Group to the West German government’s proposal to divert from 
the first annual installment (1972) a one-time sum of DM 3 million to Harvard University’s Institute for 
West European Studies (chaired by Stanley Hoffmann) for the establishment of a “German Marshall 
Memorial Endowment” to sponsor study projects focusing on Europe.  Though the GMF maintained 
representatives in Europe, as of 1977 Ms. Marion Bieber (4 Rue de Chevreuse, Paris) and Mr. Gebhard 
Schweigler (Adenauerallee 133, Bonn), there does sem to have been a certain disconnect vis-à-vis the 
Europeans.  As of the end of 1978, only 43 of the total 184 projects the GMF had supported to this point 
had come about on the basis of an initiative from Europe.  This appears to have been due in part to the 
GMF’s location in the United States, to its form as a foundation, and to its particular methods and ways of 
thought, all of which rendered it, despite the inroads that had already been made by Americanization, still 
not quite as familiar an institution to Europeans as to Americans.    
85 Thus, the GMF helped the American Council on Germany sponsor the 9th Biennial German-American 
Conference (March 1977) with a $10,000 grant.    
86 The implementation of the JWG (a.k.a. Core Group) concept was encouraged by the perceived upshot of 
two previous “ad hoc” meetings staged by the AB andACG, one from 16-18 June 1978 in Kronberg (near 
Frankfurt), just prior to the Bonn G7 economic summit of July 1978, and another from 25-27 April 1980 at 
Wye (near Washington DC), several months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  For the assertion hat
the results of these earlier ad hoc consultations had been received and utilized as “valuable” and 
“beneficial” contributions by the American and West German governments, see the AB Activity Report for 
12 June 1980-25 May 1981, ACDP K114/2.  For an assessm nt of these earlier ad hoc meetings as 
“successful and worthwhile,” see the Application by Dr. Peter Pechel, Deputy Chairman of the AB, to 
Frank Loy, President of the GMF, ACDP K114/2.  Originally expected to function over a period of one to 
one and a half years, the JWGs ultimately emerged from the gathering of a small steering committee, 
consisting of about ten representatives from each the AB and the ACG, from 14-16 May 1982 in 
Washington DC.  The outcome was the formation of three joint working groups meeting in Germany (e.g. 
JWG 1 in Frankfurt; JWG 2 on 28 June 1983 in Ebenhausen by Munich) and the US (e.g. Washington DC) 
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Republic for American journalists from outside the northeastern US were granted at 
various times by the GMF as well as the Robert Bosch Stiftung and the BPA.87  
Meanwhile, the GMF assisted in financing the ACG’s John J. McCloy Fund to enable 
American-German youth exchanges.88  Likewise, the Atlantic Institute received GMF 
funding for its series of press seminars and for particular studies, with the Trilateral 
Commission (see later in this chapter) similarly awarded study financing.89  The GMF 
                                                                                                                                      
and comprising members of both organizations (four t  seven from each per group).  The entire project was 
co-chaired, on the West German side, by Amb. (a.D.) Rolf Pauls and, on the American side, by Robert 
Ellsworth.  Co-chairmen for the individual groups included Germans such as Dr. Manfred Meier-Preschany 
(East-West), Prof. Karl Kaiser (Security), and Erik Blumenfeld (West-West Relations) and Americans such 
as Joseph Nye, Dr. Fritz Ermarth, and Fred Bergsten.  The JWGs aimed to generate proposals that could 
influence practical Western (especially US and West German) policy and help prevent, resolve or reduce 
differences at a time when intractable problems and an increasing potential for “conflict” allegedly 
burdened the intergovernmental German/European-American elationship and endangered the cohesion of 
the alliance.  As of November 1983, the remaining JWG means amounted to about $13,000 (Considerations 
on the JWG Project of the AB and ACG by Dr. Beate Lindemann, November 1983, ACDP K144/1).     
87 The GMF was also engaged in financing the first German-American conference for young journalists,  
involving twelve Americans and thirteen Germans of the “successor generation” (ages 25-45), that would 
take place from 10-13 July 1983 in the Amerika-Haus in West Berlin.  The Atlantik-Brücke, the United 
States Information Service, the American Council of Y ung Political Leaders, and the Berlin Senate were 
all involved, as well, in organizing and financing this conference, which emerged in the larger framework 
of an intensified exchange of American and West German “opinion leaders,” initiated by their two 
countries’ respective Coordinators for German-American Relations, and the agreement reached by the 
participants at the G7 summit in Versailles in June 1982 on youth exchange.  After the conference, each of 
the German participants would invite an American counterpart home for several days, during which the 
Americans would spend time with their German hosts in he Redaktionen of newspapers or radio and TV 
stations to gain insight into “the German system.”  If this conference proved a success, another one would 
be held in one or two years.  For Karl Klasen, Chairm n of the Atlantik-Brücke, having by the mid-1980s 
“at least toned down [zurückgestellt]” his skepticism regarding the activities of the GMF, see KB to 
Hermann J. Abs, Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 23 February 1984, ACDP K062/3.   
88 For example, the GMF awarded a grant of $18,000 to the McCloy Fund for the American-German visits 
of young trade union officials in the second half of 1977.   
89 The GMF, itself a public expression of gratitude, reflected the general Atlanticist concern with public 
relations.  Thus, it maintained a substantial Communications/Media program area through which it funded 
a variety of television, radio and press projects.  I  was as part of these activities that the GMF financed the 
Atlantic Institute press seminars (e.g. 1976-78: $96,000).  Furthermore, the fund encouraged the wide 
dissemination of project reports and conclusions and was noticeably pleased that the results of many 
endeavors it supported were available in the form of publications (sometimes in non-English languages, 
even Portuguese).  Moreover, the GMF saw to it that journalists and other media figures were among the 
participants in the diverse undertakings it funded.  Finally, the GMF planned to begin in Summer 1979 the 
publication of a journal appearing at irregular intervals that would discuss the selected problem areas the 
foundation focused on in its financing.  These public relations efforts also encompassed the distribution of 
information about the organization itself, with a vriety of published material, for example brochures and 
reports (including some available in German and French), explaining the fund’s background, goals, and 
operations.  Regarding studies, the GMF funded, for instance, a joint Atlantic Institute-Trilateral 
Commission work on “Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation in Western Europe, North 
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supplied some financing as well for the Mid-Atlantic Clubs and the Standing Conference 
of Atlantic Organizations.90  Furthermore, the GMF aided in funding Atlanticist-minded 
institutions with which Birrenbach maintained a certain contact, such as the Council on 
Foreign Relations and the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies (again, see later in this 
chapter).91  More broadly, the Federal Republic, its persons and institutions figured 
significantly in GMF-supported projects whether as direct participants or as themes.92  
Finally, a number of GMF-funded endeavors did deal in  trans-Atlantic and European 
                                                                                                                                      
America, and Japan (1977: $81,500), dealing with labor-management-government relations.  The stress on 
broad public opinion manifested itself, as well, in the presence on the GMF Board of Trustees of 
personalities engaged in newspaper publishing and the like, among them figures such as Elizabeth Midgley 
(Producer, CBS News, Washington DC) and Max Frankel (Sunday Editor, New York Times).   
90 As of 10 May 1974, the GMF would assist the Mid-Atlan ic Clubs (again, see later in this chapter) in 
New York, Paris, Washington, Brussels, London and San Francisco, with others to be formed in West 
Germany, during the next three years (1974-77) witha grant totaling $15,000 (administered by the AI) to 
support a modest central MAC secretariat in Europe t  improve communication between the clubs (e.g. 
coordination of the speaker programs).  Formed at the Rockefeller Center in Bellagio (Italy) in March 
1973, the SCAO was an informal umbrella group of about two dozen private American- and European-
based Atlanticist organizations that sought to coordinate, rationalize and assist in their work.  Its officers, 
with James Huntley as first secretary, were charged with representing the Atlanticist organizations as a 
whole to large foundations, governments and bodies such as NATO.  Among its other aspirations, the 
group hoped to stimulate funding in the face of the disturbing trends of this period, with the effort for the 
creation of a Transatlantic Foundation one of its most cherished ventures.  As of 10 May 1974, the SCAO 
was expected to receive $30,000 total (administered by the AI) from the GMF to help support the 
publishing of a bi-monthly newsletter and other activities over the next three years (1974-76) (GMF Status 
Report on Fund Theme, Programs, Projects and Resource Decisions, 10 May 1974, ACDP K114/1).   
91 Likewise, GMF support also benefited the activities of organizations like the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (London); the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Washingto  
DC); the Brookings Institution (DC); the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Georgetown 
University’s School of the Foreign Service (DC).  Although we have not yet discussed Birrenbach’s 
dealings with the George C. Marshall Research Foundation (Lexington VA), the GMF granted a special 
award of $205,000 over six years (1974-80) to the GCMRF to assist Dr. Forrest Pogue in the research and 
preparation of the portions of his official Marshall biography covering Marshall’s role in post-World War II 
European development and the origins and operations of the Marshall Plan.  Finally, the GMF also made  
grant of $1,500 to the Foundation Center (New York City).   
92 Thus, as of 31 December 1978, the Federal Republic ranked second after the United States by this 
measure of involvement (US: all 184 projects; FRG: 111; Britain: 103; France: 96).  Among the Germans 
benefiting from GMF funding, either directly or by taking part in GMF-supported activities, were Kurt 
Leonberger (Auswärtiges Amt) as well as a number of personalities Birrenbach would have been familiar 
with through institutions like the DGAP (Bonn) and the Trilateral Commission, including Karl Kaiser, 
Wolfgang Hager, Gebhard Schweigler and Hanns Maull.  German organizations engaged in Atlanticist 
activities that benefited from GMF funding included the Institut für Weltwirtschaft (University of Kiel); the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Bonn); the Deutsche Institut für Urbanistik (Berlin); and the IG Druck und 
Papier; as well as the Independent Commission for Internatio l Development Issues (Geneva), this latter 
not a German institution per se but chaired by former chancellor Willy Brandt.     
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(EC) context with international and foreign political, economic, trade, monetary, 
business, energy and development topics probably of interest to Birrenbach.93   
Though of less significance than the German Marshall Fund, the establishment of 
the London-based Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society in 
March 1973 through the intergovernmental Brandt-Heath Agreement represented another 
in a string of extraordinary West German institutional initiatives in the field of non-
governmental trans-Atlantic relations in the early 1970s.  With its stated aims of 
promoting the study and deepening the understanding of the changing modern industrial 
society, fostering relevant education and advancing the knowledge of the British and 
German people about that society, exploring ways and means of resolving the problems 
that arose in it, and stimulating the development of industrial society in a manner most 
beneficial to the community, this foundation bore many similarities to the GMF, though it 
focused much more strictly (e.g. thematically) on the Federal Republic and United 
Kingdom.  Incorporated in the latter by a royal charter granted in December 1973 and 
with the West German federal government providing its initial capitalization at a rate of 
DM 3 million per year for five years as a token of friendship, the AGF furthered its goals 
                                                
93 For Birrenbach’s assertion that the “most important achievement [bedeutendste Leistung]” of the GMF 
was its having assisted in the founding (in 1981) and initial sustaining of the Institute for International 
Economics (Washington DC), which was directed by Fred Bergsten and addressed European-American 
economic problems, see KB to Hermann J. Abs, Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 23 
February 1984, ACDP K062/3.  By the end of 1978, the GMF had funded a total of 184 projects to the tun 
of just over $11.4 million (it had by this point received $27 million through its first seven annual 
installments from 1972-78 with the remainder going, for instance, towards administration, program/project 
development and, most significantly, investments), with total grants for budget year 1978-79 anticipated to 
be $3.055 million.  On not all the expectations of the GMF having been fulfilled in its first years but f ture 
prospects being better today than several years ago, see the report on “Die Deutsche Marshall Stiftung, 
1972-1979,” ACDP K078/1.  For further information othe activities of the GMF during the 1970s, see the 
report on The German Marshall Fund of the United States (1972-75), ACDP K078/1; the GMF Report on 
Current Activities, May 1975, ACDP K078/1; the GMF Report on Current Activities, February 1976, 
ACDP K078/1; the GMF Report on Current Activities, May 1976, ACDP K078/1; the GMF Report on 
Current Activities, November 1976, ACDP K078/1; and the GMF Report on Current Activities, September 
1977, ACDP K078/1.   
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by initiating, encouraging and financing pertinent projects within and between the two 
countries, including research and the resulting publications; professorships, bursaries and 
other awards; mutual visits and exchange programs; s well as lectures, courses of study, 
exhibitions and meetings.  In the process, the AGF played a vital role, at times jointly 
with the GMF, in funding Atlanticist activities like the Königswinter Conferences.94  For 
all of Birrenbach’s criticism, especially of the GMF, such new financing institutions 
possessed some clearly positive features for him and undeniable significance for German 
Atlanticism as a whole, not least in so far as they promoted an intensified and broader 
form of that phenomenon, as amply reflected in personnel, perspectives and themes.95   
                                                
94 As of April 1975, the foundation’s patrons were Prince Philip (United Kingdom) and Bundespräsident 
Walter Scheel (Federal Republic).  The British Trustee  were Sir Roger William Jackling (Chairman); Sir 
David Haven Barran (Vice Chairman); Lady Gaitskell; Dr. Francis Edgar Jones (FRS); Rt. Hon. Lord 
Feather; and Prof. William Grigor McClelland.  The S cretary-General was Peter McGregor.  The AGF 
took a particular interest in the fields of economics, commerce, science, technology, sociology and the arts.  
Among the themes addressed were the working conditis of those engaged in industry (e.g. safety, healt , 
welfare); labor-management relations; work satisfaction; as well as pollution and other hazards associated 
with industry.  See, for example, Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, Proposed 
Programme, Fourth Edition, April 1975, ACDP K103/2.  On the AGF providing key funding for the 1977 
Königswinter Conference, see the Memorandum about the Annual DEG Member Assembly of 19 April 
1978, Malkasten, Düsseldorf, ACDP K105/1.       
95 Thus, the broader Atlanticism (and referring here not only to its German version) advanced by the GMF 
often dealt with hitherto unexplored subjects and also engaged in some capacity, for instance, officials and 
civil servants of the national states as well as of international organizations like the European Communities 
(e.g. the EC Commission) or the OECD (e.g. the OECD’s “Interfutures” research group) rooted in 
departments focusing on areas like anti-trust, revenue-sharing, energy, and myriad fields typically 
considered domestic in nature (e.g. Dietrich Sperling, the parliamentary state secretary in Bonn’s 
Bundesministerium für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau); leading personalities from state and local 
levels of politics, government and administration (e.g. Manfred Rommel, mayor of Stuttgart); as well as 
environmentalists, urban planners, and other previously non-existent or neglected experts.  Such breadth 
also manifested itself in the variety of institutions involved in GMF funding activities, in many cases far 
transcending Birrenbach’s immediate circle, among them city associations (e.g. the US-European 
International Urban Technology Exchange Program); universities (e.g. the Stanford University Graduate 
School of Business); scholarly associations (e.g. the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher 
Education); labor unions (the Swedish Trade Union Organization); research centers (e.g. the Institute for 
Environmental Action (NY); the Vera Institute of Justice (New York City)); public interest groups (e.g. the 
National Center for Resource Recovery (Washington DC)); and media outlets (e.g. “Bill Moyers’ Journal: 
International Report”; the “Atlantic Dateline” radio program; and the International Writers Service).  The 
expanding scope of Atlanticism was further reflected in the presence on the GMF Board of Trustees of 
figures like Russell Train (President, World Wildlife Fund (US), Washington DC); Marian Wright Edelman 
(Director, Children’s Defense Fund, Washington DC); Bernard Gifford (as of 1975: Deputy Chancellor, 
New York City Board of Education; as of 1979: Residnt Scholar, Russell Sage Foundation, New York 




F. New Publications: Interplay 
The difficult economic situation manifested itself with respect to the fate of a 
significant publication effort in which Birrenbach was involved, namely the founding of 
an Atlanticist intellectual journal bearing the rather unfortunate name Interplay.96  The 
international monthly, which was “wholly owned and supported by a small group of 
distinguished and liberal-minded (and wealthy) individual Americans” and whose first 
regular issue appeared in June 1967, was aimed at a relatively narrow circle of educated, 
affluent readers.97  Interplay was published by Birrenbach’s contact Gerard Smith until 
he became head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1969.  Its editor-in-
chief, operating out of Manhattan, was the influential, British-born journalist Anthony 
Hartley, previously of The Economist, Encounter, and The Spectator.98  Another regular 
Birrenbach contact, François Duchêne (UK), also formerly of The Economist, was the 
European Editorial Representative.  From the start, Birrenbach served on the multi-
                                                                                                                                      
The German Marshall Fund and the Anglo-German Foundation were among several measures 
undertaken by the Federal Republic around this timeintended to contribute during the 1970s and 80s to 
strengthening trans-Atlantic relations, including “the understanding between the partners” on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  For instance, to enhance the effectiv ness of the German-American Fulbright “scholarly” 
exchange program, the federal government increased its share in the financing from DM 2 million to DM 
3.5 million per year.  To reinforce the cooperation between American and German research institutes, th  
government decided to annually contribute DM 5 million for an exchange program of “highly qualified” 
American and German natural scientists.  Meanwhile, th  Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft 
pledged to supplement the government contribution by DM 2.5 million annually, with the additional means 
being used for the exchange of representatives of the humanities.  On all this, see the Bulletin of 7 June 
1972, Nr. 83, p. 1141, ACDP K114/1.   
96 To Birrenbach’s credit, he (along with some others) di liked the title of the journal and preferred the
earlier name, Intercontinental Review. 
97 See the unidentified article on I terplay in ACDP K209/1.  Interplay actually appeared ten times a year. 
98 Hartley had been a contributing editor at Encounter and deputy editor at The Spectator. 
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national Editorial Advisory Board, a body naturally stacked with other Atlanticists.99  
Interplay was a journal of news and informed opinion from around the world that 
embraced the general Atlanticist thesis of “interdependence.”  At least initially, it focused 
on trans-Atlantic affairs, including international but also relevant domestic issues.  The 
articles dealt with a wide variety of subjects within this extensive field and featured 
authors from a broad national range, for instance Germans such as Golo Mann and Theo 
Sommer.100  For those involved in or simply observing the venture, Interplay seemed a 
valuable instrument to influence international opinion and, especially, to encourage 
closer, more cooperative trans-Atlantic relations at a time when those relations seemed to 
be deteriorating.101  To Birrenbach, Interplay represented a “bridge between Europe and 
the United States” and a worthwhile aid to their overarching “common cause.”102 
Birrenbach assisted the journal in a number of ways in his capacity as a member 
of the Editorial Advisory Board.  His Atlanticist-oriented expertise in European-
American relations was important to a periodical devot d, at least at first, to this subject, 
enabling him to submit useful comments and ideas on authors and content.  Functioning 
in one of his typical roles as a gatekeeper, Birrenbach helped recruit other Germans to 
join the magazine in various capacities, for instance Marion Gräfin Dönhoff as a member 
                                                
99 The German members of the editorial board included Birrenbach, Marion Gräfin Dönhoff and Helmut 
Schmidt.  Among the participants from other countries were George Ball and Christian Herter Jr. (United 
States); Max Kohnstamm (Netherlands); Kenneth Younger (Britain); and Marc Ullmann (France).  The 
first meeting of the Editorial Advisory Board occurred in Washington (DC) in January 1968, with a few 
people from the government and press also invited. 
100 Golo Mann published an article on Adenauer in the first regular issue.  Sommer was among those 
providing reports from the major capitals in Europe, in his case Bonn.  Some editions of the journal focused 
on particular themes, for example “the multinational corporation.”  
101 This was, for instance, Smith’s own conception of the endeavor. 
102 KB to Gerard Smith, “personal and private,” 6 October 1969, ACDP K209/1. 
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of the EAB and Theo Sommer as a regular writer.103  He was also able to pass judgment 
and offer suggestions on other prospective writers and EAB members, for instance 
approving of Helmut Schmidt’s joining the EAB, though not having actually had a hand 
in recruiting him.  Birrenbach was well positioned to give advice, or at least to locate 
experts who could provide such advice, regarding the peculiarities of the marketing and 
sale of the journal in the Federal Republic.104  His wide network of contacts enabled him 
to bring Interplay to the attention of influential individuals and publications in West 
Germany that would be particularly interested in such an organ.  Birrenbach supplied the 
journal with the membership lists (including contact information) of certain Atlanticist 
organizations to assist in direct mail solicitations for subscribers in the Federal Republic 
and himself worked to find such subscribers.105  Thus, Birrenbach played a significant 
role in establishing a “fire base” for Interplay in West Germany, a central country of 
concern for the journal both thematically and in business terms.  However, perhaps most 
vitally, Birrenbach was expected to, and did, employ his knowledge of and connections in 
the Wirtschaft (especially industry) to aid in securing funding, chiefly corporate support 
via advertising.  Indeed, it was hoped that, above all multinational, corporations would 
view such backing of Interplay as being in their own enlightened self-interest. 
Despite some episodic successes, the existence of Interplay was generally a 
financially troubled one.106  During its start-up period, the journal struggled with limited 
                                                
103 A duly compensated Sommer wrote short pieces four or five times a year aiming to give readers a sense 
of “the outlook” from Bonn (the same was done from France, Britain and Italy by other suitable authors).   
104 Such marketing issues included advertising, appearance, pricing, circulation and subscriptions, with a 
stress on identifying how these aspects differed in the Federal Republic from the United States. 
105 For instance, at Smith’s request, Birrenbach provided the names and addresses of the members of the 
DGAP.  In general, businesspeople, rather than, say, intellectuals, were particularly coveted as subscri ers 
due to the interest they generated amongst major advertisers.  
106 A specific episode deemed a success was the ordering by the West German embassy in the United States 
of two thousand copies of “the Gittler piece” that d appeared in the third issue, along with the cover f 
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subscription income and the difficulties of attracting advertising for such a new and still 
small-circulation review.  Therefore, the journal operated during this time at a very large 
deficit, only part of which was covered by Smith and his financial partners.107  In 
December 1968, in a desperate effort to attract a wider readership and more advertising, 
Interplay even modified its scope and subtitle, with Birrenbach’s approval, from “The 
Magazine of European/American Affairs,” to “The Magazine of International Affairs” 
even as it continued to dedicate much attention to trans-Atlantic relations.  Unfortunately 
for the magazine, Birrenbach found it significantly more difficult than he had expected to 
locate funding for this venture.  Taken as a whole, his approaches in this matter to West 
German industry, including but not limited to the st el industry, as well as to the 
foundations, especially the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, resulted in failure.108   Moreover, 
with his party out of government from October 1969 on, it became considerably more 
difficult for Birrenbach to obtain funding for an undertaking like Interplay through 
approaches to the Bundespresseamt.  Doubting the journal’s financial viability in its 
current format but offering a positive assessment of its content and mission, Birrenbach 
proposed, at various points in time, turning I terplay into a quarterly or linking it to an 
American non-profit organization.109  Finally, in 1971, Interplay, as a result of its dire 
                                                                                                                                      
the magazine and subscription blanks, for mailing to various people it believed would be interested (Gerard 
Smith to KB, 6 November 1967, ACDP K209/1.   
107 Subscribers were primarily located in the United States (10% in Europe as of September 1967, aiming 
for 30%).  The target was 50,000 overall subscribers y 1971-72.  For these and additional figures, see th  
Memorandum for the Advisory Board, Progress Report on INTERPLAY Magazine, from Gerard Smith, 20 
September 1967, ACDP K209/1 and Gerard Smith to KB, 31 January 1968, ACDP K209/1.   
108 Birrenbach pointed out that the steel industry rarely, if ever, advertised in the press and especially not in 
such a “sophisticated” magazine (KB to Gerard Smith, 21 March 1968, ACDP K209/1).  The allure of the 
Stiftung Volkswagenwerk here was that its by-laws were “somewhat more flexib ” than those of the 
Thyssen Stiftung (KB to Gerard Smith, “personal and private,” 6 October 1969, ACDP K209/1).   
109 For example, KB to Gerard Smith, “personal and private,” 6 October 1969, ACDP K209/1 and KB to 
Gerard Smith, 13 March 1969, ACDP K209/1.  
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financial straits which a frustrated Birrenbach found himself unable to contribute 
sufficiently to overcoming, was forced to merge with another magazine.110 
G. New Meeting Places: The German-American Parliamentary Group 
In addition to new financing instruments and publications, the world of German 
Atlanticism also saw efforts during the early 1970s to establish new institutions designed 
to bring Atlanticist-minded individuals together and to create lasting contacts between 
them.  One such effort, albeit abortive, in which Birrenbach was centrally engaged during 
this time was that with regard to the construction of a German-American parliamentary 
group.  In the fall of 1970, Birrenbach had been placed in charge of conducting the 
“negotiations” pertaining to the formation of such institutional contacts by Bundestag 
President Kai-Uwe von Hassel, with whom the idea had originated.  The aim of this 
undertaking was to create a permanent contact between th  members of the Bundestag 
and the Congress in the hopes of thus contributing to the closing of postulated 
“communication holes” in the German-American relationship.  A particular sense of 
urgency was imparted to the project as a result of the perceived need to balance in this 
fashion the extension of parliamentary contacts eastward that also occurred in the early 
1970s.  The Federal Republic maintained such parliamentarian groups for almost all of its 
“partners” in NATO and the EEC, and Birrenbach for one, therefore, considered it 
“unnatural” if such an all-party group were not formed vis-à-vis its “principal ally,” the 
United States.111  The thorny aspect of this endeavor and the main topic of discussion was 
the founding of the American counterpart group, for official American parliamentary 
groups, resting on an Act of Congress, existed for only the neighboring states of Canada 
                                                
110 KB to Gerard Smith, 16 February 1971, ACDP K209/1.   
111 KB to Wayne Hays, House of Representatives, cc: Sparkman and Botschaftsrat Wolff, 30 March 1971, 
ACDP K142/2. 
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and Mexico.  While Birrenbach did not expect an Actof Congress, he insisted that an 
American group had to be at least somewhat equivalent to its German complement, 
evincing a certain level of organization encompassing at minimum a chairman and 
secretariat.  As he put it, he had no desire for a purely “Neckermann-Unternehmen.”112 
Birrenbach’s efforts in this direction dragged on fr several years.  During that 
period, his key contacts in this matter consisted of the German embassy in the United 
States, including Amb. Rolf Pauls; David Abshire, formerly of the CSIS and now the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; and leading members of both 
houses of Congress, including Wayne Hays and John Sparkman.113  Birrenbach did not 
believe that the responsibility for the prolonged nature of this process necessarily was to 
be placed at the doorstep of the German side.  While he immediately received a positive 
response in the House, this was from the undesired “N ckermann perspective,” and while 
by November 1972 there was a readiness in principle in the Senate, here the question of 
financing remained unclear.  With respect to this issue of funding, Birrenbach rejected 
multiple requests for financing from a German Stiftung, seeing this not only as a violation 
of their statutes but also as harmful to the spirit of the group.  Over the course of these 
years, Birrenbach repeatedly expressed his pessimism regarding the project, particularly 
with respect to the founding of the American counterpart group.114  Indeed, Birrenbach’s 
contacts with members of the Senate and with Abshire imparted to him the distinct 
impression that the members of the Congress preferred a relatively loose link, looser than 
                                                
112 KB to Konteradmiral Herbert Trebesch, Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 16 November 1972, ACDP K027/1.  
As of this point (November 1972), an American-British group had been formed several years ago, financed 
by one of the “great” American foundations but limiting itself only to visits and a single annual meeting, 
while an American-Japanese group later came into being on a similar basis after Birrenbach had initiated 
his own efforts.  Ultimately, Birrenbach hoped for s mething more from a German-American group.  
113 Hays was a Democratic Representative from Ohio.  Sparkman was a Democratic Senator from Alabama.   
114 Rolf Pauls, the West German ambassador in the United S ates at the time, shared this outlook. 
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he desired at any rate, between a German group in the Bundestag and the Foreign Affairs 
Committees of the two houses of the Congress.  By March 1972, sensing that his earlier 
doubts would prove justified but prior to the ultimate failure of his efforts, Birrenbach 
consoled himself with the thought that they had lived without such a group “not too 
badly” for twenty years thanks to existing institutions like the NATO Parliamentarians 
Conference.115  Birrenbach’s endeavors in this matter appear to have eventually simply 
dissipated without an explicit, definitive rejection from either side.    
H. New Meeting Places: Mid-Atlantic Clubs 
 A new Atlanticist institution that did appear during the first half of the 1970s, 
albeit only briefly in the Federal Republic, was the network of Mid-Atlantic Clubs.  The 
concept of these small, private, experimental, peculiarly Anglo-Saxon entities and the 
impetus for their establishment came from James Huntley, who had also played a driving 
role in the creation of the Atlantic Institute.  The first MAC, inaugurated in London in 
October 1970, was followed in succeeding years by clubs in other key cities of the 
“Atlantic region.”  These staged periodic meetings on a diversity of trans-Atlantic issues, 
usually comprising informal, off-the-record discussions among the members, preceded by 
short speeches of prominent “experts.”116  Drawing from the cities in which they were 
                                                
115 This quote is actually contained already in KB to David Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional 
Relations, Department of State, Washington DC, 15 March 1971, ACDP K142/2.   
116 Attendance at MAC meetings seems to have ranged from around twenty-five to somewhat more than 
fifty.  Such gatherings were typically held at a variety of sites, among them hotels.  For the London MAC 
staging its meetings in a private room at the Royal Automobile Club, see Notes on the Organization of 
Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 
1972, ACDP K068/1.  On the Brussels MAC conducting its first meeting at the Société Royale Belge des 
Ingénieurs et Industriels, see the Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, 
dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1.  Club meetings deally consisted of simple, pleasant, sociable, 
relatively unstructured study-luncheons (often with drinks beforehand) in which members and, at least 
sometimes, guests confronted timely current or emerging themes and problems of a security, political, 
economic or social nature (for instance, Eurodollars and other monetary matters, the “energy squeeze,” the 
environment, and the “fair society”).  By providing for regular and frequent contact (the London MAC 
about 7-9 times a year, basically monthly with some breaks), the clubs enabled participants to explore such 
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located, each MAC boasted a “high-quality,” international membership from a wide array 
of professions, backgrounds and experiences, aspiring in this regard to be a microcosm of 
the Atlantic Community itself.117  Such a composition encouraged a range of perspectives 
and enabled a broader dissemination of the thoughts expressed.  As groups, the members 
did not arrive at unified positions on the topics addressed, nor did they explicitly seek to 
influence government policies.118  While politicians were among the members, the clubs 
                                                                                                                                      
subjects at a suitably elevated level of sophistication and depth.  The closed nature of the functions, with 
remarks not intended for attribution or publication, facilitated frank discussion.  Speakers (some of whom 
were members, others outside guests) at the London MAC included J. Robert Schaetzel (US Ambassador to 
the European Communities in Brussels) on 29 October 1970 about “The Implications for the Trans-Atlantic 
Relationship of the Enlargement of the European Communities”; Max Kohnstamm (Deputy Chairman of 
the Monnet Committee; Director of the EC Institute for University Studies, Brussels) on 19 October 1971 
about “The Crisis in European-American Relations”; Albert Weitnauer (the Swiss Ambassador) on 1 
February 1972 about “The Role of the EFTA Countries in European Integration”; and Sir Reay Geddes 
(Chairman of Dunlop-Pirelli) on 24 July 1972 about “Business in the Atlantic Society.”  The interest in 
American voices rooted outside the US Northeast is intimated, for example, by William Pearce (Vice 
President of Cargill Inc. (Minneapolis, MN); Member of President Nixon’s Commission on International 
Trade and Investment Policy) speaking on 19 February 1971 at the London MAC about “American 
Agriculture and the Enlargement of the Common Market.”  
117 Given the pool of qualified potential participants, the membership of each club tended to exhibit at least 
a large plurality of, and in some cases was dominated by, figures from the country in which it was based.  
Swiss and Swedes were also to be found among the European members.  Chosen by the MACs themselves, 
the members of these institutions were trumpeted as leading, “responsible” individuals of “goodwill” with a 
keen interest in trans-Atlantic affairs, comprising a multi-professional public and private cross-section hat 
included government officials, civil servants and diplomats; parliamentarians and other politicians; 
industrialists, bankers and assorted businessmen; lawyers; journalists and further mass media personalities; 
scholars and educators; figures involved in the many associations and research institutes; and even some
artists (e.g. Yehudi Menuhin in London).  Among thevital criteria in assessing the feasibility of a MAC in 
a specific city was the existence of a sustainable enthusiasm among a sufficient number of suitable people 
there, especially a willingness to attend gatherings and to perform the organizing and administrative work.     
118 On the other hand, members might do so in an individual capacity.  As groups, the MACs hoped to 
exhibit a tangible impact by constructively molding perceptions among leadership groups and thus 
indirectly strengthening the crucial, mutually beneficial trans-Atlantic bonds and cooperation.  For the
MACs being firmly based on the belief that consequential decisions and actions in international affairs 
were taken not only at the governmental level but also t many other levels, including those of busineses, 
universities and further “private bodies,” see Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. 
Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1.  For the 
MACs striving for the development of a “fellowship based on the gradual growth of a sense of common 
purpose, a broad consensus about the nature of the transatlantic tie and its importance,” see James Huntley 
to KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2.  On the formation of the MACs being 
rooted in the conviction that “a working consensus across borders, among those who shape and make 
important decisions” was necessary to ensure the cosi n and functioning of “the maturing transatlantic 
economy-society-polity,” see The Mid-Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North American 
Consensus, 22 November 1970, ACDP K130/1. 
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were intended to be non-partisan.119  Despite the distances involved, the MACs aimed to 
maintain close communication and cooperation with one another, thus promoting a larger 
dialogue.120  Exceedingly “lean” institutions, the MACs were directly linked with, even 
reliant on, other Atlanticist organizational elements, both in terms of personnel and 
infrastructure.121  Financing for the clubs was quite modest, ultimately coming, to some 
                                                
119 The origins of at least the London and New York MACs demonstrate a distinct absence of political 
parties in the process of their creation.  The London MAC was started by a self-constituted executive 
committee of three Americans, including James Huntley, a diplomat (Stanley Cleveland), and a 
businessman, and four Britons, among them the head of the National Coal Board (Derek Ezra), a 
businessman, and a banker (RJ Clark) (The Mid-Atlantic Clubs, June 1971, ACDP K066/2).  As of 
November 1970, the London MAC executive committee also included François Duchêne (The Mid-
Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North American Consensus, 22 November 1970, ACDP 
K130/1).  As of July 1971, the planning in New York City was thus far being spearheaded by two Standard 
Oil executives, who might also associate with them an Italian currently working for the Ford Foundation, 
Alfred Neal (Committee on Economic Development), and o e or two European businessmen living at the 
time in New York (James Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2).   
120 Therefore, even with all their considerable autonomy, the MACs exhibited some patently centralizing 
features, as well.  In addition to being loosely connected by a common organizational and procedural 
concept, there existed a correspondence between the chairmen and secretaries of the various MACs, an 
exchange of discussion summaries and a degree of programmatic and thematic coordination.  In May 1973, 
the London, Paris and New York MACs held special, separate meetings to discuss US National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger’s “Atlantic Charter” speech of 23 April 1973.  The MACs also staged certain 
“All-Club Events,” for instance the first meeting of fficers representing all the MACs on 27 March 1973 
in Amsterdam, which included reports from each club and a discussion on general club policies.  Moreover, 
Huntley hoped that sometime in late Spring 1974 each MAC could dispatch two or more representatives to 
a two-day meeting to discuss the MAC network and its fu ure, program cooperation, as well as one or tw 
current substantive topics, and to elect a network chairman, vice chairman and secretary (Annual Progress 
Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1).  Also as 
of November 1973, there were plans for a modest central office and central fund to facilitate the imperative 
coordination and development of the MAC network for at least a three-year period (1974-76).  Largely in 
his post of MAC Network Secretary, Huntley fostered virtually all of these cooperative facets, keeping 
officers, members and friends of the MAC network (including Birrenbach) apprised of the personnel, 
activities and plans of that network and of the individual clubs, all the while offering as well as requesting 
advice and suggestions, for instance with respect to po ential members of future MACs.   
121 Most significantly, the Atlantic Institute demonstrated a marked benevolence towards the MACs.  For 
instance, the AI and the Atlantic Council of the United States acted, at least early on, as central offices, 
receiving and expending all funds, maintaining special accounts and rendering periodic reports.  On the AI, 
according to John Tuthill (Director General), being unable as of April 1971 to help finance the organizing 
work but willing to take the “important” step of accepting contributions earmarked for the “promotion” f 
the MACs, see Huntley to KB, 13 April 1971, ACDP K066/2.  On this appreciation for the MAC idea 
extending to the AI Policy Committee, see again Huntley to KB, 13 April 1971, ACDP K066/2.  The 
informal quality of the MACs was reflected in their organizational arrangements, with the London MAC, 
for example, not being legally incorporated, lacking a written constitution and, as of April 1972, nothaving 
had elections to choose its officers (the members con idering this unnecessary).  Without their own 
exclusive personnel, the MACs were run on a part-time basis by well-known Atlanticists in each location, 
themselves often tightly connected with other Atlanticist-minded institutions.  Such personalities included 
Derek Ezra (Chairman of the London MAC; Chairman of the UK National Coal Board); Sir Kenneth 
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extent, from the participants themselves as well as from a variety of American-based 
sources: the US government; business corporations; f undations; assorted organizations; 
and certain individuals.122  For Huntley and other advocates, the MAC represent d an 
                                                                                                                                      
Younger (Chairman of the London MAC, having succeeded Ezra in Fall 1972; former head of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs); George Franklin (Chairman of the New York City MAC; Council on 
Foreign Relations, including former Executive Director); Zygmunt Nagorski (Secretary of the New York 
City MAC; member of the CFR staff); Dr. Lincoln Gordon (Chairman of the Washington MAC; Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars); Henri Bonnet (Chairman of the Paris MAC; former French 
ambassador to the US); and Prof. André Vlerick (Chairm n of the Brussels MAC; head of the Business 
School of the University of Ghent, former Belgian Fi ance Minister).   
Quite early on, the Mid-Atlantic Clubs were already eyeing an expanded collaboration with fellow 
Atlanticist organizations.  At the “All-MAC” meeting of 27 March 1973 in Amsterdam, the “means of 
cooperation” with such “bodies” as the Atlantic Institute and the Trilateral Commission were considere 
and, as of November 1973, the AI and TC were among the institutions examining the possibility of using 
the MACs as “sounding-boards” to air policy-oriented draft proposals.  For Huntley speculating that the 
MACs could serve as a forum where governments and private research groups might “float a trial balloon” 
(“important new ideas”), see the Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, 
dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1.  On Huntley, and perhaps the AI itself, envisaging an AI-MAC 
cooperation that would broaden the AI’s “capacity to draw on the ideas of concerned people in major 
centers” and, in turn, would provide the latter with “access to experts” engaged with items on the “trans-
Atlantic agenda,” see The Mid-Atlantic Clubs, June 1971, ACDP K066/2.  On the AI having arranged for 
Prof. Dr. Gardener Ackley (University of Michigan, former member of the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisors), Rapporteur of an AI study on inflation, to lead a discussion on that topic (“Inflation: 
A Transatlantic Problem”) at the London MAC in May 1971, see again The Mid-Atlantic Clubs, June 1971, 
ACDP K066/2.  Similarly, on 9 March 1972, Pierre Uri (Counselor for Studies at the Atlantic Institute and 
Professor at the University of Paris) spoke at the London MAC on “Monetary Policy: The United States 
and Europe.”  Indeed, for Huntley regarding the MACs as essentially “complementary” to the AI, see 
Huntley to KB, 13 April 1971, ACDP K066/2.  On the AI also willing to offer substantial assistance to a 
potential Rome MAC, see the Memorandum on the Possibility of Founding a MAC in Rome, by James R. 
Huntley, Secretary of the Network of MACs, 30 August 1972, ACDP K068/1.  Likewise, with respect to 
future MACs in North America, Huntley claimed to have the backing of Adolph Schmidt (US Ambassador 
to Canada); Martin Hillenbrand (US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs); as well as a number 
of private personalities, among them several at the ACUS like W. Randolph Burgess and Theodore 
Achilles (Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2).      
122 The funding of the MACs was decentralized in nature, with each club responsible for its own financing.  
As of 6 December 1973, the New York MAC was the only one with paid memberships, with fees set on a 
sliding scale for businessmen, diplomats and academics (from most to least) and having resulted in a 
treasury of about $4,000 (Huntley, Network Secretary, Memo to all Chairmen and Secretaries of MACs, 6 
December 1973, ACDP K068/1 and Huntley, MAC Network Secretary, Memo to Officers of MACs, 
regarding MACs in North America, 4 October 1973, ACDP K068/1).  Aside from the members themselves, 
sources for the requisite MAC funding encompassed th  US Information Service, the US mission to the 
EC, the US delegation to NATO, Exxon Inc., the First National City Bank, the Insurance Company of 
North America, the German Marshall Fund, the North Atlantic Foundation (New York), the Hugh Moore 
Fund, the Batelle Memorial Institute, Mrs. St. John Garwood, and an anonymous source (via the ACUS).  
As of June 1971, the London MAC did not pay fees to nor cover the expenses of its “discussion-openers” 
and had no paid secretariat, its executive committee sharing in the “housekeeping” tasks (The Mid-Atlantic 
Clubs, June 1971, ACDP K066/2).  As of April 1972, the officers of the London MAC served gratis, and 
some of the incidental costs of the organization (e.g. postage, printing) had been “absorbed” by their own 
offices (Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of 
the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1).  Thus, H. Walter Lessing’s office provided 
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effective means to broaden transnational communication nd understanding and to 
expand the elite trans-Atlantic network.123   
The idea of a German Mid-Atlantic Club was first brought to Birrenbach’s 
attention in November 1970 by Sir Frank Roberts, a member of the London MAC.124  
Seeking advice in this matter, Roberts had initially pproached Fritz Neef of the BDI 
Secretarial Office in London who, along with the BDI’s Hellmuth Wagner in Cologne, 
had agreed that Birrenbach was the most suitable person in the Federal Republic for 
Roberts to contact with such a proposal.  At a meeting arranged between Roberts and 
Birrenbach at Neef’s house in November 1970, it wassuggested to Birrenbach that he 
create such a “talk circle” in the Federal Republic and that he establish links between the 
British and German MACs.  Huntley and H. Walter Lessing, both of whom Roberts was 
                                                                                                                                      
essential clerical services to the London MAC cost-free (Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 
1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1).  Nevertheless, on the difficulties of some 
MACs (among them the Washington DC MAC) with respect to finances, see again the Annual Progress 
Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1.  For 
Huntley’s efforts to obtain contributions for the exp nses he incurred (e.g. travel) in his work to organize 
the MACs (anywhere from $10,000 to $17,000 per year), including to prod “the Thyssen Company” (not 
the foundation), he hoped with Birrenbach’s help, to make an initial contribution of $3,000 to $5,000 and to 
persuade the Atlantica to provide financial support for the MACs as well as for EURNAC (Huntley had 
also proposed this to Walter Stahl), see Huntley to KB, 13 April 1971, ACDP K066/2.  Among other 
potential sources of such MAC funding, Huntley here cit d H. Walter Lessing, a member of the London 
club who had made a tentative financial commitment in the range of $1,000-$2,000; Standard Oil of New 
Jersey at probably $5,000 a year; and IBM at possibly $5,000 a year.  As of November 1973, there was an 
intensive financing effort with regard to the planned MAC central office and central fund, with 
contributions sought from North American and European sources (not the clubs themselves), including 
individuals and businesses not connected with the MACs as well as foundations and governments (Annual 
Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1).   
123 The founders of the London club had chosen the somewhat puzzling “Mid-Atlantic” designation to 
signify their desire to look at common “trans-Atlantic” problems “from some hypothetical halfway point  
the great Ocean” (to achieve “a meeting of minds betwe n Europe and North America”) (Notes on the 
Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club 
of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1).  At this point (April 1972), Huntley considered the MACs more 
necessary than ever in light of the serious “Atlantic” issues emerging from major “developments” with 
fundamental “international repercussions” and indicative of “impending change” (e.g. the signing of the
Treaty of Rome by Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland; the “crises” experienced by the American and 
other economies; President Nixon’s trips to Peking a d Moscow; Bonn’s Ostpolitik; discussions about 
mutual balanced force reductions and a European security onference; questions about the maintenance of 
US troops in Europe; aid to and trade with “less-developed countries”; and the “world ecology crisis”).   
124 Roberts was a former British ambassador to the Fedral Republic (1963-68) and active in Atlanticist 
institutions such as the Atlantic Institute. 
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in close contact with, also encouraged the founding of a German counterpart to the 
London MAC.  The Mid-Atlantic Club that Birrenbach reated, the second founded 
overall after that in London, first convened on 29 March 1971 in the Tulpenfeld complex 
in Bonn.  Birrenbach saw the considerable potential of the group in that it would examine 
and help surmount the complex trans-Atlantic military, political and economic problems 
that currently festered or potentially loomed between the United States and a possibly 
expanded EEC (embracing Britain among other new entrants) and that might impair their 
future cooperation.  This would be undertaken within t e larger framework of efforts 
pursued in the same direction by government, parliament, Wirtschaft and press, and 
perhaps in cooperation with them.125  Birrenbach received generally positive responses 
from almost all those he addressed, about twenty in total, regarding their readiness to 
enter such a talk circle.126  Members and participants in the group’s discussions ncluded 
personalities from politics, government ministries, the Wirtschaft and the press, as well as 
the American ambassador and figures from the European Commission.127  The Bonn 
MAC was not supported in any way by outside organiztions, rather its functions were of 
a strictly personal nature and, therefore, each member assumed the costs for himself.   
                                                
125 Birrenbach Memo of 11 December 1970, ACDP K130/1.  To Birrenbach, this appeared all the more 
“urgent” as “for the first time” in the United States a “certain anxiety [Besorgnis]” was being expressed 
(especially in connection with the Mills Trade Bill) regarding the potential expansion of the EEC, in 
particular the entrance of Britain.  This conjured up fears of the further impairment of the world free-trade 
system (GATT) at a time when Europe did not appear to be advancing towards political unification.  A 
“protectionist development” in the United States that the EEC failed to hinder could also acutely 
complicate European-American political and military relations, not least with respect to the crucial problem 
of the presence of US troops in Europe.  Similarly reflecting such concerns, the Monnet Committee called 
in its meeting of 24 February 1971 for the creation of a permanent organ enabling steady consultations 
between high-level US and EC representatives on key qu stions.    
126 For instance, from Sigismund von Braun, State Secretary in the Auswärtigen Amt.   
127 These personalities from politics also, of course, encompassed parliamentarians, while those from the 
Wirtschaft included bankers.  Meanwhile, representatives of the relevant government ministries included 
state secretaries and the chiefs of the ministerial departments. 
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Yet while Birrenbach had ostensibly founded a Mid-Atlantic Club, actually apart 
from its name and despite its origins, this Bonn MAC was quite different from the other 
clubs that were created along the lines proposed by Huntley.  The membership of 
Birrenbach’s MAC consisted solely of very high-level Germans and also reflected his 
decidedly partisan conception of such a talk circle.128  While informal, the speeches and 
discussions of the Bonn MAC maintained a stringently confidential character.  Finally, 
Birrenbach’s Mid-Atlantic Club was extremely policy oriented, meeting now and then to 
clarify the state and pending issues of European (EEC)-American relations, identifying 
appropriate courses of action, and unabashedly striving to directly influence West 
German and possibly American policy in this regard.  All of this differentiated 
Birrenbach’s Bonn MAC from the others and rendered it an entity unto itself, effectively 
outside of the MAC network, thus de facto leaving the Federal Republic out of the MAC 
system entirely.129  Although Birrenbach cited a number of reasons that dictated this 
approach, it seems clear that he ultimately had no real desire to create a MAC like the 
others and simply considered his own method to be more effective in achieving the goals 
he had in mind.130  Birrenbach’s virtually sole influence over such matters stemmed from 
                                                
128 Underscoring the partisan nature of this endeavor, Bir enbach even made clear to Huntley that if clubs 
were established in Munich, Hamburg and/or Frankfurt, he would rely in each case on members of his own 
party (Union) from the Bundestag, meaning that the German MACs would all have their roots primarily in 
the CDU-CSU (James Huntley to KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2).   
129 For instance, in view of the rigorously confidential nature of the proceedings (not even any written 
records), it was impossible to invite to meetings anybody from outside the club, as Huntley had envisioned. 
130 Thus, Birrenbach pleaded a lack of time in explaining why his Bonn MAC had little or no contact with 
the other clubs.  For Huntley’s alarmed realization hat Birrenbach’s Bonn MAC (and possibly future 
German MACs) would differ fundamentally from the other clubs, his fear that Birrenbach’s approach to the 
German MAC(s) would undermine their cooperation andcommon purpose with the non-German MACs, 
his grudging recognition that Birrenbach’s MAC was perhaps a valuable (even necessary) undertaking in 
terms of the German situation, his attempt to clear up what he vainly hoped was merely Birrenbach’s 
misunderstanding of the MAC concept, and his desire that at least one MAC somewhere in Germany be 
like the others, see Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2.  On Birrenbach’s blatant disinterest in 
being part of the larger MAC network, in particular his claim that the Bonn group needed “no mediator or 
broker” (i.e. Huntley) to carry out its activities, see again Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2. 
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a situation in which, unlike the other MACs that were already in or later came into 
existence, the Bonn MAC was essentially founded by him alone rather than created and 
shaped by multiple individuals, organized as steering and executive committees.131   
However, Birrenbach’s Bonn MAC was short-lived.  Its second, and final, 
meeting occurred on 21 September 1971, with twenty-six members taking part, a 
seemingly considerable number.132  Although he insisted that the meetings had gone very
well and were more effective than those arranged by most of the other Mid-Atlantic 
Clubs, Birrenbach henceforth shut down the Bonn MAC, for all intents and purposes, 
citing the lacking interest of the parliament in matters of trade, currency and the like.  
Nevertheless, Huntley consistently saw the MAC project developing quite well as a 
whole.133  Within quite a short time, there developed a loose network of similar, affiliated 
                                                
131 Even with Huntley’s central role, the decisions regarding the founding and development of the particular 
MACs were primarily taken by small groups of indigenous and foreign personalities located in the 
individual cities.  Enabling them to adapt the MAC concept to widely diverse environments (e.g. local 
custom and law), these groups retained considerable freedom and flexibility with respect to a variety of 
questions related to organizational patterns and practices such as the maximum size of a given club and the 
specific members invited to join; the selection of officers; possibilities of legal incorporation and of formal 
elections; program, topics and format; the arrangement and frequency of meetings; modes of financing; a d 
languages used (Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-
Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1).   
132 At this meeting of 21 September 1971, Birrenbach provided a short overview about the current 
economic- and currency-political situation.  Talks were then given by Amb. J. Robert Schaetzel (US 
Representative to the European Communities in Brussels), Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf (EC Commissioner) and 
Ministerialdirektor (AA) Dr. Axel Herbst (the latter “from the perspective of Bonn”) on the efforts being 
undertaken between the EEC and the United States in this theme area.  In his introductory Referat, 
Schaetzel pleaded for understanding for President Nixon’s measures of the previous month (August 1971) 
and pointed out that Nixon had stressed in his annul State of the World Report of February 1971 that e 
US-European relationship had to be a genuine partnership, still not fully attained, in which both partners 
had to demonstrate patience (Summary of the Exposition  of Schaetzel, Dahrendorf and Herbst at the 
Meeting of the Mid-Atlantic-Group-Gesprächskreis on 21 September in Bonn, ACDP K130/1).   
133 See, for instance, Huntley to KB, 28 June 1972, ACDP K068/1.  While Huntley admitted that it could 
not yet be asserted (or ruled out) that their activities to this point had at all “changed history” or “even 
altered the thinking or policy of governments,” he offered generally positive assessments of the indivdual 
MACs (e.g. New York: “dynamism and élan”, “the most ac ive and successful of all”; Paris: “vigorous”) as 
well as of the MACs’ overall development and effectiveness in fulfilling their goals (“rapidly becoming 
firmly rooted”), claiming, in part based on his personal conversations, that such enthusiastic judgments 
were shared by numerous other MAC members (see especially the Annual Progress Report on the MACs, 
October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1).  For the waiting list of people 
who had inquired on their own initiative about membership in the London MAC, see Notes on the 
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MACs in major centers around the “Atlantic Rim.”  As of 10 May 1974, Mid-Atlantic 
Clubs existed in London, Washington DC, New York City, Paris (started by John Tuthill 
and Curt Gasteyger of the Atlantic Institute), Brussel  and, a recent addition, San 
Francisco.134  It was not least thanks to the ambitious Huntley, who perceived, at least 
during the early 1970s, promising prospects for a gowth of the MAC network, that 
rumblings could be heard over the years about the founding of more such clubs in both 
North America as well as Europe, with an effort to maintain a certain geographic balance 
between the two.  With respect to the latter, West Germany served as a focal point as 
Huntley entertained the notion of eventually spreading MACs across the Federal 
Republic, with Bonn, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Munich all being mentioned at one time or 
another as potential sites.135  In his attempts to revive a, this time non-partisn, MAC in 
                                                                                                                                      
Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club 
of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1.     
134 The MAC phenomenon highlights the role of extant Atlanticist institutions in facilitating the 
establishment of others.  Here, the personnel of the Atlantic Institute provided considerable assistance.  
Especially Tuthill (Director General), with the encouragement and counsel of Huntley, was involved in 
exploring the possible founding of a Paris MAC, even occupying a place on the steering committee.  For 
Huntley also consulting the AI’s Curt Gasteyger with respect to a potential Paris club, see the 
Memorandum for John Tuthill from James Huntley on the Possibilities for Organizing a MAC in Paris, 
copies to T. Achilles, K. Birrenbach, N. Campbell, D. Ezra, HW Lessing, AW Schmidt and S. Stamas, 22 
October 1971, ACDP K066/2.  Furthermore, the prior existence of MACs eased the process of establishing 
new ones, with creators able to draw on the experiences and advice of their predecessors.  On officers of 
current MACs being available to assist in any way the founding of new clubs, see Memorandum on the 
Possibility of Founding a MAC in Rome, by James R. Huntley, Secretary of the Network of MACs, 30 
August 1972, ACDP K068/1.  For H. Walter Lessing of the London MAC taking part in the exploration of 
the possibility of founding a Paris club, see again the Memorandum for John Tuthill from James Huntley 
on the Possibilities for Organizing a MAC in Paris, 22 October 1971, ACDP K066/2.  Moreover, to assist 
those contemplating the formation of a club, Huntley drew up and distributed a “handbook” on the 
organization and activities of the MACs, based on the experiences of the London club and on the views of 
those in other cities presently developing MACs (Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by 
James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1).  
135 As of November 1973, the network of five active MACs in London (founded in October 1970 and on 
which the other clubs were patterned), Washington DC (May 1972, with US Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Kenneth Rush as the “discussion-opener” at the first meeting), New York City (December 1972), Paris 
(January 1973), and Brussels (October 1973, with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns as speaker on the 
“State of the Atlantic Alliance” at the first meeting) boasted a total of more than two hundred and fifty 
members (Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, 
ACDP K068/1).  By January 1974, the six existing MACs (here rather optimistically including the 
stagnating Bonn MAC chaired by Birrenbach) totaled about four hundred members.  As of November 
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Bonn, efforts begun at the latest by December 1973, Huntley continued to consult 
Birrenbach and even tapped him as a potential co-chairman or “honorary president” for 
such an undertaking.  However, another Mid-Atlantic Club never appeared in the Federal 
Republic after the fading away of the Bonn MAC.136   
While Birrenbach, and the Federal Republic, might have taken part in the larger 
MAC endeavor only ostensibly and fleetingly, the phenomenon of the Mid-Atlantic 
Clubs deserves a degree of attention in any study of German Atlanticism.  For one thing, 
the MACs enjoyed a certain significance in so far as some Germans did participate in 
their activities, briefly in the Bonn MAC as well as, especially, abroad.137  The MAC 
                                                                                                                                      
1973, Huntley predicted that within another year there would be at least seven or eight MACs and looked to 
a time when a MAC existed in each big city of the Atlantic world, collectively forming “the town meeting 
of the Atlantic Community.”  Other major cities Huntley considered at this time as possible MAC locations 
included Amsterdam, Geneva, Milan, Rome, San Francisco, and Toronto (Annual Progress Report on the 
MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1). 
136 As of November 1973, Huntley acknowledged that the inactive Bonn MAC was no longer meeting but 
noted with cautious optimism that conversations were now taking place about the reconstitution of thatclub 
and that he was carrying out considerable organizing efforts in major cities elsewhere in the Federal 
Republic (e.g. Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg) with indivi uals and steering groups.  Regarding a revived 
Bonn MAC, Huntley consulted Birrenbach (as well as Philip Schmidt-Schlegel of the West German 
consulate in New York and Frank Roberts) about personnel, including the future, respected and non-
partisan chairman.  Huntley hoped to base the future Bonn MAC not only on Birrenbach (as one of two  
honorary presidents, the other a member of the SPD), but also on Karl Kaiser (the new head of the DGAP 
Research Institute), Walther Leisler Kiep (whom Birrenbach had brought Huntley into contact with several 
years ago), and the DGAP itself (of which Birrenbach was, by then, president).  On all this, see the Annual 
Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1; 
as well as The Mid-Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North American Consensus, 22 
November 1970, ACDP K130/1; and Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2.   
137 For instance, a number of Germans living abroad were members of the MACs there, prominent among 
them Curt Heidenreich (Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities), vice chairman of 
the Washington DC club.  On the two German members of the London MAC as of November 1970, see 
The Mid-Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North American Consensus, 22 November 
1970, ACDP K130/1.  Other participants in US-based MACs included Karlfried Normann of Mercedes-
Benz North America (at the New York City MAC); Otto Kaletsch, the West German General Consul (in 
New York City); Karl Carstens (speech on 10 April 1973 at the Washington MAC); EC Commissioner Ralf 
Dahrendorf (speech on 8 June 1973 at the Washington MAC); Jan Reifenberg of the FAZ Washington 
bureau (speech on 27 November 1973 at the New York City MAC); and Berndt von Staden, the German 
ambassador to the United States (speech on 21 March 1974 at the New York City MAC).  Participants at 
the Paris MAC included Alfred Fritsch (Stuttgarter Zeitung-Allgemeine Zeitung); Günter Oehlke, Director, 
Bayer Chimie SARL; and a Dr. Türmer, Director, Robert Bosch France.  As of September 1972, the 
London MAC had planned as its next speaker MdB KarlMoersch on “Germany’s Ostpolitik and the 
Atlantic Relationship” (Summary of the Monthly Discussions of the London MAC, 1971-72, September 
1972, ACDP K130/1).  Also, on 28 June 1972, the London MAC hosted a reception, with Amb. Karl-
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episode also exposes the difficulties confronting such an endeavor in the Federal 
Republic due to its geographic peculiarities.  Namely, it would have proven tricky in any 
case to establish a MAC there akin to those in, for example, London and Paris (or even 
New York) since no West German city was a genuine capital in that sense.  Therefore, it 
was inevitably tougher to find the same proportion of highly qualified foreigners in the 
realms of business, journalism and academics.  In Bonn, for instance, it would have been 
particularly thorny to find foreign businessmen, though diplomats and perhaps some 
academics and press correspondents would have been available.  While Birrenbach, as 
noted, received generally positive responses to his inquiries regarding the founding of a 
German MAC and met with a broad readiness to enter the club, some individuals 
addressed also expressed criticisms regarding the inflation of talk circles and referred to 
the many bodies that had been discussing such issues for years.138  Despite these hints of 
a certain fatigue with respect to further infrastruc ural expansion, the MAC effort 
ultimately demonstrates the ongoing desire among Atlanticists as a whole to build 
institutions and the continued impetus, also that coming from outside the Federal 
Republic, for such initiatives.  The episode highlits as well Birrenbach’s primary 
interest in relentlessly policy-influencing instituons.  Finally, the starkly partisan form 
Birrenbach’s Bonn MAC assumed underscores the unusually sensitive political situation 
                                                                                                                                      
Günther von Hase among those present, for the German parliamentary state secretary in the Auswärtigen 
Amt.  On the other hand, Birrenbach appears never to have taken part in MAC activities abroad.   
138 Otto Wolff von Amerongen, for example, pointed in this regard to “bodies on the most varied levels,” 
among them the DGAP, the Königswinter Conferences, the Atlantik-Brücke and the Atlantic Institute, as 
well as the German group of the International Chamber of Commerce, this last with respect to foreign trade 
(Amerongen to KB, 8 March 1971, ACDP K130/1).  Birrenbach also heard concerns regarding the inflation 
of talk circles from Wilfried Guth (Deutsche Bank Vorstand) and Katharina Focke (Bundeskanzleramt).   
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in the Federal Republic, especially after the embarking on a “new” Ostpolitik that 
persistently and sometimes bitterly divided German Atlanticists from one another.139 
I. New Meeting Places: The Aspen Institute Berlin 
Another effort involving German Atlanticists to shore up frayed relations between 
Europe, including the Federal Republic, and the United States during the first half of the 
1970s was the establishment of the Aspen Institute Berlin in 1974.  This European branch 
represented an expanded overseas presence of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies 
and was linked to the AIHS Program in International Affairs, also begun that year.140  
The AIB primarily received financing from the West Berlin government but enjoyed 
considerable funding as well from private (overwhelmingly German) Stiftungen, 
Unternehmen and individuals, among them the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.141  With 
                                                
139 For more information on MACs, see The Mid-Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North 
American Consensus, 22 November 1970, ACDP K130/1; The Mid-Atlantic Clubs, June 1971, ACDP 
K066/2; Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of 
the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1; and Memorandum for John Tuthill from 
James Huntley on the Possibilities for Organizing a MAC in Paris, copies to T. Achilles, K. Birrenbach, N. 
Campbell, D. Ezra, HW Lessing, AW Schmidt, and S. Stamas, 22 October 1971, ACDP K066/2.   
140 On the AIB, see Volker Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone 
between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
Discussions about such an institution commenced at the latest by March 1970 between Joseph E. Slater 
(President of the AIHS) and J. Robert Schaetzel (US Ambassador to the European Communities in 
Brussels).  Founded in Fall 1949 by the Chicago industrialist (and son of a Prussian immigrant) Walter 
Paepcke (along with several personalities based at the University of Chicago), the AIHS grew out of a 
commemoration that summer in Aspen (Colorado) of Goethe’s 200th birthday, attended by Albert 
Schweitzer, Thomas Mann, José Ortega y Gasset, Thornton Wilder and other world-renowned 
representatives of humanism.  By 1975, though the cor facilities were still located in Aspen, the AIHS 
headquarters was based in New York City, and the institute had expanded its activity into various parts of 
the country, with offices operating in Palo Alto (CA), Boulder (CO), Washington (DC) and Princeton (NJ).  
Harlan Cleveland directed the AIHS Program in Interational Affairs until 1980 out of the Princeton office.  
For the AIHS also maintaining an Aspen Regional Program that sought to deepen the attachment to 
humanistic values throughout the entire United States, see the Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, 
ACDP K191/2.  However, as of June 1980, the AIB remained the only permanent Aspen Institute seminar 
facility outside the US (Harlan Cleveland Report, 18 June 1980, ACDP K191/2).    
141 At least initially, the AIB support from the West Berlin government included DM 2.5 million over four 
years for personnel and administrative costs as well as a plot of land and a rent-free building in a high-class 
residential area on the island of Schwanenwerder in the Havel River, featuring what was described as a
magnificent view over Wannsee.  As of April 1984, approximately two-thirds of the AIB budget derived 
from the West Berlin Senate, while the rest was provided by the above-mentioned Stiftungen, Unternehmen 
and individuals.  Aside from the FTS, these Stiftungen consisted, among others, of the Pressestiftung 
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Birrenbach’s American contact Shepard Stone as director, the AIB staged fifteen to 
twenty conferences per year on a variety of current themes, with a focus on the European-
American relationship and the East-West dialogue.142  Frequent cooperation with fellow 
Atlanticist organizations included the German-American Economic and Finance 
Seminars (on, for instance, trade and currency questions) conducted in Berlin, starting in 
May 1976, with the Atlantik-Brücke and American Council on Germany, each aiming to 
inform as well as to facilitate experience exchanges and personal contacts between 
Führungskräften from the younger generation (35-45 years of age).143  The AIB also 
                                                                                                                                      
Tagesspiegel, the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung, the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, the 
Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft, the Axel Springer Stiftung and the Robert Bosch Stiftung 
GmbH (AIB-Pressemitteilung, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2).   
142 As of 1974-75, the AIB Executive Committee consisted of Robert O. Anderson (Chairman of the AIHS 
Board of Trustees, Chairman of the Atlantic Richfield Company, Los Angeles), Marion Gräfin Dönhoff 
(Publisher of Der Zeit and the sole German among the increasingly international AIHS trustees), Joseph E. 
Slater (President of the AIHS), Shepard Stone, and MdB Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU).  Other members 
of the AIB eV included Sir Alan Bullock (historian, Master of St. Catherine’s College, Oxford); Ralf 
Dahrendorf (Director of the London School of Economics); Richard Löwenthal (Professor at the Free 
University of Berlin); Robert McNamara (President of he World Bank, Washington DC); and Jean-
François Revel (L’Express, Paris).  Meanwhile, the honorary members of the AIB eV comprised Willy 
Brandt (SPD Chairman); Alfons Goppel (Minister-Presid nt of Bavaria); John McCloy (former US High 
Commissioner); Chancellor Helmut Schmidt; and Klaus Schütz (Regierender Bürgermeister of West 
Berlin) (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K19 /2).  Stone had previously been president of the 
International Association for Cultural Freedom (Paris), a private organization with worldwide activities and 
a significant trans-Atlantic character.  Slater hade rlier spent six years in Germany, three as the deputy 
American secretary at the Allied Control Council in Berlin and three as general secretary of the Allied High 
Commission in Bonn.  As of April 1984, the AIB staff (counting the director as well as deputy and research 
directors) came to nine persons in all (AIB-Pressemitteilung, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2).   
143 Participants in the 1st German-American Economic Seminar (twenty per side) hailed from such 
institutions as Deutscher Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank and Hapag-Lloyd as well as First National 
City Bank, IBM, the New York Times, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Standard Oil Company of 
California, and Bethlehem Steel Corporation.  Guests at the 1st German-American Economic Seminar 
included Klaus Schütz (Regierender Bürgermeister of West Berlin), Horst Elfe (President of the Industrie- 
und Handelskammer zu Berlin), and Prof. Kurt Biedenkopf (CDU) along with US Ambassador Martin 
Hillenbrand (all three days), Paul Volcker (President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), John 
McCloy, and John Diebold.  According to Walter Stahl, ll the participants considered this first seminar 
particularly worthwhile, while Hillenbrand characterized it as one of the best seminars in which he had ever 
been involved (Stahl, AB-Mitteilungen, to AB members, 28 May 1976, ACDP K132/1).  For another 
assessment of the 1st German-American Economic Seminar as “excellent,” see the Protocol of the AB-
Vorstand meeting on 14 September 1978, ACDP K134/2.  A second such German-American Economic 
Seminar was planned for 12-15 December 1978 with the number of participants limited to twenty-four 
(twelve per side) because of space considerations.  Karl Klasen (AB) suggested inviting as many qualified 
Berliners as possible to this second seminar and proposed Dieter Hiss (President of the Landeszentralbank 
in Berlin) as German chairman of the function.  As of June 1977, the Atlantik-Brücke was furthermore 
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staged conferences with the DGAP and the Aspen Arms Control Consortium, dealing 
with issues like “Western Security Policy and Arms Control.”144  While Birrenbach did 
not play a role in the founding and leadership of this organization, Stone did keep him 
informed about certain activities, and Birrenbach attended a number of its functions over 
the years, for instance giving a speech at the AIB on 29 September 1977 on “Relations 
between Europe and the United States.”145  Ultimately, the specific endeavors and even 
                                                                                                                                      
encouraging the AIB to stage, under AB auspices, a political seminar in the Federal Republic in Fall 1977,  
in continuation of German-American meetings (essentially nuclear workshops) that had been held in 
Spitzingsee, Princeton, and Woods Hole (Protocol of the AB-Vorstand meeting on 8 June 1977, ACDP 
K134/2).  On the AIB’s interest in the generational question, especially its efforts to invite to its 
conferences “gifted men and women of the younger generation,” see the AIB-Pressemitteilung, 10 April 
1984, ACDP K191/2.  For personalities of “geistiger Autorität” along with “young people” from “all areas 
of society” pondering problems of “peace and social welfare [Wohlfahrt]” at the AIB, see the Brochure on 
the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2.  This brochure d picted the AIHS, as a whole, as being 
characterized by the “engagement of leadership forces and young people.”       
144 By April 1984, the AIB had carried out about 250 conferences with a total of about six thousand 
participants (AIB-Pressemitteilung, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2).  Indicative of the themes addressed 
was the conference planned for May 1984 on “The German Question: The Two German States in the 
Context of the East-West Relations” (AIB-Pressemitteilung, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2).  The Aspen 
Arms Control Consortium was organized and managed by the AIHS Program in International Affairs.  
Conceived of as the nation’s “first team” of academic research units on arms limitation and national 
security policy, the consortium initially comprised Cornell, Harvard, Stanford, MIT and the Aspen Institute 
itself and was then enlarged to include the Brookings Institution, the RAND Corporation and UCLA.  
Funded mostly by the Rockefeller Foundation, the consortium staged three or four major workshops each 
year, while a number of research houses around the world, most of them assisted by the Ford Foundation, 
functioned as active correspondents and, sometimes, participants or even co-sponsors in these workshops.  
As of June 1980, Paul Doty, Director of the Aspen Institute’s Program on Science, Technology and 
Humanism (co-located at Harvard with the JFK School’s Center for Science and International Affairs), 
would be assuming leadership of the consortium.  For Harlan Cleveland’s assessment that the discussions 
of the Arms Control Consortium had “often presaged” shifts in the “postures and policies” of governments, 
see his Report of 18 June 1980, ACDP K191/2.  In a different vein but one that highlights the diversity of 
interests, the AIB program for 1975 included, among ther things, the study group of the Max Planck 
Institute for Molecular Genetics on 8-9 March (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2).  At 
least at the outset, the AIB also maintained a guest program that offered artists and Geisteswissenschaftlern 
(among them, Bullock and the Indonesian author Mochtar Lubis) the chance to stay and work several 
weeks in Berlin (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2).  As part of its efforts to make its 
work accessible to a larger Berlin public, the AIB staged as well the Hans Wallenberg Lecture Series 
(among the speakers: Bullock, Dönhoff, Nahum Goldmann, Pehr Gyllenhammar, Henry Kissinger, Rolf 
Liebermann, Steven Muller, William Norris, Fritz Stern, Daniel Bell and Edzard Reuter), each lecture 
followed the next day by a discussion with Berlin guests at the AIB.   
145 Prior to this, Birrenbach had at least planned to at end an international AIB meeting in Berlin from 29
November-2 December 1976 headed up by Raymond Aron.  Furthermore, Germans (and other Europeans) 
also participated in seminars at the AIHS itself.  For example, Birrenbach was invited (possibly at the 
suggestion of Schaetzel) and encouraged, by Dean Acheson and Schaetzel, to take part in a meeting of 17-
30 July 1966 at Aspen, where Acheson himself would be the main attraction.  Though Birrenbach insisted 
he would try to attend, he admitted that scheduling issues posed daunting obstacles.  Among the German 
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the location of the AIB reflected the Atlanticist interest in, indeed growing concern about, 
Berlin and its future.146    
J. Expanding the Focus of German Atlanticism: The Trilateral Commission 
However, even as the German Atlanticists continued to strive to strengthen their 
institutional ties with the Atlantic realm, and espcially with the United States, arguably 
the most significant development in the evolution of German Atlanticism in the early 
1970s, and in some ways its most significant challenge, was the gradual expansion of its 
geographical focus.  Here, the most important element was the substantial German 
participation in the efforts to integrate the Japanese into the Atlanticist worldview and the 
functioning of the Atlanticist network.  This was largely a reflection of the growing 
recognition of Japan’s increasing weight in world affairs, including with respect to trans-
Atlantic relations.  As with so many of the trends and perspectives we have already 
explored, this particular development also found institutional expression, in this case 
                                                                                                                                      
enthusiasts was Theo Sommer (editor-in-chief, Die Zeit), who, having spent time at Aspen, glowingly 
portrayed the AIHS to Newsweek as an unprecedented concentration of “Begabung, geistige[r] Brillanz und 
Weltkenntnis” (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2).   
146 Conferences taged by the AIB addressed, among other themes, Berlin’s political situation (occasioned 
by the 20th anniversary of the construction of the Wall and the approximate 10th anniversary of the Four 
Power Agreement); economic prospects; architecture and city planning (in international comparison); and 
role as a center of Wissenschaft and culture.  As Chancellor, Willy Brandt justified the well-considered 
choice of Berlin as the location for the AIB by pointing to the city’s function as an “intersection” and 
“testing ground [Prüfstand]” of the new relations between East and West (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and 
AIB, ACDP K191/2).  Furthermore, the directors of Berlin’s leading institutions of Wissenschaft and 
culture regularly gathered in talk circles at the AIB, thus initiating, for instance, considerations about an 
institute for advanced study (in 1978, the AIB assumed the planning of the Wissenschaftskollegs zu Berlin, 
which was founded in 1981), the strengthening of the Berlin Wirtschaft and Wissenschaft, and the shaping 
of the celebrations of the 750th anniversary of the city’s founding (AIB-Pressemitteilung, 10 April 1984, 
ACDP K191/2).  Meanwhile, the German Marshall Fund of the United States also took into account the 
importance of Berlin, supporting a number of projects that were entirely staged or at least held meetings 
there, among them the International Center Cities Program; a Summer 1974 experimental German language 
improvement program (in cooperation with the DAAD) for American social scientists; and an April 1975 
International Public Employee Unions symposium on issues confronting public sector labor organizations.   
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most notably in the form of the Trilateral Commission.147  While, as we shall see, many 
of the forms and themes touched upon earlier in our discussions of the Atlanticist 
institutions recur with regard to the Trilateral Commission, this organization also 
presented Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists with new opportunities to be 
exploited as well as new problems to be resolved.  Despite the rather precipitous decline 
in his political influence during the early 1970s, outlined in Chapter 6, Birrenbach served 
as a center point with respect to the German involvement in the Trilateral Commission.  
Consequently, as so often before, examining his actvities in this regard offers us a 
valuable window into this aspect of the further evoluti n of German Atlanticism. 
Birrenbach’s own interest in Japan and his appreciation for that country’s 
importance with respect to trans-Atlantic relations had evinced themselves at the latest by 
the early 1960s.  The business of the Thyssen firm vis-à-vis Japan vitally contributed to 
Birrenbach’s consciousness of that nation and directly led to his only trip there, in March 
1962, prior to the 1970s.148  Birrenbach’s “early” interest in Japan during thefirst half of 
the 1960s is perhaps best attested to by his short bo k The Future of the Atlantic 
Community, which in addition to its German- and English-langua e versions was also 
published, in 1964, in translation in Japan.  In a special afterword, Birrenbach stressed the 
                                                
147 On the Trilateral Commission, see Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) as well as Holly Sklar, ed., Trilateralism: The Trilateral 
Commission and Elite Planning for World Management (Boston: South End Press, 1980).     
148 On Birrenbach’s eye-opening trip to Japan, particularly the case pertaining to his understanding of the 
Japanese relationship with China, which he considered “sui generis” and “hardly comparable to the 
relations of any two other states,” see KB to Prof. Dr. phil. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 
1969, ACDP K023/2.  He was astonished to find that Japan (including, on a deep level, the Japanese 
“population”) “strangely” did not fear but rather “admired” China (at least in part as “the great bringer of 
culture [Kulturbringer]” to Japan, whereas Japanese achievements lay more “in the civilizational area”) and 
valued it as “the great market of tomorrow.”  Therefo , also due to the “Hiroshima complex,” Japan had
not yet taken the security measures, such as those enacted by India, that one might have normally expected 
in reaction to the “development” of China.  On Birrenbach already during his time in Argentina having 
noted Japan’s appearance there, as well as in Chile, as a competitor, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert 
Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 11 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.   
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significance of Japanese cooperation for the construction of the Atlantic Partnership.149  
However, despite these precedents, Birrenbach’s engagement with Japan only became 
especially characteristic beginning in the early 1970s, a period during which the broad 
notion of trilateralism was gaining considerable currency.  To some degree, Birrenbach’s 
sources for information on Japan during this period were similar to those he enjoyed with 
respect to the United States.  Books and other publications, his American contacts, as 
well as occasional personal meetings with the Japanese ambassador to the Federal 
Republic and with further prominent Japanese personalities helped him form a more 
accurate picture of contemporary Japan.  To a far greater extent than his previous output, 
Birrenbach’s writings from this time repeatedly insisted on the need for a recognition of 
Japan’s importance in the process of solving trans-Atlantic problems.150  Nevertheless, 
while Birrenbach exhibited a certain knowledge and ppreciation of Japan, he did not 
possess with regard to that nation anything even remot ly approaching the extensive 
network of contacts and constant communication that he enjoyed with respect to the 
                                                
149 Also in the non-Japanese versions of the book, Birrenbach depicted Japan, along with Turkey, as 
belonging to the Atlantic Community, albeit not primarily by virtue of any cultural similarity but rather 
simply due to their status as powers threatened by the East.   
150 For Birrenbach acknowledging that “the factor Japan” had to be seriously “taken into consideration” 
when dealing with European-American relations, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.  
On Birrenbach’s awareness that durable settlements of certain issues could not be crafted in “purely 
bilateral” EC-US negotiations but required the inclusion of Japan in the “negotiation context 
[Verhandlungskontext],” see KB Report of 20 February 1973, ACDP K183/2.  Thus, for Birrenbach on the 
“fundamental” necessity of negotiating “an acceptable world trade and monetary system” and, convinced 
that such problems could only be constructively solved “in cooperation with Japan,” devising “some 
formula to connect Japan in trade and monetary affairs directly to the bilateral American-European 
partnership,” see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.  On Birrenbach’s 
cognizance as of 1969 of the “extraordinarily close” cooperation of Japan with the “main NATO partners” 
and Switzerland with respect to currency questions n the Club of Ten, see KB to Prof. Dr. phil. Theodor 
Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.  In this letter to Schieder, Birrenbach argued that
the “rapid upswing [rasante Aufschwung]” of Japan had transformed it into, “even if still not a power 
center [Machtzentrum],” a “first-order decision center [Entscheidungszentrum] in the world” and a “first-
order power factor in the Pacific.”  The further Japanese economic power developed, the more certain it 
became that Japanese military power (though “not absolutely the nuclear component”) would also gain in 
consequence, a trend Birrenbach detected in the swiftly growing role of Japanese “security-political 
interests” with regard to the NPT negotiations, as manifested by a mounting hesitance to sign the treaty.    
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Atlantic sphere, particularly the United States.  For Birrenbach, there was, prior to 1973, 
virtually no Pacific counterpart to his Atlantic network that enabled him to stay so well 
abreast of developments in this region. 
In any case, Birrenbach was far from alone in his grasp of the significance of 
Japan and even prior to the founding of the Trilateral Commission, the expansion of the 
geographic focus of German Atlanticism had also expr ssed itself institutionally.  This 
became evident earliest and most extensively at the A lantic Institute, where the first 
major effort was undertaken to gradually and institutionally integrate the Japanese, so 
different in their culture and tradition, into the Atlanticist network.  After a period during 
which Japanese participants were included in relevant Atlantic Institute conferences, as 
well as in the Young Leaders Program (starting in 1969), the Institute finally admitted the 
Japanese, at their own request, in 1970.151  Henceforth, the Institute’s program would 
take an even greater account of the need for a closer dialogue between the Atlantic 
countries and Japan, a recognition reflected in its studies, publications, conferences (some 
of which were actually held in Japan) as well as other projects and activities.152  
                                                
151 Given the generally business-oriented nature of the Atlantic Institute, it comes as no surprise that te 
key partner in this particular process of Japanese integration was the Keidanren, the Japanese Federation of 
Economic Organizations (essentially the Japanese counterpart to the Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie).  This entity hereafter handled AI affairs in Japan, and the president of the K idanren, Kogoro 
Uemura, became one of the Japanese representatives on the Board of Governors. 
152 For instance, in March 1971, as part of a major study project on “Trade and Investment Policies for the 
1970s,” the Atlantic Institute, actively supported by the Keidanren, staged its first conference in Japan 
(Tokyo).  The international conference, entitled “Trade and Investment Policies for the 1970s - New 
Challenges for the Atlantic Area and Japan,” was chaired by Kogoro Uemura, an AI Governor and the 
President of the Keidanren.  It was attended by about ninety leading representatives of the public and 
private sectors of Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan.  Also around this time, the 
Atlantic Institute had several projects under consideration for 1972-73 dealing with Japan.  These included, 
in the realm of “East-West Relations,” a study of economic, financial and trade relations between the 
“countries of the Atlantic area (plus Japan),” on the one hand, and Eastern Europe (with the Soviet Union), 
on the other; and, with respect to “Japan and the Atlantic World,” an examination of Japan’s future political 
and security role in Asia as well as her relationship with North America and Western Europe.  Furthermore, 
the Atlantic Institute and the Keidanren organized an international conference in Tokyo in September 1973 
and published a collection of the resulting papers, dited by Curt Gasteyger, as an Atlantic Paper in 1974.  
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However, the integration of the Japanese into the Atlantic Institute was carried out in a 
manner that did not place them on an equal level with other key nations.  While gaining 
entrée to several organs of the AI, the Japanese received a rather small number of seats 
on the Board of Governors given their relative importance and were denied a place on the 
newly created, and quite influential, Foreign Policy Committee.  This appears to have 
been, at least in part, a result of the intractable problems existing at the time between 
Europe and Japan, and it was only on the basis of an rganizational compromise that 
Birrenbach assumed the chairmanship of the FPC.153    
In light of the qualified nature of such earlier efforts, we can say that the key 
institutional expression of the increasing appreciation of Japan’s significance was the 
Trilateral Commission, the first organization that made a vigorous attempt to integrate the 
Japanese institutionally into the Atlanticist network n an equal basis.  Inaugurated in 
July 1973, the commission was an American initiative, the brainchild of its chairman 
                                                                                                                                      
Guest speakers addressing AI Participating Members m etings included Hisao Kanamori (Japan Economic 
Research Center).  Among the “respondents” to the AI’s Participating Members meeting of 7 November 
1975 was Kozo Okabe (Labour Attaché, Japanese Embassy in Bonn).  For Japanese AI Participating 
Member firms as of 1977 (the collection done on a general basis by the Keidanren), see the Memo from 
Martin J. Hillenbrand, AIIA, Director-General, Paris, to all members of the Board of Governors, 9 June 
1977, ACDP K058.  On Katsuichi Hayashi, chief Paris correspondent of the major Japanese newspaper 
Mainichi Shimbun, among the journalists at the AI Press Seminar of 3 April 1978, see the Report on the 
AIIA Press Seminar, 3 April 1978, ACDP K129/1.  The Atlantic Institute’s interest in “non-Atlantic” 
countries besides Japan is intimated, for example, by the role of Roberto Campos (former Brazilian 
Minister for Planning) as a guest speaker at a Participa ing Member meeting.  For new AI Participating 
Members in 1973 including the Bank of New South Wales (Australia), see the AI Activity Report 1973, 
ACDP K104/2.  
153 Announced at the Atlantic Institute’s Board of Governors meeting on 27 November 1971, the 
organizational reshuffling connected with the Japanese entrance involved, in part, a redistribution of the 
functions of the Policy Committee (previously responsible for both the administration and policy direction 
of the institute).  Thus, as of June 1972, the Japanese were represented on the Board and the Economic 
Committee as well as on a newly established Steering Committee.  Indeed, the Economic Committee had 
been enlarged by one member and now included a repres ntative from Japan as well as from Australia.  
Headed by the chairman of the Board of Governors, the Steering Committee was elected by the Board from
its own members and acted on its behalf between meetings.  Meanwhile, the Foreign Policy Committee 
took on many of the tasks of the now defunct Policy Committee, namely focusing on setting the guidelines 
for and supervising the work of the institute, in the process providing direction with respect to the div rse 
problems concerning the alliance and of relevance to the institute’s activities.  However, with the creation 
of a separate Steering Committee, Birrenbach was freed of the task of guiding the organizational work and 
management of the Atlantic Institute that had been among the responsibilities of the Policy Committee.    
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David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board of Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City.  
The commission was based on the premise that the Unit d States, Western Europe and 
Japan, the most powerful democratic industrial complexes in the world had common 
interests and global responsibilities.  Cooperation between these three trilateral regions 
would be decisive not only for intra-trilateral development but also for the future 
development of the entire world, and therefore concer s existed, especially among 
Rockefeller and other Americans, about the trilateral strains in the early 1970s, for 
instance in the fields of finance, economics and tra e.  The Trilateral Commission, at 
least ostensibly, was an endeavor to institutionalize the necessary contacts and 
collaboration on a certain level of relations with regard to a wide range of issues, 
including foreign, political, security, economic and development policies.  This was seen 
as being of considerable relevance especially for European-Japanese relations, the 
allegedly weak leg of the triangle.  Looked at from a somewhat different perspective, just 
as the German construction of and participation in the Atlanticist institutions had been 
undertaken in large part as a means to break a certin strain of German isolationism, the 
Trilateral Commission was touted by many of its proponents as a prime instrument to 
overcome isolationist and nationalist tendencies in Japan and to encourage there a greater 
acceptance of internationalism as well as the notio of interdependence.   
Whatever its novel elements, the Trilateral Commission was essentially an 
evolution of the Atlanticist institutions we have discussed earlier and shared many of 
their characteristics.  This was, by and large, an American-style action committee, though 
in many ways operating on a bigger and more lavish scale than other variants, such as the 
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Monnet Committee.154  The Trilateral Commission consisted of a broad professional 
range of leading private citizens from the three regions, comprising politicians, former 
government officials, businessmen, labor heads, jurists, scholars, and members of the 
media.155  Sharing the critique of government already entertained by the Atlanticist 
institutions, the commission produced joint recommendations addressing the many 
problems confronting the trilateral regions as well as, indeed, the world beyond and 
promoted their implementation, especially vis-à-vis governments, intergovernmental 
organizations and other “opinion leaders.”156  With its reliance on policy-oriented reports, 
drawn up by the various trilateral task forces established as a basis for discussions and 
proposals, the commission exhibited the same enthusiasm for and confidence in the 
practical utility of scholarship and Wissenschaft as the Atlanticist institutions that 
preceded it.157  Likewise, with its chief publications, newsletters, press conferences, post-
meeting communiqués and general desire to exert influe ce as well on the broader 
                                                
154 As of July 1977, the Trilateral Commission totaled more than two hundred members from the three 
regions, although the Executive Committee was considerably smaller.   
155 As was typical of such organizations, the commission’  membership found itself in a certain flux with 
some figures entering and others leaving, the latter of n because they had assumed government positions.  
Though no strict rotation was imposed, the commission remained constantly aware of the desirability of 
regularly introducing new and younger members. 
156 Governments were viewed as indispensable but also as experiencing difficulty in dealing with many of 
the key issues, either because they raised politically thorny questions or because they were of such a long-
range nature that they failed to garner sufficient attention from men inevitably preoccupied with day-to-day 
crises.  Members of the commission could not belong t  overnments, including in the capacity of officials, 
since it was believed they would otherwise not be fre to express their own ideas. 
157 The trilateral task force reports were produced by rapporteurs (rooted in the Wissenschaft) from each of 
the three regions, themselves drawing on a wide array of consultants and experts (including the members of 
the commission) from politics, Wirtschaft and Wissenschaft, also from each of these regions and sometimes 
beyond.  For apporteurs being in contact with prominent authorities and organizations like the respective 
development ministries, the World Bank and the OECD, see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 
9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2.  Task force reports stres d concrete proposals, while being brief enough that 
policymakers would actually read them.  In addition t  helping the commission understand the various 
issues in question and formulate its recommendations, the very process of generating the task force reports 
was intended to encourage cooperation between Americans, Europeans and Japanese.  Like the products of 
many other Atlanticist organizations, the trilateral reports became a core source of Birrenbach’s knowledge.  
For instance, note the reliance on the Trilateral Commission paper of December 1974 on “Energy: A 
Strategy for International Action” in assessing Japan’s energy dependence in ACDP K198/2.   
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masses, the commission demonstrated a concern with public relations similar to that of its 
Atlanticist relatives.158  All of this meant that, whatever the differences in detail, the 
functioning of the Trilateral Commission was well trodden ground for Birrenbach and 
other Atlanticists taking part, especially given the overlap in membership between the 
already existing Atlanticist organizations and the Trilateral Commission.159   
In early 1973, Birrenbach accepted Rockefeller’s offer to become a member of 
the Trilateral Commission.  This invitation was facilitated by Birrenbach’s having been in 
contact with Rockefeller, and other figures at Chase Manhattan Bank, since at least the 
early 1960s and also enjoying connections with several organizers of the commission.  
These organizers included Zbigniew Brzezinski, executive director of the commission; 
Gerard Smith, chairman of the American group; and Max Kohnstamm, chairman of the 
European group.160  Birrenbach thus became the first German member of the Executive 
Committee, the commission’s key organ.161  In logistical terms, this meant yet another 
major commitment on his part, entailing effort, time, meetings and travel, to fit into an 
already tight schedule.162  Whatever Birrenbach’s lip service to goals such as 
                                                
158 Chief publications of the Trilateral Commission included, most notably, its task force reports.  
Meanwhile, the American and Japanese groups also distributed newsletters, dealing with the activities of 
the commission as well as with more expansive trilateral issues, to a large circle of influential indivi uals.  
For example, as of July 1977, the American newsletter, entitled Trialogue, went to about two thousand 
people in the United States and elsewhere.  On the exp ctation that commission members would further 
exercise influence beyond the principal but relatively narrow “target groups,” even on “the masses [die
breite Masse],” see the KB Report about the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2.   
159 For Birrenbach on the Trilateral Commission adhering to the “well-known” American practice of “free 
personalities” coming together to make proposals to governments, “independent of party and political ties
[Bindungen],” see the KB Report about the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2.   
160 Central among the tasks assumed by Brzezinski as executive director was the preparation, planning and 
guidance of the commission’s studies.  McCloy was one f those with close ties to Chase Manhattan Bank. 
161 The ExComm of the Trilateral Commission was especially responsible for producing, discussing and 
deciding upon the commission’s policy recommendations.  Drawn from the larger group of commission 
members, the ExComm consisted of the regional chairmen and deputy chairmen as well as thirty other 
individuals, among them twelve from the various countries of the European Community and Norway.   
162 Meetings of the full Trilateral Commission occurred about once every nine months in one of the three 
regions.  Such gatherings were characterized by discussions of task force reports; the adoption of 
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strengthening the American-Japanese and European-Jap ese legs of the triangle, he 
clearly saw the commission’s true value as a means to facilitate the construction of the 
bilateral European-American partnership, especially n so far as he continued to view 
Japanese cooperation as essential to solving the major problems bedeviling them in the 
fields of trade, currency and energy.163  Aside from this overarching concern, certain 
contingent elements may also have encouraged his part ci tion.  For instance, 
Birrenbach considered the Trilateral Commission particularly useful at this time since he 
expected that the Watergate affair and its aftermath would cripple the ability of the 
American government, now more dependent on Congress, to arrive at constructive 
solutions to international problems.164  Birrenbach may also have been encouraged by 
Wilhelm Grewe, the West German ambassador to Japan duri g the early 1970s and a 
former ambassador to the United States with whom Birrenbach enjoyed close contacts, 
who argued that it was essential to integrate Japan “into the Western world” via trilateral 
cooperation to prevent it from simply “swim[ming] around freely” in the wake of the 
American diplomatic opening to China.165 
 In addition to becoming a member of the ExComm, Birrenbach also played a key 
role in ensuring that a German group actually took part in the trilateral project.  Funding 
                                                                                                                                      
resolutions and proposals; presentations by and consultations with government, legislative and international 
leaders as well as experts in the fields under consideration; and seminars about the country in which the 
meeting was being held.  In the lead-up to meetings of the Trilateral Commission or its ExComm, there 
were also gatherings of the individual regional andnational groups, with the primary purposes of providing 
commissioners an opportunity to proffer suggestions on the task force reports and to hammer out common 
group standpoints in preparation for the upcoming “hi her-level” meetings.   
163 For such lip service as well as Birrenbach’s genuine interest in the potentialities of the Trilateral 
Commission, see for example KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Trilateral Commission, New 
York, 5 July 1974, ACDP K081/2.      
164 KB to Otto Friedrich, President of the BDA, 29 May 1973, ACDP K081/1.   
165 Wilhelm Grewe to KB, 2 January 1974, ACDP K081/2.  On Birrenbach’s anticipation that “a certain 
arms build-up [Aufrüstung]” by Japan was “unavoidable,” even if only to become “more independent” from 
the United States, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.   
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the commission was no small undertaking, with the expected cost for the first triennium, 
comprising the expenses for both the administration and the task force studies, amounting 
to almost $2.2 million.166  While of course expected to provide only a fraction of this 
sum, the Germans were responsible for the largest share of financing of any of the 
members of the European group, a particularly daunting task given the fundraising 
difficulties in the Federal Republic noted earlier in this chapter.167  With respect to 
securing the European financing, Birrenbach was among the first people to whom 
Kohnstamm turned.  Indeed, Birrenbach’s willingness to ecure financing for the 
commission and his well-known proficiency in such end avors was a major reason, along 
naturally with his expertise and authority in the Federal Republic, that he was invited to 
join the ExComm (as well as the commission’s Finance Committee).168  With respect to 
the German funding, Birrenbach addressed once again his proven financing network.  
Regarding the administrative costs of the European group, Birrenbach tapped both the 
federal government and the Wirtschaft for funds.  Beginning in April 1973, Birrenbach 
was in touch with the heads of the four major German economic organizations: Hans-
Günther Sohl (BDI President), Otto Friedrich (BDA), Otto Wolff von Amerongen 
                                                
166 The Trilateral Commission had cost a projected $2,193,000 for its first triennium, while the second 
triennium projection was $2,278,491 (actually a considerable reduction in real expenses) (“The Trilateral 
Commission,” July 1977, ACDP K062/1).  
167 This was due to a system of determining the various national shares of the administrative costs of the 
European group based on relative national economic strength (GNP).  In practice, this meant that the 
Federal Republic was expected to pay 25-30% of the annual administrative expenses of the European group 
during the first three years (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2).  
As of May 1975, the costs of the Trilateral Commission for Europe were $130,000 per year (meetings: 
$60,000; research: $50,000; secretariat: $20,000) (François Duchêne to KB, 16 May 1975, ACDP K072/2).   
168 The other person, besides Birrenbach, that Kohnstamm immediately approached with regard to initial 
financing was the Italian Giovanni Agnelli, the president of Fiat, who also promised his assistance.  Like 
Birrenbach, Agnelli was selected as a member of the ExComm in part due to his value to the commission 
with respect to financing.  Thanks to Agnelli’s largesse, in particular his early donation of approximately 
$50,000 (Birrenbach cited a current figure of $45,000 in KB to Sohl, 26 July 1973, ACDP K081/1), Italy 
proved quite forthcoming with regard to its share of the commission’s administration expenses. 
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(DIHT) and Alwin Münchmeyer (BdB).169  It was from these Spitzenverbänden that 
Birrenbach obtained the lion’s share of the German funding for the commission’s 
administrative costs.  Meanwhile, his key contact in the government was with the 
Auswärtigen Amt, particularly State Secretary Paul Frank, the result of which was the 
securing of a lesser governmental financing, to the tun  of DM 20,000 a year.170   
 With respect to the German funding of the commission’  individual task force 
studies, Birrenbach turned to the Stiftungen, believing that such financing could not be 
expected from the Spitzenverbänden and separate firms of the Wirtschaft.  Here, 
Birrenbach strove to exploit his influential position at the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung as well 
as his connections to the other German foundations.  These efforts were not entirely 
successful, with, for example, his attempt to encourage the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk (and 
even the UK-based Nuffield Foundation) to contribute to the funding of the trilateral 
reports apparently resulting in failure.  They were not rendered any easier by an 
American-devised system of task forces that did not really fit neatly into the framework 
of European foundation law.171  However, Birrenbach did succeed in securing adequat  
funding for the task forces from his own Thyssen Stiftung.  Henceforth (after the first 
year), the Thyssen Stiftung would finance four-fifths of the European share of the funding 
for the task force reports, approximately $40,000 per year out of the European share of 
                                                
169 Wolff von Amerongen came to support the idea of a Trilateral Commission after consultation with his 
American and Japanese friends. 
170  While Birrenbach had initially entertained some hopes of obtaining at least nominal funding from the 
trade unions, such financing never materialized.  
171 On the most important European foundations having d fficulty aiding the Trilateral Commission since, 
according to European foundation law, they could, as a rule, only finance projects centered on universti s 
or research institutes, see KB Report about the Trilate al Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2.  At the 
meeting of the European members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in Brussels, several such members, 
including Birrenbach, were entrusted with examining this question to determine whether a compromise 
between the American and European perspectives was possible.  
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$50,000.172  Thus, thanks primarily to Birrenbach’s efforts, the German funding for the 
Trilateral Commission was rapidly secured.  In so far as Birrenbach simply relied on the 
components of his financing network that had already proven their worth over the years 
with respect to the Atlanticist infrastructure, namely Stiftungen, the economic 
Spitzenverbände, and the federal government, we can speak not only of an institutional 
continuity between Atlanticism and the related phenomenon of Trilateralism, but also of 
a continuity in regard to the financing of their institutions. 
 However, merely securing the German funding for the Trilateral Commission was 
not the end of this issue for Birrenbach, particularly while the financial contributions of 
other key nations remained in doubt.  In contrast to the relatively quick successes in the 
United States, Japan, Italy and the Federal Republic, such financing (and participation) 
posed a far more difficult proposition, at least at the outset, for several European nations, 
most significantly France and Britain.173  Birrenbach insisted that the European financing 
of the commission assume a truly collective character, rather than becoming a burden 
                                                
172 The annual research budget for the Trilateral Commission amounted to about $220,000.  The French 
committee provided the other one-fifth (about $10,00 ) of the total European share of $50,000.  These 
figures all pertain to the commission’s first triennium (Duchêne to KB, 16 May 1975, ACDP K072/2). 
173 A number of factors fed into this situation, among them the struggles of especially the European 
economies during this period with the effects of the “energy crisis.”  Furthermore, foundations remained 
comparatively still few and far between in Europe and, as already noted, the prominent ones that did exist
were hampered in their dealings with the Trilateral Commission by incongruities between the American-
designed task force system and European foundation l w.  Aside from these general European 
circumstances, there were also factors of specific relevence to individual countries.  Thus, even apart from 
the straits in which its economy found itself, money had always been rather tough to collect in Britain.  
Meanwhile, attitudes in France towards any type of trilateral organization and vis-à-vis trilateral matters as 
a whole were mixed at best, with the posture of the Messmer government crucial in this regard.  Well into 
1974, therefore well into the life of the commission, a state of uncertainty persisted with respect to a 
sufficient financial contribution from and participation of these two nations, as well as several smaller ones.  
As of April 1974, the matter had still not been entirely settled, particularly as it pertained to France, though 
at this point the British representatives believed a certain amount of funding from their side would be 
possible (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2).  Meanwhile, the 
Frenchman Georges Berthoin assumed that, following the upcoming French presidential elections, France 
would alter its course “in the sense of a rapprochement [Annäherung] with the United States,” which would 
also lead to change in the French perspective on the Trilateral Commission, and was therefore requesting a 
postponement of a definitive decision in these affairs to the June 1974 ExComm meeting.   
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borne primarily by the Federal Republic and Italy.174  Consequently, during the first year, 
Birrenbach withheld the German financing he had arranged, with the exception of an 
initial sum critical to enabling the European group (and, therefore, the commission itself) 
to function even without French and British funding.175  Only starting in July 1974, the 
second year of the commission, when the French, British and other recalcitrant European 
groups belatedly resolved the funding questions originally bedeviling the organization by 
beginning to contribute to the financing (principally administrative expenses), did 
Birrenbach finally approve the release of the full German contribution he had previously 
secured.176  All of this was especially significant in light of the stress the Americans  
placed at this time on shifting the onus of financing from themselves and, instead, having 
also the Europeans and Japanese shoulder it equally.177   
In addition to this crucial matter of financing, Birrenbach also played a central 
part in determining the composition of and in actually recruiting the German group, thus 
                                                
174 Indeed, Birrenbach’s concerns in this regard became so great that, at the meeting of the European 
members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in Brussels, he suggested, along with several other participants 
(though the view did not prevail in the end), that if a nation like France ultimately did not take part, the 
Trilateral Commission could be transformed into a “Multilateral Commission” in which the individual 
European “states” interested in such an undertaking could continue on with the project and its essential task 
together with the United States, Japan and Canada, albeit “on a somewhat less financially extravagant 
level” (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2).  
175 This initial sum of DM 30,000, paid one-third by the federal government and two-thirds by the 
Wirtschaft, was intended for the first meeting of the commission, actually of its ExComm, in October 1973 
in Tokyo and possibly for the first meeting of the European group (KB to Sohl, 26 July 1973, ACDP 
K081/1).  At least at the start, the European group was able to operate thanks to American financial and 
intellectual assistance, funding support from the German and Italian groups, as well as financial and 
infrastructural aid from Max Kohnstamm’s EC Institute for University Studies (Brussels).   
176 On the French taking full part in the work and financing of the commission after the change of 
government in France, see the KB Report on the Trilate al Commission, 3 July 1974, ACDP K081/2. 
177 During the first year of the commission, therefore through July 1974, the Ford Foundation paid entirely 
for the task force studies, but beginning in the second year, the European and Japanese groups were 
expected to pay an increasing share of the costs of the task force reports, each one-sixth of the amount in 
the second year and each one-third of the amount in the third year (KB Report on the Trilateral 
Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2).  On the Americans assuming the complete expenses for 
the task force studies and almost the full expenses for the administration for the first year of the 
commission (1973-74), see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2. 
 503
continuing in his familiar role as gatekeeper.  As usual, he took this function very 
seriously, convinced that the success of the Trilate al Commission depended to a large 
extent on the personnel involved.178  In this regard, he remained in regular contact with 
Kohnstamm, who as European chairman was quite engagd in the recruiting of suitable 
members for the European group and was in consultation not only with Birrenbach and 
other Europeans to this end but also with Smith and Brzezinski.179  While selecting the 
German group, Birrenbach had to take into account several factors.  For starters, it was 
necessary to name another German member to the ExComm, this one linked to the 
governing SPD-FDP coalition (Birrenbach, of course, epresented the opposition).  In 
consultation with and with the support of Helmut Schmidt and Herbert Wehner, 
Birrenbach (along with Kohnstamm) ultimately agreed on the SPD MdB Klaus Dieter 
Arndt, president of the Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung i  Berlin and former 
state secretary in the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, who had been suggested by the 
federal government.  Besides Birrenbach and Arndt, twelve other Germans (the internal 
Beratergruppe, as Birrenbach referred to the twelve non-ExComm members), for a total 
of fourteen, formed the German group.  Though not necessarily clearly differentiated 
according to party sympathy or membership, approximately six of these came from each 
the governing coalition and the opposition.180  In working to get this group together, 
Birrenbach now maintained contact not only with Kohnstamm but also with Arndt. 
Naturally, Birrenbach exercised the most influence ov r the selection of those 
individuals in his own “party group” to the Trilateral Commission.  Here, Birrenbach had 
                                                
178 KB to Otto Friedrich, 29 May 1973, ACDP K081/1. 
179 Meanwhile, the Japanese chairman was Takeshi Watanabe, former executive director of the IMF and of 
the World Bank, as well as former chairman of the Asian Development Bank. 
180 KB to Otto Friedrich, 29 May 1973, ACDP K081/1.  Following his death in January 1974, Arndt was 
replaced by the SPD MdB Herbert Ehrenberg.   
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to take into consideration that the Wirtschaft was paying the preponderant share of the 
German contribution to the commission’s administration costs.  This meant that the 
Spitzenverbände of the Wirtschaft, and more specifically their leaders, also enjoyed a 
certain role in selecting and recruiting potential members for the commission.  At the 
same time, in Birrenbach’s mind, other factors made it eminently desirable to create 
something beyond a mere group (and conference) of Wirtschaftlern, a course proposed, 
for instance, by Otto Friedrich.  For example, due to the emphasis placed on scholarship 
in the activities of the commission, it was important to include as well a Wissenschaftler 
in the opposition group.  Furthermore, in light of the complexity of the problems to be 
confronted by the commission, which far transcended narrow wirtschaftspolitische 
questions, and in view of the linkages between foreign, security, trade, currency and 
financial affairs in trilateral relations, Birrenbach deemed it necessary to include 
representatives not only from the different parties but also from a wide range of social 
fields, comprising as well as outside of the Wirtschaft, since these diverse figures often 
brought with them a unique familiarity with at least some of these connections.181   
                                                
181 KB to Otto Friedrich, 29 May 1973, ACDP K081/1.  Asof 27 September 1973, the German members 
of the Trilateral Commission included Birrenbach; Klaus Dieter Arndt (also member of the European 
Parliament); Werner Dollinger (MdB; Deputy Chairman of the CSU); Karl Hauenschild (President, IG 
Chemie-Papier-Keramik; member of the DGB-Vorstand); Karl Kaiser (Director of the DGAP Research 
Institute; Professor of Political Science at the Saarland University, Saarbrücken); Otto Graf Lambsdorff 
(MdB, FDP; member of the Vorstand of the Victoria-Rückversicherung AG); Eugen Loderer (President, IG
Metall; member of the DGB-Vorstand); Alwin Münchmeyer (President, Bundesverband deutscher Banken; 
partner in the bank Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst & Co., Hamburg); Gerhard Schröder (member of the 
CDU-Präsidium; Chairman, Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee); Hans-Günther Sohl (Presid nt of the 
BDI; Chairman of the Board of Directors of the August-Thyssen-Hütte AG); Theo Sommer (Editor-in-
Chief, Die Zeit); Heinz Oskar Vetter (Chairman of the Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes); and Otto Wolff 
von Amerongen (President, Otto Wolff AG; President of the Deutschen Industrie- und Handelstages) (List 
of European Members of the Trilateral Commission, 27 September 1973, ACDP K081/1).  For the 
governing coalition being represented by Arndt, Lambsdorff, Kaiser, Sommer, Vetter, Loderer, and 
Hauenschild; and the opposition by Birrenbach, Schröde , Dollinger, Sohl, Münchmeyer, and Wolff von 
Amerongen, see KB to Sohl, 26 July 1973, ACDP K081/1.  While at this point Birrenbach was proposing a 
Wissenschaftler (namely Prof. Hans-Peter Schwarz in Hamburg) to occupy the opposition’s remaining free 
place, it appears that as of September 1973 this position had been filled by Fritz Dietz (President, 
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As with each of the Atlanticist institutions and initiatives we have previously 
examined, it is virtually impossible to gauge with any great precision the success of the 
Trilateral Commission.  However, in touting the organization’s growing impact and 
political achievements, pleased proponents over the years cited in all three regions the 
impressive number of commissioners entering high government positions and the wide 
press and mass media coverage of the institution and its activities, exposure providing in 
turn a substantial boost to the circulation of its reports and other published material.182  
Moreover, the organizers and members of the commission, as a whole, were sufficiently 
convinced of its effectiveness and of the ongoing need for such an institution to 
repeatedly extend its life at three-year intervals.183  Initially conceived of as a temporary 
entity, intended to exist for only three years and designed to address the extraordinarily 
troubling circumstances of the first half of the 1970s, the Trilateral Commission became a 
de facto permanent institution.  German funding for the commission continued to flow 
                                                                                                                                      
Bundesverband des Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandels), though Birrenbach was now hoping to recruit an 
opposition-minded journalist, particularly the FAZ’s Günther Gillessen (KB to Münchmeyer, 26 September 
1973, ACDP K081/1).  Other German members of the Trilate al Commission over the years included Horst 
Ehmke (Deputy Chairman of the SPD-Bundestagsfraktion; former Federal Justice Minister); Herbert 
Ehrenberg (MdB, SPD); Wolfgang Hager (Senior Fellow, DGAP Research Institute); Hans Hartwig 
(President, Bundesverband des Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandels eV, Bonn); Dr. Diether Hoffmann 
(Vorstand Speaker, Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft AG, Frankfurt); Ludwig Huber (President, Bayerische 
Landesbank); Horst Jannott (Vorstand Chairman, Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft); Hans-
Jürgen Junghans (MdB, SPD); Prof. Dr. Norbert Kloten (President, Landeszentralbank in Baden-
Württemberg); Erwin Kristoffersen (Director, DGB International Division); Richard Löwenthal 
(Wissenschaftler); Hanns Maull; Karl-Heinz Narjes (MdB, CDU); Friedrich Neumann (Chairman, 
Landesvereinigung der industriellen Arbeitgeberverbände Nordrhein-Westfalens eV, Düsseldorf); Konrad 
Porzner (MdB, SPD); and Olaf Sund (SPD).  As of July 1977, Birrenbach and Lambsdorff were the 
German members of the ExComm. 
182 The gratifying trend regarding government positions was particularly striking, for instance, in the period 
1976-77, especially in the United States with respect to the composition of the recently elected Carter 
administration, though one could also point to the Federal Republic, where during this same time Herbert 
Ehrenberg became Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung and Olaf Sund became Senator für Arbeit 
und Soziales in the Landesregierung of West Berlin.  In part, the commission’s attempts to inform the 
media of its purposes, activities and recommendations were intended to counter the not inconsiderable 
attention dedicated to what it derided as conspiracy theories. 
183 The first such extension was unanimously approved in May 1975 at the ExComm meeting in Kyoto 
(Japan).  In June 1978, the plenary meeting in Washington (DC) also unanimously accepted the 
continuation of the Trilateral Commission for a further three years.   
 506
principally from the Wirtschaft, especially the Spitzenverbänden and the Stiftungen, as 
well as from the Auswärtigen Amt.184  Given that Birrenbach had devoted a substantial 
amount of effort to the commission’s creation and maintenance and remained a crucial 
member, one might have assumed that he would be absolutely delighted about its 
apparent accomplishments and rather unexpectedly enuring nature.  In reality, 
Birrenbach’s attitude towards the commission was a quite mixed one.  Certainly, he 
acknowledged positive aspects, as already noted largely approving of the institution’s 
overall premises and purposes.  He also judged many elements of the commission to be 
of a high quality, including the American and Japanese groups, the meetings of the 
ExComm, as well as the working papers and task force reports. 
That said, Birrenbach entertained serious doubts and criticisms of various aspects 
of the commission as it actually functioned.  Indeed, this marked ambivalence and his 
fervent efforts to overcome what he considered the commission’s glaring flaws 
constituted some of the most salient characteristics of Birrenbach’s participation in the 
entire venture.  Among his chief complaints were those pertaining to a trilateral approach 
within the commission that, in practice, ignored to a great extent security and political 
issues.  Quite early on, Birrenbach ascertained that, whatever the perfunctory nods 
directed at security affairs and East-West relations, the American plans for the 
commission focused primarily on the areas of economic, currency, trade, energy and 
development policy.185  This realization meshed quite well with Birrenbach’s suspicions 
                                                
184 The overall budget for the Trilateral Commission in 1978 was about $850,000.  At the European plenary 
meeting of December 1978 in London, the proposed annu l budget of the European group was stated as 
$250,000 (Report of Hans Maull to All European Members regarding the European Plenary Meeting, 4-5 
December 1978, ACDP K204/2). 
185 KB to Sohl, 26 July 1973, ACDP K081/1.  For “development aid” as “a central task of our time” and not 
only a matter of “economic problems” but also of an “eminently civilizational problem” in so far as there 
existed an “action-reaction” dynamic, distinguished by “the reception of Western civilization by the 
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that the true American interest in trilateralism as an overall concept was principally as a 
means to persuade the Europeans and Japanese to help relieve the Americans of their 
deficits in the balances of trade and payments.  Within the commission, Birrenbach 
repeatedly sought to alter this focus by insisting o  the vital importance of security and 
foreign policy issues and on the need to address them holistically in connection with 
questions of economics, currency and trade.  Such concerns on Birrenbach’s part about 
the thematic of the commission were only intensified by continued rumblings during this 
period about the reduction of American troops overseas, including in Europe, and by the 
implications of the October 1973 war in the Middle East.186  They also reflected and 
fueled Birrenbach’s staunch belief that Japanese interests fundamentally differed from 
those of Europe vis-à-vis the United States and, therefore, his unabated stress on the “top 
priority” of the “American-European partnership,” despite the admitted relevance to it of 
Japan in some respects, and firm objection to any alleged “partnership à trois.”187 
Birrenbach was also consistently perturbed by what he considered the sorry state 
of the European group.  One major element of this concern was his intense dissatisfaction 
with Kohnstamm’s replacement following the Dutchman’s long-planned resignation in 
                                                                                                                                      
developing countries” and the reciprocal impact of this process on “the bearers of Western civilization” 
themselves, see already the Expositions by Dr. KurtBir enbach, Deputy Chairman of the Kuratorium, in 
the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the 1st Activity Report of 
the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP K077/1.  In these expositions, Birrenbach posited that this complex 
relationship would be “especially interesting” with respect to aid to “countries of high culture” like India, 
Pakistan or Indonesia.      
186 For Birrenbach’s endeavors in this regard, here with reference to “the Near East conflict,” see his 
Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2.  On “alarming” votes in the US 
Senate in September 1973 regarding a cutback of American troops abroad, see KB to Brzezinski, Columbia 
University, Research Institute on Communist Affairs, 1 October 1973, ACDP K081/1.     
187 For Birrenbach balking at the prospect of a “partnership à trois,” including a “strange partnership” that 
also encompassed the Soviet Union as “a silent partner,” see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 29 June 
1973, ACDP K184/2.  On the “top priority” of the “American-European partnership,” see KB to Sen. Jacob 
Javits, Washington DC, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.   
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late 1975 as European chairman.188  During 1974-75, Birrenbach, along with figures such 
as Guido Colonna (Italy), François Duchêne (the European group’s new executive vice 
president) and Kohnstamm himself, played a central role in identifying a suitable 
successor, only to discover that all his proposals proved either unfeasible or unacceptable 
to others in the commission.189  At the Trilateral ExComm meeting of 29 November-2 
December 1975 in Paris, the European group finally se ected Georges Berthoin, a man a 
bitterly disappointed Birrenbach characterized as an “insignificant [unbedeutenden]” 
former ambassador of the European Communities to the United Kingdom who had been 
chosen over Birrenbach’s own favorites “only because he was French.”  According to 
Birrenbach, this meeting imparted “an embarrassing p cture.”  Interpreting the broader 
meaning of these events, Birrenbach argued “[t]he scenes that played out in connection 
with this presented a dreadful [schreckliches] picture of the steadfastness [Standfestigkeit] 
of the representatives of the other European nations, who simply let themselves be 
overrun [niederwalzen] without opposition [widerspruchslos] by the French side.”  For 
good measure, Birrenbach even admonished the Italian nd British participants that if 
they continued thus, there was no long-term hope of preventing a French “hegemonial 
                                                
188 A move in the offing for well over a year, Kohnstamm resigned his position in order to become 
president of the European University in Florence (Italy).    
189 For example, Birrenbach (at the Brussels conference of the European group in April 1974) and 
Kohnstamm had originally proposed the Belgian Jean Rey (former President of the Commission of the 
European Communities), impossible it turned out since Rey had meanwhile succeeded Walter Hallstein as 
President of the European Movement and could not further increase his work load (KB Report on the 
Trilateral Commission, 3 July 1974, ACDP K081/2).  Although Birrenbach judged Duchêne (Director of 
the Institute for Contemporary European Studies at the University of Sussex) an “outstanding man,” he 
opposed the notion prevalent among the English members of the ExComm that Duchêne should succeed 
Kohnstamm as European chairman, since he could not be, in Birrenbach’s opinion, as “politically 
representative” as Rey or Kohnstamm (Birrenbach Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, 
ACDP K081/2).  Duchêne had previously been director of the “superb” (Birrenbach’s word) International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (London), editor of the Economist (London), and Monnet’s personal assistant.    
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position” in Europe.190  So, at least in Birrenbach’s eyes, the personnel decisions of the 
Trilateral Commission became the site for the parallel unfolding of some larger political 
issues confronting Europe.  Birrenbach’s complaints about the quality and effectiveness 
of the European group stretched well beyond the person of its chairman, but for years to 
come, Berthoin would remain the embodiment for him of that group’s deficits. 
Finally, closely related to these other two worries, Birrenbach was constantly 
concerned with respect to the costs of financing the Trilateral Commission and was 
especially intrigued by the possibility of reducing or at least limiting these expenses.  At 
the same time, this raised the question of the ability or willingness of the commission to 
integrate itself into the already existing system of German Atlanticist institutions.  In 
some respects, this integration proved to be quite smooth and rapid.  Most notably, the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik not only offered logistical support, such as 
furnishing rooms for meetings of the commission memb rs, but also served as a valuable 
source of rapporteurs to generate the various task force reports.191  However, the 
commission’s relations with the Atlantic Institute w re considerably more complicated.  
On the one hand, extensive personnel linkages (e.g. common membership) existed 
between the two organizations, including on the elevated level of the Trilateral 
Commission’s ExComm and the Atlantic Institute’s Board of Governors.  Of course, 
Birrenbach was himself a prime example of this phenomenon, with his simultaneous 
positions in both the AI and the TC.  To ensure a maxi um coordination of activities 
                                                
190 KB to Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 5 December 1975, ACDP 
K173/2. 
191 German rapporteurs on task force reports over the years included Karl iser, Director of the DGAP 
Research Institute (Towards a Renovated International System (1977), capstone report of the commission’s 
first triennium); Wolfgang Hager, Senior Fellow of the DGAP Research Institute (Seeking a New 
Accommodation in World Commodity Markets (1976)); Hanns Maull, European Secretary of the Trilateral 
Commission (Energy: Managing the Transition (1978)); and Richard Löwenthal, Professor Emeritus of 
International Relations at the Free University in West Berlin (An Overview of East-West Relations (1978)). 
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between the two institutions, John Louden, Chairman of the AI Board, also became a 
member of the TC ExComm.  Nevertheless, Birrenbach advocated a more far-reaching 
cooperation or even integration of the Atlantic Institute and the Trilateral Commission.192  
Given the substantial, though by no means complete, overlap of the two organizations’ 
interest and activity areas and at a time when funding was becoming increasingly scarce, 
such a cooperative or integrative relationship, rather han a primarily separate and 
potentially competitive one, held out attractive prospects of enhancing efficiency, saving 
money and facilitating fund-raising efforts, surely in Europe.193   
 It is true that with respect to these concerns a certain amount of progress, from 
Birrenbach’s perspective, was evident over time within he Trilateral Commission.  
While he may have been particularly adamant and vocal in expressing them, Birrenbach 
was far from alone in his reservations regarding the commission.  Indeed, for all their 
willingness to continue on with the overall project, others in the European and German 
groups voiced concerns often similar to Birrenbach’s own, whether they pertained to the 
thematic focus, the relative ineffectualness of the European group, or the costs of their 
undertaking.194  Particularly with regard to security and foreign policy issues, 
                                                
192 For instance, at the meeting of the European members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in Brussels, 
Birrenbach, along with several others, proposed utilizing the Atlantic Institute as a secretariat or 
administrative base for the European group, especially if the financing issues, among them those we have 
previously described with regard to France, were to persist and the commission were to switch over to a 
multilateral framework (favored by Birrenbach if the French were to drop out).  That the Trilateral 
Commission was able to survive in its early stages wa due, in part, to its reliance on the infrastructure of 
Kohnstamm’s EC Institute for University Studies (Brussels), including initially as a secretariat.  On such 
matters, see for example the KB Report on the Trilate al Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2. 
193 It was hoped that said efficiency could be improved through a more effective utilization of collective 
resources and fund-raising eased by creating an appealing, coherent complex and, thus, reducing the 
uncertainty of, for instance, foundations with regard to the roles of the respective organizations.  See, for 
example, François Duchêne to KB, 7 July 1975, ACDP K072/2.  One key field where the Trilateral 
Commission and the Atlantic Institute did not totally coincide in their research interests was the theme 
“NATO,” a prominent concern of the AI, but only much less so of the TC.   
194 For example, at the ExComm meeting in Tokyo on 22-23 October 1973, the two German participants, 
especially Alwin Münchmeyer but also Otto Graf Lambsdorff, as well as, somewhat more cautiously, 
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Birrenbach’s worries actually formed part of a larger consternation, at least during the 
early 1970s, about the entire notion of trilateralism at seemingly all levels in Europe, 
including among governments, wrapped up with a sense that the trilateral approach 
threatened to undermine Europe’s privileged relationship with the United States.195  
Beyond the complaints articulated by Birrenbach, the German trade unionists also 
expressed some discontent with the commission in sofar as they believed that their 
names were being associated with reports whose views they did not fully support.196  At 
times, certain German financial contributors even threatened to terminate their assistance 
if improvements were not implemented.197  Not least due to the various criticisms 
emanating from the German and European groups, somechanges were indeed made in 
the practices of the commission.  Thanks in no small degree to Birrenbach’s insistence, 
                                                                                                                                      
Kohnstamm and the Norwegian Otto Grieg Tidemand mirrored, sometimes explicitly, Birrenbach’s 
arguments about the need to devote greater attention to security matters.  Birrenbach could not attend this 
first meeting of the ExComm since his doctors forbade him to fly to Tokyo so soon after his heart attack in 
April 1973.  However, at Birrenbach’s request, Münchmeyer, who anyway generally shared Birrenbach’s 
views and made his various objections known, represent d him there (also on the topic of monetary policy).  
Likewise, for discussions at the meeting of the European members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in 
Brussels about how and by how much the future costs of the Trilateral Commission could be reduced, see 
the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2.  On the British and Italian 
groups and financial contributors as well as important individuals within the European group, including 
Kohnstamm and Duchêne, promoting a very close cooperation between the Atlantic Institute and the 
Trilateral Commission, see François Duchêne, European Vice-Chairman, to KB, 7 July 1975, ACDP 
K072/2 and the Record of the European Regional Meeting, 9 May 1976, Ottawa, ACDP K056/2.     
195 Especially the French were also suspicious of American interference in European relations with Japan.  
For these reasons, many Europeans and European governments (among them that of the Federal Republic), 
sometimes simply to maintain solidarity with one another (including with France), favored bilateral 
structures of relations between Europe, the United States and Japan, rather than the principally American 
concept of a single trilateral structure.  For the Nine having on 14 November 1973, correspondingly, 
recommended to Japan a bilateral European-Japanese declaration, thus excluding the possibility of “a later 
development” towards an “overarching” trilateral declaration, see Wilhelm Grewe (West German 
ambassador in Tokyo) to KB, 2 January 1974, ACDP K081/2.      
196 This unease may help explain the notable membership turnover experienced among German trade 
unionists within the commission.  While Heinz Oskar Vetter (President of the DGB) remained on as a 
member after the first triennium, the other two German trade unionists departed, replaced by Erwin 
Kristoffersen (head of the DGB’s International Secreta iat).  On this theme, see the Discussion of the 
European Regional Meeting, Sunday, 9 May 1976, Ottawa, ACDP K056/2.   
197 See, for instance, the record of Karl Kaiser’s remarks in the discussion at the European Regional 
Meeting of 9 May 1976 in Ottawa, contained in ACDP K056/2. 
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the theme security was placed on the commission’s agenda from a rather early date.198   
Motivated by a desire to reduce expenses, the number of trilateral task force reports was 
halved beginning with the second triennium.199  Also during the second triennium, half of 
the trilateral studies undertaken were conducted jointly with the Atlantic Institute.200   
On the other hand, there also existed serious opposition within the Trilateral 
Commission to the vision of that body entertained by Birrenbach and, therefore, ample 
controversy over these specific connected issues.  For instance, many ExComm members 
considered it at any rate premature to explore the field of security, with some furthermore 
believing this to be a regional matter wholly unsuited to trilateral discussions.  Especially 
the Japanese, reluctant to enter immediately into a cl ser relationship with Europe and 
with at least American acquiescence, hesitated being drawn into dealing with the question 
of European security or, indeed, to address security affairs in general, a particularly 
sensitive topic for them.201  With respect to a potential cooperation or merger of the 
Trilateral Commission and the Atlantic Institute (or even the use of the AI as an 
administrative infrastructure), there was significant resistance among the American, 
                                                
198 At the very first ExComm meeting, in Tokyo in October 1973, a sentence on the theme of security was 
inserted into the Statement of Purpose: “Although the risks of nuclear confrontation have diminished, world 
peace and security are still to be given a lasting basis.”  The incorporation of this sentence was, to a great 
extent, immediately attributable to the efforts of Münchmeyer (representing Birrenbach) and Lambsdorff at 
that meeting.  This served as a compromise solution for the topic of security and seemed to pave the way 
for its informal inclusion in the future discussions of the commission.  As Birrenbach put it, “[o]ne will 
therefore have to try in the future to continue to insist on this point, since it is politically of essential 
character” (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2). 
199 This decision was taken in May 1975 at the Kyoto (Japan) ExComm meeting.  In addition to cutting 
costs, this approach offered commissioners more tim to discuss the individual reports. 
200 Joint Atlantic Institute-Trilateral Commission projects dealt with subjects like “Industrial Relations” and 
“National Industrial Strategies.”  See, for instance, the Summary of Study Group Discussions on 17-19 
March 1977, by Prof. Benjamin Roberts, ACDP K056/1.  
201 Whatever their personal views, Rockefeller and Brzezinski sought at minimum to accommodate the 
Japanese, arguing that the latter should be allowed to gain confidence in the Trilateral Commission by 
initially tackling themes of greater interest to them before taking up topics such as security.   
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Japanese and French members of the commission for a variety of substantive reasons.202  
Therefore, while shared by others, including many in the German and European groups, 
Birrenbach’s assessment of the commission’s flaws wa  in many respects not the 
consensus opinion within that body, and consequently these problems, as Birrenbach 
perceived them, persisted.  Though, as we have alluded to, Birrenbach contributed to 
getting the issue of security on the agenda of the commission from an early date, this was 
achieved only in a broad, informal framework more palatable to the Japanese and never 
seems to have borne practical fruit, at least not to his satisfaction.  Likewise, while the 
hypothetically far-reaching cooperation and integration of the Atlantic Institute and the 
Trilateral Commission advocated by Birrenbach was the subject of meetings between 
leadership figures of both organizations, actual collab ration never moved beyond the 
already mentioned joint research studies.203  True, Birrenbach fathomed the motives for 
the hostility directed towards his proposals, but this made it no less frustrating for him, 
and well into the life of the commission, he continued to bemoan its defects.204   
                                                
202 Opposition came as well from the Keidenren, which handled AI affairs in Japan.  On the theme of 
opposition, see the record of the Discussion of the European Regional Meeting, Sunday, 9 May 1976, 
Ottawa, ACDP K056/2 and Karl Kaiser’s Note About the Meeting of the European Members of the 
ExComm of the Trilateral Commission at Giovanni Agnelli’s in Turin on 10-11 October (1975), dated 14 
October 1975, ACDP K072/2.  Birrenbach’s own proposal to utilize the AI as infrastructure, a general 
concept to which the Americans objected, also encoutered a “massive resistance” on the part of the French 
representative at the meeting of the European members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in Brussels that 
Birrenbach could not overcome even by means of a personal talk (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 
9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2).  Diverse arguments were mustered against such cooperation or mergers: for 
example, that Atlanticism and Trilateralism did notenjoy the same basis of support; that two bodies could 
not effectively run a single research program; and that a provisional commission and a quasi-permanent 
institute, one focused primarily on contacts and the other on research, could not be married together.   
203 With regard to such meetings, for instance, an ad hoc Working Group, under the chairmanship of Amb. 
Egidio Ortona (Italy) and comprising personalities connected with the Atlantic Institute and the Trilater l 
Commission, gathered in Paris on 26-27 February 1978 to consider possibilities for the future relationship 
of their two institutions.  On this theme, see The Future Relationship Between the Trilateral Commission 
and the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs: Indications of Possibilities, ACDP K204/2.   
204 For Birrenbach’s recognition of “Japan’s special situation [Sondersituation]” and his appreciation of 
that situation’s impact on the Japanese posture, see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 
November 1973, ACDP K081/2. 
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Given this mixed picture of a permanent but, from Birrenbach’s perspective, 
flawed trilateral organization, what was the ultimate meaning for Birrenbach and German 
Atlanticism of the Trilateral Commission?  On one level, the TC helped create linkages 
between the three trilateral regions, including betwe n Europe and Japan, involving the 
members of the German group.  Indeed, the commission became the centerpiece of a 
variety of complementary activities sprouting up around it and reinforcing such European 
contacts with Japan, among them separate European-Jap ese meetings staged in Japan 
(e.g. in Hakone).  For Birrenbach, a “Trilateral network” rapidly emerged, appended to, 
and in many cases overlapping with, the Atlanticist networks we have already examined.  
This Trilateral network consisted, to a great extent, of many of his Atlanticist contacts, 
sometimes now in different capacities, and encompassed a diversity of subsets: the 
overall leaders of the commission (Rockefeller, Brzezinski); the heads of the American 
and European groups (Smith, Kohnstamm); the members of the ExComm, especially the 
European ones (also certain personalities of the broader European group); the German 
members of the commission, particularly those from the Union; as well as the crucial 
financial contributors, namely the chiefs of the German economic Spitzenverbänden and 
the relevant liaisons in the Auswärtigen Amt.  Thanks to this network, functioning via 
correspondence, telephone, private discussions and larger trilateral meetings, Birrenbach 
remained apprised of and provided information about the state and activities of the 
commission and its sundry elements; passed on copies f task force reports and working 
papers emerging from the commission; played a role in managing the commission and in 
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making key decisions determining its practices and future; pressed his case for changes to  
the commission; and secured the necessary financial support on a continuous basis.205 
Beyond this expansive administrative network, the Trilateral Commission 
benefited Birrenbach in his political activities by, to some extent, enhancing his already 
impressive array of contacts.  This development principally occurred in a distinctly 
“Atlanticist” direction as Birrenbach established new linkages with certain figures based 
in the “Atlantic region” and found further field toreinforce his ties to and utilize 
effectively his numerous existing American and European contacts that were now taking 
part in the commission.206  Participation in the Trilateral Commission also enabled 
Birrenbach to expand his links in subsequent years with respect to Japan.  These 
connections, which encompassed top members of the Japanese Diet, never formed much 
in the way of correspondence or other long-distance communications.  Rather they were 
accessed primarily within the framework of the gatherings of the Trilateral Commission 
itself and occasionally proved useful for Birrenbach in gathering information about vital 
issues, such as those surrounding nuclear energy (e.g. th  Non-Proliferation Treaty), and 
especially Japanese attitudes towards them, as well as insights into overall events in 
Asia.207  Birrenbach’s endeavors along such lines were aided by the commission’s 
                                                
205 For example, see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2; KB 
to Alwin Münchmeyer, 26 September 1973, ACDP K081/1; and KB to the Members of the German Group 
of the Trilateral Commission, 15 June 1977, ACDP K056/1.  In his efforts to alter the commission’s focus, 
especially with regard to the issue of security, Birrenbach acted along with a number of other Europeans on 
the ExComm and, furthermore, often presented this matter as a concern of the European group as a whole.  
206 Thus, the American group comprised at one time or an ther George Ball, Robert Bowie, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Henry Owen and George Franklin (Coordinator of the Trilateral Commission 
from 1977-82, Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1953-71). 
207 For Japan being among those countries (along with other “non-nuclear powers” like India, Sweden and 
Brazil) whose “demands [Forderungen]” vis-à-vis the “atomic powers” Birrenbach recommend d the 
Federal Republic “to join [anzuschließen]” so as to provide the efforts to present “our rese ve 
[Zurückhaltung]” towards and to modify the “Atomsperrvertrag” with a generalized “screen [Schirm]” of 
“cover [Deckung],” see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 19 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.   
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nurturing of its relations with governments and intergovernmental organizations, which 
made up a constituent aspect of its attempts to augment its own influence.  Participants in 
Trilateral Commission meetings usually engaged, as part of these functions, in 
consultations with key governmental officials in the ost country, among them assorted 
presidents (including each of the US presidents), prime ministers, cabinet members and 
other prominent political and parliamentary figures, some of whom themselves had once 
been commission members.  They also met with leading personalities of 
intergovernmental institutions like the World Bank and the European Commission.208   
Finally, the Trilateral Commission constituted part of a noteworthy broadening 
around this time of the German Atlanticist geographical and thematic perspective.  
Amidst still-pursued earlier approaches, this trend was reflected as well in the 
composition and activities of other elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure, among them 
many of those outlined earlier in this chapter such as the Mid-Atlantic Clubs, the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, the Aspen Institute Berlin, and the various youth-
oriented entities.209  The AI’s Board of Governors now subtly signaled such changes by 
                                                
208 For example, the members of the Trilateral Commission came together for consultations over the years, 
to focus on the United States for the moment, with American Presidents (e.g. Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, 
Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan); Secretaries of State (Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance); as well as other 
cabinet officers (Secretary of Defense Harold Brown; Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson; Secretary 
of Transportation William Coleman; Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher) and a number of US 
Congressmen.  Richardson and Coleman were former members of the TC.  While in Washington DC, 
members also met with luminaries like World Bank President Robert McNamara.  Similarly, during the TC 
European plenary meeting in Brussels on 26 May 1977, participants consulted with personalities of the 
European Commission, including in the context of sessions chaired by the President (Roy Jenkins) and the 
Vice President and Commissioner for External Affairs (Wilhelm Haferkamp).  Details in “Trilateral 
Commission Meets in Ottawa,” ACDP K056/2; the Report on the Trilateral Commission Washington 
Meeting of 12 May 1976, ACDP K056/2; and the Record f the Trilateral Commission Europe Plenary 
Meeting, Brussels, 26 May 1977, ACDP K056/1. 
209 Thus, speakers at the London MAC included, on 19 November 1971, Amb. Joseph Greenwald (US 
Representative to the OECD) about “Prospects for Trans-Atlantic/Trans-Pacific Trade Relations” and, on 
12 April 1972, John Tuthill (Director General of the Atlantic Institute, Paris) about “Japan, the United 
States and an Enlarged EEC.”  In addition to the stres  placed on the United States and Europe, GMF 
financing activities also encompassed other, actually virtually all, regions of the world.  By the end of 1978, 
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augmenting their organization’s name to the more spatially extensive Atlantic Institute 
for International Affairs.210  These trends were underpinned by the recognition of a  
international interdependence existing not only betwe n the industrial United States and 
Europe but increasingly reigning in a modern world that also comprised other developed 
as well as developing societies and that, far from s lely providing benefits, might at times 
stoke tensions among countries with conflicting, rather than strictly mutual, interests; 
coupled with a desire to transcend Cold War themes in a period of détente.  Intertwined 
                                                                                                                                      
welcome project applications were flowing from indivi uals and institutions in the United States, 
practically each of the European countries, Japan as well as other industrial nations, and a total of fifty-two 
industrial and developing countries were engaged in such projects, either through a direct participation of 
persons or institutions or in the form of subject matter.     
At least initially, the AIB concentrated its work on seven Schwerpunkte: Environment and Quality 
of Life; International Affairs; Communication and Society; Science, Technology and Humanism; Justice, 
Society and the Individual; Education for a Changing World; and Pluralism and Society.  Other AIB 
conference themes over the years included, for instance, “Changing Roles of Men and Women” and, more 
generally, those pertaining to Wirtschaft as well as Bildung, art and culture.  Meanwhile, the AIB’s Second 
German-American Economic Seminar, planned for December 1978, was expected to address North-South 
questions and the relationship to the Third World.  Indeed, Paul Volcker (President of the Federal Reserv  
Bank of New York), one of the initiators of this particular seminar, was motivated to a great extent by the 
hope that these gatherings could help the West, especially the United States and the Federal Republic, 
prepare to act in concert in the face of future thrats like that emanating from OPEC.  For AIB conferences 
in the field Communication and Society comprising topics like “European-American Relations in the 
Mirror of the Press,” “Informationspolitik in the Countries of the Third World,” and “Ownership Structure 
[Eigentumsverhältnisse] in the Press [Pressewesen],” see the AIB-Pressemitteilung, 10 April 1984, ACDP 
K191/2.  Those involved in the AIB management and activities originated from a wide geographic 
spectrum.  For the AIB being led by an “international board [Gremium]” consisting of scholars as well as 
“men and women of public life” in Europe, Asia, Africa and the United States, and for participants in AIB 
conferences and other functions hailing not only from Western Europe and North America but also “from 
all parts of the world,” see the Brochure on the AIHS (USA) and AIB, ACDP K191/2.   
Finally, such “expansionist” currents were also apparent in the discussions staged during this 
period by the Atlanticist youth organizations, whether at the AB’s German-American Youth Conferences 
(e.g. the “North-South Dialogue,” including relations between developed and less-developed countries, the 
New International Economic Order, and development aid; “Internal Affairs,” like “The Responsibility of 
Government in a Democratic Society,” “The Family in Modern Society,” along with topics pertaining to 
domestic political, business, banking and legal affairs and systems; and “The Future” (for instance, 
questions about the fundamental values of the Western world)); the DEG’s Young Königswinter 
Conferences (e.g. “A World Thrown Off-Balance,” “The Bridging of the Differences and Gaps in the 
Modern Society” and “For which Goals should the Free World Struggle?”); or EURNAC (“Political 
Decision-Making and Technological Development,” “Public Policy for the Multinational Corporation,” 
“Policy Implications of the Changing Roles of Women and Men in Society,” “The Public Responsibility of 
Television,” “Science and Technology and the Public Interest,” and “The Environment.”   
210 As of April 1975, while vigilant against “the danger of expanding into an unwieldy private sector UN 
organization,” the Atlantic Institute was planning to invite, for the first time, business and banking figures 
from outside the nations represented on the AI Board f Governors to the next Participating Members 
meeting and was also considering opening up Participa ing Membership to firms and other bodies based in 
countries beyond the OECD area (John Loudon to Max Kohnstamm, 28 April 1975, ACDP K072/2).   
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with his continued focus on the vital Atlantic sphere, Birrenbach himself exhibited a 
notable interest in regions outside of Europe and the United States during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, for example tracking events in East and Southeast Asia during the 
Americans’ “Vietnam period” as well as those in theMiddle East with an eye towards its 
essential oil supplies.211  Though less pronounced, a certain penchant of the German 
Atlanticists to think in terms of the “world situation” (e.g. world politics, the world 
economy), to demonstrate an interest in regions outide of the Atlantic Community 
proper, and to exhibit a cognizance of the emergence of the Asian, Latin American, and 
African nations as a factor in international affairs was apparent well before the early 
1970s.  Already by the early to mid-1950s, Birrenbach was quite aware of the possible 
effects of happenings in the Far East (e.g. China and Indochina) on the situation in 
Europe and by the early 1960s evinced a definite interest in development policy.212  Early 
                                                
211 For developments in China offering one possible basis for the transformation of the “world 
constellation [Weltkonstellation]” imperative to bringing about a “European peace order 
[Friedensordnung]” (i.e. the “abolition [Aufhebung] of the status quo”), see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, 
Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.  On the crucial need to determine and weigh the attitudes of the 
main “threshold powers” in arriving at a definitive judgement of the NPT, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner 
Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 
1968, ACDP K020/1.  For the significance of the Middle East due to “the European dependence upon oil” 
and, though this stake required that Europe’s voice be heard there, Birrenbach’s feeling “ashamed” at the 
“deplorable” “attitude of Europe in the Near East conflict,” see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 
1973, ACDP K184/2.  On Birrenbach’s anxiety as of late 1973 regarding the possible impact of the “oil 
crisis,” see KB to Frau Prof. Dr. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP 
K028/1.  For Birrenbach’s fear, related to the “problems of energy and inflation,” that the “Middle East 
conflict” could endanger or “even destroy the cohesion not only of the European Community, but also of 
NATO,” see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.  More 
sweepingly, on Birrenbach’s assessment that the entire world constellation had changed and his contention 
that one now had to consider the global perspective, se  his February 1973 Europa-Archiv article “Partner 
oder Rivalen?” (3/1973), a work based on his talks with contacts in the US and among those writings from 
this period that dealt with issues soon to be addressed by the Trilateral Commission.     
212 On events in China holding substantial significance (even “world-historical importance”) in so far as 
“every bipolarity of a political and doctrinal nature within the communist imperium” (here between the 
Soviet Union and China, including Mao’s rise in stature following Stalin’s death) contained the potential 
“in the long-run to awaken tendencies towards independence [Selbständigkeitstendenzen] within the 
satellite states,” see “Rußland nach dem Tode Stalins,” by KB, Düsseldorf, 10 September 1953, ACDP 
K001/1.  For Birrenbach also following events in Indochina as of the mid-1950s with respect to their 
impact on France, see “Um das Schicksal der EVG,” by KB, 9 May 1954, ACDP K001/1.  Later, in his 
book The Future of the Atlantic Community, Birrenbach emphasized that a coordinated action vis-à- is the 
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evidence of this process also revealed itself through the products, including studies and 
publications, emerging from the Atlanticist organizat ons, with the Atlantic Institute even 
establishing in 1962 a rather prolific Latin American program.213   
Nevertheless, it can be said as a whole that Birrenbach, like many other 
Europeans apparently, never totally embraced the trilateral ethos.  This is indicated, for 
instance, by the fundamental geographic composition of his network of contacts.  While 
the Trilateral Commission undoubtedly improved his links with Japan, Birrenbach did not 
seriously cultivate there anything remotely approaching the plethora of contacts he 
already enjoyed in the Atlantic realm, particularly in the United States.  Whether in an 
administrative or a political sense, Birrenbach’s trilateral network would not extend in 
any substantial way to the Far East.  Birrenbach’s oncern about the attention being 
lavished on Japan even manifested itself in his displeasure with the choice of Tokyo as 
the site for the first ExComm conference on 22-23 October 1973, a selection he attributed 
to the American view that “the Japanese problem” was “especially urgent.”214  For 
Birrenbach, whatever his considerable engagement, the Trilateral Commission and the 
broader notion of trilateralism were, ultimately, at best a useful offshoot of Atlanticism 
and at worst a dangerous distraction from the most significant, still chiefly “Cold War,” 
matters.  Indeed, the commission served him largely as et another means, a 
                                                                                                                                      
developing countries, especially in light of the efforts of the East Bloc, was the greatest economic task of 
the Western world since the Marshall Plan and urged m asures to open the markets of the industrialized 
countries to the goods from these developing nations, including the requisite structural industrial changes in 
the West, and to reduce the fluctuations of raw materi l prices.   
213 Already the first two DGAP Research Institute yearbooks, appearing in 1958 and 1961 respectively, 
aspired explicitly to provide in-depth accounts of the “Weltpolitik,”  while other DGAP Research Institute 
publications around this time included Südostasien seit 1945 by Emanuel Sarkisyanz (1961) as well as 
“Weltpolitische Aspekte des chinesischen Bürgerkrieges” by Gottfried-Karl Kindermann (planned to have 
published in 1962).  Likewise, the studies produced by the Atlantic Institute in the mid-1960s included “A 
Monetary Policy for Latin America” by Pierre Uri.    
214 KB to Hans-Günther Sohl, President of the BDI eV, Cologne, 26 July 1973, ACDP K081/1. 
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“Verbindungsglied,” to enhance his contacts with the US, for example especially within 
the Carter administration, and the rest of the Atlantic world.  Another, perhaps secondary, 
factor in Birrenbach’s ongoing participation in the commission was a desire to placate its 
American promoters by acceding to their wishes regarding its continuation.215  Despite 
the undeniable role of the Trilateral Commission in expanding the geographic and 
thematic nature of German Atlanticism, Birrenbach, and probably at least some other 
Germans with him, remained convinced of the primary importance of the bilateral 
European-American partnership in which security issue  yet enjoyed a central place. 
K. Conclusion 
 The late 1960s and early 1970s saw German Atlanticism, as we have been 
examining it through the person of Kurt Birrenbach, in a state of transition.  True, much 
remained essentially unchanged.  German Atlanticism still involved not merely action on 
the level of government but also on the level of private initiatives and institutions.  These 
private individuals and organizations went on espouing many of the same prescriptions 
as before, such as those pertaining to a close relationship between the Wissenschaft and 
Politik.  Their activities continued to rely on the financial support of the firms of the 
Wirtschaft, the Stiftungen, the political parties, trade unions, and governmet.  As 
Birrenbach’s ongoing presence demonstrates, numerous major personalities persisted in 
their engagement.  However, German Atlanticism was also evolving, indeed operating in 
two main directions.  Among these was a direct attempt to strengthen trans-Atlantic 
relations, in large part, through the maintenance of existing Atlanticist institutions as well 
as the creation of new ones.  At the same time, there was an effort, to a great extent 
American-inspired, to expand the scope of Atlanticism itself both thematically and 
                                                
215 KB to the Members of the German Group of the Trilater l Commission, 15 June 1977, ACDP K056/1.   
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geographically, most strikingly to take account of he growing and now essential role of 
Japan in trans-Atlantic relations.  This latter especially found organizational expression in 
the establishment of the Trilateral Commission.  However, such recognitions and 
undertakings, whatever their benefits, simultaneously represented a potential threat to 
certain “Cold War” German Atlanticists, in so far as Birrenbach and others feared they 
would devalue the bilateral European-American relationship and dilute its distinctive 
focus on security and political affairs.  All of this occurred against a backdrop of 
economic troubles, demographic shifts in the United States, an aging Atlanticist network 
and disturbing strains in trans-Atlantic relations, a framework that provided impetus for 
the endeavors of Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists during this period, in 
addition to posing to them unique obstacles.              
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Chapter 9: German Atlanticism as a “Mature” Establishment Phenomenon 
 
A. Birrenbach’s Changing Position 
 Although he continued to work quite relentlessly in h s later years, from 
approximately 1973 onward Birrenbach gradually began to relinquish some of his varied 
posts and memberships.  This was the case at Thyssen, wh re in April 1973, he gave up 
the chairmanship of the Aufsichtsrat of the August-Thyssen-Hütte AG to Hans-Günther 
Sohl and became that body’s deputy chairman.  In late November 1979, essentially after 
twenty-five years, Birrenbach resigned as chairman of the Verwaltungsrat of the Thyssen 
Vermögensverwaltung GmbH.  Finally and most significantly, in June 1981, Birrenbach 
vacated the chairmanship of the V rwaltungsrat of the important Thyssen 
Beteiligungsverwaltung GmbH (Düsseldorf) and, as a result, all of his places in the 
Aufsichtsräten of the other Gesellschaften of the Thyssen group, including that of the 
Thyssen AG (the former ATH).1  Long after he had resigned from his official positi ns at 
the firm, Birrenbach retained contact with Thyssen, fu ctioning in particular as an 
advisor to Dieter Spethmann, Sohl’s successor as chirman of the ATH-Vorstand, as well 
as more broadly to the Thyssen AG, where he also continued to maintain a Düsseldorf 
office and to enjoy a certain high-quality, albeit considerably numerically and temporally 
diminished, secretarial assistance.  Furthermore, even after formally leaving Thyssen, 
Birrenbach acted as something of an informal lobbyist on behalf of the West German 
Wirtschaft, especially the Thyssen AG, in cooperation and coordination with Sohl, 
Spethmann and the Düsseldorf-based Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie.2  
                                                
1 At the same time that Birrenbach departed, Sohl left his post as chairman of the Thyssen AG’s 
Aufsichtsrat.  Founded in 1976, the Thyssen Beteiligungsverwaltung GmbH was the largest shareholder of 
the Thyssen AG, containing that big Paket of Thyssen stock also owned by the Allianz insurance company.  
2 Spethmann served simultaneously from 1974-84 as chirman of the WVES. 
 523
Nevertheless, on balance, the upshot was that Birrenbach had substantially reduced his 
presence and engagement in the realm of the Wirtschaft.   
A similar trend was discernable with respect to Birrenbach and the German 
Atlanticist organizations.  Long after the triumphant conclusion of the struggle against 
Occidentalism, the institutions created and inhabited by the Atlanticists remained active, 
carrying on many of the same types of endeavors and performing many of the same 
functions as before.  Even subsequent to leaving the Bundestag (see later in this chapter), 
Birrenbach stayed involved in preparing and participating in their administrative 
meetings, for instance those of the Atlantic Institute and Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, and major gatherings, such as those staged by the Atlantik-Brücke, the Deutsch-
Englischen Gesellschaft and the Trilateral Commission.3  Such activities, along with a 
number of one-time events, continued to prove of significance for Birrenbach (also for 
his fellow German Atlanticists), providing him with e coveted opportunity to engage in 
a valuable exchange of views with foreign participants; enlightening insight into their 
perspectives and attitudes and, by extension, into the policies of their respective nations; 
as well as the occasion to undertake potentially fruitful efforts at persuasion.  Thus, much 
as before, they considerably shaped Birrenbach’s outlook on key substantive issues, in 
addition to the overall international situation, and were crucial in attempts to further 
                                                
3 Among the functions in which Birrenbach took part were the now biennial German-American 
Conferences (the 9th on 4-6 March 1977 in Princeton (NJ); the 10th on 15-18 March 1979 in Hamburg; the 
11th from 19-22 March 1981 at Princeton University); the Königswinter Conferences, including those held 
in Britain (Oxford in April 1978, Cambridge in March 1980); the annual Fall meetings of the AI Foreign 
Policy Committee with the NATO Council and the European Commission in Brussels (including at Comte 
René Boël’s Château du Chenoy); and certain gatherings of the Trilateral Commission (e.g. Plenary 
Conference in Bonn in October 1977 and Plenary Confere ce in Washington DC in June 1978).  For 
Birrenbach chairing the annual Atlantica-Atlantic Institute colloquia, here comprising American, French, 
Dutch and German personalities in June 1980 in Cologne and dealing with “the current world situation and 
the consequences for European-American relations,” encompassing issues like détente, the military balance 
as well as the Persian Gulf “crisis” (Birrenbach’s word), see Walter Stahl to Atlantica Members, 16 May 
1980, ACDP K142/1 and KB to Paul Riebenfeld, 27 June 1980, ACDP K092/3.      
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maintain his network of foreign, particularly American, and West German political 
contacts, especially thanks to the many available possibilities to converse face-to-face at 
length with them and other figures either at the functions themselves or on the periphery.4  
The German-American Conference in March 1977 and the Königswinter Conferences of 
1977 and 1980 are illustrative in so far as they were c ntral in alarming and galvanizing 
Birrenbach with respect to the Carter administration’s new non-proliferation policy and 
what he considered the negative British attitude towards European unification.5  
                                                
4 On Birrenbach having “long talks [Unterredungen],” at least in part with respect to nuclear issues, with 
Emile van Lennep (OECD Secretary General), Ulf Lantzke (Executive Director of the International Energy 
Agency) and “several American representatives” in the framework of AI meetings in Paris in mid-
December 1977, see KB to State Secretary Hans-Hilger Haunschild (Bundesministerium für Forschung und 
Technologie), 20 December 1977, ACDP K182/1.  For the US Secretary of Defense speaking of “the 
necessity of developing new tactical nuclear weapons” (perhaps referring to “the neutron weapon”) in 
response to Birrenbach’s concrete inquiry in the context of the TC gathering in Washington DC in mid-
June 1978, see KB to Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 19 June 1978, 
ACDP K153/1.  For Birrenbach making the acquaintance of Arthur Burns, soon to be appointed US 
ambassador to the Federal Republic, and Lawrence Eagl burger, soon to be appointed Assistant Secretary 
of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, at the March 1981 German-American Conference in Princeton 
(NJ), see KB to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Washington DC, 24 June 1981, ACDP K146/2.  
Regarding one-time events, in November 1982, Birrenbach attended a four-day German-American 
gathering on “The Future of German-American Relations” in Bad Godesberg’s Hotel Dreesen, organized 
by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, where he spoke personally with Paul Nitze (leader of the US delegation 
in the INF talks in Geneva), Amb. Robert Grey (Acting Deputy Director of the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency), Amb. Edward Rowny (chief US negotiator in the START talks in Geneva), former 
ambassador Jonathan Dean (who until recently had con ucted the MBFR negotiations for the US), Richard 
Allen (former Reagan national security advisor), former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as well as 
numerous American congressmen (including briefly Sen. Sam Nunn (GA)) and press representatives.   
5 At the German-American Conference in March 1977, Birrenbach along with some other Germans openly  
and bitterly criticized, in Birrenbach’s case perhaps too sharply, the Carter administration’s policy on non-
proliferation and the “peaceful use of nuclear energy,” as it had been explained there by American 
participants like Gerard Smith (soon to be appointed Carter’s Special Representative for Non-Proliferation 
Matters), McGeorge Bundy (President of the Ford Foundation), and Joseph Nye (Deputy to the Under 
Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science a d Technology).  Also significant in sparking 
Birrenbach’s fears regarding the Carter administration’s policy in this field were the proceedings at the
International Atomforum Conference staged in New York just a few days later.  Beyond the substance, 
Birrenbach found it disturbing that the US administration had fundamentally declined the invitations to 
dispatch its key representatives (e.g. Mondale, Vance, Brzezinski, Christopher) to these two conferences, 
thus forestalling a proper dialogue.  For instance, at the International Atomforum Conference, attended by 
figures from dozens of nations, the US was represent d by only a relatively young, subordinate B amten 
who issued no statement relevant to the theme.  Following the March 1977 German-American Conference, 
Bundy sent Birrenbach the recently released study on “Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices,” produced by 
the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group (chaired by Spurgeon Keeny Jr., sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation, and administered by the MITRE corporatin) that formed the basis of his remarks at the 
conference and, at least in part, of the Carter administration’s nuclear energy policy.  On Birrenbach being 
“disappointed” as of early June 1977 about “the British attitude at Königswinter” that year regarding 
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In June 1973, Birrenbach assumed from Günter Henle the mantle of DGAP 
president, so inheriting the leadership of an institution facing serious organizational and 
financial challenges.  In this capacity, Birrenbach focused his attention primarily on 
carrying out effective fund-raising campaigns.  Though the rapidly increasing complexity 
of world affairs dictated an expansionary development of the DGAP and its activities, he 
also steadfastly rejected proposals during his tenure to transform the DGAP into a type of 
“super-organization.”  Largely as a result of Birrenbach’s course and efforts, the DGAP 
was able to remain afloat even while continuing to rely significantly on funding from the 
Wirtschaft and consistently limiting or outright rejecting governmental outlays, thus 
securing its immediate financial (as well as political) independence from the state.6  
Working intensively within the framework of its institutional structure, Birrenbach 
crucially stamped the DGAP during this time, playing a central part in policy and 
personnel decisions and, in this way, reshaping the composition of key organizational 
bodies (e.g. the Präsidium, the Geschäftsführenden Präsidium) as well as constantly 
influencing and stimulating substantive endeavors, not least by securing outstanding 
figures (among them his own foreign contacts) to deliver the regular Vorträge before the 
members.7  Meanwhile, he continued to engage in the steady stream of DGAP activities, 
                                                                                                                                      
Europe as well as that in “our meeting” of the European members of the Trilateral Commission with the 
European Commission in Brussels in late May “the British participants” had avoided taking a clear positi n 
apropos “the fundamental questions the present situation raises concerning the future of the [European] 
Community,” see KB to Julian Ridsdale, MP, Chairman of the Anglo-Japanese Parliamentary Group, 
London, 3 June 1977, ACDP K068/2.  For Birrenbach finding the “anti-European” stances of the British a 
manifested at the 1980 KWC “worse than could be imag ned” and also finding them “clearly [eindeutig] 
anti-French (which I understand),” see KB to Robert St ausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980, ACDP K210/2.   
6 Birrenbach was greatly assisted in financing campaigns by the successive DGAP treasurers: Gotthard 
Freiherr von Falkenhausen (until 1975; the Bankhaus CG Trinkaus & Burkhardt, Essen); Jürgen Ponto 
(1975-77; Vorstandssprecher, Dresdner Bank AG); and Hans Friderichs (starting in 1978; 
Vorstandssprecher, Dresdner Bank AG).  Such figures engaged in campaign planning, lent their names to 
these fund-raising efforts, and themselves carried out targeted interventions vis-à-vis proposed firms.   
7 DGAP guest speakers in this period included Congressman John Anderson (US presidential candidate; 
July 1980); Jean-Pierre Brunet (French ambassador to the Federal Republic; October 1979); Richard Burt 
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retaining his chairmanship of the Study Group II until 1978, when he was succeeded by 
the CDU MdB Richard von Weizsäcker, and leading the Vortragsveranstaltungen, which 
not only provided him the opportunity to present his own, often pregnant, introductory 
remarks but also to talk alone at length with many of the guest speakers.8 
However, Birrenbach also gradually withdrew from the Atlanticist organizations.  
Beginning in the late 1970s, he officially resigned his place in the TC ExComm (October 
1979), the DGAP presidency (June 1981), membership in the SWP Stiftungsrat (October 
1982), his post in the AB Vorstand (July 1984), his positions in the AI (vice presidency in 
June 1982; spot on the Board of Governors apparently in December 1984), and the 1st
Chairmanship of the Atlantica (December 1984).9  Birrenbach’s participation in the 
various Atlanticist gatherings, like the Bilderberg Conferences, waned as well, 1983 
being the last year he attended a German-American Conference and the Königswinter 
Conference, though even afterwards he trained an alert eye on the goings-on at such 
                                                                                                                                      
(New York Times; October 1978); Lord Carrington (British Foreign Secretary; October 1979 on “Europe: 
Prosperity and Security”); Jacques Chirac (Mayor of Paris; October 1978 on “European Perspectives”); 
Hans-Georg Wieck (former West German ambassador to Moscow and new ambassador to NATO; 
November 1980 on “The Soviet Union in the 80s”); SACEUR Gen. Alexander Haig (October 1975 and 
September 1978); Giovanni Malagodi (Chairman of the I alian Liberal Party (PLI), Monnet Committee 
member; October 1974 on “Europe, seen from Rome”); Yohanan Meroz (Israeli ambassador in Bonn; 
November 1976 on “Prospects for Peace in the Near East”); Konstantinos Mitsotakis (Greek Foreign 
Minister; May 1981 on “The Foreign Policy of Greece after the Entrance in the EC”); the retired Israeli 
diplomat Gideon Rafael (April 1981 and September 1983); SACEUR Gen. Bernard Rogers (October 1980 
on “NATO in the 1980s: A Decade of Challenge and Decision”); Eugene Rostow (Director of the US 
ACDA; October 1981 on “Arms Control in the 80s: Problems and Concepts”); Sir Christopher Soames 
(Vice President of the European Commission; May 1974 on “Europe in the World”); and US Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger (May 1983).  For more, also earlier, speakers, see Ch. 7, p. 353, fn. 1.   
8 After being elected Governing Mayor of Berlin, Weizsäcker was himself succeeded in 1981 by the CDU 
MdB Alois Mertes as chairman of the Study Group II.  As before, this body explored the broad 
development of East-West relations as well as more specific themes, during the first half of the 1980s, for 
example, facets of the Polish “crisis,” among them the current state of West German-Polish relations and 
conceptual considerations of Western policy towards Poland.     
9 For Birrenbach’s resignation from the TC ExComm, see KB to David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board 
of Chase Manhattan Bank, New York City, 1 October 1979, ACDP K081/3 and KB to Georges Berthoin, 
European President of the Trilateral Commission, 28 September 1979, ACDP K081/3.  In 1973, Birrenbach 
relinquished the chairmanship and in June 1982 the vice chairmanship of the AI Foreign Policy Committee 
but seems to have remained a member of that entity until December 1984.  Birrenbach had succeeded 
Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim as 1st Chairman of the Atlantica in June 1977.  Beyond all this, 
Birrenbach also left the Senate of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft in May 1981.   
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events.10  In certain cases, he remained connected in some capacity with these 
organizations, for instance as honorary president of the DGAP (like Henle before him), as 
a member of the newly created AB Kuratorium, or as an ordinary member of the TC, thus 
facilitating a limited participation in, influence on and support for particular personalities, 
activities and projects, whether they be administrative and member meetings, especially 
interesting functions, or financing operations.11  Final performances of his gatekeeping 
role, Birrenbach often took part in identifying suitable successors, for instance Karl-
Heinz Narjes and Otto Wolff von Amerongen in the TC ExComm, Günter Diehl as 
DGAP president, and Wilfried Guth as vice president in the AI Board of Governors.12  
With regard to some bodies, among them those at the AI and SWP, a proud Birrenbach 
exited as the longest serving member.  Despite the accompanying recognition for his 
efforts and achievements, typically in the form of a copious correspondence and worthy 
farewell functions, Birrenbach usually found his departure from such institutions “pretty 
sad.”13  Nevertheless, with the exception of the AI, which ceased to exist in 1987, 
virtually all these organizations went on well after Birrenbach passed from the scene.14   
                                                
10 Birrenbach’s last Bilderberg Conference was that of April 1972 in Knokke (Belgium).  In March 1983, 
Birrenbach took part in the German-American Conference in West Berlin but had to leave on the first day
due to health issues (fever and bronchitis).  
11 Birrenbach was also bestowed the rare title of “Honorary Governor” by the AI and named Honorary 
Chairman of the Atlantica.  Similarly, in June 1977, Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim became 
honorary president of the Atlantica.  At the same time that Birrenbach resigned the DGAP presidency, 
Marion Gräfin Dönhoff left her post as a vice president and was elected an honorary member of the 
Präsidium.   
12 Narjes was a CDU MdB.  Birrenbach tapped Wolff von Amerongen, president of the DIHT and tied 
closely to the Chase Manhattan Bank, primarily due to his links with the Wirtschaft and his consequent 
value in securing the commission’s future German funding.  With regard to the DGAP presidency, 
Birrenbach undertook a trying and ultimately futile y ar-long search for a figure with direct contact to he 
Wirtschaft, in light of the organization’s financial situation, but did approve of his eventual replacement, 
the former ambassador and state secretary Diehl.  Guth was Vorstandssprecher of the Deutschen Bank AG.  
13 KB to John McCloy, 30 March 1981, ACDP K178/2, actually referring here to his final Thyssen 
meetings but also perfectly applicable elsewhere.  For example, Schlussveranstaltungen were staged for 
Birrenbach in 1981 within the context of the DGAP Präsidium and Mitgliederversammlung. 
14 As we have noted in Chapter 8, some Atlanticist organizations closed down earlier, most notably the 
Monnet Committee in 1975 as well as the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle in 1973.  
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Birrenbach’s relinquishing of such offices and positi ns owed much to advancing 
age and declining health.  As he bluntly put it to Max Kohnstamm in 1980, “enough is 
enough.”15  One particularly stark example illustrating the latter was Birrenbach’s 
resignation from the TC ExComm as a result of heart problems that increasingly rendered 
it inadvisable or even impossible for him to fly long distances, especially to Japan.  
However, given the obvious pleasure and meaning that Birrenbach derived from his work 
in the Atlanticist organizations, his laying down of these accustomed roles was never 
entirely voluntary, rather at best grudgingly accepted.  Indeed, Birrenbach’s departure 
from the DGAP presidency was to no small degree the belated, logical, and essentially 
amicable upshot of his own complicated efforts to ref rm and rejuvenate (“Verjüngung”) 
the Präsidium, efforts that also impacted during the late 1970s and early 1980s on the 
now elderly Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, Carlo Schmid, Hans-Günther Sohl, and Hans 
Speidel.16  In some cases, Birrenbach openly bristled when he sensed, rightly or wrongly, 
that he was being unjustifiably excluded from, for example, the Königswinter 
Conferences or certain AB activities.17  Thus, Birrenbach did, at times, experience the 
frustration of other older Atlanticists, some of whom, usually not disinterestedly, warned 
that the institutional desire to introduce “fresh blood” into the network was tipping the 
balance too far towards the side of callow youth.18  In the final analysis, Birrenbach 
                                                
15 KB to Kohnstamm, 24 January 1980, ACDP K150/2. 
16 An internal DGAP group decided which members should be cordially requested, including by a 
sometimes remorseful Birrenbach, to resign whether du  to age or lack of participation.  This body 
permitted Birrenbach, whose exit had already been announced the previous year, to stay on until 1981.   
17 For a peeved Birrenbach not having been invited “for the first time in thirty years” to the KWC, see KB 
to Prof. Hans Merkle, Chairman of the Geschäftsführung of the Robert Bosch GmbH, 12 February 1982, 
ACDP K076/2.  On a likewise irritated Birrenbach not being invited to the 7th German-American Young 
Leaders Conference, staged by the AB and ACG in Hamburg in August 1984, see KB to Peter Pechel, Vice 
Chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke, Bonn, 20 September 1984, ACDP K054/1.     
18 On the need for “fresh blood,” see the Protocol of the AB-Vorstand Meeting on 28 January 1980 in 
Bonn, ACDP K114/2 and the Hanns Maull memo to David Rockefeller et al., on the European Response 
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became, to an extent, a victim of processes, whatever heir broader merits, that he too had 
played a considerable part in promoting within the Atlanticist infrastructure.19 
The main exception to Birrenbach resigning his positions was his continuation as 
chairman of the Kuratorium in the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, a post he retained to the very 
end.  Unfortunately for Birrenbach, economic conditions from the mid-1970s onward, 
characterized by oil shocks and a dire crisis of the West German steel industry that he 
considered the worst since the Great Depression, somewhat crippled the Wirtschaft as a 
source of financing.  This situation was reflected in the mounting hurdles Birrenbach 
confronted in his ongoing efforts to gather money from the Wirtschaft, particularly to 
support Atlanticist organizations and endeavors, and also drastically impacted on the state 
of and dividends distributed by the Thyssen AG, whose shares still constituted the 
foundation’s “basic fund.”20  With its means thus limited, the Thyssen Stiftung 
substantially curtailed its overall program and individual grants, including for “foreign- 
political projects.”21  Nevertheless, Birrenbach was still able to effectiv ly promote 
                                                                                                                                      
about the Future of the Trilateral Commission, 24 January 1978, ACDP K204/2.  For much earlier 
complaints, specifically regarding the Königswinter Conferences, see Prof. Dr. Friedensburg (MdB) to KB, 
11 April 1963, ACDP K103/1 and Ernst-Ulrich Fromm, Die Welt, to KB, 20 January 1965, ACDP K103/1.   
19 Age dictated Birrenbach’s quite frictionless departure from the Thyssen group as well.   
20 For Birrenbach’s “extremely difficult” and “disappointing” experiences “today with the collecting of 
money [Geldern],” see KB to Dr. Karl Hohmann, Bonn, 4 November 1976, ACDP K190/2. 
21 On the disturbing shape of the European steel industry that had last year seen Thyssen as “almost the 
only company in Europe” that still distributed “some dividends,” see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 
24 June 1981, ACDP K178/2.  For the FTS issuing “merely” DM 4 million in “approvals” at its most recent 
meeting, whereas “earlier” DM 14 million would have b en typical, see KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupé, 
Newtown Square (PA), 20 July 1981, ACDP K210/2.  Onthe Thyssen AG paying no dividends in 1984 
“for the first time in its history” due to the “structural crisis” that afflicted the steel industry in Germany 
(and “all other countries”), see KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Honorary President of the Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV, Munich, 9 February 1984, ACDP K030/1.  For a 
particular German sensitivity to the current recession in Europe that was “the worst… since the end of the 
war” (indeed a “deep economic crisis” whose “solution” was still not yet in sight), especially as “Germany 
has made this experience now the third time in its recent history,” see KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
CSIS, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 7 Decemb r 1982, ACDP K132/2.  On Birrenbach being 
“glad” that J. Robert Schaetzel’s “very valuable” and “useful” project, designed to establish a “special 
arrangement” between the directly elected European Parliament and the US Congress and in which Prof. 
Karl Kaiser (Director of the DGAP Research Institute) was also involved, would apparently be supported 
 530
specific research directions, while the hobbled FTS managed, in part relying on its 
reserves, to remain active during these lean years in a surprising breadth of fields, not 
least through the encouraging, organizing and financing of important Atlanticist 
initiatives, among them conferences, studies and guest professorships.22  German 
Atlanticist entities like the DGAP and the Atlantic Institute, as well as several like-
minded, strictly American outfits such as the Brookings Institution (Washington DC) and 
the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Cambridge MA), ranked as some of the most 
prominent beneficiaries.23  Simultaneously, other Atlanticist-inclined West German 
                                                                                                                                      
by the European Cultural Foundation (Netherlands) rather than by the FTS, see Schaetzel to KB, 31 
January 1979, ACDP K098/2 and KB to Schaetzel, Washington DC, 13 February 1979, ACDP K098/2.  
Here, Birrenbach cited the “very severe” impact on he Thyssen AG of “the five years’ crisis of the stel 
industry” (“the deepest since fifty years”), intensified by “a steel workers’ strike of fifty days.”   
22 On the Thyssen Stiftung being forced this year (1984) to “dig into” its reserves, see KB to Butenandt, 9 
February 1984, ACDP K030/1.  Regardless, Birrenbach maintained in this letter to Butenandt that “the 
level [Niveau] of the discussions” in the FTS was “still excellent [vorzüglich].”    
23 For example, the FTS financed The Atlantic Community in Crisis (New York City: Pergamon Press, 
1979), a work produced by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., edited by Prof. Walter Hahn a d 
Prof. Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr., and also appearing several years later in the Federal Republic in German 
translation (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982).  Founded in 1976, the IFPA was associated with the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University).  During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Birrenbach was 
in contact via correspondence with Pfaltzgraff (IFPA resident) and Hahn (IFPA Deputy Director).  
Furthermore, the FTS funded the IFPA’s Cape Route st dy that by August 1982 had so far spawned three 
published monographs.  Along with private American sources, the FTS funded the work of the Brookings 
Institution on new forms of “International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy,” including a small conferenc 
convened in Bellagio (Italy) in late March 1980.  Meanwhile, the FTS proposed and financed an AI study 
on “The Future of Berlin,” edited by Martin Hillenbrand (AI Director General), that emerged as a book in 
English (Montclair NJ: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1980) and German (Frankfurt, Berlin, Vienna: Ullstein, 
1981).  Similarly, the DGAP study on “Die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie und Nichtverbreitung,” 
expected to appear soon as of May 1981, enjoyed FTS funding.  On the FTS about to examine an 
application of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington DC) for a project dealing with 
“The Neutralist Temptation in Europe” that would involve American and German figures like Henry 
Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Adelbert Weinstein, see KB to John McCloy, 30 November 1981, 
New York City, ACDP K132/2.  For Heino von Meyer (Institut für ländliche Strukturforschung, Frankfurt) 
working on an FTS-financed study about “Regional Development Policy: A Task for the EC,” see KB, 
August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Dr. Philipp Jenninger, Staatsminister in the BKA, Bonn, 31 January 
1984, ACDP K030/2.  Thanks crucially to FTS funding as well as Birrenbach’s interventions with 
personalities at or close to the German universities n question, among them Prof. Dr. Hans Maier (the
“excellent” Bavarian Staatsminister für Unterricht und Kultus), Robert Strausz-Hupé served as a guest 
professor during the period 1978-81 at the Universiti s of Munich (Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für 
Politikwissenschaft) and Münster, enabling him also to give lectures there addressing international 
relations, European security and the foreign policy of the Atlantic alliance.  In some cases, these 
interventions of Birrenbach were guided by members of the Wissenschaftlichen Beirat, for instance Prof. 
Helmut Schelsky (Chairman for Rechtssoziologie, University of Münster).  FTS grants in this respect 
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foundations sustained their own operations in comparable fashion, with, for instance, 
Stiftung Volkswagenwerk funding crucial to the 1983 creation of the McCloy Academic 
Scholarship Program for German exchange students at Harvard’s Kennedy School.   
 However, already by February 1976, Birrenbach had m e the momentous 
decision to forego another Bundestag candidacy in the fall.24  While in part dictated by 
the mounting burdens imposed on him given his age and health, several other factors 
eased this still difficult choice.25  Some were of a rather static nature, with Birrenbach 
explaining, for instance, that “the perpetual election campaign [ständige Wahlkampf] 
renders a profound addressing of the problems difficult” and, therefore, “[t]he parliament 
as such has never satisfied me.”26  Others were more recent in origin, among them the 
tribulations of years in opposition for a man with “executive experience” and what he 
portrayed as a decline in the quality, including the “intellectual level,” of the Bundestag 
as well as the other Western parliaments.  Plagued by a sweeping failure in the system 
and principles for selecting parliamentarians as well as from the “diminished attraction” 
for “intelligent people” of such a career, these bodies now consisted largely of 
mediocrities incapable of grasping the complexity of the contemporary and long-term 
                                                                                                                                      
included DM 25,000 to the University of Munich for Winter 1979-80 and DM 30,000 to the University of 
Münster for Winter 1980-81.  As of February 1979, the FTS was also funding functions of the 
Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen (University of Cologne), with 
Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Schwarz, director of the institute, Birrenbach’s key connection in this regard.  Such 
functions included a week of lectures given by Strausz-Hupé in January 1979, one of which Birrenbach 
attended, with the FTS providing for travel within Germany and an Honorar of approximately DM 1,200.  
24 For Birrenbach suggesting that, in lieu of formally taking part in the campaign, he contribute by carrying 
out discussion sessions, press conferences and other functions involving small but vital groups of the 
Politik, Wirtschaft and press in the lead-up to the election, see KB to Kurt Biedenkopf (CDU Secretary 
General), 8 March 1976, ACDP K130/2.  It is unclear if Birrenbach actually followed through on this idea.   
25 As Birrenbach succinctly put it, elucidating his decision in terms of the work load he had continued to 
bear, “that was just too much!  I believe I have acted correctly” (KB to Hans-Helmut Kuhnke, Chairman of 
the Vorstand of the Stifterverbandes für die Deutsche Wissenschaft eV, 28 April 1976, ACDP K130/2). 
26 KB to Prof. Dr. hc Hans Merkle, 28 April 1976, ACDP K130/2.  In this same vein, Birrenbach also 
remarked that “[t]he parliament was always more of a strain [Belastung] for me than a stimulus 
[Anregung]” (KB to Ernst Plesser, 2 March 1979, ACDP K130/2). 
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challenges facing them.27  All this was part of his larger, similar critique of the declining 
quality in the Western democracies of political lead rs across the spectrum (including the 
Union) in both the executive and legislative spheres.28  Longing for the giants of the 
1940s, 50s and 60s, Birrenbach embraced the concept of an age of “epigones” and 
cautioned that “[w]e are not living any more in theworld of Churchill, Adenauer, De 
Gasperi, Schuman, Monnet,” evidence of his greater app eciation for the deceased 
Adenauer in later years, at least for his clarity of thought and judgment as party leader 
and dedicated European.29  As of May 1986, Birrenbach regretted not only Chancellor 
                                                
27 KB to Robert Bowie, 21 January 1977, ACDP K160/2.  On Birrenbach now pleased that “I have not to 
sit in the Bundestag and listen to debates without real substance,” see KB to Jean Monnet, Houjarray, 
France, 21 March 1978, ACDP K158/2.  On “the strength of your [the US] presidency” being “now 
worsened by the lack of experience… of the Congress,” see KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, 
Department of State, Washington DC, 17 April 1979, ACDP K098/2.  Birrenbach’s criticisms extended as 
well to the, from 1979 on, directly elected European Parliament.  On this European Parliament’s “very poor 
start,” see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 24 July 1979, ACDP K210/2.  For Birrenbach on “the low level of 
modern parliaments,” see KB to J. Robert Schaetzel, Washington DC, 20 November 1978, ACDP K098/2.  
28 For Birrenbach’s reference to the deleterious impact of “the modern political leadership,” see KB to 
Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, ACDP K098/2.  During this period, he regularly lambasted the most 
prominent West German political leaders for their lack of hardness, persuasiveness [“Überzeugungskraft”], 
and will to act on behalf of their convictions.  Inexplicating this phenomenon, Birrenbach declared that “it 
is well known [bekannt] that the military courage of the German people [Volk] is simply [nun einmal] 
greater than its Zivilcourage” (KB to Prof. Karl-Heinz Beckurts, 18 March 1980, ACDP K193/1).  While 
Birrenbach claimed to view Margaret Thatcher as a positive figure for Europe, he also criticized the British 
efforts to “solve” their “terrible budget problem” as of April 1980 as too “Thatcherous” (i.e. “stormy”) (KB 
to George Ball, 9 April 1980, ACDP K160/3).   
29 KB to Eugene Rostow, 3 August 1984, ACDP K212/2.  On “epigones,” see KB to Amb. Martin 
Hillenbrand (US), Bonn, 4 May 1976, ACDP K083/1.  For a skeptical Birrenbach asking, “[h]ave you the 
impression that personalities of the rank of the fifties are in power now?” see KB to Henry Kissinger, 24 
July 1984, ACDP K146/3.  On Birrenbach’s belief that “the leadership in Europe and the United States is 
not any more comparable with that of the personalities… like Dean Acheson or Adenauer,” see KB to 
Rostow, 10 May 1984, ACDP K212/2.  For Birrenbach bemoaning that “we have no Adenauer any more.  
But where do you have a man like Adenauer?” see KB to Kissinger, 30 March 1982, ACDP K146/3.  On 
Birrenbach’s lament that “K[ohl] is not Adenauer,” see KB to George Ball, 18 October 1982, ACDP 
K160/3.  For Birrenbach asserting that, while an intelligent and “excellent” man per se, “[Jacques] Delors 
[President of the European Commission] is also no Walter Hallstein” and that Delors’ predecessor as well
“was not entirely up to his tasks,” see KB to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 30 January 1985, ACDP K029/2.  In 
this letter to Kohl, Birrenbach stressed that, in particular, Delors was “not sufficiently politically-
structurally oriented,” citing the proposal that the Frenchman had presented in Strasbourg on 14 January 
that “hardly leads to a result” since “the concept is formulated too intellectually and economically” and did 
not make clear “the structure of a possible European charter.”  Ultimately, Birrenbach wondered “[w]here 
are there still men who at the same time so master the economic policy [Wirtschaftspolitik] that they would 
be able to present a convincing draft?”  Likewise, as of 1979, Birrenbach detected in England a dearth “on 
both sides” of “constructive” political figures, asthey had existed earlier under the likes of Bevin, Eden, 
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Helmut Kohl’s inability to mobilize sufficient foreign policy Kräfte “of format” but, even 
more, the sheer paucity of such in the present-day Federal Republic, professing himself  
astonished about the lacking format of the average Politiker today.  A large part 
of the contemporary Politiker and voters is still far removed from the democrati 
Geist of the Weimar time or from the Staatstreue of Prussia….  The political 
world in its current level [Niveau] in the Federal Republic disappoints every 
expert [Kenner] on the German Politik.30  
 
Therefore, confronted by this desolate setting, an at least ostensibly relieved Birrenbach 
still insisted a few years after departing the Bundestag, “I prefer the Wissenschaftliche 
Beirat of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung to the [Bundestag] Foreign Affairs Committee.”31   
Whatever changes it entailed, leaving the Bundestag in 1976 did not halt 
Birrenbach’s intensive political efforts, particularly with respect to foreign policy.  Here, 
he retained his broad interest in the contemporary developments transpiring within the 
fields of international security, political, economic (including trade and monetary), and 
                                                                                                                                      
Macmillan, Macleod and Heath (KB to Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London, 16 February 1979, ACDP K068/2).  With regard to parliaments, see KB to Prof. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Trilateral Commission, New York City, 7 February 1975, ACDP K146/1; 
KB to Rostow, 8 August 1984, ACDP K212/2; and KB to R stow, 2 October 1984, ACDP K212/2.  On 
Birrenbach’s assessment that “also the [US] Congress is today no longer that, what it has been at the im
of Vandenberg and Johnson” and “[t]he abandoning [Aufgabe] of the ‘seniority rule’ is one of the reasons 
for its failure [Versagen],” see KB to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 
June 1980, ACDP K034/1.  For Birrenbach claiming still “to pursue… the goal set by Schuman, Monnet, 
Adenauer and De Gasperi” in Europe, see KB to John McCloy, 25 March 1980, ACDP K134/1.   
30 KB to Kohl, 27 May 1986, ACDP K029/2.  For Birrenbach on the personnel sources of Kohl’s “tough 
situation,” requiring that he “strengthen the structure of the current government,” see KB to Kohl, 28 June 
1984, ACDP K029/2.  In this letter to the chancellor, Birrenbach raised doubts whether “all the members of 
the cabinet” possessed “the necessary caliber” in “today’s trying circumstances.”  The “functionality 
[Funktionsfähigkeit]” of the Bundeskanzleramt was “absolutely crucial,” yet “[k]ey positions” there were 
“inadequately occupied [unzureichend besetzt]” in comparison to the “Adenauer-time.”  Kohl simply did 
not have at his disposal “the ample [ausreichende] number of Mitarbeitern” enjoyed by Adenauer, Kohl’s 
“great model [Vorbild].”   
31 KB to Ernst Plesser, 2 March 1979, ACDP K130/2.  For Max Kohnstamm, perhaps alluding to subtle or 
potential pressure surrounding this departure, insisti g that Birrenbach had accomplished too much “to be 
pushed out in the end by young and ignorant people,” se  Kohnstamm to KB, 8 March 1976, ACDP 
K150/2.  For Amb. Karl-Günther von Hase speculating hat Birrenbach’s departure was motivated by 
“political and personal reasons,” see Hase to KB, 23 March 1976, ACDP K068/2.  However, for CDU 
Secretary General Kurt Biedenkopf’s trepidation about the anticipated absence of Birrenbach and his 
“multifaceted” foreign policy counsel, see Biedenkopf to KB, 26 March 1976, ACDP K130/2.  For MdB 
Rainer Barzel being “blindsided [unerwartet getroffen]” by Birrenbach’s decision, which “I respect but do
not approve,” see Barzel to KB, 10 March 1976, ACDP K130/2.  It was only now, in 1976, that 
Birrenbach’s membership in the Vorstand of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion also came to an end.  
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energy affairs.  Especially trans-Atlantic but also East-West, German-German and 
German-Israeli relations, all crucial for the Federal Republic, remained the matters of his 
primary attention.  Following his announcement but prior to actually exiting the 
Bundestag, Birrenbach repeatedly stated his firm intention t maintain the closest of 
contact with the party leadership and to continue providing advice and assistance on vital 
issues to party and Fraktion.32  At least outwardly, Birrenbach put on a brave face nd 
even claimed to have benefited from terminating his parliamentary activity since, “as a 
free man,” he could now speak more openly and, no lo ger engaged in what he 
denigrated as the often insignificant and insubstantial work, meetings and proceedings 
characteristic of Fraktion and Bundestag, could focus on tackling significant problems 
more productively.33  As Birrenbach put it, “I work now more in politics than before 
because I am liberated from the senseless Bundestag debates without real dimension….  I 
can now work in a deeper dimension… which satisfies m  more than sitting on the 
opposition bank [sic bench] and discussing the budget deficit now and in the future.”34   
Henceforth, Birrenbach sought to fulfill the quintess ntially American role of 
“elder statesman.”  This comprised aggressive efforts t  counsel key government and 
political personalities in the Federal Republic, among them the Presidents, Chancellors, 
relevant ministers and, up to October 1982, the leadership figures in the opposition Union 
(mainly Karl Carstens and Helmut Kohl).35  Birrenbach’s attempts to advise Chancellor 
                                                
32 KB to Helmut Kohl (CDU Chairman), 8 March 1976 and 1 April 1976, both contained in ACDP K130/2 
as well as KB to Heinrich Krone and the former chancellors (now MdBs) Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger, all dated 23 February 1976 and also located in ACDP K130/2.  
33 KB to Prof. Eugene Rostow, Yale University Law School, 13 November 1979, ACDP K212/1. 
34 KB to John McCloy, 21 March 1978, ACDP K210/1. 
35 Among the relevant ministers that Birrenbach tried to advise, including during the chancellorship of 
Helmut Schmidt, were Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), Economics Minister Otto Graf 
Lambsdorff (FDP) and Defense Minister Georg Leber (SPD).  Previously Director of the DGAP Research 
Institute (1970-73) and Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion (1973-76), Carstens functioned 
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Helmut Schmidt and his social-liberal government coexisted uneasily with his professed 
loyalty to “our party,” his belief in its crucial part in bringing about the much-needed 
“Wende” and his continued involvement in some Union activities, especially as a member 
of the CDU’s Ältestenrat and Bundesfachausschuß Außenpolitik.36  As justification, an 
embittered Birrenbach stressed not only his desire to influence the executive, directly 
active as it was in foreign policy, but also a decline in level within party and Fraktion that 
left him a relative vacuum of genuine contacts willing to seek and follow his proposals.37  
Despite his model, Birrenbach never truly grasped th , ideally, reserved grace of the 
                                                                                                                                      
now as President of the Bundestag (1976-79) and President of the Federal Republic (1979-84).  Even 
before becoming Chancellor in October 1982, Kohl was Chairman of the CDU party and of the CDU/CSU-
Bundestagsfraktion.  Important subordinates and intermediaries substantively addressed in some cases by 
Birrenbach encompassed, during the Schmidt chancellorship, Berndt von Staden (Ministerialdirektor in the 
BKA and, then, Staatssekretär in the AA) and, during the Kohl chancellorship, Ministerialdirektor Horst 
Teltschik (BKA), Staatsminister Philipp Jenninger (BKA), and Staatsminister Alois Mertes (AA).  For 
Birrenbach visiting the next day Gen. Jürgen Brandt (Inspector General of the Bundeswehr but not 
somebody with whom Birrenbach regularly dealt) following “my recent contacts with the United States,” 
see KB to George Ball, 19 November 1981, ACDP K160/3.  
36 At the meetings and discussions of the KAS-administered Ältestenrat, Birrenbach interacted with 
notables like Heinrich Krone (the chairman), Eugen Gerstenmaier, and Bruno Heck.  On Birrenbach hoping 
to see Kai-Uwe von Hassel at the next gathering of the “Senioren,” see KB to Hassel, Bundestagspräsident 
aD, MdEP, 16 July 1984, ACDP K082/2.  For Birrenbach on his “good contact” with the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, in part through its “extremely interesting” Vortragsveranstaltungen, see KB to Karl-
Heinz Bilke, Hauptgeschäftsführer, KAS eV, 6 July 1983, ACDP K082/2.  The Bundesfachausschuß 
Außenpolitik was chaired by the MdBs Werner Marx and, later, Volker Rühe.  Birrenbach also attended at 
least the May 1983 CDU-Bundesparteitag in Cologne.   
37 On Birrenbach declaring his devotion, as before, to “the cause [Sache] of our party,” see KB to Josef 
Rösing, KAS eV, 23 July 1979, ACDP K160/1.  For Birrenbach asserting that he was no Social Democrat, 
rather “a man of the CDU,” see KB to MdL Heinrich Köppler, 7 July 1978, ACDP K160/1.  However, for 
Birrenbach admitting to be “deeply worried [beunruhigt] about the fate of our party,” see KB to MdB Paul 
Mikat, 7 July 1978, ACDP K160/1.  On Birrenbach’s reg et that “the prospects for the development of 
ideas in the Bundestag, in light of the current state of the Fraktion, certainly makes a treatment of the more 
complex problems in a deeper dimension more difficult rather than easier,” see KB to Gerhard Stoltenberg, 
6 July 1978, ACDP K160/1.  For Birrenbach clearly upset about Kohl’s failure to consult with him prior t  
Kohl’s recent US-trip and remarking that his contact with “the leader of our party” (Kohl) was “practially 
non-existent,” see KB to Köppler, 7 July 1978, ACDP K160/1.  Birrenbach’s cooptation into the 
Bundesfachausschuß Außenpolitik only occurred once he brought pressure to bear in July 1977 following 
an “amusing” letter from CDU Secretary General and Sozialpolitiker Heiner Geißler explaining the desire 
to rely instead on younger personalities to generate f esh ideas on the world situation.  An incensed 
Birrenbach, referring to the need to fully understand the intricate thematic linkages and to master multiple 
foreign languages, responded that “in order to produce new ideas about the world, one must first of all 
know [kennen] the world (and not only from the perspective of S zialpolitik)” (KB to Kai-Uwe von Hassel, 
19 May 1978, ACDP K153/1).  In this letter to Hassel, Birrenbach moaned, “[t]hat is a sad [trauriges] 
picture.  However, it unfortunately corresponds to what the party is doing at the moment.  That is extremely 
painful for someone who has served the party twenty years.  [It] will be even more painful for the country,” 
which was thus denied “a genuine alternative for tomorrow.”  
 536
American “wise man” that led John McCloy, resisting Birrenbach’s entreaties, to remark, 
“I fear that if I intervene [with US government figures] I would be viewed as an officious 
intermeddler.”38  Though a limited contact emerged via correspondence, the drawing up 
and passing along of confidential reports and analyses, and occasional discussions, both 
on the phone as well as in face-to-face meetings, the busy personalities Birrenbach 
targeted generally sought to ward off these unwelcome and sometimes, to be generous, 
overassertive approaches.  For all his persistent exer ions, Birrenbach never succeeded in 
recreating with Chancellors Schmidt and Kohl the close relationship that had once existed 
with Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger and operated in later years primarily as an 
irritating and, as we shall discover, even potentially dangerous “loose cannon.”39   
In all of this, Birrenbach cited not just his vaunted, decades-long experience with 
America as well as Europe as a basis for his judgment but also proudly, and insecurely, 
insisted that, even after leaving the Bundestag, his activities otherwise went on virtually 
as before.  To all who would listen, Germans and foreigners alike, he asserted that he 
continued to work at least as intensively and productively and in a similar fashion, 
performing essentially the same functions and tasks, as during his parliamentary time.  
Here, Birrenbach pointed to the various non-legislative posts he still occupied, his 
unabated travels abroad, and his ongoing participaton in diverse international gatherings.  
Furthermore, he claimed to remain in a constant, trustful contact and substantive 
                                                
38 McCloy to KB, 4 February 1983, ACDP K178/1.  As McCloy observed regarding his own relations with 
the American government, “[i]f they need my help, they know where they can reach me at any time” 
(McCloy to KB, 16 March 1978, ACDP K210/1).  
39 For Kohl’s apparently “angry [böse]” reaction to Birrenbach’s criticisms, see KB to Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl, 22 December 1982, ACDP K029/2.  On Birrenbach’s difficulty in convincing Kohl to follow his 
advice on particular issues, see KB to McCloy, New York City, 25 November 1982, ACDP K178/2.  
Birrenbach’s efforts to establish and maintain a meningful contact with Franz Josef Strauß (as Minister-
President of Bavaria and, more significantly, chancellor candidate of the Union in 1980) and Richard von 
Weizsäcker (as Federal President beginning in 1984) were similarly in vain.  For Birrenbach’s attempts vi -
à-vis the latter, see KB to Weizsäcker, Berlin, 24 May 1984, ACDP K031/2.  
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cooperation with many leading personalities (in large part at their initiative), among them 
key government and political figures, in the Federal Republic and throughout the Western 
world, especially the US (including access to those in ide or very close to the successive 
administrations) but also Western Europe, and even in the Middle East.  Moreover, he 
maintained that, not least due to these foreign contacts, he continued to possess valuable 
expertise and advice, exclusive knowledge and often secret information, along with 
extensive materials pertinent to contemporary foreign policy and international affairs.40  
The picture painted was of a Birrenbach who, as respected and influential as ever at home 
and abroad, remained indispensable.  However, striving to sustain this illusion dictated 
that Birrenbach’s final years devolved into an extended episode of embarrassing 
obfuscations, blatant exaggerations, ostentatious name-dropping (“my old friend John 
McCloy”), dubious boasts and brazen self-promotion.  These practices evoke a rather 
distressing image of a man, incapable of crafting a ew role in life, desperately striving in 
myriad ways to regain or retain some relevance in his currently disintegrating one.41 
True, even after leaving the Bundestag, Birrenbach did maintain substantive links 
with prominent personalities in a variety of fields both inside and outside the Federal 
Republic.  Within the Wirtschaft, he remained in contact with figures at a number of 
firms, especially in the steel industry (of course at the Thyssen AG) and banking sector 
                                                
40 As evidence of the enduring strength of such linkages, Birrenbach highlighted, for example, the speed 
and positivity with which contacts responded to his letters, circulated appreciative missives from said 
figures, and revealed little-known details about these personalities (e.g. regarding health conditions).  
41 For Birrenbach making clear that he remained “on the ball,” see KB to Karl Carstens, 15 March 1978, 
ACDP K110/3.  On a satisfied Birrenbach informing Eugene Rostow that Alexander Haig had told him “to 
call him Al” and that Haig had “real confidence” in him, see KB to Rostow, 13 December 1979, ACDP 
K212/1.  For Birrenbach requesting that George Ballsecure for him a special invitation from Peter Peterson 
(Ball’s partner at Lehman Brothers) so that he could participate in an upcoming discussion among German 
and American “industrialists” about world affairs, particularly in the context of the “economic crisis,” ee 
KB to Ball, 19 November 1981, ACDP K160/3.  On Birrenbach reminding Chancellor Kohl that “[f]ew in 
Germany know [kennen] America as well as I,” see KB to Kohl, personal-confidential, 22 March 1983, 
ACDP K029/2.  For Birrenbach claiming to know “dozens of Reagan advisors who will probably get key 
positions in the ministries,” see KB to Helmut Schmidt, 22 December 1980, ACDP K033/3.  
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(e.g. Deutsche Bank), as well as key economic associations like the BDI and the 
Ostausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft.42  Within the Wissenschaft, Birrenbach still 
operated in the context of his Stiftung sub-network, with men like Hans Merkle, and 
sustained connections with individuals in the crucial organizations, such as Adolf 
Butenandt, along with scholars at relevant institutes at home and abroad, among them 
Boris Meissner, Hermann Priebe and Ulrich Karpen.43  Meanwhile, he continued to 
cooperate with those constituting his Atlanticist inst tutional network.44  In West German 
politics, these links included members of the government and, even during the social-
liberal era, the governmental bureaucracy (for insta ce, in the AA and BKA as well as at 
NATO), along with figures of the CDU-Bundestagsfraktion (e.g. Werner Marx, Karl-
Heinz Narjes, Kurt Georg Kiesinger) and men who had essentially passed from the scene, 
such as Eugen Gerstenmaier, Heinrich Krone, and Walter Hallstein.45  At the same time, 
Birrenbach remained in touch with the embassy system, enjoying relations, to one extent 
                                                
42 Among these figures was Wilfried Guth, Vorstandssprecher of the Deutschen Bank AG (Frankfurt).  
Likewise, see KB to Helmut Haeusgen (Vorstand Member of the Dresdner Bank AG, Frankfurt), 5 
December 1977, ACDP K141/1.  Birrenbach had just seen Haeusgen the previous week at the most recent 
meeting of Dresdner’s Zentralbeirat, where they had spoken about the state of the steel industry and, 
related to this, the “lack of solidarity” in the European Community. 
43 Merkle was Chairman of the Geschäftsführung of the Robert Bosch GmbH (Stuttgart).  Butenandt served 
as Honorary President of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV (Munich).  
Prof. Dr. Boris Meissner directed the Institut für Ostrecht (University of Cologne).  Prof. Priebe led the 
Institut für ländliche Strukturforschung (University of Frankfurt), where he dealt with European 
agricultural policy, not least the therein differing Franco-German interests.  As of July 1981, Dr. jur. Ulrich 
Karpen was based at the Institut für Staatsrecht (University of Cologne). 
44 In 1973, Prof. Karl Kaiser became Director of the DGAP Research Institute.  In 1978, Vice Admiral (D) 
Herbert Trebesch succeeded Amb. (aD) Dr. Gebhardt von Walther as Geschäftsführender Stellvertretender 
Präsident at the DGAP eV.  For Birrenbach feeling that, aside from Günter Henle, he had been closest to 
Trebesch at the DGAP, see KB to Trebesch, 6 July 1981, ACDP K136/1.  Martin Hillenbrand took over as 
Director General of the Atlantic Institute in 1977.  On Birrenbach looking forward to upcoming 
“cooperation” in the SWP with Hans Merkle (already a member of the DGAP Geschäftsführenden 
Präsidium and now the new president of the SWP-Stiftungsrat), see KB to Prof. Hans Merkle, 25 January 
1979, ACDP K130/2.  In May 1984, Dr. Walter Damm (Generalbevollmächtigter, Bankhaus Sal. 
Oppenheim jr. & Cie, Cologne) succeeded Walter Stahl as Geschäftsführer of the Atlantica.   
45 In addition to heading the CDU’s Bundesfachausschuß Außenpolitik, Marx chaired, from 1969-80, the 
AK V of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion.  On Birrenbach hoping for and having discussed “a personal 
cooperation in the future” with Gerstenmaier and Krone, see KB to Prof. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, 
Bundestagspräsident aD, Oberwinter, 21 August 1981, ACDP K086/1.  Hallstein’s Stuttgart base appears 
to have made face-to-face meetings rare, requiring instead a stress on correspondence and the telephon.  
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or another, with the ambassadors and personnel of the significant foreign missions in 
Bonn (i.e. United States, Britain, France, Israel) nd with the West German ambassadors 
in Washington DC.46  Finally, despite his considerable initial anxiety after departing from 
the parliament, Birrenbach was able to retain many of his foreign contacts, notably those 
in the United States and Western Europe (this encompassing Britain and Brussels).  Much 
as before, these valuable assets functioned to keep him better apprised, even from a 
distance, of the personalities, situations, events, proposals, conceptions and policies 
existing in the Federal Republic and beyond.47   
Such links also proved essential in enabling Birrenbach, though no longer 
occupying an official political position, to continue acquiring and digesting a still rather 
impressive amount of materials pertaining to complex international affairs and issues.  
True, on one level, these sources comprised simply the mass media (i.e. print, radio, 
television), not only the key West German outlets but in some instances foreign, 
including American, ones, as well as relevant books, articles and journals (e.g. Europa-
                                                
46 With respect to the US embassy in Bad Godesberg, this included the ambassadors Walter Stoessel (1976-
81), Arthur Burns (1981-85) and Richard Burt (1985-).  Regarding the British embassy, this applied 
especially to Amb. Sir Jock Taylor (1981-84).  For Birrenbach’s letter to the recently departed French 
ambassador Jean-Pierre Brunet, see KB to Brunet (Paris), 15 February 1982, ACDP K033/1.  On 
Birrenbach conducting a discussion and correspondence with Richard Burt (already while the latter was 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), see KB to Burt, 13 April 1983, ACDP K132/2.  For 
Birrenbach claiming that he had “many a time… dealt [des öfteren… verhandelt]” with Burt (who was still 
not ambassador yet) on US-European relations, see KB to Chancellor Kohl, 1 March 1984, confidential, 
ACDP K029/2.  Among other things, these links comprised visits by Birrenbach to the embassies 
themselves; extensive, in-depth talks with the US and other ambassadors; the dispatching of letters or 
telexes to American contacts and personalities, for example in the State Department, via the US embassy 
(e.g. courier mail); as well as invitations to and attendance at diverse embassy functions (for instance, 
American and British garden parties, annual meetings, and receptions).  
47 For Birrenbach claiming that he still boasted a “circle” of “ten or twelve first-class American friends 
[erster Kategorie],” see KB to Chancellor Schmidt [cc Carstens], 26 October 1979, ACDP K033/3.  After 
the dissolving of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Birrenbach stayed in touch wit
Monnet, including via the latter’s wife and through visits to Houjarray.  With the additional time at his 
disposal, Birrenbach’s own letters became, if anythi g, even more extensive and detailed in this period.   
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Archiv, Foreign Affairs).48  However, he also accumulated abundant materials being 
churned out in the Federal Republic and abroad, particularly in the US and elsewhere in 
the West, by governments, legislatures, political parties and international and 
intergovernmental organizations as well as by influential statesmen, officials, politicians, 
soldiers and scholars.  Notable among the last wereAm ricans like the still influential 
University of Chicago political scientist Albert Wohlstetter.49  These materials, some of 
an internal or confidential nature, encompassed a motley collection of analyses, reports, 
speeches, statements, communiqués, resolutions, testimony, legislative bills, publications 
                                                
48 For a US News & World Report article on the neutron bomb in Birrenbach’s Nachlaß (“Pro and Con: Go 
Ahead with the Neutron Bomb?”), undated but apparently from June 1977, see ACDP K115/2.  Likewise, 
for Rudolf Woller’s “contribution to the strategy discussion just beginning in the Federal Republic” 
(entitled “Which War Does Not Threaten Us”), a piece from the Deutschen Zeitung of 19 August 1977 (Nr. 
35), p. 3, see ACDP K115/2.  On Birrenbach praising Alain Peyrefitte’s “great volume” Le Mal Français, 
see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 21 December 1978, ACDP K033/3.  For Birrenbach reading the quarterly 
Strategic Review, published by the United States Strategic Institute, and the USSI Special Reports “with 
greatest interest,” see KB to Mrs. Donna Razeto, Administrative Assistant, US Strategic Institute, 
Washington DC, 28 February 1979, ACDP K098/2.  For Birrenbach being “extraordinarily interested” in 
and planning to “immediately” order Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens’ upcoming 45 Jahre Ringen um die 
Europäische Verfassung and having already ordered Lipgens’ Die Anfänge der europäischen 
Einigungspolitik (1977), see KB to Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, ACDP K036/1.  On 
Birrenbach subscribing to Strategic Survey (IISS), actually “since almost twenty years,” see KB to Hans-
Otto Thierbach, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, cc Stahl, 27 June 1983, ACDP K142/1.  For Birrenbach on 
the “great” Strategic Review, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Editor in Chief, USSI, Cambridge MA, 5 
January 1984, ACDP K092/1.  On Birrenbach listening to the “excellent” BBC, see KB to Sir Jock Taylor, 
Ambassador, British Embassy, 8 June 1984, ACDP K068/2.  For Birrenbach having recently read Rose’s 
“excellent” Contre la stratégie des Curiaces (1983), which dealt at least in part with Franco-German 
relations and cooperation, as well as Rose’s essay in the Fall 1982 issue of Foreign Affairs along with “all 
the articles” appearing in that journal during the year 1982 addressing future NATO policy and strategy, 
such as the “interesting plans” of SACEUR Gen. Bernard Rogers, see KB to Amb. Comte François de 
Rose, Paris, 9 July 1984, ACDP K074/1.   
49 See Wohlstetter’s essay “Spreading the Bomb Without Quite Breaking the Rules” (Foreign Policy, 
Winter 1976-77) in ACDP K141/1.  For Wohlstetter’s “Möglichkeiten zur Verlangsamung und Begrenzung 
der Ausbreitung von Nuklearwaffen,” based on a working paper for a German-American Arbeitstagung 
about energy policy in Spitzingsee in January 1977 and appearing in the Europa-Archiv (8/1977, pp. 234-
248), see ACDP K180/2.  On State Secretary Hans-Hilger Haunschild, having been approached at the 
MPG-Senate meeting in Bremen, sending Birrenbach a BMFT copy of the Wohlstetter study on the 
“plutonium Problematik” (with the potentially interesting marginalia of the responsible Referenten) as well 
as “restricted” British memos offering a summary of Wohlstetter’s standpoint as revealed in his September 
1977 testimony at the hearings on the Windscale (UK) reprocessing facility, see Haunschild to KB, 23 
November 1977, ACDP K141/1.  On Uwe Nerlich (SWP) having sent Birrenbach three Foreign Affairs 
articles by Wohlstetter and Birrenbach’s desire to discuss their contents, see KB to Nerlich, 11 April 1979, 
ACDP K176/2.  For Wohlstetter’s April 1983 paper “Statesmen, Bishops and other Strategists on Bombing 
Innocents,” also sent to Birrenbach by Nerlich, see ACDP K132/2.  Wohlstetter sat on the organizing 
committee of the European-American workshop on “Soviet Military Power in Europe: Some Threats and 
Responses” held at the SWP from 2-4 June 1976 and funded in part by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.  
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and other documents.50  Furthermore, thanks largely to his ongoing connections to and 
work with the Atlanticist institutions, Birrenbach ontinued to receive similar types of 
materials, as well as detailed studies, produced and presented within the framework of the 
Atlanticist infrastructure and by the personalities as ociated with it, as well as helpful 
suggestions on and corrections to his own papers.51  All of this expert information and 
advice remained crucial in permitting Birrenbach to carry out his activities, especially 
regarding intricate technical matters of an armaments, economic, and energy nature.52   
                                                
50 Among the materials obtained by Birrenbach were those produced by the US Information Service (e.g. 
the Wireless Bulletin from Washington), the Auswärtigen Amt (internal reports from West German 
embassies), other departments of the federal government (the Bulletins of the Bundespresseamt), the 
Unionsfraktion and its AK V, NATO (the NATO-Brief), and the European Commission, along with texts of 
American legislation and Senate testimony, US party policy documents, and pertinent Bundestag protocols.  
51 For Birrenbach having received the “brilliant speech [glänzenden Vortrag]” of Prof. Dr. Klaus Ritter 
(SWP) given at the seminar of the International Peace Academy in July 1979, “one of the best papers” he 
had read about “this extraordinarily difficult them,” see KB to Ritter, 20 August 1979, ACDP K200/2.  On 
Birrenbach having gotten and read “with great interest” Uwe Nerlich’s paper analyzing the SALT II treaty, 
see again KB to Ritter, 20 August 1979, ACDP K200/2.  For Birrenbach being “pleased” about the 
“opinion exchange” that had “come about” between him and Nerlich (SWP), see KB to Nerlich, 11 April 
1979, ACDP K176/2.  On Birrenbach receiving a Kurznotiz about the effects of SALT II on the US “Cruise 
Missile Program” drawn up by the SWP’s Hubert Feigl, which had otherwise only gone to the AA as 
“input” for its policy briefs, see Ritter to KB, 9 August 1979, ACDP K200/2.  For the SWP-Lagenotiz of 
March 1977 on the “Determinative Factors of Israeli Domestic and Foreign Policy” by Bernd L. von 
Bismarck, see ACDP K174/2.  For Birrenbach thanking Prof. Dr. Eberhard Schulz (DGAP Research 
Institute) for sending papers relating to “the German-Polish Westgrenze,” see KB to Schulz, 5 August 1980, 
ACDP K070/1.  On several assisting “commentaries” being currently prepared at the SWP with respect to 
Birrenbach’s SALT II paper, see Nerlich to KB, 3 August 1979, ACDP K200/2.  On Birrenbach making 
use of the arms figures contained in the IISS (London) publication of 1978-79 (probably Strategic Survey), 
see his confidential “Interim Report” on the state of the SALT negotiations, dated 6 July 1979, in ACDP 
K200/2.  The publications Birrenbach received in this vein included Trialogue (Trilateral Commission).  
52 On Birrenbach acquiring information for personal use from Vice Admiral Herbert Trebesch (German 
Military Representative in the NATO Military Committee, Brussels) and his office, see the report of 23 
May 1977 on the bilateral US-USSR SALT negotiations in Geneva, ACDP K200/2; the text of 18 January 
1978 containing technical analysis and views, especially regarding SALT II, in ACDP K115/3; the 
document addressing “nuclear weapons for tactical use [Einsatz]” (containing the ranges of various NATO 
and Warsaw Pact arms) of 26 January 1978, ACDP K115/3; and Trebesch to KB, 6 February 1978 along 
with corrections to and statistics for Birrenbach’s article on European security, ACDP K110/3.  For the 
Federal Economic Ministry’s monthly reports on the W st German economic situation (here January 1979), 
see ACDP K127/3.  On Narjes providing Birrenbach with a confidential interim report about the German-
Brazilian nuclear deal of June 1975 (“concerning the export of nuclear energy plants [Kernenergieanlagen] 
to Brazil and the German-Brazilian agreement about c operation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy”) produced by an ad hoc working group of the Fraktion, see MdB Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes to KB, 25 
March 1977, along with the actual report, in ACDP K180/2.  On the confidential draft program for 
consultations between the West German and British heads of government in October 1979 in Bonn, worked 
on by VLR von Puttkamer, see ACDP K068/2.  For Birrenbach citing John M. Collins of the Congressional 
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However, Birrenbach’s network of foreign Atlanticist political contacts stagnated 
rather than evolved during later years.  In rare cases, his links with particular figures 
simply became dormant.53  Over time, the advancing age, declining health, and death of 
contacts, along with other colleagues, damaged this web to some extent, with Monnet’s 
failing health and ultimate demise in March 1979 a key loss.54  Though, to Birrenbach’s 
delight, some of his American contacts held posts in he administrations of this era (for 
instance, Brzezinski, Smith, Bowie and Owen, under Carter, and Nitze and Rostow, 
under Reagan), he was dismayed that others left government positions for good (e.g. 
McCloy, Kissinger, Ball, Schaetzel), thus becoming permanent “outers.”55  While 
Birrenbach remained connected to these men in their rol s as private citizens, often 
occupying prestigious stations in law, business, consulting and academia in the Northeast, 
whether on Wall Street, in the Ivy League or elsewhre, as they continued striving to 
impact international affairs via other avenues, this represented a process by which the 
                                                                                                                                      
Research Service as one of his sources for detailed re ative figures pertaining to the US-USSR arms race, 
see KB to Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 11 August 1981, ACDP K032/1.  
53 For instance, those to Sen. Jacob Javits (US) and Col. William Bass (UK).  
54 Further individuals that passed away included Christian Herter (December 1966), Fritz Erler (February 
1967), Hajo Holborn (June 1969), Dean Acheson (October 1971), Goetz Briefs (May 1974), Prof. Ulrich 
Scheuner (February 1981), and Axel Springer (September 1985).  Monnet’s death hit hard from a personal 
perspective, with Birrenbach remarking, “I miss him very much.  He was as a man unique” (KB to Eugene 
Rostow, 25 April 1979, ACDP K212/1).  Birrenbach attended Monnet’s burial in Paris and a “very worthy” 
ceremony in the small church of Montfort.  “Strangely there prevailed no mood of sorrow, not even in the 
songs of the priest, rather one of triumph.  A realexperience [Erlebnis]!” (KB to Horst Osterheld, 
Zentralstelle Weltkirche, German Bishops Conference, 23 March 1979, ACDP K112/2).  Experienced 
vicariously by Birrenbach through correspondence, Holborn’s deterioration, including emphysema, was 
especially notable for its drawn-out misery.  For Birrenbach (and apparently Shepard Stone) being “pretty 
worried” about John McCloy’s physical appearance and health, see KB to McCloy, 25 November 1977, 
ACDP K188/3.  On Hans Speidel resigning the SWP presidency in 1978 following a stroke, see KB to 
Monnet, Houjarray, France (Montfort l’Amaury), 8 November 1978, ACDP K158/2.  For Theodor 
Schieder being unable to correspond since he was suffering the effects of diabetes, see KB to Dietrich 
Gerhard, 18 June 1979, ACDP K158/1.  Hallstein was also sick for an extended period in his final years.   
55 Zbigniew Brzezinski served as National Security Advisor; Gerard Smith as Ambassador at Large in the 
State Department from 1977-80 (Special Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters); Prof. Robert 
Bowie as Deputy Director of the CIA for National Foreign Assessment; Henry Owen as Ambassador at 
Large in the Executive Office of the President (responsible for international economic summits); Paul Nitze 
as leader of the US delegation in the INF negotiatins (Geneva); and Eugene Rostow as Director of the US 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (but fired in Ja uary 1983).  During the Carter administration, 
Birrenbach’s contact with Smith was especially valuable on the theme of the civilian use of nuclear energy.  
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political influence and explanatory powers of even Birrenbach’s most prominent 
contacts, and indirectly his own, gradually diminished.56  Moreover, Birrenbach’s 
relationships with top US officials dwindled as he never developed genuine ties with 
many of the crucial personalities in the Carter andReagan administrations (e.g. 
Presidents, Secretaries of State and Defense).57  Virtually the sole reinforcement to 
Birrenbach’s trans-Atlantic political network was the rapport he attained from the late 
1970s onward, primarily thanks to the annual Fall AI Foreign Policy Committee function 
in Brussels, with Gen. Alexander Haig (US).58  In a sense, Birrenbach was correct in 
                                                
56 In addition to their other endeavors, McCloy (law) served as Chairman of the American Council on 
Germany (1972-87), while Brzezinski (academia) became  Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies at Georgetown University.  OnGeorge Ball mostly spending the last two years 
writing and speaking, see Ball to KB, 28 January 1985, ACDP K160/3.  For Eugene Rostow’s New 
Republic article on the “stakes of the nuclear negotiations” that “continues to circulate and to be read,” his 
enclosed speech, and his being still “in touch” with Robert McFarlane (National Security Advisor), George 
Shultz (Secretary of State), Kenneth Dam (Deputy Secretary of State) and Fred Iklé (Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy), see Rostow to KB, 23 August 1984, ACDP K209/2.  For McCloy, as a member of the 
transition committee on foreign affairs, engaging i discussions with and offering policy recommendations 
to the incoming president and administration (including on “the need for close attention to the German 
relationship”), as well as having made suggestions on the “types” of people who would be “equipped” to 
accomplish what was necessary on the US side, see McCloy to KB, 23 January 1981, ACDP K178/2.  On 
William Bundy (now editor of Foreign Affairs) having “personal contact” to candidate Carter, see KB to 
Bundy, New York, 14 June 1976, ACDP K083/1.  For one f Birrenbach’s American “friends” passing on 
Birrenbach’s letter to McGeorge Bundy of 27 April 1977 (dealing with American nuclear energy policy) to 
the US Secretary of State, another of his American frie ds sending the text of a speech Birrenbach had 
given in February 1977 before American bankers in the Redoute (Bad Godesberg) to the US Secretary of 
the Treasury (who in turn circulated it within the “upper ranks” of his department), and a third American 
“personality” passing along to Brzezinski (National Security Advisor) correspondence of Birrenbach about 
“the current American situation,” see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 16 May 1977, ACDP K033/3.  In the late 
1970s and 1980s, McCloy, Kissinger and Ball all testifi d before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on issues like SALT II (1979) and the East-West pipeline controversy (1982).  On Birrenbach’s belief that 
the “proposal” of the Kissinger Commission (the Presid nt’s National Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America) “seems to me… to make progress possible,” see KB to Bowie, 5 June 1984, ACDP K160/2.  
57 This was true, for example, of Secretaries of State Cyrus Vance and George Shultz as well as Secretary 
of Defense Casper Weinberger.  Nevertheless, Birrenbach had made the acquaintance of Shultz in October 
1973, when the then-Secretary of the Treasury had spoken, at Birrenbach’s invitation, before the DGAP.  
Birrenbach’s sole personal encounter with Carter occurred in June 1978 at a presidential reception at the 
White House in the framework of the Trilateral Commission’s Plenary Conference in Washington DC.  At 
times, Birrenbach admitted that his links with the US embassy withered in later years.  For Birrenbach 
lacking “a real contact” with Amb. Arthur Burns (“although I have seen him two or three times”), in 
contrast to his relations with “all the predecessor of [Walter] Stoessel” (therefore including Amb. Martin 
Hillenbrand up to October 1976), see KB to Alexander Haig, 29 March 1982, personal, ACDP K146/2.  
58 Haig served as SACEUR (December 1974-July 1979) and then as Secretary of State (January 1981-July 
1982).  Birrenbach initially came into a distant contact with Haig when the latter had first delivered a talk, 
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insisting that since departing the Bundestag “[m]y contacts in foreign policy questions 
remain the same as before,” but implicit in this was a stagnating network largely confined 
to his long-time contacts, an instrument of declining value.59 
Into the early 1980s, Birrenbach continued embarking o  his trips to the United 
States, often combining them with Atlanticist functions there.60  Whatever the American 
geographic-demographic trends, these visits remained quite narrowly focused on elite 
                                                                                                                                      
at Birrenbach’s invitation, before the DGAP in October 1975.  On the “great openness” with which Haig 
had spoken and the “approval [Anerkennung]” demonstrated by those in the auditorium, see KB,Berliner 
Allee, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Schmidt, Bonn, strictly confidential, 15 November 1978, ACDP K033/3.  
In this letter to Schmidt, Birrenbach stressed his “very personal contact” with Haig, including his having 
traveled two weeks ago to SHAPE where he had met with the general for about one and a half hours, a 
conversation of “extremely confidential [höchst vertraulicher] nature but of an astonishing openness.”  On 
Birrenbach’s discussion with Secretary of State Haig in Washington DC after the March 1981 German-
American Conference in Princeton, see KB to Haig, 24 June 1981, ACDP K146/2.  For Birrenbach being 
“very happy and grateful” that Haig had “supported our common ideas” in the Scowcroft Commission (the 
President’s Commission on Strategic Forces) and his hope that Congress “will finally approve your 
proposals,” see KB to Haig, 13 June 1983, ACDP K146/2.  From 1977 onward, Birrenbach did establish an 
enhanced linkage with Amb. Comte François de Rose, f rmer French ambassador to the US and NATO 
and now Director General of the Société Nouvelle Pathé Cinéma (Paris) as well as a member of the AI 
Board of Governors and Foreign Policy Committee and of the Trilateral Commission.  For Birrenbach’s 
proposal that Rose enter the FPC to provide “in our discussions a competent French voice,” see KB to 
Martin Hillenbrand, 31 May 1977, ACDP K058.  On Birrenbach having had “several times close contacts” 
with and gotten a “first-class impression” of Rose, the need to nominate a man like Rose chairman of the 
FPC, but also his uncertainty whether Rose “as a Frenchman” would “dare to accept this position,” see KB 
to Jonkheer John Loudon, 5 November 1981, ACDP K076/2.  For certain brief, relatively ephemeral, 
flurries of correspondence, here Birrenbach having recently written to “prominent English personalities” 
(Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington; former Vice Presid nt of the European Commission Sir Christopher 
Soames; and Lord Alec Douglas-Home) to call their attention to the “fundamental importance” of Britain’s 
“active cooperation [Mitarbeit]” in the European Community, as well as his having acted similarly two 
years ago with respect to several “prominent” Labour Party figures, such as Roy Jenkins (President of the 
European Commission) and Shirley Williams [also Christopher Tugendhat, the Conservative member of 
the European Commission], see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 11 June 1979, ACDP K068/2.  
59 KB to Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 6 July 1981, ACDP K032/1.  On Birrenbach being “in contact with all my 
old friends,” see KB to Monnet, Houjarray, France, 21 March 1978, ACDP K158/2.  For Birrenbach’s 
claim that “I have maintained my old contacts in all these countries exactly the same as before [genauso… 
wie bisher],” see KB to Sir Siegmund Warburg, London, 24 September 1982, ACDP K068/2.  On 
Birrenbach’s insistence that the Atlantik-Brücke be further “politicized,” not least because he andhis fellow 
“older” members of the Vorstand no longer possessed sufficient, and sufficiently important, contacts in 
Washington DC, see Walter Stahl’s Aktennotiz regarding his phone conversation with Birrenbach on 7 June 
1976, ACDP K132/1.  A major aspect of this organizational “activation” was the establishment of an office 
in Bonn initially headed by former West German ambassador to the US and NATO Wilhelm Grewe (as 
Deputy Chairman of the AB from 1978-81), whose tasks in part consisted of efforts to counteract this 
deficit.   
60 Birrenbach visited the US in March 1977, October 1977, June 1978, July 1980, March 1981, January 
1983, and October 1983.  He canceled a number of planned trips in 1982 due to illness, the Falklands crisis, 
and the “incalculable” political and internal situaion in the Federal Republic (see, for example, 
Birrenbach’s Aktennotiz of 24 September 1982, ACDP K146/2).  
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environments in Washington DC and New York City.61  During these trips, Birrenbach 
went on carrying out his extensive talks on concrete issues with American contacts and 
personalities.  These comprised meetings not only with figures currently functioning 
outside of the government proper, among them journalists, individuals closely associated 
with the Atlanticist organizations, and official repr sentatives of the Federal Republic, 
but also at times with those actually operating within the successive administrations and 
the Congress.62  In all of this, Birrenbach still received logistical support (e.g. advice 
regarding, along with communications and the arranging of appointments with, 
prospective talk partners), especially that provided by the personnel of the US embassy 
                                                
61 On Birrenbach staying in Washington DC in June 1978 at the L’Enfant Plaza Hotel (also the site of the 
Trilateral Commission meeting he attended), see KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 8 June 1978, ACDP K146/1.  
62 For example, in March and October 1977, Birrenbach met with National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, both times in the White House (but not i  June 1978 due to Brzezinski’s health nor in July 1980 
when Brzezinski was in Tokyo); Ambassador at Large Gerard Smith; Amb. Henry Owen; and Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur Hartman (March 1977).  On Birrenbach having met with 
“some higher civil servants” in the White House and State Department in March 1977, see KB to George 
Ball, 30 March 1977, ACDP K160/3.  For Birrenbach meeting with Senators in October 1977, among them 
Frank Church (future Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee) and Sam Nunn (GA), see KB to 
Amb. Walter Stoessel (US), 14 October 1977, ACDP K100/2.  On Birrenbach hoping to see William 
Diebold Jr. (a Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) in New York in October 1977, 
see KB to Diebold, 19 August 1977, ACDP K106/2.  For Birrenbach having had the chance during his June 
1978 trip, on the “periphery” of the Trilateral Commission conference, to again conduct informative talks 
in New York and Washington, also with “numerous” influential Americans not directly connected to the 
TC such as McCloy, Kissinger, Ball, Eugene Rostow, Bowie (in his Washington home), Owen, and Paul 
Volcker (President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York); the “understanding” exhibited by his 
“discussion partners” for the “vital interest” that “we must have” in the question of civilian nuclear energy; 
as well as his brief consultations with Amb. Berndt von Staden (DC) and Amb. Rüdiger von Wechmar 
(UN), see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 17 June 1978, ACDP K098/2.  On Birrenbach’s “constructive” 
conversation at “the Council” with Winston Lord (CFR President) in July 1980, see KB to Lord, 13 August 
1980, ACDP K134/1.  For Birrenbach and Amb. von Wechmar having discussed “in detail” in July 1980 
Birrenbach’s “observations,” see Wechmar to KB, 20 August 1980, ACDP K134/1.  In March 1981, 
Birrenbach met with figures like Secretary of State Al xander Haig, Lawrence Eagleburger (soon to be 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), Walter Stoessel (Under Secretary of State for Politica  
Affairs), and Helmut Sonnenfeldt.  For Birrenbach in March 1981 having met in Ball’s home in Princeton 
(at Ball’s invitation) with, among others, Paul Volcker (now Chairman of the Federal Reserve) and Lloyd 
Cutler, see KB to Ball, 13 April 1981, ACDP K160/3.  On Birrenbach in January 1983 having discussions 
with “the Geneva group,” Amb. Edward Rowny (chief START negotiator in Geneva), Richard Burt (soon 
to be Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), “members of the State Department,” and Fred Iklé 
(Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, with whom Birrenbach had in the Pentagon his “most difficult 
discussion”), see KB to Ball, 24 February 1983, ACDP K160/3.  For Birrenbach claiming that in October 
1983 he had spoken in the United States with “leading personalities of the armaments and arms control 
policy [Politik]” as well as for two hours with James Reston (New York Times), “the most prominent 
American political journalist,” see KB to Chancellor Kohl, 14 October 1983, confidential, ACDP K029/2.  
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(Bonn), the West German embassy (DC), and Thyssen Inc. (NY).  Birrenbach’s post-trip 
activities continued to include informing contacts and others in the Federal Republic and 
abroad about his talks and broader impressions, not leas  by generating and distributing to 
a limited number of recipients his familiar, confidential, written reports.63  Of course, 
Birrenbach’s trips to the United States during thisperiod still constituted only one 
element in the larger framework of such travels being undertaken also by other German 
Atlanticists.64  Nevertheless, whatever their similarities, Birrenbach’s Amerikareisen in 
later years were merely pale imitations of those that had come before, occurring with 
lesser frequency, lasting for a shorter duration (usually about a week) and, despite his 
hopes but essentially confirming his fears, manifesting a lower quality and quantity of 
discussion partners, particularly within the presently governing administrations.65   
                                                
63 Such recipients included foreign contacts like McCloy and Ball as well as a few important German 
figures like Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Economics Minister 
Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Amb. Hans-Georg Wieck (Standing West German Representative at NATO) and 
Alois Mertes (Chairman of the Arbeitsgruppe Außenpolitik of the Unionsfraktion).  On Birrenbach 
planning to report to Kaiser after the former’s trip in July 1980, see KB to Prof. Karl Kaiser, Director, 
DGAP Research Institute, 4 July 1980, ACDP K160/1.  For Birrenbach expecting to “briefly report” to 
Butenandt by phone about his “impressions” gathered from his imminent USA visit, see KB to Prof. Dr. 
Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, ACDP K141/2.  On Amb. Peter Hermes (Washington DC) as 
the lone dissenter with respect to Birrenbach’s Amerika report dealing with his trip in March 1981, a 
document based on “first-class, direct [unmittelbarer] and personal [persönlicher]” information that 
encompassed talks with “prominent personalities” from the United States, see KB to Hermes, 18 May 
1981, ACDP K134/1.  Otherwise, this report had been “fully endorsed [bestätigt]” not only by Chancellor 
Schmidt but also by “first-class personalities [rsten Persönlichkeiten]” in the US, France and England.    
64 For John McCloy having explained to Erik Blumenfeld (CDU) the situation in the US during the latter’s 
most recent visit to New York, see KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, ACDP K178/2. 
65 On Birrenbach’s consternation about whether it would be possible for him to secure appointments with 
figures in Washington (presumably meaning in the Excutive and Congress) since he was no longer a 
member of the Bundestag and his concern that even his being DGAP president might not suffice in this 
regard, see KB to Amb. Berndt von Staden, Washington DC, 24 January 1977, ACDP K100/1.  On his visit 
to the US in March 1977, Birrenbach met with approximately nineteen American personalities.  For 
Birrenbach claiming that in October 1983 he had conducted talks with “about twelve American politicians 
of rank,” see KB to Chancellor Kohl, 14 October 1983, confidential, ACDP K029/2.  At the latest by 
November 1982, it appears that Birrenbach’s trips were not much of a priority for the West German 
embassy, which now seems to have performed its related functions rather lackadaisically.  Also, for 
Birrenbach expecting to meet with Amb. Hans-Georg Wieck (Standing West German Representative at 
NATO) at the latest in October, indeed hoping to come to Brussels the day before the Atlantic Institute 
function there in order to speak with him, see KB to Wieck, Brussels, 16 July 1981, ACDP K033/2.  
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Thus, as Hans-Günther Sohl recognized, Birrenbach did not spend the “twilight of 
[his] life [Lebensabend]” in “peace and tranquility [Ruhe und Beschaulichkeit].” 66  
Spurred on at least in part, as in so many other respects, by John McCloy’s example, 
Birrenbach never truly retired and continued to work, even into “old age,” quite actively 
and at considerable personal expense in fundamentally those same fields that had 
previously occupied him: political and, especially, international affairs; the Wirtschaft; 
and Wissenschaftspolitik.67  Therefore, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, who saw Birrenbach from 
time to time at political events in Bonn (e.g. the CDU-Ältestenrat), could remark to 
Birrenbach with pleasure that “[y]ou have, you know [ja], remained truly der Alte.”68  
However, Birrenbach’s final years were primarily stamped by his desperate efforts to 
remain relevant in both the Federal Republic and abroad, particularly in the United 
States, even as he slowly relinquished the posts tha  in many cases he had occupied for 
decades.  Though he was able to preserve certain superficial forms, the substantive 
functions of many of his activities gradually became hollowed out.  Birrenbach’s attempt 
in this period to carve himself a new position of influence ultimately resulted in failure.   
B. Internal Threats to Atlanticism in the Federal Republic 
To the end, a fearful, “preoccupied,” at times even d featist Birrenbach radiated 
an increasingly intense pessimism, characterized by a sense of instability, uncertainty, 
crisis and catastrophe.  This remained not merely a g oominess regarding virtually all 
                                                
66 Sohl to KB, 1 July 1985, ACDP K082/2.  
67 On Birrenbach’s admiration for McCloy’s “effort [Einsatz]” even at the age of eighty-eight, see KB to 
Michael Hoffmann-Becking, 15 August 1983, ACDP K178/1.  For Birrenbach taking part as of early 1978 
in “numerous” meetings of Aufsichtsräten and other organizations, see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 22 
February 1978, ACDP K033/3.  On Birrenbach toiling “still” eight to ten hours a day and reading on the 
weekends at least six hours a day, see KB to Kiesing r, 6 July 1981, ACDP K032/1.  For Birrenbach 
spending more than DM 100,000 per year on his “politica  work,” see KB to Kohl, 29 September 1981, 
ACDP K032/1.  
68 Hassel to KB, 2 July 1984, ACDP K082/2. 
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contemporary affairs but a deeper cultural pessimism about the modern West, a sense that 
all areas of society, both elites (e.g. the Politik) as well as broader populations, had been 
“infected” by a debilitating “sickness.”69  Birrenbach continued to bemoan many of the 
                                                
69 KB to Kissinger, 30 March 1982.  Perhaps due to his own health history or his father’s profession, 
Birrenbach regularly utilized illness/sickness analogies in this context.  Birrenbach often referred to the 
“symptoms of sickness.”  Birrenbach saw “symptoms of decay” in Europe (KB to Henry Kissinger, 14 July 
1982).  “The resistance against the use of nuclear ene gy is taking epidemic forms with catastrophic results 
in view of our energy situation, if it cannot be stopped.” (KB to Eugene Rostow, 1 June 1979, ACDP 
K212/1).  Reflecting on the assassination attempts on the US president, the English royal couple and the 
Pope (a “Wahnsinnsakt”), Birrenbach remarked “What a world we live in!…[H]umanity finds itself in a 
condition which one can only describe [bezeichnen] as pathological.” (KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz 
Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K112/2).  As of October 1979, Birrenbach insisted that the Americans were 
“kurierbar.” (KB to Schmidt, 26 October 1979).  The state of the West was worse than it had ever been 
since the war.  The western countries on both sides of the ocean did not have sufficient statesmanship.  The 
welfare state system for instance in Western Europe, and the increase of the influence of the American 
Congress on the administration had increased in such a way that the US, apart from the lack of statesmen, 
was not able to act as they wanted. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de 
Rose, Paris, 9 July 1984, K074/1).  Birrenbach saw the high points of Gerstenmaier’s life in his activity in 
the Kreisauer Kreis and as president of the Bundestag.  In both institutions, Gerstenmaier had played an 
outstanding role by which Geist, strength of character, courage and readiness to act [Einsatzbereitschaft] 
for the interests of our country had been the most important preconditions.  “There are almost hardly men 
like you in the present [heutige] time any more.”  That was the reason for the sympto s of decline 
[Verfallserscheinungen] in our society. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Bundestagspräsident 
aD Prof. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, Oberwinter, 21 August 1981, K086/1).  In his book’s first chapter, 
Lübbe spoke of the growing hostility towards Wissenschaft [Wissenschaftsfeindlichkeit].  As a non-
Wissenschaftler, Birrenbach would assert that indeed [überhaupt] in the current epoch the inclination to 
deal in-depth with problems of a profound nature had w ned universally [allgemein].  This was why 
comfortable television was preferred to reading the newspaper.  On top of it, after the even more rapidly 
increasing secularization, one initially had connected expectations with the Wissenschaft which, as before 
by religious conceptions [Vorstellungen], could not be fulfilled in the desired extent.  When Lübbe said that 
there was no destination-crisis [Zielkrise], rather only a steering-crisis [Steuerungskrise], Lübbe himself 
said there were limits to the innovation-processing capacity for individual as for social systems and that
today we moved in the area of these limits.   Birrenbach agreed that the Wissenschaft and the Technik 
dependent on it were included in this process of self-distancing [Selbstdistanzierung] of our civilization, 
from which everything had been expected, but simply onl  that could get what it was able to provide 
[leisten].  There normally developed from it, in view of the aspirations [Anspruchs] which the Wissenschaft 
as such had raised, a Wissenschaftsfeindlichkeit, as today also existed such a thing vis-à-vis the Politik, 
from which also more had been expected than it could fulfill.  That leads in political life to a disaffection 
with the state [Staatsverdrossenheit], he erosion of authority and Staatsräson and precisely of the 
fundamental values that were the precondition for a successful political process. (KB to Lübbe, 15 August 
1977, K171/1).  Berglar knew how much Birrenbach since years had been worried about the decay 
[Verfall] of the authority, of Staatsräson and the fundamental values [Grundwerte] of the state by us and in 
the welfare states of Europe, especially however by us.  The secularization in the world, especially also in 
the Federal Republic, did fundamental harm to the authority, since the authority somewhere had a 
transcendental root.  The longer Birrenbach pondered it and looked at Berglar’s seven theses on the 
authority, the more Birrenbach wanted to raise the problem whether in the second half of the 20th century 
there was still anything at all present of this transcendental content [Gehalt] of the authority.  After all, the 
authority of a personality rested today essentially more on his geistigen superiority, his proving 
[Bewährung] in life, in the profession, his menschlichen dignity [Würde], personal/character qualities, his 
resolve [Entschlossenheit], his prestige [Ansehen], his influence, his power [Macht], than on something 
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same interrelated “Verfallserscheinungen of our time” that he had detected at the latest by 
1968: the permissive society; the decay of spiritual and moral virtues; a decline in the 
fundamental values of state (e.g. a sense of Staatsraison and power politics); an erosion 
of respect for authority, including that of the state; a decline in historical consciousness; a 
loss of national identity and feeling (in the FRG); a decline in courage, will and morale; 
the complexes comprising the illusionary “détente thought” and the soft, selfish, 
exaggerated “welfare state thought.”70  The crucial implications of these perhaps 
                                                                                                                                      
else.  Birrenbach even doubted that the element of tradition today still played a great role for the authority.  
Who was today the crown prince of Prussia or the head of a great noble family or otherwise the bearer of a 
great name?  The authority of an institution rested on the consensus of those who had chosen the bearer of 
the authority in State, Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft, Gesellschaft and, with this, on legal right [gesetzlichem 
Recht].  Here, Birrenbach admitted that tradition, connected with the office, played a larger role than by 
personal authority.  Naturally, important for the authority of the institution was the quality of the b arer or 
bearers.  Therefore, also the decrease [Abfall] of the authority of the modern parliaments, since their 
members were no longer to be compared with the House f Commons at the turn of the century, to name 
one example.  That authority and power did not coincide and need not coincide was evident.  Therefore, the 
problem that Birrenbach saw was whether the authority, as it today existed, as (as Berglar said) “appers 
derived from God”, and also the performance-related [l istungsbezogene] authority could be separated from 
the divine authority origin.  In this sense, Birrenbach could today no more see that all authority, as Berglar 
said, stemmed from the “summa auctoritas of God” and for this reason was “constituent part and execution 
[Vollzug] of religion.”  In the British, Spanish, Japanese and perhaps Saudi Arabian and Persian monarchy, 
but probably only in these, there still existed an aura [Hauch] of transcendental origin.  But this was an 
exceptional phenomenon.  Greater importance came to the element of tradition by that than to the religious 
element.  In the church sphere, the authority of the pope had sunk to a minimum in comparison to other 
times, although the transcendental origin here was not to be denied.  In the sense of the starting point of 
Berglar’s Vortrag, the “moral and practical rearmament,” Birrenbach believed that it would be nice if it 
would be or could come again so.  But the signs of the time did not appear to confirm this hope (KB to 
Prof. Peter Berglar, Cologne, 5 November 1977, K151/2).  As of September 1977, Birrenbach feared a 
potential “Balkanized Europe” (unlinked Europe) (KB to Prof. Raymond Aron, École des Hautes Études en 
Sciences Sociales, Centre Européen de Sociologie Historique, Paris, 22 September 1977, K074/1).  As of 
September 1977, Birrenbach saw a “dissolution” of the EC and NATO.  (KB to Marjolin, 14 September 
1977).  In line with his historical thought, Birrenbach saw these as lost years in a decisive/critical period of 
history.  
70 Birrenbach (wrongly) opposed and advised Kohl against the holding of elections in March 1983 not only 
because of constitutional concerns (constitutional m nipulation) but also because it would submit the vital
decision to deploy American missiles in Germany to a plebiscitary vote.  On his US trip of March 1981, 
Birrenbach replied to Kissinger’s question what he hought of the US situation only with “Let’s hope.” (KB 
US trip report of 1 April 1981).  With respect to spiritual and moral decay, Birrenbach pointed to the lack 
of transcendental bonds [Bindungen] and the lack of family cohesion [Zusammengehörigkeit].  With 
respect to the erosion of state authority, Birrenbach saw a Rechtsstaat coming “unhinged”; and the 
undermining of FRG political stability and of the normal functioning of the state.  Birrenbach identified a 
decline in national cohesion in the FRG.  In connection with the decline in historical consciousness, 
Birrenbach pointed to a lack of historical knowledg and a lack of understanding for all tradition.  With 
respect to the decline in the fundamental values of state, Birrenbach pointed to a declining sense of raison 
d’état and an undermining of the substance of states and of the will to power of the state [staatlichen 
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irrevocable phenomena led him to designate them (this spirit) “the enemies of the West, I 
would almost say even worse than the East.”71  Ever historically minded, Birrenbach 
conjured up specious analogies with the interwar period, referring to the path to Weimar, 
“the world economic crisis” of the late 1920s and 1930s and appeasement.72  He found 
                                                                                                                                      
Machtwillens].  With respect to national-state thought, Birrenbach referred to the priority of mere narrow 
national interests, complete independence and self-int rest.  With respect to the decline of moral values, 
Birrenbach referred to the decline of the respect for he Menschen.  With respect to the non-identification 
with the state, Birrenbach referred to a St atsverdrossenheit.  In connection with welfare state thought, 
Birrenbach saw an unrealistic and overdrawn welfare state; an entitlement mentality [Anspruchsdenken]; a 
lack of stamina among the citizens; a stress on individual and private well-being, happiness, interests and 
material advantage; a revolution of expectations; a unwillingness to sacrifice for the common cause; a lack 
of unselfish effort [Einsatz um der Sache willen]; and a priority to increase living standards rather than 
military strength/defense.  Birrenbach believed they ad wrongly interpreted détente.  Birrenbach 
complained about a non-identification with the state.  Birrenbach saw these phenomena as “just [eben] a 
sign of our time.” (KB to Dr. Dieter Spethmann, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, 5 September 1978).  
For Germany being more sensitive with respect to the future than other countries, “particularly being a 
divided nation with an unsufficient sense of identity,” see KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 7 December 
1982, ACDP K132/2.  For Birrenbach’s complaint that “[i]n the Politik itself, historical arguments are 
hardly discernible [erkennbar]” and that “[t]he knowledge of the history of the most important nations, for 
instance in the Bundestag, is minimal,” see KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübbe, Birchli, Haus Claudia, 
Switzerland, Einsiedeln, 23 April 1981, ACDP K032/1.  
71 KB to Strausz-Hupé, 30 June 1980.  As Birrenbach put it, “The West is retreating in all realms, with the 
exception of technology and economy, particularly spiritually.” (KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupe, US 
Mission to NATO, Brussels, 25 April 1977, K100/1).  As of September 1979, Birrenbach saw the 
“symptoms of political decay in our time” contributing to the failures of US and European policies. (KB to 
Rostow, 19 September 1979 and KB to McCloy, 20 September 1979).  As of February 1980, Birrenbach 
agreed with Kohnstamm that they lived in “ugly” times (KB to Kohnstamm, 21 February 1980).  In 
November 1979, Birrenbach  moaned “What becomes in Europe actually not bad [schlecht]?  The Western 
world is in the condition of a latent crisis.” (KB to Kohnstamm, 16 November 1979).  Reflecting on what 
he considered the dire arms situation in September 1979, Birrenbach remarked on the possibility that “this 
all initiates perhaps the final defeat.” (KB to Rostow, 19 September 1979 and KB to McCloy, 20 
September 1979).  Birrenbach was appalled at the inabil ty of the big Western countries to muster the 
internal strength to substantially reduce their energy consumption.  According to Birrenbach, a process of 
renewal [Erneuerung] would be extremely difficult (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1).  
Birrenbach cited the potential implications for security (e.g. defense budgets) and energy (consumption) 
policy. 
72 As of October 1981, Birrenbach feared that “the same could happen [in the FRG] as in Britain when 
Chamberlain spoke after the meeting in Munich in 1938 about ‘peace for our time.’” (KB to Bowie, 9 
October 1981).  Who could have imagined that Western Europe, more than three decades after WWII, 
would be considered weak-willed and complacent, an attitude now characterized as “Finlandization”?  
Europe in recent years had shown some symptoms of weakness, as we had discovered historically in France 
and Britain before WWII.  McCloy and Birrenbach still remembered the weakness both countries showed 
in the midst of the victories achieved by Hitler in occupying the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and 
even Poland.  The present mood in many countries, particularly the smaller ones like Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, perhaps Italy and some groups in Britain, Germany and France, tended towards 
accommodation to the security demands of the USSR. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2).  
Rather than Weimar, Birrenbach also sometimes referred to the danger of ending up like the 3rd French 
Republic.  As of November 1982, Birrenbach wondered if they were facing a new world economy crisis as 
he had experienced it at the start of the 1930s.  Referring to the German terrorism and the tepid respon e to 
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these trends more acute in Europe, especially the FRG, than in the US, where they were 
also present to some extent but which he continued to trumpet as having an incomparably 
greater stability and moral and material substance.73  By the early 1980s, Birrenbach was 
declaring that “Europe is now the ‘sick man’ like Turkey before the First World War.”74  
Yearning in many respects for a return to the 1950s, 6  and even early 70s, he was 
haunted by the notion that “the best part of the post-war time lies behind us.”75   
Within the Federal Republic, the primary threat to he now institutionalized 
establishment German Atlanticism continued to stem fro  an extra-governmental Left.  
Among the new, yet apparently deep-rooted, factors n urishing Birrenbach’s pessimism 
in the late 1970s and into the 1980s were the burgeoning “irrational” radical mass 
(public; social) movements opposing and pressuring both the Schmidt and Kohl 
                                                                                                                                      
it, Birrenbach claimed “I feel vividly reminded of the years 1931-32.” (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, 
K173/1).  The demonstrations in view of the swearing-in of the young recruits on the 25th anniversary of 
the founding of the Bundeswehr eminded Birrenbach of the worst times of Weimar (KB to Hallstein, 14 
November 1980).  Birrenbach also remarked on the “mntality of Vichy of ‘anxiety and defeatism’” in 
Europe (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2).  As of October 1981, Birrenbach believed with 
respect to the peace movement in the FRG that “Sometimes I thought that the same could happen as in 
Britain when Chamberlain spoke after the meeting in Munich in 1938 about “peace for out time.” (KB to 
Bowie, 9 October 1981).  Birrenbach’s references to Weimar were in part due to his perception of an 
increasingly plebiscitary democracy.  Even as Birrenbach pointed to his voluntary emigration in 1939 as 
evidence that he was a “democrat” and not a “reactionary,” he argued that “I find a democracy that orients 
itself by opinion polls unbearable [unerträglich]” (KB to Staatssekretär Hans-Hilger Haunschild [BMFT], 
20 December 1977, ACDP K182/1).  
73 All in Europe thought the United States had more substance and was more stable than any other country 
in the West and that the symptoms of decay in Europe did not exist in the US. (KB to Robert Schaetzel, 
DC, 11 January 1978, K100/2).  Birrenbach included Britain as part of Europe in this assessment. 
74 KB to McCloy, 22 March 1982.   
75 As of July 1983, concerned about events in Europe and the Atlantic areas, Birrenbach feared “that the 
best part of the postwar time lies behind us.”  As of 5 April 1978, Birrenbach remarked that they lived in a 
“world full of worries….  I almost would say the bett r part of the postwar time lies behind us.” (KB to Sir 
Siegmund Warburg, Warburg Paribas Becker Inc., NY, 5 April 1978).  In July 1979, Birrenbach moaned 
“We are living in the wrong century.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 24 July 1979).  As of October 1979, 
Birrenbach feared that “Dangers threaten us therefore fr m all sides.” (KB to Schmidt, 26 October 1979).  
As of June 1982, Birrenbach’s concerns were “deeper today than they have ever been since the end of the 
1950s.” (KB to McCloy, 23 June 1982).  As of January 1981, Birrenbach expected the new year to be a 
very difficult one, “perhaps the most difficult one since the end of World War II.” (KB to Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, 13 January 1981).  We stood before the most difficult situation of the postwar time (KB 
Aktennotiz of 6 July 1981, K178/2).  It had never been so bad with respect to the European question 
(European unification process) as now. (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1).   
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governments.76  These included peace/neutralist demonstrations, mo t specifically 
resisting the local deployment of US/Western nuclear weapons (including the neutron 
bomb; INF weapons; criticize arms policy), as well as environmentalist (alternative; 
citizens initiatives) demonstrations against nuclear energy.  Birrenbach saw these 
allegedly criminal, dangerous and violent movements threatening “catastrophic results” 
for the FRG’s foreign, security and economic policy and was appalled by what he 
considered the weak toleration of such demonstrations by a considerable part of the 
Politik and population and the failure to halt them.  Particularly dismaying to Birrenbach 
and other Atlanticists was the fact that, at least from the late 1970s, Berlin, once a 
staunchly pro-American city that embraced the US as the defender of its freedom and 
security, a city that continued to be a destination for American Atlanticist visitors and the 
target of Atlanticist efforts to maintain its status, served as a hotbed for such 
movements.77  Furthermore, after seeing them hitherto as relatively well-behaved and 
moderate, Birrenbach viewed the demands and activities (e.g. demonstrations) of the 
German trade unions and their leaders during this period (at least between 1977-83) 
                                                
76 At times, Birrenbach referred to these movements as emotional, “hysterical,” dramatic and a wave. 
77 As of August 1981, McCloy had taken a trip to Berlin.  Reagan planned to visit Berlin in June 1982.  In 
line with his yearning for the past, as of September 1981, Birrenbach believed that Berlin was no longer 
comparable to the Berlin of McCloy’s time (KB to McCloy, 21 September 1981).  As of June 1975, Stone 
(in contact with Monnet) was suggesting (and Monnet was enthused at the prospect) to and asking for 
advice from the responsible German Stellen (the governing mayor, the Bevollmächtigten of the FRG, 
Birrenbach and Brandt) that the Monnet archive be purchased by a German Stiftung or the Staatsbibliothek 
in Berlin and be housed in Berlin in the new Staatsbibliothek.  Thanks to the christening of this archive 
(Monnet would visit Berlin on this occasion) and the attraction the archive would present for many 
Wissenschaftler, Politiker, journalists and Schriftsteller from the entire world, Berlin’s importance as a 
European city would be underscored (in the interest of the Land Berlin).  Birrenbach informed Stone he 
would talk with Kohnstamm and try to get a solution t  the matter. (Stone to KB, 10 June 1975).  As of 
December 1981, Birrenbach had the Briefdienst (September 1981) of the work circle Sicherung des 
Friedens which included a contribution by Inspector General (aD) Ulrich de Maizière (as of July 1981, 
General (aD) de Maizière was a member of the DGAP).  
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regarding economic and social issues as elements of these deleterious phenomena.78  
While only the peace movement was overtly anti-American, each of these extra-/anti-
governmental left-wing movements, and their objectionable attitudes, represented a threat 
or obstacle to the plans of Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists.79 
                                                
78 These various pro-labor measures included the 35-hour week and increases in social status, wages and 
benefits.  On the “outburst” and protests of the trade unions and the left-wing of the SPD, see KB to 
McCloy, 25 November 1982, K178/2.  These struggles included criticisms of government legislation and, 
as of 1983, demonstrations for the 35-hour week.  Birrenbach did not view all trade unionists negatively 
during this period on the key issues.  When, as of November 1977, Birrenbach had been asked by Dr. Heinz 
Schimmelbusch (Geschäftsführendes Präsidialmitglied of the Deutschen Atomforums eV) which member 
of the SPD-Fraktion he would propose for a seat in the Atomforum, Birrenbach proposed to co-opt Herrn 
Adolf Schmidt (Deputy Fraktion Chairman and Chairman of the IG Bergbau und Energie), who was a 
proponent of the nuclear energy and an “experienced [g standene]” personality. 
79 Regarding the wave of neutralism, set through with anti-American elements, such a thing was hardly to 
be observed in countries like France, Britain and Italy.  Naturally, the position of the Federal Republic was 
more vulnerable than that of these three other states.  This qualification was however considerably less 
relevant in the age of nuclear weapons, especially of the LRTNFs, since these countries were endangered 
by these weapons in the same way as the Federal Republic.  The mood of neutralism was characteristic for 
the northern regions of Europe (i.e. North Germany more than South Germany).  That went also for the 
predominant Protestant churches or groups of members of these churches in these countries.  A certain anti-
Americanism could be observed in France already since the end of the war.  At the moment it was less 
acute than in the years of the Gaullist period, though also now it was symptomatic for a certain attitude in 
France.  The strongest of all was the anti-Americanism in countries like the Netherlands, Denmark and 
currently in the Federal Republic. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, 
Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1).  Among the key 
elements of the US-FRG relationship currently, Birrenbach cited the increasingly strong neutralist wave, 
which ,with anti-American elements, set itself through, had begun to emerge more and more clearly in parts
of the population, especially the youth, the youth organizations of the SPD, in part also of the FDP, church 
groups, also the leadership of the SPD-Fraktion. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut 
Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1).  While 
critical of the “irrational” opponents of nuclear energy and claiming to be aware of the concerns regarding 
the effect of nuclear energy, Birrenbach was rather cavalier about the health issues involved.  So far as was 
known, in the last 30 years not a single fatality had been recorded due to Leichtwasser- eactors, which were 
functioning in the Federal Republic as in other countries.  In the Bergbau, in the steel industry in the last 
thirty years, there had been numerous fatalities.  Auto traffic alone claimed victims.  One could not 
therefore eliminate these three factors.  That could not seriously be the view of even a church 
representative.  In the world today there were almost four billion people, including a billion who starved 
and had no energy resources of whatever type.  Based on the magnitude of the energy need, the 
development of sun energy and other substitute energies would require one or two decades.  Whether this 
then would be fully usable could still not be said to ay.  Birrenbach agreed with the Cardinal that it was not 
the task of theology rather of Fachwissenschaft to ascertain whether the construction of breeder reactors 
and reprocessing plants, whether the transport and deposit of atomic waste was possible according to the 
current state of Wissenschaft and Technik in a way that certainly excluded explosions, radiation damage 
and other catastrophes.  Birrenbach agreed that risks were also connected with other industrial processes.  
But Birrenbach disagreed with the Cardinal when he said that it was not sufficient if the Fachwissenschaft 
thought it was likely that through safety controls and surveillance technology damage could be preventd, 
that the absolute certainty was necessary.  Even the catastrophe in Harrisburg had not provably led to 
deaths.  Clearly, radiation damage was dangerous, but the degree of endangering was not clear.  The 
development of safeguard technology had made such progress that a rationally acceptable safety concept 
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At the same time and ultimately to the end, Birrenbach identified this dangerous 
irrationalism increasingly impacting also on the German parties.  In key policy areas (e.g. 
foreign policy, nuclear energy), Birrenbach saw the powerful left-wings of the SPD and 
FDP (apparently less-powerful) as well as an influential left-wing Green Party allied with 
the peace, anti-nuclear energy and trade union moveents.80  Within the SPD, the leader 
of this group was Willy Brandt, a man whose political resurgence Birrenbach deeply 
regretted “because he is a visionary and without understanding for the realities of the 
world.”81  Other prominent personalities in the SPD left-wing, contemptuously referred to 
by Birrenbach as the “comrades [Genossen],” included Wehner, Egon Bahr, Alfons 
Pawelczyk, Apel, Lafontaine, Ehmke, Koschnik, Eppler and Vogel.82  With regard to 
foreign policy, their views were distinctly neutralist, anti-American and anti-
NATO/alliance, explicitly accusing the Atlanticists of a vassal-like allegiance to the 
United States, while eager to conduct an expansive Ostpolitik towards the USSR/East.83  
                                                                                                                                      
already existed today.  When the cardinal referred to the dangers of the reprocessing and the quick breeder 
reactors, Birrenbach believed that both processes on the one hand offered the chance of exploiting the 
nuclear fuel elements to a higher degree, by the quick breeder reactors alone by 60% more, and on the other 
hand were stages of disposal.  The danger by the reproc ssing plants lay less in the possible environmental 
damage than in the possibility of using high-percentage uranium for military purposes.  True, the question 
of the final elimination of the remaining nuclear fuel elements had still not been completely solved.  The 
problem of final disposal could certainly be solved by the Wissenschaft in ten or twenty years. (KB to 
Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K1 2/2).  As of December 1984, there was the 
question of a unified European environmental protection (Katalysator), which does not seem to have been 
high on Birrenbach’s priorities.  As of January 1986, Birrenbach saw the complete overestimation of the 
ecological events impeding the development of nuclear energy and other modern productions.  As of 
January 1984, Birrenbach wanted to take the savings from a settlement of the EC budget question and 
devote it to other European areas like research and environmental protection.  Birrenbach saw the German 
environmental movement ignoring the main safety data regarding nuclear energy. 
80 These left-wing party elements in the FRG included or were influenced greatly by theorists and 
intellectuals.  Apparently the FDP left-wing was not as bad as that of the SPD, at least by the 1980s, but it 
was still a problem. 
81 KB to Bowie, 21 January 1977.  As of 1979-82, Brandt was SPD Party Chairman. 
82 Wehner was old.  Wehner was another leader in the SPD and as of March 1979 the SPD’s leader/whip in 
the Bundestag.  Bahr was SPD General Secretary as of March 1979 and Staatsminister in the BKA as of 
October 1982.  Pawelczyk was the SPD disarmament spoke man as of 1979. 
83 For Birrenbach, this “pacifist”-minded foreign policy (including moral arguments) included opposition t  
the neutron bomb and to the NATO double-track rearmament decision of December 1979; a misjudgement 
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of the East-West arms balance; proposals for a special status in Central Europe between East and West 
(including the DDR and an atomic-free zone); a willingness to make too many concessions to the USSR (at 
least in part in an effort to get important concession  regarding the DDR); an exaggerated desire to avoid 
irritating and precipitating a war with the USSR and even the DDR; and false positions on 
security/arms/peace issues like East-West disarmament negotiations/SALT (e.g. receptivity to USSR 
disarmament initiatives).  As Birrenbach put it, “When I hear a man like Eppler speak about this question 
[nuclear energy], I simply get sick [schlecht].” (KB to Beckurts, 18 March 1980).  As of January-May 
1982, Birrenbach at least implicitly believed that even if the parties were split, still about two-thirds of the 
FDP and a majority of the SPD was pro-Atlanticist (supporting the NATO double-track resolution) and 
apparently the rest not.  Birrenbach continued to view the Union as far preferable to the much-criticized 
SPD and Greens (and to a lesser extent the FDP) with respect to foreign and domestic policy and welcomed 
the replacement of Schmidt’s Social-Liberal coalition by Kohl’s Union-Liberal government.  At least 
ostensibly on particular issues, Birrenbach attribued Atlanticist views to Kohl.  The political theses of the 
SPD could not represent the German Politik of tomorrow.  The new government of the CDU/CSU and
FDP, which would permit to the government Rau no government capable of action, would see to it. (KB, 
ill, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Richard Burt, Ambassador of the US, American embassy, Bonn, 
10 September 1986, K030/1).  Schmidt was facing difficulties now in his party, particularly in the military 
field and in the realm of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  This internal situation preoccupied Birrenbach 
“very deeply.” (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, t  Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 
February 1981, K074/1).  With respect to the stationing of American weapons in Europe, the attitude of the 
German government was clear, but the opposition parties in Germany conducted a policy which was not in 
accord with the alliance policy, this applied for the larger part of the SPD and the Green Party in Germany 
and certain elements of the Protestant church.  The motives were the ever-growing welfare state thinking in 
Germany; the increased fear that the Federal Republic could become the battlefield in a nuclear conflict 
between East and West and/or the hostage of such a conflict; and the fact that the USSR would try with all 
political measures of different categories to convince large parts of the population that a German attitude in 
accord with the alliance would damage basic German interests.  The Russians had in mind economic 
measures by blocking German exports and trade relations with the USSR and East European states. (KB, 
August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Lord Carringto , Secretary General of NATO, Brussels, 5 
November 1984, K074/1).  The Social Democratic Party, part from the Greens, had not clearly supported 
the American policy in the same way as the CDU/CSU and FDP. (KB to Burt, 13 April 1983, K132/2).  In 
Germany, the Greens and the larger part of the SPD were partly against the stationing of cruise missiles n 
Europe. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984, K160/2).  Haig could have full confidence in men like 
Genscher and Graf Lambsdorff. (KB to Haig, 18 January 1982, K146/2).  The Social Democratic Party had 
now joined the peace movement.  The SPD plus the Gre ns and possibly certain parts of the trade unions 
would fight the stationing of INF weapons on German soil. (KB to Haig, 20 April 1983, K146/2).  
Birrenbach repeatedly complained that the Federal Republic now had two Chancellors (KB to Haig, 17 
September 1981, K146/2).  Birrenbach considered the comments he read about the neutron weapon and 
MBFR by many Socialist politicians in the whole West irresponsible and ridiculous. (KB to Schaetzel, 6 
October 1978, K098/2).  The CDU, 45% of the German electorate, supported the present direction of 
American policy. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2).  Schmidt, Genscher and the CDU/CSU 
would maintain their attitude and defend the American position. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, 
K132/2).  Schmidt and Genscher had defended US policy.  But Schmidt was not identical with the SPD and
the left-wing of the FDP, or with one part of the population, nor with other northern European countries. 
(KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2).  A certain part of two parties, especially the SPD but also 
the FDP, gave too high a priority to détente which had less importance than the men behind Brandt thought. 
(KB to McCloy, 3 March 1980, ACDP K134/1).  One part of the political community in Germany was not 
any more as Atlantic-minded as it had been in the past.  The idea that détente was divisible became mor  
popular in Germany, particularly in certain groups of some parties. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, 
K178/2).  We had committed the mistake of pumping into ndustry too much public money on account of 
loans taken by state governments and the federal government.  They did not go into investments but 
ultimately into consumption.  This was the tribute a social-democratic government paid to its electors. (KB 
to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1).  Incomparison to the US, the Federal Republic had the 
advantage of the full autonomy of the German federal r serve bank (the Bundesbank), the experience of 
two total inflations and the pretty constructive inter ational economic policy of Schmidt and Lambsdorff. 
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With respect to personalities like Brandt and Bahr, t is represented for Birrenbach simply 
a continuation of earlier animosities.  Indeed, as of April 1980, Birrenbach still stewed 
over Brandt’s reference ten years ago to our “partners” in the East.84  These party left-
wings limited the power and authority of the Atlanticist-minded, pro-nuclear energy 
right-wings of the SPD and FDP, which Birrenbach, in a display of Atlanticism’s cross-
party nature, genuinely held in high regard, notably Chancellor Schmidt (SPD) as well as 
personalities like Foreign Minister Genscher (leader of the FDP) and Minister Leber.85  
                                                                                                                                      
(KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1).  Our system was that of assuring a maximum of free 
economy and, in a restricted way, interventions from the government in the economic process.  But these 
interventions had recently increased too much. (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1).  As
of November 1980, Schmidt had withdrawn from the 3% formula.  As of June 1984, Birrenbach deeply 
regretted the terrible difficulties Kohl had with te “infamous Politik” of the SPD (KB to Kohl, 14 June 
1984).  Hoping for the appropriate election results, Birrenbach suggested arguments/viewpoints to Kohl 
ostensibly to help him win the March 1983 election.  As of September 1980, Birrenbach believed that a 
poor 1980 election result could mean a further fourl st years and that they then would not recognize their
country. (KB to Staatsminister für Unterricht und Kultus Prof. Dr. Hans Maier, Munich; 23 September 
1980).  As of December 1985, Birrenbach believed that in the stationing of the nuclear weapons, Kohl had
achieved a historic success.  As of December 1982, Birrenbach referred to the “abusive [missbräuchliche]” 
social legislation of the CDU/CSU (KB to Kohl, 30 December 1982).  As of April 1980, Birrenbach 
believed that Schmidt gave a somewhat higher priority than Strauß and Birrenbach to the specific German 
problems.  
84 Bitterly citing Brandt, Birrenbach derisively referr d to “our charming Eastern ‘partners.’” (KB to 
Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980). 
85 The situation in the Federal Republic was characteized by the strong leadership of Helmut Schmidt who 
had, however, serious difficulties with men like Brandt, Ehmke, Bahr and his whole left wing and made it 
impossible for him to act in each case as he wished. (KB to Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2).  Birrenbach 
assured Haig of the Atlanticist attitude of the Chancellor and his close friends and of the leadership of the 
FDP and the whole CDU.  Only certain elements on the left-wings of the coalition partners thought in the 
terms published in the press.  The whole German nation was deeply convinced that without the US an 
effective defense against the USSR would be impossible. (KB to Haig, US Army, SACEUR, 22 March 
1979, K153/1).  Europe was neither politically stable nor economically consolidated; on the contrary.  This 
applied to almost all the states in Europe.  The German position was in some respects better than that of 
others like Britain, France or Italy.  But the economic crisis had not been overcome.  The two coalitin 
parties were deeply split into a right- and left-wing, with the left-wing possibly stronger than the right-
wing.  On the other hand, the leaders of both parties (i.e. Schmidt (not Brandt) and Genscher) still had
decisive influence.  They only had to make some compr ises with their left-wings because of the interal 
votes.  The right-wings of the SPD and also the FDP were as Atlanticist as before.  The CDU party had no 
real leader, but was one hundred percent Atlanticist.  49 per cent of the CDU gave the leaders of the two 
coalition parties a wider basis enabling them to impede any step by the left fractions of their parties which 
would be negative for the Atlantic policy. (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, K098/2).  The left-wings 
of both (coalition) parties were using the emotional and hysterical mood to force Schmidt, Genscher, 
Lambsdorff, [Volker] Hauff and other reasonable lead rs to abstain from any kind of use of nuclear enegy. 
(KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2).  The Christian 
Democratic Party with 49.5% of the votes was overwhelmingly in favor of the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2).  That was 
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Such intra-German divisions also found expression at the Atlanticist functions (e.g. the 
1980 KWC), particularly with respect to explicitly Atlantic questions (not European 
questions).86  For Birrenbach, much of this situation was reminiscent, after a considerable 
lull, of the Vietnam era.87   
Linked to some extent with these left-wing movements was the persistent and 
uncontrollable intrusion into politics of what seemd to Birrenbach irrational religious 
                                                                                                                                      
Birrenbach’s opinion (regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy) and the opinion of the most powerful 
politicians in this country of all the parties, excpt the extremists like Bahr, Ehmke, Koschnik or others.  It 
was the opinion of the whole board of the CDU/CSU. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State 
Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2).  We urgently needed nuclear energy.  But there was a certain movement in 
the Federal Republic of “dreamers” and the left-wings of  both coalition parties, particularly the Social 
Democratic Party, which wanted, repeating the movement of ten years ago, to have nothing to do with 
nuclear energy.  The program which this group of demonstrators had proposed to the Chancellor was 
“ridiculous.”  Every word is “nonsense”: no growth any more, equality of all earnings in the whole 
population, to live under the most modest conditions as in previous centuries. (KB to Gerard Smith, 
Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2).  Each of the principal European states was split 
as far as foreign policy was concerned.  This applied also to the two principal German coalition parties, the 
SPD and FDP.  Schmidt’s difficulties had come particularly from this side. (KB to Gerard Smith, 
Ambassador at Large, Department of State, 17 April 1979, K098/2).  The SPD had split into two parts.  The 
left-wing was very strong, led by men like Brandt, Wehner, Bahr, Koschnik, Ehmke and others. Their 
principal goal was détente.  Schmidt was a man in whom Birrenbach generally had confidence.  This 
applied also to a certain smaller part of his party. (KB to McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2).  Schmidt was 
strongly blocked in his Atlanticist attitudes by Brandt, Wehner, Bahr, Ehmke, Koschnik, Pawelczyk and 
others and the Jusos. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 1980, K134/1).  Grass didnot understand anything about 
European policy. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2).  It was neither Schmidt nor Genscher nor 
the CDU/CSU party, which would emit the pacifist and anti-American commentary.  It was the left-wing of 
the SPD.  The influence of Brandt in this context was large.  There was no doubt that the majority of the 
Bundestag, including the entire CDU/CSU, would place itself behind the NATO resolution.  There was no 
doubt about my attitude and that of the CDU/CSU.  Birrenbach was always for the fortification of the 
German-American relationship.  He could be sure that men like Schmidt, Genscher and the leaders of the 
CDU/CSU party did everything not to endanger the alliance. (KB Aktennotiz of 6 July 1981, K178/2).  An 
over-sensitiveness in the question of nuclear weapons was promoted by a certain political side, which only 
damaged the cause [Sache]. (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1).  Birrenbach also considered 
Lambsdorff, Friderichs and Ertl good men in the FDP but I am not sure if they were Atlanticists.  
Birrenbach (aside from all the blatantly obsequious flattery) did express to his US contacts his high regard 
of Schmidt, including as Chancellor.  This extended to Schmidt’s pro-Atlanticist and pro-European efforts 
(including in cooperation with France/d’Estaing).  It was Chancellor Schmidt who in 1977 in London had
recommended the idea of the deployment of medium-range rockets.  As of July 1981, Birrenbach agreed 
with McCloy that among the present European leaders, Schmidt was the best.  As of February 1981, 
Birrenbach considered Schmidt the best man they had now (in the FRG, I guess).  For an example of 
questionable flattery, see Birrenbach’s letter to Schmidt for the latter’s birthday, in which Birrenbach lauds 
Schmidt as “a true statesman”, among many other things for his combating of terrorism (internally and the
Mogadishu coup) (KB to Schmidt, 21 December 1978). 
86 KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980. 
87 KB to Rostow, 14 August 1981.  During the late 1970s and into the 1980s (to the end), the British 
Labour Party (including Michael Foot) also displayed strong anti-American and anti-NATO attitudes. 
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perspectives.  Long after the triumph of Liberal Atlan icism over the Abendland 
worldview in the Federal Republic, this phenomena appe red to be one of the most 
disturbing trends in many regions of the world.  For Birrenbach, the impact of religion on 
international relations continued to be a constant source of concern.88  For Birrenbach, 
who in later years portrayed himself as somebody who “t inks in realistic terms and does 
not expect miracles,” personalities like Carter (as a Baptist), Israeli Prime Minister Begin 
(as an Orthodox Jew), Sharon, Khomeini, as well as the religious groups in Israel (as of 
1976) represented “another world.”89  These personalities and groups were religious 
fanatics, whose strictly past-oriented perspectives and judgments and ignorance of the 
contemporary and future realities in the world undermined the entire basis for any 
reasonable policy, including that of the United States and Israel.90  Particularly in the 
wake of the revolution in Iran in 1979, a concerned Birrenbach saw the entire Arabian 
world “in an emotional state of Islamic renaissance,” and feared a dangerous Islamic 
religious radicalism, due in part to Israeli policy (in Palestine) that enraged the Arab 
world and inflamed the extraordinarily serious Israeli-Palestinian/Arab (Near East) 
conflict (not merely a regional but an international/world problem), that threatened to 
                                                
88 Birrenbach feared that “the Renaissance of Islam” would stretch to the entire east coast of the Arabian 
Peninsula and from the Horn of Africa up to the Persian harbors.  Then there would be not a single secure 
point in this region including the thirty “princesses” in Saudi Arabia, on which the Western world could 
count (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, London, 16 February 1979, K068/2). 
89 For Birrenbach thinking in realistic terms and notexpecting miracles, see KB to Shirley Williams, 25 
July 1977.  For “another world,” see KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, 14 September 1983 (speaking here 
specifically of Sharon).  Birrenbach also longed for the times of Ben Gurion as Prime Minister (“one of the 
greatest statesmen of his age”), convinced that he would have acted differently.   
90 Thus he criticized Begin, “a man of religious fanaticism who lives in the past” for “judging the situation 
based on a historic perspective of biblical origin.” (KB to Henry Kissinger, 25 January 1978; KB to Eugene 
Rostow, 3 March 1978, ACDP 188/3).  As of January 1978, Birrenbach criticized Begin’s “biblical 
approach.”  For Birrenbach on Carter and Begin in th s regard, see KB to Rostow, 9 April 1980, ACDP 
K209/2.  The zeal of Thatcher was dangerous.  It could end in a catastrophic confrontation with the trade 
unions. (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1).  This was probably the case in July 1979 
when Birrenbach criticized what he saw as merely “pious admonitions” coming from the US. (KB to 
Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2). 
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spread throughout the Islamic population in the entir  Middle East (including Palestine, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the Emirates; disintegration of the whole region 
between the Persian Gulf and Israel/Horn of Africa; undermine the consolidation of the 
situation), triggering fundamentalist revolutions and rousing them to work for the 
Palestinians.91   
Moreover, during the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g. 1981-84), such irrational 
religious phenomena also threatened to impact Europe and the Federal Republic via the 
role of the churches.  At least in the case of the Catholic Church, an interest in 
international affairs manifested itself in the public positions assumed on key issues by the 
leadership and at least certain clergymen (German bishops; Cardinal Höffner; German 
Bishops’ Conference), its participation in and even staging of particular functions and the 
publication under the auspices of prominent clergymen of studies on relevant themes.92  
                                                
91 KB to Bowie, 14 June 1982; KB to Eugene Rostow, 23 March 1979, ACDP K212/1.  Birrenbach 
doubted that the United States would be able to influe ce the irrational power in Iran by the measures th y 
had in mind. (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 16 April 1980, K134/1).  Irrational 
power could not be convinced by economic sanctions. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1).  The Arab 
world was now in an emotional state of Islamic renaiss nce. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, 
Department of State, 17 April 1979, K098/2).  Birrenbach feared that the Islamic revolution would extend 
over the whole Eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula and also to Saudi Arabia. (KB to Gerard Smith, 
Ambassador at Large, Department of State, 17 April 1979, K098/2).  Saudi Arabia was in danger of 
becoming a victim of Islamic fundamentalism. (KB to Kissinger 13 December 1982, K132/2).  The 
position of Saudi Arabia was endangered by the wave of Islam and also the other countries on the eastern 
coast of the Arabian peninsula. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2).  Birrenbach considered Begin 
disastrous [verhängnisvoll] for Israel in spite of certain charismatic traits, which Birrenbach did not deny 
him; but exactly since he disposed of an “indirect connection to heaven [Verbindung zum Himmel],” the 
man was so dangerous in practical Po itik, “like a certain other President.” (KB to Dr. Günther Gillessen, 
FAZ, 23 January 1978, 153/1).  As of August 1979, Birrenbach saw Iran and potential similar 
developments in Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Kuwait and Anatolia as warning signs of what might happen 
in the Middle East if peace were not established in this region (Palestine).  As of February 1979, 
Birrenbach feared the Palestine conflict fed into “the renaissance of Islam.” (KB to Schaetzel, 13 February 
1979, K098/2).  As of October 1978, Birrenbach saw ince 1972 a renaissance of Islam in the critical 
Middle East (e.g. Iran) that could one day have serious consequences for the Western powers and for which 
the Palestinian question could become the powder-barrel (e.g. in Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Lebanon and 
other important states could be affected by the constant opposition of the Palestinian elements) (KB to 
Schaetzel, 6 October 1978, K098/2). 
92 For instance, in the 1981 invitation of the DGAP that Birrenbach (along with the AA/Amb. Gehlhoff and 
Homeyer/the German Bishops’ Conference) was involved (cooperated) in bringing about to Cardinal State 
Secretary Archbishop Casaroli to speak before the DGAP.  Casaroli was glad to accept (and I think even 
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To Birrenbach’s dismay, the declarations emanating from the Church contained many 
objectionable elements, tending toward an opposition to nuclear weapons and the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as towards a definitive recognition of the Oder-
Neisse border.  Distinctive in Birrenbach’s post-Bundestag period, especially the early 
1980s, were his efforts to influence the German Catholic Church through an increased 
contact (e.g. letters, discussions) with its leadership, including personalities within the 
German Bishops’ Conference in Bonn (e.g. the Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach).93  
                                                                                                                                      
stimulated) the DGAP invitation (though I am not sure if anything ever came of it).  Also the Fachgespräch 
planned for 24 June 1981 in the Erzbischöflichen Haus (Cologne) about questions of Energy Supply and 
the use of nuclear energy to which Birrenbach was invited (but could not attend).  Invitations for the June 
1981 Fachgespräch went out (at least formally) from Joseph Cardinal Höffner.  Aside from Birrenbach, 
invitees (experts) included religious personalities (bi hops/archbishops, including Höffner himself; also 
from Switzerland), businessmen/Wirtschaft (including Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Beckurts, Firma Siemens, 
Munich), Wissenschaftler (Prof. Dr. Adolf Birkhofer, Forschungsgelände, Garching; also from 
universities), environmentalists (Prof. Dr. Wolfgan Engelhardt, President of the Deutschen 
Naturschutzrings eV, Munich), those in the nuclear/energy organizations (Prof. Dr. Rudolf Guck, President 
of the Deutschen Atomforum, Bonn; Prof. Dr. HW Levi, Hahn-Meitner-Institut für Kernforschung, Berlin; 
Dr. jur. Horst Magerl, Geschäftsführer of the Vereinigung deutscher Elektrizitätswerke, Frankfurt; Prof. Dr. 
Hubertus Nickel, Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH; Prof. Dr. Rudolf Schulten, Kernforschungsanlage 
Jülich GmbH) and Politiker (e.g. members of the Bundestag).  As of May 1981, Birrenbach was familiar 
with (and to Hengsbach claimed to agree with) the sudy “Energie und Umwelt” published on 25 August 
1979 by the Rhein-Ruhr Stiftung (led as of 1981 by the Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach). 
93 Other such personalities with whom Birrenbach was in contact were Ilgener; and Prälat Dr. Josef 
Homeyer, the leader of the General Secretariat of the German Bishops’ Conference.  As the Bishop of 
Essen, Hengsbach was therefore the bishop in the Rur area.  As of 4 July 1980, he was also Chairman of 
the Commission Weltkirche in the German Bishops’ Conference.  I am not really sure what Ilgener’s 
position was.  Homeyer was also referred to as (or as part of) the Zentralrat of the German Bishops’ 
Conference.  Though I believe Homeyer presented Birrenbach’s letters to the cardinals (at least Cardinl 
Joseph Höffner) and despite Birrenbach’s efforts, I have no evidence that Birrenbach ever came into direct 
contact with Höffner (Archbishop of Cologne and Chairm n of the German Bishops’ Conference).  
Birrenbach was also in touch during the late 1970s and early 1980s with Amb. (aD) Dr. Horst Osterheld 
and his successor Prälat Alfons Mappes (both Zentralstelle Weltkirche of the German Bishops’ 
Conference, the latter as of February 1981) but these two were not political contacts like Homeyer and
Hengsbach, rather they supplied Birrenbach with copies of the relevant brochures published by the office of 
the German Bishops’ Conference.  As of January 1982, Hengsbach was attempting to get Birrenbach to 
prevent the closing of some Thyssen work (Schalker Verein in Gelsenkirchen) to save jobs, so this 
relationship between Birrenbach and churchmen was a two-way street.  As of September 1980, Birrenbach 
believed that the church in Poland could (or did?) attempt to compensate for its careful attitude in the 
course of the strike through an initiative in the border question.  See Birrenbach’s remarks on the stat ment 
of Cardinal Höffner before the plenary assembly of the German Bishops’ Conference in Fulda in 
September 1980 [KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K112/2].  Birrenbach agreed 
with Cardinal Höffner’s conclusion that “the responsibility consciousness of all Menschen and Völker vis-
à-vis nature had to be awakened and strengthened.”  However, the consequence which he drew from it in 
his sixth conclusion regarding the use of nuclear energy Birrenbach did not find convincing. (KB to Bishop 
of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K112/2). 
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Demonstrating the dramatically different modes of th ught, Birrenbach sought to inform, 
even awe, these religious contacts with his knowledge, experience, and judgement, 
supplying them with a variety of arguments and materi ls (books, Briefdienst) more 
suited to an audience of international affairs experts than to the bewildered clergy.  
Birrenbach also depicted a disputed state-church relationship and argued that such theses 
undermined the Staatsautorität.94  However, the roles played by both the Protestant and 
(to a lesser extent and in a moderate way; at leastelements of) the Catholic churches in 
the FRG and Western Europe ultimately promoted the extra-governmental movements 
there and reflected a contentious relationship betwe n them and German Atlanticism.95 
                                                
94 KB to Hengsbach, 14 December 1981.  Birrenbach insisted that the church not get involved in areas that,
according to the Grundgesetz, belonged to the state (e.g. regarding the Oder-Neisse Line).  Birrenbach 
claimed to be interested in the fundamental problems of state, church and society. 
95 As of June 1981, Birrenbach was upset about the “irrational” scenes at the Protestant church festival in 
Hamburg (peace movement, vs. NATO decision of December 1979). (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, 
K178/2).  As of November 1981, Birrenbach believed that the situation in the FRG with regard to 
neutralism (anti-Atlanticism) was no different from that of the Protestant countries in Europe (including 
Britain; the other northern European countries), although signs had recently become visible also in the 
Catholic countries (e.g. France and Italy).  As of July 1981, Birrenbach found a feeling of uncertainty  the 
FRG and other countries, particularly in the northern states of Europe.  With respect to Birrenbach’s stress 
on religious irrealism, as of December 1979, Birrenbach also believed that Pope John Paul II had forced his 
tempo too strongly and comprised too much of the globe too quickly (e.g. pastoral trips; the entire earth) in 
his efforts to make an impact and to change this new G sellschaft (might bring people into irrevocable 
conflict with the contemporary world).  Birrenbach seems to have thought positively about the Polish 
Church.  In later years, Birrenbach saw the church in Poland as an element of authority, indeed the only 
non-political institution with authority in that country and professed (at least to Hengsbach) to see the 
Polish episcopate in a brave struggle against USSR power and the Polish Communist Party as of January 
1982 in the face of enormous difficulties.  However, he also argued that “the Church alone cannot govern 
Poland.” (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 20 January 1982).  As of March 1983, Birrenbach seems to have 
approved of the (I think Polish) Church’s middle course with respect to Poland as the only possible one.  
Whatever his views of the impact of religion on international affairs, Birrenbach does seem in general to 
have thought highly of (admired) Pope John Paul II (personality; strength [Kraft]; at least to Osterheld and 
Homeyer), believed he occupied a key position with potential impact, claimed to be astonished by his 
patriotism, welcomed the Pope’s successful visit (a of November 1980) to the FRG and its potential 
results, and was impressed with and expressed interest in his encyclicals and speeches (and owning a 
volume of earlier speeches; at least some of these mat rials, along with other interesting Church works, 
were sent to him by Osterheld).  On the other hand, Birrenbach never had any significant contact with the 
popes.  Of the popes, Birrenbach had only known (how well? from afar?) Pius XII, already from 
Birrenbach’s time in Berlin, when Pacelli was Nuncio there.  As a member of a small commission of six 
members of the European Parliament under the leadership of the Italian Foreign Minister, Birrenbach had 
had an audience by him in Castel Gandolfo.  Pius XII had impressed Birrenbach.  As of November 1980, 
Birrenbach had personally experienced [rlebt] the impressive Pope John Paul II in the Kölner Dom, where 
Birrenbach had sat hardly more than 12 meters away from him.  As of December 1981, Birrenbach 
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Birrenbach saw these extremist movements receiving added impetus from abroad.  
Indeed, the peace, anti-nuclear energy and trade union movements were burgeoning 
international, in some cases trans-Atlantic, phenomena with developments in the United 
States, Britain and continental Western Europe mutually stimulating one another.96  Thus, 
Birrenbach complained about the peace (nuclear freeze) movement in the US, including 
leaders of the Democratic Party, the Catholic bishop  and certain foreign policy thinkers, 
with a “terrible” article in the Spring 1982 edition of Foreign Affairs by Robert 
McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan and Gerard Smith particularly 
egregious.97  Meanwhile, the Socialist parties in Europe exhibited a considerable 
                                                                                                                                      
professed himself happy that the Catholic Church (“our church”), unlike the Protestant Church, had merely 
peripheral groups [Randgruppen] propounding such irrational theses (KB to Hengsbach, 14 December 
1981).  As of the late 1970s, Birrenbach found Christian-Social elements in the CDU supporting various 
pro-labor measures (e.g. purely paritätische Mitbestimmung).  As of September 1978, Birrenbach claimed 
to have 25 years experience in this area (I guess Mitbestimmung). 
96 The peace movement seems to have first appeared in Europe, including the FRG, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Italy and probably Britain.  As of the early 1980s, the peace movement also existed in the US, apparently 
after its appearance in Europe, including in the form f the attitudes/movement of the American (Catholic) 
bishops/church.  The opposition to nuclear energy exist d in the US and Europe.  The trade union 
movement existed in at least Britain and the FRG.  Indeed it appears that the peace movement in Europe 
encouraged the appearance of such a movement in the United States.  As of December 1982, Birrenbach 
was upset at the impact of the American bishops’ peace movement/offensive on two Italian Catholic 
bishops in Sicily, who apparently had been in personal contact with the Pope.  Birrenbach remained well
aware of the domestic situation and developments abroad and their impact on Europe and the German 
domestic scene (e.g. the major West European countries, especially Britain and France, also Italy and 
Spain; e.g. politics, elections, economics, finance, mood, military affairs). 
97 Birrenbach complained about the declaration of the US Catholic bishops on this issue.  The Spring 1982 
Foreign Affairs article proposed pledging the renunciation of a nuclear first-strike (no first use; as 
frequently proposed by the USSR) and was considered isolationist by some.  Rostow hated this article.  The 
freeze movement in the US was endangering the situation in the Federal Republic and Europe.  This 
applied especially to the proclamations of the American conference of bishops. (KB to Kissinger 13 
December 1982, K132/2).  The declarations of the conference of American Catholic bishops and the freeze 
movement which became visible also in the November elections preoccupied Birrenbach very much.  
Birrenbach was in contact with the Catholic church in the Federal Republic, which intended to publish the 
documents edited by the last Catholic Bishop conference.  If the whole contents of this declaration would 
become known in Germany, it would be even more difficult for us to deploy the Pershing 2.  Birrenbach 
feared that then demonstrations would not make impossible but would disturb the process of stationing 
these weapons. (KB to McCloy, 25 November 1982, K178/2).  While acknowledging that the situation in 
the FRG was worse, Birrenbach did remind the Americans what had happened in the US during Vietnam 
(KB to Haig, 29 September 1981).  As of November 1982, Birrenbach (in line with his medical thought) 
feared that the nuclear freeze movement in the US could increase “the infection” that had affected parts of 
the youth in Europe (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 5 November 1982).  As of 1983, Birrenbach claimed that
many of the leading personalities in the US freeze movement were known to him since one or two decades.  
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neutralist and anti-American sensibility.98  Ironically given his own occasional clashes 
with the government executive, the authoritarian-mided Birrenbach, always disturbed by 
diverse and competing interests, stressed the need at home and abroad to eliminate or 
control those elements (among nations, within governm nts, parties, populations) 
dissenting from the Atlanticist line.99  Furthermore, Birrenbach insisted, sometimes 
                                                                                                                                      
In explaining the German peace movement to his US conta ts, Birrenbach pointed to feelings of fear and
frustration in many parts.  For the “terrible” article on “Nuclear Weapons in the Atlantic Alliance” in the 
Spring 1982 edition of Foreign Affairs (written by people Birrenbach considered “serious personalities”), 
see KB to Rostow, 3 May 1982.  As of October 1983, Birrenbach rejected Kennan’s arms policy.  
Birrenbach also referred to these movements as a wave (n ture imagery; also used this to refer to other 
things).  With respect to Democratic leaders, Birrenbach cited Kennedy, Hart and Mondale. 
98 The British Labour Party exhibited increasingly left-wing attitudes and resolutions which aligned it at 
least with the peace movement.   
99 Birrenbach demanded clarity.  Birrenbach complained repeatedly about a situation in which the Federal 
Republic had two chancellors (Schmidt and Brandt), whereas one was enough.  Important SPD 
personalities, especially Brandt, the party Geschäftsführer Bahr, and leading personalities of the SPD in the 
Bundesländern, had given statements at home and abroad which stood in clear contradiction to the 
outwardly declared policy of the Bundesregierung.  Especially the negotiations of Brandt in Moscow and 
the proposals presented by him there and his interpretations of alleged USSR concessions had extremely 
worried the American administration, but also other NATO partners like Britain and France.  Who was the 
representative of German foreign policy: Chancellor Schmidt or the leader of the Socialist Internationale 
and SPD Party Chair, who constantly intervened in German foreign policy?  This question was repeatedly 
asked inside and outside of the Federal Republic. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut 
Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1).  The fact 
that political personalities, who as such oversaw the effective circumstances, indirectly supported the 
Alternative-thought of misguided masses and still more the pronouncements of the USSR, directed at the 
division of Europe, meant an undermining of the Staatsautorität, which could lead to the most dangerous 
consequences.  It weakened the position of the Federal R public in the circle of alliance partners, as the 
commentary from the countries of our Western alliance partners showed, and even more confirmed the 
main thrust of the irrational forces in the Federal Republic.  In times of adversity there could not be two 
Außenpolitiker, who went out from opposed viewpoints and not from those which had belonged to the 
principles of our state since the existence of the Federal Republic, namely the maintaining of freedom, the 
stability of our country and the survival of Western Civilization.  If in this context mass demonstrations 
were staged or encouraged, which contradicted the official policy and the fundamental interest of the 
country, so is given to the factor of the emotional effect of Alternative-forces a political significance which 
it did not deserve. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the 
CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1).  One of the things that Birrenbach 
claimed to like about Pope John Paul II was his Integrationskraft.  On Genscher’s “intolerable” 
Doppelpolitik, which made Chancellor Kohl’s efforts more difficult, undermined Kohl’s authority and 
hindered the federal government’s success, see KB to Kohl, 25 June 1985.  Birrenbach was surprised (an
appreciative) to find that in some instances the demonstrations in the FRG found more understanding 
among his American contacts than himself.  As of September 1981, Haig had shown understanding for 
certain demonstrations as a symbol of the freedom of opinion/speech (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, 
K146/2).  For an example of Birrenbach’s statements a d activities disturbing certain personalities, in this 
case most notably Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with respect to his in-depth depiction to Gerard Smith of the 
role of US nuclear weapons, and Birrenbach’s apparent incomprehension and insistence to Schmidt that he 
had not contradicted the views and attitude of the fed ral government, see KB to State Secretary Dr. 
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bizarrely, that the German and European peace movement (and foreign policy divisions 
in the two principal German coalition parties and the principal European states) was 
stoked by concerns and doubts raised by US practices and policies, including those 
involving the stationing of new weapons in Europe and lternately those that led to the 
decline of US military power and, particularly under Reagan, a fear of nuclear war 
aggravated by an overheated policy and rhetoric, including a lack of prior consultation 
(e.g. on the neutron bomb) and an apparent unwillingness to negotiate realistically with 
the USSR on disarmament.100  Therefore, though Birrenbach believed international 
events (e.g. Poland crisis) might modify this trend, he also urged on his US contacts 
policies and measures crucial to countering it.101   
                                                                                                                                      
Manfred Schüler, Head of the BKA, 15 September 1980, K192/3.  To the extent that Birrenbach expressed 
understanding for Carter’s human rights and open foreign policies, it was due in part to the greater chances 
these policies had, in comparison to a solely balance-of-power policy, in integrating the US nation and i  
holding together the Western world. (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 17 August 1977).  While McCloy 
sensibly saw no chance to completely stop the attacks on him in 1983-84, Birrenbach not only regretted 
these attacks against McCloy, he wondered why it was not possible to stop this “completely 
incomprehensible” hostility (KB Aktennotiz, 29 July 1984).  As of April 1986, Birrenbach hoped that Kohl 
would succeed in bringing the German Politik again to a clear line, which would be extraordinarily difficult 
in view of the efforts of personalities like Genscher, Rau, Vogel and Prof. Biedenkopf. (KB to Kohl, 3 
April 1986).  As of September 1981, Birrenbach was referring to the “misused freedom of speech” in 
connection with the demonstrations in the FRG (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, K146/2).  Birrenbach 
praised Reagan’s charismatic ability to restore to the American population the unanimity, sympathy and
self-confidence lost after Vietnam and Watergate.  On such charismatic and psychological elements, see 
KB to Kohl, 24 February 1984 and KB to Kohl, 12 November 1984.  The psychological upswing in 
foreign, economic and domestic policy in the US wasclear. (KB to Hermes, 18 May 1981, K134/1). 
100 With respect to lack of consultation, Birrenbach cited a recent US neutron bomb decision as of August 
1981.  With respect to rhetoric, Birrenbach cited the mention by US representatives of a possible limited 
nuclear war in Europe and Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s mentioning the possible use of the neutron 
bomb.  The plans of Kissinger and Nunn to strengthen  conventional potential of Europe could not be 
successful because the threat contained in these proposals to withdraw American troops would encourage 
the neutralist and peace movement in Europe.  If the US conducted a cool, flexible and strong policy vis-à-
vis the USSR it would be possible to reduce in Europe the danger of separatism, pacifism and anti-
Americanism. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984 K160/2).  For instance, at least as of April 1983, 
Birrenbach argued that a US (Congress) rejection of the deployment/bunkering of the land-based MX 
missile on US soil (Utah, Nevada, Nebraska and Wyoming) would cause difficulties for the Federal 
government insofar as it would encourage and strengh  the left-wing parties and the political peace 
movement in Europe to resist the discriminatory stationing of Pershing 2 and Cruise Missiles in the densely 
populated areas of the European continent (Netherlands, Belgium and Britain) and in the FRG (the most 
populated area on the demarcation line). 
101 This included a greater care in announcing weapons decisions and an improved rhetoric.  The European 
peace movement grew out of abhorrence and fear of an all-out nuclear war between the two suicide-minded 
 565
During the mid- to late-1970s (at the latest by November 1977; perhaps into the 
early 1980s), Birrenbach was very concerned about the problem of and need to combat 
the wave of terrorism (left-wing radicalism) in the F deral Republic (apparently also 
occurred elsewhere in Europe).  Birrenbach promoted a cool, calculating and consistent 
policy against the terrorism, which he saw as a product of the permissive society.  
Birrenbach advocated tough measures/threats against hostage-taking groups and states 
(e.g. Iran).  He was appalled by what he considered th  defencelessness and half-hearted 
fight in the Federal Republic against this terrorism (silence, sympathy, weak and 
insufficient response) on each level of society, including the coalition government as well 
as the population, the courts and the police, seeing this as part of a larger failure of the 
Rechtsstaat in the face of spreading violence.  Keeping in line with his historical 
consciousness, Birrenbach distinguished the German terrorism from that in 
Ulster/Ireland, the Middle East (e.g. Palestinian) d the USA (which he seems to have 
considered as having more of a motive) and instead was reminded of the Russian nihilists 
in the reign of Alexander II.102  Aside from any general interest in this phenomena, this 
issue challenged and impacted on Birrenbach and the Atlanticists with respect to security 
arrangements for Atlanticist meetings, with Birrenbach for instance having to arrange 
with the Chancellor for the security of the foreign uests at the TC conference in Bonn as 
of November 1977 (it does not appear that any Atlanticist conference was actually 
harmed by terrorist activity), and also claimed the liv s of certain personalities associated 
                                                                                                                                      
superpowers that seemed to have no utility as the means were so disproportionate to any ends.  I believe 
Birrenbach praised in this respect the excellent speeches in the US and Europe/FRG, for instance by 
Reagan and Haig. 
102 KB to Bowie, 4 November 1977.   
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with the German Atlanticist network.103  Birrenbach addressed the issue of the German 
terrorism.104  Birrenbach was disturbed by a series of assassination ttempts in the late 
1970s and early 1980s (e.g. vs. the Pope, the English royal couple and Reagan).105 
As in the 1960s, the presence of a German Left challenging the tenets of Liberal 
Atlanticism in the Federal Republic continued to be linked to the generational issue.  As 
elsewhere in Europe, Birrenbach saw a young generation l rgely characterized by 
alienation, utopianism and a dearth of political knowledge, depth and perspective.  In 
addition to the disturbing implications for upcoming elections as well as the entire 
                                                
103 As of October 1977, Birrenbach was very upset about the recent death of Ponto and the kidnapping and 
murder of Schleyer, remarking that the murder of Schleyer was “a horrendous indication of that which still 
awaits us.” (KB to Schmidt, 20 October 1977).  As of September 1976, Jürgen Ponto (Vorstandssprecher 
of the Dresdner Bank AG) was one of Birrenbach’s contacts in the business world.   
104 During the TC conference, Birrenbach had been asked by the Americans to put down a few ideas about 
the German terrorism, which Birrenbach had done.  Birrenbach had drawn a parallel to the Narodnaya 
Volya, the Russian development under Alexander II. (KB to Dr. Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, 
153/1).  Birrenbach enclosed the ideas he had put down on the German terrorism. (KB to Dr. Günther 
Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, 153/1). 
105 Keeping with the imagery of illness, Birrenbach argued that Europeans were suffering from a “peace 
syndrome.” [KB to Henry Kissinger, 10 February 1982].  In line with his medical thought, as of November 
1978, Birrenbach saw the FRG population “infected” by the opposition to the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, K098/2).  Birrenbach saw the peace movement “infecting” 
countries.  Birrenbach saw those Germans and Europeans in the peace movement and the movement itself 
as manifesting “extreme symptoms” and also as sympto s of other problems.  Birrenbach’s revulsion 
against the terrorism in Germany was also due to the fact that it was directed not only against the state but 
also against major personalities like Ponto, Schleyer, Drenkmann and others and even against the American 
commander in Germany.  For Birrenbach the demonstrators nd terrorists (both of which used violence; I 
think in the FRG) did not have relevant motives.  As of September 1981, Birrenbach also complained about 
the demonstrations that he saw directed against any kind of improvement of the university system and other 
important problems of their civilization (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, K146/2).  As of April 1981, 
Birrenbach also complained about demonstrations against the public oath of recruits and against 
Hausbesitzer.  As of June 1981, Birrenbach saw a part of Germany as “irrational.” (KB to McCloy, 24 June 
1981, K178/2).  Ultimately, Birrenbach acknowledged that the resistance against the stationing of rockets 
had been lower than expected (KB Aktennotiz, 14 September 1984).  As of September 1982, Birrenbach 
referred to “symptoms of a certain anti-Americanism” in the FRG.  Birrenbach also referred to the peace 
demonstrations as “eruptions of emotions” (KB to Haig, 29 September 1981).  Birrenbach continued to 
identify troubling “symptoms” in the FRG.  Birrenbach referred to “symptoms” of neutralism and other 
undesirable phenomena in Europe/FRG and remarked that “T e neutralism is like an infection which 
extends like an epidemic all over Europe.”  (KB to McCloy, 9 November 1981, not sent off since KB 
phoned with McCloy).  Birrenbach saw the peace movement and the opposition to the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy as a “symptom.”  Birrenbach saw the peace movement as an infection spreading from 
country to country.  As of 1984, Birrenbach appears to have seen the organized peace movement 
advocating such bad ideas as Western unilateral (nuc ear) disarmament, a Western nuclear freeze and 
FRG/European denuclearization.  As of December 1977, based on the experiences of his life, Birrenbach 
believed that the Germans tended to an “emotionalism and sometimes also irrealism” which found their 
expression in positive and negative exaggeration. 
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democratic process, the problematic state of the German youth manifested itself in its 
significant role, especially particular subgroups (e.g. Protestants, Jusos, intellectuals and 
the unusual and regrettable mass of students), in the left-wing movements and 
terrorism.106  Faced with this situation, the Atlanticists continued with their generational 
efforts to influence the German youth.107  In his various leadership capacities, Birrenbach 
                                                
106 For Birrenbach on such issues, see KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2.  On the alienation of the 
young generation in the Federal Republic, see KB to Kissinger, 30 March 1982.  On the disturbing traits of 
the European youth and their results, see KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2.  For Birrenbach 
linking the contemporary protests/demonstrations to the “Ohne mich”-movement of the early 1950s, see 
KB to Hallstein, 14 November 1980.  As of 1980, the Jusos (SPD youth organization) were chaired by 
Gerhard Schroeder.  With respect to the youngest generation of intellectuals, Birrenbach was explicitly 
critical of the political expressions of Grass (KB Aktennotiz, 16 June 1980, K134/1).  As of April 1981, 
Birrenbach bemoaned the lacking cultural homogeneity of he generations in the FRG.  Sontheimer was 
right in his last interview of April 1981, when he expressed deep concern about the Geisteshaltung of the 
German youth.  Birrenbach agreed with Sontheimer that a defeatism spread in certain parts of the youth.  It 
was no longer ready to secure and defend our political order.  Also the “Leistungsbereitschaft” waned by 
the younger generation.  This had grown up in affluence and was less resilient than earlier age groups like 
our generation.  It feels, as Sontheimer says, normal equirements of the work- and professional life as an 
imposition, at times as an oppression. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Prof. Dr. Hermann 
Lübbe, Birchli, Haus Claudia, Switzerland, Einsiedeln, 23 April 1981, K032/1).  As of June 1981, 
Birrenbach saw in the FRG the encouraging of the political left-wing and the development of an 
“alternative,” totally irrational thinking of parts of the youth, both facilitated by the US-USSR imbalance of 
power. (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2).  The problem of the generations was of great importance.  
The Federal Republic increasingly devoted itself to this question and hoped that this also would happen in 
the US. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, personal, confidential, 10 November 
1982, K029/2).  Electoral concerns particularly with respect to Strauß in 1980.  As of May 1980, 
Birrenbach believed that as “a baroque figure” Strauß was not accepted by a large part of the FRG youth 
(KB to McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2).  Birrenbach claimed that the unusual mass of students in the FRG 
had become clear as of 1968 and was a sign of false priorities in the FRG (and it seems a symptom of 
decay). 
107 Birrenbach welcomed it that Butenandt was ready to direct an appeal to rejuvenate [verjüngen] the 
Wissenschaftlichen Beirat.  “We would otherwise copy the central committee of the KPDSU.”  That was 
just not possible in the long run.  Birrenbach had made the first attempt.  Birrenbach had traveled to Prof. 
Hauss to Münster and presented his request.  The main justification was that he no longer was the leader of 
the clinic and that Birrenbach’s letter at the time had limited his activity to the time up to 1 January 1980.  
He had told Birrenbach that this bitter news could not have been more kindly transmitted to him and 
therefore he had complete understanding that Birrenbach directed this request to him in the name of the 
Kuratorium and of the leader of the WB.  They had then talked both as “old Münsteraner.”  You can 
imagine what still confronts us (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2).  
Strausz-Hupé was right when he drew attention in his speech to the youth in many countries, including the 
Federal Republic.  They had no sense of history.  They no longer considered what had happened in the past.  
For selfish reasons, they took the security of our civilization for granted.  This created doubts regarding the 
purpose for which they thought to have to fight.  Western governments had failed to clearly tell the truth to 
their citizens, particularly to the young population. (KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupé, US Mission to 
NATO, Brussels, 25 April 1977, K100/1).  As of Februa y 1980, Birrenbach had had the chance to talk (I 
think in the FRG) with former Amb. Strausz-Hupé.  Part of the Atlanticist generational effort, Birrenbach 
saw Strausz-Hupé’s 1978-81 guest professorships at the Universities of Munich and Münster (see earlier in 
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played a key role in efforts to rejuvenate (Verjüngung) the bodies of the Atlanticist 
institutions (e.g. DGAP).108  Indeed, a younger generation of German Atlanticists did 
emerge to succeed Birrenbach’s to take part in and maintain the Atlanticist network and 
infrastructure, including personalities in the political (e.g. Prof. Biedenkopf, Kiep) and 
Wirtschaft (e.g. Dr. Dieter Spethmann of Thyssen) realm.109  Though in spite of their 
international experience Birrenbach’s children never entered the network he inhabited, 
some sons did follow in their fathers footsteps (e.g. A. Freiherr von Oppenheim, 
Christian Peter Henle).110  While Birrenbach sought to involve Spethmann, the politically 
                                                                                                                                      
this chapter) as an effective means of exposing hopefully impressionable Germans to Strausz-Hupé’s 
views, as well as keeping in touch with Strausz-Hupé personally, sustaining Strausz-Hupé’s engagement 
with German questions, honoring Strausz-Hupé, and simply doing Strausz-Hupé a favor.  
108 As DGAP President, Birrenbach took a leading role as of April 1979 in the efforts to reform the DGAP 
Präsidium, including a rejuvenation [Verjüngung] of its members.  Birrenbach cooperated in these DGAP 
efforts with Gräfin Dönhoff (Deputy President of the Präsidium), Trebesch (Geschäftsführender 
Stellvertretender Präsident) and Chancellor Schmidt and with the input of the DGAP Geschäftsführenden 
Präsidium (discuss the list).  However, it appears that Schmidt did not have much time to deal with such 
matters as Chancellor.  These reform efforts involved a changing of the DGAP räsidium due to age and 
non-participation and involved the drawing up and making proposals about and reworking a list.  
Birrenbach’s son-in-law was at the DGAP MV on 25 June 1987.  
109 Biedenkopf gave a speech at the March 1977 German-American Conference.  As of July 1981, Kiep 
was a member of the DGAP Geschäftsführenden Präsidium and as of June 1987 a member of the AB eV.  
In later years, Mertes took part in a number of Atlan icist functions and organizations (attended the 1981 
KWC; was Deputy Chairman (of the commission?) in the 28-30 April 1981 Arbeitstagung of the North 
Atlantic Assembly’s special commission “Nuclear Weapons in Europe” ).  As of 1971, Spethmann was by 
Thyssen, as of 1977-83 he was Chairman of the Thyssen AG Vorstand and Chairman of the WVES and as 
of 1971 he was possibly head of the French Society in Düsseldorf. 
110 There were also American counterparts to this phenomenon.  As of May 1968, Birrenbach would within 
a fortnight have the chance to meet Christian Herter’s son who had become a member of the AI Board of 
Governors.  As of June 1987, A. Freiherr von Oppenheim was the 1st Chairman of the Atlantica.  As of 
June 1987, Christian Peter Henle was the newly elected President of the DGAP.  There was especially 
Thomas’ considerable work experience in the United States.  Birrenbach’s son, Thomas, had been trained 
in the steel export business (1961-63: apprenticeshp in Hamburg in the firm Ernst Komrowski & Co.), 
married an Iranian woman (Cleopatra Broumand; it appe rs married in NY; possibly gave up her Persian 
citizenship in the mid-1970s to become a German citizen), spent a considerable amount of time abroad, 
including in the United States (internship at the Thyssen Steel Corporation (NYC) in the 1964 summer 
semester; worked in New York City from 1969-74 at the Thyssen Steel Corporation (NYC) in a number of 
capacities (e.g. steel sales business, including sale of products of the ATH AG to industrial and trade firms 
on the US East Coast; reorganization of the Edgcomb Steel and Aluminum Corporation; corporate 
planning; including as assistant to Günther Drechsler (President of the Thyssen Steel Corporation)), during 
which time Birrenbach and his son visited one another; was again in the US for some reason as of 
December 1981) and Iran (Teheran; 1978-79; working in the steel business (sale of steel mills and other 
projects), I believe for the Thyssen firm; apparently left ultimately due to the revolution/situation there) and 
had foreign language knowledge (English: worked in the US; Spanish: 12 years in Argentina; and French: 
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engaged Thyssen industrialist, more than any other individual of this younger generation 
in the network, in general he never welcomed or respected the new generation of German 
Atlanticists (politicians), including those in the Union, seeing Kiep as someone who 
makes “press statements [Presseverlautbarungen] which are untimely [unzeitgemäß] and 
superfluous [überflüssig]” and Biedenkopf as “an intellectual crank [Spinner], who is 
filled at the same time by an enormous ambition.”111   
This new internal threat to Liberal German Atlanticism was merely the most 
significant factor in the tensions and fractures within the Atlanticist network in later 
years.112  For Birrenbach, disagreements continued to emerge with foreign contacts on 
themes of détente, nuclear strategy and the arms race/balance (e.g. Ball and Smith) and, 
                                                                                                                                      
school, reading and several multi-week stays in Frace to study the French language).  In 1964, Thomas 
had been in England (I think London), though I am not sure how long.  Birrenbach’s daughter (Irene) also 
had some international experiences, particularly with regard to Britain (enjoyed living in London (Marlow, 
Bourne End), apparently also to Birrenbach’s delight/pleasure, with her husband and children as of July 
1975, but left England in 1976 since the trilateral cooperation in the nuclear field did not work very 
effectively and her husband had become the manager of a nuclear company in Germany; Birrenbach 
sometimes visited them in England (e.g. possibly in April 1976)).  Birrenbach’s children spent part of their 
vacation in England (e.g. Southwest England, near the sea; at least this was planned as of July 1963 for 
August-September 1963).  Thus they had the opportunity to stay as (paying) guests with good English 
families and to interact with other young British peo le.  As of July 1963, this had all been arranged by the 
German-British exchange agency in Düsseldorf. 
111 KB to Kohl, 4 February 1986.  Birrenbach referred to the Biedenkopf planning. (KB, August-Thyssen- 
Straße, Düsseldorf, Federal Chancellor Kohl, 28 June 1984, K029/2).  Biedenkopf was an “outspoken 
intellectual.” (KB to McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2).  As of February 1986, Birrenbach was upset that 
Biedenkopf would lead the Land NRW during the election period.  Birrenbach had know  his activity in 
NRW since the death of Köppler.  Birrenbach believed that Biedenkopf was inappropriate in his attitude 
and character for the CDU leadership in the largest German Land.  It would not be possible for Biedenkopf 
(just like Worms in the past legislature period in NRW) to crucially promote the development of the CDU 
in this extremely difficult and important Wahlkreis.  Birrenbach feared that this election by Biedenkopf 
could have “possibly fatal consequences.”  His deputy Pützhofen would still not have sufficient experience 
by the election to lead NRW in our sense. (KB to Kohl, 4 February 1986).  As of 30 June 1978, Biedenkopf 
hoped for a continued good cooperation.  As of October 1981, Birrenbach’s main Thyssen contacts were 
Spethmann and Sohl.  As of February 1979, Birrenbach thought little of the judgment of Kiep, who was 
Albrecht’s advisor (peaceful use of nuclear energy).  Birrenbach kept Spethmann informed as of 1981-82 
about some of his correspondence with US contacts. 
112 One could say that the Ostpolitik threatened to or actually did lead to an undermining of the Atlanticist 
network.   
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more heated, the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Smith).113  Even more intense were 
disputes surrounding Israel, whose policies Birrenbach criticized from about 1970 on due 
to his concerns about Mideast turmoil and conflict.114  Ironically, he looked to the US to 
exert pressure on a dependent Israel and was dismayed at the one-sided pro-Israel 
perspective of the Carter and Reagan administrations.115  As with the entire West, 
Birrenbach saw a decline in Israeli leadership, particularly when comparing Likud right-
wingers (e.g. Begin, Shamir and Sharon) with personalities like Ben-Gurion (or Sadat).116  
                                                
113 Ball appears to have been anti-Reagan, including wth regard to East-West and Middle East policy.  
Birrenbach’s disagreements with Smith included, but not only, the well-known Foreign Affairs article.  
Zbigniew Brzezinski clearly did not see the USSR as so powerful a threat as did Birrenbach in later years.  
For instance, as of July 1980, Gerard Smith questioned whether Birrenbach’s doubts regarding the 
credibility of the US deterrent were technically justified. (Gerard Smith to KB, 29 July 1980).  Ball 
supported the SALT II treaty.  As of July 1979, Birrenbach claimed that Schmidt did not like the SALT II 
treaty.  As of June 1977, Dönhoff had pointed out t Birrenbach with respect to deterrence the existence of 
an overkill capacity (objective) while Birrenbach, agreeing with this (nuclear potential of the two 
superpowers too large to serve rational military purposes) but unconvinced, countered with the need for the 
readiness of the deterring power to use these weapons in emergency and to make this credible in the minds 
of the Soviet opponent (subjective) (KB to Dönhoff, 10 June 1977, K151/2).  As of April 1980, Birrenbach 
claimed that he had been in a “clinch” with Smith since many years on the problem of the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy (KB to McCloy, 23 April 1980).  As of February 1985, Birrenbach disagreed with Ball’s 
idea of relying on SLBMs.  As of August 1977, Carstens did not entirely agree with Birrenbach on the issue 
of the Carter human rights policy, and Birrenbach hoped that his depiction of that policy “even if it does 
not find your applause [Beifall], so nevertheless does not excite your objection [Widerspruch].” (KB to 
Carstens, 18 August 1977). 
114 As of April 1976, Birrenbach was quite critical of what he considered inflexible, catastrophic, 
dangerous,  unreasonable, extremist, intransigent, irrational, “fatal,” irresponsible, nationalistic, militarized 
(not political), unrealistic, illegal go-it-alone Israeli policy (in the occupied territories (e.g. settlements; 
status of Jerusalem; rejection of UN Resolutions 242 and 338; annexations; claims to Judea and Samaria 
(part of Eretz Israel); total rejection of genuine Palestinian autonomy; lack of concessions in peace 
negotiations; bombing of the Baghdad reactor as of June 1981; invasion of Lebanon in June 1982; as of 
1984 rejection of the Reagan plan).  He saw Israel facing a potentially dangerous/fatal/desperate isolation 
in the world (including UN, Third World, Arab world, and the West, including the US and Europe and even
a considerable part of the crucial Jewish diaspora). 
115 KB to Ball, 27 June 1979.  Birrenbach conceived of US pressure to alter Israeli policies as threatening a 
temporary halt/reduction to the US delivery of arms and money.  As of October 1978, Birrenbach doubted 
that Carter had the “guts” needed to pressure Israel to achieve a peace settlement (KB to Schaetzel, 6 
October 1978, K098/2).  Birrenbach wanted the US to pressure Israel to accept American plans and offers 
(e.g. guarantee, Reagan Plan). 
116 While Birrenbach was critical of Labour in this regard (e.g. Prime Minister Rabin), Birrenbach clearly 
favored Labour personalities like Peres (who however as of 1983 he considered no sufficient leadership 
personality).  Ben-Gurion served as the gold standard, sort of like how Birrenbach viewed and admired 
Truman for the US.  Birrenbach had met Ben-Gurion on his 1965 Israel mission and saw him as a “great 
man” who was understanding and moderate.  As of September 1983, Birrenbach argued that Israel was no 
longer the state of Ben-Gurion or even of Levi Eshkol or Golda Meir.  As of August 1984, Birrenbach 
believed that the Israel of today, deeply divided, was no longer the Israel of Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol, 
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Israel trips in May 1971 and March 1976 had confirmed his view of a leadership and 
population gripped by an obsessive “siege mentality,” setting Israel “on the road to 
Massada.”117  Birrenbach was influenced in this by his contacts nd knowledge of the 
perspectives in the US and Europe, the persistence of his rudimentary Israel network and 
incipient contacts with personalities in the Arab world.118  Birrenbach repeatedly warned 
                                                                                                                                      
Golda Meir, Abba Eban or Teddy Kollek, Gideon Rafael and Weizmann.  For Birrenbach, Begin was “a 
fatal figure.” 
117 On the irrational siege mentality, see for instance KB to Schmidt, 8 May 1981; KB to McCloy, 30 
November 1981, K132/2; and KB to Dr. Ephraim Lahav, 21 January 1982.  As of July 1975, Birrenbach 
believed that a militarized Israeli policy ran the dangerous risk that Israel would “assume a position à la 
Sparta in the Near East.” (KB to Siegmund Warburg, 16 July 1975).  Birrenbach also referred to a “siege 
psychosis.” 
118 Birrenbach’s rag-tag Israel network included a number of prominent, influential, leading 
personalities/circles at home and abroad, inside an outside of Israel, including the US, continental Europe 
and Britain, with which he maintained contact (e.g. correspondence), including his contact with foreign/US 
Atlanticist contacts (e.g. Javits; overlap); members of the international Jewish diaspora in the Western 
world (Nahum Goldmann; Sir Siegmund Warburg (London)); regular contact with the Israeli embassy and 
ambassadors in Bonn (e.g. Meroz as of August-September 1977); former Israeli ambassadors 
(corresponded at least somewhat with Natan and Rafael in Israel); personalities associated with the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem (e.g. Prof. Avraham Harman, President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, if 
he was a contact at all; Prof. Alex Keynan, Prof. at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem as of 1981-83, 
Marine Biological Lab in Woods Hole, Massachusetts as of August 1977, Brandeis University, Rosenstiel 
Basic Medical Sciences Research Center as of July 1978) and Teddy Kollek (at least somewhat).  As of 
July 1978, Birrenbach believed that he and Hesselbach thought alike about the Israel/Middle East situat on.  
Birrenbach’s views on US policy towards Israel and the Middle East seem to have been generally at least in 
line with other contacts of his (e.g. McCloy, McGeorge Bundy, Ball; conventional wisdom in Europe (since 
about 1970) and the US).  According to Siegmund Warburg, Begin’s policy represented an aggressive 
ideology.  As of May 1981, Birrenbach argued that supporting a “fatal” Israeli policy did not correspond to 
a moral obligation expected from the German governmnt and insisted that he had never done anything that 
was not in the higher interests of the Jewish destiny (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Alex 
Keynan, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 8 May 1981, K033/3).  Birrenbach claimed that most people 
in Europe agreed with his views on Israeli policy and argued that his January 1978 FAZ letter to the editor 
had found an echo everywhere.  Among Birrenbach’s contacts in Israel, Keynan was apparently anti-Likud 
and generally agreeable to Birrenbach.  As of 1977, Keynan had joined the Party of Yigael Yadin and 
hoped Birrenbach would agree to show him their correspondence.  Keynan also wanted to show 
Birrenbach’s letters to President Katzir who was a good friend of Keynan’s and who had a variety of 
unofficial study groups in his home.  However, not all of Birrenbach’s contacts in Israel agreed with his 
advice on Israeli policy.  This was the case for insta ce with Kollek.  As of 1985, Birrenbach was surprised 
to find that in his view Kollek was calling his attitude towards Israel into doubt.  In 1977 in Bonn, 
Birrenbach met the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister who was as of April 1979 about to become the leading 
personality in that country.  In January 1982, Birrenbach had a long discussion with Crown Prince Hassan 
of Jordan.  As of December 1982, Birrenbach claimed h  had 20 years of contacts with that area (I think 
meaning the Middle East), with Israelis as well as with leading prominent figures of Jordan, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia. (KB to Kissinger 13 December 1982, K132/2).  As of May 1981, Keynan had been up to the 
formation of the Begin government the chairman of acommittee of university professors who dealt with 
Israeli foreign policy.  As of September 1980, I believe Keynan could not do much to change the situation 
or policy of Israel but was in contact with Peres.  As part of his move towards the Arab world, Birrenbach 
also embraced the admirable and “courageous” efforts of Sadat for peace.  As of September 1983, 
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Israeli political leaders, in government (e.g. Prime Ministers Meir, Rabin and Peres) and 
opposition, via letters as well as extensive private meetings on his trips.119  However, 
Birrenbach’s Mideast peace proposals and criticism of Israeli policy merely led to serious 
tensions with the Israeli embassy, strained relations with certain pro-Israel Atlanticist 
contacts, particularly Eugene Rostow, and ruptured ties to Axel Springer.120  On the sole 
                                                                                                                                      
Birrenbach had been a certain time (just some correspondence in 1982 it looks like) in contact with the
crown prince of Jordan (Hassan bin Talal).  As of February 1982, Talal had given a speech in Bonn that 
Birrenbach had heard and they had met one another there in Bonn (perhaps DGAP?).  As of February 1982, 
Talal had invited Birrenbach to Jordan and Birrenbach claimed to be very interested in such a trip (which 
never happened to my knowledge).  Birrenbach claimed as of 1982 to have seen Jordan and also Amman in 
1965 and to have been very much impressed by Jordan.  As of August 1977, Birrenbach had had 
discussions with leading personalities of Saudi Arabia.  In November 1980, there was a German-Israeli 
Conference in Bonn.  As of January 1985, Ball was collaborating with his historian son, Douglas, on a 
larger study of relations between the US and Israel (also published as a by-product a small book describing 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and some of its implications) (Ball to KB, 28 January 1985, ACDP 
K160/3).  
119 While one could not characterize this as a genuine correspondence with these personalities, Peres at 
least did answer Birrenbach’s letter (to former Prime Minister Meir and to Peres) of 26 July 1978.  Onhis 
trip of March 1976 to Israel, Birrenbach had the chance to speak with leading personalities of the Israeli 
government (including the head of government), the ministries (three or four state secretaries and 
ministerial directors, including in the foreign ministry), the universities and also in the population and 
commandants of individual stations.  Both of Birrenbach’s Israel trips (May 1971 and March 1976) 
included visits to Jerusalem.  Birrenbach spoke with Prime Minister Rabin in July 1975 in Bonn.  It appears 
that the Rogers mission in 1971 may also have had some impact on Birrenbach’s Israel views.  Among 
those in opposition, Birrenbach warned the leader of the opposition Peres. 
120 Tensions with the Israeli embassy included most notably sharp exchanges with the respective 
ambassadors during the October 1973 war and in the wak of Birrenbach’s January 1978 FAZ letter to the 
editor.  Apparently these occasions/incidents did not lead to a break in relations with the Israeli 
ambassador(s) in Bonn.  During the October 1973 war, Birrenbach had offered to Ambassador Ben-Horin 
on the phone “well-meant advice” regarding the need for restraint which seems to have brought Ben-Horin 
to heatedly (reproach) suggest that Birrenbach and perhaps the Union were anti-Israel (which hit 
Birrenbach very hard).  In 1978, Birrenbach’s January FAZ letter to the editor (which Birrenbach had also 
sent to the ambassador) resulted in a correspondence between the two that included what Birrenbach 
considered “sharply formulated” and “extremely astonishing” letters from Amb. Meroz.  As of 1981, 
Birrenbach believed Meroz was avoiding him (not meet with him) due to their differences of opinion on 
Israel/Middle East (though Meroz denied there was any problem and claimed that it was he who had 
requested that Birrenbach be at the meal in May 1981 given by Foreign Minister Genscher as Meroz’s 
farewell dinner).  Birrenbach’s Mideast peace proposals professed to do justice to all parties/states in the 
region (Arabs and Israelis; apparently Palestinian homeland).  As of 1975, with respect to Israel and the 
Near East, Birrenbach argued for the need for an exchange of territory (Israeli political and territorial 
concessions) for security and a genuine peace settlment/treaty (all in accord with his interpretation of UN 
Resolutions 242 and 338).  In later years, Birrenbach’s proposed Middle East peace plan (solution of the 
Palestine conflict) included the security of Israel (limited frontier changes); a confederative union of Jordan 
with the territories that Israel conquered since 1967 (West Bank and Gaza Strip; genuinely autonomous 
homeland, some kind of self-determination for the Palestinians); and a Vatican status for Jerusalem 
(internationalization/neutralization of the Holy Places for all religions (including Islam); on basis of an 
autonomous Washington DC to quote a US personality).  As of January 1979 (in the midst of heated 
correspondence) Birrenbach feared Rostow might evenbr ak off relations with him (KB to E. Rostow, 9 
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occasion that Birrenbach dropped his philo-Semetic/Israeli posture, unusual for a 
German, he withdrew from Der Welt a Mideast piece due to substantive differences with 
Springer, publishing it instead as a Letter to the Editor in the FAZ in January 1978.121  
Birrenbach’s concerns with regard to the state of the Federal Republic manifested 
themselves not merely in his writings, but also in his FTS activities.  Largely due to 
                                                                                                                                      
January 1979).  By October 1980, Birrenbach was explicitly trying to extend his correspondence with 
Rostow to problems other than the Middle East and by March 1982 Birrenbach was explicitly avoiding the
theme altogether in his correspondence with Rostow, and by June 1983 he and Rostow seem to have simply 
agreed not to deal with the theme at all.  Birrenbach lso clearly disagreed in this general sense with other 
contacts (e.g. Haig, Strausz-Hupé) about the Middle East/Israel but it did not really come to any signif cant 
tension between them over this.  It is clear there were other tensions among Atlanticists over Israel (e.g. 
between Ball and Rostow).  As of August 1983, Birrenbach was also critical of a part of the US Congress 
for its views on the Middle East.  Birrenbach described the pro-Israel Axel Springer as “a one hundred 
percent supporter of Begin.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 February 1978).  The issue of Israel divided the 
German Atlanticists.  Chancellor Brandt confronted the opposition of the papers of the Springer-Konzern (I 
believe Die Welt and the Bild-Zeitung).  In New York, a Zionist paper blamed Brandt for appeasement 
(1973) and for having made the comfortable choice wh n he had to decide between the existence of Israel
and the warmth of German homes.  However, on 14 November 1980, Birrenbach would chair a function in 
Berlin in the Haus Springer about “Europe and America After the American and German Elections.” (KB, 
August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein, c/o Prof. Dr. Hans Ritter, Stuttgar , 14 
November 1980, K084/2).  Ironically enough, with resp ct to the Middle East, Birrenbach found himself 
often rejecting the strictly legalistic and historic arguments of Rostow (himself a professor of law) nd
arguing from a more politically motivated view.  Ironically, on his March 1976 trip to Israel, Birrenbach 
got a sense that the views of the youth and part of the intellectuals were more accurate (regarding 
Israel/Middle East) than those of the Israeli government and many politicians.  Ironically, among 
Birrenbach’s criticisms of US views on the Middle East (at least during the Reagan years) was that they 
focused solely on the East-West aspects.  Rostow and Springer were both Cold Warriors generally in 
agreement with Birrenbach. 
121 This appeared in the FAZ of 30 January 1978.  Birrenbach was constantly concerned about being seen 
as anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic.  Among other things, Birrenbach repeatedly professed his friendship towards 
and concern for the interests and fate of Israel, inc uding the need for Israeli security from dangers and a 
peace favorable to Israel.  He also claimed to be pushing the responsible German Stellen to implement 
viable measures to improve German-Israeli relations.  Birrenbach’s concerns for Israel seem to have been 
derived from a sense that time was working against the Israelis (e.g. declining Israeli position; the belief 
that the Arabs would eventually learn to use modern weapons) and his doubting of US (and 
Western/European, including to some extent it seems the FRG) willingness to continue to support/aid Israel 
indefinitely (military and financial aid) in its policies/views (and Israeli reliance on such a thing; symptoms 
of fatigue regarding the Middle East).  The people at the Springer press appear to have been very pro-Israel.  
I believe that Birrenbach had originally planned to summarize his proposals for the solution of the Pal stine 
question in a section of a chapter of the book (MS) he was preparing but had decided instead to interrupt 
the completion of this chapter with the beginning of the Lebanon war (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, 
Düsseldorf, to Sir Siegmund Warburg, London, 24 September 1982, K068/2).  From his vacation in Baden-
Baden shortly after Christmas, Birrenbach had dictated n article for Die Welt on the theme of peace in the 
Near East (“Wohin führt der Weg Sadats?”, 29 December 1977, K071/3).  However, he had withdrawn this 
after he read Begin’s statement in Ismailia and got an earlier expression of Springer on the question of the 
“settlements” in the occupied areas.  After he had conducted the negotiations at the time about the 
introduction of diplomatic relations to Israel, Birrenbach did not want to appear as a critic of Israeli policy. 
(KB to Dr. Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, 153/1). 
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Birrenbach’s efforts/proposals as president, the FTS sought to preserve the experiences of 
Weimar and the tradition of Prussia in the historical and political consciousness/memory.  
The upshot was a historians colloquium staged in Cologne (in the FTS?) in June 1979, 
financed by the FTS, to explore the reasons for the downfall [Verfall] of Weimar as well 
as a series of almost twenty lectures about Prussia and its impact on German history, 
staged/organized by the FTS/Birrenbach from 1980-84 in the Preußischen 
Staatsbibliothek in Berlin with the help of (together with) the Stiftung Preußischer 
Kulturbesitz.  Birrenbach had a key role in selecting the speakers/participants, which 
included top German historians and Wissenschaftler (e.g. Hillgruber (Weimar, gave the 
speech on foreign policy), Profs. Erdmann, Nipperdey, Schieder; Bracher; Hagen 
Schulze) and, in the case of the Prussia lectures, foreigners (e.g. Raymond Aron, Michael 
Howard).122  Also at Birrenbach’s behest, there emerged a number of volumes based on 
these conferences, among them Weimar-Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie (edited by the 
FTS, Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Hagen Schulze; 1980) and several from the Prussia 
lectures.  These also contained Birrenbach’s introductory Vorträge (given as chairman of 
the FTS-Kuratorium), most significantly “Sind Symptome von Weimar in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland erkennbar?”, which served as a fundamental introduction to 
the Weimar book and argued that symptoms of decline [Verfallserscheinungen] at least 
similar to those in Weimar were indeed apparent in the contemporary FRG.123  
                                                
122 The Prussia lectures (“Preußen-seine Wirkung auf die deutsche Geschichte”) represented the initial part 
of a larger effort of “Thyssen-Vorträgen”, established in 1979 and aimed at introducing the Anglo-Saxon 
model of “Lectures,” hitherto absent/lacking from the wissenschaftlichen life of the FRG.  As of March 
1984, another lecture series was planned to be stagd soon in Munich, this one on the theme 
“Auseinandersetzungen mit der Antike.”  I am not sure who exactly was invited to the Prussia lectures.  
Nipperdey spoke on “The Prussian University History.” 
123 Birrenbach depicted and analyzed these “symptoms à la Weimar.”  This particular meeting may have 
actually been the capstone/finale of a series of FTS lectures and conferences involving eminent historians 
and scholars (e.g. Coing, Erdmann, Schieder) on the reasons for the decline of the Weimar Republic.  At 
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Birrenbach distributed the published versions of such speeches, including to all the top 
German politicians.124  Though they never came to fruition, Birrenbach also had a 
                                                                                                                                      
times, Birrenbach conjured up the possibility of a new economic crisis à la 1929 that the FRG and the 
German people would not survive (KB to Gerard Smith, 21 April 1980).  Birrenbach would send the book 
about the reasons for the decline of Weimar.  Birrenbach believed that the situation had meanwhile (since 
the conference) even worsened with respect to the Verfallserscheinungen i  the Federal Republic. (KB to 
Hans Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 30 September 1981, K032/1).  As a birthday 
gift, Birrenbach gave Hallstein the decline of Weimar book. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, t  
Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein, c/o Professor Dr. Hans Ritter, Stuttgart, 14 November 1980, K084/2).  
Birrenbach distributed this Weimar book to his contacts.  For Birrenbach, the symptoms of the failure (of 
Weimar?) in the contemporary Federal Republic were not dramatic but could lead in the long-term to 
serious consequences.  As of August 1979, this colloquium had been held recently.  Birrenbach’s 
introductory Vortrag was improvised in so far as it had been hastily dictated by Birrenbach after the 
cancellation of Prof. Schieder on the eve of the meting without using a single book so obvious were the 
symptoms. (KB to Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, London, 1 August 1979, K034/3).  With respect to the 
symptoms of Weimar today in the Federal Republic, Brrenbach could have stressed even more the position 
of the church (although he had twice mentioned it with the concept of secularization) or the disastrous 
[verhängnisvolle] effect of the media.  Birrenbach had sent Guth his introductory Vortrag a few days ago 
and would also send him a list of the themes and Referenten before which Birrenbach had spoken. (KB to 
Dr. rer. pol. Wilfried Guth, Vorstandssprecher of the Deutschen Bank AG, Frankfurt, 5 July 1979, K034/3).  
Springer had mentioned a series of symptoms of the current time in his Vortrag, some of which 
corresponded to a series of points in Birrenbach’s introductory Referat.  Birrenbach sent Springer the book. 
(KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Axel Springer, Berlin, 10 August 1981, K033/2).  Birrenbach 
sent Strauß his introductory speech for the colloquium on the decline of Weimar. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, 
Düsseldorf, to Bundesminister aD Franz Josef Strauß, Minister President, Freistaat Bavaria, Munich, 
private-confidential, 4 July 1979, K034/1).  Birrenbach sent Schmidt a reprint, which contained this 
introductory Referat. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, 24 
June 1981, K033/3).  The book published by us regarding Weimar was enjoying good sales. (KB, 
Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübbe, Birchli, Haus Claudia, Switzerland, 
Einsiedeln, 23 April 1981, K032/1).  At Birrenbach’s behest (see also the introduction), a historians 
colloquium had met a year ago and discussed the reasons for the decline of Weimar.   The meeting began 
on a Thursday morning at 10 AM. On Wednesday evening around 6 PM, Prof. Dr. Th. Schieder (University 
of Cologne), who was the historian in the Wissenschaftlichen Beirat of the FTS, called Birrenbach to tell 
him that he could not come due to health reasons and that Birrenbach should give the introductory speech. 
Birrenbach told him that since he was no historian, in spite of all his historical interest, that would not be 
appropriate by the rank of the historians who would appear there.  Schieder insisted on it.  Thereupon, 
Birrenbach had used a “ruse de guerre.”  On the next morning (i.e. not even a half day lter), Birrenbach 
had spoken about the theme “Are Symptoms of Weimar Discernible in the Federal Republic?”  That was 
not so simple.  But Birrenbach had more or less succeeded and it appeared now as the first chapter of this 
book.  The book had a forward.  Birrenbach had written he first chapter.  Birrenbach found that the 
symptoms he had there depicted increasingly strength ed in recent years in the Federal Republic. (KB, 
August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein, c/o Professor Dr. Hans Ritter, 
Stuttgart, 14 November 1980, K084/2).  In an introductory speech at a meeting of historians of the FTS
about the causes of the decay of Weimar, Birrenbach spoke, as President of the Board, about the present 
symptoms of Weimar in the Federal Republic.  Birrenbach did not come in this speech to dramatic 
conclusions, but the result was not at all encouraging.  This applied also to the internal situation in the other 
Western European countries (KB to Kissinger, Washingto  DC, 27 July 1979, K098/2). 
124 As of December 1985, Birrenbach had sent the published version of the Prussia lectures to more than 
160 top German politicians.  At least the first volume of the Prussia lectures came out by Klett-Cotta. (KB, 
August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Federal President Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, 
K033/1).  At least up to May 1982, Birrenbach had two copies of the first volume of the Prussia lectures. 
(KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Federal P esident Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 
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number of other potential projects in mind that he saw as of real importance in the present 
state of history.125 
                                                                                                                                      
1982, K033/1).  Birrenbach would send Carstens the first volume of the Prussia lectures. (KB to Federal 
President Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, K033/1).  In his capacity as chairman of the FTS-
Kuratorium, Birrenbach had to introduce Prof. Nipperdey in the Prussian Staatsbibliothek in Berlin for a 
Vortrag about the university history of Prussia. (KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 
1981, K112/2).  Birrenbach sent at least some of his German contacts the first volume of the Prussia 
lectures.  Birrenbach continued to distribute the products of those projects financed by the FTS (e.g. to 
Chancellor Schmidt). 
125 KB to Hans Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 30 September 1981, K032/1; KB to 
Bowie, 11 December 1985.  As of September 1981, these lectures had been going on for about 1.5 years.  
At the end of this month (September/October 1981?), Birrenbach would introduce there Prof. Gall for his
Vortrag, entitled “Bismarck’s Prussia, the Reich and Europe.”  The first four Referate would appear in 
January 1982 in the Propyläen-Verlag in Berlin.  Birrenbach would perhaps then send this book. (KB to 
Hans Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 30 September 1981, K032/1).  At Birrenbach’s 
initiative, a study had just taken place by the FTS of the Grandes Écoles in France, of the civil service in 
Britain and of the post-graduate study in the US and in Britain that showed how important it was to place 
the accent on achievements [Leistungen]. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, 22 
December 1982, K029/2).  In the middle of January, Birrenbach sent the introduction he had written for the 
first FTS Prussia volume to Merkle.  This volume contained the first four Thyssen (FTS) lectures, which 
would be printed in three volumes.  Birrenbach sent Merkle another copy.  Birrenbach had drawn up a 
program for the next lectures, which he had told Prof. Knopp a few days ago after Birrenbach had already 
informed beforehand Schieder and Ritter.  Birrenbach assumed that Merkle agreed with this program.  Such 
a summary gave a meaning to the lectures.  From the start on, Birrenbach did not want to view them merely 
as Prussia lectures, rather as a “means to an end” for the filling of a vital Legitimitätslücke for the political 
development of the Federal Republic. (KB, FTS, Chairm n of Kuratorium, Cologne, August-Thyssen-
Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. hc Hans L. Merkle, Chair of the Geschäftsführung of the Robert Bosch 
GmbH, Stuttgart, K036/1).  As of April 1981 (actually already by 1979), Birrenbach believed that a 
historical consciousness and interest was again gradually developing in the FRG (e.g. biographies; not only 
for the recent past like Weimar but for the larger G rman history) and believed there was a remarkable 
upswing in the interest in Prussia not only in the FRG but also in the DDR and demonstrated a seeking for a 
historical identification possibility (which had togo deep into history and include the development of the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German nation) (KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübbe, 23 April 1981, K032/1).  
The situation in the Federal Republic worried Birrenbach innen-, wirtschafts- as well as außenpolitisch.  
Birrenbach referred to his Weimar initiative and his proposal to make the problem of the post-graduate 
study and of the Grandes Écoles in France the subject of a project.  The project of the Prussia lectures had 
developed well.  Birrenbach believed that he should sti l propose now several other themes.  What did 
Butenandt think about it?  The first would be the relationship of Geist to Politik or Staat and vice-versa.  
The second theme would be the problem of the complete d cay [Verfall] of the historical consciousness and 
the displacement [Verdrängung] of the idea of the nation.  Finally, Birrenbach thought of a theme which 
emerged from the demonstrations against nuclear energy, the Hausbesitz and the public oath of the recruits.  
The extent and the limits of freedom had clearly blurred in the last ten years.  The reason was, among 
others, the decline [Verfall] of the Staatsautorität.  The leap from authoritarian state [Obrigkeitsstaat] into a 
demonstrations democracy (as Prof. Weichmann had chra terized it) was a serious symptom.  Birrenbach 
felt vividly reminded of the 1930s.  Next time, Birrenbach wanted to make proposals in this direction, 
initially only tentatively to ask if on this basis the FTS could become active. (KB to Professor Dr. Adolf 
Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2).  Birrenbach was pleased that Lübbe had agreed to 
collaborate on the project “Berlin,” which was so important to Birrenbach for the above-named reasons (i.e. 
concerns regarding historical/national consciousnes). (KB to Lübbe, 15 August 1977, K171/1). 
 577
At the same time, German Atlanticism was modified an potentially undermined 
in later years, among other factors, by its increased interest in the East.  At least in later 
years, Birrenbach increasingly recognized that the USSR (Warsaw Bloc) was a 
vulnerable, one-dimensional (military, not economic) superpower facing considerable 
internal and external crises and tensions and weaknesses and inferiorities vis-à-vis the 
West.  Internally, the USSR confronted problems of a political, economic, ideological 
and demographic nature, while internationally, it faced difficulties with respect to China, 
Afghanistan and in controlling Eastern Europe (perhaps imperial overstretch).126  As 
Birrenbach realized, such trends (some apparent since the Stalin period) portended 
significant effects on the power and stability of the USSR/East, offering the West long-
run prospects for genuine settlements in various areas (e.g. disarmament).127  
Nevertheless, based on his experiences in the 1930s with totalitarian states (including the 
NS-regime), Birrenbach continued to stress the streng hs of such states, (i.e. the East, 
USSR) in comparison to the Western democracies, in dealing with internal difficulties, 
for instance their ability to impose hardships on their populations and to isolate 
themselves from the outside world (close frontiers), a  well as the possibility of a more 
adventurous USSR foreign policy, even armed aggression, as a means to escape from 
                                                
126 Politically, these problems included leadership transitions/successions (including generational change), a 
stagnating, over-bureaucratized system of the nomenklatura that was only capable of limited action, and a 
rule becoming immobile near the end of the Brezhnev period.  Economically, these problems included 
industrial and technical issues, the burden of an overlarge arms expenditure and an oil gap as of 1981.  
Ideologically and demographically, these problems included difficulties in controlling the central Russian 
and Asiatic nationalities, instability/insecurity/unrest, a softening up in the border areas and in the regions 
east of the Urals. 
127 KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Honorary President of the MPG zur Förderung der Wissenschaften 
eV, Munich, 9 February 1984, K030/1.  The position of the USSR in Southeast Asia and the Middle East 
showed, together with its complete abstinence from the material support of underdeveloped countries, how
vulnerable the East is also. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2).  As of July 
1981, Birrenbach even acknowledged that Soviet decline might be irreversible in the long term (KB to 
Strausz-Hupé, 20 July 1981, ACDP K210/2). 
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internal problems.128  Therefore, even as the Cold War neared its conclusion (even as of 
May 1986) and in spite of the various leadership and regime changes and difficulties 
confronting the USSR, Birrenbach continued to think in terms of an often increasingly 
dangerous East-West conflict/tension, in which a powerful USSR (Communist menace) 
was the principal prospective enemy, an aggressively expansionist power-political threat 
to the security and peace of Western Europe, the US and the world.129 
Given this perspective, it is not surprising that while Birrenbach ostensibly 
exhibited elements of moderation with respect to East-West relations, he ultimately 
remained a hawk to the end.130  Rejecting what he considered the “moral,” “idealistic” 
and “naive” arguments of the peace movement and left-wing politicians, Birrenbach 
continued to call for a strong, tough rhetoric and policy to limit and defend against the 
                                                
128 KB to Strausz-Hupé, 20 July 1981, ACDP K210/2.  Also KB to Prof. Raymond Aron, 22 September 
1977, K074/1.  As of February 1979, Birrenbach argued that “It is, as is known [ja], our experience in 
Europe that totalitarian regimes simply cover-up [zudecken] internal problems through outer measures.  I 
could absolutely imagine that by the USSR.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 1 February 1979).  As of February 
1981, Birrenbach suggested the USSR might solve its new shortage of oil (economic problem) by 
controlling the Strait of Hormuz from Afghanistan (KB to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 
February 1981, K074/1).  As of October 1986, Birrenbach seemed at least implicitly (at least reporting it 
from elsewhere) to have recognized that the deterioration of the USSR economy forced it to place more 
stress on improving/modernizing its worsening economy (including due to the reactor accident at 
Chernobyl) and made necessary a reduction of outlays for armaments and a breathing pause for its foreign 
policy. (Notizen zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, and Anhang, 15 October 1986, by KB).   
129 As of 1984, Birrenbach saw the new USSR regime as rigid (I think like those before).  As of June 1979, 
Birrenbach believed that the USSR did not think in terms of arms control (KB to Ball, 27 June 1979).  As
of 1977, Birrenbach believed that the USSR would view proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons on all 
sides as utopian.  As of September 1983, Birrenbach elieved that the USSR behavior in Sakhalin showed 
with whom they were dealing.  As of December 1982, Birrenbach argued that the influence of the USSR 
military power would impede the success of the negotiati ns, though Andropov would be more flexible 
than Brezhnev (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 7 December 1982, K132/2). 
130 Elements of moderation included Birrenbach’s calls to avoid deepening the existing conflict with the 
USSR; for a cool, flexible, patient, convincing, constructive and flexible policy vis-à-vis the USSR as of 
1984; acceptance in principle of constant efforts of the US/West for a cautious, flexible, serious diplomacy, 
negotiations, dialogue, compromises, cooperation, summits, agreements and understanding with the 
USSR/East in various areas to help solve important international problems (e.g. disarmament, arms 
control/reduction) and come to an acceptable genuin solution/settlement with the West; opposition to 
exaggerated demands in those negotiations; vs. overreaction in the arms race; see limits of their 
possibilities.  Birrenbach claimed not to underestima e the importance of Ostpolitik and détente. 
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threat posed by the USSR.131  He remained critical of the exaggerated priority the West 
attached to Ostpolitik and the “illusion” of the “so-called détente” (at the expense of the 
priorities of security and liberty), anticipating only extremely limited, even harmful 
effects.132  Birrenbach remained skeptical of the possibilities in the foreseeable time of 
fundamentally transforming Russia into a peaceful, status quo state, into a democratic 
system respecting human rights, reaching a real overall settlement [Gesamtregelung] with 
the USSR (negative USSR attitude), achieving a major improvement in 
relations/cooperation (including German-Soviet relations, including their economic 
relations (deals) or gaining substantial concession from it (e.g. also for the FRG, 
including political concessions).133  Indeed, Birrenbach saw only a low scope [Spielraum] 
for the totalitarian USSR in this regard for various internal (e.g. endanger the system) and 
external reasons (e.g. undermine its control of the East Bloc; overall situation in the 
                                                
131 Birrenbach actually opposed the NATO double-track resolution itself, fearing the Europeans would put 
too much emphasis on negotiations and the Soviets would have an enormous chance, and he favored simple 
deployment (KB to Kissinger, 8 February 1983 and KB to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 
February 1981, K074/1).  Birrenbach’s preferences manifested themselves in an opposition to an 
“exaggerated” stress on negotiations with the USSR; an opposition to unilateral (US) concessions to the 
USSR in the mere expectation of facilitating negotiations and of gracious counter-concessions (e.g. arms
control like SALT II; renunciation of neutron bomb under Carter; about nuclear arms; weakness achieved 
nothing; no concrete quid pro quo or relevant concessions).  As of July 1980, Birrenbach seems to have 
been pleased that Schmidt had spoken clearly to the USSR about Afghanistan.  Birrenbach even saw some 
German military personalities propounding such “naive” arguments. 
132 In Germany too many politicians had a wrong concept of the priority of the Ostpolitik.  Of course it was 
very important to maintain the advantages earned by paying such a high price as we did in the Eastern 
Treaties.  Of course, Rose admitted that the Federal R public did not want to choose between Moscow and 
Washington DC.  But Birrenbach agreed that Moscow and the GDR disposed today of certain levers to 
influence the public opinion and economy in our country.  Birrenbach agreed that this was one of the 
consequences of Helsinki.  The position of Germany was the key for the Russians in their European policy. 
(KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 February 1981, 
K074/1). 
133 Détente included involving the USSR in economic, te hnological, cultural and political agreements.  
Birrenbach pointed out that the West had not understood that the Soviet policy of co-existence was 
something completely different.  As of August 1978, Birrenbach saw the opening up of the Tyumen as the 
historic task, it was a “generations problem.” 
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East).134  Therefore, perhaps more than ever, Birrenbach opposed potential concessions 
from the West to the Russians (including in the FRG’s Africa and economic policy, 
including economic concessions via the efforts of the German Wirtschaft, especially 
those that went beyond our abilities [Kräfte]).135  Birrenbach historically justified his 
anti-détente stance to Chancellor Schmidt in February 1978 in a lengthy confidential 
account of Russo-German relations since the Congress of Berlin (since 1880).136   
                                                
134 For instance, if the USSR permitted the GDR to become more liberal (made crucial concessions to the 
FRG that led to the loss [Wegfall] or loosening [Lockerung] of the lock [Riegel] of the DDR), the USSR’s 
relations with the entire Eastern bloc would be endangered. (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22 July 1980).  
Birrenbach was doubtful of the ability of totalitarian governments to make concessions to their own people.  
As of September 1980, he doubted that the Polish government could afford free unions.  As of June 1985, 
Birrenbach confessed that the proposals of Gen. Abrahamson (I think regarding SDI) were not fully 
convincing, particularly with regard to Europe.  The USSR would not reduce its weapons in favor of laser 
rays, neutral particle beams and anti-satellite weapons.  The USSR conventional power alone was 
necessary for the protection of Eastern Europe. 
135 The idea of including the Russians by economic offers and military concessions to become a “peaceful 
partner” had been from the start a pure illusion (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 15 October 
1979, K098/2). 
136 Birrenbach seems to have dated détente in the West(including the US, Europe and the FRG) to around 
the late 1960s (more than a decade as of July 1981; the last decade as of August 1977; the Carter and 
previous US administrations).  Moscow saw the global world problems under the perspective of a 
confrontation and not, as the West, of détente.  Possibly, the US and France were about to abandon this 
concept in favor of the stabilization of the balance of power which had no constructive basis in the relations 
between our countries and the USSR which did not knw this concept because it was not identical with co-
existence.  In the West, one was accustomed to say that there was no alternative to the policy of détente.  
Birrenbach agreed that this formula was disastrous because it meant that whatever the USSR did, we wer
condemned to pursue a wrong policy.  Thus, we would lose our independence from Moscow. (KB, August- 
Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 February 1981, K074/1).  After 
Afghanistan it would be very difficult for the West to continue the economic and cultural policy with those 
countries where “the conception of the détente adapts [s’accommode] perfectly [etc.].”  Birrenbach agreed 
that nobody was condemned to face the dilemma of either détente or Cold War.  It would be necessary to 
maintain the dialogue with the East to keep the door open for possible negotiations.  But one had to see and 
recognize the real nature of the USSR which Birrenbach agreed was not a state like France, the Federal 
Republic or the US. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 
February 1981, K074/1).  We stand in a serious world crisis, more difficult than it ever had been after the 
Berlin blockade.  Thereby was to consider that the American deterrence factor was no longer credible.  A 
balance of forces no longer existed and could not be reestablished for a number of years, at least not bef re 
1985.  What would happen by then in Afghanistan, in Ira  or in both countries or even on the European 
front, if it came on the Persian Gulf to some type of military operations?  With European and American 
hardness the worst could be averted.  In case of a s tening up of public opinion, which we currently faced, 
and a completely wrong interpretation of the concept “détente,” which was completely incomprehensible 
for the USSR (as had been known since many years but ignored), developments could emerge that would 
be fatal for Europe. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), President, to Leo 
Tindemans, Minister President (aD), Brussels, 10 April 1980, K074/2).  The SALT Treaty did not reduce, 
unless it amended, the present arms race, but confirmed or perhaps pushed it. (KB to Brzezinski, National 
Security Advisor, 15 October 1979, K098/2).  The government had spoken too much about the definite 
 581
In line with this, Birrenbach urged particularly the US to take measures to reverse 
current trends and restore a stable global and regional equilibrium of (military) power in 
order to preserve peace and security (FRG, West, Europe, world; contain), eliminate 
                                                                                                                                      
state of détente and discovered now that détente as i  h d been understood by many people in the Federal 
Republic was an illusion. (KB to McCloy, 24 June 198 , K178/2).  Birrenbach was happy that the US 
seemed to be discovering that détente did not mean wh t it had believed in the last decade. (KB to McCloy, 
19 February 1980, K178/2).  A strong group in the SPD blindly believed in détente and did not understand 
the basic Soviet policy from the start. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2).  After the war, the 
Russians had never respected the idea of détente, a term unknown in their country.  Coexistence was 
something completely different and did not exclude aggression as in Afghanistan and Angola. (KB to 
McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2).  There was no real détente in the world.  This was not the opinion of 
the French and German government.  On both sides of the ocean, the Russian policy had been 
miscalculated since at least 12-15 years. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2).  The American 
administrations had had illusions regarding the expectations about Soviet détente policy.  One could not 
change fundamentally the Russian policy by involving the USSR in economic, cultural and other kinds of 
agreements. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 1980, K134/1).  Birrenbach agreed with Strausz-Hupé’s analysis of 
Soviet motivations as a nuclear and global power.  The build-up of the Soviet navy alone, apart from the 
enormous speed of their armaments development, showed that the USSR understood détente in a different 
way than the West.  But it was like in the times of Hitler: he had said in his terrible book everything he did.  
Nobody had taken it seriously.  The same applied to the Soviets.  They spoke openly about coexistence a d 
never about détente.  They mentioned continuously that they had to support the liberation movements 
everywhere in the world.  Birrenbach agreed that they probably would not take recourse to a full-scale war.  
But the creation of an imbalance of power, the political interference in other countries and their wars by 
proxy showed the goal of Soviet policy.  Détente in the Western sense was possible only in a very limited 
way.  One could concretize it by the word “restraint,” and they meant by restraint the intent to avoid 
nuclear war.  But the nuclear deterrent did not work if there was not a readiness in the West to use sch
weapons in extremis.  Whether in the long run détente would bring about a gradual transformation of Soviet 
society was doubtful to a certain degree.  Russia had always been an autocratic country.  The number of 
dissidents was as small as in the 19th century.  Birrenbach agreed that they should pursue détente but only 
on the basis of a recognition of its natural limits vi -à-vis a totalitarian superpower like the USSR.  It might 
have an effect on the Eastern European peoples democracies, but it would not fundamentally affect the 
USSR itself.  One of the effects of détente was that i  eroded the spirit of resistance in the West.  It was our 
task to keep this under control, which was very difficult, in the welfare states, particularly with socialist 
majorities or big minorities. (KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupé, US Mission to NATO, Brussels, 25 April 
1977, K100/1).  Birrenbach doubted whether the ideaof an open linkage with a constraint of the Russians 
in other parts of the world would be accepted by the USSR.  The SALT agreement would not liberate the 
United States from new Angolas, Yemens, Zaires and other interventions influenced by the Russians 
through third countries like Cuba or the GDR.  But I may be mistaken.  Brezhnev’s age and his will to get 
the SALT agreement approved by the Senate at any cost might induce him to be more cautious this time. 
(KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2).  Arms control was neither defense nor 
deterrent.  Its effectiveness was not proven and was doubtful vis-à-vis a state like the USSR. (KB to 
Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2).  In the Nixon period, the word détente had 
been abused in an irresponsible way.  To speak about creating peace in our generation, as Nixon repeatedly 
said, undermined the readiness of modern welfare stt s in Europe and to a certain degree only also of the 
American nation to draw the consequences from the enormous growth of Soviet military forces and the 
development of the USSR policy as a new global power. (KB to William R. Tyler, Director, Dumbarton 
Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University, DC, 24 February 1977, K100/1).  It was doubtful that most 
European states were ready to increase substantially their conventional forces according to the welfare state 
thinking and the wrong assessment of the effect of détente. (KB to William R. Tyler, Director, Dumbarton 
Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University, DC, 24 February 1977, K100/1).  Birrenbach’s report was dated 22 
February 1978.  Birrenbach’s report (Gutachten) was seventy pages long. 
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existing windows of vulnerability (e.g. to a USSR counterforce first strike) and facilitate 
successful negotiations with the USSR (need strong bar aining chips to get concessions, 
quid pro quo).  Due to the massive USSR military build- p (“Überrüstungspolitik”) 
during the 1960s and through the 1970s and the failure of the Western powers/states, 
most significantly the US but also Europe (Britain, France and FRG), to respond 
adequately (decline in real terms arms/defense expenditures; détente; since the end of the 
1960s through the Carter administration), Birrenbach perceived throughout these later 
years (e.g. 1977-85) a USSR (East, Warsaw Pact) dangerously superior to the US (the 
West, NATO, Europe) in a broad range of military power, not merely conventional but 
now in a fundamental shift from the period 1950-70 also nuclear (strategic) forces.137  
Like that of certain other Atlanticists, Birrenbach’s perspective was noticeably warped by 
something of an inferiority complex with respect to he USSR as well as a tendency to 
                                                
137 As of March 1980, Birrenbach believed (and probably disagreed with it) that the US had abandoned 
after the two Cuba crises its Euro-strategic weapons as a concession to the USSR.  As of November 1978, 
Birrenbach believed that the US and Western Europe wer  no longer in the same “militant mood” as in the
past (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, K098/2).  As of 1985, Birrenbach saw the USSR having made 
far higher research expenditures for space defense than the US since the ABM treaty.  In later years (e.g. 
1980-81), Birrenbach had doubts about the state/weaknesses of the US army and was still very upset about 
Nixon’s abolishing (or 1975?) of the draft/conscription system and its quantitative and qualitative impact 
on US military strength and insisted on the need for a US draft, conscription (restructuring) or selective 
service.  As of 1980, Birrenbach saw the US army in a state that was not comparable to that of the Soviet 
and perhaps the German army (as evidenced in part by the “disaster” of Tabas), citing as reasons “[t]he 
percentages of illiterates and unemployed” and the lack of qualified pilots and engineers (due to insufficient 
pay) (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2).  Among other things, Birrenbach pointed out the 
halting by the US of the bomber program and some technically high-quality weapons system (I think ABM 
or at least some defense network) after the conclusion of SALT I.  Birrenbach also saw the USSR enjoying 
geographical advantages.  Birrenbach saw this with respect to e.g. ground forces, artillery, tanks, (fighter) 
bombers, transport planes, strategic power, strategic land-based missiles, inter-continental nuclear weapons, 
theater war, land-based nuclear weapons, Euro-strategic weapons (even including the French and British 
weapons), SLBM, IRBM, INF, gray zone, all parts of the triad, tactical-nuclear (nuclear medium range) and
intercontinental areas; no effective civilian or air defense; shrinking US navy.  Birrenbach saw a “defense 
gap.”  The US had enjoyed a clear traditional superiority in strategic/nuclear weapons.  With regard to 
nuclear forces, Birrenbach saw the USSR build-up taking place since the Cuba crisis.  At his June 1978 
encounter with Carter, Birrenbach had his judgement of the past three years confirmed when Carter 
responded to a question from Birrenbach by insisting o  the current existence of a balance of power with
the USSR in the various military areas.   
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reduce East-West relations to a narrow exercise in nuclear accountancy.138  Therefore, 
Birrenbach proposed a broad increase in US military strength (rearmament, buildup), 
including support for the timely production and deployment of a range of controversial 
weapons systems, including the neutron bomb, Euro-Strategic weapons (NATO Council 
double-track rearmament resolution of December 1979; scheduled for 1983) and at least 
in principle SDI; and in practice opposed actual arms control negotiations and agreements 
(e.g. SALT I and II, MBFR) as well as the various pro osals for the unilateral Western 
nuclear weapons renunciation, disarmament or freezes or the complete denuclearization 
of the FRG/Europe.139 
                                                
138 Birrenbach continued to exaggerate the relative Russian strength, technological and productive prowess 
(e.g. in weapons), experience, strategic/military thought/perspective, quality of leadership (e.g. Andropov, 
Gromyko, Ustinov), skill and toughness (e.g. in negotiations, use of its (nuclear) weapons; skeptical of 
prospects of Russian generosity in negotiations; Gorbachev).  As of June 1979, Birrenbach claimed that t e 
USSR was an “imperial power” (KB to Ball, 27 June 1979).  As of August 1977, Birrenbach took account 
of the US technical superiority in armed forces (including in nuclear weapons) vis-à-vis the USSR but did 
not believe that new technologies could offset the quantitative advantages of the East, and the USSR was 
making every effort to catch up in technology.  As of July 1980, Birrenbach saw the West ignoring the 
USSR approach to military power (striving for supremacy, not deterrence) and forgetting the nature of 
deterrence (must make clear they use their weapons in extremis).  With respect to nuclear accountancy, 
Birrenbach was a victim of his own knowledge of and obsession with the minutiae of nuclear 
strategy/technology.  Birrenbach’s inferiority complex led him to overestimate this adversary in materi l 
and non-material respects in comparison to the US and the West. 
139 Birrenbach also supported, for instance, the American strengthening of the conventional potential (e.g. 
tanks), the improvement of the entire American triad, the mobile MX missile, inter-continental ground 
missiles, the resumption of Minuteman III production, Trident, B-1 bomber; strategic weapons; re-
introduction of the draft system in the US that hadbeen abandoned by Nixon; improving current weapons 
(e.g. weapons research and modernization/technology); and the maintenance of the ABM system.  The flip 
side of this was that Birrenbach was aggravated by any unilateral delays, wavering or cancellations of uch 
weapons (unilateral disarmament; abandonment of the ABM system; concessions to the USSR without 
USSR concessions, especially under the Carter administration (e.g. B-1 bomber, neutron bomb, mobile MX
and Trident submarines (Congress delaying significant budget appropriations here for the MX, apparently 
under both Carter and Reagan); appear to have been difficulties in producing the MX and B-1 under 
Reagan but I am not sure whose fault); delays reflect d the poor judgement of the US technical military 
complex of the situation).  In Birrenbach’s final years, Reagan’s SDI program/idea (defense in space) 
became an important issue in German-American relations, and Birrenbach seems to have given a general 
support (had not rejected it; Europeans should seriously examine the US planning) and believed it might 
display some advantages and achieve certain goals (e.g. defend the US and Europe from USSR aggression), 
though he never seems to have come to a final definitive view of SDI (cautious; regarding European 
participation), given the long-range nature of the complete project (at least ten years) and unknowns such as 
its chances of acceptance and realization and its final effect/result and given the need that it fulfill certain 
conditions and avoid certain dangers (not permit the USSR to undermine the Western defense in Europe; 
still possibly reject SDI).  With regard to the double-track resolution, though Birrenbach ostensibly 
 584
As of 1977-86, while Birrenbach remained concerned about an overwhelming or 
limited USSR military aggression against Western Europe, he continued to fear as even 
more likely a bandwagoning Finlandization of a weak, frightened Western Europe.140  
The USSR could impose its will through diplomatic pressure on a vulnerable, 
demoralized Western Europe (declining spirit of resistance; undermine its independence), 
undermine the trans-Atlantic partnership and ultimaely bring about a decoupling of the 
trans-Atlantic alliance.141  Birrenbach already claimed to detect symptoms with respect to 
France and Britain and in the Federal Republic under Chancellor Schmidt, even detecting 
“Rapallo” tendencies in the FRG as of 1979.  Citing Dean Acheson’s earlier reference to 
Birrenbach to the possibility of Europe embarking on “a mad race towards Moscow,” 
Birrenbach insisted that “Already many groups in Europe sit at the starting blocks 
                                                                                                                                      
supported simultaneous negotiations, he always assumed that a US-USSR agreement on the zero option 
was unrealizable.  As of July 1985, the FRG, Britain, Italy and Belgium had successfully stationed the 
Pershing II and cruise missiles.  The Euro-strategic weapons included TNF, INF, Pershing II, cruise 
missiles, intermediate-range rockets, gray-zone weapons, and medium-range ballistic nuclear missiles.  The 
NATO Council double-track resolution of December 1979 called for the deployment of US/Western Euro-
strategic weapons in the Federal Republic and several other important European states/nations in 1983 if 
the Geneva TNF negotiations failed and seems to have been an effort at modernization.  Birrenbach also
opposed the Nitze-Kvitsinsky compromise of July 1982 and I guess also START, INF, TNF, and gray zone 
negotiations and agreements.  As of June 1979, Birrenbach was urging the US to build the B-1 bomber in 
secret even if it violated the SALT II treaty (KB to Ball, 27 June 1979).  The MBFR negotiations aimed at 
the reduction of conventional troops.  SALT II dealt with strategic nuclear weapons.  Birrenbach argued 
that SALT II needed amendments. 
140 For Birrenbach, force relationships (military balance; universal power balance system, including the 
nuclear balance) lay at the basis of and influenced international politics and diplomacy.  Birrenbach saw a 
close relationship between the military balance (force relationships; power balance) and the prospects for 
Finlandization.  As of November 1977-April 1978, Birrenbach was shocked that some US representatives 
could argue that a worsening of the strategic nuclear balance would have no negative international political 
or diplomatic impact (he rejected this view).  He pointed to the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuba crisis of 
1962 and the Mideast crisis of 1973.  In the first two, the US had relied on and used its strategic nuclear 
superiority (and in the second in the war zone) to achieve successes.  In 1973, the military balance i the 
war zone and the strategic nuclear balance were morbalanced and therefore there came about a 
compromise. 
141 As of April 1980, Birrenbach feared the East would “cream off [absahnen] the European cake because 
none stands anymore” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980).  Birrenbach saw the USSR operating with a 
combination of threat and sham concessions.  In a meeting of the NATO Council last week, Birrenbach had 
observed that the Turkish-Greek conflict had not yet been overcome. (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, 
K098/2).   
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[Startlöchern].” 142  For Birrenbach, this represented part of a larger loss of credibility of 
and confidence in the United States and its policy in the world, a process occurring not 
just in Europe, but also among American allies in Asia (e.g. Japan) and the Middle East 
(e.g. Arab countries) as well as in the East bloc.143  He continued to the end to cite 
German history in the 19th and early 20th centuries in opposing a “dangerous 
[gemeingefährlich]” operating of a neutralist FRG between the two fronts.  Indeed, as 
part of his efforts during this period and as late s December 1985, as part of his efforts to 
soothe such concerns within the Western alliance and among his own foreign contacts, 
Birrenbach denied any such German ambitions and objected to any German policies or 
actions that stoked such fears.144  While Birrenbach remained interested in a solution of 
the German question/problem, he continued to insist also here on the need for a 
                                                
142 KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980.  “The wild race has not yet begun.  But I see symptoms that some 
countries are looking now for the start blocks.” (KB to Gerard Smith, 19 February 1979).  During a stay of 
two days in Paris, Birrenbach had had the chance, to speak with numerous French personalities, who almst 
all cautiously asked Birrenbach, what the actual gol of the German Politik in the framework of the 
mediation [Vermittlung] between the USSR and USA was. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to 
Federal President Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, personal, 4 February 1982, K033/1).   
143 In later years, Birrenbach offered contradictory images of the Europeans, sometimes as fearful of but 
also sometimes as distressingly oblivious to the changes in the military balance (e.g. KB to Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, 15 October 1979, K098/2).  In later years t least, Birrenbach seems to have sensed a general 
loss of US credibility in the world.  As of September 1985, Birrenbach complained that in the Middle East 
the US had since several years lost the faith of the war-waging powers that they really seriously meant it i  
the carrying out of their policy.  As of September 1985, Birrenbach complained that the Israeli population 
began (after the US withdrew its armed forces from Lebanon in March 1984) to doubt the seriousness of 
US military intervention in its favor.  The Israeli citizens doubted the seriousness of the US effort to 
achieve a constructive solution of the Palestine conflict including the protection of Israel. (KB Middle East 
Paper, 6 September 1985).  As of April 1980, Birrenbach saw the US economic development alone creating 
doubts all over the world which also had consequences for the US international security relations. (KB to 
Ball, 9 April 1980).  As of April 1981, Birrenbach believed that the way the US had handled the fate of the 
Shah had further contributed to the reluctant attitude of the rulers of the Arabian states. 
144 Examples of such disturbing visits, agreements or policies included the economic agreement of 6 May 
1978 as a special agreement with the USSR and its treatment in the Bundesrat; as of July 1978, agreement 
to the Brezhnev visit to Bonn; as of January 1982, Schmidt’s visit to the Werbellinsee and to Güstrow 
shortly before the imposition of martial law in Poland; as of July 1978, German Africa policy with regard 
to the conflicts on the basis of the USSR-Cuban interventions in the region on the Horn of Africa up to the 
South. 
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fundamental policy of solidarity with the US and the Atlantic/Western alliance 
(“reinsurance” in the East required insurance in the West).145     
On the other hand, Birrenbach also demonstrated a greater openness towards the 
East in some respects.  During this period (1980-85; in later years), while vocally 
disapproving of it, Birrenbach was at times almost understanding of and sympathetic to 
and explaining what he considered legitimate excuses/influences to his US contacts for an 
FRG (West Europeans’; also of the Social-Liberal government) Finlandizing 
tendencies/policies (e.g. unique elements of the German situation; endangered/vulnerable 
to USSR military aggression (especially in anomalous West Berlin), division of 
Germany, most exposed/endangered/vulnerable geographic situation near the border with 
the area dominated by the Warsaw Pact (East Bloc; East-West demarcation line), 
different Europe/FRG circumstances, situation, limits and geopolitical situation compared 
to the US, the need to maintain contact between the FRG and GDR (e.g. through visitors, 
which could be reduced by raising the minimum entry charge to the GDR; human rights 
policy); claimed as of June 1979-April 1980 that the FRG government could not afford to 
irritate the USSR in an isolated way.146  As part of this, Birrenbach seems to have gained 
                                                
145 As of April 1980, Birrenbach argued (in agreement with Strauß and Birrenbach’s party) that the security 
and liberty of the FRG and Europe had priority in moments of danger over other interests. (KB to Ball, 9 
April 1980).  As of 1977, Birrenbach saw the FRG’s scope [Spielraum] for substantial concessions to the 
USSR as very low (foreign policy considerations).  As of April 1986, Birrenbach had repeatedly warned 
Kohl about Genscher’s policy, which he saw as operating between the fronts (KB to Kohl, 3 April 1986).  
Birrenbach believed that operating between the fronts was not sustainable for a Germany acceptable in the 
world (KB to Kohl, 27 May 1986).  As of August 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski had spoken of a German 
“self-Finlandization.” 
146 It was dangerous to operate between the fronts in spite of the clear commitment of Schmidt to NATO 
and German friendship towards the US.  Germany was in  different position than other countries, 
including the US.  It had been divided by the last world war.  Birrenbach had never fully accepted the 
Ostpolitik because it was not based on equivalent contributions from both sides.  One of the greatest 
achievements of the Ostpolitik had been a mutual contact between the two parts of the German nation.  
Also, the Federal Republic was geographically situated on the limit of the Eastern hemisphere over a 
thousand kilometers and thus was more endangered than any other country in Europe and the world.  Also, 
the Federal Republic developed substantial trade with the GDR which at the same time meant a bridge 
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between the two countries which was not comparable with the situation of any other Western country.  The 
USSR which had always had a superiority in conventional weapons had acquired a clear superiority in 
Euro-strategic weapons, perhaps also in tactical nukes.  Berlin was situated in the midst of the GDR and
was therefore enormously endangered. (KB to Haig, 18 January 1982, K146/2).  The FRG may (or may 
not) have been a host nation (the only one?) for missiles in the Kennedy period, in which case there would 
have been a significant change with the 1980s.  TheFederal Republic had special interests in the GDR and 
therefore détente.  In the Federal Republic, there were no sympathies for the East, but people in the GDR 
were also Germans, in spite of all the treaties, and there was an understandable wish of the German 
population to create more intimate relations with their relatives and friends in the GDR.  In the long run, 
they wanted to hold open the option for a settlement with the GDR but this was far away and impossible 
without a previous arrangement between the US and USSR. (KB to Haig, US Army, SACEUR, 22 March 
1979, K153/1).  The Federal Republic was vulnerable du  to the division of our country and 1,000 km of 
frontier with the Eastern bloc.  The risk of not fulfilling written agreements with the USSR was a dangerous 
question for the Federal Republic.  Almost 80 or 90 percent of our imports from the USSR consisted of fuel 
or raw materials that we could not get in other countries.  Therefore, they were interested for political and 
economic reasons in maintaining a trade contact with the USSR.  Certain contact with the USSR should be 
kept open.  The division of Germany made the Federal Republic very sensitive vis-à-vis the East.  But we 
cannot take recourse to reinsurance in the East without having clear insurance in the West.  This insurance 
could only come from the US. (KB to Haig, 23 July 1980, K146/2).  The social-liberal coalition had 
invested much in the so-called Eastern Treaties and did not want to sacrifice the minor concessions they 
got.  The negotiations in the framework of the Ostpolitik had not stressed enough the idea of a modus 
vivendi.   Therefore the treaties were unclear and gave the other side the possibility of different 
interpretations of the treaties.  This made the Federal Republic vulnerable. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, 
K134/1).  Schmidt was a genuine Atlanticist who saw the limits of détente but also considered the risks 
Germany would run in a conflict with the USSR.   We w re located on the demarcation line but we had 
created certain contacts, meager, with the GDR.  He did not want to provoke Russian aggression when th 
military superiority of the USSR was a generally confirmed risk.  We had to think of the exposed situat on 
of Berlin. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2).  Schmidt did not perhaps sufficiently stress the 
possibilities to influence the USSR to a certain degre  in the economic field. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 
1980, K134/1).  The maintenance of a stable relationship with the East to maintain contact with the 16 
million Germans in the GDR and military vulnerability were legitimate interests of the Federal Republic 
but, as Strauß and Birrenbach’s party said, the security and liberty of the Federal Republic and Europe had 
in moments of danger priority over other interests.  We have to see both problems in conducting our 
policies. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 1980, K134/1).  In regard to Afghanistan, the Federal Republic 
defended today for one the results of its O tpolitik and on the other hand also the advantage which had 
accrued to the Federal Republic from the Osthandelspolitik.  The Federal Republic did not want to give that 
up especially as the Federal Republic was the most vulnerable country of Europe.  In so far, the interest 
situation of the Federal Republic was not completely identical with that of America.  However, it was clear 
to all reasonable people that any détente, limited as it was, which was grudgingly admitted by some forces, 
depended on the security of the Federal Republic, which only the US could guarantee.  However, since this 
guarantee was less convincing today, German foreign policy did not coincide completely with the 
American one, although the Federal Republic had full understanding for American leadership in the 
alliance, in case and in so far as it was exercised in convincing form.  This had not been the case in recent 
years.  The Federal Republic would not strive for a neutrality course, which would be a catastrophe.  The
times of the Reinsurance Treaty or Rapallo were no lo ger given.  This was not the general German 
opinion.  But the Federal Republic tried to hold on t  the achieved advantages of the Ostpolitik which had 
been so dearly bought and for instance in the question of the Euro-strategic weapons did not want to be so 
clearly alone exposed.  Therefore, the Federal Republic operated in the military nuclear area very 
cautiously.  The attempt to maintain the détente condition directly with the USSR did not mean a falling 
back into a neutrality policy for which there was no basis in the Federal Republic. (KB Aktennotiz, 16 June 
1980, K134/1).  It was the desire to avoid irritating the USSR that led Birrenbach to reject an isolated 
German-American venture on the European continent by deploying as the only continental (non-nuclear) 
host power/state/nation the new Euro-strategic weapons on FRG soil (NATO Double-Track Resolution), 
they could only do it if at least one other European non-nuclear state (or possibly Britain; need Italy; other 
European countries) did the same. 
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a greater appreciation of and to defend the value (benefits, interests) to the FRG of the 
(German initiatives towards the East) Ostpolitik (Ostverträge, détente, 
Deutschlandpolitik) with the Warsaw Pact states in later years (need to maintain a certain 
stable relationship/contact with the USSR/East; politica  and economic reasons for 
maintaining trade contact with the USSR; maintain co tact with Germans in the GDR; 
FRG thus gained certain advantages/concessions from the USSR (“the expensive fruits of 
the Ostpolitik”; as of July 1980 Schmidt’s visit to Moscow) worth preserving and 
therefore had to fulfill the treaty obligations (vis-à-vis the USSR) imposed on it (e.g. as 
of July 1980 written agreements with the USSR like the Tikhonov agreement)).147       
During the early 1980s, including with regard to East Europe, Birrenbach stressed 
the need for cautious gradualism, believing that overambitious efforts to bring about 
change were doomed to failure or even to produce serious harmful consequences.  
Whatever hopes (e.g. they would regain freedom), his respect for the bravery, 
understanding for their difficult situation, and his professed awareness of Poland’s 
tragic/sorrowful history (and therefore obligatory connection to its dramatic situation), 
even the upheaval in Eastern Europe during the early 1980s, particularly Poland, left 
Birrenbach feeling rather gloomy (disturbed, pessimi tic, worried, concerned, 
problems).148  On one hand, Birrenbach doubted the prospects for a genuine change and 
reform in Poland and the other people’s democracies, at least in the short-term.149  
                                                
147 At least to Schmidt on Schmidt’s birthday, Birrenbach praised Schmidt’s détente efforts to the extent 
that they had established an astonishingly good relationship to certain East European states such as Pol nd 
and Hungary (I doubt this was sincere).  For the “expensive fruits,” see KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22July 
1980.  As of July 1980, Birrenbach saw pros and cons with respect to the Tikhonov Agreement.   
148 The events in Poland were going on as of August 1980-March 1983.  Birrenbach referred to a 
“dangerous crisis” and a “terrible tragedy.”  There w re also events in the GDR as of December 1980. 
149 Birrenbach remarked, “I got the impression that ‘Solidarnosz’ has not really understood what it dared to 
do.  Less would have been more.” (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 20 January 1982).  Birrenbach doubted that 
the other Peoples Democracies bordering on Poland would follow the Polish example.  Birrenbach believed 
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Furthermore, Birrenbach feared that the concerned USSR and other fearful Eastern Bloc 
states (including the GDR) were not ready to permit fundamental changes in the existing 
governmental and economic systems in Eastern Europe or a blowing up of the artificial 
states (Birrenbach referred to the possibility of “the whole Eastern bloc in flames”; 
endangering of the internal cohesion of an Eastern state) and would respond to such a 
dangerous threat with a disastrous repetition (e.g.in Poland) of previous 
interventions/invasions (e.g. GDR, Hungary, Prague Spring).150  Therefore, Birrenbach 
pointed to the dangers of a too rapid FRG Ostpolitik (including vis-à-vis the GDR), a too 
aggressive, overambitious human rights policy, and even a perceived Western 
                                                                                                                                      
that even a relatively free Polish regime of tomorrow would at best be like the Hungarian solution/status, 
though there was no Kádár in Poland (including Wales ).  Birrenbach doubted the waning potential 
effectiveness and strength of the overreaching and unrealistic Solidarnosz union, particularly after the 
declaration of martial law in Poland after 13 Decemb r 1981, an event that Birrenbach claimed left him
“deeply shaken.” 
150 The development in Poland was astonishing, the dynamism of its Volk was admirable.  Surprising was 
the extent to which the large organizations in their actions imposed themselves vis-à-vis the state.  There 
were always groups that were not controllable.  Thedanger for Poland was great that the USSR would 
finally intervene, since the democratic process in Poland crossed a threshold, which could be hard to stop.  
Poland faced two difficult obstacles.  If via strikes or other fundamental changes of the internal situation, 
Poland was viewed as a center of infection for the neighboring states by the USSR, this would hardly 
permit any other possibility than to intervene.  Therefore, a moderation in the development of this new
Polish Dynamik was crucial.  Birrenbach referred to the economic situation in Poland.  Birrenbach doubted 
if capitalism in the Polish way was achievable.  The transformation of a planned economy into a relatively 
free economy was an unusually difficult task under th  conditions of Poland.  Only thus could the problems 
in industry and agriculture really be solved.  Birrenbach wondered if that was possible.  A Polish Marsh ll 
Plan via the Western powers in the current recession stage could not be financed.  It would also not be 
accepted by the USSR.  There was goodwill (in the West) towards Poland, but today the means were 
lacking. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, t  Zbigniew Rapacki, Paris, K070/1(?), I think this is 
from the early 1980s, probably 1981).  The situation in Poland particularly interested Birrenbach. (KB to 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, 7 December 1982, K132/2).  Solidarnosz had made very serious mistakes, passing 
over the limits in politics which were politically prudent.  Walesa was no politician but an idealist.  If 
Poland would become a democratic state, this fact would infect the whole area between the Soviet frontier 
and the Western demarcation line.  Progress in this area was only possible if it was made step by step. (KB 
to Haig, 5 April 1982, K146/2).  The Polish military egime was violating the Helsinki Act.  The question 
of Poland could be dealt with only in a very cautios way.  The moment the USSR would invade Poland, 
the situation would change fundamentally. (KB to Haig, 5 April 1982, K146/2).  Birrenbach pointed to the 
danger to the USSR of the possibilities of economic crisis in Poland and the weakening of the Polish party 
apparatus and the creation of a Polish system, including more freedom, that might be copied by 
neighboring states/nations.  In this, Birrenbach warned against a potential convulsion/catastrophe in Eastern 
Europe triggered by an encouraging of the hopes there of American support followed by a leaving of the
population in the lurch (e.g. Hungary in 1956, GDR on 17 June 1953 and Berlin Wall in 1961).  This would 
result in the loss of any remaining belief in the values of the Western world. 
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intervention in the Eastern Bloc.151  Only a very slow, step-by-step development could be 
successful, involving a constant comparison of the standard of life.152  As of 1980-81, 
                                                
151 Therefore, Birrenbach seems to have opposed forcing the European nations to impose sanctions 
regarding Poland (apparently unless the USSR invaded, th n more would be possible and necessary, 
including from Europe).  Ultimately, Birrenbach had  mixed, not entirely negative, attitude towards the 
American human rights campaign.  At least in principle, Birrenbach endorsed in later years (e.g. 1978) an 
active West/US/Carter human rights policy and campaign (“ideological counter-offensive”; in accord with 
the Helsinki Conference agreements (CSCE); not resignation), practiced on a universal basis, including vis-
à-vis the East (totalitarian states).  Indeed, Birrenbach stressed the unique interest of a divided Germany in 
the human rights issue, complained that the human rights policy of the federal government as of 1977 did 
not go far enough, for instance with respect to criticiz ng the GDR, and also bemoaned the different 
measures applied by the West (particularly the Left) to he crimes of right-wing regimes and the repressive 
systems of the East.  As of March 1978, there was a German branch of Amnesty International pushing the 
human rights effort from the German side.  To try to substitute an effective defense, not only deterrent, by a 
human rights campaign would not work.  If the Americans stressed human rights beyond a certain point, 
the result would be a negative one.  All the doors in the East would be closed.  The idea of human rights 
was a good one and a necessary complement to the general defense policy. But it presupposed a very strong 
West, particularly the US. (KB to Schaetzel, 9 August 1977, K100/2).  The idea of human rights was 
important and had a visible effect on the population in the Eastern countries, more than perhaps in the 
USSR, an autocracy since the creation of the principality of Kiev.  The introduction of human rights might 
be the beginning of a long period which one day could have important results if the West remained within 
the limits we discussed. (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 17 April 1978, K098/2).  Birrenbach 
would never forget the linkage Sen. Jackson tried to reach through the vote of the Senate in SALT I to 
attach a clause that would permit the larger emigration of Jewish citizens from Russia to Israel (Jackson 
Amendment).  It was clear to Birrenbach that the Russians would never accept this unless it was arranged 
in very cautious and discrete way.  (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2).  If 
one said that the President had shown his toughness by writing a letter to Sakharov, then Birrenbach 
answered that the effect of the letter would be further repression in the USSR and not the alleviation of the 
situation of the dissidents.  American history showed two trends in foreign policy: the moralistic one and 
the pragmatic one.  The combination of both would be the right thing.  But to concentrate on the moral ne 
alone could have disastrous effects, particularly if the admonitions could not be followed up by deeds. (KB 
to William R. Tyler, Director, Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University, DC, 24 February 1977, 
K100/1).  Regarding Carter’s championing of human rights, Birrenbach argued that the espousal of human 
rights was for no country more important than for ou s.  The question was only what methods one used.  
According to the mentality of the leadership of a totalitarian state like the USSR, it could lead to the
opposite of what one strived for in the West, an effective improvement of the status of the Soviet citizens.  
It could be viewed as an open snub which only made it more difficult for the Soviet leadership to yield to 
the Western pressure.  In discrete form, the represntatives of the US government by their negotiations with 
the USSR could refer to the importance of human rights and say that without a change of Soviet policy it 
would be hard to win American public opinion for political and economic agreements with the USSR. (KB 
to Carstens, President of the German Bundestag, 12 May 1977, K151/2).  Birrenbach questioned the 
method and degree of Carter’s human rights campaign, not the matter as such. (KB to Carstens, 19 April 
1977, K151/2).  In line with this approach, even as Birrenbach stressed the readiness of the FRG and the 
West to help cautiously in regard to Poland, he also stressed the limited possibilities, sources and means for 
doing so (e.g. limited credit in the FRG from private banks).  Birrenbach laid this out in a letter to 
Archbishop Glemp a few days ago as of 20 January 1982.  Ultimately, at least ostensibly, Birrenbach 
apparently hoped for and welcomed and highlighted (and claimed to promote that) the FRG and the West to 
give vocal support and humanitarian aid to Poland and the Polish people (e.g. displays and gestures of 
sympathy of the people, including demonstrations; reaction by governments; statement of solidarity of the 
Union party with the Polish nation; improve the relationship between the German and Polish peoples; 
NATO demands about lifting martial law, release of all prisoners and renewed negotiations of the military 
council with the episcopate and the former leadership of the Solidarity union; social aid, agrarian 
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Birrenbach pointed to the danger that the USSR and neighboring states might respond to 
a perceived Western intervention in Poland by an aggressive (military) action in Europe 
or elsewhere in the world.   
As was typical of Atlanticism, this interest in the East led to the creation of 
relevant meeting functions, aiming to express policies, deal with specific issues and 
problems, exchange opinions and generate contacts in this direction.  In line with the 
closeness of the FRG contacts with Poland relative to the other countries in the East, the 
centerpiece of such efforts was the German-Polish Forum, a series of periodic, 
confidential multi-day conferences held in both the FRG and Poland, meeting for the first 
time a few months prior to March 1978 and going on at least into 1984.  This forum was 
intended to be creative, cooperative and fruitful and to play a constructive role to the 
benefit of their two states and peoples.  The German and Polish delegations/participants 
included representatives from government, parliament, politics (of all directions), the 
Polish embassy (including the ambassador), Wirtschaft, trade unions, Wissenschaft, press, 
institutes/academies and the churches.  Meetings included speeches and discussions on 
themes of German-Polish relations, like the border question (a particular Polish concern) 
and human rights issues.  This forum emerged pursuant to the German-Polish Treaty (as 
of March 1978) as a result of the discussions at summit conferences between the German 
and Polish leadership and clearly enjoyed some level of official approval.  The DGAP 
Research Institute, including its leader Prof. Kaiser, played a major role in organizing and 
                                                                                                                                      
provisions, products and food aid, including from the Christian aid organizations and from German 
individuals; credit for a partial debt restructuring; in February 1982, Birrenbach suggested to Rostow the 
halt of all payments as the best measure, together with the grain embargo). 
152 Birrenbach’s report of 22 February 1978 had concluded that the USSR was not at all in the situation to 
make fundamental concessions in regard to the GDR since their entire Central European belt would then 
collapse sooner or later. 
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running these conferences, which had steering committees comprised of German and 
Polish members, and also kept Birrenbach informed about their proceedings and press 
echo.153   
                                                
153 Though it had been initially foreseen that the forum would meet alternately in Warsaw and Bonn, the 2nd 
forum had occurred as of 24 November 1978 in Olsztyn (Allenstein; as of March 1978 had been expected 
to occur in Warsaw).  From 13-15 May 1980, the 3rd German-Polish Forum (FRG-VRP Forum) was held 
in Darmstadt.  As of July 1984, the next meeting of the German-Polish Forum was foreseen for the end of 
September in Krakow.  German participants (I think in the 3rd Forum) included among others: Prof. Dr. 
Karl Kaiser (greeting introduction), Staatsminister Dr. Klaus von Dohnányi (MdB); MdB Anton Pfeifer; 
MdB Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes; MdB Herbert Wehner (Chairman of the SPD Bundestagsfraktion); MdEP Dr. 
Philipp von Bismarck (CDU); MdB Martin Grüner; and MdB Gerhard Jahn.  Polish participants included 
members of government ministries; journalists/editors; members of the Central Committee of the PVAP 
and other bodies of the PVAP; Deputies of the Sejm; personnel of the Polish embassy; the Polish 
Ambassador in the FRG; the heads of various institutes and academies (e.g. the Rector of the Christian 
Theological Academy; the Deputy Director of the West In titute); members of the Polish chamber of 
commerce; members of the departments of the PISM; Wissenschaftler; trade unionists (members of the 
Central Council of the Trade Unions); the director of the state publishing institute PIW; the leader of the 
central direction of the state archive; and the deputy leader of the foreign department in the Head Council 
of the Federation of the Socialist Youth Organization.  Being confidential, press representatives were 
permitted for reporting only at the opening and closing meetings.  The 3rd forum participants received 
greeting messages from Chancellor Schmidt and from Edward Gierek (Warsaw; 1st Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party).  These forums also involved certain public figures in 
certain events (e.g. dinner at the invitation of Dr. Bernhard Vogel, the Minister-President of Rheinland- 
Pfalz in the Festsaal of the Staatskanzlei; lunch at the invitation of the Mayor of Darmstadt in he 
Orangerie; dinner at the invitation of Foreign Minister Genscher (MdB) in the Restaurant Burg 
Frankenstein; dinner at the invitation of the Kultusminister of Hesse Hans Krollmann (MdL) in the 
Jagdschloss Kranichstein; lunch in the Justus-Liebig-Haus; the conference was held at the Congress Hall 
of the new Rathaus in Darmstadt and the conference secretariat was in the foyer of the Congress Hall).  The 
Polish delegation and the German members of the Steering Committee at the 3rd Forum stayed at the Hotel 
Weinmichel, while the German participants got rooms reserved in the Parkhaus Hotel.  Rapacki did not 
consider the representatives (German? Polish? both?) in the Poland/Polish Forum (Darmstadt) independent 
since they were delegated by the government.  The DGAP Research Institute drew up programs for these 
forums.  Kaiser was a member of the German-Polish Forum in Darmstadt, functioned as Chairman of the 
first meeting of the German-Polish Forum, was in cotact with Wojna regarding the forum as of July 1984; 
was as of June 1984 co-chairman of the German group of the Steering Committee or perhaps of the entire 
Steering Committee.  As of July 1980, Dr. Eberhard Schulz (DGAP Research Institute) was the German 
Secretary of the Steering Committee (of at least the 3rd Forum).  Schulz kept Birrenbach informed about 
these forums, sending him reports drawn up by Consul General (aD) Dr. Alfred Blumenfeld about their 
course and compilations of the press echo.  On the Polish side, Ryszard Wojna appears to have been central 
in organizing these meetings (leader of the Polish delegation at the 3rd forum; as of July 1984 in contact 
with Prof. Kaiser regarding the forum).  The German-Polish Forum corresponded to the spirit and letter of 
the German-Polish (VRP) Treaty of 7 December 1970 about the normalization of relations.  Guest speakers 
at the DGAP included Soviet Amb. Falin (1977 and I believe also earlier; as of June 1979, Birrenbach had 
also invited Soviet Amb. Semyonov though I don’t know if this happened or not).  On 9 November 1982, 
Birrenbach had attended (at the invitation of the CDU; CDU Bundesgeschäftsführer) a conference in the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Haus (in the Großen Saal; Bonn) on “Two Years Solidarity: How Can We Help?”  
Taking part in this function were a series of representatives of Solidarity, including the founder and leader 
of the underground publisher NOWA (Paris), the leader of the radio Solidarity, a representative of the 
information and coordination office of Solidarity (Bremen) and others (e.g. the leader of the initiative Hilfe 
für Polen eV (Bonn; Michael Lingenthal); CDU General Secretary Federal Minister Dr. Heiner Geißler; Dr. 
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Another element of all this were the expanding cooperative ties of the DGAP (and 
also other Western foreign affairs institutes; other Atlanticist organizations?) with the 
Communist countries in the East, including at the lat st by 1974 with the cooperative 
network of influential (over there) scholarly international affairs institutes that had also 
grown up there by 1974.  During this time (at least up o 1979, presumably beyond), 
these included good and constructive contacts and work/cooperation, for instance, with 
the Soviet Union’s IMEMO and the Polish Institute of International Affairs.  Such 
cooperation included the staging of a joint DGAP-IME O conference on some theme in 
Fall 1980 in Bonn, the staging with the PIIA of a Polish-German conference in June 1977 
to discuss all problems frankly (could this be the German-Polish Forum?), visits of top 
IMEMO personnel to the DGAP, visits of Germans to the IMEMO for discussions there 
and participation of DGAP Research Institute personalities in IMEMO colloquia.  
Meanwhile, around this time, the DGAP was also engaged in general information visits 
(including for individual conversations) of the personnel of its Research Institute to the 
East (e.g. USSR) and staged speech functions for prominent Soviet personalities (e.g. 
influential foreign policy journalists) on information visits to the FRG.  This overall 
process was promoted/facilitated not only by the German Moscow embassy and the Bonn 
AA, but also by Birrenbach himself, though it appears that he did not (or was not able to) 
attend or take part himself in such activities.    
Nevertheless, in line with this overall trend, in later years, Birrenbach manifested 
an increasing and explicit interest in the East, particularly a desire to gain some valuable 
                                                                                                                                      
Christina Graef, Polish doctor (Frankfurt); Walter Brückmann, Editor-in-Chief, Deutsches Monatsblatt 
(Bonn)).  These Solidarity representatives had present d their problems that they currently had in Poland 
and with which the FRG might be able to help (humanitarian aid, replacement parts, etc.).  Birrenbach had
been convinced by the arguments and had taken part in the discussion.   
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and lacking experience and knowledge of life there (including with respect to politics, 
Wissenschaft and Wirtschaft) and to meet (make contacts and talk with) leading ecision-
making personalities (especially in the USSR/Moscow).  Though Birrenbach planned a 
number of unusual and promising (foreign) trips andctivities in this regard, health issues 
precluded any from actually coming to fruition.  Inhis capacity as DGAP President, 
Birrenbach received several personal invitations from 1979-81 from the director of the 
Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR (IMEMO) in Moscow to be a guest of/at the institute for ten days, 
a personal visit that would involve giving a speech before the institute to a USSR 
audience as well as what Birrenbach expected to be difficult meetings (discussions, talks; 
not least due to his own opinions) on key East-West poli ical, military and economic 
issues with personalities (Wissenschaftlern) based at the institute, with prominent USSR 
politicians (representatives, functionaries), and (perhaps on the side?) dinners with 
representatives of foreign embassies and the press.154  With respect to meeting (making 
contacts with) key personalities, at least the German embassy mentioned as possibilities 
                                                
154 The director of the IMEMO was Prof. NN Inozemtsev, who was also a member of the USSR Academy 
of Sciences and an advisory member of the Central Committee and an advisor to Brezhnev.  As of 1979, 
Birrenbach maintained substantive relations to one ext nt or another with the USSR ambassador in Bonn. 
In later years, Birrenbach may have read the journal Kontinent.  Birrenbach had read Sakharov’s letter to 
the assembly of the Nobel Prize winners on 26 October 1983 in the Paris Sorbonne in the journal Kontinent 
(Nr. 1/1984).  For Birrenbach coming across and sending Rapacki a “quite interesting” article from the 
journal Kontinent, see KB to Rapacki, 6 February 1984, ACDP K070/3.  As of 1984, Birrenbach at least at 
times heard speeches of USSR Politburo members (e.g. Gorbachev) on Moscow-Rundfunk.  As of 1981, 
Birrenbach was aware of the reactions in the USSR press to certain things and to certain USSR press 
conferences.  With respect to his planned IMEMO trip, Birrenbach got assistance from the governmental 
bureaucracy (e.g. the Foreign Ministry (e.g. VLR I Sieger, Eberhard Boenke, Amb. Dr. Friedrich Ruth 
(AA, Bonn) and Ministerialdirigenten Dr. Heinz Dröge), the Economic Ministry (e.g. Dr. Jahnke) and the 
Defense Ministry) and the European Commission (Brussels; e.g. Hans Beck in the cabinet of Haferkamp, 
Vice President of the EC Commission), while personalities helpful to Birrenbach at the Deutschen Bank 
AG included Dr. Trouvain and those based in Moscow, and mong those at the BDI, Kurt Steves (Leader 
of the Hauptabteilung Außenwirtschaft of the BDI eV, Cologne).  As of April 1981, to put his IMEMO 
Vortrag together, Birrenbach had been in contact personally with eight or nine institutes (including 
Meissner), both at home and abroad.  
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even Prime Minister Kosygin, as well as a courtesy vi it to a high post in the foreign 
ministry and meetings with Amb. Falin and Samjatin (at least the latter and possibly both 
members of the Central Committee) and Arbatov (leader of the America Institute).   
Birrenbach’s increasing interest in the East in later years (1977-January 1985) 
also manifested itself in his efforts to improve and overcome differences in FRG-Polish 
relations.  During the early 1980s, Birrenbach himself remained in contact with a series 
of Polish friends with whom he had been in contact in part for many years close to the 
Polish church (including directly involved with Zbigniew Rapacki, the Polish 
representative in Paris).  Spurred on by developments in Poland, the insistent Rapacki 
was a/the principal force in generating the various proposals in this realm, with 
Birrenbach functioning as a/the central figure in the FRG, examining Rapacki’s ideas, 
making his own proposals, informing Rapacki about progress and obstacles, engaging 
him in an idea exchange, and serving as an intermediary between Rapacki and German 
personalities potentially interested in such projects (e.g. contacts, meetings, functions, 
activities).155  Birrenbach’s most significant such effort was his central role (at least 
                                                
155 As of June 1977, Birrenbach considered Rapacki’s idea of forming a non-governmental organization 
composed of known personalities (Polish dissidents, I believe), invested with moral authority, worth 
examining (though I believe he also had certain doubts/questions regarding particular elements).  Rapacki 
was close to Cardinal Glemp.  One of Birrenbach’s main undertakings in this regard was to try to create 
other contacts in the Federal Republic for Rapacki with various important Germans (e.g. Mertes).  As of 
January-March 1981, Birrenbach was in touch (discused) with Bismarck (official member of the Steering 
Committee of the German-Polish Forum), Weizsäcker and Mertes (Chairman of the Arbeitsgruppe 
Außenpolitik of the Unionsfraktion; at least certain members of the German Bu destag, at least in the 
Union; Birrenbach wanted Mertes to get in touch with the other colleagues in the parliament regarding this) 
regarding the arrangement of a secret and what Birrenbach considered useful and important German-Polish 
Gespräch/meeting (exchange of views; with an agreed upon prgram and time) on future FRG-Poland 
relations for May proposed by Rapacki between him and five of his friends (independent Polish 
personalities, not delegated by the government) and members of the Bundestag (representatives of the 
CDU; not sure who all would take part but apparently certain important Union MdBs, at least Birrenbach 
and Mertes; Weizsäcker proposed as the German partici nts Bismarck, Mertes, Birrenbach, Blüm and 
possibly Pieroth and Stercken; Weizsäcker himself could not take part; Bismarck did not want to participate 
since he did not want to play a double role, an official one and an unofficial one, but did wish to coordinate 
his opinions with those of Birrenbach and Mertes and to this end wanted to occasionally meet with Rapacki 
in Paris) and the securing of the requisite and intentionally non-official financing in the FRG (for the trips 
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1982-around January 1985) in plans to organize a German “Poland Committee.”156  
While considerable uncertainty persisted over the years regarding the exact goals, 
functioning, activities, financing and infrastructure of this group, it aspired to be an action 
committee (Aktionskreis) consisting of about twenty-five high-quality, prominent, non-
state German members enjoying a certain connection to Poland and representing the 
various realms of public life.157  Functioning in close cooperation with larger West 
European governmental and non-governmental efforts, the institution would have sought 
to improve relations with Poland, including by creating and strengthening contacts and 
dialogue (e.g. political, humanitarian) with all Poles inside and outside of Poland and 
providing urgently needed charitable aid to Poland.158   
                                                                                                                                      
and two-day stay costs of the Polish participants i the FRG).  As of March 1982, Hillenbrand had 
promised Birrenbach a colloquium on the problem of P land (I guess AI). 
156 This was the Deutsche Vereinigung zur Aussöhnung mit Polen.  Together with Birrenbach, it appears 
that MdEP Dr. Philipp von Bismarck and MdB Dr. Hans Stercken were especially central/energetic in 
discussing, shaping and attempting to realize this idea (get the group functioning and organized), about 
which these three had a first and thorough discussion/meeting in Bonn (I believe in the Haus Tulpenfeld of 
the Bundestag) on 12 July 1982 (including a decision about goals, number of members and groups to be 
addressed).  It was expected that in September 1982, the three would meet again in Bonn or Düsseldorf to 
deal with their experiences to that point.  As chairm n, Birrenbach would summon meetings of the German 
group to discuss the implementation in-depth (to consider ideas and deal with problems). 
157 These realms included the Politik (each of the three major political parties, including CSU and FDP); the 
Wirtschaft (e.g. industry and firms, including those carrying out foreign trade with Poland in the higher 
sense); the Wissenschaft; the trade unions; the press, publicists/journalists; the churches, both the Protestant 
and Catholic; and cultural life. 
158 The personalities in this action committee were to be proposed by their respective organizations.  The
committee, including Birrenbach, identified, considered, proposed, spoke with, addressed, agreed on, 
expressed doubt about, chose and appointed (offered membership to) the (suitable potential) members.  A  
part of these efforts with respect to the German group composition, Birrenbach engaged in difficult talks 
with the Wirtschaft to find another suitable representative.  As of October-November 1984, the composition 
of the German group had originally had Birrenbach (chairman); the Church represented by Prelate Wilhelm 
Schätzler (Secretary/Office of the German Bishops’ Conference, Bonn), Oberkirchenrat Uwe-Peter 
Heidingsfeld (Leader of the Hauptabteilung III of the Kirchenamtes of the EKD, Frankfurt), Clemens Prinz 
von Croy (Odenthal; since 25 years President/leader of their Malteser Aid Service (Order) and had proven 
himself in the area (transport) of the Catholic Churc ’s help (relief supplies) for Poland (at least from Essen 
to Poland)); the parties represented by (CDU/CSU) former MdB Birrenbach (at least initially in place of 
Bismarck; as a member of his party), MdEP Dr Philipp von Bismarck (Obernholz; had difficulties with his 
organization and therefore would take part in the group but at first not publicly), MdB Dr. Hans Stercken 
(Bonn), (SPD) Federal Minister (aD) Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski (MdB; SPD Vice President), Prof. Dr. 
Karl Kaiser (Director of the DGAP Research Institute), and (FDP) Federal Minister (aD) Josef Ertl (MdB; 
former Federal Agriculture (Ernährung) Minister); the Wirtschaft represented by Dr. hc Berthold Beitz 
(Chairman of the AR of the Fried. Krupp GmbH, Essen; Chairman of the Kuratorium of the Alfried Krupp 
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von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung, Essen; chief of the house Krupp; close connections with Poland since the 
war and one of the best Poland experts), with Dr. F. Wilhelm Christians (Vorstandssprecher of the 
Deutschen Bank AG, Düsseldorf; personality from the banking world; very well-versed Osthändler) being 
especially considered (he had shown much interest).  Birrenbach also planned to propose (at the suggestion 
of Stercken) for the CSU the President of the Catholic Kirchentages Prof. Dr. Hans Maier (Munich; 
Bavarian Kultusminister; Chairman of the Central Committee of the German Ctholics, Bonn).  As of 
October 1982, the German group would consist of at most 20-25 members from all areas (including Prof. 
Dr. phil. Georg Strobel), with the core group consisting of Dr. Philipp von Bismarck (MdEP; thought 
exactly like Birrenbach and Rapacki), Dr. Hans Sterck n (MdB) and Birrenbach.  As of October 1982, the 
group had proposed Prelate Binder or Prelate Bocklet to represent the Catholic Church.  As of August 
1984, one of Birrenbach’s major difficulties was in fi ding a personality from the CSU (MdB) suitable to 
the demands of the task.  After the experiences of the last year, Birrenbach had become very careful 
because the political diction of many CSU MdBs on the Ostpolitik could be extremely disruptive to the 
German-Polish relationship.  He had still not found a ybody who was politically experienced and 
diplomatically schooled who could represent the CSU in this group.  As of July 1984, there were also 
difficulties in finding additional suitable personalities in the Wirtschaft corresponding to the weight of 
Beitz.  Both Croy and Schätzler had been active for years in the question of aid for Poland and both had 
been proposed to Birrenbach by Bishop Hengsbach.  As of 6 February 1984, Birrenbach had also 
considered for membership the former Foreign Minister and Federal President Walter Scheel (FDP), the 
former Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder (CDU; no connection to Poland), the former Defense Minister 
Leber (SPD), Jahn or State Minister (aD) Corterier (both SPD; Corterier was in the DGAP Präsidium from 
1981-82), and Prof. Rhode (Mainz; the best Poland expert among the Wissenschaftlern in Germany).  As of 
June-July 1984, Bishop Lohse (the Chairman of the EKD; who had apparently traveled repeatedly to 
Warsaw, at least once with Heidingsfeld) and the Prelate Binder (Bevollmächtigter of the Council at the 
seat of the FRG in Bonn) had been consulted by Bismarck with respect to desired proposals for 
representation from the Protestant Church (EKD).  Birrenbach was particularly active in addressing the 
(searching for; asking) representatives of the Wirtschaft, in particular Berthold Beitz, while Stercken 
addressed the appropriate politicians of all Fraktionen and Bismarck addressed certain organizational 
personalities (MdB Dr. Ottfried Hennig as chairman of the Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen and Prof. Dr. Karl 
Kaiser (DGAP)).  As of July 1982, the proposed membrs included Politiker (Dr. A. Mertes; Bundestag 
Vice President Frau A. Renger; Georg Leber; Gerhard Re demann (Birrenbach wondered if he was 
competent enough in this area); Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker; Norbert Blüm; Leber; Dr. Marx; Peter von 
der Heydt; and if need be an appropriate representative of the FDP-Bundestagsfraktion); publicists 
(proposed: Marion Gräfin Dönhoff; Jürgen Wahl (whom Birrenbach did not know)); Churches (proposed: 
Prelate Binder, Prelate Bocklet; Birrenbach did not know either of these two; Birrenbach would have 
proposed Hengsbach); Wirtschaftler (proposed: Berthold Beitz); Trade Unionists (proposed: Sperner; 
Birrenbach did not know him) and Wissenschaftler (proposed: Prof. Strobel, Darmstadt; Prof. Schnur 
(Birrenbach did not know him), Tübingen; Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Bonn, Leader of the DGAP Research 
Institute) and MdB Dr. Ottfried Hennig (as chairman of the Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen).  (Except where 
noted, Birrenbach agreed with those proposed).  As of July 1984, Birrenbach found the interest of the 
Bundestag and the Wirtschaft quite low (limited to relatively few people).  As of 21 October 1982, 
Birrenbach expressed agreement but also doubt regardin  some of the personalities proposed for the 
committee with regard to whether some were competent nough in this area and others whom he simply did 
not know.  As of October 1982, Birrenbach would also have proposed Bishop Hengsbach (the Church’s 
contact man to Archbishop Glemp) and recommended including Kurt Steves (the leader of the BDI’s 
Hauptabteilung Außenwirtschaft und Integration) in the group.  As of July 1982, Stercken wanted to 
include the presidents of the large economic organizations in this committee as well (BDI, BDA, 
Zentralverband des deutschen Handwerks, and the Bauernverband).  As of July 1984, Schätzler was in 
contact/talks with their Polish partners with respect to the project.  As part of the aid to Poland, the group 
aimed to promote the transfer of technology as a precondition for the strengthening of mittelständischer 
structures and to provide aid (e.g. production means) to the benefit of the undersupplied population in 
private agriculture and private Handwerk in Poland (rehabilitation of these two especially suffering 
economic branches to prevent a further aggravation of the situation in Poland).  Possibilities for the
financing of the group (work) were the Catholic Church and/or the federal government.  Such financing 
would provide for an office and the executive organ working there.  In 1982, as part of his efforts to 
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examine ideas/ways to significantly aid Poland, including by making the Polish Wirtschaft somewhat 
productive without requiring visible, not justifiable means in the West (costing us nothing) and therefore 
being in our interest and in the interest of the German creditor of credits to Poland, Birrenbach wondere  
and as of November 1982 was in contact with the AA and Dr. Hansjörg Häfele (MdB; Parliamentary State 
Secretary by the Federal Minister of Finance) to see if they could examine whether the lacking replacement 
parts in Poland for machines of German firms possibly could be supplied (limited sum in the whole and 
temporally) on the basis of a tax arrangement which made the value of the necessary replacement parts tax-
deductible.  Perhaps there was a public relations angle to this whole thing since the action would be 
presented to the public (or was this simply in order to raise funds/goods?) and, in general, Birrenbach 
sought to present the Germans to his foreign contacts (i.e. Rapacki) as sympathetic to the fate of Poland.  
As of March 1983, while admitting this was only a low consolation, Birrenbach pointed to the masses of 
packages sent from Germany to Poland as evidence for and to convince Rapacki of the large sympathy in 
Germany today for the fate of Poland.  This larger context/framework/process within which the group 
would closely cooperate (contact, partnership, coordination) included the larger joint efforts of the West 
European governments (including the federal governmnt), the EEC, the highly qualified active 
counterpart/parallel groups (e.g. the French group in Paris, in existence as of February 1984), Polish 
representatives independent of the Polish government (Rapacki?; the Polish side), the churches in both
countries (including the Catholic Church in the FRG, perhaps elsewhere as well; the Commission of the 
Bishops’ Conferences of the EC), a “kirchlichen” foundation created in Western Europe and a partner 
foundation created in Poland specifically for this context (execution of government, private and churc aid 
program in the West; administrative basis; Polish-German-French charity policy).  Z. Rapacki had brought 
about the connection with the French sister group.  It is not surprising that France had a group since France 
was particularly interested in Poland.  It was expected there would be a common German-French platform.  
The French group included personalities like Maurice S humann (RPR), François Poncet (UDF) and Jean-
François Deniau (UDF) (as of February 1984, Couve de Murville and Kosciusko-Morizet may have 
represented the RPR).  As of July 1984, it appears th t Birrenbach had met with the French group and was
considering meeting with it again to show them thatey took the aid for Poland seriously.  As of July 
1984, Birrenbach claimed that the French group had asked him repeatedly to discussions in Paris in the past 
months.  It appears that the Polish church had especially suggested (to whom exactly?) this form and 
ultimate destination of aid.  The foundation in Western Europe was created by (but not legally dependent 
on) the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the EC (association according to Belgian law in 
Brussels), while the foundation in Poland was created by the Polish Church/episcopate (passage of the 
foundation law in Poland by the Sejm).  The existence of these foundations would enable tax-free donations 
of the church, population and industry to pass through as aid/shipments/relief/supplies (e.g. food and 
similar goods) to Poland where they would be received and “neutralized” (so that they were not credited to 
the Polish government; not go directly from governme t to government) and passed on to the Polish 
population in private agriculture and Handwerk/industry.  To Birrenbach’s apparent approval, the 
substantial financing of the goods/project/program ( s of February 1984 a project running potentially into
the billions over five years) should be through contributions from the private side, the Church (including 
the German Bishops’ Conference; Catholic Church; chur es in the various countries, presupposing the 
formation of a committee), the Federal Government, later other Western governments/states (e.g. France), 
the EC and possibly the US.  In the FRG, there was as of February 1984 a pilot project (but only a pilot 
project) for the aid to Poland of about DM 20 million.  During 1982-84, in his capacity as foreseen 
chairman, Birrenbach cooperated (consulted; in contact with; discussions/negotiations) in these activities 
with other personalities in the FRG, including the (Catholic) church (at least Dr. Franz Hengsbach (Bishop 
of Essen) (e.g. about the Poland Group, including whom Hengsbach would consider appropriate 
(recommend) from the Catholic Church, including perhaps Hengsbach himself, and about means to secure 
the financing and assessment of and informing about the situation and advice regarding favorable 
scheduling of a first group meeting/discussions and ssessment of the prospects of success of the overall 
group proposal)) and the government/state/AA (representatives of the federal government; official political 
side; at least the responsible Amb. (aD) Per Fischer (AA) who had as one of his most important tasks the 
treatment of the Poland aid (about the Poland Group t  inform him about the developments regarding 
putting this group together; got assessment of and informing about the relevant overall/larger/political 
situation/project and advice on and assessment of the prospects of success of the overall group proposal and 
suitable scheduling of first group meeting; about possible financing of the project/group)) and also kept the 
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Though Birrenbach accepted these invitations, he end d up postponing/cancelling 
each of them and the planned trips (flight) to Moscow never happened.  Health problems 
(e.g. heart issues, laryngitis) go a long way towards explaining this.159  However, 
                                                                                                                                      
foreseen members of the proposed group informed (in contact with) about progress/details with respect to 
organizing the German group (e.g. at least consulted th m and perhaps got their approval regarding when 
first summon group and start plan; circulated proposals/drafts (by whom?; at least some by Birrenbach 
himself) regarding group composition and formation and seeking to put together the draft of a 
text/statement regarding the group’s work (draft I believe by Birrenbach and passed around for opinions 
and change proposals; to be voted on)), thus bringing about by December 1984 something of a German 
network with respect to Poland made up of these personalities and formed by Birrenbach (including also 
Rapacki; e.g. Birrenbach passed on information regarding Poland (analyses by others) to them).  As of July
1984, Bishop Hengsbach had communicated to the Polish Church the efforts of the German group.  As of 
about July 1984, Birrenbach claimed that his efforts since a year regarding a German Committee had been 
at the stimulus of Hengsbach.  Hengsbach was of considerable importance to this endeavor since he was 
very interested in their matter and was the Church’s ontact man to Archbishop/Cardinal Glemp (relevant 
discussions during Hengsbach’s trips to Poland and during Glemp’s visits to the FRG).  Hengsbach also 
attempted to bring about a contact between Birrenbach and Glemp by inviting Birrenbach to visit Glemp 
during his visit to the FRG (I think in late July 1984) though Birrenbach was sick and could not make it.  
As of July 1982, Stercken was in contact with Prelate Dr. Homeyer (Secretary of the Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference) about the committee.  Homeyer welcomed such an idea since the German Catholic Church 
sought to promote aid actions vis-à-vis Poland on the basis of an as plural as possible representative circl .  
However, Homeyer wanted a decision on this question (c mmittee or overall aid efforts to Poland) to be 
postponed until more information had been gotten from sources in Rome and Poland in the next weeks.  In 
March 1982, following up on their discussion in Liesen’s Kasino a few days prior, Birrenbach sent Dr. 
Klaus Liesen (Chairman of the Vorstand of the Ruhrgas AG, Essen) an extremely confidential secret report 
(looks like “Additional Foreign-Political Information”) about the situation in Poland that should be of 
interest to Liesen.  As of November 1984, Birrenbach was receiving reports from Poland (he probably 
means Rapacki) and was passing them on to his German contacts interested in Poland (I think primarily 
those in the prospective German “Poland group”). 
159 Health reasons were not solely responsible for this.  In 1980, Afghanistan was at least part of the cause 
of his cancellation.  Birrenbach also cited other international circumstances/issues that would have also 
made his trip difficult during this period (e.g. Poland crisis as of 1981), particularly given Birrenbach’s 
acknowledged frankness regarding his concerns, though I am not sure if these actually contributed to the 
cancellations.  Birrenbach also postponed his Moscow trip in 1980 due to the change in German 
ambassadors, which left only a chargé d’affaires there for an interim period (including during the p riod 1-
10 October when Birrenbach would have come; no more Amb. Dr. Hans-Georg Wieck; the German 
ambassador would also have been away during the 1981 trip, something Birrenbach preferred would not 
have been the case (want a constant opinion exchange on that day’s events), though I am not sure if this 
played any role in the cancellation).  The personnel of the German Moscow embassy (including Amb. 
Wieck and then Amb. Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut and Gesandter Hermann Huber) and the AA (Bonn; 
Birrenbach claimed the Foreign Minister himself approved of the trip; e.g. VLR I Sieger and Eberhard 
Boenke, Amb. Dr. Friedrich Ruth (AA, Bonn) and Ministerialdirigent Dr. Heinz Dröge) apparently 
welcomed Birrenbach’s planned trip and played a very aluable intermediary and advisory role in 
supporting and helping organize it, including with respect to the conditions in the USSR, providing 
valuable informational and analytic materials, easing the paperwork/formalities for entry into the USSR, 
transportation within the USSR (pickup from airport), arranging embassy functions for Birrenbach (e.g. 
dinner), perhaps substantive suggestions, communicating with and making requests to the IMEMO (e.g. 
regarding contacts) and arranging meetings/contacts with appropriate German and Soviet personalities and 
leading embassy Mitarbeitern.  As of June 1980, Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser (leader of the DGAP Research 
Institute) had also gotten an invitation.  The trips of the two did not need to coincide.  Birrenbach would 
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Birrenbach’s declining of these invitations also demonstrates the tensions and difficulties 
for a German Atlanticist with respect to contacts with (trips to) the East, in particular the 
difficulties presented by the international situation/atmosphere during this period (need 
favorable political conditions; East-West relations; i  1981 only if reduction in the Polish 
crisis/tension) and its potential impact on his trip (e.g. date and speech theme; 
conversations; little openness with regard to the talk substance and atmosphere; not 
permit fruitful discussions due to host’s iron-clad position; very difficult; difficult debates 
[Auseinandersetzungen]) and the need to demonstrate Western solidarity.  It appears that 
perhaps these conditions (and not just health) played some role in Birrenbach 
postponing/canceling these planned trips to Moscow.  By March 1983, though willing to 
stay on as an organizer, advisor and member (in the CDU group), Birrenbach had 
declined the chairmanship (leadership) of the Poland group (project) foreseen for him due 
to advancing age, poor health and numerous other tasks, ll of which sapped him of the 
necessary energy.160  However, it appears that after prolonged uncertainty, n part due to 
external framework obstacles including in the East, this planned German group never 
came into existence, certainly not with any role for Birrenbach, thus undermining one 
                                                                                                                                      
have flown with Lufthansa (with SU 2413 within Russia; with AY 713 back to Germany via Helsinki).  
Birrenbach wanted to keep this trip confidential (not in press) and did not want it to be “hochgeputscht” by 
any side (something with which Wieck agreed), maybe to keep it secret from the Americans.  Birrenbach’s 
Moscow trip would have also included shorter stays elsewhere, namely Leningrad and Zagorsk (the 
monastery), with Birrenbach wanting to visit historically and culturally interesting points in all three 
locations.  Birrenbach’s desire to go on this Moscow trip can be seen by his conscious efforts to avoid any 
actions, such as offensive publications, that might prevent it from occurring (KB to Uwe Nerlich, SWP, 14 
August 1979).  As of July 1984, Kaiser planned in September to travel to Warsaw to sound out the situation 
there. 
160 As of 1984, Birrenbach requested that Hengsbach consider who should replace Birrenbach in the 
foreseen position in the group.  Birrenbach saw his abdication as a disappointing of Hengsbach.  
Birrenbach was involved in identifying a suitable chairman.  By October-November 1984, Birrenbach 
proposed and wanted to talk to Dr. hc Berthold Beitz (Fried. Krupp GmbH, Essen) to get him instead to 
assume the chairmanship/leadership of the Poland group.  Beitz, whom Birrenbach seems to have thought 
very highly of as of August 1984 (and apparently believ d would be able to raise/collect the necessary 
sums (millions each year), had a decades-long experience and a good reputation in Poland and was known 
and recognized internationally in the German-Polish area. 
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prospective element in a permanent German “Poland” network.161  In any case, 
Birrenbach’s activities demonstrate that German Atlanticism was clearly wrestling during 
this period with the proper posture to be assumed towards the East.  
C. Criticism and Concerns Regarding the United States 
Little changed in Birrenbach’s overall Atlanticist perspective in later years.  He 
remained to the end a staunch advocate of not merely a stable Atlantic Alliance but also 
of a more extensive consolidation of the West, including such measures as the 
establishment of a tight-knit Atlantic Community and a still-unachieved Atlantic 
Partnership between the United States and a closely united Western Europe.162  This was 
                                                
161 As of December 1984, it had still not come into being or held its first meeting.  As of January 1985, an 
overall plan had still not been concretized.  As of about July 1984, Birrenbach still seems to have seen 
hopeful prospects for success for this venture, arguing that the fact that the German population had supplied 
in an outstanding way/extent over the last years the Polish population with food showed that the German 
population was ready in principle to help Poland in its fatal situation.  As of 1984, Birrenbach still saw the 
situation containing a number of external obstacles inhibiting/postponing the carrying out of the generous 
plans/work/efforts related to the German Committee hat needed to be eliminated (e.g. regrettable incident 
that created waves in the discussion in public opini n and addressed several problems and that involved the 
text of a sermon and letter from Cardinal Glemp to Cardinal Höffner; belief of everybody, including the 
German ministers, that action on our part would be premature; blocking of the EC budget until the end of 
March 1984 as of February 1984; still open question requiring agreement/settlement; uncertain whether 
foundation would be founded in Poland; USSR displeasure vis-à-vis such a project; a changed, more 
complicated, uncertain and not assessable but not necessarily definitive situation/difficulties/events in 
Poland to the disadvantage of the project largely due to USSR pressure in the RGW meeting so that the 
neutralization of supplies was not currently secured; lack of final decisions about the setting up of 
corresponding institutions in Poland and also in Europe (counterparts to the German group?); unripe 
political situation; not clarified conditions for the supplies between government, church and foundation in 
Poland; still need agreement with the Polish governme t; difficulties in the contact with Poland in Summer 
1984; need to clarify open questions of detail; lack of necessary preconditions for founding; contact 
partners on the Polish side; skepticism in Poland, particularly in the Church, with respect to the plans 
regarding the Birrenbach/Rapacki/German group as a re ult of the trip of the high clergy of the other 
confession to Poland as of May 1984 (German Protestants?); Birrenbach’s health/sickness). 
162 For Birrenbach, notions such as Atlantic Partnership involved mutually beneficial, trusting, extensive, 
cohesive, rapid, vital trans-Atlantic understanding, relations, connections, cooperation, exchange, 
consultation, coordination (policy), solidarity, combination of efforts/strength, planning, measures and 
overcoming all the existing problems between the US and a closely united Western Europe (V rein of the 
Atlantic nations).  The common global dialogue (concept, consensus) involved would go far beyond 
particular limited themes and encompass the politica , economic/trade (e.g. agrarian trade; vs. 
protectionism; sanctions), military/security/defens/strategy, currency, technological/industrial (most 
explicitly in these years with respect to (conventio al) armaments/weapons, SDI) policy realms.  The 
conception of Atlantic Partnership aimed to further the internal cohesion of the alliance by bringing about a 
common concept, strategy, consensus, perspective, and priorities and thus avoid surprise decisions on a 
wide variety of fundamental international relations decisions/policies/issues, whether it be with respect to 
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even as such grand conceptions had become increasingly less common, a fact implicit in 
Birrenbach’s references to himself as an “old Monneta r.”163  Though cognizant of 
certain differing interests between the United States and Europe (including the FRG), for 
instance due to geopolitical factors, Birrenbach continued to view their interests as 
interwoven and fundamentally identical and their mutual survival as dependent on their 
cooperation.164  Though Birrenbach paid lip service to the notion of these two partners 
functioning as equals, he more than ever stressed the centrality to Europe and the Federal 
Republic of a militarily, politically and economically powerful and engaged United States 
as the key power in virtually every aspect of interational affairs, regardless of theme or 
geography.  Within the context of Atlantic Partnership, he stressed the significance of this 
United States exercising a just, wise and strong leadership (authority), a concept that 
recognized the possibility of US pressure but that also pointed to the crucial importance 
of compromise and consultation, ensuring that the US take into account the key interests 
of a dependent Western Europe and Federal Republic and enhance their influence on US 
policies.165   
                                                                                                                                      
internal Western affairs (e.g. major Western states, the Western/Atlantic Alliance, intra-West European 
policy; Atlantic Council) or external affairs such as East-West relations (e.g. trade, especially technology 
transfer, and negotiations, including arms control like SALT II and ABM Treaty).  In later years, 
Birrenbach believed the larger European nations should take part in the research stage of the SDI plan(as 
Britain and Germany had just announced as of February 1985).  The German Atlanticists hoped there 
would be a spill-over effect to the European or German Wirtschaft and employment through a 
technological-economic success of the American SDI project in which they participated (either state or 
non-state participation; including hopefully participation of German firms in the SDI research; SDI 
involved not just US-FRG negotiations but also purely economic aspects).   
163 Birrenbach admitted in 1975 that the idea of an Atlantic Partnership “unfortunately has never been 
defined.” (KB to Ball, 22 January 1975).  In later y ars, Birrenbach saw Strausz-Hupé as still a supporter f 
an Atlantic Partnership (as in the past), though this may not have been a very precise characterization.  
Birrenbach still saw himself supporting and working for Monnet’s goals and vision of Europe (e.g. United 
States of Europe, Atlantic Partnership) and insisted that he was a “Monnet-European” (an “old Monnet 
loyalist [Anhänger]”). 
164 KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2.  As of 1980, Birrenbach saw US and European interests 
differing with respect to the Middle East and Iran due to geopolitical reasons. 
165 In later years, Birrenbach saw no European nuclear factor.  Birrenbach was critical of various French 
weapons/military policies/strength (e.g. transformation in the early 1980s into a Volksarmee ineffective in 
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Paradoxically, Birrenbach saw the importance of the trans-Atlantic link enhanced 
in later years even as he endorsed the trend of German Atlanticism towards a world 
system perspective, accepting that they now inhabited “a global world.”166  As previously 
explained, economic, financial and energy developments had earlier led him to recognize 
the value of global economic institutions (e.g. OECD) and in some respects the need for 
cooperation with extra-Atlantic allies, notably Japan.167  From the mid-1970s on, while 
factors such as EC expansion probably played a role, the increasing attention Birrenbach 
devoted to far-flung regions was also the product of developments emerging from the 
dangerous North-South and interwoven East-West confli ts and potentially impacting 
critical Atlantic and German political, economic and military interests.168  Among the 
most ominous threats, the USSR, traditionally a land power, was extending its direct and 
indirect influence into vital areas of the Third World, aided by a much-expanded navy 
and various proxies.169  Meanwhile, crucial energy and raw material sources found 
themselves vulnerable in unstable crisis regions like Africa, Southeast Asia and, 
especially, the Middle East (oil), the latter menaced by the related problems presented by 
                                                                                                                                      
modern war; priority to nuclear weapons rather than army; low deterrence effect of the numerically inferior 
French nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis the USSR).  Birrenbach continued to stress that Atlantic Partnership could 
not be a command relationship.  As of December 1985, Birrenbach sought a genuine connection with 
respect to SDI between the US and the FRG along the patt rn of Britain to ensure the FRG’s influence on 
the shaping of US strategic conceptions (like Kohl but apparently unlike Genscher; participation of the 
FRG in decisions about future defense strategy; in a sense to this extent an Anglo-Saxonization of German 
foreign policy). (KB to Kohl, 19 December 1985). 
166 KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980. 
167 Such cooperation included the consideration of their interests. 
168 Birrenbach followed events in the Middle East/Persian Gulf (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan), 
Central America (underbelly of the American continent), South America (e.g. Falklands War), Africa (e.g. 
Rhodesia and Namibia as of 1978, Angola/Horn of Africa, South Africa) and Asia (e.g. Southeast and 
Southwest Asia).  With respect to EC expansion, one can point especially to that towards the 
Mediterranean. 
169 Admiral Gorshkov led this expanded modern navy, a historical novelty.  Birrenbach saw the USSR 
efforts for instance especially in the Middle East nd Persian Gulf; Afghanistan; Cuba; Southeast Asia(e.g. 
Cambodia); Africa (e.g. South Africa, Angola, Ethiopia); and the Barents Sea.  This included USSR 
political, economic and military power and influenc.  These proxies included the Cubans, the GDR and 
liberation movements. 
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the USSR (invasion of Afghanistan), the Arab-Israeli conflict and the disintegration in 
the Arab world.170  The cutting off, by embargo or otherwise, of such sources on which 
the West depended portended devastating economic and social instability and crisis.171  
While rejecting a geographic expansion of the NATO reaty, Birrenbach remained true 
to the notion of Atlantic Partnership in insisting that the European powers (including the 
FRG), though essentially lacking a military capability n these regions, transcend their 
continental perspective and assume an expanded role in th  world in support of the 
essential US efforts there to defend their common interests (division of labor).172   
                                                
170 There was uranium in South Africa and oil in Southeast Asia. 
171 As an indication of the importance Birrenbach attached to oil, as of August 1977, Birrenbach considere  
Saudi Arabia the second or even the most powerful state in the Near East.  As of April 1980, Birrenbach 
feared that aside from any military consequences military measures with respect to the Iran crisis might 
lead to a complete cutoff of oil from Southwest Asia.  It appears that continental Europe was dependent on 
oil from the Middle East, perhaps Britain was not s dependent.  Other sources of imported energy in later
years for the FRG/Europe included Russia (natural gas), Canada (uranium) and the US (uranium) as well as 
coal in part from somewhere.  Birrenbach saw this disintegration beginning from Iran (and Iraq and Yemen 
to Saudi Arabia).  The FRG and Japan also depended on these sources. 
172 Birrenbach also called on Japan in this respect.  In general, demands for greater European defense 
contributions were related in part to growing US responsibilities in the Persian Gulf.  With respect to a 
division of labor, Birrenbach pointed to French efforts in Africa, the possibility of Britain contributing to an 
interim solution in Rhodesia and Namibia via patience and pressure, the major support the FRG was giving 
Turkey and Pakistan and possibly an increase in the FRG navy to protect the sea lanes that would enabl 
the FRG to import the necessary raw materials in a conflict and possibly an FRG mobilization of reserves 
to allow the withdrawal of US troops from the Central f ont (European continent) so that they could be 
used for instance in an RDF on the Straits of Hormuz (e.g. KB to Rose, 10 February 1981, K074/1).  On the 
other hand, as of August 1977, Birrenbach doubted th  Bundeswehr could act outside the national space 
(even stationing functions in the Mediterranean or on the north flank) without inner difficulties. (KB to 
Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1).  As of May 1982, Birrenbach believed that all three powers (Britain, 
Argentina and the US) plus the EC and perhaps NATO would be losers in the Falklands war (he wanted a 
solution), with Britain losing sovereignty of the islands, Argentina’s economy almost breaking down, while 
the US would damage its relations with Latin America and perhaps the entire Third World (which would 
endanger the security of the US “underbelly” and enhance USSR influence).  As of April-July 1980, 
Birrenbach hoped the US would not impose a sea blockade vs. Iran (postpone military action vs. Iran) that 
would mean a war with Iran and perhaps the USSR (and push Iran into the arms of the USSR) and the 
death of the hostages without getting the consent thus of the Arabian states around the Gulf.  As of April 
1978, while claiming to be strongly opposed to and in favor of the elimination of apartheid, Birrenbach’s 
objection to a dangerous and irresponsible rapid transition in South Africa to a “one man one vote” election 
system (possibly US policy at this point) was based in part on the danger of inviting a Cuban and Russian 
intervention in the resulting revolt/bloodbath. (KB to Brzezinski, 17 April 1978, K098/2).  As of April 
1977, Birrenbach saw a “geopolitical retreat of the W st” in many regions of the world. (KB to Amb. 
Robert Strausz-Hupé, US Mission to NATO, Brussels, 25 April 1977, K100/1).  As of August 1980, 
Birrenbach saw South Africa pursuing “its impossible internal policy of apartheid with an ideological 
madness which could lead to an explosion in the south f the African continent.” (KB to Gerard Smith, 12
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For all the importance he attached to them, Birrenbach saw trans-Atlantic 
(including US-German) relations in a state of deterioration, plagued throughout these 
later years by internal disputes and crises, encompassing a wide variety of political, 
economic and security issues, that threatened a drifting apart and even irreparable 
decoupling of the US and its West European allies.173  East-West relations constituted a 
central source of such tensions, particularly the viability and divisibility of détente, a 
theme comprising arms control negotiations, weapons deployment (neutron bomb, TNF), 
visits of leaders to one another’s countries, economic sanctions and the Osthandel.  With 
the USSR invasion of Afghanistan and events in Poland, the US advocated a harder line 
towards the East, while the European nations (FRG) sought to preserve détente.174  Other 
sources included conflicting views on nuclear energy (a specifically US-German dispute 
during the Carter administration), out-of-area issues in the Third World (response to Iran 
after the Shah’s fall, conduct of the Middle East negotiations), European defense 
contributions, and SDI.  In an effort to clarify what he considered trans-Atlantic 
misunderstandings, Birrenbach tried to soothe his US contacts’ concerns about European 
and German policy, including, in a departure from his behavior in the early 1960s, those 
related to the Osthandel, most specifically the gas-pipeline deal of the early 1980s (e.g. 
                                                                                                                                      
August 1980).  As of June 1982, Birrenbach saw “a world which has now become a global problem in a 
real sense.” (KB to McCloy, 23 June 1982).  Birrenbach’s proposed Middle East (Israel-Palestine) peace 
plan/settlement comprised of a Western (full US) guarantee and military peace contingents (at least the US, 
including a treaty ratified by Congress, and possibly the USSR and perhaps other European countries 
(Britain and France)) to ensure Israeli security for a series of years since the future Israeli frontiers would 
be less defensible than present ones.  As of July 1979, Birrenbach complained about Europe’s current 
condition of “uncertainty [Unsicherheit], frustration and disorientation in weltpolitischer respect.” (SALT 
Negotiations, Interim Report on the Situation at the End of the Year 1978, by KB, 6 July 1979).  
Birrenbach apparently saw this as a foreign policy effort on the part of the European powers. 
173 Birrenbach saw a Vertrauenskrise (crisis of confidence).  During the Carter administration, there seems 
to have been tension over that administration’s insistence on the “locomotive theory” in economic 
questions. 
174 As of July 1980, Chancellor Schmidt’s visit to Mosc w had apparently caused criticism from the US.  
As of January 1982, Schmidt had received criticism in the US (which Birrenbach disagreed with) for his 
attitude during Brezhnev’s visit. 
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McCloy).175  Birrenbach’s discouragement with the state of trans-Atlantic relations 
contrasted with the optimism of some foreign contacts, especially Monnet regarding their 
overall plans, but was nourished by the gloominess of others, including McCloy, Strausz-
Hupé, and Rostow (CPD).176  Despite lingering hopes and a sense of personal 
accomplishment, Birrenbach ultimately fell prey to a certain despair, resignation and 
fatalism about the prospects of realizing his decads-long Atlanticist projects and 
“dreams.”177 
                                                
175 With respect to the Osthandel, there was the Tikhonov Agreement (FRG) as of June 1980 and the gas-
pipeline deal/project as of July 1980-June 1983. 
176 In later years, Monnet admonished Birrenbach and perhaps even feared Birrenbach had given up hope in 
their project.  Birrenbach sometimes put on a false front of optimism vis-à-vis Monnet.  As of November 
1978 (to Monnet), Birrenbach claimed that in observing the creation of the European Council, the future 
election of a parliament on the basis of a universal suffrage and the efforts for the constituting of a 
monetary zone by d’Estaing and Schmidt that Monnet’s Europe had created a self-operating dynamism.  
Therefore, he hoped that one day Monnet’s dream would become reality. (KB to Monnet, 8 November 
1978).  Birrenbach’s pessimism sometimes also drew rebukes from contacts such as Kissinger. (Kissinger 
to KB, 9 July 1984).  The CPD was a manifestation of the stunning pessimism of many American right-
wingers during the Carter years, not just regarding the short term but also the overall prospects of the US 
vis-à-vis the USSR (West on verge of losing the Cold War) even as the USSR neared collapse.  Ultimately, 
Birrenbach can also be counted amongst these right-wing Chicken Littles.  This cultural pessimism was not
unique to Birrenbach but was an element of a larger crisis of confidence in the West during part of this 
period.  See Brzezinski’s speech at the Trilateral Meeting in May 1976, “Trilateral Commission Meets in 
Ottawa,” ACDP K056/2.  Birrenbach had the impression, t  quote the title of Aron’s last book, that they 
were facing “une Europe en décadence” (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Adenauerallee 133, 
Bonn), President, to Prof. Raymond Aron, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Centre Européen 
de Sociologie Historique, Paris, 22 September 1977, K074/1).  As of February 1979, Birrenbach saw the 
European states (quoting Raymond Aron) in a condition of “Dekadenz.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 1 February 
1979).   
177 According to Birrenbach, Europe almost did not exist any more, the unity was a very weak one (KB to 
McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2).  Indeed, it appears that the vision of Europe as Monnet and Birrenbach 
shared it never really caught on in Cognac (as Monnet used to say).  However, the reality of Europe as 
Kant, Voltaire and Gibbon perceived it was stronger than ever.  This was a sense that Europe was an entity 
divided into provinces.  In September 1984, Birrenbach moaned, “You can see almost nothing of the 
dreams of Jean Monnet.” (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984, K160/2).  As of June 1980, Birrenbach saw a 
slowing, even a regression, in the Politik of European unification (KB Aktennotiz, 16 June 1980, K134/1).  
Birrenbach seems to have viewed Europe in a state of dissolution/disintegration.  As of May 1977, 
Birrenbach acknowledged that Europe had made progress after 1950 politically and economically.  A new 
war between the nations of West Europe was no longer conceivable. (KB to Monnet, 24 May 1977).  At 
least in later years, Birrenbach stressed the long-term nature of the process of European unification, seeing 
this “dream” as “a secular task” requiring at least twenty years (KB to Gerard Smith, 1 October 1980).  
Birrenbach continued to see European unification as a secular task.  Birrenbach referred to “the European 
dream.” 
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These disputes exhibited a clash between Atlanticist interests and a greater 
German assertiveness regarding economic interests, manifested in Birrenbach’s own 
behavior.  In contrast to the early 1960s, he conspicuously and reassuringly defended, 
even in the face of US opposition, the controversial German trade deals of the period in 
an effort to ensure the export credibility and possibilities of German industry, so crucial 
to one of the world’s principal exporters.  These deals included, at least in their aftermath, 
the German-Brazilian nuclear treaty and the Osthandel in general, more specifically the 
natural gas-pipeline treaty concluded in November 1981 by the Federal Republic and 
other European nations with the USSR.178  With respect to the gas-pipeline deal, 
Birrenbach acknowledged the validity of the concerns, i cluding among US contacts like 
McCloy, regarding the timing of the treaty’s conclusion, the enormous sums of hard 
currency that would flow to the USSR and which could be used to acquire military and 
non-military technologies in Europe, the favorable trade and financial conditions afforded 
the USSR, the potential creation of an energy/trade dependence on the USSR facilitating 
its political domination/leverage over Western Europe and also promoted an expansion of 
the COCOM list to prevent the delivery of militarily valuable goods to the USSR, but 
rejected the notion of imminent dependencies and stres ed the essential nature for the 
                                                
178 The German-Brazilian nuclear treaty existed as of April 1977 and involved capital goods.  The German-
Brazilian agreement and the US effort to impose politica  conditions became a test case of German 
faithfulness to contracts [Vertragstreue] and the FRG’s need to protect the certainty of its ability to supply 
goods [Lieferfähigkeit] as a producer of advanced technologies and could impact on many other areas as 
well.  The other European nations involved in the gas-pipeline treaty included at least France.  As of 
September 1982, Birrenbach argued that it would be extremely difficult for the European states to break the 
gas-pipeline treaty after it had been concluded (why?).  The second embargo against the licensee firmshe 
considered legally inexcusable. (KB Aktennotiz, 24 September 1982).  The Siberian gas-pipeline 
treaty/deal/project/agreement (natural gas; Tikhonov Agreement) involved the German and European 
export of pipes to the USSR and the import of gas energy via pipeline from the USSR. 
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FRG of many fuel and raw material imports from the USSR.179  Ultimately, Birrenbach 
embraced the idea that good business could be good policy.180  Finally, from late 1982-
85, he repeatedly urged Chancellor Kohl to resist the “strangulation” of the competitive, 
private, unsubsidized German steel firms (industry) within the EC framework caused by 
the subsidy- and nationalization-policies of the surro nding EC governments to the 
benefit of their own largely uncompetitive, unprofitable steel industries.181     
                                                
179 Birrenbach argued that the increased resulting dependencies on the USSR in primary energy supply 
were acceptable (not so dangerous), especially if gas was also gotten from other sides.  Birrenbach also 
downplayed the USSR’s importance as an overall trading partner of the FRG (including when compared to 
FRG imports from and exports to the competitive countries in the West).  As of July 1980, Birrenbach 
reported the FRG’s trade with the USSR to be only a sm ll percentage (2.3%) of its overall foreign trade 
and the FRG’s 1979 imports from the USSR as DM 7.4 billion and 1979 exports to the USSR as DM 6.6  
billion (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22 July 1980).  As of July 1980, Birrenbach also pointed out to his US 
contacts that the Tikhonov agreement was the consequence of the agreement of 6 May 1978 and was 
therefore similar to the US action of eliminating from the US grain embargo the seven million tons that the 
US had agreed to deliver to the USSR before the crisis in Afghanistan.  Although I have no exact evidence, 
it is possible/probable that Birrenbach approved of the gas pipeline from the USSR at least in part due to its 
appealing balance of trade contracts to supply the pip . 
180 As of July 1980, Birrenbach pointed out that almost 80-90% of the FRG’s imports from the USSR 
consisted of fuel or raw materials they could not get from other countries.  As of August 1978, Birrenbach 
claimed to Schmidt that he considered Schmidt’s (I think economic) agreement with the USSR of 6 May 
1978 valuable.  However, as of July 1980, Birrenbach believed that the idea to conclude a general 
agreement to cooperate with the USSR in 1978 during a period of 25 years was a question that could be the 
subject of discussion (sounds quite skeptical).  
181 This situation/practice had been accepted/conceded by the social-liberal coalition, including as of 
August 1981 Graf Lambsdorff, at least since the mid-1970s.  Those countries giving out subsidies to their 
steel industries included Belgium, Britain, France and Italy.  Important with respect to the subsidy policy 
was the “fatal” 1981 EC subsidy code.  In addition t  the cessation of the nationalization and subsidy 
policies, Birrenbach also desired in the meantime (balances) the assignment to the FRG steel industry of a 
proper production share within the EC quota system (not the currently depressed share of the EC quota 
arrangement since 1980) and potentially government financial aid/subsidies to the German steel 
firms/industry.  At least during the 1980s (at the lat st by July 1981), Birrenbach saw actions in Europe/EC 
impacting very negatively on the German steel industry and at least contributing to the steel crisis (i.e. 
nationalization, subsidy policy, efforts to place th  social and regional problem in the foreground) and 
resulting in a dispute of the German steel industry with the EC and the neighboring states.  As of June 
1983, Birrenbach argued that with the nationalization by certain EC states of steel works (as of 1983, there 
were large nationalized steel firms in Belgium, France, Britain and Italy; not FRG firms), it was now a row 
between states rather than between free firms. (KB to Kohl, 28 June 1983).  In September 1983, Birrenbach 
believed that Chancellor Kohl’s personal “interventio ” in the “steel crisis” was “more urgent than ever.” 
(KB to Kohl, 15 September 1983, cc Dr. Stein).  In Ju e 1983, Birrenbach informed Kohl that “the fate of 
the steel industry…lies now purely in your hands.” (KB to Kohl, 28 June 1983).  As of December 1982, 
Birrenbach was warning Kohl that unless policy was changed, the Ruhr would become “an undeserved 
poverty zone.” (KB to Kohl, 22 December 1982, K029/2).  Probably playing on the Chancellor’s domestic 
political interests, Birrenbach complemented his economic arguments by also pointing out to Kohl the 
political/electoral repercussions, particularly in the Ruhr/NRW, the industrial core area of the FRG where 
coal and steel was the crucial economic basis.  But most of the (steel) companies in other (European) 
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Birrenbach’s efforts to further the interests of German industry also intersected 
with trans-Atlantic disputes on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  While supporting 
safeguards against nuclear proliferation in principle, he continued to promote the crucial 
introduction of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic, including the construction of new 
power plants and the rapid development and employment of advanced technologies (e.g. 
plutonium, including the fast breeder).  In resisting any discrimination or dependence vis-
à-vis the nuclear weapon states (e.g. US, France and Britain), Birrenbach stressed not 
only the negative impact on the FRG itself but also on European unification, with the 
creation of two classes of states regarding civilian (and military) nuclear power 
potentially fueling French and British claims to complete independence and French 
claims to hegemonic leadership in Europe.182  This desire to attain energy independence 
and security for the FRG was largely based on concern about the unpredictable attitudes 
of other countries (e.g. the US and France) and, in particular, fears of an embargo on the 
delivery of nuclear materials.183  Such concerns were stoked by bitter past experiences 
with the US and other Western countries in the nuclear and energy field, including US 
behavior during the 1960s regarding the MLF and NPT and, more recently, the neutron 
                                                                                                                                      
countries lived only from state subsidies or were nationalized.  How could we in Germany compete against 
the budgetary and protectionist policy of their neighbors? (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2).   
182 As of 1977, the German position with respect to nuclear energy differed from that of the US since the 
FRG had a large dependence on imported oil, thus requiring the strong use of nuclear energy, and also had 
only a low stock of uranium.  As of April 1979, Birrenbach considered France and Britain as nations of 
“equal rank [gleichgeordneter]” to “us.”  To McGeorge Bundy, Birrenbach remarked, “Thirty years after 
the war, one should treat Germany now as an equal partner among equals.” (KB to McGeorge Bundy, 
President, Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1). 
183 Birrenbach’s stress on independence led him in later years to oppose the FRG’s involvement in various 
current or potential forms of international cooperation in the realm of the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
(e.g. multi-national partnerships/consortiums/cooperation (e.g. fast breeder organization; Super Phoenix 
consortium; COGEMA; Almelo; URENCO (involving the construction of a British enrichment plant in 
Capenhurst)) involving various West European countries (and Iran) in which Germany apparently would be 
a junior participant (e.g. to France); apparently largely French solutions/proposals).  Birrenbach opposed 
any FRG dependence on the uncertain supply of enriched material from a nuclear bank (Gerard Smith 
proposal) or of uranium from South Africa, USSR, US, Canada and Australia.  Birrenbach was concerned 
about the possible formation of a uranium cartel. 
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bomb; the US interruption in delivery of nuclear materials in 1977; and US legislation 
(new as of April 1978) that further threatened thispo sibility.184  All this also contained 
elements of international competition, with Birrenbach expressing frustration at the low 
civilian use of nuclear energy in the FRG compared to other countries (e.g. France), 
agonizing about the eroding technical advantages of the German reactor (nuclear) 
industry and stressing the related need to ensure its ab lity to produce and export reactors 
to the world in competition with, especially, the US but also France and Japan.185   
                                                
184 Birrenbach also pointed out that the Dutch had hesitat d in the midst of the 1973 crisis to deliver gas to 
the FRG and that Britain and Norway were not very willing to distribute their oil production among their 
European partners.  In later years, Birrenbach objected to the risks of what he saw as an increasing German 
dependence on other nations with respect to nuclear and other energy.  As of 1977-78, Birrenbach 
recognized the risks in his proposed course of action and feared that the building of sensitive installa ions in 
the FRG might lead the US government to (again) halt t e delivery to the FRG of nuclear/enriched 
materials/uranium.  These deliveries were the subject of US-EURATOM agreements.  Birrenbach believed 
that the new US nuclear non-proliferation law decred in 1978 contained the condition that the US 
government’s approval/consent was necessary to supply US uranium or enriched material, a condition 
aiming to keep the non-military nuclear states from setting up reprocessing and enrichment facilities.  
Birrenbach saw this law creating for the US a right of Mitbestimmung of discriminatory nature.  With 
respect to the need for FRG independence with respect to the full nuclear fuel cycle and his lack of trust, 
Birrenbach pointed to prior negative German experiences in the supply of uranium even with the US and 
Canada and feared that an anti-German French left (Front Commun) that won the elections might cut-off 
reprocessed uranium from France.  Birrenbach also pointed to negative prior German experiences regarding 
the supplying of natural gas in the embargo crisis in the Netherlands and the dangers with respect to the 
USSR (I guess regarding natural gas)).  As of April 1977-September 1980, Birrenbach saw the 
Netherlands/Dutch trying to prevent/delay the construction of a German enrichment plant (i.e. 
discrimination via the Troika treaty; based on his experiences by the URENCO (i.e. the enrichment plant in 
England) and by Almelo; e.g. by non-fulfillment of the target production).  Birrenbach argued that the 
experiences with the URENCO unfortunately proved that ey could not enjoy the confidence of even an 
ally that would permit them to build such a plant for themselves.  Nuclear materials included enriched 
material, uranium and similar products.  The US embargo/interruption in 1977 dealt with deliveries of 
enriched/nuclear materials or uranium contracted on the basis of the US-EURATOM treaty (the first 
receiver was EURATOM).  As of April 1978, a critical Birrenbach claimed that the recent US decision 
about the neutron bomb was a new reminder for the FRG not to put all its eggs into one basket.  Birrenbach 
complained that the US had eliminated the European option in 1966.  
185 At this point, the US had the largest export opportunities.  As of 1980, Birrenbach saw the US, France, 
Britain, the USSR and the FRG striving to benefit from the reactor (nuclear?) industry.  This relative 
backwardness vis-à-vis France may have been implicit when, as of December 1977, Birrenbach noted the 
lack of a “Cartesian clarity” by many representatives of the public hand with respect to nuclear energy 
which could have removed problems within the FRG.  The German-US rivalry in this regard was reflected 
for instance in the fact that the US objections to the German-Brazilian agreement (as of March 1977) were 
in part the result of American industry-political/policy interests, including the firm Westinghouse.  As of 
March 1977, Birrenbach saw the FRG with the largest export opportunities, after the US.  To export 
reactors, the German reactor industry had to be able also to deliver nuclear fuel elements.  As of October 
1980, Birrenbach complained that the French had an export advantage over countries like the FRG and 
Japan due to its independence from outside uranium sources. 
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These views on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, b ought him into active 
opposition against the new/altered US non-proliferation policies of the Carter 
administration (apparently not Reagan), which at lest temporarily called for a 
prohibition in non-nuclear weapon states on advanced technologies (plutonium) until 
alternative technology became available; a system of ulti-national regional centers in 
which sensitive but crucial fuel cycle installations/services (uranium enrichment and 
waste reprocessing facilities) would be located solely in the military nuclear powers (e.g. 
France; supplier nations); and a prohibition against the export/sale of such facilities to 
third countries.186  Birrenbach’s view of Carter’s policy in this regard was that of 
disappointment, “if not even of a certain bitterness [Verbitterung].” 187  Indeed, by the late 
1970s, in large part due to what he considered the unilateral American violation of 
Article 4 of the NPT, guaranteeing the freedom of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
Birrenbach even came openly to doubt the wisdom of the ratification of the NPT by the 
Federal Republic, believing that the bases of this acceptance no longer existed.188  During 
the late 1970s (April 1977), Birrenbach defended an urged firmness (not unilaterally 
cancel) with respect to the German-Brazilian nuclear energy deal/agreement regarding 
sensitive facilities (cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy) signed in June 
                                                
186 Waste reprocessing facilities were necessary for the disposal of nuclear waste. 
187 KB to Schmidt, 22 February 1978.  As of October 1980, Birrenbach pointed out that the fact that 
President Carter had made special concessions to India in the matter of the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
demonstrated that US policy was not a pure policy of m ral conviction but also of political interest. (KB to 
Gerard Smith, 1 October 1980).  Birrenbach was also harshly critical of Carter’s policy on the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy in the Trilateral Commission.  Asof April 1977, Birrenbach said he was not ready to bow 
to a “unilateral American Diktat” (regarding Carter’s policy on the peaceful use of nuclear energy). (KB to 
Amb. (aD) Hellmuth Roth, 1 April 1977).  Birrenbach was quite concerned with the possibility that the 
Carter administration’s policies on the peaceful use of nuclear energy were “a veiled effort by the United 
States to obtain an unfair commercial advantage.” (KB to State Sec. Hans-Hilger Haunschild, BMFT, 23 
December 1977). 
188 In this regard, Birrenbach also pointed to the declin  in credibility of the US nuclear deterrent vs.the 
USSR which removed the anticipated protection of the non-nuclear weapon states by the nuclear weapon 
states vs. other nuclear powers. 
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1975 in Bonn.189  As part of his efforts, Birrenbach impatiently promoted throughout the 
late 1970s the construction of its own sensitive facilities in the FRG, especially by 
repeatedly urging Kohl (and to a lesser extent Bavari n Minister-President Strauß) in vain 
to prod Minister-President Ernst Albrecht (Niedersachsen) to rapidly proceed with the 
construction of a German reprocessing facility in Gorleben to forestall a dependence on 
the sensitive facilities in France (La Hague) and Britain (Windscale).190 
During the late 1970s, an international network andinfrastructure, exhibiting 
certain general similarities to and even overlapping to some extent with their Atlanticist 
                                                
189 As Birrenbach saw it, the agreement was in accord with the approval process involving the IAEA 
(IAEO), the suppliers club and the US administration (consulting).  He saw this as a precedence case and a
matter also of the entire plutonium technology. 
190 Birrenbach also spoke to Albrecht himself on this at ome point and also made requests to the 
Chancellor for clear words to the US and to the German parties.  Birrenbach became very upset/frustrated 
with Kohl (and Albrecht) due to what he considered not kept promises and evasions (attitudes; excuses) in 
this regard, with Albrecht hesitating to proceed due to Land electoral/psychological/domestic-party 
political considerations (internal development) that Birrenbach detested (“the sphere of opportunism”).  As 
of 5 September 1978 Birrenbach admitted that, based on his experiences with regard to Gorleben, 
“interventions vis-à-vis [Einwirkungen auf] Kohl according to all my experiences are completely 
pointless….  It’s simply not worth it!” (KB to Bergassessor aD Dr. hc Hans-Günther Sohl, August-
Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, 5 September 1978).  As Minister-President of Niedersachsen, Albrecht was 
not actually subordinate to Kohl (Chair of the Fraktion) but they were from the same party and Birrenbach 
thus wanted the Fraktion to pressure Albrecht.  In March 1979, Strauß pointed out to Birrenbach that as 
Minister-President Albrecht had to deal with more poblems than simply nuclear energy, that his domestic 
political considerations were understandable and had helped him achieve a considerable government 
majority.  As of November 1977, the FRG had a pilot plant for reprocessing in Karlsruhe and a share in the 
enrichment plants built in Britain and the Netherlands by URENCO (a British-Dutch-German firm; 
tripartite contract/treaty with Britain and the Neth rlands; built by Britain and the Netherlands).  As of June 
1978, Birrenbach did not believe that the URENCO treaty had led to concrete results for the FRG in certain 
questions.  As of June 1978, the FRG had a pilot enrichment plant in Jülich.  As of March 1979, Birrenbach 
had a confidential source informing him about Albrecht’s plans (perhaps Szekessy?).  As of November 
1977, Birrenbach hoped that Chancellor Schmidt would disregard a possibly negative vote in the SPD 
Parteitag regarding the construction of a Zwischenlager in NRW on the basis of the Grundgesetz 
conditions on the setting of the guidelines of policy (KB to Kohl, 11 November 1977, K141/1).  Birrenbach 
had spoken with Schmidt about this and it is possible Birrenbach encouraged Schmidt in this though I am 
not really sure.  As of June 1978, Birrenbach wanted progress with respect to the planned enrichment pla t 
in Gronau (NRW competence) and had had a not very encouraging last talk with Kühn (I believe the SPD 
Minister President of NRW).  As of October 1977, Birrenbach saw the Federal Government and certain 
Länder governments perhaps looking for an alibi not to build sensitive installations in the FRG.  Birrenbach 
saw Kohl’s and Albrecht’s lack of action as a manifestation of the lack of “civil courage” among many 
German politicians with respect to the issue of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  As of April 1981, 
Birrenbach disliked the impossible administrative legal procedures [Verwaltungsrechtsverfahren] with 
regard to nuclear energy. 
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counterparts, explored the increasingly significant peaceful use of nuclear energy.191  
Indeed, the theme nuclear energy featured in the work of the German-American 
Conferences (March 1977), the DGAP Research Institute (project group on “The 
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Proliferation”) and a series of US-German nuclear 
energy conferences staged by the Max-Planck-Institut and apparently the ACG.192  
                                                
191 These similarities included (e.g.) a stress on industry, technology, international exchange and secure, 
cooperative and peaceful relations between states marked by mutual confidence; institutional and political 
approaches to solving problems; ideas for internatio l regimes; internationalism; world-wide/global 
perspective; focus on specific current problem/issue areas; plenary sessions, at least sometimes broken up 
into working groups. 
192 As of June 1977, the Atlantik-Brücke again planned a nuclear energy conference (I believe US-German) 
with parliamentarians for Fall 1977.  A meeting of this DGAP project group occurred on 19 September 
1980.  The DGAP Research Institute ran its project group on “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and 
Proliferation” as of December 1978-September 1980.  On Thursday 22 June 1978 at the DGAP there was a 
Vortrag on the international problems by the introduction of uclear energy by KH Beckurts 
(Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH) that interested Birrenbach very much.  I am not sure if this was part 
of the DGAP project group or just a separate Vortrag.  The meetings of the DGAP Research Institute’s 
project group on “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Proliferation” were held in the DGAP.  The 
meetings of the DGAP Research Institute’s project group on “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and 
Proliferation” included first-class experts.  This was the Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der 
Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt (especially Prof. CF von Weizsäcker).  The 
MPI-ACG conferences took place on the Spitzingsee (Spring 1977), in Woods Hole (17-20 June 1977) and 
in Airlie, Virginia (Airlie House, 12-15 January 1978).  Participants in the MPI-ACG conferences included 
American and German government bureaucrats, parliamentarians, Wirtschaftler, Wissenschaftler, 
personalities of the nuclear energy organizations and those of the Atlanticist-minded organizations.  These 
bilateral German-American conferences had as participants German and American parliamentarians 
(MdBs: Blumenfeld, Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes and Werner Zywietz; Congressman Paul Tsongas, DC; also 
various relevant Congressional counsels and staff members), government bureaucrats (German: 
Ministerialdirigent HW Dittmann, AA, Bonn; Christian Patermann, FRG embassy, DC; Gesandter Hans 
Schauer, FRG embassy, DC; American: Joseph Nye, Dep. to the Under-Secretary of State for Security, 
Science and Technology, Dept. of State, DC; Charles van Doren, ACDA, DC; Ted Greenwood, Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, DC; Philip Farley, Dep. US Special 
Rep. for Non-Proliferation Matters, State Dept., DC; Marvin Moss, Dept. of Energy, Office of Energy 
Research, DC), Wissenschaftler (German: Prof. Dr. KH Beckurts, Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH; 
Prof. Dr. Walter Köhler, Interatom GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach; Prof. Dr. Horst Böhm, Gesellschaft für 
Kernforschung mbH, Karlsruhe; Prof. Dr. CF von Weizsäcker and Prof. Dr. Klaus Gottstein, both of the 
Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingu gen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt, 
Starnberg; American: Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty and Frederick Williams, all three from the Program for 
Science and International Affairs, Harvard University; Eugene Skolnikoff, Director, Center for 
International Studies, MIT; Henry Jacoby, Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge; Thomas Neff, 
Policy Analyst, Center for Energy Policy Research, MIT), Wirtschaftler (Dr. Günter Hildenbrand, 
Kraftwerk Union AG, Erlangen; Dr. Albrecht von Kienlin, Urangesellschaft mbH & Co KG, Frankfurt; Dr. 
Carsten Salander, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH, Hannover), 
personalities of the Atlanticist-minded organizations (Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, DGAP Research Institute; 
David Klein, Ex. Dir., ACG, NYC; Abram Chayes, The Brookings Institution, DC) and institutional 
personalities of the nuclear energy organizations (Dr. Felix Oboussier, Wirtschaftsverband 
Kernbrennstoffkreislauf eV, Bonn; Carl Walske, President, Atomic Industrial Forum, DC; John Gray, 
President, International Energy Assoc. Ltd., DC).  The Rapporteur was James Cooney (Amherst, MA) and 
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Meanwhile, a separate and more specifically focused multilateral infrastructure included 
continuing forums like the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluations Program, a 
multi-year conference decided on in May 1977 by the summit of the trilateral countries 
and chaired by Gerard Smith, and the International Consultative Group on Nuclear 
Energy, convened in London in October 1977 and sponored jointly and privately by the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.193  Such forums 
                                                                                                                                      
the staff was Sara Ann Fagin and Karen Furey.  Confide tial papers for these MPI-ACG conferences were 
prepared by, among others, Frederick Williams (Harvard University).  Reports on the MPI-ACG 
conferences were written e.g. by David Klein (ACG), the Rapporteur James Cooney and by Prof. Dr. Klaus 
Gottstein (MPI zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissen chaftlich-technischen Welt; intended 
for Amb. Grewe FYI). 
193 At the March 1977 German-American Conference, these is ues (including the Brazil agreement and 
more) were dealt with in Panel A, of which Birrenbach was not a part, with the German participants on this 
panel including Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker (German introducer) and (I believe) Prof. 
Beckurts and Dr. Hildenbrand.  A background paper was produced for this panel by Eugene B. Skolnikoff, 
Director, Center for International Studies, MIT.  From 15-18 January 1977, there was a US-German Energy 
Policy Workshop, for which Henry Jacoby (MIT) had pre ared a paper.  As of August 1977, there had been
within the past six months a German-American Conference in Spitzingsee organized by CF von 
Weizsäcker.  Häfele had written a paper on the theme “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” for this 
conference.  As of 1981, quite a few of the important works that Birrenbach read in his efforts to stay up-
to-date on the peaceful use of nuclear energy emerged f om Atlanticist-minded institutions.  As of 1981, 
these included the DGAP’s soon to appear “Die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie und Nichtverbreitung”; 
and “Die Weltenergieperspektive-Analyse zum Jahre 2030” by Robert Gerwin based on the IIASA research 
report (presented by the MPG in Germany).  These also included materials emerging from the US, for 
instance, the well-known Ford Foundation study “Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices”; “International 
Cooperation in Nuclear Energy” of the Brookings Institution (Washington DC); and (I guess not 
necessarily Atlanticist-minded) the studies of the American development ministry.  The Deutsche 
Atomforum eV appears to have been a promoter of nuclear energy.  As of November 1977, the Deutsche 
Atomforum eV had a Geschäftsführendes member of its Präsidium (Dr. Heinz Schimmelbusch) as well as 
seats occupied by members of the Bundestagsfraktionen (including the SPD Fraktion; co-opted).  As of 
August 1979, the Deutsche Atomforum eV had a working group “International Cooperation” (which held its 
first meeting on 5 June 1979) in its AK III (Law and Administration).  At least at times, the working group 
meetings were attended by Szekessy (I guess a member) and by a Ministerialdirigenten from the BMFT, 
enabling those present to make requests of the latter (e.g. the making available to the members of 
confidential internal governmental reports/opinions  the peaceful use of nuclear energy (including o the 
Euratom Treaty), a request which was indeed granted and carried out).  On 21-22 January 1980, there was 
an International Information Conference of the D utschen Atomforum eV at the Hilton Hotel in Mainz.  At 
this conference, KH Beckurts had given a Vortrag, and there was also a report on INFCE (also by 
Beckurts?).  As of June 1977, there had recently been an Atomic Industrial Forum Fuel Cycle Conference 
in Kansas City at which Donald Couchman (NUS Corporati n, Rockville MD) had given a speech and Karl 
Cohen had presented a technical paper.  In May 1977in Salzburg, Austria, the International Conference on 
Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle was held.  Nye (Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security 
Assistance, Science and Technology) spoke at this conference.  In late November 1977, there was in San 
Francisco the annual meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Society.  At this
meeting, State Secretary Hans-Hilger Haunschild (BMFT) gave a Vortrag on “Nuclear Energy Policy: A 
View from Western Europe.”  In 1978, there was a Fuel Cycle Conference of the Atomic Industrial Forum 
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brought together, as participants and members, experts from the parliaments, nuclear 
energy organizations (including national ones), inter ational and government agencies, 
Atlanticist-minded organizations, Wirtschaft (including the nuclear and energy industries) 
and Wissenschaft (including research institutions and universities) from developed and 
developing countries around the world.194  Birrenbach welcomed this infrastructure, with 
its frank, informal discussions, debates and study, believing that such policy-oriented 
conferences fostered a better international understanding about the international aspects 
and problems raised by nuclear energy, and in particular significantly improved the US 
attitude in this field.195   
                                                                                                                                      
(Inc.).  In October 1978, there was an “International Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Safeguards” staged by the Atomic Industrial Forum Inc. at the Hilton Hotel in New York City.  At this 
conference, Joseph Nye (Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and 
Technology) gave a Vortrag about “The US Approach to Non-Proliferation: Are We Making Progress?”  
As of December 1977, Carl Walske was the president of the Atomic Industrial Forum.  The Atomic 
Industrial Forum dealt at least in part with issues of nuclear power and nuclear proliferation.  As of June 
1979, the INFCE appears to have been at work.  From 9-11 September 1979, the American Nuclear Society 
staged in New Orleans (US) an “Executive Conference on International Nuclear Commerce.”  As of 1978-
79, there existed a Wirtschaftsverband Kernbrennstoffkreislauf eV.  Dr. F. Oboussier (not a Birrenbach 
contact) was the Geschäftsführende VS member (the organization also had a central secretariat).  This 
organization distributed documents/information/circulars to its member firms (including I think Szekessy’  
GWK).  On 9 March 1978, Oboussier conducted discussion  in Washington DC in the State Department 
and Department of Energy about the interpretation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and drew 
up a memo about these discussions.  It appears that there was also a nuclear industry transnational network, 
with representatives of at least the German and American nuclear industries holding talks with one another 
and both at least expressing opposition against at leas elements of the Carter administration’s policy 
regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  In May 1979, there was a European nuclear conference 
1979/FORATOM VII.  Chancellor Schmidt gave a speech at the opening of this conference.  The 
nuclear/energy industry developed its own system of con erences.  In October 1977, the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung staged a conference in Bonn (at the Ebert-Stiftung) on Problems of Nuclear Energy Supply.  At this 
conference, Joseph Nye Jr. (Deputy to the Undersecretary for Security Assistance, Science and 
Technology) gave an address on “Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation.”  As of Fall 1978, the 
ICGNE had held three plenary sessions (London, October/Nov 1977; London, May 1978; Mont Pèlerin, 
Switzerland, September 1978).  Its next plenary meeting would be held in January 1979.  The ICGNE had a 
working program. 
194 US personalities, including government figures, gave speeches at the nuclear energy conferences.   
195 The DGAP Research Institute’s project group on “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and 
Proliferation” may have been initiated at Birrenbach’s prompting (not sure).  Themes addressed by the 
nuclear energy infrastructure included, for instance, technologies, institutional arrangements and fuel 
cycles; peaceful nuclear relations between states; m ans of minimizing nuclear weapons proliferation; the 
need to ensure the security of energy supply for all countries; the international political, social and 
economic implications; future alternative scenarios; how civil nuclear activities could be conducted safely, 
rationally and in a manner generally acceptable to the world community.  As of September 1977, Gerard 
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Though Birrenbach did not really participate in thededicated nuclear energy 
conference system, he did continue to monitor the relevant international discussion, 
especially as it pertained to the Federal Republic.196  Particularly during the Carter 
administration but also after, Birrenbach maintained his mutually advantageous links, 
existing since many years, to the most prominent German personalities in the nuclear and  
energy industry/area.197  Such contacts assisted and advised him with, often technical, 
                                                                                                                                      
Smith was the special commissioner of the London summit conference for the working out of a nuclear 
program, who had been asked to draw up a report on the uclear question.  Gerard Smith chaired the 
INFCE as of April 1979.  The INFCE lasted at least  year and a half and had concluded by March 1980.  
The ICGNE existed at least through the end of 1979 and as of November 1978 was chaired by Ian Smart 
(consultant/advisor on international energy affairs, UK).  The ICGNE Secretariat consisted of a R pporteur 
(Myron Kratzer, USA/DC, senior consultant, International Energy Associates Ltd.), a Research Associate 
(Dr. Richard Lester, Department of Nuclear Engineering, MIT, USA), and a Secretary (William Walker, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London/UK).  With respect to ICGNE members, 
these parent institutions included the Imperial College of Science and Technology (UK) and the Secretariat 
for Future Studies (Sweden).  ICGNE members took part strictly in their personal capacities, not as 
representatives of their parent organizations or countries.  These members reflected a wide diversity of 
approaches, interests and attitudes and technical expertise with respect to the relevant issues.  The members 
of the ICGNE were experts from fifteen countries.  As of November 1978, the German member of the 
ICGNE was Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Beckurts (Chairman of the Board of Management, Kernforschungsanlage 
Jülich GmbH).  Other ICGNE members came from Western Europe (including Spain, France, Sweden, the 
UK), Latin America (including Argentina, Brazil), North America (including Canada, Mexico and the US 
(Dr. Mason Willrich, Director for International Relations, Rockefeller Foundation)), Asia (including Iran, 
Pakistan, India and Japan (Dr. Ryukichi Imai, General Manager for Engineering, Japan Atomic Power 
Company)), Australia, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (based in Austria).  I think the ICGNE 
was relatively small, with about 15-20 members. 
196 Birrenbach took part in the meetings of the DGAP Research Institute’s project group on “The Peaceful 
Use of Nuclear Energy and Proliferation.”  On 21 May 1981, Birrenbach would take part in an E ergie 
Forum in Berlin.  Due to another engagement, Birrenbach was unable to take part in the 
Fachgespräch/meeting on 24 June 1981 on questions of energy supply and the use of nuclear energy in the 
Erzbischöflichen Haus (Cologne) to which he had been invited by (at least formally) Joseph Cardinal 
Höffner. 
197 These nuclear/energy contacts included: Prof. Dr. Dr. Eh Heinrich Mandel (VS member of the 
Rheinisch-Westfälischen Elektrizitätswerkes AG (I think Essen); as of April 1977-August 1978); Dr. ipl.-
Phys. Günter Hildenbrand (Kraftwerk Union AG (Erlangen), Abt. RB; as of March-November 1977); 
Rudolf von Bennigsen-Foerder (Chairman of the VS of the VEBA AG (I think Düsseldorf); as of October 
1977-August 1978); Günther Scheuten (Chair of VS, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wiederaufarbeitung von 
Kernbrennstoffen mbH (I think Hannover); as of April-August 1978; facilitated by Prof. Mandel, chairman 
of the AR); Prof. Dr. Wolf Häfele (Deputy Director, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA), Schloss Laxenburg (Vienna), Program (Department) Leader/Director, Energy Systems (Energy 
Planning); as of August-October 1977); Prof. KH Beckurts (Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH; as of 
1980); Dr Günter Wirths (Chair of the Geschäftsführung of the NUKEM GmbH, Hanau/Main; as of March 
1977; who was himself in contact with Prof. Beckurts and Dr. Hildenbrand); J. Szekessy (Geschäftsführer 
of the Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH; as of August 1979).  Birrenbach 
appears to have thought highly of Prof. Weizsäcker with respect to nuclear energy issues though I don’t 
think he was a real nuclear energy contact. 
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information, analysis, proposals, reports and other materials, including those about and 
emerging from the nuclear-themed functions (among them papers of a confidential 
nature).198  Birrenbach reciprocated with relevant materials, papers, information and 
analysis of his own, whether it be warnings about the proposals of the Carter 
administration, impressions based on his trips to the US or updates on his efforts and 
findings with respect to important German politicians.199  While these German contacts at 
least ostensibly generally supported Birrenbach in is views and goals, Birrenbach 
                                                
198 These materials also included a number of published ICGNE working papers.  Birrenbach’s Nachlaß 
contains a draft of a working paper of an MIT project (MIT Energy Lab in cooperation with the Center fo
International Studies, sponsored by the US Department of Energy) on the Determinants of Nuclear Fuel 
Assurance and Strategies for Assured Supply of Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel, 22 December 1977.  On 30 
November 1979, there was a Vortrag on the occasion of the Beirat-meeting of the Dresdner Bank in 
Hannover on “The Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuels as Economic Task,” given by Dr. Walter Schüller 
(Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH), which was in Birrenbach’s Nachlaß.  In 
January 1977, Birrenbach received the exposé “On the Overcoming of the Nuclear Controversy in 
Germany” by and from Hermann Josef Werhahn, in the firm Wilh. Werhahn, Neuss am Rhein, Bankhaus.  
As of June 1978, Birrenbach’s Nachlaß contained the Vortrag (I believe pro-nuclear energy) “Peaceful Use 
of Nuclear Energy: Chances and Risks“ given by Prof. Dr. CF von Weizsäcker in the Bonn 
Wissenschaftszentrum.  As of October 1977, it appears that Mandel was involved in the COGEMA 
negotiations.  As of February 1978, Birrenbach hoped to talk to Prof. Dr. Klaus Gottstein about nuclear 
energy issues, something which Gottstein reciprocated (but not sure if this was or became a real contat or 
not).  As of 27 June 1977, there had been a symposium in Dr. Spethmann’s house in which Mandel had 
taken part (Birrenbach thanked Mandel for this).  The ICGNE generated working papers by individual 
authors (writing in their personal capacities; including Beckurts) on specific problem/topic areas, studies 
based on the policy research of its members or outside experts (research promoted by (under the auspice  
of) the ICGNE; benefiting from ICGNE discussion), tha  were regularly circulated and discussed within t e 
group (internal use).  The ICGNE (the Rockefeller Foundation/Royal Institute of International Affairs) 
published some of the working papers (and planned to publish a public collective report covering the full
scope of its discussions in January 1980 (end of ICGNE?)) in an effort to encourage and inform a wider and 
more responsible debate on international nuclear energy policy.  Prof. Dr. Klaus Gottstein (Max-Planck- 
Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt) sent Birrenbach 
the reports on the MPI-ACG conferences written by himself and others, with Birrenbach passing at least 
some of them on to Szekessy and Narjes.  Birrenbach w s familiar with the INFCE report/conclusion.   
199 The materials provided to Birrenbach by his contacts included circulars, articles, analyses, papers, 
memos, talks/speeches, documents, evaluations (includi g confidential German government opinions).  
Here, Birrenbach perhaps sought to defend the interests of German industry even more than that industry 
itself, with the German nuclear/electricity Wirtschaft seeking to take part in sensitive nuclear facilities to 
overcome the current obstacles to the further construction and operating of reactors (e.g. regarding the 
COGEMA agreement).  As of November 1977, Birrenbach was informing three leading personalities of 
German industry related somehow to the COGEMA negotiati ns about the results of his efforts.  To top it 
off, Birrenbach was also astonished at the politicaly and economically unacceptable financial conditions 
the French offered and the German industry (German nuclear/electric Wirtschaft) by April 1978 accepted 
for reprocessing German material at the new French “multinational” nuclear reprocessing plant/company 
(Le Hague by Cherbourg (the COGEMA project)), with the Germans not even getting a share in the 
enterprise for their considerable investments/financing of installations (billions of DM as of April 1980). 
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simultaneously enjoyed contacts with some of the most prominent American figures in 
the field of nuclear energy, among them Gerard Smith, Henry Owen and McGeorge 
Bundy, all three of whom supported Carter’s policy.200  Ultimately Birrenbach’s German 
and American contacts crucially influenced his thought on matters related to the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy, enabled him to grasp the technological developments in this field, 
offered him a much coveted insight into the policies and views of expert German, 
European and American personalities in government, parliament, the reactor industry and 
Wissenschaft and, especially as a number of them also took part themselves, provided an 
indirect entrée into the goings-on in the world of the nuclear energy infrastructure.201     
Birrenbach’s efforts highlight the role of the overall economic and energy context 
during this period in certain trans-Atlantic disputes.  From the mid-1970s well into the 
1980s, the United States and Western Europe were wracked by economic recession and 
financial difficulties, characterized by inflation, unemployment, budget deficits and 
currency instability and chaos.  These phenomena were accompanied by and were, in 
part, the result of gaps in the energy supply, largely due to persistent oil shortages since 
                                                
200 For instance, Birrenbach’s German contacts in this field stressed the immediate need for the construction 
of independent German nuclear facilities and for continued pursuit of nuclear technologies.  Birrenbach’s 
nuclear contacts stressed the need to continue pursuing their nuclear technologies and (e.g. with regad to 
Albrecht) the need for the construction of nuclear power plants and a German reprocessing/disposal 
capacity/facility (with the energetic support of the public hand), preferably immediately, and saw a possible 
reprocessing agreement with COGEMA or BNFL (with France) as at best a temporary over-bridging (a 
better over-bridging was the immediate approval and construction of an external central Zwischenlager or 
even the Eingangslager of the German reprocessing/disposal facility; prefer no further contracts with 
COGEMA, which meant high costs; remove arguments against the construction of further nuclear power 
plants).  At least some foresaw that the EVUs and the DWK (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH, Hannover) would be responsible for the erection of the 
center in Niedersachsen.  They opposed what they considered a long-run untenable dependence of the 
German disposal on the abroad, including France, which t ey believed would also have serious 
consequences for the export capability of the German re ctor industry.  Birrenbach conducted 
correspondence with McGeorge Bundy (President of the Ford Foundation) as of April 1977-February 1978. 
201 Among the US materials that Birrenbach acquired from his German nuclear/energy contacts was a 
document from the Office of Technology Assessment (US Congress) of April 1977 on “Nuclear 
Proliferation and Safeguards” (also a report from SCIENCE).  On 22 March 1978, Mr. Yager (Brookings 
Institution) passed on to Birrenbach(?) acts of Congress regarding nuclear proliferation. 
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1973.  For Birrenbach, this represented a full-blown economic crisis that, at least in the 
Federal Republic (e.g. unemployment), was largely a long-term structural problem and 
that threatened the very basis of their societies.  In the face of such adversity, he was 
spurred on in his informal lobbying on behalf of the crisis-plagued steel industry, 
interventions most explicitly directed at influential CDU personalities (including 
Chancellor Kohl as well as those involved in drawing up the party’s 
Grundsatzprogramm).202  However, this dire situation impacted not only on the purely 
economic aspects of his activities, including as we have seen fund-raising in the 
Wirtschaft, but also undermined the crucial economic preconditions of many Atlanticist 
measures he deemed necessary.  This included hindering increases in the US and 
European defense budgets as well as the unification of Europe, the latter by encouraging 
the “renaissance of a nation-state” and the priority of national interests in most European 
countries and by rendering more difficult joint solutions and policies.203  Ultimately, 
many of the controversial measures and efforts of Birrenbach, and the FRG, whether the 
promotion of trade with the USSR, the German-Brazili n nuclear deal or the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy, testified to a greater self-assertiveness stimulated by the economic and 
                                                
202 These conditions persisted in Western Europe (e.g.France, Britain, Italy), including the Federal 
Republic at least until 1984 and in the US at least as of 1982.  The United States also endured financal 
problems.  The FRG economic difficulties included the current account [Leistungsbilanz] and loss of 
reserves.  As of October 1982, Birrenbach urged Kohl to consult first forces of the Wirtschaft to improve 
his economic program.  As of April 1983, Birrenbach suggested to Kohl as neutral advisors on the steel
issue either the WVES and/or the steel moderators.  As of April 1983, Birrenbach had spoken in depth with 
the steel moderators about the steel situation and advocated at least some of their recommendations.  As of
December 1982, Birrenbach suggested that Kohl should personally talk to and listen to the views of the 
three steel advisors of the federal government. 
203 It was in this context that Birrenbach occasionally cited the saying of Talleyrand to the effect that “on ne 
peut que faire la politique de ses moyens” (e.g. KB to Rostow, 26 March 1982).  For Birrenbach on a 
European “renaissance of a nation-state,” see KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 17 August 1977. 
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energy situation in the FRG and the West as a whole and the desire to overcome and 
consolidate it.204 
At the same time, Birrenbach bemoaned the West European contribution to such 
trans-Atlantic difficulties.  The individual nations, including the Federal Republic, found 
themselves in deplorable overall domestic conditions, suffering from alarming political 
and economic troubles.  These included the deep political divisions manifested in the 
disputes surrounding European and Atlantic question (especially the former in France 
and Britain, the latter in France and the Federal Republic) as well as in the Euro-
Communism in France and Italy during the late 1970s.205  Meanwhile, in foreign policy, 
Britain and perhaps most of all France, deluded by a nostalgia for their vanished historic 
pasts, but also to some extent the Federal Republic nconstructively focused on national 
sovereignty and their own diverse national interests, exhibited a tendency to operate 
between the fronts and mustered only inadequate defens  efforts.206  In part due to 
statements made to him personally by French figures, mo t notably Foreign Minister 
Sauvagnargues already in 1976, Birrenbach saw a recalcitrant France, long after de 
                                                
204 Birrenbach criticized the Western energy policy. 
205 The conditions of Britain, France and Italy were perhaps even worse.  For Birrenbach’s recognition of 
an “astonishing phenomenon” in the meeting between th  European members of the Trilateral Commission 
and the European Commission in Brussels in late May1977, namely the downplaying by “[t]he 
representatives of all Latin states, starting with Belgium, France, Italy,” of the potential impact on Europe 
and NATO of a future entrance of the Communist Party into the French or Italian governments, see KB to 
Prof. Walter Hallstein, Stuttgart, 31 May 1977, ACDP K141/1.   
206 In November 1978, Birrenbach referred to the “incomprehensible” and “idiotic answer of the Europeans 
regarding the neutron bomb.” (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, K098/2).  Birrenbach remained, 
perhaps increasingly, concerned about British-EC relations.  Problems between Britain and Europe 
(probably France) included the British contribution t  the European budget (including I think particularly 
the agriculture question; a question on which Birrenbach did sympathize with the unjustly treated British).  
Birrenbach hoped the problems could be resolved via compromises.  For instance, he was pleased by the 
compromise of Fontainebleau in 1984.  Birrenbach seems to have considered Ireland and Denmark also 
part of Europe.  Insufficient defense efforts included for instance insufficient defense budgets as of 1977-85 
and criticism and opposition to the deployment/hosting of gray zone weapons and the neutron bomb.  The 
tendency to operate between the fronts included e.g. the gas-pipeline deal, wavering, hesitant, unreliable 
policies and the response to the Iran and Afghanist crises.  At least in the British case, there was the 
memory of empire.  Birrenbach did find the British more pro-Atlantic (dynamic) than the Germans. 
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Gaulle’s departure, continuing in the “Colbertschen” and Gaullist traditions, stressing 
anti-Americanism and anti-Atlanticism, France’s gloire, and a claim to hegemonic 
leadership in Europe.207  Looked at as an international whole, Europe comprised merely a 
group of weak, unstable, loosely linked, heterogeneous, contentious (e.g. 
budget/agriculture) states exhibiting little prospect of unification or Atlantic 
integration.208  With Europe in such a sorry condition, incapable of functioning as a 
                                                
207 Sauvagnargues indicated to Birrenbach that France was by nature not integrierbar (due to its being a 
nuclear power).  Similar statements had come from other French ministers, though I am not sure if they 
were made to Birrenbach personally or not.  As of April 1977, Birrenbach saw France also assuming a 
special position in the framework of the peaceful use of nuclear energy (not entered EURATOM and had 
recently not signed/ratified the verification/control agreement between EURATOM and the IAEO 
(Vienna)).  As of August 1980, Birrenbach argued that to strengthen France’s special/privileged 
(continental I guess) political position by giving them also a continental monopoly for the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy (Britain was more cautious) would enanger the still uncertain future of Europe (damage 
European interests), damage German interests, and le d in the long run to a conflict with France (endanger 
the Franco-German friendship in energy).  Birrenbach o casionally saw glimmers of hope with respect to 
France.  The Colbertschen tradition centered on an economic policy of state in rvention (e.g. economic 
planning in the national interest; protectionism; subventions, including in steel).  The French stress on 
independence rather than integration was revealed for instance in matters of defense/security (e.g. defens  
of the hexagon, not forward defense of Germany (Elbe) and other European states, including strategic 
nuclear defense/power).  In November 1979, Birrenbach bitterly remarked on the “disturbing” character of 
the French attitude on defense for those who had the “pleasure” (FRG and US) of protecting “the grand 
empire.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 20 November 1979).  France’s tendency to operate between the fronts 
revealed itself in a variety of ways (e.g. semi-neutrality; perhaps détente over military balance; stress on its 
“privileged relations” with the USSR; Osthandel, e.g. by offering special interest rates to the USSR and 
refusing to impose certain limits on credits and supplies; conclusion of the gas-pipe deal six weeks after 13 
December 1981 whereas the FRG had done it on 19 November 1981).  The anti-Americanism and anti-
Atlanticism of French policy revealed itself in a number of ways (e.g. neutral or negative, along with 
several other countries, towards US initiatives like SDI; not station TNF in France).  It appears that
Birrenbach wanted Europe to follow the German lead [Führung].  Birrenbach believed that France lacked 
the necessary substance for its hegemonial claim.  As Birrenbach could personally ascertain three weeks 
ago in Paris (presumably AI), France was not ready to enter into NATO. (KB, currently in Freiburg in the 
hospital, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Helmut Schmidt, MdB, Bonn, 25 July 1984, K033/3).   
208 On British “imperial thinking,” see KB to Kohl, 14 June 1984.  Birrenbach saw widespread negative 
British attitudes towards the EC/European idea under both Labour (as of 1979-80) and Conservative parties 
and governments (e.g. Thatcher), with the possible exc ption of the insignificant Labour (Liberal?) Party.  
As of June 1984, Birrenbach found that “the lady” is really difficult.  As of April 1984, I believe 
Birrenbach had “experienced [erlebt]” Thatcher “multiple times [mehrfach]” and was not surprised by her 
unconstructive attitude.  Birrenbach did agree with Thatcher’s views on the deployment of nuclear 
weapons/cruise missiles (I guess in Britain).  Birrenbach saw British attitudes reflected in insufficiently 
diplomatic behavior in the EEC Councils.  At times ( .g. 1980, 1984), he even feared Britain might leave 
the EC.  As of May 1979, Birrenbach referred to a reluctant Britain as “only a half-hearted partner in 
Europe.”  As of February 1978, Birrenbach believed that the British relationship with continental Europe 
seemed to be similar to “a couple immediately before the divorce.  The behavior of the British… was as 
negative as arrogant.”  As examples of Britain still th nking in terms of empire or Commonwealth, 
Birrenbach pointed to trade and to the Falklands.  With respect to the 1982 Falklands War, Birrenbach 
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genuine partner and evincing no great desire to be def nded, Birrenbach feared that, like 
the French in 1939, the discouraged Americans would ne day ask themselves in a crisis 
“Pourquoi mourir pour Danzig?”209 
Alarmed by the repeated warnings, criticism and appe ls emanating from the US, 
including from his own contacts (e.g. Strausz-Hupé, McCloy), Birrenbach continued in 
later years to urge the European states, including the FRG, to make greater efforts to 
improve the condition and reputation of Europe.  Such measures included a greater 
solidarity with the US, as demonstrated for instance i  policies regarding defense 
budgets, military strength and security issues; arms control negotiations, Osthandel; 
Third World issues and crises and European integration.210  With respect to the latter, 
                                                                                                                                      
believed that Britain had committed a fundamental mistake in not accepting during the previous seventeen 
years of negotiations a lease-back treaty with Argentina (also Lord Carrington had not taken Argentina’s 
war preparations seriously enough).  Birrenbach found that the European mood that had once existed, for 
instance during the time of the Monnet Committee, was no longer present.  “The spirit of Monnet is not 
visible any more.” (KB to McCloy, 10 July 1985).  As of June 1984, Birrenbach found Europe “in a severe  
[schweren] identity crisis.” (KB to Kohl, 14 June 1984).  Birrenbach always stressed the need for action 
rather than just resolutions and speeches to solve problems.  As of September 1979, Birrenbach was 
outraged about the attitude of the European powers, “who all sit around the fireplace [Kamin]…and at the 
same time say nice words to one another without proceeding to joint acts” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 4 
September 1979).  As of October 1979, Birrenbach insisted that “Europe cannot defend Europe, certainly 
not this Europe.” (KB to Schmidt, 26 October 1979).  As of 1984, Birrenbach argued that a Central Europe 
without US (nuclear support) would be in a situation like Poland, since the British and French weapons did 
not suffice to offset the USSR nuclear potential.  At the Brussels meeting, Birrenbach had been told fr m a 
most competent side that at the two summit meetings nothing at all could have been noticed of Europe as a
unit. (KB to Professor Walter Hallstein, Stuttgart, 31 May 1977, K141/1).   
209 As of September 1977, Birrenbach saw a “half-hearted participation” from the British in the EC. (KB to
Aron, 22 September 1977).  As of October 1978, Birrenbach saw many of the British civil servants in 
Brussels as the “most arrogant” representatives of the EC. (KB to Schaetzel, 6 October 1978, K098/2).  As 
of 1977-78, the anti-EC/European mood in Britain (“anti-marketeers”) included a large minority of the 
Labour Party, a small wavering group of the Conservatives and most of the trade unions (e.g. men like 
Michael Foot, Wedgwood Benn and Enoch Powell).  In Britain there was a focus on the Common Market, 
not political and economic union/integration and not on federation.  As Birrenbach put it in December 
1979, “Europe is not any more Europe.” (KB to Rostow, 13 December 1979).   
210 With regard to the East-West Osthandel, this included as of June 1983 imposing limits on and not 
making concessions in the USSR trade; not undertaking new extensive deals as of 1980 and 1983; 
imposing limits on credits and supplies and offering no special interest rates to the USSR.  With respect to 
defense budgets and security issues, this included increasing the European nations’ (including the FRG’s) 
defense budgets in real terms and (conventional) armed forces and military power, including an adherence 
to and execution of those various plans to do this,e.g. the recommendations of the Brussels NATO summit 
conference (as of October 1977), the NATO resolution of December 1978 and the Rogers Plan as of 1982-
85, and the NATO double-track rearmament decision of December 1979; paying for and carry out the 
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Birrenbach’s notion of Atlantic Partnership required to the end a united, ideally federated, 
Europe with strong authorities and institutions, coordinated policies, speaking with one 
voice in economic, monetary, and ultimately (foreign) political and security affairs 
(EC/EEC/EU).211  While Birrenbach continued to advocate constructive European 
reforms in this direction,212 he continued to oppose the enlargement of the EC beyond 
                                                                                                                                      
infrastructure program on German soil; an acceptance of SDI and a certain participation/connection in 
principle in the US SDI plans/program.  With respect to arms negotiations, this included staying tough and 
not insisting on further US INF negotiating proposals in 1983-84.  General Rogers was the US High 
Commander of NATO in Europe.  The NATO resolution of December 1978 pertained at least to the 
European nations (also to the US?).  An exception was Birrenbach’s displeasure as of 1979 that all the 
West European states had accepted SALT II without reservation.  The Federal Republic cooperated with 
the United States to stop the development of nuclear w pons in other states, including in the Third World. 
(KB to McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1).  The Federal Republic 
would cooperate with the United States to eliminate all the dangers resulting from the abuse of the 
plutonium technology.  But the United States could not expect more from us. (KB to McGeorge Bundy, 
President, Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1).  The Federal Republic would develop all the 
necessary safeguards (regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy). (KB to McGeorge Bundy, President, 
Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1).  The Federal Republic would try and was ready for a 
cooperation in the future for a non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, 
Bundespräsidialamt, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1). 
211 KB to McCloy, 19 August 1977.  Birrenbach advised Kohl in his discussion with the US President to 
make clear the fundamental German attitude that an Atl tic Partnership in the widest sense was 
“indispensable.”  That presupposed however in Europe a coordinating of heterogeneous interests, which t e 
FRG would try to carry out.  There were limits to achieving this goal. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, 
Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, personal, confidential, 10 November 1982, K029/2).  Birrenbach described 
European unification as “a historic necessity.” (KB to Gerard Smith, 1 October 1980).  The countries of 
Europe would seek common solutions.   
212 For instance, Birrenbach welcomed the founding of the European summit (as of July 1978); the creation 
of a European Monetary System (new as of December 1978), in which Schmidt and d’Estaing/France 
appear to have been very involved; the intensificaton of joint defense measures (e.g. common arms 
projects, 1984).  As of 1977-78, Birrenbach advocated/welcomed a directly elected European Parliament 
with effective additional rights/prerogatives and thus with the respect and participation of the electorate and 
a democratic legitimizing function vis-à-vis a workable executive (European institutions).  As of September 
1977, Birrenbach saw an effective European Parliament as “the last instrument which could serve to 
revitalize the European idea.” (KB to Aron, 22 September 1977).  However, as of July 1979, Birrenbach 
saw the start of the European Parliament as “almost a comedy” and something that could not be considered 
a new beginning (KB to Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2).  As of 22 November 1984, Birrenbach was not 
happy with the result of the European elections and believed the next ones could turn out even worse if the 
development went on.  As of 18 July 1978, with respect to the EMS, Birrenbach warned, as he had in the 
times of Triffin, that a monetary/currency system of this kind would work in the long run only on the basis 
of a coordination of European economic, fiscal, finance, currency and energy policies.  Among those 
reforms Birrenbach advocated were improving the decision-making process in Brussels by eliminating the 
Luxembourg Compromise of 1965-66 and reestablishing majority decisions in the Council of Ministers and 
the newly created European Council (i.e. a restoration of and complementing of the original solution of the 
Treaty of Rome); as of 1984-85 reform of the CAP (EC budget, enormous agrarian subsidies; agreed with 
Thatcher/Britain), which excessively favored France and inexcusably took up 60% of the EC budget and 
subsidized 8-9 million European farmers (took funds away from the difficult military and economic 
situation); as of January 1984, an end of the subvention policy (codex of 1981) that was fatal for steel; 
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Britain, pointing to the resulting heterogeneity and the related integration, coordination 
and decision-making problems.213  Though Birrenbach continued to see France as the 
FRG’s most important European partner and the most important friend after the US, he 
continued to reject an isolated Franco-German axis against Britain.214  Urging an 
accelerated process of European unification in stage  in the face of a lack of political and 
economic homogeneity and goodwill with a minority of members/nations that could not 
or would not follow the lead of the more effective ones (impede), Birrenbach embraced 
from the mid-1970s onward ideas involving core powers, including that of a transitory 
construction of Western Europe on a two-tier system (“à deux vitesses”; nucleus of 
power).215  As Birrenbach put it, “We cannot wait for the last ship in the European 
                                                                                                                                      
solve its economic and financial problems; as of 1984 strengthen and institutionalize the European political 
cooperation/consultation (EPC); the carrying out of a regional policy (as Prof. Priebe said) aimed at the 
lagging areas of the EC).  As of July 1983, Birrenbach was upset about the negative impact of the 
acceptance by earlier German governments of “massive” (European) agrarian expenditures (KB to Kohl, 7 
July 1983).  As of 1984, Birrenbach saw the CAP bringing them into conflict with the US, in the budget 
question with the FRG’s own financial interests, with Britain and important developing countries.  In later 
years, Birrenbach consistently insisted on the principle of “do ut des,” for instance with regard to France.  
As of March 1978, Birrenbach claimed that the Commission was working very slowly and without major 
authority.  For Birrenbach’s hopes for the European P rliament, see KB to Schaetzel, 13 February 1979, 
ACDP K098/2. 
213 Birrenbach found all this making it more difficult to manage affairs and pointed to stagnation and 
endangered substance.  Birrenbach pointed with disapproval to the three Mediterranean countries.  As of 
June 1984, Birrenbach saw Papandreou and leaders of similar states as obstacles to genuine European 
integration.  As of April 1984, Birrenbach argued that Britain had not yet been digested and that Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland and Denmark were not real European partners (KB to Haig, 5 April 1984).  As of May 
1977, Birrenbach quoted approvingly de Gaulle’s refer nce to the “grand large.”  Birrenbach believed that
the new entrants/members into the EC were economically b ckward compared to the core countries. 
214 For instance, Birrenbach argued that demands or attacks vis-à-vis Britain (e.g. regarding the budget 
question as of 1984) should be presented in a larger framework, including the overwhelming majority of 
EC states.  As of 1984, Birrenbach advocated Franco-German coordination and cooperation (e.g. 
military/defense; peaceful use of nuclear energy).  As of October 1980, Birrenbach claimed that the 
German-French relations were better than they had been in the last 20 years. 
215 Birrenbach embraced such ideas since a few months as of July 1975 until at least as late as June 1984.  
Far from being an original idea of Birrenbach’s, as of July 1975, this idea (“à deux vitesses”) had been 
previously raised by Brandt on German TV a year ago (when he reported on the last summit meeting) and 
in the 1960s by some of Birrenbach’s friends in his party and as of July 1975 had been much talked about 
during the meeting of the EC heads of government in Brussels and had been proposed in the report about 
the European Union to the Council of Europe presented by Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans in 
December 1975.  At their December 1974 meeting in Paris, the heads of government of the Nine had given 
the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans the task of putting together a report for them on the future 
realization of the European Union.  A former member of the Action Committee for the United States of 
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Europe, Tindemans (Christian-Social Party of Belgium) first presented his idea to the members of the 
Monnet Committee in Brussels, and his report to the Council of Europe (Brussels) was dated December 
1975.  The solution of the institutional problems of the EEC was not possible so long as the economic 
problems in the agrarian, finance, and trade area, which were the subject of the Fontainebleau summit, were 
not settled in a lasting, effective, constructive way, which was only possible on the basis of the creation of a 
system à deux vitesses. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, confidential, 10 
September 1984, K029/2).  Birrenbach saw no alternaive for a European unification. (KB, August-
Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1).  The 
survival of Europe as an active and influential [mitentscheidender] factor of world Politik was only 
thinkable if Europe united into a Gemeinschaft.  Birrenbach used the word Gemeinschaft and still not 
Bundesstaat or even Staatenbund. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens, 
Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1).  Therefore, Birrenbach doubted that precisely in the current 
moment, where it would be especially urgent to create a European unity, such a striving would be feasible.  
If one tried to set through plans which from historical reasons were not feasible in the short term, one 
would fail, and this setback would make the continuation of the struggle for the unity more difficult.  
Therefore, Birrenbach believed that the moment for a constitutional arrangement was premature.  Not 
premature, rather even extraordinarily pressing, was progress in integration, both in the economic as well as 
in the political area.  However, for this, a complete constitutional draft would be no basis.  Unfortunately, 
the European parliament, without sufficient functions, would achieve by the next election only a relatively 
low election participation.  Therefore, a planned, stage by stage setting-in process would be better than a 
fundamental new beginning.  A unity of Europe would be more necessary than ever.  If you however look 
at the French attitude to NATO, the development of pr tectionism and subventionism in the EC in all its 
imbalances [Einseitigkeiten] and also consider that the newly joining nations have pursued only half-
heartedly the path to Europe, then Birrenbach found it obvious to go a more pragmatic way.  Self-evidently, 
the Politik would have to be included in the stepwise integration process.  Without this step, a deepening of 
the overall integration process would not be possible. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. 
Walter Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1).  Today, it would be important: 1) to give back 
the Commission the functions which it had before the crisis in the middle of the 1960s; 2) to again carry out 
the majority right in the Council of Ministers with e exception of clearly vital problems; 3) to give the 
European parliament additional functions; 4) to solve the budget problem under the change, not abolition, 
of the agrarian market conditions.  Other areas of the community required at least the same amount of help 
as the agrarian market.  This would bring us in the long run into conflict with the US and Britain.  It was 
not acceptable in its current form. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens, 
Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1).  With respect to the taking up of new partners in the EC, 
Birrenbach pointed out what had happened with Norway, the negative mood in Denmark and what the 
taking up of the three southern countries meant for the EC budget (but not only that).  A Gemeinschaft 
would have to consist essentially of homogeneous state .  However, the three southern countries were not 
that.  To fully digest them financially and politically would not be simple.  Therefore, Birrenbach had 
always supported the introduction of a “two-tier system,” as also had been proposed by Minister President 
Tindemans.  Such a system did not mean a slighting of the new applicants.  On the other hand, the lovet  
the EC was not so great by any of these southern cou tries that they could not accept a varying treatmnt in 
accordance with their performances and their ability to integrate.  As soon as they are fully willing and able 
to integrate, they would have the immediate right of becoming a full member of the EC.  That was 
Birrenbach’s opinion at the time.  In the case of Ireland, Birrenbach was not entirely sure.  Since Ireland 
did not belong to NATO, it was in so far a certain “alien body [Fremdkörper].”  A community that 
excluded itself from a crucial area always had a defect.  But Ireland was small and in so far no obstacle.  
However, the problems which we will have with the southern countries are difficult, and the original 
French idea, thereby to strengthen the Latin area, was certainly today no longer shared in the hearts of 
many, who thought it at the time, alone from agrarpolitischen viewpoints.  The other states were in the first 
line concerned about the budget question, the Italians and French about the agrarian question.  That me nt 
that this expansion meant at the moment still no deepening of the community.  Birrenbach had always 
believed that the European political cooperation was an entirely crucial element of the EC and that there 
should be means and ways to link it organizationally in any case indirectly with the EC.  Finally, the lack of 
this cohesion was one of the reasons why the EC today was no longer as popular as it once was.  The 
lacking popularity of the EC also resulted from thefact that on one hand the organization did not functio  
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“properly [sachgerecht].”  Without a certain limitation of the sovereignty via a genuine exercise of the 
majority right, in any case in not clearly vital questions, a Gemeinschaft of this type was not capable of 
action.  It also appeared over-bureaucratized to Birrenbach.  Even more important however was the 
homogeneity of the interests of the individual partne s.  Therefore, Birrenbach would welcome it if 
considerable progress were made in the question of the European Political Cooperation during the 
presidency of Britain. (KB to British Amb. Sir Jock Taylor, Bonn, 25 September 1981, K068/2).  
Birrenbach shared Aron’s skepticism regarding the possibility of the creation of a Europe à deux vitesses.  
This also meant that Aron did not consider possible the elimination of the Luxembourg Compromise of 
1965/66.  The present European institutions were practically not able to act.  The stagnation was evidnt 
since the decision-making process no longer functioed in a satisfactory way.  This was already true for the 
Europe of the Nine. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Adenauerallee 133, Bonn), President, to 
Prof. Raymond Aron, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Centre Européen de Sociologie 
Historique, Paris, 22 September 1977, K074/1).  The current co ditions could not remain.  The agrarian 
and budget policy would explode if the EC expanded an  it did not come to a Europe “à deux vitesses,” 
which Tindemans had also mentioned in his report at the ime, to which Birrenbach fully subscribed.  
Unfortunately, in Europe one had proceeded in the question of expansion too “tumultuously [stürmisch].”  
There were substantial reasons for it.  However, it would only be a constructive element of the European 
Politik if the decision-process in Brussels was improved to an extent not at all foreseeable at the moment.  
Therein lay Birrenbach’s deep worry. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), 
President, to Leo Tindemans, Minister President (aD), Brussels, 10 April 1980, K074/2).  If the direct 
election of a European parliament in 1978 (or 1979) “would not make much difference to the state of 
Europe, at least for quite a few years,” and you “don’t see any prospect of a decisive move toward political 
integration within the next few years… and nothing or very little will happen in the field of monetary and 
economic integration,” then the same impression had been the principal reason for the preoccupation 
expressed to Marjolin in Birrenbach’s letter.  The question raised under these conditions was what would 
be the consequence of such an evolution.  If, in answer to Birrenbach’s question, Marjolin did not see either 
the possibility of a Europe à deux vitesses or the elimination of the Luxembourg Compromise, which 
Birrenbach had mentioned in the same context, then t  ew enlargement of the EC would practically block 
and not only slow down the whole decision-making process in Brussels, which had been stagnating for 
many years. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), President, to Robert 
Marjolin, Université de Droit, d’Économie et de Sciences Sociales de Paris, 14 September 1977, K074/1).  
Birrenbach agreed that the further enlargement of the EC was politically unavoidable.  Otherwise the 
Mediterranean states would be pushed either into a dependence upon the Soviet bloc or a kind of non-
aligned situation which would not permit the US and European navies to operate in the Mediterranean.  But 
the result of that enlargement would be, to quote de Gaulle, “le grand large.”  We need a European power 
nucleus.  It could be created within that “grand large” only on the basis of an i formal two-tier system 
similar to that of the monetary snake which could be joined at any moment by every member if it wished to 
do so.  This would not affect the community as such.  To a certain degree this system existed in the form of 
representation of Europe in the summit conferences.  Nobody could say that this meant the creation of a
Europe of two classes of members.  Therefore, the French term of “une Europe à deux vitesses” seemed 
more adequate. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP, President, to Rt. Hon. Mrs. Shirley Williams, 
MP, Secretary of State for Education and Science, London, 1 April 1977, K074/1).  Since the compromise 
of 1965-66, the influence of the commission had regrettably increasingly declined.  Furthermore, the cair 
of the European Council of Ministers changed every six months.  Birrenbach could not imagine how the 
commission, under these circumstances, could exercise a stronger decision power.  It would not only be a 
question of goodwill since there would be states that, by best will, could not.  Therefore, a non-
discriminating, two-tier system had certain advantages vis-à-vis the total reestablishment of the majority 
right.  Here, Birrenbach had the thought in the back of his mind that, in vital questions, he would currently 
hesitate to subject the Federal Republic to a majority decision of the EC.  The definition of what was vital 
was naturally very difficult but worth the pondering.  If Europe still lacked the political will then one had to 
say with Rueff, but in another sense as/than above mentioned, “L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se 
fera pas.”  Certainly the secular idea of European unification via the currency union alone could not be 
carried out because this was not possible without the o her precondition. (KB to Helmut Haeusgen, 
Member of the VS of the Dresdner Bank AG, Frankfurt, 5 December 1977, K141/1).  The currency union 
as it had been conceived at the time by the Werner Committee could only function if it were accompanied 
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by a clear coordination and harmonization of the economic and fiscal policy of the EC member states.  This 
presupposed however a higher degree of political integration than today existed.  The nations were not 
ready to orient their budgets according to the interests of the community if the political goals of the 
members were not identical.  In spite of the relatively good functioning of the European Political 
Cooperation in the foreign policy area, which unfortunately did not stand in any connection with the EC,
the political integration in recent years had made no genuine progress.  Recession had extraordinarily 
impaired, even if not made impossible, the attempts around the end of the 1960s and the start of the 1970s 
to coordinate the economic and social policy.  Not even the currency snake functioned in the framework of 
the EC.  Since the Luxemburg Compromise of 1965/66, the initiative right, which was due to the European 
Commission on the basis of the Rome Treaties, had been substantially limited to the benefit of the Council 
of Ministers.  In the Council of Ministers almost only the national standpoints were represented.  Decisions 
were made almost only on the basis of the lowest denominator.  The creation of the European Council had 
changed nothing decisive in that.  A union, of whatever type, presupposed however a functioning decision 
mechanism.  Since the Luxemburg Compromise had essentially abolished the majority voting right, there 
no longer existed in view of the re-nationalization of the economies the chance to set through an effective 
coordination and harmonization of the economies of the EC partner states.  The recession had shown how 
heterogeneous the economic structures of the individual states were.  In the crisis, each nation thougt only 
of itself, and since a political union did not exist and there also was no prospect for this at the moment, the 
fundamental preconditions for an economic and currency union were not present.  If Jacques Rueff, whom 
Jenkins cited, had said in 1949, “L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas,” then this standpoi t 
was perhaps understandable from the view of a pure finance expert, but was unrealistic from political 
perspectives.  The experiences with the proposals of the Werner Committee had shown that clearly.  
Monetary means alone could not solve the problem in Europe.  What would be necessary to come to a 
similar solution?  This question was all the more justified as the widening of the EC to twelve member 
states would further sharpen the existing stagnatio within the EC.  All three states (Spain, Greece and 
Portugal) were still not ripe to become full members of the community, in fact neither politically nor 
economically.  How could a coordination be possible of these economies with the Nine, which functioned 
neither at the time among the six nor today among the nine member states?  If one on the other hand 
considered the attitude of Britain to the EC and knew that France, exactly as in the last twenty years, still 
insisted on total independence, then how could one imagine the functioning of a currency union in view of 
the extraordinary divergence of the inflation numbers, of the high unemployment, of the structural 
differences of the individual economies and of the sp cial needs of the three Mediterranean states.  For a
Europe of the six or seven, including Britain, a rel chance would exist in the repeal of the Luxemburg 
Compromise to master these problems in the long run. In the process, however the question had to be 
asked whether a majority decision on the basis of an application of the Commission, which the special 
situation of the individual countries already drew in view, could at all be carried out, if for instance the 
trade unions in England, France or Italy did not play a part in the wage question.  Then, the majority 
decision would come to nothing and would be unrealizable.  The readiness for mutual aid had its limits 
since all the states were in a crisis and had large budget deficits.  With each majority decision, theFederal 
Republic would be again challenged.  If this would happen beyond an acceptable extent, which was today 
certain, also the Europe-friendliness, which still existed in the Federal Republic, would be very strongly 
reduced.  There would still be a second solution, a “Europe à deux vitesses.”  That would be therefore 
perhaps in Britain in 1980 the case.  But then would again emerge the problem whether these states would 
submit at all to a majority decision, also only of a core Europe. (KB to Helmut Haeusgen, Member of the 
VS of the Dresdner Bank AG, Frankfurt, 5 December 1977, K141/1).  The extraordinarily large structural 
differences between the various countries of the European continent and the astonishing phenomena that in 
spite of the USSR this danger was no longer recognized as a Fédérateur made Birrenbach extremely 
concerned.  The decision-process in Brussels no longer functioned at all, even less in case of a renewd 
widening.  In France and Britain, Birrenbach had ascertained in many places that a rescinding of the 
Luxemburg Compromise or the accepting of a “Europe à d ux vitesses” as a remedy was only with 
difficulty acceptable. (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1).  Like Guth, Birrenbach considered pure 
fantasy Jenkins’ ideas to make a currency union without a clear coordination of the economic and fiscal 
policy, which presupposed for their part in turn a high degree of political integration.  Jenkins did not even 
accept the re-establishment of the majority voting r ght in the EC or a “Europe à deux vitesses.” (KB to Dr. 
Wilfried Guth, Vorstand member of the Deutschen Bank AG, Frankfurt, 29 March 1978, K153/1).  
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convoy.”216  All this was intended to increase the American interest in a long-run 
partnership with Europe and to facilitate closer trans-Atlantic relations.   
However, even as Birrenbach insisted that he remained a staunch friend of the 
US, he continued to attribute to it a sizeable rolein the trans-Atlantic difficulties.  True, 
from at least the late 1970s on, Birrenbach generally preferred Republicans to Democrats, 
seeing them contributing to a much-needed Trendwende in the US with respect to foreign 
and military, as well as economic, policy.  In 1982, facing imminent Democratic electoral 
victories, he remarked, “To imagine that Ted Kennedy would become President… would 
induce me almost to emigrate a second time in my life.”217  That said, Birrenbach did not 
                                                                                                                                      
Birrenbach pointed to the system of the currency snake as an application of this principle (“à deux 
vitesses”) that could be studied and applied to other political situations.  In supporting such ideas, 
Birrenbach recognized the difficulties involved in the foreseeable future (e.g. including getting the consent 
of all the members of the community), not least dueto the doubts, skepticism and rejection expressed by 
the majority of leading West European personalities with whom Birrenbach had had contact, but also 
rejected the notion that such an approach was discriminatory and would create two classes of members, 
arguing that each member invoking the veto right would later be able to follow the general political trend.  
At least with respect to the Atlantic framework, Birrenbach saw this as consisting of France, Britain and the 
FRG.  Sensing the potential dangers (hinder; potentially destructive crisis) to NATO and the EC (process of 
European unification), at least in the Atlantic framework, Birrenbach promoted an informal, non-
institutionalized approach.  To the very end, though he continued to favor good Franco-German 
relations/cooperation, Birrenbach continued to oppose purely Franco-German initiatives or any semblance 
of Franco-German union, since they could split Europe (frighten the English and continental states) and 
Europe from the US.  As of July 1984, Birrenbach rejected the plan for the creation of a joint Franco-
German military cooperation involving 30 divisions of both states.  The situation in Europe, including a 
deep rift (difficult relations) between France and Britain during the 1980s, prevented such ideas from ever 
being really possible for the time being.  As of September 1984, in perhaps a related (same?) suggestion, 
Birrenbach proposed the creation of a US-European Strategic Council that would involve secret 
negotiations of the representatives of the government chiefs about the overall strategy/policies to be applied 
towards the USSR (caucus of power).  As of July 1979, Birrenbach saw the attitude of a series of European 
countries presenting obstacles to European integration.  Birrenbach continued to believe in the concept of 
“interdependence” between the West European powers.   
216 KB to Monnet, 13 February 1976.  As he insisted to Monnet, “[w]e cannot wait in Europe until the last 
partner has begun to understand in what a dangerous situation we are.” (KB to Monnet, 22 July 1975).  As 
Birrenbach put it, “We cannot wait forever.” (KB to Monnet, 13 February 1976). 
217 For the Ted Kennedy emigration quote, see KB to Haig, 30 June 1982.  To Birrenbach, Mondale was 
“the embodiment of the American freeze movement.” (KB to Chancellor Kohl, 28 June 1984, K029/2).  As 
of October 1984, Birrenbach found Weinberger too hawkish and believed that, together with the two 
undersecretaries of state (Iklé and Pearl), he had att ined a power position that was too strong.  As of June 
1979, Birrenbach believed that “with embracements you cannot solve the problem, neither in the Middle 
East, nor in the SALT negotiations.” (KB to Ball, 27 June 1979).  Birrenbach advocated tough US 
measures/threats against Iran if it did not release the US hostages.  As of 2 April 1980, Birrenbach believed 
Carter’s letters to Banisadr and Khomeini were “foolish.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980).  Birrenbach 
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consider either Carter or Reagan a real statesman, rather incompetent figures exhibiting 
grave personality and character flaws and a distinct lack of judgment, experience, 
knowledge and understanding of the complexities of federal and international affairs.218  
As Birrenbach put it, “neither [Reagan] nor his predecessor have been real presidents.”219  
Meanwhile, both administrations featured dysfunctional power structures and policy-
making processes, populated by foreign and defense policy advisors of remarkably poor 
quality and composition, in many cases suffering the same defects as the presidents.220  
                                                                                                                                      
seems to have applauded the courage of hostage rescue fforts (Teheran, Entebbe, Mogadishu).  As of 30 
January 1978, Birrenbach argued one should not leave decisions about weapons deployments to timid and 
naive people.  Birrenbach seems to have recognized a cooling off of tensions by the mid-1980s.  As of 
October 1986, Birrenbach did not expect a difficult international crisis. (Notizen zur Außen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik, and Anhang, 15 October 1986, by KB).  One can extend the concept of hawkishness to 
include Birrenbach’s insistence as of December 1977 that with respect to nuclear energy questions “we 
need hardness externally as well as internally.” (KB to Haunschild, 20 December 1977).  In the economic 
respect, Birrenbach credited Reagan with the courage to cut the budget (social expenditures) and apparently 
to cut taxes.  Birrenbach did complain about the comp sition of Reagan’s defense budget and also 
criticized certain elements of Reagan’s economic plans since they were not differentiated enough.  
Birrenbach professed a recognition of Carter’s character, firmness and high intelligence.  With respect to 
the Reagan administration, Birrenbach did complain at least about the time lost in solving the problem of 
sheltering the MX (maybe also other arms programs).  Birrenbach preferred a Reagan administration to the 
various Democratic presidential possibilities (e.g. Carter, Ted Kennedy, Mondale/Ferraro, Gary Hart). 
218 Birrenbach believed they also lacked an understanding of economics issues.  Echoing what the 
Americans said, Birrenbach argued that Reagan was more a “communicator” or “performer.”  On Reagan 
being “a communicator,” see KB to McCloy, 9 January 1986.  On Reagan as a “performer,” see KB to 
Prof. Alex Keynan, 14 September 1983.  Birrenbach viewed Carter as remarkably obstinate and as 
someone who did not listen to his advisors or genuinely discuss the issues prior to making decisions.  
Perhaps hinting at the same traits, Birrenbach argued that Reagan could not be influenced rationally.  With 
regard to the Reagan administration, Birrenbach complained about the dominance of the White House, 
which did not accept the advice of really competent political personalities, and the too small role of the 
State Department.  Among the personal flaws Birrenbach detected were irrationality, emotionalism and a 
reliance on mere intuition. 
219 KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, 29 June 1982.  Summing it up to an American contact, Birrenbach remarked, 
“You have no real President.” (KB to Bowie, 3 April 1980).  In some instances, Birrenbach saw the US 
trying to carry out policies though lacking the necessary means.   
220 Birrenbach saw divisions among the close foreign and defense policy advisors and multiple centers of 
authority producing multiple voices attempting to speak on foreign policy.  Birrenbach complained that t e 
Carter administration was addressing too many complicated matters on all the continents at the same ti
rather than focusing the entire attention of the cabinet on each.  In the Reagan administration, Birrenbach 
saw differences between the groups centered on Meese, Weinberger (defense policy) and Haig (foreign 
policy) and stressed the need to bridge these differences.  Birrenbach also complained that there weretoo 
many personalities with influence with Reagan.  Thedifferences between the three groups in the 
Republican Party, of the right-wing, of the personalities from the American West and of the Ford-Kissinger 
group had not been overcome and played a large role with respect to the new occupation of posts. (KB to 
Hermes, 18 May 1981, K134/1).  With respect to the Carter administration, Birrenbach was very critical in 
these regards of Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, Secretary 
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Whereas the Carter administration conducted a weak, irresolute, passive foreign policy, 
overstressing morality and human rights, the Reagan dministration engaged in an 
extreme, reckless, confrontational policy and rhetoric (e.g. the USSR as “evil empire”) in 
thrall to an insufficiently nuanced East-West worldview.221  However, both carried out 
irrational, disoriented, unpredictable, flawed foreign policies and practices in a variety of 
                                                                                                                                      
of the Treasury Blumenthal, the NATO Ambassador, Warnke (appointed for SALT II), Hamilton Jordan 
(on the White House staff), Sorensen, Duncan (Brown’s deputy), Christopher (Deputy Secretary of State) 
and the UN Ambassador (Andrew Young).  While not goin  into detail, Birrenbach was clearly not 
impressed with the personalities from other areas, for instance Lance or the Attorney General.  While 
Birrenbach was pleased that Schlesinger had become Secretary of Energy, this also indicated that his 
influence on the President in foreign policy questions had clearly declined.  Birrenbach’s criticisms of 
particular personalities sometimes came in spite of his recognition of their positive qualities in other 
respects.  Thus, Birrenbach never doubted that Vance was a good man, only that he was no Acheson or 
Marshall or Ball, particularly in so far as Birrenbach feared that reaction from Vance that solely followed 
the attitude of his President.  Likewise, Birrenbach had no doubt that Brown was a brilliant technologist 
and Wissenschaftler.  However, he doubted whether Brown was just as brilliant a politician and 
administrator, as evidenced by the unconvincing degrees of his overreaction in the Vietnam War and his 
active regret later on.  While Birrenbach personally liked Brzezinski very much and considered him a 
brilliant thinker, who was also more skeptical regarding détente than many others, Birrenbach doubted that 
he was just as good an “operator” and could think in power-political categories.  With respect to the 
strength of personalities, Birrenbach complained that Vance only did what the President wanted, while 
Brzezinski at least tried to take a stronger positin.  Also of importance to some extent for Birrenbach were 
those personalities that were dropped.  For instance, as of January 1978, Carter had dropped Arthur Burns 
of whom Birrenbach thought highly.  For an extended v rsion of Birrenbach’s critiques of Carter’s advisors 
(e.g. “not the non plus ultra of possible personnel decisions”), see KB to Amb. Berndt von Staden, DC, 24 
January 1977, K100/1.  Birrenbach seems to have had a v ried amount of personal relationship with the 
Carter and Reagan advisors and cabinet members.  Birenbach had known Brzezinski for years and enjoyed 
a particularly personal relationship to him.  Through Ball, Birrenbach had met Mondale two years ago (I 
think as of January 1977) and spoken with him.  Birrenbach claimed to know Blumenthal, though he did 
not know Carter’s Secretary of Commerce and does not appear to have known Charles Schultze (had heard 
much about him).  Oddly enough, at some point, Birrenbach did praise the composition of the economic 
part of Carter’s cabinet (Blumenthal and Schultze).  With respect to the Reagan administration, Birrenbach 
generally liked Secretary of State Haig but criticized the presence of Weinberger, Carlucci (Deputy 
Secretary of Defense), Donald Regan and Ken Adelman (Rostow’s successor in the State Department).  In 
general, Birrenbach argued that the Reagan cabinet had oo many professional Wirtschaftler (pure laymen 
like Weinberger and Carlucci) and not enough Politiker.  Birrenbach criticized certain Reagan 
administration cabinet members as too hawkish (i.e. W inberger).  These power structures and policy-
making processes were defective, flawed, confused, haphazard and uncoordinated.  With respect to power 
structures and policy-making processes, Birrenbach referred to the White House, the executive, the US and 
the cabinet.  Birrenbach found the advisors insufficiently strong (at least in the Carter administration) and 
too right-wing (in the Reagan administration). 
221 Birrenbach complained about the Carter administraton’s unilateral concessions to the USSR in the 
hopes of future reciprocation and its (related?) annulling/delaying of key weapons systems.  With respect to 
unilateral concessions to the USSR, Birrenbach pointed to the withdrawal of the neutron bomb proposal in 
the hopes of some form of reciprocation in the US-USR SALT II negotiations.  Among those weapons 
systems annulled/delayed were the B-1 bomber, neutron bomb, MX missile and Trident submarine.  
Birrenbach referred to the Carter administration’s human rights campaign as a “daring exploit 
[Husarenstreich].”  The Reagan administration tended to view situat ons solely in East-West terms rather 
than truly seeing their different facets (e.g. the Near/Middle East conflict, with stress on the Persian Gulf). 
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issue areas (e.g. security, economics, energy) and regions (e.g. trans-Atlantic relations, 
East-West relations, Third World).222  Though aware of certain strengths of these 
administrations, Birrenbach argued that especially, but not only, with respect to foreign 
policy “Reagan is, all told, as much a failure as Carter, only in the reversed sense.”223   
                                                
222 With respect to the Carter administration and the T ird World, Birrenbach criticized its policies with 
respect to Iran (including the risky/hopeless and “tragic” failed hostage rescue effort in 1980), Afghanistan 
and Africa (including the Horn of Africa and South Africa).  Birrenbach argued that the Iran hostage rescue 
effort had no chance of success in the midst of a city like Teheran that was not Mogadishu or Entebbe.  H  
saw the Carter administration attaching too much importance to the Third World and enormously stoking 
the North-South conflict through the unwise treatment of the threshold countries of the Third World with 
respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy (e.g. German-Brazil treaty).  Birrenbach argued that the Carter 
administration’s ultimatum regarding the Olympic boyc tt had too short a term.  With respect to the 
Reagan administration, Birrenbach criticized US Latin America policy and argued as of January 1982 that 
the Reagan administration had not fully understood the dangerous Third World crisis after the increase of 
oil prices.  Birrenbach considered the foreign policy of these administrations in this period emotional, 
inconsistent, and unclear. 
223 KB to Kohl, 31 January 1983.  Birrenbach also applied this verdict to economic policy.  As of February 
1985, Birrenbach considered it a pity that neither Ca ter nor Reagan followed Theodore Roosevelt’s 
admonition “to speak softly but carry a big stick.” (KB to Ball, 25 February 1985).  At least to US contacts 
(e.g. McCloy), Birrenbach did admit Reagan had some merits (charismatic; correct general direction of 
policy, e.g. vis-à-vis the USSR; gave back courage and self-confidence to the American people (recover 
from Watergate and Vietnam); somewhat restored the strength of the US economy; somewhat rearmed the 
US). (e.g. KB to McCloy, 8 November 1984).  Birrenbach ridiculed William Clark’s (Deputy Secretary of 
State) lack of foreign experience, “except three days in Santiago” (KB to McCloy, 4 February 1981).  At
one point, Birrenbach questioned with perhaps some sarcasm the possibility of learning the complex 
problems of foreign policy “even for a former member of the High Court of California.” (referring to 
William Clark here, in Birrenbach’s view somebody who had Reagan’s special confidence (cronyism?)). 
(KB to McCloy, 9 August 1983).  Birrenbach seems to have had that European tendency, at least in later 
years, to simultaneously be concerned about the US being too resolute or too weak.  In April 1980, upon 
hearing that Vance had just resigned, Birrenbach rema ked “I would have done the same thing already 
years before.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 28 April 1980).  As of October 1979, Birrenbach found the American 
leadership to be “nil [gleich Null].”  The American government power [Gewalt] currently showed “chaotic 
traits.” (KB to Schmidt, 26 October 1979).  In July 1979, examining the difficulties in carrying out the US 
energy program, Birrenbach remarked sarcastically, “[p]erhaps Hamilton Jordan will solve the problems!!” 
(KB to Strausz-Hupé, 24 July 1979).  As of April 1980, Birrenbach found the situation in the US 
“frightening [beängstigend].”  The Carter administration “reaches in its vacill ting [schwankenden] 
decisions the border of disgrace[Blamage]….  We have not had a situation like this since more than a 
quarter century.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980).  As of March 1980, Birrenbach remarked that “the 
problem Carter is ui generis.” (KB to Prof. Beckurts, 18 March 1980).  Birrenbach was part of an 
international/foreign/world sentiment that disliked Carter and his policies in so far as they impacted on their 
own security.  Birrenbach remarked about Carter, “[t]he man goes all-out [aufs Ganze] in all things and will 
with it fail.” (KB to Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes, MdB, Kiel, 5 April 1977).  Birrenbach’s criticism of the Carter 
administration ignored the fact that the administration steered the alliance to major accomplishments 
(agreement on the Long-Term Defense Program, the decision to increase real defense spending by three 
percent, and the approval for a major theater nuclear force initiative involving both arms control and 
modernized deployments).  Birrenbach pointed with approval to James Reston having referred to Carter’s 
talkativeness [Redseligkeit] in the difficult Near East policy as the “open mouth policy.” (KB to State 
Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, Bundespräsidialamt, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1).  As of August 1978, 
Birrenbach considered Carter an “emotional [gefühlsgeladenen] President, who thinks more in moral than 
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To the end, Birrenbach entertained many of the same fears with even increased 
intensity.  Particularly after the “trauma” of Watergate and Vietnam, he was haunted by 
an incipient American isolationism/”introversion” (withdrawal to a “Fortress America”; 
less universal foreign policy; lack of engagement in Europe).224  Such fears were piqued 
by his view of the reduced value of Europe as a glacis gainst the USSR since the 1950s 
and 60s, US inactivity (defeats) as of 1978-80 in areas like the SALT negotiations and the 
Third World, and the “neo-Mansfield” proposals even as of the mid-1980s in Congress 
and elsewhere by pro-European personalities like Kissinger and Senator Sam Nunn for a 
reduction of US troops in Europe and a limited separation of the US and Europe.225  
Alluding to Raymond Aron, Birrenbach repeatedly complained that after Vietnam and 
Watergate the United States, no longer exercising the necessary leadership as in past 
                                                                                                                                      
in political logic.” (KB Aktennotiz, 8 August 1978).  While Birrenbach acknowledged the importance of 
morality in the world of states, he argued that “it is not easy to confront men like Brezhnev and Amin on 
the basis of morality alone” and also doubted that a completely open foreign policy would be possible 
towards adversaries of this type (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 8 July 1976).  Birrenbach even referred to 
“the problem Carter” (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, Bundespräsidialamt, Bonn, 27 April 1977, 
K141/1). 
224 In later years at least, Birrenbach worried about the US commitment to free trade (including with resp ct 
to steel) and saw an increasing threat of US protecti nism.  As of May 1977, Birrenbach believed that the
US commitment to free trade was no longer as intense as in the 1950s and 1960s.  He pointed to the 
electoral groups that had elected Carter and a series of stagnating economic branches in the US and the fact 
that the US had in recent months violated its obligation regarding high-grade steel [Edelstahl]. (KB to Prof. 
Walter Hallstein, Stuttgart, 31 May 1977, K141/1).  As of December 1978, Birrenbach’s concern about 
trans-Atlantic relations was increased by the abandonment [Fallenlassen] of Taiwan (in spite of all 
correctness of the China decision).  As of 1979-February 1980, Birrenbach found the US and US foreign 
policy incalculable [unübersehbar] at the moment and in the long-term.  As of October 1979, Birrenbach 
found the American mood “indefinable.”  On the “introvertedness” of the US Congress, see KB to Gerard 
Smith, Ambassador at Large, Department of State, Washington DC, 17 April 1979, ACDP K098/2.  
225 Such defeats for/failures of US policies in the Third World included Africa (e.g. Angola and 
Mozambique; Horn of Africa; Ethiopia), Asia (e.g. Taiwan, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, also mentions 
Korea), the Caribbean Sea (e.g. Cuba) and the Near/Middle East (e.g. Iran, Afghanistan; South Yemen).  
As of April 1977, Birrenbach considered the US attitude in Zaire pretty dangerous.  In criticizing any 
isolationist tendencies in US policy, Birrenbach (perhaps simply agreeing with Zbigniew Brzezinski) cited 
in October 1979 Wendell Willkie’s declaration in 1944 that they lived “in one world” and argued that “[w]e 
cannot escape our destiny.” (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 15 October 1979, K098/2).  
Apparently also Haig had made such proposals.  Withrespect to “neo-Mansfield” proposals, see KB to 
Lord Carrington, 5 November 1984.  With respect to Congress, as of February 1984 there had been since 
months a motion in the Congress to reduce US forces in Europe and as of July 1985 there was the Nunn 
Amendment.  To the end, Birrenbach also opposed measur s that would have reduced British troops on the 
continent and wanted British forces stationed there.  Nunn was a Democrat. 
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decades and aimlessly adrift, was no longer an “imperial power” as it had still been in the 
1960s.226  Meanwhile, Birrenbach feared an American bilateralism that focused on 
improving the relations and addressing the mutual interests of the superpowers while 
ignoring the interests of and relations with the European allies.  For instance, in surveying 
détente, including the various arms control negotiati ns (e.g. SALT II; Carter), as well as 
the structure of the US nuclear build-up, Birrenbach came to fear the prospects of a 
theater war (nuclear conflict) limited to Europe while sparing the territorial Sanktuaria of 
the two world powers.227  As of 1979, Birrenbach complained about doubts among 
                                                
226 KB to Eugene Rostow, 19 March 1980, ACDP K209/2.  Unfortunately, everybody knew that “America 
is no longer the Imperial Republic, as Raymond Aron has once called it.”  That manifested itself especially 
also in the economic area. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von 
Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 June 1980, K034/1).  At the time (I think middle of the 1960s), the 
US was still, as Raymond Aron had designated it, an “ imperiale Macht.”  After Vietnam and Watergate 
under Carter, they no longer are, as was shown almost daily. (KB, Berliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, confidential, 26 March 1979, K033/3).  From their own interest, the Americans 
would not act as they would have when they were still an imperial power.  They are no longer that today in 
the same sense. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Berndt von Staden, State Secretary of the AA, 
Bonn, 11 November 1981, personal-confidential, K033/2).  A European unification, step for step, was 
today more necessary than ever, since to a great extent the US was no longer the “puissance impériale” that 
it had been in the past years since the entrance into WWII.  Could you imagine Carter on the throne of 
Louis XIV?  I lack all the imagination necessary for it.  But that could be a mistake on my part.  Birrenbach 
had foreseen the situation in America since years. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Ralf 
Dahrendorf, London School of Economics and Politica Science, London, 16 February 1979, K068/2).  
Birrenbach believed that without the creation of a European power center things simply would not work out 
in view of the dubiousness [Zweifelhaftigkeit] of the American posture [Haltung] vis-à-vis the conflict 
points in the world.  For instance, the British fleet had left the Persian Gulf.  How did it look there now?  
The withdrawal [Rückzug] of England from the world was almost as disastrous [verhängnisvoll] as the 
current American policy of President Carter, which could be foreseen from the first second of his entrance 
in the primaries. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, London, 16 February 1979, K068/2).  Some declarations by the last 
American president and experiences with American policy after Vietnam and Watergate made many people 
in many nations doubt whether the United States would still be the imperial power as Raymond Aron called 
it in his book that appeared in 1973 about the foreign and military policy of the United States. (KB to Nitze, 
4 July 1980, K134/1).  The USSR was an imperial power and did not think in terms of arms control. (KB to 
Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2).  As of June 1978, Birrenbach 
moaned that neither an “imperial presidency” nor an “imperial republic” were currently recognizable (KB 
to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 June 1980, K034/1). 
227 With regard to SALT II, for instance, Birrenbach was upset about the limited range of cruise missiles 
and the prohibition on the transfer of certain (weapons) technology and cruise missiles themselves from the 
US to Europe/NATO.  Birrenbach seems to have seen détente as consisting of compromises and 
understandings to settle conflicts. 
 634
Europeans, including himself, about the lack of US leadership due to recent events.228  
Birrenbach also feared American unilateralism, repeatedly expressed in hasty actions 
carried out without proper consultation or coordination with the European powers on 
issues like the neutron bomb as well as trade with and sanctions against the East.229 
                                                
228 Without clear American leadership, NATO would never function, by which Birrenbach meant military 
as well as political and perhaps economic leadership.  Only American leadership and clear readiness to ac  
would awaken a series of European nations. (KB to Haig, US Army, SACEUR, 22 March 1979, K153/1).  
Strong US leadership would be able to overcome the spirit of successive weakening that could be observed 
everywhere (I believe in Europe). (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, K098/2).  All this should be done 
without a too strong rhetoric and be accompanied by moral demonstrations in the Western world.  But 
would the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Britain and other countries be successful 
in this test, in spite of Soviet threats.  The final success, relative as it may be, would depend on the 
credibility of American power and the American diplomatic attempts to hold together Western Europe.  
The future could not be foreseen today.  Much would depend on American policy expressed with one 
voice. (KB to Haig, 18 January 1982, K146/2).  We could only act if the United States, the strongest power, 
would lead and make it quite clear to your allies that one could not, acting in a reasonable way, reach peace 
without the readiness to take risks.  Upon the answer to this question would depend the unity of NATO, the 
security of the West and also of the US. (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 15 October 1979, 
K098/2).  Without a restoration of the authority of the US in the world, there would be no real peace in the 
world or solution of the Middle East problem. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1).  The increase of the 
budget accepted by Congress was a good symptom, and Birrenbach thought this all would influence the 
nations in Europe to strengthen their forces and try to think more in global terms than in the past. (KB to 
Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1).  If the United States were still the strongest power in the West and if the 
decision-making process in the United States were convincing it would be easier to motivate the Europeans 
to hold the line in Europe with more proper forces. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1).  Only a strong US 
which exercised real leadership in the Western world could change the situation. (KB to Gerard Smith, 
Ambassador at Large, Department of State, 17 April 1979, K098/2).  Only if the US re-established its 
authority as the leadership power through it that it lso had the means to intervene in an emergency for the 
protection of Europe would trust in Europe quickly appear again. (KB to Schmidt, 17 July 1980, K134/1).  
On account of the “unprevisibility” of the decision f the US leadership in recent years, the Europeans did 
not know in which situation they would be if they blindly followed the US lead. (KB to McCloy, 29 
September 1980, K178/2).  The present world was no lo ger that of the 1960s or start of the 1970s.  Think 
only of the danger of an energy crisis or the blockage of raw material or the closure of sea lanes, and you 
will understand why the Europeans need an encouragement. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 
August 1979, K098/2).  If the US would not again take  really leading position in world politics, at least in 
essential parts of the globe, this situation would worsen and weaken the US’s European flank and also 
access to the most important raw material resources in the world.  We are facing not only an East-West 
conflict, but also a North-South conflict.  The combination of both could be of a disastrous consequence for 
all of us. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2).  The administration and 
Congress were big obstacles to overcoming the difficulties the US was facing now and which were 
weakening its international position as a leader of the West. (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, 
K134/1).  The leadership failed.  Therefore, there was no clear line in the strategy deliberations of the 
alliance.  That was not surprising because on the one hand the US itself was now deadly vulnerable and on 
the other hand the military defensive power [Abwehrkraft] of the European nations was subjected to an 
increasingly strong “process of contraction [Schrumpfungsprozeß]” due to the welfare-state thought and in 
view of the critical economic situation (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1). 
229 As of January-March 1982 regarding threat/impositin of sanctions on the USSR/Poland regarding 
Poland (Reagan).  As of September 1982, the US had not expressed its opinion regarding the gas-pipeline 
deal to the federal government clearly and early enough.  Birrenbach argued that only sanctions (including 
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In this context, Birrenbach had a mixed attitude in later years towards the 
phenomenon of a surging, institutionalised neo-conservatism in the United States.  On the 
one hand, he saw the unilateralism espoused by someneo-conservatives, for instance 
Irving Kristol, as part of a reversion in the West into “national-state thought” and feared 
that it threatened “fatal consequences.”230  On the other, in analyzing the strategic 
situation during the Carter years, especially the US-USSR military balance and SALT II, 
Birrenbach embraced and came under the influence of the efforts of the alarmist/militarist 
Committee on the Present Danger.  Founded in November 1976, this private action 
committee, based in Washington, DC, aimed to dramatically alter American foreign and 
defense policy, especially recommending the need for a military build-up directed against 
the USSR.231  Its members, all of them Americans, included a number of Birrenbach’s 
most respected contacts, including Eugene Rostow (Chairman of the ExComm) and Paul 
Nitze (Chairman of Policy Studies).232  Birrenbach relied greatly on the information, 
                                                                                                                                      
grain and modern technologies) that were supported by all the NATO/Western countries (not just the US) 
would be effective (influence the USSR to abandon its present intentions; be useful in solving the Polish 
problem).  With respect to the neutron bomb, this had appened on at least two occasions as of February 
1981, including in 1977 regarding its construction. 
230 On the “fatal consequences” of such unilateralism, ee KB to Rostow, 2 October 1984.  Among the neo-
conservative institutions was the Committee for the Fr e World, founded in 1981 by American and 
European neo-conservatives.  This committee, in which Irving Kristol, John Podhoretz, Vladimir 
Bukovsky, Sidney Hook, Richard Burt and Eugene Rostow and the prominent neo-conservatives of 
multiple generations (including many intellectuals) were involved, held annual two-day conferences and 
debates (on the State of the Nation), including in Washington DC (in the modest function room of the 
Washington Hyatt) in May or June 1984.  Neo-conservatism was characterized by the grandiosity of its 
views and its perception of a favorable American cultural condition compared to that of a declining Europe. 
231 The CPD was not an Atlanticist institution per se since it was also interested in Far East questions.   
232 The CPD billed itself as “a non-profit, non-partisan educational organization of private citizens devot d 
to the Peace, Security and Liberty of the Nation.”  As of 1978, the CPD was intentionally a small group 
rather than one with a mass of members and had about 150 directors and several hundred non-voting 
members.  The co-chairmen of the CPD were Henry Fowler (Goldman, Sachs & Company, NYC), Lane 
Kirkland and Hon. David Packard (Hewlett-Packard Co., Palo Alto, CA).  The Treasurer of the CPD was 
Charles E. Walker, its Counsel was Max Kampelman and the Director was Charles Tyroler II.  The CPD 
had a Board of Directors (from all around the country), which held annual meetings/dinners in DC (with 
discussions).  Members of the CPD ExComm included, among others, Richard Allen, Richard Pipes, Prof. 
Dean Rusk (University of Georgia), and Elmo Zumwalt.  The CPD apparently had a staff.  Strausz-Hupé 
might also have had some links to the CPD.  The CPD still existed as of 1984.  The CPD was a harsh, 
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analyses and other products generated and issued by the CPD, which he received from his 
CPD contacts (especially Rostow), sometimes even disi genuously presenting their 
arguments as his own.233  Seen as a whole, Birrenbach’s relationship with the CPD 
                                                                                                                                      
(Cold Warriors), hard-line neo-conservative organiztion (e.g. anti-SALT II, anti-McGovern, anti-Carter 
(“a secret McGovernite” as Rostow referred to him, Rostow to KB, 11 May 1978); anti-Carter 
administration, anti-USSR, anti-Kissinger, pro-military buildup, pro-Reagan).  The CPD had a number of 
goals: to preserve (world) peace and halt a slide to war (approaching general war); preserve the balance of 
power vs. the USSR; to restore US military strength (rearmament; increased military budget; conventional 
and strategic); to preserve freedom; to defend the US (and the non-communist world) and its security and
interests vs. USSR expansion.  At least sometimes on behalf of the CPD, CPD members contacted and 
sought to influence the President (Carter; Brzezinski; administration; officials of the Executive branch) and 
individual cabinet members (Brown) and Congress people (e.g. Sen. Jackson) and US Presidential 
candidates (Nitze and Rostow with Reagan and his foreign policy team) and testified before Congress (key 
Congressional Committees like the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) and sought to influence US 
public opinion throughout the country (lectures; appeared on big Sunday talk shows; press conferences; 
participated in and talked at conferences; speaking and writing; reprinting, quoting, digesting, summarizing 
of CPD statements in press and other media).  The CPD manifested all the trappings of neo-conservatism 
(the love of Senator Jackson; false historical (especially WWII-era) analogies, such as comparing the 
current situation to that of the 1930s and comparing the USSR with Hitler, appeasement, comparisons to 
the days before Pearl Harbor; the superficial veneration of Churchill (as of November 1979, Rostow had
even come to imitating Churchill’s habit of taking a real nap each day); the labeling of opponents as 
“defeatists” and “appeasers” and “McGovern Democrats” nd “isolationists” and comparing themselves to 
the anti-appeasers and “troublemakers”; the sense that their opponents were awake or subject to illusions; 
the delusions of grandeur (e.g. in battle); the unnecessary allusions to classical literature and philosophy; 
crisis-mongering; the silly admiration of Russian dissidents like Solzhenitsyn, at least some of whom would 
only have contempt for such neo-cons; the shameless fear mongering regarding opposition (USSR) 
(military) strength, skill/intelligence and expansionist intentions).  Rostow seems to have realized that he 
was virtually delusional, remarking to Birrenbach that “You and I are sons of Don Quixote, so we shall 
never really give up tilting at windmills [e.g. of rthodoxy].” (Rostow to KB, 4 September 1979).  Did he 
know what this meant?  Birrenbach seems to have been also taken in by other CPD scares, being as of 
October 1979 very concerned about the Cuba brigade an  “the Cuba crisis.”  The CPD represented the 
phenomenon of civilian militarism and also a change of mood in the US.  Rostow was still chairman of the
ExComm as of September 1979.  As Chairman of Policy Studies as of 1978, Nitze directed (provided, 
prepared) the various CPD analyses (studies).  The CPD also claimed to try to influence economic policy 
and to revitalize the solidarity of the US alliance system.   
233 These circulated products also included policy statements, brochures, studies, reports, testimony and 
speeches.  Birrenbach’s reports on the state of the SALT II negotiations were based on extensive, secret, 
detailed, original, US material on this theme from a competent US side (CPD?).  Birrenbach seems to have 
viewed the up-to-date materials provided to him by his CPD contacts as the product of the most important 
American arms experts (competent/prominent/leading US personalities).  Birrenbach gave Guth 
Birrenbach’s situation report about SALT.  In the last two or three years post-Bundestag, Birrenbach’s 
American friends had always made the secret SALT papers available.  Birrenbach had then made these 
available, completely reworked, to the Chancellor, f reign minister, defense minister and Carstens. (KB to 
Dr. rer. pol. Wilfried Guth, Vorstandssprecher of the Deutschen Bank AG, Frankfurt, 5 July 1979, K034/3).  
Birrenbach’s last letter to Schmidt had been on 14 March, with which Birrenbach had sent Schmidt his 
secret report about the state of the SALT negotiatins at the end of last year.  This had been based on 
original American figures given to Birrenbach. (KB, erliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt, Bonn, confidential, 26 March 1979, K033/3).  Birrenbach had gotten a series of evidence on the 
SALT agreement in the English text.  Birrenbach hadexpressed his opinion on the whole SALT question 
clearly to a very representative figure that stood cl se to Birrenbach among the attesters. (KB to Dr. Werner 
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suggests a broader trans-national, largely civilian, phenomenon during this period in both 
the US and Europe focused on talking down the Western d fense capacity and strategy.234  
Indeed, given his anti-Carter efforts in the Federal Republic, which were facilitated and 
encouraged by the CPD, with regard to issues like SALT II and the neutron bomb, 
Birrenbach informed Rostow that he even considered himself “an associated member of 
your group.”235    
                                                                                                                                      
Marx, MdB, Chair of the AK V of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 27 August 1979, K034/2).  
Yesterday evening, Birrenbach had gotten the original text of SALT. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at 
Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2).  Birrenbach had studied the SALT treaty very thoroughly in the 
course of the negotiations since he got much information, including of a secret character. (KB to McCloy, 
24 August 1979, K178/2).  Birrenbach knew roughly Carter’s fallback position for the SALT negotiations 
on the basis of a discrete message passed on to Birrenbach from a reliable source. (KB to Carstens, 
President, German Bundestag, 12 May 1977, K151/2).  Birrenbach had studied very thoroughly (private 
studies) and reached conclusions on the whole SALT complex on the basis of first-hand reports.  
Birrenbach wrote about it, of course without mentioing the names, to the Chancellor and German 
President. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2).  Birrenbach could not make 
available to Gillessen the reports that he, after his last US trip, had presented to the Chancellor, foreign 
minister and defense minister about the SALT conceptions of the US administration and had discussed with
them. (KB to Dr. Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, 153/1).  Rostow sent Birrenbach his talk on 
“SALT II-A Soft Bargain, A Hard Sell: An Assessment of SALT in Historical Perspective,” by E. Rostow, 
Sterling Prof. of Law, Yale Law School, former Unders cretary of State for Political Affairs, Chairman, 
ExComm, Committee on the Present Danger, DC; a talk presented at a Conference on US Security and the 
Soviet Challenge, 25 July 1978, Hartford, CT.  Birrenbach saw the CPD as part of a subtle trend to the rig t 
in the US population, which included a belated reaction to the USSR Africa policy and the resistance of 
influential groups against the conclusion of the SALT II treaty in the form planned by the Carter 
administration (KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 17 June 1978, K098/2).  Meanwhile, Birrenbach simply 
dismissed as counterproductive any (US) expert analysis that suggested that perhaps there was not such a 
disequilibrium of power as he insisted (KB to Gerard Smith, Amb. at Large, State Dept., 8 June 1979, 
K098/2).  As of August 1979, Orbis had published an alarming article (sent to Birrenbach by Kintner) by 
Ori Even-Tov on NATO Conventional Defense.  In later y ars, Birrenbach claimed that numerous 
American friends of his, including those in high positi ns, understood and approved of his views on the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy and opposed US policy in this regard and encouraged him to speak out 
clearly on this issue.  Among those items Birrenbach passed on to Chancellor Schmidt, the Foreign 
Minister and Defense Minister Leber was his secret SALT report.  Birrenbach also passed on information 
(e.g. regarding SALT) to the Undersecretary of State in the German Foreign Office for Nuclear Affairs (at
the request of the Foreign Minister).  For instance, Birrenbach pointed to the secret, detailed, original US 
materials he received pertaining to SALT II and the information he received (am informed) on the state of 
the SALT II negotiations (including the US attitude) from US sources.  
234 Another element of the CPD functioning in a transnational manner was that CPD members traveled all 
over the world (e.g. Europe, Iran and China) to talk o responsible government and military leaders (and 
members of the foreign offices and the leaders of foreign affairs institutes).   
235 KB to E. Rostow, 15 December 1977.  Due to its potentially self-fulfilling nature, Birrenbach’s “poor-
mouthing” of US strategic forces, the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and the strategic situation 
irritated some of his foreign and German contacts (e.g. Brzezinski, Gerard Smith, McCloy, Helmut 
Schmidt).  Schmidt was also particularly disturbed about Birrenbach’s CPD links and the fact that 
Birrenbach often expressed himself on DGAP letterhead as the DGAP President, thus creating false 
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While highly critical of the Carter and Reagan administrations (the quality of US 
leadership), Birrenbach perceived, more importantly, systemic problems in the US that 
seriously impaired American foreign policy.236  By 1976 and thereafter, he was 
                                                                                                                                      
impressions.  In May 1978, Brzezinski believed thatey would be greatly helped if people like Birrenbach 
would help reinforce in Europe the message of US commitment to Europe (Zbigniew Brzezinski to KB, 13 
May 1978).  In August 1979, Gerard Smith insisted, perhaps in a subtle hint to Birrenbach, that “[w]e must 
not let ‘poor-mouthing’ of our strategic forces unnerve us.” (Gerard Smith to KB, 20 August 1979).  Given 
his talking down, Birrenbach appears to have often claimed that he shared McCloy’s opinions even when 
he apparently did not.  As of February 1981, Birrenbach claimed to share McCloy’s opinion that the 
skepticism, suspicions and doubts prevalent in Europe egarding the stability and reliability of the US as an 
ally in the East-West struggle were not justified.  He claimed to be fully aware that the Carter era had
ended.  As of 1983, Schmidt did not believe that the military equilibrium had substantially deteriorated to 
their disadvantage over the last 15 years.  With a letter of 30 October 1979, Chancellor Schmidt informed 
Birrenbach that he was sure that many members of the DGAP would not share Birrenbach’s negative 
assessment of SALT II.  His letter to the USA could therefore evoke a false impression. (Schmidt to KB, 30 
October 1979).  Schmidt had the firmness to tell Birrenbach off.  Chancellor Schmidt was critical of sme 
of Birrenbach’s activities in later years.  Chancellor Schmidt was critical of Birrenbach’s relationship with 
the anti-SALT II and anti-President Carter lobby in the US (e.g. CPD) which strengthened that lobby.  
Schmidt viewed this as potentially “catastrophic [verhängnisvoll]” (Schmidt to KB, 22 March 1979).  As of 
November 1979, Schmidt expressed concerns regarding the attitude of Birrenbach’s US friends and their 
impact on Birrenbach’s understanding of German-US relations (KB to Schmidt, 2 November 1979).  
Birrenbach and Schmidt seem to have openly differed in their assessments of the SALT II treaty.  
Birrenbach also seems to have openly disagreed with Brzezinski in their assessment of the SALT II treay.  
As of June 1979, Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing had issued a declaration favoring ratification of SALT II. 
Such talking down helped undermine the message of a US commitment to Europe and the credibility and 
deterrence of the alliance.  The phrase “poor-mouthing” comes from Gerard Smith to KB, 20 August 1979.  
In later years, Birrenbach’s hard-line views brought him into disagreement with certain personalities of the 
Wissenschaft like Adolf Butenandt (regarding nuclear weapons in Europe/the West) and Hans Merkle (vs. 
SDI).  Helmut Schmidt was Vice President of the DGAP throughout Birrenbach’s presidency, and as of 
December 1979, Schmidt had had a long-years intensiv  connection with the DGAP and as of December 
1985, Schmidt took part in DGAP meetings.  
236 Birrenbach saw Reagan as not being up to people like Truman, Eisenhower or Ford (KB to Kissinger, 25 
October 1984).  From the start, Birrenbach had said that Carter was an amateur. (KB, August-Thyssen- 
Straße, Düsseldorf, to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 June 1980, 
K034/1).  Birrenbach showed particular worry about the American situation.  “The main problem is 
naturally the President [Carter], if one can refer to him as such.” (KB to Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, London, 
1 August 1979, K034/3).  Carter cannot stand in such positions people who would say “no” to a demand 
from him.  However, this American could and had done that in a world historical situation and drawn from 
it the consequences. (KB to Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, London, 1 August 1979, K034/3).  When in July 
1978 the American President had personally answered Birrenbach’s question when the West would be in a 
position to offset the military imbalance by saying that there existed an American superiority both in 
conventional, tactical-nuclear as in the inter-continental area, this sentence required no comment.  It 
illuminated the situation. (KB, Berliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, 
confidential, 26 March 1979, K033/3).  The seriousness of the situation was compounded by the fact that a 
completely “unstaatsmännische” personality was the leader of the American nation, who even-“terribile 
dictu”- had the chance of becoming his own successor. (KB to Dr. Werner Marx, MdB, Chair of the AK V 
of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 27 August 1979, K034/2).  Birrenbach was “upset [bestürzt]” 
about Reagan’s careless, imprecise expressions and the stuttering answers to the questions of journalists.  
Birrenbach had the impression that as a coordinator for the foreign policy Reagan lacked in the foreseeable 
time the sufficient knowledge of the details. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Berndt von 
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Staden, State Secretary of the AA, Bonn, 11 November 1981, personal-confidential, K033/2).  The 
situation in the United States had worsened.  The president did not have control since he had no experience.  
Birrenbach feared that a key figure in this framework could fall. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, 
to Berndt von Staden, State Secretary of the AA, Bonn, 11 November 1981, personal-confidential, 
K033/2).  Birrenbach had already told Kohl repeatedly that Reagan was not Birrenbach’s case. (KB, 
August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, 28 June 1984, K029/2).  In the past year, 
Birrenbach had asked the President when he believed that it would be possible to come to a balance on the 
European continent.  The President had answered that there existed no imbalance in any of the three sectors 
of the triad.  “What is one supposed to say to that?” (KB, Berliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Dr. Werner Marx, 
MdB, Chairman of the AK V of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, confidential, 13 August 1979, 
K034/2).  Birrenbach believed that President Carter answered his oblique question in the context of I think 
the June 1978 TC on the neutron weapon evasively.  Birrenbach referred to Carter’s statements at Notre 
Dame University, which bordered on the “laughable [Lächerlichkeit].”  If one tried in this way, with 
“decency [Anstand]” and “optimism,” to dominate [dominieren] the challenge of history, the result was 
today already clear.  The facts of this administration, which Brzezinski counted up, were only in part of real 
historical and lasting value, therefore no “real and concrete achievements.” (KB, Berliner Allee, 
Düsseldorf, to Dr. Werner Marx, MdB, Chairman of the AK V of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 
Bonn, confidential, 13 August 1979, K034/2).  Birrenbach never considered correct the rhetoric of the 
Reagan administration. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Honorary 
President of the MPG zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV, Munich, 9 February 1984, K030/1).  
Furthermore, the American rhetoric used in the course of recent years à la Orlando would make it hard for 
European parliaments to approve larger contributions t  their defense. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, 
Düsseldorf, to Lord Carrington, Secretary General of NATO, Brussels, 5 November 1984, K074/1).  The 
new US administration for several reasons had no clear orientation.  It was unpredictable.  This was a 
problem of great importance. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Adenauerallee 133, Bonn), 
President, to Prof. Raymond Aron, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Centre Européen de 
Sociologie Historique, Paris, 22 September 1977, K074/1).  You can imagine what Birrenbach thought 
about Reagan’s speech at Orlando, his joke in Los Angeles or the remark of a crusade against the Soviet 
Union two months ago.  Weinberger was an inflexible hawk. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984, K160/2).  
A result could not be reached with a rhetoric à la Orlando. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984, K160/2).  
Birrenbach had not yet arrived at a definite conclusion regarding what would happen in the next years.  
When he knew Carter’s choices for Secretaries of State and Defense, he would know more concretely what
Carter would do in the future.  Birrenbach did not have the impression that Ball or Brzezinski would be 
appointed for this position.  Birrenbach doubted that men who were as strong as Schlesinger or Nitze would 
become the head of the Pentagon.  The new President had only limited experience in foreign affairs and 
wanted to be his own foreign secretary.  Therefore, Birrenbach had a feeling of uncertainty, which was 
serious. (KB to Sen. Javits, 18 November 1976, K100/ ).  Like Birrenbach, many people in the Federal 
Republic had no confidence in the present American le dership. (KB to McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2).  
Birrenbach referred to the fear in the Federal Republic (among prominent German personalities) that the 
personality of the US President and Congress did not assure them that a change in mood of the US (the 
abandoning of the post-Vietnam and Watergate attitude) would lead to real American action in the present 
crisis. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2).  Birrenbach did not believe in the capacity of the US 
President.  The US President had told Birrenbach personally, etc. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, 
K178/2).  The President spoke as either a dreamer or a c nvinced pacifist who could not lead in the world 
of today the biggest Western military power. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2).  President Carter 
was intelligent and strong-willed but without any foreign policy and federal political experience and filled 
by an almost “messianic hubris.”  His main collaborat s in the foreign- and defense-political field were not 
personalities of outstanding format.  Carter would not be a Truman because he neither surrounded himself 
with strong personalities in the foreign policy area nor would listen to their advice in an emergency since 
he wanted to be his own foreign secretary. (KB to Carstens, 19 April 1977, K151/2).  Birrenbach’s general 
negative impressions about the US president had been confirmed after he had met Carter himself (I think 
within the context of the TC meeting in Washington DC of June 1978).  (KB to Kohl, Chairman of the 
Unionsfraktion, 19 June 1978, K153/1).  With greatest care, the choices (regarding the cabinet) had so been 
carried out that none of the candidates was in the situation to thwart [in den Arm zu fallen] the 
inexperienced President, if he would take a decision. (KB to Amb. Berndt von Staden, DC, 24 January 
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convinced that the US presidential/constitutional/executive system no longer functioned 
effectively in this regard (since almost a decade as of 1982).  The principles for selecting 
the US executive (electoral system; political leadership) had been devised at the end of 
the 18th century when the US was still a territorial state nd was inappropriate for the 
present needs of a global superpower.  Birrenbach often referred with approval to Lord 
Acton’s 1894 “Lectures on Modern History,” where th British historian argued that the 
constitution’s rules regarding the election of the pr sident and vice-president were “a 
total failure.”237  Furthermore, Birrenbach continued to be concerned about the 
substantial development of Executive-Legislative relations (power shift), believing that 
following Watergate and Vietnam, the executive had become too dependent on the 
consent of Congress in foreign policy (e.g. War Powers Act; abolition of the seniority 
                                                                                                                                      
1977, K100/1).  The main problem was in Carter’s personality. (KB to Amb. Berndt von Staden, DC, 24 
January 1977, K100/1).  Birrenbach had concerns regarding Carter.  Already since June 1976, Birrenbach 
had repeatedly said that Carter would not be a Truman, as was often asserted, because he neither 
surrounded himself with strong personalities in the for ign policy area nor would listen to their advice in an 
emergency, since he desired to be his own foreign secretary.  Vance would not be able to set himself 
through against Carter. (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, Bundespräsidialamt, Bonn, 27 April 1977, 
K141/1).  A President (Carter) who had no foreign affairs experience and was so deeply convinced that he 
was right in all he said was a certain risk. (KB to William Bundy, Editor, Foreign Affairs, 10 January 1977, 
K100/1).  The composition of the cabinet had confirmed what Birrenbach had told Bundy in his letter of 8 
November.  In some aspects, Carter’s cabinet was better than could be foreseen, especially with respect to 
the realm of finance and economics.  But in the field of foreign affairs and defense, Birrenbach was not 
fully satisfied.  Vance was a good choice, but he was not an Acheson, Marshall or Ball.  A very competent 
US friend had told Birrenbach that he was a first-class second man.  Christopher’s experience for the 
position of Deputy Secretary of State did not seem overwhelmingly great.  Brzezinski would be a brilliant 
thinker, but Birrenbach doubted he was able to think in terms of power politics.  The new American 
ambassador in the UN was surely no expert in this field.  The same applied to Sorensen who would becom 
director of your intelligence service in the CIA.  s Birrenbach had foreseen, Carter did not surround 
himself in the vital field of foreign and defense affairs with really strong men, and this would distinguish 
him from Truman. (KB to William Bundy, Editor, Foreign Affairs, 10 January 1977, K100/1).  For 
Birrenbach, it was essential that an American president was ready to make good people his collaborators 
(e.g. Schultz and Richard Allen) and to follow their advice (in contrast to Carter). (KB Aktennotiz, 18 June 
1980, ACDP K134/1).  Carter had responded to Birrenbach’s question when the balance in the various 
forms of the triad could be re-established in June 1978 that in all areas the US was leading.  Birrenbach 
answered that he had never heard that from anybody.  Asked then by Birrenbach, one of the President’s 
collaborators had said that that was “baloney.” (KB Aktennotiz, 18 June 1980, ACDP K134/1). 
237 KB to Henry Kissinger, 15 April 1980.  In support of Acton’s argument, Birrenbach pointed to the rise 
of men to the presidency like Harding, Coolidge, Nixon and Carter (KB to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von 
Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 June 1980, K034/1). 
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rule/system (constitutional change) making it more difficult for the President to exercise 
his influence in Congress via a few personalities; too much power for Congress; weak 
and incapable of acting; hampered US power and predictability; also regarding US 
energy program as of 1979).  While recognizing thate US constitution was a kind of 
“sanctum,” Birrenbach urged his US contacts to take measures to solve these problems.238  
He urged “a return to the Hamilton constitutional methods.”239  Birrenbach even 
suggested the creation of a cabinet system with a Prime Minister under the leadership of a 
President elected according to the present election rules.240  At times, Birrenbach was so 
distraught that he contemplated the need for constitutional changes in the FRG.241 
                                                
238 KB to Rostow, 8 August 1984.  As of March 1980, Birrenbach wondered about the possibility of 
amending the Constitution to provide for an indirect lection (with this security clause) in which the 
Congress would propose several men for the definite decision of the US. (KB to McCloy, 3 March 1980, 
ACDP K134/1). 
239 KB to Rostow, 2 October 1984.  As of April 1980-November 1984, Birrenbach also argued that the US 
lacked the decision-making process in recent years required to deal with the problems it constantly 
confronted (e.g. wavering and unpredictable).  Ironically, as of December 1977-1979, Birrenbach looked to 
the Senate (Congress) to block/modify a bad SALT II treaty.  Birrenbach believed that Carter had only 
limited authority in his own party with respect to SALT.  As of July 1985, Birrenbach complained that the
US executive was weaker now than in recent years.  As of June 1978, Birrenbach was very concerned 
about the constant conflict between President and Congress.  As of June 1978, Birrenbach saw the US 
Congress resisting the President (especially in the question of the raw oil tax) and thus making very 
difficult the solution of the US energy problem (KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 17 June 1978, K098/2).  As of 
April 1977, Birrenbach disliked the US attitude in A gola which he saw as due to the intervention of 
Congress.  As of April 1980, Birrenbach disliked the attitude of the US Congress.  Birrenbach was very
critical of President Carter’s role/responsibility in the constant President-Congress conflict.  In several 
points, the President had backed down [zurückgesteckt], more due to the resistance of the Senate than of his 
collaborators.  In that was a, limited, consolation. (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, 
Bundespräsidialamt, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1).  Fortunately, the nuclear debate had for the time being 
come to a standstill.  Otherwise, the impossible Warnke would never have come through in the Senate.  The
blocking minority in the Senate (40) would hopefully protect us from worse. (KB to State Secretary Dr. 
Paul Frank, Bundespräsidialamt, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1).  There were differenc s between the 
administration and Congress. (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1).   
240 Possibly KB to Eugene Rostow, 2 March 1979, ACDP K212/1. 
241 In Carstens’ term as Bundespräsident, he had understood not only to assume throughout a completely 
überparteiliche attitude, which had brought him the sympathies of the entire Volk.  Birrenbach always 
wondered whether it was not possible that a Bundespräsident of Carstens’ capacity could have intervened 
more actively in political events.  He admitted that C rstens was right to distance himself.  Otherwise hi  
Überparteilichkeit would have been endangered.  In this regard, Chancellor Adenauer had overestimated 
the office possibilities of a Bundespräsidenten and therefore also taken distance from the candidacy for this 
office.  Birrenbach argued that the American system created at the end of the 18th century for a territorial 
state, may have been suitable at the time.  Today, it was not the suitable basis for the selection of the 
highest executive of the United States as a superpower in a world crisis.  Birrenbach today preferred the
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At least in later years, Birrenbach was also disturbed by post-war demographic 
trends in the United States.  These included dramatic tr nsformations in the composition 
and character of the population and especially the unprecedented and deleterious role 
played by ethnic minorities.242  Birrenbach was particularly troubled by the enormus 
influence of the Jewish lobby, reflected for instance in US policy towards both Germany 
                                                                                                                                      
French system, which showed that in spite of the separation of executive and legislative the president 
disposed of full powers, which allowed him to almost independently influence the Politik of his country.  
Of course, de Gaulle had utilized this independence.  However, since de Gaulle was in certain respects a 
unique personality and his life had given him an authority, which went beyond the constitution of the 5th 
Republic, through the crucial role which he had played in the war for France, he could be seen as the 
exception.  His successors Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing had played a mediating role, which went 
beyond that of an überparteilichen President.  Birrenbach wondered therefore whether the position of 
Bundespräsidenten i  the West German constitution should not be expanded.  The party disputes in the 
Federal Republic today assumed such diffuse proporti ns hat one could rightly wonder whether it would 
not mean an adequate improvement of the stability of he Federal Republic if the President, possibly elect d 
with a qualified majority, disposed of higher political authority.  He would then be the crucial mediator 
between the parties.  Birrenbach believed that it might then have been possible to better contain the wave of 
irrationalism than was currently the case.  However, none of Carstens’ predecessors could have 
successfully played such a role.  Their country had t erefore missed this chance.  This was a historical 
period that appeared to become extremely difficult with continuing problems.  Birrenbach did not doubt the 
Überparteilichkeit of Carstens’ successor.  But he wondered whether Üb parteilichkeit sufficed in the 
long run to master the crisis that possibly stood before them. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, t  
Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bundespräsident, Bonn, 22 May 1984, K030/1).  Birrenbach may also have been 
hinting to Weizsäcker about the need for a modification of the position of the Bundespräsidenten. (KB to 
Federal President Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin, 24 May 1984, K031/2).  
242 Ethnic minorities played a role they had never played in the past so American policy was no longer as 
predictable as it had been in the fifties or sixties. (KB to Haig, 23 July 1980, K146/2).  The author (Pfaff?) 
said that on the two sides of the Atlantic, the societies were now rather remote from one another and that 
the US today was perhaps even more distant from West Europe than it was in the isolationist 1920s and 
1930s.  The influence of European ideas on the US had decreased in the meantime.  The US did not any 
more feel itself to be essentially a European society.  Non-European sources and your non-European 
quality had created a less homogeneous national culture.  You are more preoccupied with your own 
national life. (I believe these are Pfaff’s ideas though not entirely sure) (KB to McCloy, 29 September 
1980, K178/2).  Birrenbach admitted that the interest of the US in Europe was less strong than it had been 
in the past.  One of the basic reasons for this was th t the US was no longer the melting pot it had been in 
the past.  “The WASPs are not any more the clearly dominating element in your country.  The ethnic 
minorities play now a role they have never played in the past.  I refer only to the Jewish lobby, the Polish or 
the Spanish influence, and of other minorities.  They do not create any more the same national background 
which existed in the time of Woodrow Wilson.”  A German national ethnic group did not exist in spite of 
almost 20 percent of the people being of German origin.  America’s interests were now less concentrated 
on Europe than on other regions in the world on account of a completely changed political, cultural and 
economic development.  The European civilization no longer influenced in the same way the American 
way of life as in the past.  The young generation n lo ger had the same tradition as our generations had 
during the last world wars and before.  Therefore the US did not think any more in the same terms as 
Europe, apart from certain differences of interest. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2).  
Birrenbach criticized Carter’s “konzeptlose” Africa policy, which on top of it still a man represented 
(Andrew Young) who operated from racial feelings but not from clear world political perspectives. (KB to 
Carstens, 19 April 1977, K151/2).  Birrenbach pointed o this as a reason that US policy was no longer as 
predictable as in the 1950s or 60s. (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22 July 1980). 
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(e.g. the hard US reaction to Bitburg) and the Middle East.243  Furthermore, he continued 
to bemoan the shift in power towards personalities and regions located outside the 
Northeast (East Coast; e.g. South, West, Midwest), which he invariably considered 
provincial, with distorted perspectives, lacking in pragmatism and the necessary 
understanding and judgment of the complexities of foreign policy and global/world 
affairs and ignorant of concepts like balance of power and power politics.244  Alluding to 
the Southern origins of personalities in the Carter administration and their “inexcusable” 
South Africa policy, Birrenbach mused about mix-ups [Verwechslungen] between 
                                                
243 KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, 14 September 1983.  As of June 1978, Birrenbach believed that the Turkish 
embargo demonstrated Carter’s limited authority even in his own party.  According to Birrenbach, an event 
like that in Verdun was not possible in America since “[c]ertain minorities are too strong in the United 
States.” (KB to Kohl, 2 May 1985).  Birrenbach was very critical of the influence of the Jewish minority in 
the United States in preventing pressure on Israel.  The passive American attitude to the Palestine problem 
had been discernible since the non-carrying out of the second part of the Camp David agreement of 2 
December 1978.  Reagan had especially failed to pressu  Israel to settle the Palestine question.  In 1983, 
the United States had concluded with Israel a strategic agreement in order to secure the Straits of Hormuz.  
This decision was also impossible.  It was taken from the East-West perspective.  The Americans had not 
taken the importance of the Palestine problem seriously enough.  The pressure of the Jewish minority in the 
USA had played and still played hereby a role.  TheAmericans had deviated in the last months slightly 
from the one-sided perspective, but remained reservd in the solution of the Palestine problem, especially 
in the election year.  The criticism of Reagan in this question was great among well-versed personalities in 
the United States.  Birrenbach had responded to Kohl’s speech in Eichholz that the minorities (meant here 
was especially the Jewish one) had an influence that would have been still “inconceivable” in 1950. (KB, 
August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, 14 February 1984, K029/2).  As of April 1985, 
Birrenbach believed that the Jewish lobby in the US would be very difficult to influence/convince with 
respect to the Bitburg affair.  As of April 1985, Birrenbach believed that certain minorities in the US were 
too active for there to be a US gesture à la Verdun.  As of 1985, Birrenbach may have seen the Jewish 
lobby in the US making a moderate solution to the Palestine conflict difficult/impossible.  The US 
Congress may have voted with respect to Bitburg in a way that Birrenbach did not like as of May 1985. 
244 On such regional deficiencies, see for instance KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 20 January 1982.  Regarding 
the US Africa policy, especially South Africa, Birrenbach would have to use a stronger term.  The 
declarations by Young were “irresponsible” and those by Vice President Mondale were 
“ununderstandable.”  “South Africa is not Atlanta.”  Birrenbach was no friend of a colonial system.  But the 
problem was more complex than both politicians saw it.  (KB to Schaetzel, 9 August 1977, K100/2).  
Rhodesia and Namibia were not identical with “Atlanica [Atlanta].” (KB to Brzezinski, National Security 
Advisor, 17 April 1978, K098/2).  Some personalities from the West Coast did not understand well enough 
what was happening in Europe. (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2).  The Woodrow Wilson Center had 
approached Birrenbach to create contacts with personalities of the West Coast and Germans in my country.  
Birrenbach was awaiting their proposal. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2).  As of 1980, 
Birrenbach had started an initiative with respect to the United States that had been offered to him by one of 
the most qualified personalities in the USA that there was and that he knew.  On the virtues of East Coast 
personalities and the deficiencies of those from other regions, see KB to Strausz-Hupé, 16 March 1978.  As 
of July 1978, Birrenbach approved in certain limits Carter’s “human rights” policy because one could thus 
more easily integrate contemporary America (South, West and Mid-West) than with Kissinger’s pragmatic 
(balance of power) policy. (KB to Schmidt, 12 July 1978). 
 644
Georgia and Transvaal and pointed out that “Pretoria does not lie that close to 
Atlanta!”245  Likewise, with respect to the West Coast background of many key Reagan 
administration advisors (cabinet members, policy makers), Birrenbach remarked that “the 
Polish crisis…is more complex than one thinks in Los Angeles.”246  Such systemic and 
structural problems contributed to faulty American analyses (understanding, 
perspectives) of situations and more specifically to the declining American understanding 
and closeness to European/FRG situations, interests and thinking with respect to military, 
economic and political affairs, to unfortunate US views and policies towards Europe and 
ultimately to the problems in European/German-American relations and rendered 
Birrenbach pessimistic that particular US election results/candidates would rectify the 
situation.247 
At least in later years, even as Birrenbach continued to see the US as the most 
powerful country in the West, indeed the West’s lone true Großmacht and world power, 
he also saw it as a nation/power in relative declin from the position of superiority 
(predominance) it had enjoyed in the first decades after the war.248  Though the US 
                                                
245 KB to Pauls, 6 March 1978.  Birrenbach also remarked, “I remember that Stettinius didn’t know where 
Trieste was.” (KB to Pauls, 6 March 1978).  Birrenbach referred to the “incomprehensible” attitude of men 
like Mondale and Young on South Africa (“one man, oe vote”). 
246 KB to Rostow, 26 March 1982.  Within the Reagan administration, Birrenbach apparently saw Haig 
(East Coast, more understanding for European interests than Weinberger or Meese) battling personalities of 
the West Coast (KB to McCloy, 15 March 1982). 
247 As of October 1980, Birrenbach claimed that the next election results in the US would in any case be 
“painful.” (KB to McCloy, 23 October 1980).  The understanding for European problems in the US was not 
comparable with that of the 50s and 60s. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Lord Carrington, 
Secretary General of NATO, Brussels, 5 November 1984, K074/1).  As of September 1979, Birrenbach 
was concerned about “the drifting apart” of Europe and the US (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 4 September 1979).  
As of November 1981, Birrenbach had the impression that Europe and the US did not see the world from 
identical perspectives.  As of 4 September 1979, Birrenbach believed “the American and the German natio  
no longer have the feelings of common ground as in the 1950s and 60s.”  That was however at least as true 
and perhaps more so with regard to France, England and other European countries. (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 4 
September 1979).  As of August 1982, Birrenbach argued that the US in its present mood was no longer 
understood in Europe (apparently including the FRG), neither historically nor currently. 
248 As of March 1981, Birrenbach remarked, “I rarely have returned from the US so full of uncertainties.” 
(KB to McCloy, 30 March 1981).  Birrenbach also seems to have seen a Britain in decline.  As of 
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weapons potential was considerably superior to that of ll the other Western nations, it 
found itself in relative decline militarily vis-à-vis the USSR, now the leading military 
power to which it had lost its earlier superiority (the other Großmacht).  While it still 
enjoyed an enormous industrial/production capacity, the US found itself in relative 
decline economically vis-à-vis Western Europe and the world, having lost its economic 
superiority since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system.249  More subtly, the 
United States had seen its moral authority seriously ndermined, mainly due to the 
Vietnam War.250  He was relentlessly negative and critical about the condition of the 
United States, whether referring to its political, economic or energy situation.  While 
Birrenbach could put a positive spin on some of these developments, for instance 
pointing to the economic advances of Western Europe and the resulting increased claim 
to US-European consultations, this relative decline ultimately had dangerous 
consequences for Europe and the world.251  In line with his often Conservative mode of 
                                                                                                                                      
December 1981, Birrenbach believed that events in Britain had led to it in the last fifteen years that in many 
economic areas they had a lower level.  As of January 1977, Birrenbach saw a structural, economic and 
political crisis in Britain. 
249 As of August 1981, Birrenbach saw the US GNP per capita as lower than that of the citizens of the EC. 
The American economic development created doubts all over the world which also had consequences in 
America’s international security relations. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 1980, K134/1).  There was 
disappointment in the Federal Republic that the US had not been able to get the oil crisis under control. 
(KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2).  Birrenbach had dealt in-depth with the tax plans of the new
government. (KB to Hermes, 18 May 1981, K134/1).  As of August 1978, Birrenbach found the US 
helplessness in regard to the dollar crisis “disturbing [beunruhigend]” since it represented a general 
symptom and not only a “critical” failure at a certain point. (KB to Schmidt, 24 August 1978).  As of 
December 1978, Birrenbach’s concern about trans-Atlantic relations was increased by the dollar crisis.  
During the Carter administration, Birrenbach saw in the US inflation and a dollar decline (due principally 
to the energy question?). 
250 KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2. 
251 As of 1977, Birrenbach pointed to the advances of the Europe of the Nine and the Six (EC) in absolute 
terms and relative to the US with respect to GNP and world trade.  For the resulting increased claim of the 
European states to US-European consultations, see KB to Schmidt, 17 July 1980, K134/1.  American 
monetary issues were also of great concern to the Europeans.  Preoccupying for all Europeans, and not o ly 
for them, was the question of the American dollar.  We had discussed this problem many years ago before 
your home in Brussels after the Connally coup in 1971.  Schaetzel had disagreed with Birrenbach then, but 
Birrenbach had told Schaetzel that the American benign eglect would have serious consequences.  It had. 
The present state of the dollar was due not only to the American oil import, deficit with Japan, inflation, 
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thought, Birrenbach suggested that this regrettable decline of the United States as a world 
power was due primarily to idealistic rather than materialistic factors, or as he put it in 
July 1979, “It is perhaps more a moral problem than a technological one.”252  As 
Birrenbach put it in 1977, “I still believe in the United States… but my belief is not 
anymore as deep as it has been over many years.”253  Birrenbach considered this “sad… 
for a man who has been for all his life a great admirer of your country [USA].”254   
In a related trend, Birrenbach increasingly saw a decline in the American military 
effectiveness in defending Europe.  In particular, as of at least 1977-84, Birrenbach 
                                                                                                                                      
lack of preparedness to increase your export at all cost (which would have been easy), but also to 
psychological reasons. (KB to Schaetzel, 6 October 1978, K098/2).  Birrenbach did not understand 
Blumenthal’s policy regarding the exchange rate of the dollar.  In this way, the United States would not be 
able to solve the economic crisis in the world.  This did not mean that the United States was guilty for the 
present situation.  (KB to Schaetzel, 9 August 1977, K100/2).  Not all that shined was gold.  The Federal 
Republic also had very serious problems.  Birrenbach could not see a reduction of unemployment and was 
very worried about the development of our foreign trade due to the general situation on the world market.  
Our foreign trade constituted 27% of our GNP.  A breakdown of this part of our GNP would have very 
serious consequences, particularly if there were a strong wave of protectionism.  German wages were 
enormously high.  But we reinforced our efforts to push our exports in view of the stagnation of the int rnal 
market.  To push our public expenditure more would en anger our inflation rate, which was low on account 
of the experiences of two total inflations in the past. (KB to Robert Schaetzel, DC, 11 January 1978, 
K100/2).  In spite of everything, we would remain a faithful supporter of your currency.  But you have to 
try to stop the decline of the dollar.  The principal cause of the American deficit in the trade balance and 
current account balance was the energy factor.  Our Common Market was not in a very good condition, you
still had a clear surplus in your exports to the European continent in spite of all its internal and economic 
difficulties.  The efforts we made in the export business were enormous.  Since Birrenbach had worked in a 
US company he knew how “graciously” you sell your goods and how tough we were working in that 
business.  We export everything we produce.  The constant decline in the dollar was a very serious sign
which was destabilizing the whole world economy andcreated difficulties for other countries.  This could 
not be a healthy relation for the biggest export-import country in the world. (KB to Robert Schaetzel, DC, 
11 January 1978, K100/2).  In explaining the sorry condition of the world economy, Birrenbach 
acknowledged the negative impact of economic conditions and policies in the US.  Enormous deficits and
high interests in the US had negative effects on the world economy. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984 
K160/2).  Birrenbach was concerned about the state of the US economy as of the late 1970s and early 
1980s (as of 1979 the constant decline of the dollar and the inflation). 
252 KB to Gerard Smith, 27 July 1979.  At the same time, Birrenbach argued that “[t]o be a world power is 
to a certain degree a destiny.  It is difficult to avoid it and easy to lose its strength.” (KB to Gerard Smith, 
27 July 1979). 
253 KB to McCloy, 5 August 1977.  As of June 1980, Birrenbach saw this change in the US-European 
relationship being expressed in the interest situation of Europe vis-à-vis the US being no longer the same.  
The European states had “come of age [mündig].”  This type of maturity was expressed in an autonomy in 
their judgement vis-à-vis the actions of the US to a previously not present extent, with the exception of 
France.  Even the FRG was among those national states oriented in various directions (previously only 
France). (KB Aktennotiz, 16 June 1980, K134/1). 
254 KB to Eugene Rostow, 2 March 1979, ACDP K212/1. 
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bemoaned the dangerous erosion in recent years of the survivability and credibility “in 
extremis” of the extended nuclear deterrent, due to the shifts in the US-USSR nuclear 
balance, the unprecedented sacrifices and physical vulnerability of the US in a conflict 
with the USSR and the related decline in the will to risk using these weapons.  This 
concern was reinforced by public debates in the US regarding the relevance of nuclear 
weapons, including certain attitudes of and statements by President Carter and prominent 
members of his administration on the senselessness of nuclear war, the unlikelihood of 
the use of nuclear weapons barring a direct threat to the US and proposals for their 
elimination on all sides.255  Birrenbach also criticized the epiphenomenon of a non-
credible area covering nuclear strategy and force structure (based on inaccurate SLBMs) 
that represented a return to a variation (Abart) of Dulles’ massive retaliation, which 
would destroy cities, industrial complexes and civilian facilities, killing millions and 
presenting the alternative of capitulation or total w r and mutual assured destruction.  
Instead, Birrenbach (still as of 1981) advocated more credible counterforce strategies and 
force structures of flexible response and limited war directed against select military and 
economic targets (based on a US nuclear superiority, particularly in secure, accurate land-
based inter-continental nuclear weapons/rockets), especially the strategy of selected 
                                                
255 With respect to the expressions of the Carter administration, Birrenbach feared the US would thus tempt 
the Russians to test American credibility, citing parallels with expressions/debates during the first stage of 
the Kennedy administration following which the Russian  had tested the US readiness to fight (credibility) 
in the second Cuba crisis (KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupé, US Mission to NATO, Brussels, 25 April 
1977, K100/1).  Birrenbach feared the new Carter administration’s statements would undermine the 
important element of tactical nuclear weapons in the NATO military doctrine/strategy of flexible response, 
consisting in the triad of conventional, tactical nuclear and inter-continental strategic nuclear weapons, and 
indeed the entire strategy itself. (KB to William Bundy, Editor, Foreign Affairs, 10 January 1977, K100/1).  
In later years, Birrenbach saw the use of tactical nuc ear weapons as a key element in the large US 
deterrence. 
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strikes proposed by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger  1975.256  Birrenbach’s concerns 
with regard to the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence also took on a 
retrospective cast, both in identifying its origins and the timeline of erosion.257  
Ultimately, such worries were closely connected to the overriding sense of the systemic 
difficulties and relative decline of the United States.   
D. Public Relations: Atlanticist Retrospective Activities 
In later years, public relations continued to constitute an important element of 
overall German-American relations.  As before, the Atlanticists continued their efforts to 
influence German and West European/foreign commentators, for instance via meetings.  
While Birrenbach was critical of the Carter administration’s stress on public openness in 
                                                
256 In comparison to the vulnerable, thickly populated US East Coast, Birrenbach contrasted the less 
vulnerable USSR spatially and according to population density. (KB to Dönhoff, 10 June 1977, K151/2).  
As of 1977, Birrenbach complained that since years the US sought to set the nuclear threshold higher and 
higher and to avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a stage in the chain of escalation if possible, 
something that Birrenbach feared would eliminate the deterrent factor.  As of 1977, Birrenbach seems to 
have recognized that Carter’s statements that the use of nuclear weapons was only imaginable if US 
security were in question was understandable from the US perspective though undesirable from the 
European perspective.  As of 1985, it appears that the US strategy, at least in name, was flexible respon e.  
Birrenbach disliked certain passages of PRM-10. 
257 Birrenbach saw the decisive beginning of this process (with its objectionable consequences) with 
McNamara’s (administration’s) incomprehensible halting of the Minuteman III production (big, land-
based, inter-continental nuclear missile and set hope in SLBMs) in 1968 (also pointed to the neglecting of 
the nuclear protection of the gray zone since 1958 (in that year, Gen. Norstad had proposed the Europeans 
be able to “desanctuarize” the USSR by their Euro-strategic weapons) and the abandoning of the IMRBMs 
after the second Cuba crisis and the concentration on improved technology in single items like MIRVs, I 
think this is what he means when he refers to modern w apons development).  As of April 1979, 
Birrenbach seems to have been doubting, in retrospect at least, whether the Americans in the Kennedy 
epoch would have responded with inter-continental weapons to an overwhelming USSR attack in Europe.  
As of April 1978, Birrenbach claimed that just since the Kennedy era, he had observed first light doubts in 
discussions with personalities in the US and Europe egarding the US use of nuclear weapons in extremis 
(KB to Brzezinski, 17 April 1978, K098/2).  The need to maintain deterrence also fed into Birrenbach’s 
support for a forward defense strategy in Europe.  As of 1977, Birrenbach argued that the immediate and 
voluntary giving up (by the US) of a large part of terrain on the Eastern border would bring about an almost 
immediate collapse of the Western/European defense a d that it would no longer be believed that the West 
was ready for the utmost (undermine the subjective element of deterrence). (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 
1977, K173/1).  As of 1979, Birrenbach claimed that “I still believe in the United States” (I think referring 
specifically to US nuclear weapons credibility, butcould be interpreted more broadly) but confessed that he 
had had some doubts (only doubts) since 1961 and now these doubts were approaching certainty (KB to 
Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2).  As of August 1979, Birrenbach pointed to the 
MLF story as evidence that many people had doubted th  US nuclear deterrent during the John F. Kennedy 
administration. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2). 
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foreign policy, he continued to be concerned with and to take into account the 
psychological elements of international relations, the importance of public relations and 
the broad and significant elements of public opinion, the impact of events on it and its 
potential impact on policy, the Federal Republic’s nternational (trans-Atlantic, 
European) relations and issues.258  Naturally, the potentially crucial moods and attitudes 
of the American press and population, for instance isolationist sentiment in this period 
and including with respect to the FRG, remained a key concern to be monitored by 
Birrenbach.  He welcomed efforts in the FRG to influence this public opinion, including 
the various initiatives planned and carried out in the FRG regarding the US bicentennial 
and the components of the German participation in the tricentennial celebration in the US 
in October 1983.259  Within the Federal Republic and Western Europe as a whole (the 
Western countries), Birrenbach remained particularly concerned about the apparent 
success of a Soviet anti-American propaganda that sought to encourage the development 
of the pacifist/neutralist movement, prevent the deployment of INF weapons in Europe 
and to undermine the trans-Atlantic alliance, in part by presenting the United States as the 
                                                
258 It was necessary to analyze the psychological situation of many European countries. (KB to McCloy, 30 
November 1981, K132/2).  Prolonging negotiations would increase the fear in the European region. (KB to 
McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2).  The psychological question had an entirely crucial share of the 
dollar’s slide. (KB to Dr. Wilfried Guth, Vorstand Member of the Deutschen Bank AG, Frankfurt, 29 
March 1978, K153/1).  During this period, Birrenbach perceived an extremely sensitive psychological 
situation in Europe (especially northern Europe).  Birrenbach detected a loss of sympathy for Reagan. 
259 Though Birrenbach believed there had been an insuff cient public echo to the visit of the Federal 
President and his outstanding speeches. (KB to Kohl, 14 October 1983).  As of April 1982, Birrenbach 
seems to have been pleased that the CDU/CSU would organize great demonstrations for the alliance in 
Bonn and Munich on 5 June (I believe while or around the time Reagan was in the FRG). (KB to Haig, 5 
April 1982, K146/2).  The feeling in the Federal Republic towards the US was manifested by the fact that 
there were 4,000 private bicentennial celebrations n the Federal Republic in last year. (KB to McGeorge 
Bundy, President, Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1).  In assessing why he considered even the 
German celebrations of America, particularly for the bicentennial in Frankfurt in the Römer and the 
Paulskirche, as inferior to what had come before, such as the Kennedy function of 1963, Birrenbach 
argued, “[t]hat was due to the composition of the participants” (KB to Staden, 29 June 1976).  At the 
invitation of the Chancellor, Birrenbach took part in he official tricentennial meetings/functions organized 
in Washington DC and Philadelphia from 2-7 October 1983.  
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prime instigator of the arms race.260  At the same time, Birrenbach was alarmed to find 
that elements of the mass media were also playing a propagandistic role with respect to 
the peace and alternative movements (nuclear question) in the FRG.  Birrenbach’s 
concerns were particularly strong due to his conception of a fearful, irrational and 
ignorant Western European population.261 
Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists confronted a number of difficulties in 
their efforts abroad in this field.  Birrenbach continued to detect intense anti-German 
sentiment and attitudes in American and European (especially French) public opinion, 
both in the press and broader populations.  Fed by historical experiences (e.g. the NS- 
regime), deep misunderstandings/misinterpretations (including between the US and the 
FRG; including of the FRG’s fundamental system and ideas) and envy of the FRG’s 
disproportionate power and economic development, such spicions abroad flared up in 
connection with the FRG’s efforts surrounding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the 
wave of terrorism in the FRG and the government’s efforts to combat it during the late 
1970s, the public anti-American activities, proposals, policies and expressions of left-
wing politicians and personalities (e.g. SPD left-wing, Greens, Brandt) and peace 
movement in the Federal Republic (especially potential violence against American 
soldiers and missile sites) and the Bitburg episode in 1985 (US) and reminded Birrenbach 
of the time before 1914.262  Birrenbach was particularly concerned about the 
                                                
260 On the alleged success of USSR propaganda, see KB to ohl, 11 August 1981, K032/1. 
261 On the nature of the West European population, see KB to Brzezinski, 7 December 1982, K132/2. 
262 For the analogy to the pre-1914 period, see KB to Robert Schaetzel, DC, 11 January 1978, K100/2.  On 
“Neidkomplexe,” see KB to Kohl, 26 May 1983.  As of December 1978, Birrenbach argued that in view of 
the envy and other anti-German feelings, it was necessary that the FRG act under the old Prussian princi le 
“mehr sein als scheinen” (KB to Schmidt, 21 December 1978).  As of Septembr 1977, Birrenbach saw the 
French front commun (French Left) combining anti-American and anti-German feelings with potentially 
serious consequences for the international situation.  As of February 1984, Birrenbach did detect a more 
positive French attitude/mood towards the FRG and the German people.  As of September 1977, 
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psychological impact of such phenomena (e.g. peace demonstrations and left-wingers) on 
the “extremely sensitive” Americans, both the general population (nation) as well as 
prominent personalities (e.g. Congress), including visitors to the FRG (e.g. President 
Reagan in June 1982, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Haig, McCloy).263  In May 
                                                                                                                                      
Birrenbach was upset about the anti-German journalistic/press outbreaks in neighboring countries.  As of 
November 1977, Birrenbach seems to have detected ani-German attitudes in the Latin states in Europe 
(e.g. part of French public opinion, e.g. a series of Le Monde articles).  As of November 1977, while 
Birrenbach disliked it that a British author had refe red to the German terrorists as “Hitler’s Children,” 
Birrenbach was particularly upset about the “impossible and scandalous” anti-German reactions to the 
German terrorism (and the FRG fight against it) in the European left-wing press (e.g. in France Le Monde 
and some others (but apparently not Le Figaro), and a radio station), political groups/parties and
intellectuals, especially in the Latin countries (Italy and France) but also in Scandinavia and the 
Netherlands and in part Britain. (KB to Bowie, 4 November 1977).  As of April 1985, Birrenbach believed 
that the memory of the National Socialist regime was still too deep in the US (public opinion?) for there to 
be a US gesture à la Verdun.  As of July 1983, Birrenbach believed that the development of the steel crisis 
demonstrated the unjust attitude of the European part ers (in the EC, including France) to the FRG.  Basing 
his judgment of the situation on his having observed the development of National Socialism in Germany in 
the 1920s and 30s, Birrenbach insisted that the FRGwas in fact a permissive society that would not and
could not pursue a Hitler policy.  Birrenbach argued that if the FRG were actually a repressive state b sed 
on an exaggerated concept of law and order, the German police would not be so helpless in pursuing the 
terrorists. (KB to Aron, 22 September 1977, K074/1).  As of August 1977, Birrenbach argued that more 
dangerous than a National Socialist revival was the growth of a radical left-wave, a danger also in other 
West European states.  Birrenbach was also critical of the “irresponsible” comments of certain parts of the 
radical “intelligentsia” in Germany with respect to the German terrorism and FRG response (KB to 
Marjolin, 14 September 1977, K074/1).  In later years, French policy sought to prevent a too strong 
German army. 
263 Birrenbach admitted that the United States, in spite of its relative upswing, had not solved its economic 
crisis and that the United States had still not set up an adequate weapon program.  However, in any case in 
the substance, the United States was still ready to efend the continent [für den Kontinent einzustehen].  
However, Birrenbach considered it “extremely doubtfl” whether it still would be tomorrow by possible 
demonstrations against Reagan or a hesitation on our part in 1983.  Then it would come to a withdrawal 
[Rückzug] of the United States to the “Fortress America.”  A demonstration in Berlin against Reagan would 
have “profound [tiefgreifende]” consequences.  Birrenbach saw all that in danger and was therefore “deeply 
troubled [zutiefst beunruhigt].” (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Bundespräsidenten Prof. Dr. 
Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, K033/1).  Europe still had chances.  But the pacifist wave had to be 
somehow stopped, hard as that was.  It required a full commitment of the leading personalities, because 
they would otherwise have to reckon with consequences, namely possibly with a withdrawal of the United 
States to the “Fortress America.” (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Berndt von Staden, State 
Secretary of the AA, Bonn, 11 November 1981, personal-confidential, K033/2).  In Birrenbach’s letter to 
the foreign minister, he had said that after the “Brlin Weeks” in New York, which in Birrenbach’s view 
had been very little impressive, one could not be surprised if the Americans, to say nothing of the 
Europeans, one day by a military endangering in Berlin asked, “Pourquoi mourir pour Danzig?” (KB to 
Lübbe, 15 August 1977, K171/1).  As of June 1982, Birrenbach also referred specifically to “the extremely 
sensitive American President [Reagan].” (KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 2 June 1982).  As of June 1982, 
Birrenbach also bemoaned the murder attempt on General Kroesen.  Birrenbach’s US friend (Kissinger at 
least) was upset about the possibility of anti-American demonstrations in the FRG on Reagan’s June 1982
visit.  Some of Birrenbach’s US contacts visited the FRG.  As of November 1984, Birrenbach feared that if 
Brandt (the leader of the opposition) on the occasion of an upcoming meeting of the peace movement in 
Bonn again criticized the US policy and compared the American measures in Nicaragua with the USSR 
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1982, such fears took personal shape at a small, intimate Berlin dinner and conversation 
for Kissinger to which Birrenbach had been invited (and attended) and at which Bahr’s 
expressions regarding the United States and the NATO double-track resolution led to 
“alarmed and embittered” reactions among “our US friends” present (including Kissinger 
and Doty) that Birrenbach described as “dismaying.”264   
Faced with such obstacles, Birrenbach pushed on in the field of Atlanticist public 
relations and public opinion actions directed at a German and foreign (especially 
American) audience.  At least in the first years after leaving the Bundestag, he continued 
his journalistic activities, publishing several analytical articles on foreign affairs in outlets 
such as Der Welt and Orbis.265  Birrenbach also maintained contact with members of the 
German press, gave a few speeches in the FRG and the US and once, in November 1982, 
even gave an interview on relevant questions broadcast on nationwide radio in the US.266  
                                                                                                                                      
war in Afghanistan, this along with other statements of prominent Social Democrats would further 
stimulate “concern [Sorge]” for the alliance in the US.  As of 1981, Birrenbach fumed that certain 
irresponsible circles in northern Europe (including responsible politicians in the FRG) made the US out t  
be the warmonger (started the arms competition withthe rearmament decision and not ready to negotiate 
with the USSR about the rearmament decision) and the USSR the defensive power (KB to Kohl, 11 August 
1981).  This falsification had to be contradicted.   
264 On the “dismaying” reaction [bestürzend], see KB to Schmidt, 2 June 1982; on “alarmed and 
embittered” reactions, see KB to Bundespräsidenten Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, K033/1. 
265 See: “Grenzen amerikanischer Außenpolitik sind in er Ära Carter enger geworden,” by KB, Die Welt, 
20 October 1977; “Angst im Ausland” (Leserbrief; WamS, 30 October 1977); “Friedenschance verpaßt,” 
FAZ, 30 January 1978 (letter to the editor; on Israel and the Middle East); a large technical/non-popular 
three-part article (series) in Der Welt, 3-5 April 1978 on “Die europäische Sicherheit” (“Widersprüche 
schwächen die Schutzgarantie Amerikas,” 3 April 1978; “Der Schutz des eigenen Landes hat für die 
Supermächte Vorrang,” 4 April 1978; and “Europas Sicherheit ist nicht nur Aufgabe der Amerikaner,” 5 
April 1978) that, at the request of US friends (maybe Strausz-Hupé?), was then also published in English 
(somewhat modified) as “European Security: NATO, SALT and Equilibrium” in Orbis (Volume 22, 
Number 2, Summer 1978, on The Many Faces of Nuclear Policy); (title?), Die Welt, 5 June 1980.  As of 20 
August 1979, Birrenbach had published a piece in Orbis (when?, Summer 1978?). Birrenbach saw that his 
products received considerable distribution among prominent personalities and beyond.  Birrenbach 
continued to distribute his publications to his contacts and to alert his contacts to them (including foreign 
contacts).  As of July 1979, Birrenbach, in response to a query, placed in prospect the writing of an article 
again for the Deutsche Zeitung (editor-in-chief Ludolf Hermann), Bonn. 
266 With respect to Birrenbach maintaining contact with personalities of the German press, see for instance 
KB to Dönhoff, 10 June 1977, K151/2 and KB to Dr. Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, K153/1.  
As of June 1979, Ludolf Hermann (Deutsche Zeitung editor-in-chief) had received in the past year advice 
and help from Birrenbach.  As of July 1978, Birrenbach was pleased that such a constructive cooperation 
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Meanwhile, he welcomed US efforts aimed at the German population, including visits to 
Europe and the FRG by the President and other prominent Americans.267  Birrenbach also 
                                                                                                                                      
had come about with Wilfried Hertz-Eichenrode (Die Welt editor-in-chief).  They planned to talk (also with 
Cramer) about the situation in the Middle East, maybe in Bonn.  In July 1979, Birrenbach sent his 
Weimar/FTS introductory speech to Ludolf Hermann (Deutsche Zeitung editor-in-chief).  On Birrenbach’s 
radio interview (apparently conducted in the FRG), see KB to Kohl, 22 November 1982.  As of May 1977, 
Birrenbach had expressed his opinions in Vorträgen given in recent months in Germany (e.g. in the 
Redoute in Bad Godesberg/Bonn on 22 February 1977 on “The Relationship between Europe and the 
United States: Today and Tomorrow” at the invitation of the Vorstand of the Deutschen Bank AG before a 
group of US bankers, industrialists and members of different US departments (before the Presidential 
Executives Federal Sector)).  As of 26 September 1977, Birrenbach would soon fly to the US where he 
would give in Washington DC a Vortrag about the relationship of Europe to the US under th  simultaneous 
treatment of the nuclear problem, at the request of Gerard Smith.  Birrenbach had given a talk in 
Washington (DC) during his last stay. (KB to Dr. Wilfried Guth, Vorstand Member of the Deutschen Bank 
AG, Frankfurt, 29 March 1978, K153/1).  As of July 1980, there was or would soon be a publication of 
Birrenbach’s expositions on the occasion of the anniversary in the DGAP.  Birrenbach also may have made 
use of television for public relations purposes (or was this strictly for retrospective purposes?).  Heinz 
Grosch (no date but almost certainly first half of the 1980s) referred to the TV broadcast in which 
Birrenbach answered questions but which unfortunately was not broadcast at a more favorable time, 
limiting the audience circle. 
267 Birrenbach hoped that the new American ambassador would be able to make the situation of the United 
States and its problems understood to also a larger part of the population. (KB to Haig, 24 June 1981, 
K146/2.)  Birrenbach urged the US to eliminate the idea that the US wanted superiority in the military 
realm. (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, K146/2).  The r etoric of the American announcement of the 
change in American policy had not been diplomatic enough in view of the sensibility of the morally 
weakened population in the north of Europe.  Exposed suddenly to the reality of the world situation a part 
of the youth, especially of the SPD, the left-wing of the FDP and certain church youth groups, had initiated 
a campaign for peace with undertones against the styl  of the new administration in the US.  One or other 
psychological mistakes had been committed by the United States. (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, 
K146/2).  The psychological way in which the US introduced the neutron bomb had disturbed many people 
in Europe.  The US should have introduced this weapon step-by-step, slowly, preparing public opinion.  
Europe was sensitive in nuclear questions. (KB to Schaetzel, 9 August 1977, K100/2).  It would be usefl 
in the next critical months if the US administration asked American personalities, politicians and perhaps 
also scientists to discuss the problems of peace (I think in the German press/media) in response to the peace 
demonstrations in Germany and a pacifist development in certain parties.  It would help make the 
deployment of Euro-strategic weapons on German soil easier.  The Reagan speech had had a positive effect
on the situation in West Europe. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2).  All speeches of American 
representatives should avoid the mention of limited nuclear war in Europe.  This was in the American 
interest, and that of the Federal Republic and Europe. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2).  As of 
November 1981-April 1982, Birrenbach was hoping andsuggesting to Haig that in response to the peace 
demonstrations in the FRG and a pacifist development in certain parties the US administration would 
encourage prominent American personalities (e.g. politicians and perhaps scientists) to speak on German 
and European (i.e. British, French, Belgian, Dutch and Italian) TV about the problems of peace, the 
situation, the Geneva and START negotiations, and the US acceptance of the Harmel doctrine of 1967 
(defense and simultaneous negotiations with the USSR) and attached great importance to Reagan’s 
upcoming Bundestag speech in June, which he hoped would stress the importance of arms control.  
Birrenbach hoped such efforts would help the European statesmen combat the peace movement and dispel 
left-wing efforts in Germany to portray the Americans as intent on gaining a superiority in nuclear arms. 
(KB to Haig, 5 April 1982, K146/2).  As of 2 June 1982, McCloy’s statement (I think something to do with 
anti-US peace demonstrations and/or the Reagan visit) had been published on Tuesday in Der Welt, 
apparently to Birrenbach’s pleasure.  As of 30 Novemb r 1981, Birrenbach was pleased that Weinberger 
had recently given an interview on German television.  With respect to US visitors, for instance, as of 14 
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promoted attempts to squelch the left-wing movements a d anti-American criticism in 
the FRG.  On one hand, he looked to the Politik and Wissenschaft for a media campaign 
of education and enlightenment of the German people, ev n urging that Chancellor 
Schmidt give a Churchillian “blood, sweat and tears” ddress on television in favor of 
nuclear energy.268  On the other, in part due to his own experience of anti-American 
demonstrations in Krefeld, Birrenbach urged the federal government to get the 
demonstrations under control by force if necessary and advocated a sharpening of the 
relevant laws.269  Concerned about fears expressed by his foreign conta ts, Birrenbach 
                                                                                                                                      
June 1982, Reagan’s visit and speeches in the FRG, London and Paris and, as of February 1983, the visit of 
Vice President George Bush, I think to Europe/the FRG. 
268 KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU- 
Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1.  For an explicit refe nce in this context to Churchill 
and “Blut und Tränen,” see KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübbe, 23 April 1981, K032/1 and KB to Beckurts, 
18 March 1980.  For an explicit reference in this context to Churchill’s “blood, sweat and tears,” seeKB to 
McCloy, 4 February 1981.  Up to 1977, the “enlightenment” work in the nuclear energy question had been 
carried out, ineffectively, by the Deutschen Atomforum.  Therefore, it is no surprise that, as of March 1977, 
Birrenbach was pleased that a Zentrum für Energienachrichten had been created and would soon begin its 
work.  This was intended to correct the inaccurate assertions of the nuclear energy opponents in the public.  
However, the center also was an easy target for nuclear energy opponents and correspondingly lost in 
effectiveness since the industry itself had decided on its creation (with the Kraftwerk Union as the driving 
force) and paid its costs.  As of December 1977-June 1978, Birrenbach was receiving and reading the pro-
nuclear energy papers/circulars/publications/materils of the Informationskreis Kernenergie sent by Dr. 
Günter Brück (of that organization), a self-described effort to intervene “sachlich” and without emotion in 
the discussion about the peaceful use of nuclear energy (e.g. disposal) and thus to close the information 
holes among the citizens.  It does not appear that Birrenbach was actually in contact with Brück. 
269 Birrenbach appears to have gotten some negative feedback from his US contacts.  For instance, McCloy 
appears to have been upset and expressed disappointment to Birrenbach about the wave of pacifism in the 
FRG and about neutralist and anti-US views.  As of July 1983, in the question of the demonstration 
law/right, Birrenbach thought like Strauß and appears to have disagreed with FDP demands on this issue.  
As of April 1982, Birrenbach complained that the social-liberal coalition had overly stressed the right to 
demonstrate as a symbol of liberty (KB to Haig, 5 April 1982, K146/2).  With respect to demonstrations, 
Birrenbach himself repeatedly argued that genuine fre dom had natural limits (e.g. in the law and alsoin 
the form; not force [Gewalt] in this form).  As of March 1983, with respect to the demonstration right, 
Birrenbach argued that disguised demonstrations could not lead to the determining of violent perpetrato s 
and were as such unacceptable in a liberal [freiheitlichen] Rechtsstaat (KB to Kohl, 22 March 1983).  
Birrenbach believed the development of a plebiscitary democracy, as manifested by the large 
demonstrations (organized groups of the peace movement), undermined the state authority and weakened 
the German position in the alliance and even in the EC.  The echo from the US, France and Britain was 
especially negative since they feared that the Federal Republic was endangered as the forward glacis of the 
alliance by the Soviet threats. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, 
Honorary President of the MPG zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV, Munich, 9 February 1984, K030/1).  
Among the items Birrenbach pushed for was a prohibition against disguises in the new demonstration 
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sought to shore up their confidence and sow goodwill abroad by refuting perceptions of 
the FRG as a nationalist, repressive police state hungering for nuclear weapons and 
experiencing a renaissance of deep-rooted National Socialism, instead depicting it as a 
respectable democracy, an overly permissive society tha , in spite of the shameful 
demonstrations, was robustly Atlanticist (political elites and vast majority of people).270  
This was part of his efforts to downplay anti-Americanism and stress overwhelmingly 
pro-American public opinion in Europe.  Finally, while nothing seems to have 
materialized, Birrenbach was, as of November 1981, about to form with Ellsworth, at the 
latter’s request, a German-American group to discus the problem of the peace 
movement.271 
While Birrenbach did not devote himself solely to contemplation, in later years, 
he, along with the Atlanticist movement/infrastructure as a whole, did shift to some 
extent into a more retrospective mode/phase.272  Birrenbach looked back with a 
considerable sense of success and satisfaction on his life, efforts and achievements.  With 
respect to his own life, Birrenbach stressed “that I have gone this path practically alone 
                                                                                                                                      
criminal law [Strafrecht].  Birrenbach had observed the Krefeld demonstrations as of 28 June 1983, I think 
surrounding a function with Vice President Bush. 
270 Regarding the Bitburg affair, Birrenbach attempted damage control by explaining to his US contacts the 
realities (e.g. regarding the non-political, non-NS nature of the Waffen-SS (and the German Army) as of 
1944; the non-SS nature of the cemetery) and to defen  Kohl (did not know the SS graves were in the 
churchyard).  Birrenbach also argued to his foreign co tacts that the FRG had exemplary social conditions.   
271 For Birrenbach hoping that McCloy, chairman of theAmerican Council on Germany (1972-87), would 
be “able to support the project” Birrenbach had “offered” Ellsworth (we needed an answer by 7 December 
at the latest when we would have a/the meeting of the AB), see KB to John McCloy, 30 November 1981, 
ACDP K132/2.   
272 Birrenbach looked back on the last thirty years to draw conclusions. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, 
Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1).  Without de Gaulle we 
would perhaps have reached the goal of a political union.  Perhaps we have missed in the 1960s a decisive 
moment in history on this issue. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), 
President, to Hon. Mrs. Shirley Williams, MP, Secreta y of State for Education and Science, London, 25 
July 1977, K074/1). 
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without any support under often extremely difficult circumstances.”273  Admittedly, the 
course of his life [Lebenslauf] had been tumultuous [wirr ], “[b]ut I believe from 
unfavorable [ungünstigen] positions, with own efforts [Kräften], something [einiges] 
from it to have made.”274  Among other things, he was deeply proud of his role in the 
creation and development of the Atlanticist institutions/infrastructure, of his membership 
and work in them (e.g. Action Committee for the United States of Europe, DGAP, FTS) 
and of their functioning/activities (e.g. functions and publications).  However, Birrenbach 
insisted in later years that “The most beautiful experience of my life has been the contact 
with outstanding men in many countries in politics, economy and science.”275 
 In later years, Birrenbach basked in the public (and private) recognition of his 
achievements.  Some Atlanticists (e.g. Monnet) enjoyed honors from governments.  As of 
February 1977, Birrenbach was especially pleased that Monnet’s image would appear on 
a German stamp (which were published by the German postal and telecommunications 
minister), the first foreigner to do so.276  In later years, there emerged a series of 
Atlanticist-minded awards (or at least European-minded).  As of 1985-86, M. Alfred 
Toepfer and the Stiftung Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in Basel had created along with 
the University of Lausanne the Jean Monnet Prize (Prix Jean Monnet), which was 
awarded every two years in the University of Lausanne i  the presence of numerous 
                                                
273 KB to Dr. Gerd Tacke, Member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Siemens AG, Munich, 8 March 1979. 
274 KB to Ernst Plesser, 2 March 1979.   
275 KB to Bowie, 18 July 1977.  Birrenbach’s contact with the great FTS Wissenschaftlichen Beirat had 
been one of the most important satisfactions in Birrenbach’s life.  “I see the main profit [Hauptgewinn] of 
my life in it, in three areas with leading personalities in the world an in part even friendly contact to have 
found, in the area of the Politik, the Wirtschaft, but also the Wissenschaft.”  In this context, Birrenbach was 
always especially happy about the “great concord [Einvernehmen]” that had existed between him and 
Butenandt. (KB to Professor Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2). 
276 Birrenbach congratulated Monnet on this and claimed this demonstrated that the Germans recognized 
Monnet’s contributions to their continent.  In 1975, Monnet got the Gold Medal from the European 
Parliament. 
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personalities close to the European idea.  This prize appears to have also been somehow 
related to the FJME (received radiance from this givin ).277  As of November 1977, the 
Aspen Institute (Berlin?) gave a Statesman-Humanist Award at an Aspen Award dinner 
in which the recipient said some words after a Laudatio.278  As an artisan of the European 
construction, Birrenbach was invited (though he could not attend due to what he claimed 
was bad health), along with numerous other such personalities from the Europe of the 
Nine, to take part in May 1977 in the ceremony surro nding the planting of the Tree of 
Europe (a lime tree from Monnet’s garden in Houjarray) in Sophia Antipolis.279   
Even in earlier years, Birrenbach was not unaccustomed to receiving various 
honors, the granting of which was often the occasion for ceremonies/receptions as well as 
celebratory speeches by both the bestower (presenter) a d Birrenbach himself.  Already 
                                                
277 The awarding of the Monnet Prize was decided by a jury presided over as of 1986 by the French 
statesman M. Alain Poher.  The 1985 recipients of the Prix Jean Monnet were Bernard Clappier and 
Etienne Hirsch.  As of 1985, there was a Prix Balzan (not sure exactly what that is). 
278 As of November 1977, McCloy would receive this award. 
279 Pierre Laffitte (President, Association Sophia Antipolis, Paris) seems to have been in charge of this.  
Monnet was also invited but declined due to health.  Alain Poher (I think former president of the European 
Assembly) had accepted to give his patronage to the cer mony.  This all was a supplementary gauge of the 
European sense.  Independent of Birrenbach’s role, over the years (as of 1980), Birrenbach’s foreign 
contacts received numerous awards, orders and honorary doctorates.  In Monnet’s case, this included the 
Freedom Award (1963); the Family of Man Award at the New York Hilton at an annual dinner chaired by 
George Ball (November 1967; given by the Society for the Family of Man); the Médaille d’Or from the 
European Parliament for his contribution to European unification (as of October 1975); and nomination by 
the Council of Europe as the first honorary citizen of the united Europe (as of April 1976).  In McCloy’s 
case, this included the honorary citizenship of Rothenburg ob der Tauber, which he had saved from 
bombardment in Spring 1945; as well as the Lucius D. Clay Medal, which he had been awarded in 
Karlsruhe (I believe in May 1980) in a ceremony at which Genscher had spoken, at least in part in 
appreciation of his historic role in creating a new Germany; and the first Prix Monnet, awarded by the 
Monnet Foundation (October 1981).  In the case of Kohnstamm, this included as of 1977 the Wateler Peace 
Prize, given in the Hague (apparently a Dutch prize) based on the decision by the board of the Carnegie 
Stichting (invitations from Dr. JH van Roijen, the President of he Board of Directors of the Carnegie 
Foundation) and due at least in part to his work in the ECSC, later in the Monnet Committee and as 
President of the European University Institute in Florence.  Other awards included the gold medal of the 
Association of Friends of President Robert Schuman, the first one of which was given on 2 July 1966 to 
Konrad Adenauer in Montigny-lès-Metz with an address given by Monnet; the Paul G. Hoffman Award 
Fund, intended to recognize individual achievements in he advancement of important development 
interests; and the Paul-Henry Spaak Memorial Fellowship, the first one of which had been recently 
received by Dr. Gerhard Mally as of July 1973.  The German Marshall Fund of the United States funded 
awards (the Paul G. Hoffman Award Fund (one-time grant)).   
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in October 1965, in the Amerika-Haus in Munich, Birrenbach had received the 
Columbus-Medaille from the Columbus-Gesellschaft (Munich) for his services in the 
cause of German-American relations.280  In July 1966, the Medical Faculty of the 
University of Düsseldorf awarded him an honorary doctorate (in medicine).  In June 
1967, shortly before Birrenbach’s 60th birthday, the President of the Bundestag (in the 
name of the Federal President) granted him the Große Bundesverdienstkreuz of the 
Verdienstordens of the Federal Republic.  In March 1976, Birrenbach had received the 
Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Arabian Republic of Egypt.  
This overall process continued in the later years of Birrenbach’s life.  In June 
1977, as Birrenbach’s 70th birthday approached, the President of the Bundestag 
(Carstens) bestowed upon him the state’s highest decoration/order, the Große 
Bundesverdienstkreuz mit Stern und Schulterband.281  Shortly thereafter, in July 1977 (I 
think in Bonn), Prof. Karl Kaiser, Prof. Hans-Peter Schwarz and Amb. von Walther 
presented Birrenbach with a “Festschrift” dedicated in his honor, entitled Amerika und 
Westeuropa.  Prepared and published in the Federal Republic by the DGAP Research 
Institute (in fact edited by Kaiser and Schwarz), this birthday Festschrift enjoyed an 
excellent reception in the German press and, after  l ngthy delay, also appeared in 1979 
in an American edition.282  In June 1981, at the Hotel Excelsior in Cologne, th  Max-
                                                
280 This decoration was bestowed upon Birrenbach by Hermann Proebst (president of the G sellschaft and 
editor-in-chief of the Süddeutschen Zeitung). 
281 Carstens gave a speech for the awarding of the Großen Verdienstkreuz to Birrenbach on 20 June 1977, 
and Birrenbach gave an answer. 
282 For the press reception in the Federal Republic, see KB to Bowie, 16 June 1978.  To Birrenbach’s great 
pleasure, this volume/collection of important essay featured an introduction by McCloy (an offer made to 
him by the editors).  Birrenbach thanked McCloy for the introduction “which has been the most valuable 
gift I have received on that day.” (KB to McCloy, 24 March 1980).  According to Birrenbach, Schaetzel 
had induced McCloy to write the forward (KB to Schaetzel, 29 August 1977).  Clearly pleased with the 
contributions, Birrenbach described the F stschrift as “magnificent [glänzend].” (KB to Steinhoff, 12 
August 1977, K173/1).  At the time the book appeared, Karl Kaiser was the Director of the DGAP 
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Research Institute and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Cologne and Hans-Peter 
Schwarz was a Professor of Political Science at the University of Cologne and Acting Chairman of the 
Directorate of the Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Studies.  The contributions t  the 
volume Amerika und Westeuropa (I think the sub-title was Present and Future Problems) offered a variety 
of viewpoints and came from a group of distinguished experts on trans-Atlantic relations functioning as a 
working group that, under the aegis of the DGAP Research Institute, had discussed and thoroughly 
analyzed the pressing and future problems facing the countries of North America and Western Europe 
(Birrenbach had not seen any of the texts beforehand).  These contributors (including many Birrenbach 
contacts) were: François Bondy; Robert Bowie; William Diebold Jr. (on reforming the international 
economic system); Peter Dobell; François Duchêne (Th  EC and its Global Responsibilities); Wilhelm 
Grewe; William E. Griffith; Pierre Hassner; Martin Hillenbrand; Karl Kaiser (two articles, including 
“Amerika und Westeuropa” and a concluding article); Norbert Kloten; Ulrich Littmann; John McCloy; 
Uwe Nerlich; Henry Owen; Wilhelm Rall; Klaus Ritter; Benjamin Roberts; Robert Schaetzel; Hans-Peter 
Schwarz; Andrew Shonfield; Raymond Vernon; and Wolfgang Wagner.  The book analyzed a number of 
themes (and their impact, e.g. on trans-Atlantic relations), among them: various aspects of the Western 
economic system, basic questions of security policy, the conflicts inherent in Euro-communism, the 
concept of the international system as a whole (with special attention given to the inclusion of Japan and 
Canada in the solution of important problems), the European Community as a regional system and special 
problems of German-American relations.  The book started from the premise that the relations with North 
America remained the central concern of Western Europe and that it was essential to determine the form
and content of those relations.  It demonstrated that there were no basic differences between the viewpoints 
of America and Europe with respect to the need for and means of developing a foreign policy partnership.  
The preconditions for such a foreign policy partnership were examined and used in the analysis of current 
problems. (Some sort of promotional material for this book, K106/2).  In explaining the agonizing, 
frustrating, lengthy and embarrassing delay of the appearance of the US edition to his American friends, 
Birrenbach absolved himself and pointed to his efforts to accelerate the process (vis-à-vis the Belser Verlag 
and the DGAP) and blamed accidents and others for their mistakes and the “scandalous” and 
“unbelievable” mishandling of the matter (enormous b tacles and problems): the German publisher (the 
Chr. Belser AG für Verlagsgeschäfte & Co. KG (Belser Verlag), Stuttgart-Zurich (responsible to the 
DGAP; negotiated badly, inexperienced in international negotiations)), the American publisher (Lexington 
Books, D.C. Heath and Company (neighboring publishers), Lexington, MA; incomprehensible delays, 
worked extremely slowly; sent the book for printing at a lower price to England; thanks to the efforts f 
Kaiser), the British printing house (the large, renow ed, high-quality firm William Clowes (International 
Ltd; Printers and Bookbinders; London); had been th victim of a lengthy strike), the DGAP (had used 
second-class translators whose work had to be re-don ; vacations from July-September; personnel changes; 
Kaiser had misinformed Birrenbach about the procedur /state of publication of the book) and the publisher 
Alfred A. Knopf Inc. (New York; originally foreseen as the publisher but then gave a belated and unfair 
rejection, claiming that they preferred to publish works by single writers), all the mistakes made in the 
course of the production/printing/publishing/translation process.  Birrenbach concluded that the publishing 
industry in the US was in bad shape.  The American edition was entitled America and Western Europe: 
Problems and Prospects.  Our friend Kaiser was more a man of political scien e than the right negotiator 
with publishers. (KB to Schaetzel, 6 October 1978, K098/2).  Birrenbach sent the volume Amerika und 
Westeuropa to Coing. (Prof. Dr. iur. Helmut Coing, Director of the Max-Planck-Institut für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte, Frankfurt, to KB, 20 September 1977, K106/2).  The American edition of the Festschrift 
of the DGAP had been sold and a second edition was now published.  (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, 
K178/2).  Birrenbach wanted the book published in English in the US, believing they owed this to McCloy 
(and I assume all the American contributors).  As of February 1979, Birrenbach claimed that the German 
edition of the Festschrift had been a success in Germany (in what sense?).  An apologetic, even ashamed 
Birrenbach, appears to have been considerably more concerned than the US/foreign contributors about the 
delays.  Available on the market (at least in the US), Birrenbach’s Festschrift seems to have achieved at 
least adequate sales.  As of August 1979, the inventory of the US edition had recently sold out, and the 
publisher had decided to print a second unchanged edition (Kaiser to KB, 23 August 1979).  As of 
September 1978, the 1,219 hardcover copies of Birrenbach’s Festschrift had already been sold.  Of the 
3,700 paperbacks, 2,011 had been sold, so that 1,689 copies were still by the publisher, and the sales w re 
currently accelerating (Re: phone call from Trebesch on 19 September 1978).  As of September 1977, all 
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Planck-Gesellschaft awarded Birrenbach the rare and prestigious Adolf von Harnack- 
Medaille, one of the highest wissenschaftlichen honors in the Federal Republic, for his 
merits to the Wissenschaft as President of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and as a member of 
the MPG-Senate.283  Finally, in August 1982, Birrenbach received a “Certificate of 
Honor” from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on behalf of the university’s president 
(Prof. Avraham Harman) in appreciation and gratitude for his assistance to that 
institution’s work of teaching and research (services for the research in Israel).284  This 
realm of prizes, honors and awards also saw Atlanticists lobbying/facilitating for one 
another, with for instance Birrenbach as of January 1984 hoping/sought that Rieben 
would offer George Ball a prize (Monnet Prize?) in honor of his great services for 
Monnet and European unification and the relationship to the US in the 1950s and 60s.285   
                                                                                                                                      
that Birrenbach had heard from competent readers of his Festschrift was very positive.  As of September 
1978, a hardback copy of Birrenbach’s Festschrift cost DM 22,80 (Re: phone call from Trebesch on 19 
September 1978).  The FTS helped by paying the Belser Verlag for copies of Birrenbach’s Festschrift both 
for Birrenbach himself as well as for the DGAP, at least some for free disposal (as of 19 September 1978, 
approximately eighty copies for Birrenbach and fifty for the DGAP).  Of course, the DGAP used its means 
to assist in the shipping/distribution.  As of November 1978, it was planned that the German Information 
Center in NY would buy about 200 copies of the Birrenbach Festschrift (Kaiser to KB, 14 November 
1978).  Birrenbach saw to it that his Festschrift was distributed to his contacts and contributors (including 
delivered by the publishers but also seems to have sent it to some himself, including the English version; 
including Americans and foreigners; the DGAP was also involved in this, for instance also identifying 
Germany-experts in the USA that should receive it).  
283 This medal had been created by the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft in 1923 (also the year of that society’s 
founding).  According to Birrenbach, the medal had been awarded to that point to only about 23 or 30 
impressive personalities, among them seven Nobel Prize winners, two Federal Presidents, first-class 
researchers and at least (perhaps only?) three Wirtschaftler.  Birrenbach attributed his reception of this 
medal to his role as president of the FTS (activity in the FTS) and a member of the MPG. (KB, August- 
Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Eduard Wätjen, Ascona, Switzerland, 15 January 1982, K033/2).  During 
those years (turn of the 1920s up to the end of the 30s), Birrenbach had himself “experienced [rlebt]” a 
series of personalities to whom the AHM had been given.  The granting of the medal to Birrenbach was 
based on a unanimous decision of the MPG-Senate.  Prof Reimar Lüst (President of the MPG) gave the 
medal and a speech, and Birrenbach also gave a speech. 
284 This Certificate of Honor was sent to Birrenbach by the European representative of the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem (Dr. Ephraim Lahav). 
285 Likewise, Birrenbach’s contacts sometimes facilitated his receiving such awards.  In July 1967, 
Birrenbach thanked Barzel for the advocacy of the givin  of the Großen Bundesverdienstkreuz.  As of 
August 1982, Birrenbach believed that with respect to the certificate of honor he had gotten recently of the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem that Keynan (vice prsident of the HUJ) had worked behind the scenes and 
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The Atlanticists also had their life work recognized on their birthdays in various 
celebrations.  On one hand, Birrenbach was invited to attend the birthday celebrations of 
others (e.g. McCloy).286  On the other hand, in addition to his private birthday 
celebrations and as with the other celebrations and ho oring of Birrenbach’s career, 
Birrenbach’s special/important birthdays (e.g. his 65th and 70th) were the occasion for 
various celebratory/honoring social functions.287  Staged in a variety of venues (e.g. the 
Hotel Breidenbacher Hof and the Park Hotel, both in Düsseldorf) by a variety of entities 
(most notably the Thyssen Gesellschaften), Birrenbach’s birthday celebrations/functions 
were characterized by dinners, special meetings and speeches/laudations delivered by 
Birrenbach and others as appreciations of Birrenbach’s person, life and achievements in 
the FRG and beyond and attended (invited by Birrenbach) by illustrious 
personalities/men in the Federal Republic from the worlds of Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft 
and Politik as well as by Birrenbach’s foreign/US contacts, personalities that he was 
personally close to as well as representatives of the groups with whom he had worked 
with.288  Indeed, in July 1977, Birrenbach joked with pleased relief that he had now 
                                                                                                                                      
induced the members of the board of the university to honor Birrenbach thus and that he owed this honor to 
Keynan’s friendly intervention in his favor. 
286 Birrenbach regretted being unable to attend a birthday celebration for McCloy on 20 March 1985 (he 
had been invited) due to illness. 
287 In 1967, Birrenbach celebrated his birthday with his family in Münster in all seclusion, without 
presenting himself to the public.  In 1979, Birrenbach interrupted his work and celebrated his birthday in 
Hannover with his children and grandchildren.  In July 1983, Birrenbach celebrated his birthday peacefully 
at home. I think he celebrated his birthday in 1985 at home. 
288 Birrenbach’s birthday celebrations/functions were staged in a variety of venues by a variety of entities: 
the Thyssen Gesellschaften (evening function/celebration/reception with a dinner in the Park Hotel in 
Düsseldorf on 5 July 1977); a Herrenabend in the Hotel Breidenbacher Hof in Düsseldorf (on 6 July 1972; 
also Thyssen Gesellschaften?); the TVV GmbH (in Schloss Hugenpoet in Kettwig/Ruhr on 4 July 1972); 
the Aufsichtsrat meeting of the ATH AG (on 7 July 1972); family celebration (in Schloss Wilkinghege in/by 
Münster/Westfalen on 2 July 1972).  As of July 1979, the TVV celebrated Birrenbach’s 25 years as its 
chairman.  It was planned to hold a party in fall 1979 to celebrate in large circle Birrenbach’s anniversary 
by Thyssen.  As of July 1979, it was the 25th anniversary of Birrenbach’s taking up his activity in the 
Thyssen Gesellschaften.  Carstens had gone into an invitation to Birrenbach’s birthday.  Birrenbach 
claimed that this invitation had happened without his knowledge. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, 
to Federal President Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, K033/1).  Among those at the AHM 
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dinner for Birrenbach would be Michael Hoffmann-Becking.  Hase had been invited (had to cancel) by the 
MPG for Birrenbach’s receiving of the AHM.  Birrenbach celebrated his birthday privately on 2 July 1982.  
Those delivering speeches/Laudationes about Birrenbach at Birrenbach’s various birthday celebrations 
included Prof. Dr. Robert Ellscheid; Dr. Julian Baron von Godlewski; Prof. Dr. Helmut Coing; Spethmann; 
Chancellors (aD) Prof. Dr. Erhard and Kiesinger; Dr. Sohl; and Birrenbach himself in conclusion (all on 6 
July 1972 and/or 5 July 1977; Birrenbach would not leave it at a simple thanks but told his life story); Dr. 
Max Horst (VLR I. Kl. aD on 2 July 1972 at the family celebration and to Kurt and Ida on 2 July 1977); Dr. 
Jörg Bankmann (Vorstand Member of the TVV GmbH to KB and wife; 70th birthday); Dr. Fritz Wecker 
(Vorstand Member of the TVV GmbH on 4 July 1972); and Heinz Oskar Vetter (Chairman of the DGB, 
Deputy Chairman of the AR of the ATH AG; at the AR meeting of the ATH AG on 7 July 1972).  By 
Birrenbach’s 75th birthday in particular the then Federal President Prof. Carstens had paid tribute to 
Birrenbach.  Those attending Birrenbach’s birthday celebrations included a/the Chancellor (former?), 
President, State Secretaries, parliamentary colleagues and friends (all at the Herrenabend on 6 July 1972).  
Those attending Birrenbach’s birthday celebration in 1977 included Ponto (and I think Carstens) and Julian 
Godlewski (5 July 1977).  Those invited to and attending Birrenbach’s 70th birthday celebration in the Park 
Hotel on 5 July 1977 included: Fritz Berg; Martin Hillenbrand (Director General, AIIA); Dr. Horst Kellr 
(Generalbevollmächtigter of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Chancellor Kiesinger; Heinrich Köppler 
(CDU-Landtagsfraktion of NRW, Chairman); Dr. sc. Pol. Hanns-Jürgen Kunze (G neralbevollmächtiger 
of the Thyssen AG); Economics Minister Dr. jur. Otto Graf Lambsdorff (MdB); Paul Lichtenberg 
(Aufsichtsrat Chairman of the Commerzbank AG); Dr. Klaus Mangold; Dr. Siegfried Mann 
(Hauptgeschäftsführer and Member of the Präsidium of the BDI eV); the banker Alwin Münchmeyer; 
Hans Müser (Chair of the VS of the Thyssen Draht AG); Dr.-Ing. Rolfroderich KF Nemitz (Chair of the VS 
of the Thyssen Schachtbau GmbH); Pieter Sanders; Dr. Dieter Spethmann (Chair of the VS of the Thyssen 
AG, formerly ATH); Rudi Schwabenthan (Teheran/Munich); Prof. HP Schwarz (Forschungsinstitut für 
Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen of the University of Cologne); Prof. Gustav Stein (BDI 
eV); Dr. Jürgen Steinmetz (Generalbevollmächtigter of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Dr. Gerd Tacke 
(Member of the AR of the Siemens AG, Munich); and Trebesch (Geschäftsführender Stellvertretender 
Präsident, DGAP).  Those men Birrenbach invited to his birthday celebrations included 
outstanding/leading personalities from Politik (representatives of the federal government; parliamentary 
colleagues (especially Chancellor Erhard)), Wirtschaft (from the Verwaltungsrat and VS of the TVV; the 
ATH VS and AR; from the Vorständen of the daughter companies of the Thyssen group; the banks of our 
group; leading personalities of the BDI), the Wissenschaft (belonging to the FTS Wissenschaftlichen 
Beirat), the Atlanticist organizations (members of the DGAP Präsidium and the SWP Stiftungsrat), as well 
as personal friends from Germany and abroad.  Those invit d to Birrenbach’s 70th birthday celebration (on 
5 July 1977) included Hoffmann-Becking; the President of the Landeszentralbank in Baden-Württemburg 
(who could not take part); Franz Heinrich Ulrich (Düsseldorf; prevented on that day); Prof. Dr. Julius Speer 
(could not take part, sick); and Kohnstamm (by the TVV VS; could not attend).  Those invited to 
Birrenbach’s 70th birthday celebration in the Park Hotel on 5 July 1977 (not sure if attended) included Prof. 
Butenandt.  Those invited to but unable to attend Birrenbach’s 70th birthday celebration in the Park Hotel 
on 5 July 1977 included: Dr. Wolfgang Bernhardt (Deputy Chairman of the VS of Korf-Stahl AG); 
Ministerialdirektor Dr. Klaus Blech (AA); Carstens; Dr. F. Wilhelm Christians (Vorstandssprecher of the 
Deutschen Bank AG); Dönhoff; Dr. jur. G. Freiherr von Falkenhausen; Dr. Heinz Gehm; Prof. Dr. Günther 
Gillessen (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Institut für Publizistik, Mainz); Dr. jur. Klaus Götte (Member 
of the VS of the Allianz Versicherungs-AG); Dr. Wilfried Guth (Vorstandssprecher of the Deutschen Bank 
AG, Frankfurt); Amb. (aD) Karl-Günther von Hase (the Intendant of the ZDF, AöR, Mainz); 
Bundesgerichtshof Vice President (aD) Dr. Fritz Hauß; Heck; the lawyer Hans Hengeler (Düsseldorf, 
actually not invited due to illness); Dr. Max Horst; Federal Minister (aD) Dr. Richard Jaeger (MdB); Prof. 
Dr. Norbert Kloten; Max Kohnstamm (European University Institute, President); Hans Mayr (Dep. 
Chairman of the IG Metall); Hans Merkle; Yohanan Meroz (Israeli embassy); Frau Lilo Milchsack; Dr. 
Karl Mommer; Robert Nyssen; Ernst Plesser (Generalbevollmächtigter of the Deutschen Bank AG); Prof. 
Dr. Julius Speer; Gen. (aD) Hans Speidel (sick); Dr. jur. Wolfgang Schieren (Chairman of the Vorstand, 
Allianz Versicherungs-AG); Federal Judge (aD) Dr. Fabian von Schlabrendorff; Toni Schmücker 
(Chairman of the Vorstand of the Volkswagen AG); Georg Schröder; Gen. (aD) Johannes Steinhoff; Walter 
Stoessel Jr. (US ambassador, US embassy, Bonn); Prof. Shepard Stone; Franz Heinrich Ulrich (Chairman 
of the Aufsichtsrat of the Deutschen Bank; Düsseldorf); Heinz O. Vetter (Chairman of the DGB); Prof. Dr. 
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“survived” all that had been organized for him for his 70th birthday.289  In addition to this, 
in his later years, Birrenbach’s life and career, including his behind-the-scenes 
participation and influence in Wirtschaft and Politik, were periodically honored in the 
German press, particularly on his major birthdays/departures (e.g. from the DGAP) 
announced in those pages.290  In an exhibition of pride and vanity, Birrenbach at least at 
times had the speeches delivered on the occasions of hi  being honored (providing a 
picture of Birrenbach) printed up into brochures and then distributed them to numerous 
personalities.291 
                                                                                                                                      
jur. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum; Dr. Hellmuth Wagner; Richard von Weizsäcker (MdB); Prof. Dr. Stephan 
Waetzoldt (Gen. Director of the Staatlichen Museen Preußischer Kulturbesitz). 
289 KB to Bowie, 18 July 1977.  For Birrenbach’s 70th birthday, there were five dinners or special meetings 
for him in July 1977.  In July 1982, Birrenbach celebrated his 75th birthday with a great reception given to 
him in the Gewölbe of the St. Clara Cloister from the 13th century in Cologne.  The reception and meal had 
been given (conducted) by the FTS (Board).  The Bundespräsident (Carstens), Kohl and other prominent 
personalities from Politik, Wirtschaft and Wissenschaft had taken part in the reception. (KB, August-
Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Sir Siegmund Warburg, London, 24 September 1982, K068/2).  
Birrenbach had celebrated his 70th birthday in the first week of July in several functions. (KB to Lübbe, 15 
August 1977, K171/1).  Birrenbach’s birthday festivities dragged on for almost over a week.  “On the 
occasion of my birthday an appreciation [Anerkennung] beyond all expectations took place of my activity 
as a loner [Einzelgänger] in the past.”  From the federal president through Prof. Carstens, the highest 
German order had been awarded to Birrenbach.  Also several functions occurred for Birrenbach in whose 
course Birrenbach’s activity was paid tribute to in a way such that the closing speeches had become 
difficult for Birrenbach. (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1). 
290 For such biographical announcements of Birrenbach’s key birthdays/departures see, for instance, 
Deutschland-Berichte (I believe), July-August 1977, Nr 7/8, pp. 14-16; “KB-stets diskret,” Die Zeit, 3 July 
1981; “Birrenbach 75,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, RP, 29 June 1982, K033/1; Das Parlament, 4 July 1987; 
Welt am Sonntag, 5 July 1987, KB, former CDU MdB, Düsseldorf, became 80 years old.  The FAZ 
published a laudatory account of McCloy’s career on his 85th birthday in 1980. (FAZ, p. 4, 1 April 1980, 
John McCloy, 85).  Birrenbach’s departure from his various offices was accompanied by Laudationes (by 
Dr. Wolfgang Wagner in the case of the DGAP in 1981) and congratulations (appreciative words) from 
numerous prominent personalities in writing or orally (e.g. regarding the DGAP). 
291 Those printed up into brochures included, for insta ce, those given by Bundestagspräsidenten Carstens 
(in the name of the Federal President) and Birrenbach on the occasion/dinner of the giving of the (Großen) 
Bundesverdienstkreuzes mit Stern und Schulterband to Birrenbach in 1977; and those given for his 70th
birthday in the Park Hotel on 5 July 1977 as “Kurt Birrenbach zum 70th.”  This printing up was carried out 
for instance by his office (for the two Bundesverdienstkreuz-speeches) with the costs of the publication at 
least sometimes being partially assumed by the Thyssen AG (half the costs of publication for the speech s 
given on his 70th birthday in the Park Hotel on 5 July 1977 thanks to Spethmann and Dr. Jürgen Steinmetz).  
Among those to whom the brochures were distributed w re (at least some of whom had been invited to the 
celebrations themselves and who had been both able and unable to attend): Fritz Berg; (?), President of the 
Landeszentralbank in Baden-Württemberg; somebody in Wittlaer by Düsseldorf; Dr. Wolfgang Bernhardt 
(Deputy Chairman of the VS of Korf-Stahl AG); Ministerialdirektor Dr. Klaus Blech (AA); Prof. Dr. Gerd 
Brand; Prof. Butenandt; Carstens; Dr. F. Wilhelm Christians (Speaker of the VS of the Deutschen Bank 
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AG); Dr. jur. Ernst Coenen; Dönhoff; Günther Drechsler (Thyssen Inc., New York City); Bergrat aD Prof. 
Dr. Otto Dünbier; Robert Ellscheid; Dr. jur. G. Freih rr von Falkenhausen; Ernst Feßler; Paul Frank; 
Federal Minister (aD) Dr. Hans Friderichs (Speaker of the VS of the Dresdner Bank AG); Dr. Heinz Gehm; 
Prof. Dr. Günther Gillesen (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Institut für Publizistik, Mainz); Dr. Alfons 
Gödde (Speaker of the VS of the Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG); Dr. jur. Klaus Götte (Member of the VS of 
the Allianz Versicherungs-AG); Federal Minister (aD) Dr. Johann Baptist Gradl (MdB); Amb. Prof. Dr. 
Grewe; Dr. Helmut Gschwend (VS member of the T yssen Handelsunion AG); Dr. Wilfried Guth (Speaker 
of the VS of the Deutschen Bank AG, Frankfurt); Amb. (aD) Karl-Günther von Hase (the Intendant of the 
ZDF, AöR, Mainz); Bundesgerichtshof Vice President (aD) Dr. Fritz Hauß; Heck; the lawyer Hans 
Hengeler (Düsseldorf); Walter Henkels; Dr. G. Henle; Oberstadtdirektor iR Walther Hensel; Dr. Alfred 
Herrhausen (Member of the VS of the D utschen Bank AG); Ludolf Herrmann (editor-in-chief of the 
Deutschen Zeitung, Bad Godesberg); Prof. Dr. Karl Hettlage; Dr. Franz Heubl (President of the Bavarian 
Landtag); Oskar Heumüller; Martin Hillenbrand (Director General, AIIA); Federal Minister (aD) Hermann 
Höcherl; Dr. Max Horst; Federal Minister (aD) Dr. Richard Jaeger (MdB); Dr. Horst Keller 
(Generalbevollmächtigter of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Kerscher (Member of the FTS VS); Dr. 
Andreas Kleffel (Member of the VS of the Deutschen Bank AG); Chancellor Kiesinger; Prof. Dr. Norbert 
Kloten; Dr. Herbert W. Köhler (MdB; Geschäftsführendes Vorstandsmitglied, WVES); Heinrich Köppler 
(CDU-Landtagsfraktion of NRW, Chair); Max Kohnstamm (European University Institute, President); Dr. 
Herbert Kremp (PA AA, Kurierabt., Embassy Peking, was as of February 1979 no longer i  the Federal 
Republic and therefore the contact had been cut off); Dr. Hans-Helmut Kuhnke (Chair of the VS of the 
Stifterverbandes für die Deutsche Wissenschaft eV); Dr. sc. Pol. Hanns-Jürgen Kunze 
(Generalbevollmächtigter of the Thyssen AG); Economics Minister Dr. jur. Otto Graf Lambsdorff (MdB); 
Paul Lichtenberg (Chairman of the AR of the Commerzbank AG); Dr. Guillermo Linck (Buenos Aires); 
Prof. Dr. Reimar Lüst (President of the MPGFW); Prof. Dr. Heinz Maier-Leibnitz (President of the 
Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft); Gen. (aD) Ulrich de Maizière; Dr. Klaus Mangold; Dr. Siegfried 
Mann (Hauptgeschäftsführer and Member of the Präsidium of the BDI eV); Hans Mayr (Dep. Chairman of 
the IG Metall); Hans Merkle; Yohanan Meroz (Israeli embassy); Frau Lilo Milchsack; Dr. Karl Mommer; 
the banker Alwin Münchmeyer; Hans Müser (Chair of the VS of the Thyssen Draht AG); Landesminister 
aD Dr. KH Narjes (MdB); State Sec. (aD) Dr. Fritz Neef; Dr.-Ing. Rolfroderich KF Nemitz (Chair of the 
VS of the Thyssen Schachtbau GmbH); Ministerialdirigent Hans Neusel (leader of the Präsidialbüros in 
the Bundestag); Robert Nyssen; Ernst Plesser (Generalbevollmächtigter of the Deutschen Bank AG); 
Thorwald Risler; Pieter Sanders; Sohl; Prof. Carl Spannagel (Münster); Prof. Dr. Julius Speer; General 
(aD) Hans Speidel; Dr. Dieter Spethmann (Chair of the VS of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Prof. Dr. 
Theodor Schieder; Dr. jur. Wolfgang Schieren (Chairm n of the VS, Allianz Versicherungs-AG); Federal 
Judge (aD) Dr. Fabian von Schlabrendorff; Dr. jur. Hermann Schmitt-Vockenhausen (MdB, Vice President 
of the Bundestag); Toni Schmücker (Chair of the VS of the Volkswagen AG); Federal Minister (aD) Dr. 
Gerhard Schröder (MdB, Chair of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee); Rudi Schwabenthan 
(Teheran/Munich); Prof. HP Schwarz (Forschungsinstitut für politische Wissenschaft und europäische 
Fragen of the University of Cologne); Georg Schröder; Hans-Jürgen Schwepcke (VS member of the 
Allianz Versicherungs-AG); Prof. Carl Spannagel (Münster); Prof. Gustav Stein (BDI eV); Gen. aD 
Johannes Steinhoff; Dr. Jürgen Steinmetz (Generalbevollmächtigter of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); 
Walter Stoessel Jr. (US ambassador, US embassy, Bonn); Prof. Shepard Stone; Dr. Gerd Tacke (Member of 
the AR of the Siemens AG, Munich); Trebesch (Geschäftsführender Stellvertretender Präsident, DGAP); 
Franz Heinrich Ulrich (Chair of the AR of the Deutschen Bank; Düsseldorf); Heinz O. Vetter (Chair of the 
DGB); Prof. Dr. Jur. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum; Rolf Vogel; Hermann Volle (editor-in-chief, Europa-
Archiv); Dr. Hellmuth Wagner; Amb. (aD) Dr. Gebhardt von Walther; Richard von Weizsäcker (MdB); Dr. 
Hans Georg Willers (Chair of the VS, Thyssen Handelsunion AG); Prof. Dr. Stephan Waetzoldt (General 
Director of the Staatlichen Museen Preußischer Kulturbesitz); Dr. jur. Hans Wuttke (Member of the VS, 
Dresdner Bank AG); and Prof. Dr. jur. Johannes Zahn (Chairman of the Verwaltungsrates of the 
Bankhauses CG Trinkaus & Burkhardt).  Birrenbach distributed in printed version the sp eches given on 
his 70th birthday exclusively to a very small circle of family members and friends (10-12 persons; I think he 
distributed this to a much wider circle). 
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Another element of the retrospective outlook in later years was that many of the 
organizations of the Atlanticist infrastructure Birrenbach was a part of celebrated 
important anniversaries in Festakten (e.g. the DGAP celebrated the 25th anniversary of its 
founding on 20 May 1980 in the DGAP; the AI planned to celebrate its 20th anniversary 
in Brussels at some point between 21-24 October 1981, 22-24 October 1981, Thursday to 
Saturday).  Birrenbach often played an important role with respect to planning (also the 
DGAP Präsidium as a whole) and participation in these celebrations (e.g. delivered one 
of the two speeches, the other one by Genscher, at the DGAP celebration; planned to 
attend the AI celebration in October 1981).292  By these later years, the Atlanticist 
institutions (e.g. DGAP, AI), thanks not least to the crucial efforts of Birrenbach (as 
officer, fund-raiser and promoter) and personalities l ke him, had achieved considerable 
respect, importance and renown (at least among the initiated) in the national and 
international framework. 
In his final years, Birrenbach also took part to varying extent in a variety of 
retrospective Atlanticist organizations exploring and propagating the memory, ideas and 
work (vision) of key personalities.  Birrenbach was a founding member of the Ludwig- 
Erhard-Stiftung, located in Bonn and in existence as of December 1974, and remained 
involved with its work through at least his goodwill and advice.293  At Monnet’s personal 
invitation, Birrenbach also became a member of the Conseil of the Fondation Jean 
                                                
292 Birrenbach had not been able to take part in the cel bration of the 70th birthday of the Kaiser-
Wilhelm/Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2).  
Genscher spoke at the DGAP event since Schmidt had declined the request to give a speech due to work.  
On 10 October 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke to the Chairman and the Ladies and Gentlemen at the 25th 
anniversary (annual) assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Organization (Association?) at Loy Henderson 
Auditorium at the State Department (DC). 
293 Birrenbach was still a member of the LES as of July 1981.  Karl Hohmann, with whom Birrenbach was 
involved, was the chairman of the LES, a position he still held as of July 1985.  I believe that Hohmann 
was also a member of the DGAP. 
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Monnet pour l’Europe, created in October 1978 by Monnet and based in Lausanne, 
Switzerland.294  In fact, Birrenbach rarely took part in the FJME functions and meetings 
in Lausanne, repeatedly pleading other obligations.295  While admittedly not an 
Atlanticist organization, Birrenbach also became a member in 1977 of the Beirat of the 
Stiftung-Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer Haus, based in Bad Honnef-Rhöndorf, and was 
elected [gewählt] in 1980 to the chairmanship of that Beirat.296  Directing their various 
                                                
294 The FJME held its constituting meeting on 9 Novembr 1978 in Paris (Banque de France).  Its president 
was Henri Rieben (Professor of History at the University of Lausanne and from the start the director of the 
very closely linked Centre de Recherches Européennes).  As of 1985, the FJME Conseil consisted of 183 
members.  Notable members of the FJME Conseil at times included Prof. Curt Gasteyger (Geneva); Hns 
von der Groeben (Rheinbach); Dr. Fritz Hellwig (Bonn); Winrich Behr; Max Kohnstamm; Pierre Uri; and 
Prof. Jerzy Lukaszewski (Rector of the College of Europe, Bruges).  I do not believe Birrenbach ever 
became a member of the executive council.  The FJME had a Stiftungsrat and (wissenschaftliche) 
Mitarbeiter.  I think Rieben had been involved with Monnet even back in the late 1940s.  In some ways, it 
is probably best to consider the FJME and CRE as a whole.  The farm of Dorigny (Lausanne) housed both 
the Centre de Recherches Europeennes and the FJME.  Given that the city and university of Lausanne had 
some tradition in promoting the European idea, it was no surprise that Monnet chose Lausanne as the seat 
for his foundation.  Already in 1957, the university had set up the first chair in the world for European 
integration and, with Monnet’s influence/support, ceated (also in that year) at the university the CRE, 
which as of 1984 employed a small team of about ten collaborators of which several were employed on a 
voluntary basis.  The FJME had statutes.  The FJME was associated with the Swiss confederation, the stat
of Vaud, the city and the university of Lausanne and  number of Monnet’s friends.  Although based in 
Switzerland, the FJME clearly sought to impact in the German-language area.  As of 1984, it appears tht 
the FJME had become well-known in Western Switzerland but wanted to make itself and its activities and
its archive better known also in German-Switzerland  in the German-language abroad.  For this purpose, 
a slideshow [Tonbildschau] in German was commissioned and would be shown for the first time in April 
1984 in Lucerne on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Lucerne section of the Europa-Union 
Schweiz.  The FJME impacted in Europe and the US (and on personalities who came from all over the 
world).  This was Monnet’s personal appointment (elected?).  The Conseil was the equivalent of a 
Kuratorium. 
295  Such FJME functions and meetings included the annu l meetings of the Conseil at the Ferme de 
Dorigny (at the University of Lausanne).  Birrenbach did not even attend the constituting meeting itself and 
as of February 1980 had still never seen [“erlebt”] the FJME president, Henri Rieben.  The sole exception 
to my knowledge was his attendance on the “wonderful” evening of 24 October 1981 in Lausanne when the 
Monnet Foundation awarded McCloy the first Prix Monnet (Monnet Award), McCloy had given a speech 
on this occasion and been elected into the foundation’s Committee of Honor.  Only a fraction (less than a 
third) of the members of the FJME Conseil appear to have attended the annual meetings.  As of November 
1984, Birrenbach claimed that he had taken part in several functions of the FJME.  As of 5 March 1985, 
Birrenbach hoped to be able to take part in the celbration for Prof. Carstens (I think having to do with the 
FJME).   
296  As of 1984, Birrenbach still held this chairmanship.  As of October 1979, Birrenbach had gotten Abs to 
give a Vortrag in April 1980 on the reestablishment of the German credits after 1945 (I guess in the 
SBKAH).  I think Osterheld was also part of this Rhöndorf Stiftung.  Particularly with regard to the 
SBKAH, Birrenbach had to learn that, whatever his overall perspective on the old chancellor, it was not 
always tactful to speak openly about his views regading Adenauer’s attitude with regard to the United 
States. 
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activities at personalities in Politik, Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft as well as interested 
individuals from the general public, these organizations set up, maintained and made 
accessible Gedenkstätten and archival and research material (including Nachlässe); 
staged scholarly conferences and Vorträge; preserved and extended the links between 
those personalities seeking to realize similar ideals; promoted research and provided 
scholarly support to students; and produced and published high-quality materials and 
analyses on contemporary affairs.297  The financing for these activities came from a 
variety of sources, with Birrenbach seeing to it that the FTS provided project funding to 
the FJME/CRE, specifically for the preparation of the Monnet archives and as of 
November 1976 had induced the BDI to address a number of large firms from all parts of 
the Federal Republic to contribute to the LES, resulting in DM 70,000.298   
                                                
297 The SBKAH memorial sites included house, garden and pavilion.  On the SBKAH, see ACDP K168/2.  
Since 1957, the CRE/FJME produced/published a series of brochures (rote Hefte) on relevant themes, 
including in 1986 one by Karl Carstens (former FRG President) entitled Un souffle de renouveau en 
Europe (Environ, 50 pages).  It published certain parts of M nnet’s archives (e.g. correspondence with 
Robert Schuman).  As of March 1985, Birrenbach had promised Rieben (at the latter’s request) he would 
write a red brochure on Monnet (on the European question) but he would not be able to do this in the 
foreseeable time (months) due to health.  In December 1985, Rieben remarked to Birrenbach that the 
latter’s Europa-work about the negotiations since the times of Monnet until today made progress.  On his 
state visit in Switzerland in August 1982, Federal President Karl Carstens visited the farm and gave to the 
archive a copy of the West German archive material on the coming about of the EC.  The FJME saw itself 
in a good location for impacting particularly on the young and also the larger public.  The Monnet 
Foundation was charged with the organization of Monnet’s Nachlaß.  Such documentation collections were 
expected to be used by researchers on the university level. 
298 The financing/capital of the FJME came from various p blic and private contributions (including 
donations collected from numerous contributors by the CRE), subventions, gifts, bequests and contributions 
(including from the canton Vaud; the city and university of Lausanne; European organizations; the 
governments of France and Luxembourg).  After being ori inally housed in the premises of the University 
of Lausanne on the grounds of Dorigny, the FJME later moved in the old farm by Lausanne made available 
by the canton Vaud and specially restored for this purpose with money of the Canton and Bund.  Rieben 
asked Birrenbach regarding the possibility of the FTS financing various projects of the FJME/CRE and for 
advice on the procedure.  As of 1985, the CRE applied to the FTS for financing (e.g. for its research 
program).  As of February 1986, the FTS bodies had rejected the CRE/FJME application (Prof. Rieben; 
DM 61,100) of October 1985 and the CRE was trying to reformulate the application and reduce the 
financing needed to no more than DM 50,000.  This funding had to do with the efforts of the FJME/CRE to 
arrange (wissenschaftliche preparation and analysis of) the Monnet Archive, specifically in this case the 
part of the Monnet archives/documents dealing with the Action Committee for the United States of Europe.  
A central instrument in the FJME efforts, the Monnet Archive (supplemented by gifts from other European 
personalities) was seen as indispensable/crucial to contemporary historical research/understanding of the 
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Part of the German Atlanticist retrospective efforts, including those of Birrenbach, 
consisted of initiatives to defend the reputation and preserve the memory of foreign 
Atlanticist contacts.  McCloy, in particular, came under what Birrenbach considered 
unjustified, politically motivated public attacks in the United States in later years 
regarding his role in a number of episodes during World War II when he had served as 
Assistant Secretary of War (the failure to bomb the National Socialist extermination 
camps and the internment of Japanese-Americans) and following the war as US High 
Commissioner in Germany (the pardoning in January 1951 of Alfried Krupp and the 
Krupp directors).  These attacks levelled by certain groups, including (student) groups at 
Harvard, in the House of Representatives and in the Washington Post, were largely 
triggered by Harvard University’s honoring of McCloy in 1983 through the naming of a 
German-American scholarship program after him (the McCloy/Volkswagen Fund, itself a 
retrospective activity).299  Ultimately, Birrenbach believed that the German Atlanticist 
efforts to defend the beleaguered McCloy, including his own sending in August 1983 to 
an appreciative McCloy (at the latter’s request) several relevant analyses of the Krupp 
judgement of 1948, proved effective in helping McCloy refute the accusations against 
                                                                                                                                      
construction/development of the European community.  The FTS bodies’ decision of 30 January 1982 
made available the financing for the preparation of the section of the Monnet archive dealing with the 
ECSC.  Monnet’s extensive archives, containing all Monnet’s plans and records since WWI, all the 
materials about his ideas on the construction of a united Europe and the entire documents about his 
committee, were among the most important collections f a European statesman, and Monnet himself made 
use of them in writing his memoirs.  As of June 1975, Monnet was trying to figure out what to do with this 
archive, and the most important libraries and universiti s in France, England and the US were interestd in 
(having) this archive.  Both Monnet and Stone agreed that this archive should not go to America since 
Monnet was so closely connected with Europe.  On Birrenbach’s BDI-LES efforts, see KB to Dr. Karl 
Hohmann, 4 November 1976, ACDP K190/2. 
299 Alfried Krupp had been convicted of war crimes by the Nuremberg Tribunals (US Military Tribunal) on 
31 July 1948.  The pardon resulted in the release from prison of Alfried Krupp and the Krupp directors and 
the elimination of the confiscation of his assets. 
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him and justify his decisions.300  While Birrenbach was probably motivated in these 
interventions to some extent by a sense of personal obligation and a desire to defend the 
German Wirtschaft against the arbitrary actions of the US/Allied Military Tribunals, 
Birrenbach also saw, given McCloy’s services to the Federal Republic, “a national 
obligation.”301  Incidentally, as of February 1980, Birrenbach also found himself 
                                                
300 Most notably, Birrenbach sent McCloy a judgment he had composed about the Krupp affair/case based 
on his own personal experience, essentially his own personal impressions of Alfried Krupp’s personality, 
and what Birrenbach considered a “convincing”/”brilliant” expert legal judgement he had the well-
known/first-class Düsseldorf lawyer Dr. Michael Hoffmann-Becking draw up on the Krupp judgement/trial 
of 1948.  Birrenbach knew Hoffmann-Becking, who may even have been Birrenbach’s own lawyer.  This 
expert legal judgement was drawn up by Hoffmann-Becking without any compensation.  Berthold Beitz, 
chairman of the Kuratorium of the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung (Essen), had had the 
translations of these reports done by the translation office of his concern at Birrenbach’s request since 
Birrenbach could not have it done at Thyssen for reasons of discretion.  As of 5 August 1983, Birrenbach 
had gotten useful documents from the helpful Prof. Dr. Jochen Abr. Frowein (Director at the Max-Planck-
Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Heidelberg) regarding Birrenbach’s Krupp 
paper (actually I think Hoffmann-Becking’s examination of the Krupp judgment) and would answer 
Birrenbach’s questions.  Birrenbach may also have sent McCloy at this time the personal impressions of 
other objective personalities in Germany regarding the personality of Alfried Krupp.  Birrenbach had 
personally met and known (made the acquaintance of) Alfried Krupp (son of Gustav Krupp) in the late 
1930s (1938 or 1939) in Berlin when the firm National-Krupp GmbH had been one of his client firms that 
he advised in financial and currency questions (the owners of the capital in that firm had been the National 
Cash Register Company and Fried. Krupp AG; Birrenbach claimed to have conducted a series of 
negotiations at the time with Alfried in an affair of the National Cash Register Company and the Nation l 
City Bank).  As of 1983, Birrenbach claimed that Alfried had been a young man, reluctant, not very 
capable, had no authority whatsoever, was not even an Unternehmer in the true sense of the word, his 
political engagement had been extremely limited and he had certainly not been a National Socialist in the 
proper sense of the word.  After his father’s illness, he had been simply substituted by the Allied military 
tribunal and accused.  Of all the so-called crimes, hardly a single one had been assigned to him.  Another 
example of German Atlanticist efforts in this vein was Eric Warburg’s defense of McCloy in May 1983 
(regarding Auschwitz bombing) with a letter to the editor to the Washington Post in response to two of its 
articles about McCloy.  In 1983, Thomas Schwartz (graduate student in the Harvard history department 
writing a thesis about McCloy and the origins of the German-American alliance) wrote a letter to the 
Harvard Crimson defending McCloy.  Birrenbach welcomed any book that defended/supported McCloy. 
301 KB to Prof. Dr. Jochen Abr. Frowein, 5 August 1983.  Not just Alfried Krupp but also other German 
industrialists had been convicted by the US Military T ibunal in 1947-48.  Also, in connection with his and 
Birrenbach’s efforts of Summer 1983, Hoffmann-Becking had recently (as of October 1984) 
published/made a similar speech on the Krupp judgment of 1948 in the Rotary Club Düsseldorf before 
prominent/interested personalities of the German Wirtschaft.  Birrenbach, and maybe also Hoffmann-
Becking, had distributed this speech (and also Birrenbach’s own earlier 1983 Alfried Krupp expositions) 
among several important industrialists and politicians (including McCloy; Berthold Beitz, Chairman of the 
Kuratorium of the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung, Essen; Sohl; Spethmann; Gehm(?); 
Egon Overbeck; Dr Hans-Helmut Kuhnke (Am Thyssenhaus 1, Essen); and Berthold v. Bohlen und 
Halbach, member of the AR of Bohlen Industrie AG, Essen) so that there would be no doubt regarding the 
innocence of Alfried Krupp.  Hoffmann-Becking’s speech also threw some side glances at the two parallel 
trials in the affairs Flick and IG Farben.  Birrenbach also made it clear during this 1983-84 period that he 
agreed with other past actions of McCloy.  For insta ce, Birrenbach also claimed to agree with and admire 
McCloy’s futile efforts in World War II to get Truman to terminate the war without dropping nuclear 
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defending his own past actions, he believed successfully, in a retrospective dispute with 
Bahr, not explicitly Atlanticist in nature but supplementing their larger policy 
disagreements, regarding the insight into the protocols, a dispute that played out via 
correspondence and possibly even some formal proceeding.302   
Birrenbach was also involved in the financing of certain retrospective Atlanticist 
activities and works.  An important example of this during the first half of the 1980s was 
the money collected/raised by Birrenbach and Abs as of June 1982 from German firms in 
the Federal Republic that had taken part in the Marshall Plan aid (close to having been 
raised as of July 1980).  This sum was a grant to the George C. Marshall Research 
Foundation (Lexington), with the principal amount itended as financial aid for the 
GCMRF itself and a partial amount (half) providing the financing of a historical book 
project on the Marshall Plan that was planned/led by the GCMRF.303  Proposed to Hadsel 
(GCMRF) by Birrenbach and Abs, this book explored the Marshall Plan’s economic and 
political impact (with respect to US-German reconciliation and European unification) and 
stressed Marshall’s achievements as Secretary of State and Defense for the Federal 
Republic and Europe.  Aside from the prominent, first-class authors (including US 
historians; diplomatic/political and economic historians), the key personalities in bringing 
this project to fruition included, on the German side, Birrenbach and Dr. Abs 
                                                                                                                                      
bombs on Japan.  Truman had not followed McCloy’s advice.  As of December 1984, Birrenbach also 
claimed to agree more with McCloy than with Oppenheimer and his colleagues in the controversy over the 
building of the first atomic bomb.  Birrenbach claimed that he and Hoffmann-Becking were “deeply upset” 
when they had read the court decision in Nuremberg (K upp case), with Birrenbach believing that it was 
“really second class from the legal point of view, and not objective at all….  This is not a decision taken by 
objective and independent judges.” (KB to McCloy, 12 August 1983).  Birrenbach insisted (I think to 
McCloy) that nobody in the FRG, including himself, doubted McCloy’s attitude or his conduct in the 
Krupp case. 
302 This was apparently not nearly as publicized as the McCloy episode.  In 1979, Birrenbach quickly 
established contact with Cornides (Thomas?), the publisher of the Historischen Zeitschrift.  As of 1970-71, 
Karl von Cornides (father?) was based in Vienna.   
303 This project included no scholarly work by the GCMRF.  It did include at least one related conference. 
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(Birrenbach’s main colleague in this endeavor) and, on the US side, Dr. Hadsel (GCMRF 
Executive Director) and Harvard history professor Charles Maier (editor of the volume), 
while Birrenbach also brought in McCloy (to judge potential American authors) and 
Bowie (as an intermediary between and advisor to boh sides, for instance 
regarding/identifying potential scholarly authors; including vis-à-vis Maier).  Birrenbach 
saw this work as being of practical significance, considered the themes treated in it to be 
currently of “extreme interest” and hoped it would find interest in a circle beyond just a 
few industrialists and politicians.304   
In addition to its retrospective qualities, this Marshall Plan book project also 
demonstrates the still uneasy relationship within Atlanticism between Politik and 
Wissenschaft.  Birrenbach and Abs, stressing their responsibility and obligations to the 
donors/sponsors (including informing them), remained in contact with the various key 
principals involved (including for instance the GCMRF/Hadsel and Maier; including 
through meetings in Germany, for instance Frankfurt) and were heavily involved in 
planning the project.  They played a significant role in imparting a broad focus to the 
book that comprised not just economic but also especially political elements (since many 
other publications had already made the economic information well-known in the Federal 
Republic); in identifying, meeting/discussing in the FRG with and passing judgement on 
numerous potential German and American authors; and in ensuring a sufficient role for 
German historians in the project.305  During the course of this project (e.g. 1983), 
                                                
304 Birrenbach’s support of this project and the GCMRF might also be linked to the fact that McCloy was a 
GCMRF trustee who supported the project (and was informed by Hadsel and Birrenbach of its progress) 
and explicitly appreciated Birrenbach’s support of it (McCloy to Birrenbach, 29 June 1982).   
305 They initially wanted German historians involved in authoring the book with US historians and later 
insisted instead on giving an American author an advisory committee on which German historians would 
be represented. 
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Birrenbach and Abs had frustrating difficulties with Maier (and the GCMRF/Hadsel in 
some regard to the handling of the project; “incomprehensible”), with Maier clearly 
uneasy about and sometimes even attempting to resist the r interest and involvement in 
the program and problems to be addressed in the proj ct and the approaches to be 
taken.306  Similarly, as of Spring 1984, Birrenbach found himself in a months-long 
dispute with Prof. Wolfgang Mommsen (head of the German Historical Institute in 
London) with respect to the FTS Prussia lectures.  This revolved around Mommsen’s 
speech for the summing-up meeting, whose text Birrenbach complained “corresponded to 
the view of Disraeli, presented by Tony Benn,” and  article Mommsen published in 
Der Zeit criticizing the entire endeavor.307  Birrenbach’s activities continued to reveal the 
problems/tensions inherent in the financing of the Politik-Wissenschaft relationship.   
All sorts of Atlanticist-minded retrospective and historical works were written and 
ultimately published, including a considerable number of memoirs (e.g. Monnet’s 
memoirs as of 1976; Ball’s memoirs as of 1983).308  Birrenbach not only read this 
Atlanticist memoir literature with great interest and pleasure (usually received from the 
author or the publisher at the author’s request), but also encouraged the writing of such 
literature (e.g. McCloy with respect to his memoirs/autobiography) and even cooperated 
at times in the production of such retrospective works.  Recommended by various people 
                                                
306 As of June 1984, Birrenbach remarked, “I tell you frankly that I do not understand Prof. Maier.”  Earlier, 
Birrenbach had remarked, “[a]s President I would not nominate Hadsel as intermediator between the Near
East nations.” (KB to McCloy, 17 August 1982).  Roskamp was mentioned early on by Hadsel as a 
potential author though Birrenbach disliked Roskamp’s exclusive focus on economic issues (Roskamp was 
dropped pretty early on).  Prof. John Gimbel (Humboldt State University, Arcata CA) was another name 
mentioned early on as an author (proposed by Thompsn; he was unknown to Birrenbach and Abs).  As of 
December 1981, Birrenbach and Abs considered Prof. Forrest Pogue’s (the Marshall biographer) 
introduction/part/interpretation essential. 
307 KB to Amb. Wechmar, 5 April 1984.  Mommsen and Prof. Koselleck (Bielefeld) had been 
recommended to Birrenbach for this speech.  Birrenbach claimed the Mommsen article would not have 
appeared in Der Zeit if Marion Dönhoff or Helmut Schmidt had been there. 
308 Ball’s memoirs were entitled The Past has Another Pattern. 
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(e.g. in the US) as a person whose perspective was of substantial interest, Birrenbach 
crucially assisted his fellow Atlanticists and others (Wissenschaftler/historians) working 
on memoirs, biographies and theses of/about the key Atlanticists, most notably McCloy 
and a series of scholars dealing with him around 1983-84 (including Thomas Schwartz, 
Max Holland and Kai Bird).309  This involved, for instance, partaking in lengthy face-to-
face talks and interviews, the answering and discussing of questions, the citing and 
provision of copies of key documents and the making available of personal materials, 
accounts and analyses, all aiming to provide relevant information on particular themes.310  
Beyond this, Birrenbach sometimes sought to encourage/assist in the publication and 
spread of particularly important Atlanticist retrospective works in the Federal Republic 
(e.g. Monnet’s memoirs) by helping resolve problems, for instance by recommending 
good translators to the authors.311  In so far as foreign works in this vein (Atlanticist 
retrospectives) also appeared in German editions (e.g. Monnet’s memoirs in 1978 in 
Munich), attracted attention and generated important articles in the press, including the 
                                                
309 As of 1983, Thomas Schwartz was of Harvard’s Center for European Studies. 
310 Duchêne may have helped in Monnet’s memoirs being a success in general.  Schwarz visited Birrenbach 
in Summer 1983.  As of November 1983, Holland was in the Federal Republic.  As of December 1983, 
McCloy appears to have been working on his memoirs though I don’t think these were ever 
completed/published.  The DGAP Research Institute made a small office there available to Max Holland 
(and it appears to Thomas Schwartz, too) when he was in the FRG (1984?).  As of December 1983, it looks 
like Prof. Ernest May was also involved in some way in McCloy’s memoirs or some McCloy project.  As 
of November 1983, Max Holland and his colleague Kai Bird were researching the first independent 
biography of McCloy, being written under contract to Simon & Schuster publishers (New York).  As of 
1984, Bowie had recently met two young men doing a biography of McCloy.  As of September 1983, 
Birrenbach had also given Schwartz the discussion he had drawn up of the Krupp case.  As of July 1985, 
Birrenbach (and Abs) had been asked by McCloy for an evaluation of McCloy’s past activity. 
311 Birrenbach recommended to Monnet (as a good translator) Hermann Kusterer (AA, Sprachendienst) for 
the translation of Monnet’s memoirs.  There is no idication that Monnet actually made use of Birrenbach’s 
offer of assistance, rather it seems he ignored it. 
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German press, such Atlanticist retrospectives also potentially impacted directly in the 
Federal Republic.312   
Even prior to leaving the Bundestag, Birrenbach envisaged producing in the 
future major publications dealing with trans-Atlantic relations once he had reduced his 
extensive obligations.313  At the latest by Fall 1977, Birrenbach was contemplating a 
variety of major retrospective publications encompassing also his own activities, 
including the possibility of the publication of his correspondence, the publication of his 
US reports (with an introduction about US policy over the past twenty-five years), a 
publication describing his missions and even a full-blown Birrenbach biography.  In such 
matters, Hans-Peter Schwarz acted as his principal onsultant/advisor with other 
assistance coming from Prof. Dr. Klaus Ritter, Spethmann, Carstens and Prof. Coing (e.g. 
regarding the potential legal restrictions of the 30-year rule; proposing and contacting 
potential authors for a biography, including Prof. Dr Arnulf Baring, Golo Mann and 
Prof. Repken).314  As part of his role in these retrospectives, Birrenbach himself produced 
a number of retrospective works in a variety of forms, including some that related his 
own experiences in a public manner.  Among these was a number of published 
retrospective newspaper articles and book contributions dealing with themes like 
Adenauer’s relationship to the United States, Jean Mo net and his crucial contribution to 
                                                
312 As of July 1978, Birrenbach had both the French and German editions/versions of Monnet’s memoirs.  
The first important article about Monnet’s memoirs appeared on 14 September 1978 in the FAZ.  As of 
August 1978, Birrenbach pleaded with Monnet to understand that he had not written an essay about 
Monnet’s memoirs due to health. (KB to Monnet, 15 August 1978).   
313 In July 1975, Birrenbach declined an offer from Jeute and Dr. von Wehrenalp of the Econ 
Verlagsgruppe to publish a book in the Econ Verlag in 1976 (for the US bicentennial) to be written by 
Birrenbach (proposed by Jeute as the best for the task) about America (especially US-German political 
relations).  However, Birrenbach was clearly interested and honored by this offer and believed he could 
write important things on this theme in coming years fter he left the Bundestag at some point and had the 
time to produce a book of the “format” he desired. 
314 As of December 1977, Hans-Peter Schwarz was a historically interested and trained political scientist at 
the University of Cologne.  As of 1978, Birrenbach considered Schwarz an excellent man.  At the time, 
Baring was in the Bundespräsidialamt, and Mann declined due to current obligations. 
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Europe’s objectives, and particular political missions that Birrenbach himself had 
undertaken.315  Birrenbach also offered up autobiographical narratives (for instance about 
his life in politics) in a number of interviews intended to appear in publication/print and 
in the broadcast media.316   
                                                
315 In 1973, Birrenbach published “Die Schatten der Vegangenheit-Der Staat der Juden besteht 25 Jahre” 
(DZ/CW, 4 May 1973).  In 1974, Birrenbach published “Ein Amerikaner für Deutschland-zum Tode von 
Christopher Emmet in New York” (Rheinischer Merkur, 1 March 1974).  Birrenbach accepted a request 
and wrote “Die Aufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
Israel” in the volume Ludwig Erhard-Beiträge zu seiner politischen Biographie, Festschrift zum 
fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag, ed. Minister (aD) Dr. Gerhard Schröder, State Sec. (aD) Prof. Alfred 
Müller-Armack, Dr. Karl Hohmann, Johannes Gross, Dr. Rüdiger Altmann (Propyläen-Verlag, Berlin, 
1972, pp. 363-382).  This was the first time (1972) that Birrenbach had published an article (contribuion, 
work, report) about (the events of) his 1965 Israel mission.  In 1976, Birrenbach made a contribution o a
Sammelbuch appearing for Adenauer’s 100th anniversary/birthday: “In politischer Mission für Konrad 
Adenauer in den USA” in Konrad Adenauer 1876-1976 (edited by Helmut Kohl, Stuttgart and Zurich, 
1976).  In 1976, in another such Sammelbuch published on behalf of the KAS for Adenauer’s 100th 
anniversary, Birrenbach, at the request/offer of the KAS, contributed the essay “Adenauer und die 
Vereinigten Staaten in der Periode seiner Kanzlerschaft” in the Adenauer-Festschrift, Konrad Adenauer 
und seine Zeit-Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers (Editors: Prof. Dr. Dieter Blumenwitz 
(Augsburg), Dr. Klaus Gotto (Bonn), Staatsminister Prof. Dr. Hans Maier (Munich), Prof. Dr. Konrad 
Repgen (Bonn), Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Cologne); Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart, 1976; on 
Adenauer’s relationship to the US).  This was an account of Adenauer’s relationship and attitude to the US 
in his government time.  He distributed at least one f these two Adenauer articles to Alexander Böker 
(Amb. of the FRG by the Heiligen Stuhl) and Amb. of the FRG Sigismund Freiherr von Braun nd Dr. Fritz 
Hauß (Vice President, Bundesgerichtshof).  In 1978, on the occasion of Monnet’s 90th birthday, Birrenbach 
wrote and published a two-part article on Monnet tha appeared in the Deutschen Zeitung/Christ und Welt: 
“Jean Monnet-auf dem Wege nach Europa” (ein ungewöhnlicher Mann in seiner Zeit; DZ, Nr. 47, p. 13, 17 
November 1978) and “Jean Monnet und seine Zeit (II)-Meister in der Krise” (DZ, Nr. 48, p. 13, from 24 
November 1978) (“Jean Monnet aura 90 ans le 9 November… l’histoire du monde”).  He sent this article to 
Chancellor Schmidt.  Through an oversight of the Redaktion, the article did not go early enough in the 
printer, so that it could not appear in the 10 Novemb r edition (therefore on time for Monnet’s birthday).  
This article trumpeted Monnet’s decisive historical merits in helping Europe attain its first objective.  There 
had been a translation of this (into French?).  Birrenbach’s plans to write an essay about McCloy and his 
importance for the Federal Republic and to write a small book about Monnet (at the request of the Monnet 
Foundation) never came to fruition (during the period 1983-85), at least in part due to health problems.  As 
of December 1985, Birrenbach had been writing since September 1985 about the negotiations about the 
unification of Europe (is this the Monnet book?).  As of 30 September 1976, Birrenbach had occupied 
himself with Adenauer on his 100th birthday.   
316 For Birrenbach’s autobiographical retrospective narratives of his life, see Kurt Birrenbach im Gespräch 
mit Werner Hill, “Zeugen der Zeit,” broadcast on 27 December 1979, recorded on 20 October 1979, 
K213/1 and Dr. Kurt Birrenbach im Gespräch mit Dr. Wolfgang Bergsdorf und Henning Röhl, recorded on 
28 May 1980 and broadcast on “Zeitgenossen” on 7 September 1980, Südwestfunk, 2nd Programm, K213/1.  
In October 1979, Birrenbach had given an interview to the NDR that had been broadcast in December 1979
in the Dritten Fernsehprogramm (Norddeutschen bzw. Westdeutschen Fernsehen) that as of February 1980 
had been in part overtaken by Löwenthal in the ZDF. (KB Aktennotiz, 16 June 1980, K134/1).  As of 
February 1981 (at least once on 13 November 1980), Birrenbach had given Vogel two interviews, one 
about his negotiations in Israel in 1965 and one about his ideas after the 1965 mission (dated 4 February 
1981), interviews that would be printed/utilized in Vogel’s soon to be printed book. 
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 However, Birrenbach’s most significant retrospective work was Meine 
Sondermissionen: Rückschau auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik, “a kind 
of mémoires” published in (March?) 1984 by the Econ-Verlag.317  Approximately six 
hundred pages long, this book was the product of several years of intensive effort 
conducted under difficult conditions, including not only his other activities (e.g. work, 
travel) and illnesses but also the lack of an assistant and Birrenbach’s sheer inability to 
limit what he wrote.318  Dedicated to Monnet and McCloy, these memoirs esch wed a 
broad account of Birrenbach’s life and activities and instead, as the title indicated, 
centered on his special missions (based very closely, often verbatim, on Birrenbach’s 
own reports of his talks on such trips), of which he had always been particularly proud.  
Birrenbach supplemented these accounts with depictions of other key episodes (e.g. 
preamble to the 1963 Franco-German Treaty) and embedded them in extensive 
descriptions of the background against which these mi sions had been carried out as well 
as discussions of the relevant key events/developments in those theme areas to the 
present day (e.g. Israel), thus lending some credence to the book’s claim of exploring the 
previous two decades of German foreign policy.319  Although undoubtedly due at least in 
                                                
317 KB to Butcher, 4 March 1985.   
318 As of October 1980, Birrenbach had gotten from his publisher now a deadline to present the text of his 
planned books. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the 
CDU-Deutschland, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 20 October 1980, K032/1).  
The writing of the book also involved Birrenbach in efforts to acquire insight into the relevant materi ls 
from government archives (e.g. the AA political archive) which ran into resistance with respect to still-
classified materials due to the strict rules governing the federal ministries in such matters.  As of April 
1979, Birrenbach hoped that Ministerialdirigent Dr. Jürgen Ruhfus (BKA) could get Birrenbach access to 
the paper about the Erhard meeting with Johnson of 20-21 December 1965.  If Kant insisted that 
“sometimes less is more,” Birrenbach adhered to the rule that “if you cut something out, you might leav  
out something important.”  As of February 1981, Birrenbach planned to later write and publish a book 
(apparently dealing at least in part with his negotiations in Israel in 1965 and his ideas after the 1965 
mission). 
319 It appears that originally a broader work in which we might have learned more about Birrenbach 
himself (the man) was originally also planned but never came into being.  Indeed, as of October 1980, 
Birrenbach had two books planned, one that became Meine Sondermissionen and a second one about the 
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part to Birrenbach’s self-promotion and his influenc  with friends in press and academia, 
Meine Sondermissionen does seem to have enjoyed positive reviews.  In any c se, 
Birrenbach himself was quite pleased with the final product and naturally distributed the 
book to various German and foreign personalities/contacts (at least sometimes with 
sections of interest translated into English by an expert) and relished what he considered 
the “universal recognition” (positive reaction) it received in all fields (politics, 
Wissenschaft (including history) and Wirtschaft) in both the FRG and abroad (particularly 
the US and even partially Israel).320 
While certainly not devoid of valuable information for researchers and others 
interested in contemporary history from the Berlin Wall to the present, Birrenbach’s 
retrospective works (e.g. MS), aside from potentially suffering from Birrenbach’s 
admittedly faulty memory on occasion or the perils of improvised interviews, suffered to 
some extent from his perceived virtues.321  For one, Birrenbach’s stress also in later years 
on respect for the rules of secrecy and the need to uph ld his own word of honor 
considerably circumscribed his accounts of themes lik  the content of the protocols into 
                                                                                                                                      
entire work that he had conducted in the last twenty years. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. 
Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU-Deutschland, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 
Bonn, 20 October 1980, K032/1). 
320 Among those Birrenbach distributed the book to were Kohl, Nitze, Lord Carrington, Wechmar, Beitz, 
the Israeli ambassador (who had already bought a copy himself), and Teddy Kollek (Mayor of Jerusalem).  
Despite Birrenbach’s stated intention as of August 1984 to try to get somebody who could edit Meine 
Sondermissionen i  English (something he himself would not be able to pay for) (KB to Rostow, 8 August 
1984), it was never actually translated into English.  Among those many Americans who had written to him 
in an extremely positive and appreciative way on his book were men like McCloy, Bowie, Nitze and 
Kissinger.  Among the Germans were Federal President Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker and Weizsäcker’s two 
predecessors.  Former Chancellor Schmidt (MdB) had expressed understanding in 1984 for Birrenbach’s 
book.  According to Birrenbach, the reaction to his book had been “really first-class.” (KB to McCloy, 25 
June 1984).  As of February 1985, Birrenbach had received a serie  of letters (perhaps on Meine 
Sondermissionen?) from high standing personalities in Israel like Teddy Kollek, Asher Ben Natan, Gideon 
Rafael and in a cautious way also Prime Minister Shimon Peres. 
321 Meine Sondermissionen was the first time that Birrenbach had revealed his trip to the United States prior 
to his Israel mission and its importance for that mission. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to 
Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl, Bonn, confidential, 13 January 1984, K029/2).  Birrenbach’s retrospective 
works provided insight into the opinions of Birrenbach’s foreign/US contacts on various issues.   
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which he had received insight and the negotiations/events of his 1965 Israel mission.  
Furthermore, Birrenbach’s desire to preserve discretion in such works led him to render 
the publication of certain details/elements strictly reliant on his discussing these points 
with and ultimately securing the authorization of his contacts (e.g. McCloy; pertaining to 
what they had told or written Birrenbach) and in geeral to depict some things, including 
his personal and secret talks, in a very cautious, ab tract, covered form.322  Finally, 
Birrenbach’s striving for his ideal of objectivity encouraged him to remove himself and 
his feelings from much of his accounts, at times imparting to his retrospective works a 
rather mediocre, cold, incomplete and distorted version of events. 
True, Birrenbach always expressed surprise and claimed that he had never 
expected to be thus positively recognized and sometimes at least ostensibly doubted 
whether he actually deserved the particular and various celebrations, awards, honors, 
recognition, appreciation, laudations, praise, and positive echo that he received in his 
later years from all sides, both national and international (including Americans), in each 
of the realms in which he worked: Politik, Wirtschaft/industry and Wissenschaft.323  This 
was especially the case since Birrenbach believed he had practiced the old Prussian 
                                                
322 Birrenbach showed Shepard Stone and McCloy certain parts (e.g. pertaining to McCloy) that he wanted 
to publish in Meinen Sondermissionen and they discussed certain points. 
323 Birrenbach also enjoyed the recognition over the years from foreigners for his Atlanticist efforts.  One of 
Birrenbach’s proudest episodes of recognition of his accomplishments occurred in the start of October 1983 
during the 300-year celebration in the US.  Having traveled to the US for the tricentennial celebrations in 
October 1983, Birrenbach was very pleased that Secretary of State George Shultz had in the framework of 
the tricentennial celebrations in his speech on the occasion of a/the official luncheon that he had given to 
the Federal President Carstens and the German delegation (Staatsminister Dr. Philipp Jenninger and I think 
Klasen were also part of this German delegation) had remarked/mentioned and thanked Birrenbach since 
his predecessors had reported to him that Birrenbach h d worked hard (dedicated) for decades for the 
improvement of German/European-American relations and was a real friend of the US.  Federal President 
Carstens had introduced Birrenbach to President Reagan in the same way.  At Reagan’s request, Birrenbach 
had then depicted his contacts since more than twenty-five years with the top-ranking figures of the US 
administrations.  Birrenbach reveled in the praise giv n to him by others (e.g. by Ronald Reagan as of June 
1984).  
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“Leitmotiv”: “ mehr sein als scheinen” (to mean more than to appear).324  Nevertheless, as 
a fundamentally insecure man, he always sincerely, even embarrassingly appreciated and 
took pride in (even boasted of) such recognition whether it be of a public nature in front 
of many others of high qualification or otherwise, for instance through mere words or the 
astonishing floods of (e.g. birthday) letters/telegrams and gifts.325  On a personal level, 
Birrenbach saw these recognitions/honors marking his person, offering him symbols of 
his political legitimation, offering him “a beautiful compensation for the strain 
[Anstrengung] which he imposed on himself,” and crowning, confirming and recording 
for history his long, diverse, often little-known activities, work, services and 
achievements in each of these realms, including German foreign policy, especially the 
cause of trans-Atlantic cooperation/relations.326   
However, beyond merely personal gratification, a pleased Birrenbach also saw the 
various Atlanticist retrospectives in which he and others engaged as an important factor 
in the struggle to secure the future of Atlanticism.  Whatever their form, such 
retrospectives provided in their accounts of contemporary modern (postwar) history key 
Atlanticist political perspectives, themes (e.g. German-American relations), analyses, 
lessons and recommendations hopefully of some influe ce on contemporary politicians, 
issues and policy.327  At the same time, they offered deserved recognition to the political 
                                                
324 KB to Bowie, 18 July 1977.  Birrenbach also believed that it was appropriate in German foreign policy 
to adhere to the old Prussian saying “mehr zu sein als zu scheinen.” (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen- 
Straße, to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübbe, Birchli, Haus Claudia, Switzerland, Einsiedeln, 23 April 1981, 
K032/1). 
325 Birrenbach claimed that he had been overwhelmed with several hundred letters, telegrams and birthday 
gifts in July 1972 and for his 70th birthday (between 400 and 500 letters in July 1972).  For his 75th 
birthday, Birrenbach received an astonishing flood f high quality letters and gifts. 
326 For the “beautiful compensation,” see KB to Trebesch, 4 July 1979. 
327 This was the case for instance with Meinen Sondermissionen i  which Birrenbach detailed Western 
attitudes at the time regarding the Brandt Os politik and Western détente as a whole (not only the 
distressingly positive but also the criticisms that d been leveled by prominent American personalities like 
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giants of the Atlanticist movement, including Birrenbach’s foreign contacts like Monnet 
and McCloy, recording and highlighting their ideas, ctivities, careers and achievements 
(including with respect to the FRG).328  As a man always conscious of the judgment of 
posterity, Birrenbach welcomed the opportunity to enhance his own stature in its eyes.  
However, as Birrenbach was well aware, the Atlanticist-minded retrospectives in which 
he and others engaged were of very real current and future importance in so far as they 
functioned in a larger sense to preserve the Atlanticist perspective, experience and 
memory.329  Despite such efforts, yet in line with his generally gloomy tone in these 
years, Birrenbach ultimately feared that the Atlanticis s were fundamentally losing the 
battle for public opinion in both Europe and the United States.330   
E. Conclusion 
By the late 1970s, as Birrenbach entered a new phase of his life and career,  
German Atlanticism had achieved status as a mature establishment phenomenon.  In 
contrast to earlier periods, very little was undertaken with respect to the construction of 
new institutions, though the existing infrastructure continued to play a significant role, for 
instance in expanding the geographic extent of the Atlanticist network to include 
American personalities from beyond the traditional E st coast and in mediating a process 
                                                                                                                                      
McCloy, Acheson and I think Kissinger) and sought to call the attention of the US administration to its 
policy vis-à-vis Israel. 
328 For instance, Birrenbach’s own retrospective works bring out his impressions during his diplomatic 
missions to the US. 
329 For Birrenbach being very conscious of the need to keep alive the memory of the great Atlanticists in 
the countries of the Atlantic Community, see KB to Mrs. Herter, 1 June 1967. 
330 In later years, Birrenbach was concerned about the stat  of European public opinion with respect to 
Europe.  As of March 1985, Birrenbach complained that feelings pressing from the population were hardly 
discernible with respect to European union.  As of October 1980, Birrenbach complained that the citizens 
of the US and Europe mistakenly believed that each continent could live its own life and were no longer 
accustomed to think in global terms.  In later years, Birrenbach believed that the US population was still 
not ready to see the realities of the changed world (e.g. isolationist tendencies).  Birrenbach was pleased to 
note certain favorable signs in public opinion, as in March 1978 when he believed that the penetration of 
the Horn of Africa had made the US public opinion “more alert [hellhöriger]” than even months ago. 
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of generational succession.  Each of the governing coalitions during this period, both 
Social-Liberal and Christian-Liberal, firmly espoused the Atlanticist concept.  Though 
considerable opposition still existed in the Federal Republic, it was largely centered on 
extra-governmental left-wing politicians and movements.  As personified by Birrenbach, 
a certain amount of tension also existed within German Atlanticism, not only with respect 
to issues like the proper posture towards Israel, but also regarding the correct approach to 
interacting with the USSR in a period of rather shaky détente, tensions reflected in 
serious fractures in the German Atlanticist network.  On the international level, German 
Atlanticism continued its process of globalization, now accelerated due to the increasing 
vulnerability of energy sources and raw materials and the expanding, apparently 
worldwide, threat posed by the Soviet Union.  Particularly disturbing was the condition 
of the United States, which appeared to be in a state of systemic dysfunction and relative 
decline.  Having achieved a mature establishment posi ion, German Atlanticism also 
evolved in the manner in which it presented itself to a larger public, now placing a greater 
stress on a retrospective outlook that celebrated th  history and past achievements of its 
crucial personalities and institutions.   
On a personal level, Birrenbach’s final years were difficult ones.  Like many 
elderly, he experienced increasing isolation as thoe with whom he had emotional links 
passed away, remarking “[this] happens to me about every week.  My contemporaries 
[Altersgenossen] die, and that is naturally painful and slowly makes one lonely.”331  
Developments in his own family contributed to his hardships.  From 1979 on, 
Birrenbach’s wife was incapacitated with a permanent illness, and as of 1984 he had been 
                                                
331 KB to Balbine von Deist, 25 April 1979.  As of Christmas 1978, Birrenbach’s parents were also dead.   
 682
estranged for some time from his son, Thomas, who was living in the United States.332  
Despite his myriad efforts (e.g. medication, drugs, pills, operations), Birrenbach was 
almost ceaselessly tormented by a variety of often lengthy illnesses and ailments, 
requiring him to spend extensive time, sometimes months, in hospitals, clinics and the 
like.333  More so than before, such health issues, particularly heart problems, considerably 
                                                
332 Birrenbach’s wife required personnel to provide her with constant care at home outside Düsseldorf, 
though she was sometimes admitted to the hospital.  This was yet another thing that connected Birrenbach 
with McCloy, whose wife was also seriously ill (completely incapacitated) in later years (empathy).  Ida 
could no longer travel with him (e.g. to the US or p tentially Russia).  Birrenbach could not attend the 1982 
KWC in London (Cambridge?) due to his wife’s health.  While Birrenbach could not really be considered a 
family man, family does seem to have mattered to him at least in the abstract. 
333 As of January 1982, he had still not entirely overcome (still in the middle of) his severe illness, but he 
still wanted to briefly answer Wätjen’s card. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Eduard Wätjen, 
Ascona, Switzerland, 15 January 1982, K033/2).  In the last year, Birrenbach could not take part in the 
function (German-English Gespräch) since he was in the hospital.  Birrenbach had had repeated health 
problems, however could always solve them. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Sir Siegmund 
Warburg, London, 24 September 1982, K068/2).  Birrenbach could not accept Kollek’s invitation to his 
speech in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt and his dinner invitation.  Birrenbach had had to undergo an 
operation whose consequences he had still not overcme (cancer [Karzinom]; something to do with a 
cardiologist). (KB to Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, 25 November 1985, K094/1).  Birrenbach (in May 
or June?) had been in the hospital because he had caught a virus infection during his vacation in Spain, so 
he had to undergo special treatment. (KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, Brandeis University, Rosenstiel Basic 
Medical Sciences Research Center, 6 July 1978, ACDP K092/2).  Birrenbach had had the bad luck for 
several weeks to have had to stay in the hospital due to a severe pneumonia.  Three weeks later, he had to 
have a second stay. (KB to Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, London, 1 August 1979, K034/3).  Birrenbach had 
not been able to take part in the last meeting of the MPG since he lay in the hospital. (KB to Prof. Dr Ralf 
Dahrendorf, London, 1 August 1979, K034/3).  As of 9 July 1984, Birrenbach had switched over from the 
clinic in Düsseldorf to the medical clinic in Freiburg.  In Düsseldorf, the feverish virus Birrenbach had had 
since months had not been discovered.  Only today, from Freiburg, did Birrenbach come to it to answer 
letters.  He did this by dictating the letter through the phone to his office in Düsseldorf. (KB, currently in 
Freiburg in the hospital, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Helmut Schmidt, MdB, Bonn, 25 July 
1984, K033/3).  A prominent Israeli had recommended to Birrenbach that he travel to Israel (at least in 
part) to talk to Weizman and Ehrlich.  Birrenbach had not done it because he had not felt well (I believ  
this had been within the past few months). (KB to Pr f. E. Rostow, Yale University, 4 October 1978, 
K092/2).  Birrenbach had invited Haig to speak in Bonn before the DGAP but Birrenbach had been in the 
hospital and could not chair the meeting. (KB to Prf. E. Rostow, Yale University, 4 October 1978, 
K092/2).  Birrenbach had presented his ideas to Kohl fr m his hospital bed.  Birrenbach was recovering 
from his illness [Erkrankung]. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, 28 June 1984, 
K029/2).  Birrenbach had written his letter of 28 June to Kohl from the hospital. (KB, August-Thyssen- 
Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, confidential, 10 September 1984, K029/2).  Birrenbach was not 
doing well since many weeks.  Birrenbach was now the second time in the hospital.  In recent days, he had 
had to undergo difficult procedures/operations in the hospital.  Since eight weeks, he had had a daily38 
degree fever and in these 2 months had lost over 8 kilo.  It was a matter of a to now unidentified virus.  
Nevertheless, Birrenbach continued to work large parts of the day. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, 
Düsseldorf, to Gottfried Spannagel, Buenos Aires, 22 June 1984, K031/1).  Birrenbach had been in the 
hospital for many weeks and had left it uncured three days ago.  This had made it impossible to give Rose 
his comment about Rose’s book.  Birrenbach was suffering from a feverish virus that could not be 
diagnosed.  His physical state was weak after these difficult weeks.  He planned to possibly visit the Mayo 
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hindered Birrenbach in certain activities, especially travel, including in so far as it made it 
inadvisable or even impossible for him to fly or to s ay in extreme climates.334  Therefore, 
despite his expressed desires, Birrenbach made his last “working” visit to the US in 
October 1983 and his final trip overall, a one-month stay at the Mayo Clinic (Rochester), 
in March 1985.335  Birrenbach’s always fragile health declined particularly rapidly from 
1984 on, and by the start of 1986 he lay in the hospital, his serious illnesses including 
                                                                                                                                      
Clinic in the US if nobody in the Federal Republic could find the cause of his illness.  Birrenbach had read 
Rose’s book Contre la stratégie des Curiaces in the hospital together with Rose’s article in the Fall 1982 
issue of Foreign Affairs, “Inflexible Response.”  Birrenbach limited himself to a few remarks because the 
state of his health was so bad that he could not go into more details.  As soon as he regained his health, he 
would discuss in detail with Rose the second part of Rose’s book.  Birrenbach had to visit the hospital 
again, this time in Freiburg, because the state of his fever could not be maintained for a longer time. (KB, 
August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 9 July 1984, K074/1).  Due to 
his hospitalization and following vacations, Birrenbach had not been able to answer Marjolin’s letter in 
concrete terms. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), President, to 
Robert Marjolin, Université de Droit, d’Économie et des Sciences Sociales de Paris, Paris, 14 September 
1977, K074/1).  Birrenbach got ill in July and was in the hospital more than two months.  He had a back 
operation and was still not a hundred percent well because he suffered from constant pain and almost 
complete sleeplessness.  Nevertheless, he worked as hard as in earlier times. (KB to Bowie, Deputy to the
Director, National Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, DC, 21 November 1978, K098/2).  Birrenbach 
could not attend the Tokyo meeting of the Trilateral Commission because he had been in the hospital at hat 
time. (KB to Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2).  For Bi renbach not being able to carry out himself the 
introduction to Haig’s Vortrag in the DGAP since he was in the hospital (sick), see KB to Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, 15 November 1978, ACDP K033/3.  
334 Birrenbach was exhausted after his illness and would therefore answer Smith regarding the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy in the next letter. (KB to Gerard Smith, Amb. at Large, State Dept., 8 June 1979, 
K098/2).  Birrenbach had had to postpone his America trip (originally set for 16 June) by three weeks (i.e. 
6 July) because of a torn muscle.  Therefore, he had been unable to see on the current trip several of the 
personalities addressed by him. (KB to Schmidt, 17 July 1980, K134/1).  Last year, Birrenbach had been 
asked by a prominent Israeli personality to go to Israel and speak with Weizman and Ehrlich.  A week later 
Birrenbach had had to have a back operation that made him stay in the hospital for 2.5 months.  Then it had 
been too late to make this attempt, doubtful as it had been. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2).  
Birrenbach had gotten a fever to his laryngitis, which made it impossible for him to dictate his proposed 
answer to Hengsbach in time.  Birrenbach had still not overcome this condition and therefore limited 
himself to a short commentary to preserve his voice. (KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May
1981, K112/2).  Such difficulties in flying also included to the US, requiring Birrenbach to call off US trips 
on certain occasions.  Ill health played a role in Birrenbach’s canceling his trip to the IMEMO institu e.  
Moscow winters would have been unreasonably cold for Birrenbach.  As of March 1982, Birrenbach hoped 
to be able to take part in the conference in the US at the end of April 1982.  Birrenbach could not chair the 
DGAP speech meeting in September 1978 because he was in the hospital.  
335 As of March 1985, having been ill for several months and with hospital/doctor treatments in the FRG 
proving ineffectual, Birrenbach admitted to McCloy that he was a “wreck.” (KB to McCloy, 5 March 
1985).  In June 1985, Trebesch remarked that Birrenbach had become “thin and pale.” (Trebesch to KB, 29 
June 1985).  This trip to the Mayo Clinic was a desperate and relatively fruitless effort to cure his in omnia.  
In defense of the Mayo Clinic, Birrenbach left prematurely after one month to be present at an important 
FTS conference.  McCloy had proposed and arranged Birrenbach’s visit to the Mayo Clinic.  Birrenbach 
does not appear to have dealt with his contacts on his March 1985 trip. 
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cerebral sclerosis and acute diabetes.336  Even then, Birrenbach proudly flaunted his 
defiant contempt for his own well-being and worked as best he could from his sickbed 
well into 1986.337  This overwrought activity exhibited not only a sen  of duty, an 
inability to bid farewell to defining aspects of his l fe, and an element of escapism from 
the travails of this period, but also persistent traits of a disturbing pathological 
obsession.338  Birrenbach finally passed away in 1987.339
                                                
336 This cerebral sclerosis included bouts of dizziness.  Birrenbach’s diabetes mellitus required insulin.  As 
of June 1987, Birrenbach was in particularly bad healt  and spent his 80th birthday in the hospital. 
337 As of November 1977, Birrenbach was concerned withMcCloy’s health and wanted him to put an end 
to the enormous stress involved in his professional a d political life and live a calmer life.  In this, 
Birrenbach ignored the advice, and sometimes unfortunate examples, of his friends and others and also 
refused to heed his own advice to them. 
338 As evidence of compulsion, Birrenbach was conscious t  some extent of the correctness of the advice of 
others/friends to devote himself more to relaxation.  With respect to his increasing loneliness, Birrenbach 
remarked, “[b]ut with work much is surmountable.” (KB to Balbine von Deist, 25 April 1979).  For 
continued activity as an “obligation [Verpflichtung],” see KB to Dr. Alois Mertes, MdB, 10 July 1981.  As 
Birrenbach put it, “[y]ou see that I have still not withdrawn to the Altenteil [i.e. from public life].  I would 
not even know where that would be by me.” (KB to Kohl and Zimmermann, 5 July 1979).  As was his 
wont, Birrenbach continued to write from vacation and the hospital.  For instance, Birrenbach 
acknowledged that “77 is not 55.” (KB to Bowie, 14 January 1985).  As of 30 August 1978, Birrenbach 
admitted that “[t]his time it has certainly gotten me badly [allerdings schwer gepackt].  I will not overcome 
this thing so quickly and I must draw from it certain consequences regarding the reduction of my work.  I 
begin to realize that slowly.” (KB to Rapacki, 30 August 1978).  As of October 1980, Birrenbach had an 
invitation of the IMEMO institute in Moscow for the start of April 1981.  Birrenbach had had to already put 
off this invitation three times, one time because he had prepared so much for it that he got heart troubles 
and the second and third time in that year because it did not appear to him to be feasible [tunlich] to accept 
this invitation (as FRG) in view of the international situation.  As of October 1980, however, he had, also 
with the German ambassador over there, agreed to accept the invitation for April 1981.  That would 
presuppose certainly again two months work/preparations, especially as these special discussions would be 
connected with Vorträgen that needed to be worked out on the basis of an exct knowledge of the material. 
(KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chair of the CDU-Deutschland, Chair 
of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 20 October 1980, K032/1).  In January 1982, Birrenbach 
remarked that in the past year he had had to cancel three times a Vortrag for a conference in Moscow, the 
first time since he had so strained his heart with the preparations for this conference that he could not 
embark on the trip, the second time because of Afghanistan and the third time because of laryngitis, which 
he had contracted on the flight from Washington (DC) to Düsseldorf. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, 
Düsseldorf, to Eduard Wätjen, Ascona, Switzerland, 15 January 1982, K033/2).  Four years ago, 
Birrenbach had been invited by the then-president of the IMEMO institute to Moscow.  He had had to 
cancel, since he had prepared so intensively that he had ended up in the intensive care unit in Lübeck.  The 
first invitation was for October 1980.  The invitaton was then for April 1981 renewed, but then it came 
unfortunately to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Birrenbach therefore had to cancel with the pretext of 
still being further sick.  He was invited for a third time for February 1982.  He had been beforehand in the 
United States and had had numerous discussions and conferences there and got laryngitis on the return 
flight, which continued over months and was even now still not entirely gone.  Unable even to speak, he 
canceled for a third time.  Birrenbach understood that he was not invited again. (KB, August-Thyssen- 
Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Jörg Kastl, FRG Embassy, Moscow, c/o AA, Bonn, 8 February 1984, K030/2).  
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Birrenbach could not attend the meeting of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Brussels 
because after several stays in the hospital, he took his vacation on 28 August to be able to follow a personal 
invitation of the IMEMO institute in Moscow on 1 October. (KB to Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2).  On
5 April, Birrenbach would fly for ten days to Moscow where he would now follow the third invitation of 
the IMEMO institute. (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2).  Birrenbach 
had been invited by the president of the IMEMO institute in Moscow to visit the USSR from 30 
September-11 October.  Birrenbach informed himself about all the possible subjects of discussion. (KB to 
McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2).  As Birrenbach remarked, “you can no longer change the man [den 
Menschen] in my age.” (KB to Dr. Bruno Heck, Chairman of the KAS eV, 4 July 1979).  Birrenbach 
claimed to feel obligated to act for “reasons of conscience.” (KB to Kohl, 31 January 1983).  Birrenbach 
had a perverse compulsion. 
339 Birrenbach’s death triggered a number of laudatory newspaper articles on his career.  There was a 
Nachruf for Birrenbach entitled “Dr. Kurt Birrenbach zum Gedenken,” (Deutschland-Berichte, edited by 
Rolf Vogel, Nr. 9, September 1989).  Birrenbach was survived by his wife. 
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Chapter 10: Overall Assessment and Conclusion 
During the post-1945 period, German Atlanticism evolved from an “outsider” 
perspective into an establishment ideology.  This transformation encompassed 
organizational forms, financing methods, network construction, public relations activities, 
thematic and geographic scope, the breadth of ambitions entertained as well as the 
specific policies advocated.  The life of Kurt Birrenbach offers a revealing window into 
this German Atlanticist milieu.  Following exile in Argentina during and after World War 
II, Birrenbach returned to a Federal Republic that in the 1950s was still under the 
widespread influence of a religiously rooted Conservative Occidentalism that persisted 
from the prewar era and, embodied in the political re m by Adenauer himself, fostered a 
profound suspicion of the Anglo-Saxon powers (the US and Britain) and influences.  
Representing a hybrid figure typical of the United States but still rather novel in 
Germany, Birrenbach almost immediately set about constructing what he cherished as a 
position of considerable personal independence and ultimately a career which 
simultaneously spanned the fields of politics (CDU MdB), business (the Thyssen firm), 
and philanthropic foundations (Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung).  While the apparently existential 
Soviet threat and the desire for German reunification were the central factors, it was also 
not least due to his pre-war activity in international trade and finance, his perspective-
broadening exile and his position with Thyssen, one f those many German firms now 
reliant on access to world markets and later to plentiful (nuclear) energy, that Birrenbach 
became probably “the key man” in the world of German Atlanticism during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, an insider engaged in virtually al its wide-ranging activities and 
projects. 
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In response to the daunting challenges of the 1950s and 60s, Birrenbach and his 
fellow German Atlanticists, along with counterparts abroad, actively constructed and 
participated in a private German and international i frastructure.  This interlocking 
system of action committees (e.g. Monnet Committee), conferences (e.g. Atlantik-Brücke 
and Königswinter) and research institutes (e.g. DGAP, tlantic Institute, SWP) was 
characterized by personnel overlap, mutual learning and functional support, and a 
sensitivity in form and content to larger developments in international relations.  Given 
the diverse nature of his career and in his capacity s one of those gatekeepers controlling 
entry, Birrenbach was well suited to promote the fundamental principle of integration, a 
novel and important concept in the young FRG, as the e institutions brought together 
Atlanticist-minded personalities from a variety of major professions, political parties, 
economic interests and geographical locations, the latt r particularly significant for a 
country lacking a true capital.  The wide geographic spread of these institutions, both at 
home (e.g. Bonn, Hamburg, Munich) and abroad (e.g. Paris), can be attributed to a 
number of factors, among them the desire to shape their relationships to governments and 
international organizations.  Obstacles which had to be overcome included hostile 
attitudes in the FRG to the Wissenschaft-Politik nexus, a linkage that also generated 
tension internally between the quest for objectivity and Atlanticist propaganda goals, as 
well as various bureaucratic and financial hurdles erected by the government.  All this 
represented a conscious process of Americanization of the instruments and practices of 
German Atlanticism.  The upshot was a diverse infrastructure providing an institutional 
framework in which Birrenbach and other like-minded in ividuals could effectively 
cooperate in promoting the Atlanticist cause, not least by influencing government policy. 
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As a crucial figure in securing the necessary financing in the Federal Republic to 
sustain this Atlanticist infrastructure, Birrenbach found himself at the center of a system 
that tapped a number of sources, including at leastlements of the federal government, 
political parties, labor unions and especially the Atlanticist-minded Wirtschaft (including 
the BDI and other major economic organizations and l rge business firms like Thyssen; 
links to Rhenish heavy industry).  With respect to the latter, the German Atlanticists, 
aided by a Cold War stress on Wissenschaft, played a crucial role in promoting the 
previously stymied emergence and development in Germany of a network of large private 
philanthropic Stiftungen.  Here, Birrenbach was central in the founding of the Fritz-
Thyssen-Stiftung (1959), a milestone soon followed by the establishment of other private 
foundations along American lines.  Though dwarfed by the American giants, German 
foundations like Thyssen, which Birrenbach chaired f om 1965 on, proved effective in 
financing myriad components of the Atlanticist infrastructure.  Meanwhile, Birrenbach 
and Atlanticist-minded personalities like John McCloy (US) and Giovanni Agnelli (Italy) 
successfully promoted the international integration of the foundation systems, including 
that existing in the FRG.  While financial clout (not just a knowledge of Atlantic matters) 
was a considerable source of Birrenbach’s personal influence on Atlanticist activities, 
such financial muscle, epitomized by a powerhouse like the Ford Foundation, proved in a 
broader sense to be an even more significant element of American power, including in 
relation to the Germans, within the Atlanticist context.  Though essentially effective, the 
nature of Atlanticist financing at least potentially set the outer parameters of activity (e.g. 
pro-business) and at times explicitly raised the qustion (tension) of external influence 
(e.g. by governments) on ostensibly independent insti utions.   
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The Atlanticist infrastructure, along with technological advances in transportation 
and communications, enabled Birrenbach (and other German Atlanticists) to avoid a 
potentially suffocating isolation by constructing and maintaining a broad trans-Atlantic 
network of prominent personal contacts, the two key individuals being McCloy and Jean 
Monnet.  Such evolving transnational Atlanticist neworks represented a structural 
change in international relations, considerably expanding the external channels of 
consultation constantly available to non-governmental figures in the trans-Atlantic area.  
These contacts were a central element in Birrenbach’s political activities, whether trips 
and Sondermissionen abroad, parliamentary efforts or advising Chancellors Erhard and 
Kiesinger.  Indeed, many episodes from this period can only be properly understood by 
delving below the level of traditional great power politics and diplomacy and exploring 
the activities of this network (e.g. Franco-German Treaty of 1963, MLF).  While 
Birrenbach exploited the very real possibilities vi-à-vis the US (and West Europe), the 
impact, largely reflecting America’s dominant international role, was actually far greater 
on the FRG.  This network proved essential in transmitting Atlanticist thought to 
Birrenbach and other Germans, including the ambitious American project of a close, 
cooperative Atlantic Community and a broad, institutionalized (integrated) Atlantic 
Partnership “among equals” between the US and an eco omically and politically united 
western Europe.  It also played a primary role in increasing the independence and 
influence of the Bundestag, including that of Birrenbach as his Fraktion’s Atlantic affairs 
expert, thus ushering in the end of Adenauer’s Kanzlerdemokratie.  On balance, 
Birrenbach and his network functioned as a crucial ch nnel of foreign, primarily 
American, influence into the Federal Republic and its policymaking process.   
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While active at the level of small elite groups, Birrenbach and the German 
Atlanticists, existing in a democratic environment, also functioned in a broader, perhaps 
newer, dimension in aiming to sway a wide variety of d mestic and foreign publics 
(including in the US).  Such propaganda consisted of copious speeches, publications and 
interviews, with Birrenbach’s book Die Zukunft der atlantischen Gemeinschaft (1962) his 
signature contribution, as well as the founding of a number of intellectual journals that 
served as outlets for scholarly research.  Attempts were made to cultivate figures from the 
media world (e.g. journalists, publishers, editors), and German Atlanticism benefited 
considerably from such allies at home (e.g. Springe, Dönhoff) and abroad (e.g. Praeger).  
During the mid-1960s, Birrenbach also took part in several one-time public relations 
actions directed at least in part at Americans, including the Atlantik-Brücke’s open letter 
in US newspapers (1963), fundraising for the Kennedy Memorial Library (1965) and 
chairing the board of trustees of the Twenty Years Marshall Plan (1967).  In some cases, 
German Atlanticist propaganda specifically addressed key audiences, notably US soldiers 
and their dependents in the FRG as well as American Jews, part of larger efforts to 
nurture links with this influential minority.  Though the plight of Berlin was utilized to 
arouse sympathy for the FRG among foreigners, the German Atlanticists also confronted 
imposing obstacles here, including vivid memories of the National Socialist past.  
Whatever the difficulties, the ability of Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists to 
establish such elaborate infrastructure, financing, networks and public relations actions, 
far more effective than anything created by their opponents, ultimately played a vital role 
in enabling them to supplant German Occidentalism (and Gaullism) in the political realm, 
a process manifested dramatically in Erhard’s replacement of Adenauer as Chancellor. 
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However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, other callenges were emerging.  In 
the Federal Republic, a new threat appeared, this time from a Left that ironically 
embraced tenets of Abendland, including an intense suspicion of America.  This 
movement’s composition impressed upon Birrenbach and other Atlanticists (themselves 
the earlier beneficiaries of generational change) th  need for measures to counter 
generational and demographic trends (also in the US) and to ensure that younger leaders 
replenished the network.  The internal world of Atlan icism had often been contentious, 
as reflected in disputes engaged in during the 1960s by German Atlanticists among 
themselves or with foreign counterparts (e.g. MLF, EEC expansion and majority voting, 
Atlantic Federal Union).  Now, fresh tensions fissured the network as German 
Atlanticism, often prodded by the Americans, expanded thematically and geographically 
to address an altered world.  New partners were identified, including the USSR, in the 
context of détente, and Japan, necessary to tackle recent trans-Atlantic economic and 
financial issues and integrated into the network by the founding of institutions like the 
Trilateral Commission.  Meanwhile, the Marshall Fund funded Atlanticist projects in 
myriad hitherto unexplored fields (e.g. criminology).  Even when approving and involved 
in principle, a hawkish Birrenbach saw this wider focus as corrosive of a special US-
European relationship centered on crucial themes lik  security.  Ultimately, Birrenbach’s 
links with certain German Atlanticists were damaged by divergent views on the post-
1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and, more seriously, theOstpolitik initiated by the Brandt 
government.  Birrenbach was also troubled by a US inadequately pursuing the arms race 
and simultaneously wracked by isolationism, foreign adventurism (Vietnam), economic 
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ills, and racial and student unrest.  Finally, France, long after de Gaulle’s fall, and Britain, 
even after entering Europe, continued to stress sovereignty rather than integration.   
 Despite such difficulties, as of the late 1970s and 80s, Liberal Atlanticism 
remained a dominant establishment ideology in the Federal Republic.  In these years, its 
adherents largely repulsed a revived challenge fromthe Left, international in character 
and supported in some respects by the churches, that took the form of mass pacifist, 
environmental and trade union movements, party left-wings and acts of terrorism.  
Though Birrenbach himself sensed a certain allure of the East, he was alarmed by the 
USSR’s development into a world power threatening access to energy and other 
resources around the globe.  While this danger render d the United States more crucial 
than ever, Birrenbach not only found himself openly at odds with particular American 
policies (e.g. nuclear energy, Osthandel) but also judged the US with growing skepticism 
as a nation afflicted by dire systemic flaws (e.g. geographic/demographic change) and in 
the throes of a broad relative decline.  Still entertaining ideas of Atlantic Community and 
Partnership, he despaired about the prospects of actually realizing these revered 
blueprints and wallowed in a related cultural pessimi m.  While the Atlanticist 
infrastructure continued to function, persistent economic recession, impacting also the 
German steel industry, exposed the vulnerability of its inancing.  All this suggested a 
still-ascendant German Atlanticism, but one chastened by the events of the previous two 
decades, focused less on integrationist ambitions and more on practical trans-Atlantic 
coordination.  Even after leaving the Bundestag, Birrenbach remained engaged in the 
Atlanticist world, now also partaking in a number of retrospective projects serving to 
buttress the dominant position of Atlanticism.  Gradu lly, if not always willingly, 
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Birrenbach did reduce his role, his superseding by younger men a testament to successful 
generational transition and the continued vitality of the Atlanticist phenomenon. 
The life of Kurt Birrenbach thus provides a unique window into the evolution of 
postwar German Atlanticism.  The key trajectory of that evolution was the development 
of Liberal Atlanticism into a dominant establishment worldview, one featuring its own 
institutions, financing methods, multi-layered inter ational networks, overarching 
projects, and public relations techniques.  Over time, this ideology broadened its 
geographic perspective to include in one way or another Russia, Japan, the Middle East, 
indeed much of the globe in its area of interest, and its thematic purview to comprise not 
just security, politics, economics and finance, but also softer issues like energy, urban 
planning and environmentalism.  All this represented a thickening of German Atlanticism 
in the post-1945 era, built on but far more extensive than anything found in trans-Atlantic 
relations during the interwar period.  Whatever challenges it still faced, a somewhat 
sobered, perhaps more realistic, Liberal Atlanticism had by the mid-1980s succeeded, in 
part due to its relative effectiveness in the aforementioned activities, in supplanting the 
older Conservative Occidentalist vision of Abendland and in fending off the Left-wing 
movement that had first emerged in the late-1960s.  For all the fascination with the 
Birrenbach mystique, this process was characterized ev n more by the exercise of 
American power and influence, facilitated by personalities in the FRG.  These crucial 
allies consisted of parliamentarians, financiers, scholars, scientists, journalists and, as 
Birrenbach’s story underscores, businessmen, including at least parts of Rhenish heavy 
industry that, in contrast to the interwar years, now promoted and shaped an Atlanticist 
(internationalist) outlook.  Often conducted below but also impacting on the level of high 
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politics, the efforts of such figures, members of a newly created multi-national Atlanticist 
elite, are central to understanding change in postwar Germany and the firm integration of 
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